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her sense that it was important to bring together the "best" of this documentary material
in a widely accessible form. The several volumes of this collection, and any long-term value
it may have, are the result of that vision. Once Dr. Kraemer left her position as NASA Chief
Historian in 1990 to assume broader responsibilities within the agency, the project was
guided with a gentle but firm hand by her successor, Roger D. Launius. His contributions
have been so substantial that he fully deserves being listed as one of the primary collabo-
rators on this volume.
Jannelle Warren-Findley, an independent intellectual/cultural historian, and Linda J.
Lear, an adjunct professor of environmental history at George Washington University,
approached the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University's Elliott School of
International Affairs with the suggestion that it might serve as the institutional base for a
proposal to NASA to undertake the documentary history project. This suggestion found
a positive response. The Space Policy Institute was created in 1987 as a center of scholar-
ly research and graduate education regarding space issues--and as a resource for those
interested in a knowledgeable but independent perspective on past and current space
activities. Having the kind of historical base that would have to be created to carry out the
documentary history project would certainly enhance the Space Policy Institute's capa-
bilities, and so the Director of the Institute,John M. Logsdon,joined with Warren-Findley,
Lear, and Ray A. Williamson of the congressional Office of Technology Assessment in
preparing a proposal to NASA. Much to our delight, we were awarded the contract for the
project in late 1988, and the enterprise was officially under way in May 1989.
The undertaking proved more challenging than anyone had anticipated. The combina-
tion of getting ourselves started in the right direction, canvassing and selecting from the
immense documentary resources available, commissioning essays to introduce the various
sections of the work from external authors and writing several essays ourselves, and deal-
ing with conflicting demands on the time of the four principals in the project has led to
a delay in publishing the initial volume far beyond what we anticipated when first under-
taking the project. The final pieces of the manuscript for Volume I were not delivered to
NASA until the end of 1993, and the published volume itself did not appear until late
1995. By that time, both Jannelle Warren-Findley and Linda Lear had long ago moved on
to the next steps in their careers, and Ray Williamson, who had taken a nine-month leave
from the Office of Technology Assessment in 1990 to work on the project, had returned
to his primary job. (However, after the Office of Technology Assessment in 1995 was
closed by congressional decision, he returned to the staffof the Space Policy Institute, and
he will be deeply involved in preparing subsequent volumes in this series.) This meant
that Warren-Findley and Lear did not have the opportunity to make the kinds of contri-
bution to the overall series that they had anticipated; nevertheless, without their initiative,
the effort would not have been located at George Washington University, and they both
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madecrucialcontributionstoconceptualizingandorganizingthe work in its early stages
and to gathering the material from which the documents to be included in the collection
have been selected. For all of that, they deserve high credit.
In its start-up phase, the project profited from the advice of a distinguished advisory panel
that met twice formally; members of the panel were always available for individual con-
sultation. Included on this panel were: Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., Case Western University
(chair); Charlene Bickford, First Congress Project; Herbert Friedman, Naval Research
Laboratory; Richard P. Hallion, Air Force Historian; John Hodge, NASA (retired); Sally
Gregory Kohlstedt, University of Minnesota; W. Henry Lambright, Syracuse University;
Sharon Thibodeau, Nadonal Archives and Records Administration; and John Townsend,
NASA (retired). Certainly, none of these individuals bear responsibility for the final con-
tent or style of this series, but their advice along the way was invaluable.
We owe thanks to the individuals and organizations that have searched their files for
potentially useful materials, as well as to the staffs at various archives and collections who
have helped us locate documents. Without question, first among them is Lee D. Saegesser
of the History Office at NASA Headquarters, who has helped compile the NASA Historical
Reference Collection that contains many of the documents selected for inclusion in this
work. All those who in the future will write on the history of the U.S. space program will
owe a debt of thanks to Lee; those who have already worked in this area realize his tireless
contributions.
Among those who have been particularly helpful in identifying documents for inclusion
in this volume are: Lorenza Sebesta, European Space Agency History Project, European
University Institute; R. Cargill Hall, Air Force History Office; Mark Erikson, Air Force
Academy; Roy Houchin, Air Staff History Office; and Bill Burr, National Security Archive.
L. Parker Temple III and Charles Cook deserve particular thanks for their work on an ear-
lier overview of civil-military relations that served as a basis for the essay by Dwayne A. Day
that appears in this volume.
Essential to the project was a system for archiving the documents collected. Charlene
Bickford, on the basis of her experience with the First Congress Project, advised on our
approach to archiving and to developing document headnotes. The archiving system was
developed by graduate student John Morris, who also assisted with initial document col-
lection. The documentary archive has been nurtured with fervor by Space Policy Institute
research associate Dwayne Day; Dwayne has made many major contributions to all aspects
of the project, including the essay on NAsA-Department of Defense relations in this vol-
ume. Other students who worked on the project in its early years include Max Nelson,
Jordan Katz, Stewart Money, Michelle Heskett, Robin Auger, and Heather Young. All were
a great help.
Beginning with Linda Lear, a series of individuals struggled to bring editorial consistency
to the essays and headnotes introducing the documents included in Volume I, thereby set-
ting the standard for that and subsequent volumes. They included Erica Aungst, Kathie
Pett Keel, and Kimberly Carter. Their contributions were essential to the lasting quality of
the end product. Alita Black also helped set up the initial indexing system.
John M. Logsdon, George Washington University
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TherearenumerouspeopleatNASAassociatedwithhistoricalstudy,technicalinforma-
tion,andthemechanicsof publishingwhohelpedinmyriadwaysin thepreparationof
thisdocumentaryhistory.J.D.Hunley,oftheNASAHistoryOffice,editedandcritiqued
thetextbeforehedepartedto takeovertheHistoryProgramattheDrydenFlight
ResearchCenter;his replacement,StephenJ. Garber,preparedthe biographical
appendixandhelpedin thefinalproofingof thework.NadineAndreassenof the
NASAHistoryOfficeperformededitorialandproofreadingworkontheproject;thestaffs
of theNASAHeadquartersLibrary,theScientificandTechnicalInformationProgram,
andtheNASADocumentServicesCenterprovidedassistancein locatingandpreparing
for publicationthe documentarymaterialsin thiswork.TheNASAHeadquarters
CommunicationsManagementDivision,undertheleadershipofY.DianePowell,devel-
opedthelayoutandhandledprinting.Specifically,wewishtoacknowledgeth workof
JaneE.Penn,PauiciaLutkenhouseTalbert,JonathanL.Friedman,andKellyL.Rindfusz
fortheirdesignandeditorialwork.Inaddition,MichaelCrnkovicandCraigA.Larsensaw
thebookthroughthepublicationprocess.Thanksareduetoallofthem.
RogerD.Launius,NASA
xxiii

Introduction
One of the most important developments of the twentieth century has been the move-
merit of humanity into space with machines and people. The underpinnings of that move-
ment--why it took the shape it did; which individuals and organizations were invoh,ed;
what factors drove a particular choice of scientific objectives and technologies to be used;
and the political, economic, managerial, and international contexts in which the events
of the space age unfolded--are all important ingredients of this epoch transition fi-om an
Earth-bound to a spacefaring people. The desire to understand the development of space-
flight in the United States sparked this documentary history series.
The extension of human activity into outer space has been accompanied by a high degree
of self-awareness of its historical significance. Few large-scale activities have been as exten-
sively chronicled so closely to the time they actually occurred. Many of those who were
directly involved were quite conscious that they were making history, and they kept full
records of their activities. Because most of the activity in outer space was carried out under
government sponsorship, it was accompanied by the documentary record required of
public institutions, and there has been a spate of official and privately written histories of
most major aspects of space achievement to date. When top leaders considered what
course of action to pursue in space, their deliberations and decisions often were carefillly
put on the record. There is, accordingly, no lack of material for those who aspire to under-
stand the origins and evolution of U.S. space policies and programs.
This reality forms the rationale for this series. Precisely because there is so much histori-
cal material available on space matters, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) decided in 1988 that it would be extremely useful to have a selec-
tive collection of many of the seminal documents related to the evolution of the U.S. civil-
ian space program that was easily available to scholars and the interested public. While
recognizing that much of the space activity has taken place under the sponsorship of the
Department of Defense and other national security organizations, for the U.S. private sec-
tor, and in other countries around the world, NASA felt that there would be lasting value
in a collection of documentary material primarily focused on the evolution of the U.S.
government's civilian space program. Most of this activity has been carried out under the
NASA's auspices since its creation in 1958. As a result, the NASA History Office contract-
ed with the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University's Elliott School of
International Affairs to prepare such a collection. This is the second volume in the docu-
mentary history series; at least two additional ones detailing programmatic developments
will follow.
The documents collected during this research project were assembled from a diverse
number of both public and private sources. A major repository of primary source materi-
als relative to the history of the civilian space program is the NASA Historical Reference
Collection of the NASA History Office, located at the agency's headquarters in
Washington, D.C. Project assistants combed this collection for the "cream" of the wealth
of material housed there. Indeed, one purpose of this series from the start was to capture
some of the highlights of the holdings at headquarters. Historical materials housed at the
other NASA installations---as well as at institutions of higher learning, such as Rice
University, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University (Virginia Tech)--were also "mined" for their most significant materials. Other
collections from which documents have been drawn include the Eisenhower, Kennedy,
Johnson, and Carter Presidential Libraries; the papers of T. Keith Glennan, Thomas O.
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Paine, James c. Fletcher, George M. Low, and John A. Simpson; and the archives of the
National Academy of Sciences, the Rand Corporation, AT&T, the Communications
Satellite Corporation, INTELSAT, the Jet Propulsion I.aboratory of the California
Institute of Technology, and the National Archives and Records Administration.
Copies of more than 2,000 documents in their original form collected during this project
(not just the documents selected for inclusion), as well as a database that provides a guide
to their contents, will be deposited in the NASA Historical Reference Collection. Another
complete set of project materials is located at the Space Policy Institute at George
Washington University. These materials in their original form are available for use by
researchers seeking additional information about the evolution of the U.S. civilian space
program or wishing to consult the documents reprinted herein in their original form.
The documents selected for inclusion in this volume are presented in three chapters, each
covering a particular aspect of the evolution of U.S. space exploration. These chapters
address (1) the relations between the civilian space program of the United States and the
space activities of other countries, (2) the relations between the U.S. civilian space pro-
gram and the space efforts of national security organizations and the military, and
(3) NASA's relations with industry and academic institutions. Volume I of this series cov-
ered the antecedents to the U.S. space program, the origins and evolution of U.S. space
policy, and NASA as an organizational institution. Future w_lumes will address space sci-
ence activities, space application programs, human spaceflight, and space transportation
activities.
Each chapter in this volume is introduced by an overview essay, prepared either by a mem-
ber of the project team or by an individual particularly well-qualified to write on the topic.
In the main, these essays are intended to introduce and complement the documents in
the section and to place them in a chronological and substantive context. In certain
instances, the essays go beyond this basic goal to reinterpret specific aspects of the histo-
ry of the civilian space program and to offer historiographical commentary or inquiry
about the space program. Each essay contains references to the documents in the section
it introduces, and many also contain references to documents in other sections of the col-
lection. These introductory essays were the responsibility of their individual authors, and
the views and conclusions contained therein do not necessarily represent the opinions of
either George Washington University or NASA.
The documents appended to each chapter were chosen by the essay writer in concert with
the project team from the more than 2,000 assembled by the research staff for the overall
project. The contents of this volume emphasize primary documents or long-out-of-print
essays or articles and material from the private recollections of important actors in shap-
ing space affairs. The contents of this volume thus do not comprise in themselves a com-
prehensive historical account; they must be supplemented by other sources, those both
already available and to become available in the future. Indeed, a few of the documents
included in this collection, particularly in the chapter on civilian-military relations, are
not complete; some portions of them were still subject to security classification. As this
collection was being prepared, the U.S. government w-as involved in declassifying and
releasing to the public a number of formerly highly classified documents. As this declas-
sification process continues, increasingly more information on the early history of NASA
and the civilian space program will come to light.
The documents included in each chapter are for the most part arranged chronologically,
although some thematic organization is used when appropriate. Each document is
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assigneditsownnumberin termsofthechapterinwhichit isplaced.Asaresult,hefirst
documentin thethirdchapterofthisvolumeisdesignated"DocumentIII-l." Eachdoc-
umentisaccompaniedbyaheadnotesettingoutitscontextandprovidingabackground
narrative.Theseheadnotesalsoprovidespecificnformationabouthepeopleandevents
discussed.Wehaveavoidedtheinclusionofexplanatorynotesin thedocumentshem-
selvesandhaveconfinedsuchmaterialtotheheadnotes.
Theeditorialmethodweadoptedfordealingwiththesedocuments seeks to preserve
spelling, grammar, paragraphing, and use of language as in the original. We have some-
times changed punctuation where it enhances readability. We have used ellipses to note
sections of a document not included in this publication, and we have avoided including
words and phrases that had been deleted in the original document unless they contribute
to an understanding of what was going on in the mind of the writer in making the record.
Marginal notations on the original documents are inserted into the text of the documents
in brackets, each clearly marked as a marginal comment. When deletions to the original
document have been made in the process of declassification, we have noted this with a
parenthetical statement in brackets. Except insofar as illustrations and figures are neces-
sary to understanding the text, those items have been omitted from this printed version.
Page numbers in the original document are noted in brackets internal to the document
text. Copies of all documents in their original form, however, are available for research by
anyone interested at the NASA History Office or the Space Policy Institute of George
Washington University.
We recognize that there are significant documents left out of this compilation. No two indi-
viduals would totally agree on all documents to be included from the more than 2,000 that
we collected, and surely we have not been totally successful in locating all relevant records.
As a result, this documentary history can raise an immediate question from its users: Why
were some documents included while others of seemingly equal importance were omitted?
There can never be a fully satisfactory answer to this question. Our own criteria for choos-
ing particular documents and omitting others rested on three interrelated factors:
• Is the document the best available, most expressive, most representative reflection of
a particular event or development important to the evolution of the space program?
Is the document not easily accessible except in one or a few locations, or is it included
(for example, in published compilations of presidential statements) in reference
sources that are widely available and thus not a candidate for inclusion in this collection?
• Is the document protected by copyright, security classification, or some other form of
proprietary right and thus unavailable for publication?
As editor of this volume, I was ultimately responsible for the decisions about which docu-
ments to include and for the accuracy of the headnotes accompanying them. It has been
an occasionally frustrating but consistently exciting experience to be involved with this
undertaking. My associates and I hope that those who consult it in the future will find our
efforts worthwhile.
John M. Logsdon
Director
Space Policy Institute
Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University
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Chapter One
The Development of
International Space Cooperation
by John M. Logsdon
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, among its many provisions, indicat-
ed that NASA "under the foreign poll O, guidance of the President, may engage in a pro-
gram of international cooperation in work done pursuant to this Act, and in the peaceful
applications of the results thereof, pursuant to agreements made by the President with tile
advice and consent of the Senate."' The new space agency interpreted this provision as
giving it authority to take the initiative in international space dealings. Therefore, within
six months, NASA began to develop a program of international cooperation in space that
over the following three decades has resulted in agreements with more than 100 connnies
and in major cooperative projects with both traditional U.S. allies and the country's elst-
while competitor in space, the Soviet Union. The engagement of other countries with the
space activities of the United States has been a hallmark of the U.S. space program.
The language of the Space Act seemed to present unintentionally a formal obstacle
to NASA in taking the lead in initiating such cooperative activities. The Space Act stated
that the United States would enter into cooperative activities "pursuant to agreements
entered into by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate." This seemed to
require that the executive branch treat every cooperative space agreement as if it had the
status of an international treaty, which certainly was not the intent of the congressional
drafters of the final bill nor the desire of the White House. Thus, as he signed the docu-
ment on July 29, 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated that he regarded this sec-
tion of the Space Act "as recognizing that international treaties may [emphasis added] be
made in this field, and as not precluding, in appropriate cases, less formal arrangements
for cooperation."'-' [I-1] * With that clarification, NASA felt free to begin exploring the pos-
sibilities of cooperative activity with other countries interested in space--and particularly
in the new scientific opportunities made available by the ability to place insnuments
aboard orbiting satellites and into space beyond the near vicinity of Earth. Cooperation in
space science (in addition to the creation of the international agreements needed to
locate tracking and data reception sites in other countries) dominated the first decade of
1. "National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958," Public Law 85-568, 72 Slat., 426, Sec6on 205. Signed
hy the president on Jttly 29, 1958. This is document 11-17 in John M. Logsdon, gen. ed., with Linda.l. Leal,
.lannelle Warren-Findley, Ray A. Williamson, and Dwayne A. Day, Exploring the (h_known: Selected I)m:urrwnt_ m the
tti_t_rry _?l the U.S. Civil Spin* lXrogram, Volume I: Organizing ftrr Fxploration (Washington, DC: NASA Special
Puhlication (SP)4407, 1995), 1: 33445.
2. Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President,"July 29, 1958, Presidential Files, NASA
Historical Reference ('olle{tion, NASA History Office, NASA I teadquarters, Washington, DC.
3. Unlike most other chapters in l,'xplortng the Unknown, the documenls SUF,F,orting this essay aue listed
in lhe order in which they appear, rather lhan in chronological order, hecause of the uniqtte naltHc ot Ihe
inlernalional e|'fort in space and lhe importance of ensuring a regional continnity. This has heen done at the
expense of mainlainmg a (hronological unity to the essay, bnt lhe overall understanding of tiffs complex subjt'c!
is enhanced as a rt'stlll.
2 TI IE I)EVEI.OPMENT OF INTERNATIONALSPACE (;_ _ )PERAI ION
NASA's international activities, and this has continued ;is a (vnverpiece of U.S. coopera-
tive activities to the present.
From its start, space cooperation was linked to broader U.S. lbreign policy and nation-
al security objectives. The first comprehensive post-Sputnik statement of U.S. space poli-
cy, NSC 5814, suggested: "International cooperation in certain outer space activities
appears highly desirable from a scientific, political and p.WholoKical [emphasis added]
standpoint .... International cooperation agreements in which the United States partic-
ipates could have the effect of... enhancing the position of the United States as a leader
in advocating the uses of outer space for peaceful purposes .... -4 The considerations of
American leadership have been associated with the nation's approach to international
cooperation from the beginning.
Early Space Science Cooperation
The initial NASA approach to space cooperation was crafted by individuals who had
been involved in the U.S. activities related to the International Geophysical Year (IGY),
which ended on December 31, 1958. These included Hugh Dryden, Deputy
Administrator of NASA; Homer Newell, who came to NASA in October 1958 as its first
head of space science; and Arnold Frutkin, who had worked on IGY matters with the
National Academy of Sciences and then became NASA's second director of international
affairs in September 1959 (a position he held for almost two decades)."
Under the coordinating umbrella of the International Council of Scientific Unions
(ICSU), the nongovernmental scientific academies of participating states had carried out
most IGY activities. NASA and National Academy of Sciences leaders hoped that ICSU
could provide a venue for discussing, and perhaps coordinating, emerging cooperative
activities in space, although some in the United States suggested that the North American
Treaty Organization (NATO) would be a more appropriate body to perform this function.
At the urging of the United States, ICSU created the Committee on Space Research
(COSPAR) in October 1958. At the time of COSPAR's second meeting in March 1959,
Richard Porter, the delegate from the National Academy of Sciences, after consultation
with NASA, communicated to the president of COSPAR, H.C. van de Hulst of the
Netherlands, a groundbreaking offer. The United States hoped that COSPAR "could serve
as an avenue through which the capabilities of satellite launching nations and the
scientific potential of other nations may be brought together." To facilitate such a devel-
opment, the United States was willing to launch on U.S. boosters "suitable and worthy
experiments proposed by scientists of other countries. This can be done by sending into
space either single experiments as part of a larger payload or groups of experiments com-
prising complete payloads. TM [I-2, I-3]
4. National Security Council, NSC 5814, "U.S. Policy on Outer Space,".]une 20, 1958. This was pub-
lished as Document II-18 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Exploring the Unknown, 1: 349.
5. Arnold %'. Frutkm's 1965 book, International Cof/peration in .Space(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1965) provides an insider's view of the early years of cooperative space activity. Another source that
describes this period is ltomer E. Newell, BeyorultheAtnu_q_here:Early Yerm_/Spac.e._;cien_*(Washington, DC: NASA
SP-4211, 1980), Chap. 18.
6. Richard W. Porter to Professor Dr. H.C. van de Hulst, President, Committee on Space Research
(COSPAR), March 14, 1959, Space Policy Instimle Documentary ttistory Collection, George Washington
University, Washington, DC.
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It soon became clear that COSPAR was not well suited for the actual coordination of
cooperative scientific missions; instead, for the most part, NASA would be cooperating
with an appropriate government body in a partner country. The first country to respond
to the U.S. invitation was the United Kingdom; even before the U.S. invitation to
COSPAR, U.K. and U.S. scientists had been discussing possible cooperative projects.
British Prime Minister Harold McMillan personally announced on May 12, 1959, that a
delegation led by Professor Harrie S.W. Massey would visit the United States to discuss spe-
cific cooperative projects. Massey was chairman of the British National Space Committee,
which had been formed by the Royal Society (the U.K. academy of science) in close con-
sultation with the British government. 7 The British delegation met with NASA counter-
parts from June 25 through July 3, 1959, and reached agreement in principle on initial
cooperative activities. This agreement was reflected in an exchange of correspondence
between Massey and NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan; although this was not a for-
real agreement, the exchange provided the basis for beginning NASA's first cooperative
project. [I-4] Only in September 1961 did the U.S. and U.K. governments exchange diplo-
matic notes that put the cooperation on a formal basis." The first of the cooperative U.S.-
U.K. satellites, Ariel I, was launched on April 26, 19627
Then, as Europe decided in the early 1960s to undertake most of its space science
activities through a new multinational entity, the European Space Research Organization
(ESRO), NASA quickly extended its cooperative offer to that new body.'" [I-5]
These initial cooperative efforts and most others since were carried out within the
framework of a set of guiding principles that were developed during the first year of U.S.
space activity. H These principles were relatively conservative in character; they did not
commit the United States to help pay for other countries' shares of cooperative projects.
Rather, they provided some specific and rather limiting criteria that cooperative propos-
als would have to meet, as follows:
1. Designation by each participating government of a central agency for the negotiation and
supervision of join t efforts
2. Agreements on specific projects rather than generalized programs
3. Each countr 7 's acceptance of financial responsibility for its own contributions to joint pro-
jects
4. Projects of mutual scientific interest
5. General publication of scientific results r_
Added to this framework for cooperation in later years were the requirements that
each cooperating partner assume technical as well as financial responsibility for its
contributions and that there be simple technical interfaces between the contributions
from different countries. This latter requirement was originally established to minimize
7. NASA, "Statement by NASA," Release 59-193, July 29, 1959, Press Release Files, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
8. Arnold S. Levine, Ariel I: An Expe_ment in lnternatirmal CoOperation, Goddard Historical Note Number
4, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, September 1967, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
9. Frutkin, International Cooperation, pp. 42-43.
10. See John Krige and Arturo Russo, Eurr_e in ,_mce, 1960-1973 (Noordwijk, The Netherlands:
European Space Agency, 1994), for a brief account of the origins of ESRO.
11. See Newen, I_o, ond the Atmosphere, p. 306, and Frutkin, International Crnq_eration, pp. 32-36, fol a dis-
cussion of the development of the NASA guidelines for cooperation.
12. NASA, International Program_, 1962, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
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the managerial complexity of cooperative projects, but in later years it also became an
important safeguard to prevent unwanted technology' transfer as a result of such projects? _
Operating under these guidelines over the years, NASA anti its partners have been
able to conduct numerous space science projects that have been scientifically productive,
of increasing technical complexity, and in general free of rancor. On balance, the record
of cooperation in space science is strongly positive, with both political and scientific ben-
efits to all inwflved. This is not to say, however, that the path bas been totally smooth.
While Canada and most European countries worked closely witlt the United States in
developing capabilities for performing space science, Japan chose to develop that capa-
bility on its own. H [I-6] Only after its Institute for Space and Astronautical Science in the
1970s developed an autonomous space science program, including its own launch vehicle,
was Japan ready to enter into cooperative scientific projects with the United States.
Despite efforts from the late 1950s on to engage the Soviet Union in scientific coop-
eration (described in more detail below), such cooperation was slow to emerge, being
constantly "held hostage" to the state of the overall political relationship between the two
global superpowers. In the mid-1960s, the United States also initiated cooperative inter-
actions with emerging spacefaring countries such as India and Brazil. [I-7] For many
years, however, America's primary cooperative partner was Europe.
Even with Europe, there were difficultiesY' On the U.S. side, scientists eager to have
their instruments and experiments fly in space could not participate as principal investi-
gators in the missions undertaken by ESRO and its successor, the Etu-opean Space Agency
(ESA), which was created in 1975. Europe gave priority to nurturing its own space scien-
tists and did not want to have them compete with their U.S. counterparts for the limited
payload space available on European missions. In contrast, European scientists from the
beginning were afforded such an opportunity to participate in NASA missions.
Meanwhile, U.S. scientists complained that scarce space on U.S. scientific missions was
being allocated to non-U.S, scientists and instruments, both tor political reasons and
because the non-U.S, contributions did not cost NASA any money. Securing European
participation in the kind of large science missions that became the NASA norm in the
1970s required delicate and lengthy negotiations. TM
On the European side, there were reservations about the U.S. role as the dominant
partner in almost every cooperative project. This often meant that NASA and U.S. scien-
tists would define the ol2jectives and content of a scientific mission and only then invite
non-U.S, scientists to participate. In addition, the value of any international contribution
to a U.S. mission depended on N/LSA's ability to sustain political and budgetary support
for that mission.
These reservations peaked in the 1979-1981 period. First, Europe, frustrated by U.S.
vacillation over whether to undertake a mission to Halley's contet during its 1986 visit to
13. Personal communication from Richard Barnes, former [)irectof of NA_;A's Oftice of International
Affairs, to John M. Lx)gsdon, December 11, 1995.
14. Newell, B_rmd the Atmosphere, pp. 309-11. See Joan .]olmson-Freese, (h,er the l'a¢Jfic: Japanese Space
Poli¢3_ tnto the 7"went_-Fir_l (;entur,; (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1993), fi_r an overview of the Japanese
space program.
15. See Roger Bonnet and Vittorio Manno, International C¢_r].wration in 5,)tm_e. 77re Example _¢the Eur_pean
,_ipace AgenQ' (Cambridge, gL_: t tarvard University Press, 1994).
16. For an expansion o[ this point, see Noel Hinners, "Space Science and Humanistic Concerns," in
Jerry Grey and Lawrence Les% eds., Glottal Implications o[ Space Activitie_ (New "_i)rk: American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1981), pp. 38-39;John M. Logsdon, "U.S.-European Cooperation in Space: A 25-
Year Perspective," Sc_eT_,e 223 (January 6, 1984): 11-16.
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 5
the inner Solar System, decided to undertake a Halley mission of its own. Europe did not
want to wait for the United States to make up its mind whether it would initiate a Halley
mission and then invite Europe to participate) 7 Then, in early 1981, the United States
informed Europe that it was withdrawing its spacecraft from the cooperative two-
spacecraft International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM). [I-8, I-9] This withdrawal was fi)rced
by the decision of the new administration of Ronald Reagan to reduce the federal budget.
The White House required NASA to cancel one of its three major approved science mis-
sions (the Hubble Space Telescope, the Galileo mission to Jupiter, and ISPM), and the
space agent}' chose the ISPM spacecraft for cancellation.'" The European Space Agency
and individual European countries protested loudly, but the decision was not reversed.
Europe left this experience with a reminder of its dependence on U.S. political and bud-
getary decisions for achieving its own objectives in its many cooperative efforts with the
United States. [I-10]
While the ISPM controversy cast a temporary chill on cooperation in space science,
its effect did not linger (although the incident was frequently raised during subsequent
negotiations concerning cooperative arrangements for other U.S.-European projects).
The mutual benefits of cooperation in space science were evident to all. By 1983, fi)r
example, NASA and the Enropean Space Agency had established regular consuhations
regarding areas for possible future cooperation. [I-11] Similar consultations between tim
United States and Japan and between the United States and Canada have provided the
venue for discvssions on when cooperative scientific projects were the best ways of achiev-
ing the objectives of the participating scientific communities, as well as on when those
objectives were best served (in the case of infrared astronomy, for example) by mounting
separate missions. In addition, the Inter-Agency Consuhative Group, with the space agen-
cies of the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, and Japan as members, has proven a
valuable forum for coordinating multilateral scientific undertakings.'" From its beginning
during the IGY to the present, space science remains the paradigm for successful interna-
tional space cooperation?'
Cooperation in Human Spaceflight: Post-Apollo,
the Spacelab, and the Space Station
The Apollo program was, by its very nature, competitive and unilateral in character.
Its objective was to demonstrate to the world U.S. technological and managerial compe-
tence by being the first to and on the Moon. Although President Kennedy had considered
turning Apollo into a cooperative U.S.-Soviet undertaking in 1963 (see below), as the first
hmar landing grew near, it was clearly viewed as a symbol of U.S. power and capability.-"
[I-12]
17. See John M. Logsdon, "Missing Halley's Comet: The Politics of Big Science," l._i._ 8(} ( 1989): 268-70.
18. See Joan Johnson-Freese, "Canceling the U.S. Solar-Polar Spacecraft: Implications for International
Cooperation in Space," Space Polit_ 3 (February 1987): 24-37, for more details on this incident.
19. For a description and analysis of the Inter-Agency Consultative Group, see Joan Johnson-Freese, '%
Model for Multinational Space Cooperation: The Inter-Agency Consuhative Group," Space Polity 5 (November
1989): 288-300; Joan.[ohnson-Freese, "From Halley's Comet to Solar Terrestrial Science: The Evohttion of the
lnte; Agency Consultative Group," Space Poli_y 8 (August 1992): 245-55.
20. See Ftonnet and Manno, Internatimml Cmq_eration in Spree, for a European perspective on this.
21. Again, as mentioned previously in footnnle 3, file documents assc, ciated with this (haptet ate
at lal'iged in the order in which they are discussed, ralh<'l than in strict chronological ordm. This ,:+lganizalion
was chosen t<l best tvpT,est+nt the diw'l s<' chatacter of NASA's intetnatiot'ml relalionships.
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The idea of expanded international space cooperation had been under discussion
within the top levels of the U.S. government since the mid-1960s, and these discussions
continued after Richard Nixon became president in January 1969. [I-13] With the Apollo
11 mission a success, NASA and the Nixon administration made a conscious decision to
broaden the basis of international participation in U.S. post-Apollo efforts in spaceT-' This
broadening took two directions: (1) attempting to engage the Soviet Union in more sub-
stantial cooperative tmdertakings (discussed later in this essay) and (2) inviting U.S. allies
to participate in the human spaceflight and technology development parts of the U.S. pro-
gram (from which they previously had been largely excluded).
Such a broadening was one of the recommendations of the Space Task Group, which
had been established by President Nixon in February 1969 to advise hint on post-Apollo
space plans. In its September 1969 report, the Space Task (;roup recommended "the use
of out space capability not only to extend the benefits of space to the rest of the world,
but also to increase direct participation of the world community in both manned and
unmanned exploration and use of space." The group recognized that for other industrial
countries "the form of cooperation most sought after.., would be technical assistance to
enable them to develop their own capabilities." The group also suggested that the United
States should "move toward a liberalization of our policies affecting cooperation in space
activities, should stand ready to provide launch services and share technology' wherever
possible, and should make arrangements to involve foreign experts in the detailed defin-
ition of fnture United States space programs .... "_
Armed with these recommendations and what he believed was a direct mandate from
President Nixon to seek such expanded cooperation, during late 1969 and the early
months of 1970, NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine visited Europe, Canada, Japan,
and Australia for initial discussions of cooperative opportunities in the post-Apollo peri-
od. [I-14, 1-15, 1-16] Paine believed that he could use the post-Apollo proposals spelled out
in the September 1969 report of the Space Task Group as the basis for what the U.S. pro-
gram during the 1970s would be--and tht, s for what cooperative possibilities might be
open for U.S. allies. The reactions to Paine's overtures were varied. In addition, NASA
found that some in the Nixon White House were far less enthusiastic about cooperation
in large hardware programs than were Paine and the Space Task Group and that President
Nixon had no intention of approving in toto the group's recommended program that had
been the basis of Paine's briefings to foreign officials.
Early on, Australia indicated that space was not among its highest priorities and that
it was not able to spend the considerable amount of money required to cooperate with the
United States on a meaningful basis. The Japanese response was somewhat similar. '-'4In the
late 1960s,Japan had decided to accelerate its acquisition of an autonomous capability for
space launch and satellite construction for missions other than space science. Japan asked
the U.S. government to allow U.S. aerospace firms to license space technology to Japan to
'ijump start" that capabili_' development process. Although NASA and the Department of
22. See Arnold W. Frulkin, "International Cooperation in Space," Scirnr.e 169 (July 24, 1970): 333-38, for
an early discussion of this policy change. More recently, see Lorenza Sebesta, "The Politics of Technological
Cooperation in Space: US-European Negotiations on the Post-Apollo Programme," tfistory and Technolo_: An
Internati_malJtrurnal 11 (I994) : 317-41.
23. Space Task (;ronp, I'he I'mt-Apoll_ Space lqogram: Directions per the Future (Washington, DC: U.S.
Govetnment Printing Office, September 1969), pp. 7, 16.
24. For a discussion of the evolution of U.S.zlapanese space It'lations, see John M. Logsdon, "ll.S.-
Japanese Space Relations at a Crossroads," Science 255 (January 17, 1992): 294-300; Johnson-Freese, (hper the
l'ac!/ic.
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Defense opposed such licensing, advocates of the diplomatic and strategic importance of
the U.S.-Japanese alliance, particularly within the State Department, prevailed. [I-17]
On July 31, 1969, the United States and Japan signed an agreement that cleared the
way for firm-to-firm cooperation between the two countries. _ This agreement and its sub-
sequent modifications in 1976 and 1980 facilitated Japanese acquisition of launch-related
technology that was used and modified as the basis of Japanese booster capability for more
than twenty years; by contrast, there was limited transfer of satellite-related technology.
During most of the 1970s, cooperation between the United States and Japan was at the
firm-to-firm, not the government agency-to-government agency, level. Although Japan
eventually indicated limited interest in participating in post-Apollo efforts, clear priority
was given to Japanese autonomy in space, and the Japanese interest did not lead to a post-
Apollo cooperative agreement.
Canada, in contrast, indicated that it was interested, in the context of its modest space
effort, in making a contribution to the U.S. post-Apollo program. [I-18] After several years
of harmonious negotiations, it was agreed in 1975 that Canada would be responsible for
developing the Remote Manipulator System for use aboard the Space Shuttle.
The most difficult post-Apollo interactions were between the United States and
Europe. In addition to the uncertainties surrounding which of those systems proposed in
the Space Task Group report the Nixon administration would approve, and then what
contributions Europe could best make to such systems, there were two background issues
that influenced the discnssions. One was the question of whether the United States would
guarantee to launch communication satellites for European regional use or whether
Europe would have to develop its own launch vehicle to guarantee its access to, in partic-
ular, geosynchronous orbit. The second issue was the concern by some at the White House
that space cooperation could be a means for European firms to gain access, at minimum
cost, to advanced or sensitive U.S. technology. In the background of both of these issues
was a concern on the part of some in the White House that NASA and the Department of
State were advocating an approach to international cooperation that was not in the
administration's interest. [I-19]
During this period, a goal of U.S. policy was to discourage Europe from developing its
own launcher capable of lifting sizable payloads to orbit, thereby connecting much of
Europe's fnture in space to cooperative projects with the United States launched on U.S.
boosters, particularly the Space Shuttle. For example, NASA Administrator Thomas Paine,
in his November 7, 1969, letter to President Nixon, indicated that his "fundamental objec-
tive was to stimulate Europeans to rethink their present limited space objectives, to avoid
their wasting resources on obsolescent developments [a thinly veiled reference to
European development of an expendable launch vehicle at the time that the United
States was planning to develop a totally reusable Space Shuttle], and eventually to estah-
lish more considerable prospects for future international collaboration on major space
projects. ''_*_One reason for this posture was to maintain the U.S. monopoly on access to
space for such payloads and to create customers for the Space Shuttle once it became
available. A second reason was the U.S. attempt to protect U.S. communications satellite
manufacturers--companies that in 1970 had a "free-world" monopoly on the technology.
25. Department of Stale, "Agleemenl between the United Slates of America and Japan, July 31, 19fiq,"
Treatie_ and Other lnternationM A ct_, _q ies []375.
26. Tllomas O. Paine, NASA Administrator, to tile President, NovembeK 7, 1969, Administlators Files,
NASA I listorical Reference Collection.
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Also, the United States and its partners in the International Telecommunications Satellite
Consortium (INTEI.SAT) were participating in difficult negotiations over the filture of
the organization, and the United States wanted to block the emergence of regional com-
petitors to INTELSAT in Europe and elsewhere. '-'7
After lengthy discussions and negotiations within the U.S. government [1-20, 1-21]
and between the United States and the European Space Conference (a policy-level entity
created to coordinate European responses to U.S. positions on space issues), the United
States on September 1, 1971, set forth a policy on the awtilability of U.S. launctlers for
European satellites. The United States also made it clear ttlat the issue of post-Apollo
cooperation was, in U.S. thinking, not linked to the launcher issue. '-'_[I-22]
The other obstacle--concern that the United States would be fi)rced to transfer valu-
able technology to Europe to ensure that Europe coukt snccessfldly complete its share of
the post-Apollo program--proved more difficult to surmount. Assistant to the President
Peter Flanigan, who had responsibility within the White House for space issues, raised con-
cerns about technology flows related to U.S.-European cooperation. Flanigan suggested
that President Nixon's 1969 mandate to NASA seeking expanded international coopera-
tion was really focused on greater European participation as astronauts or in-orbit scien-
tific investigators, not on Europe as a developer of hardware to be used by the United
States. [I-23]
The debate over European involvement in the post-Apollo program had continued
throughout 1971. As the Space Shuttle finally gained approval in January 1972 as the
major post-Apollo development project, the question of European participation was still
undecidedY'Over the next several months, debates over how to proceed continued with-
in the administration. [I-24]
Among those attempting to find a position satisfactory to both the advocates of coop-
eration within NASA and the State Department and the skeptics inside the White House
was the executive secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space (;ouncil, former astro-
naut William A. And¢'rs. In a March 17, 1972, memorandum to Flanigan, Anders suggest-
ed that Europe be invited only to develop a "sortie can"--a pressurized laboratory to fly
inside the shuttle's payload bay--rather than be allowed to develop a technologically
more challenging orbit-to-orbit "space tug" or parts o1 the shuttle orbiter itself. _ [I-25]
Responding to the Anders proposal on April 29, Secretary of State William Rogers argued
against reversing the U.S. position that the space tug might be developed by Europe on a
cooperative basis and against limiting European cooperation to developing the sortie can
(also called the Research and Application Module)?' [1-26] Commenting on Secretary
Rogers's mentorandum, NASA indicated that its "preferred objective is to obtain
27. For some ha(kground on how the issue of launch guarantees interacted with European-U.S. nego-
tiations on post-Apollo cooperation, see Douglas R. Lord, Spm+olab: An l_*ternational Su_ce*_ Story (Washinglon,
DC: NASA SP-487, L987), Chap. L; Sebesta, "Politics of Technological Cooperation in Space."
28. t!. Alexis lohnson, Under Secretary of State, to Theo l.eh.vre, Chairman of European Space
(]or_fi'lente, S<'])tembel 1, 1971, NASA llistotical Reference Collection.
2<3. +lathes C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator, memorandunt tt) (;eotgc M. l.ow, NASA |)cputy
Adntitlistrator, "Sttmmaty of Peter Flanigan Meeting," March 3, 1972, Achnitxisftalors Filt's+ NASA Ilistotical
Reference t;o[le¢ tion.
30. William A. Andens, Exe_:tttive Secretary, National Aerortautic s and Space Cotmcil, I_>The I tonorable
Peter M. Flanigan, Match 17, 1972, with attached: "Position Paper on European Participation in out Post Apollo
Space Program," Space: Policy lnstitttte Documentat y History Collection,
31. William I'. Rogels, Sec+etary of State, Memorandum for the President, "P<>st-Apollo Relationships
With the Europeans+" April 2(3, 1972, NASA |iistorical Reference Collection.
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European agreement to develop a specific type of sortie modnle" and that European
development of the space tug was "a distinctly second choice, and much less desirable. ''_'-'
[I-27]
The State Department argument did not prevail, and U.S. representatives informed
their European colleagues in June 1972 that only the sortie can was an acceptable contri-
bution to post-Apollo efforts. [I-28] European governments and industry were displeased
by this outcome; substantial stud)' funds had been invested in the rag, and the sortie can
was technologically a much less interesting development? _Within a little more than a year,
however, a U.S.-European agreement on the terms for the cooperative development of the
sortie can (renamed the Spacelab) had been achieved [I-29], committing Europe to a
cooperative project with the United States that was much more expensive and highly visi-
ble than previously had been the case? _ Europe's agreement to develop the Spacelab
came in the context of a comprehensive "package deal" that also committed European
nations to develop their own launch vehicle (in spite of the 1971 U.S. assurance of access
to U.S. launchers) and to begin work on a maritime communications satellite. In addition,
Europe decided to develop a single space organization, to be called the European Space
Agency (ESA), to manage these large projects and other European efforts in space. The
European nations' experience in post-Apollo dealings with the United States was a major
factor in convincing leading European countries to pool the better part of their future
projects in a multilateral alliance for space?"
Despite the difficulties in reaching agreement on a mutually satisfactory undertaking,
as well as substantial European dissatisfaction with the results of the cooperative effort,
Eu,opean-U.S. cooperation on the Spacelab created a precedent for contemplating--
even expecting--similar close cooperation on any subsequent large-scale program that
NASA might undertake. In fact, within a year after signing the Spacelab agreement, some
at NASA were already thinking about international participation in a space station pro-
gram. [I-30] When NASA Headquarters once again began active planning for a space sta-
tion in 1982, the head of the Space Station Task Force,John Hodge, asked NASA Director
of International Affairs Kenneth Pedersen--Arnold Frutkin had left NASA in 1979--for
his ideas on what might be learned from the post-Apollo experience with respect to
preparing for international participation in a space station. In reply, Pedersen prepared a
length), memorandum containing his thoughts not only on the relevance of past experi-
ence but also on a strategy for obtaining international commitments to the emerging sta-
tion program. [I-31]
Pedersen's ideas largely governed the NASA approach to international participation
in the space station during 1982 and 1983. In addition, in August 1982 the Reagan admin-
istration adopted an overall policy statement with respect to international space relation-
ships that provided a context for making the station an international project. [I-32]
When Ronald Reagan announced the approval of the space station program in his
January 25, 1984, State of the Union address, he also stated that "NASA will invite other
countries to participate so we can strengthen peace, build prosperity and expand freedom
!',2. .]antes C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, to Honorable Henry A. Kissingm; Assistant to the Pt esident
lot National Seemit',' A[fairs, May 5, 1972, with attached: '+NASA's Comments on Secretary Rogers'
Memorandum of Apri'l 29, 1972," Administrators Files, NASA Histmical Reference Collection.
33. See, foi examph', "Europeans Delay Post-Apollo Meeting," Aviation Week &Spa+* Tedznolok'_,,]uly 17,
1972, p. 19.
3't. See Lord, Spm_hth, [br a i)arli_ipant's a_count on the international dimensions of tile undertaking.
35. See Ktige and Rttsso, 15urope it+ Spate; Michiel S¢hwatz, "European Poli{ies _m Spat<" Scicn{e and
Technolog2/, 1960-1978," IPe+ea_+h l'oli+y 8 (1979): 205-44; Michiel Schwmz, FuropeX Future in Spa+e {I+_mdou:
Routledg, c g: K<'gan Paul. 1998), Chap. 4, fi>r discussions of the early yeats of European spa¢t + ¢ oopeiaticm+
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for all who share our goals. ''_'+NASA Administrator James Beggs, acting as Reagan's per-
sonal emissary, extended the president's invitation to join the space station program to
leaders in Europe, Canada, and Japan during a series of rapid xSsits during March 1984.
After returning ti'om his visits to Europe and Japan, he reported the tollowing to Secretary
of State George Shultz:
The reaction so fl+r to the President's call for international cooperation has been strongly positive
and openly appreciative. It has been positive in the sense that our p_4ncipal Allies are moving quick-
ly, or have already moved, to take political decisions to participate. And their reactions clearly show
appreciation for the maior foreign policy benefits that wiU flow from open and collaborative coopera-
tion on such a bold, vis_ible, and imaginative project? r [I-33]
Beggs also wrote a letter to a senior official in each of the countries he had visited,
summarizing his understandings, clarifying issues that had been raised, and laying out the
next steps. He reiterated the basic U.S. position:
President Reagan has committed the US. to building an $SB fully functional Space Station to
be operational by+the early 1990s, but has also set the stage for working together to develop a more
expansive international Space Station with even greater benefits and capatnlities for all to use. Thus,
we are inviting your (;overnnwnt to take a close look at our plans and con<epts and then, based on
your long-term interests and goals, share with us your ideas for cooperation that will expand the capa-
bilities of the Space Station? _ [!-34]
It would take more than four years of difficult negotiations to develop a framework
for cooperation in the space station program that was acceptable to the United States and
its partners--ten European countries acting through the European Space Agency, Japan,
and Canada. In agreeing to that framework, the station parmers launched what was the
most expensive, longest duration in international scientific and technological coopera-
tion ever undertaken. The station agreements included a muhilateral intergovermnental
agreement among the governments of the United States, .Japan, Canada, and the nine
European countries, _"as well as three separate and length}' memoranda of understanding
(one between NASA and ESA, another between NASA and its counterpart agency in
Canada, and the third between NASA and Japan's space agenQ,?" [I-35] In its scope and
complexity, international space cooperation had come a long way flora the initial, qtfick-
ly negotiated, informal, and straightforward 1959 agreement that, almost three decades
earlier, had led to the U.S.-U.K. Anel project.
36. See John M+ Logsdon, Together tn Orbit: Th_ Orig2n._ o] Internati,mal l'ttrti,:ipation in .';pace Station l"reedom
(Washington, DC: Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, December 1991), tot an a(count of the
process of intel naliunalizing the U.S. space station program.
37. James M. Beggs, NASA Administrator, to George P. Shultz, Se(tetaly of State, March 16, 1984,
Administrators Files, NASA Histcrical Reference Collection.
38. James M. Beggs, NASA Administrator, to Kenneth Bake_, Nil', Minister nf State fin Industry wilh
Si)ecial Resp<msibility toK Space and Information Tcchnolog),, I !hired Kingdom, Apzil (J, 1984, A(tministratols
Files, NASA Histori< al Ret_'_ence Collection.
39. At the time this essay was written, the Department of Stale had n_l yel lmblished the space station
intergoveN_menlal agl eemenl. When it is published, it will appeal in the Department of State series Unitvd States
7"reatie._ <tnd Other lnter+tational Att_. However, a copy of the agreement does appeal m Hein's Microfiche Service,
United Stat_* Treatie_ <tnd Other International Acts, No. KAV 2383.
40. Each memorandum of understanding was slightly different but covered essentially the same points.
The one with Japan was signed by a representative of the Science and Technology Agency in the name of the
government of Japan: the Japanese National Space Development Agency was not formally a government I_>dy.
The Canadian signatoly was the Ministry of State for Science and Technology, because the new Canadian Space
Agency had not yet been formalb,' established in September 1988.
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Cooperation With the Soviet Union
From their inception, the space programs of the United States and the Soviet Union
were closely linked to the global political and military rivalry between the two superpow-
ers. Issues of U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation have historically received separate treatment
in U.S. policy making from those related to cooperation with U.S. allies. Although tile IGY
pro_fded the context for the first scientific satellite launches, space cooperation was the
most disappointing aspect of the IGY, primarily because the So_iet Union shared only very
limited information about the substantive character of its satellite programs with other
IGYparticipants. Also, the Soviet Union did not make the data obtained by those satellites
available for analysis to scientists outside of its borders. 4'
Although the Soviet Union had refused to discuss the possibility of space cooperation
with the United States during the Eisenhower administration, newly inaugurated
President John E Kennedy attempted to open the door to such discussions in his January
20, 1961, inangural address, stating "let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science
instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars .... ,,4_Kennedy added more detail
to this call in his first State of the Union address ten days later:
I now invite all nations--including the Soviet Union--to join with us in developing a weather
prediction program, in a new communications satellite program, and in preparation for probing the
distant planets of Mars and Venus, probes which someday may unlock the deepest secrets of the uni-
verse. 4_
To back up his cooperative initiative, Kennedy in early February asked his science
advisor, Jerome Wiesner, to establish a NASA-Department of State panel on international
space cooperation. During its meetings over the following few weeks, the panel consid-
ered not only the cooperative possibilities mentioned by President Kennedy in the State
of the Union address but also such bold initiatives as the creation of an international sci-
entific outpost on the Moon. In its report, the panel listed more than twenty possibilities
for U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. [I-36]
However, by the time the panel's final report was completed, its recommendations
had been overtaken by events. The first orbital flight by Yuri Gagarin, on April 12, 1961,
had stimulated John E Kennedy to a competitive response? + With the announcement of
the decision to go to the Moon a few weeks later, the chances for significant cooperation
in space with the Soviet Union disappeared, at least for the time being. _
Tense U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations during 1961, symbolized by the Kennedy-Khrushchev
confrontations at a June summit meeting in Vienna and the August erecting of the Berlin
Wall, seemed to make any chance of cooperation in space remote. However, even after
challenging the Soviet Union to a space race, President Kennedy never abandoned his
41. See Frutkin, International Co_rperation, pp. 19-20, for this assessment.
42, Quoted in Dodd L. Harvey and Linda Ciccoritti, U.S.-Soviet C_mperation in Space (Miami, FL:
University of Miami (;enter for Advanced International Studies, 1974), p. 65. The following account of cooper-
arise initiatives in the first months of the Kennedy administration is taken from pages 66 through 74 of this study.
43. Ibid.
4,t. This story has been told in a series of docunle1'_Is contained in Volume [ of this selies. See
I)()(uments Ill-6 through 111-12 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Expb_ng the Unknown, l: 42.'?,-54.
45. See John IVl. Logsdon, The I)ed_ion to (;o to the Moon. Prolect Apollo and the Natumal Interest (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 19701.
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hope of turning space into an arena for cooperation rather than competition. Apparently,
Nikita Khrushchev was willing to change slightly the prior Soviet position linking the pos-
sibility of space cooperation with progress in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. disarmament talks. In late
1961, the Soviet Union joined with the United States in supporting United Nations reso-
lution 1721 (XVI), which among other things called for strengthening international space
cooperation. In his February 21, 1962, message to President Kennedy, which congratulat-
ed the United States on the orbital flight of John Glenn, Khrushchev suggested:
Ij- our cou n tnes pooled their efforts--scientiJic, technical, and material--to master the universe,
this wouM be very beneficial fi_r the advance oJscience and wouM be fl_.Jullv acclaimed &, all peoples
who would like to see scientific acki_,ements benefit man and not be u_ed Jbr "cobl war"purposes and
the arms 1,(l(e. _'
Quickly seizing what seemed to be an opening, the next day President Kennedy
cabled Khrushchev. Kennedy stated that he was "insuucting the appropriate officers of
this Government to prepare new and concrete proposals for immediate projects of con>
mon action. '''_ Those proposals were contained in a March 7 letter from Kenned), to
Khrushchev. [I-37] Kennedy proposed specific cooperative undertakings in live areas:
weather satellites, tracking services, mapping of the Earth's magnetic field, satellite com-
munications, and space medicine. '"
Khrushchev's reply came within two weeks. [I-38] It in effect accepted the notion of
cooperation in most of the areas suggested by Kennedy, and it added other areas as can-
didates for cooperation. Most importantly, Khrushchev agreed to a meeting hetween U.S.
and Soviet representatives to discuss how to implement the proposals that he and
President Kennedy had made. However, Khrushchev also made it clear that the scope of
U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation was limited by broader considerations; he noted that "the
scale of our cooperation in the peaceful conquest of space, as well as the choice of lines
along which such cooperation would seem possible, is to a certain extent related to the
solution of the disarmament problem. ''4"
President Kennedy appointed NASA Deputy Adnfinistrator Hugh Dryden as his rep-
resentative to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. talks, and Khrushchev appointed academician Anatoli
Blagonravov. Both were experienced in international scientific diplomacy. Their lirst
meeting took place on March 27 through 30, 1962 [I-39]; by June the two sides had agreed
on three areas of initial cooperation."" [I-40] During October 1962 (in the midst of the
Cuban missile crisis), an exchange of letters between NASA Administrator James Vv'ebb
and the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, M.V. Keldysh, put the agreements
into effect?'
46. Quoted in ILu vey and Ciccoritti, U.S.-Soviet ('mqwration in 31pine. p. 86.
47. Ibid.
,18. John F Kennedy, "Text of Letter Dated Mmch 7, 1962, From President Kennedy to Chairman
Khrushchev Re Coope_atinn in Peacetul Uses of Ouler Space," March 7, 19(i2, Space Policy Institute
Documentary liistory Ck)llectton,
49. Nikita Khrushchev, "Text of Letter From Chairman KJirushchev in Reply to President Kennedy's
LetteT of Match 7, 1962," March 7, 1962, Space Policy Institute I)ocumentary llistory Collection,
50. Fo] an ac(mml ot the Dryden-Blagonravov negoliations, s_'_' ttafw-y and Ciccorilfi, U.._'.-,Vmviel
(;mrperation, pp. 92-102: lq utkin, lnternatumal (_ugmration, pp. 94-105.
51. Fol the texl of the letters, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, Document_ on h_ternatwnal A._pect_ o/the I"xpbrratwn and l _e u/Outel ,Spree, 1954-1962, Staff Report, May
9, 1963, pp. 357-58.
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 13
Early resnlts t-ore this initial cooperative agreement were disappointing. By
September 1963, howevm, the Kennedy administration was considering a hold initiative--
turning Project Apollo from an exercise in U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition into a cooperative
undertaking. :'_[I-41] The two countries had signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in August
1963, and President Kennedy wanted to build on that agreement to move toward a broad
d6tente between the superpowers.Joining together in sending people to the Moon would
he a dramatic symbol of such d6tente, and on September 20, 1963, in a speech to the
General Assembly of the United Nations, Kennedy asked:
Why, therefore., should man's first flight to the Moon be a matter of national competition? _'_7_y
should the United States and the Soviet Union, in preparing for such expeditions, become invoh,ed in
immense duplication of research, construction, and expenditure? Surely, we shouM explore whether the
.scientists and astronauts of our two countzies--indeed of all the world--cannot work together in the
conquest of space, sending some day in this decade to the Moon not the rq_resentatives of a single
nation, but the re;l_resentatives of all our countries. '_
Kennedy's proposal got a mixed reaction within the United States--and no response
fiom tbe Soviet Union--but the president was not dissuaded. On November 12, 1963,
Kennedy directed NASA Administrator James Webb "to assume personally the initiative
and central responsibility, within the government for the development of a program of
substantive cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of outer space." This program,
said Kennedy, should include "cooperation in hmar landing proposals. ''-'_[1-42]
Ten clays latex-, Kennedy was assassinated. While President Lyndon B.Johnson was also
in favor of U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation, the continued lack of a Soviet response to
Kennedy's Septemher 20 invitation and the absence of Kennedy's personal involvement
led to the initiative gradually fading away. By the time NASA responded to the November
directive on January 31, 1964, the focus had shifted to cooperation on the robotic prede-
cessors to a tmtnan landing on the Moon. [I-43] Even that did not happen, and through-
out the rest of the 1960s, U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation in space continued at a very modest
level.""
As mentioned earlim; in the aftermath of the first lunar landing on July 20, 1969, the
Nixon administration decided to broaden the basis of its cooperative space activities. One
set of initiatives was directed at U.S. allies; other overtures were made to the Soviet Union.
Rather than proposing cooperation across a broad range of space activities, NASA
Administrator Thomas O. Paine, in a July 31, 1970, letter to Keldysh, proposed that coop-
eration focus on the issue of astronaut safety--and particularly on a program to achieve
compatible rendezvous and docking systems between U.S. and Soviet spacecraft."' [I-44]
52, This account of the consideralion of making the Moon landing a cooperative undmlaking is dlawn
born I t:u vey and (:iccodtti, U.S.-5,'oviet ('.otrperation, pp. 112-10; Frutkin, International ('._qwratim_, pp. 105-19.
53. Quoted in i|arvey and Ciccorilti, U.S.-Sm_iet cooperation, p. 123,
54. National Secmity Action Memorandum No. 271, "Cooperation with the USSR on Outer Space
Matters," November 12, 1963, Space Policy Institute l)ocumentaty tiistm y Collection.
55. Fol an assessment of the record of U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation during the 1960s. in addition to the
somces cited above, see tl.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.._ioviet (;m_lwrali_m in ,+_lm_*,
"/_whnica[ Memorandum (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Prinling Office, luly 1985).
51_,. rl'holl|as O. Paine, NASA Administrator, m Academician M.V. Keldysh, ]qesident, Academy of
Sciences of the I!SSR, July 31, 1970, Administrators Files, NASA Historical Refi'lence (loller tion. Fro a [ull his
tol v ot what eventually became the Almll_>-Soyuz Test Ptqjc'_l, see Edward (;linlon Ezell and I Jinda Nvuman
l+'+zcll. +/7_e I'artne_hil*: ,'1 tli_tor,," o/the Apoll_S_'uz 7}'_1 I'rcqe_t (Washingltm, D(]: NASA SP-4209, 1978).
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This proposal prodttced a positive response flora the Soviet Union, and on October
26, 1970, a NASA delegation traveled to Moscow to discuss 1he l;uasibility of such a pro-
gram with its Soviet connterparts. [I-45] This was the first official NASA delegation to visit
the Soviet Union. These nxeetings went quite well, and they seemed to break a logjam in
U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative relations. In January 1971, Acting NASA Administrator George
Low and an accotnpanying delegation traveled to Moscow to meet with Keldysh and his
colleagues, and they reached a preliminary agreement on renewed and expanded coop-
eration in a variety of areas. Following an exchange of letters between Low and Keldysh,
a broad agreement on areas of U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation was announced on March 31,
1971. To implement the agreement, U.S.-U.S.S.R.joint working groups on meteorological
satellites, meteorological rocket soundings, the natural enviromnent, the exploration of
near-Earth, the Moon and the planets, and space biology and medicine were established.
These working groups and their successors have been the principal mechanisms for plan-
ning U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation since 1971.
Meanwhile, discussions on the feasibility of a 1975 joint test flight involving the in-
orbit rendezvous of U.S. and Soviet spacecraft had proceeded t_) the point where George
Low, now back in bis position as NASA's deputy administrator,,journeyed to Moscow in
April 1972 to determine whether the United States should commit to such a mission. This
trip was made secretly at the request of the White House, becanse a formal agreement on
such a mission was to be announced at a planned May 1972 summit meeting between
President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev: [I-46]
Low's recommendation was to go ahead with the mission, which was accepted by the
White House. [I-47] On May 24, 1972, President Richard Nixon and Chairman of the
Soviet Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin signed the government-to-government
"Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for
Peaceful Pnrposes. '''_ Ahhough this agreement incorporated all the areas of cooperation
that had been agreed to in 1971, its centerpiece was the atmouncement of the Apollo-
Soyuz Test Project (ASTI'). The agreement had a five-year lifetime, with the possibility of
an extension by mntual agreement.
Soviet and U.S. engineers, managers, and astronauts met fiequendy over the next
three years. [I-48] Tiffs led to the successful ASTP mission, which took place from July 14
to 24, 1975. The mission itself was accomplished without major problems.""
Even as the launch dates for the ASTP mission approached, George Low and Keldysh
began to discuss follow-on cooperation, particularly in human spaceflight and robotic mis-
sions to the far side of the Moon and to Mars. [I-49] These discttssions continued over the
next two years, and by May 1977, when the U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation agreement was
renewed for five more years, the two countries had also agreed to consider a joint mission
between the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Soviet Salyut space station, as well as cooperation
in the development of an "international space platform. ''"' [I-50]
As it turned ont, however, the ASTP mission marked the high point of U.S.-U.S.S.R.
space cooperation for some time to come. That cooperation fell prey to a deterioration in
the overall state of U.S.-US.S.R. relations during the presidency of Jimmy Carter and the
first White House term of Ronald Reagan. The Carter White House by 1978 was ques-
57. George M. l,ow, NASA Deputy Administrator, "Visit to Moscow, April 1972, to Discuss Compatible
Docking Systems for US and USSR Manned Spacecraft," April 445, 1972, with attached: "Addendum, Moscow
Trip, April 4-6, 1972," May 30, 1972, Deputy Administrators Files, NASA llistorital Reference Collection.
58. For more on the agreement, see Ezell and Ezell, 7"he Partnership, pp. 192-9%
59. See itrid. [br details.
60. Office of Technolog 3' Assessment, _LS.-Soviet Co_rperation, p. 32_
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tioning whether it was in the U.S. interest to be seen as a highly visible cooperative
partner with a Soviet Union that it was accusing of human rights violations, and the shut-
tle-Salyut project was set aside. As part of the U.S. reaction to Soviet involvement in the
declaration of martial law in Poland in 1981, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation agree-
ment was allowed to lapse when it came up for renewal in 1982. With that development,
any cooperation in space between the United States and the Soviet Union had to be on a
scientist-to-scientist basis, with no formal government involvement or funding.
This situation lasted for several years. Then in 1986, the United States, in response to
the reforms of new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and to increasing pressure from sci-
entists and others in the United States who viewed space as an arena for demonstrating a
new, post-Cold War superpower relationship, indicated its willingness to resume formal
cooperative relations in space with the Soviet Union. Negotiations led to the April 1987
signing of a new government-to-government cooperative agreement that identified six-
teen areas for initial cooperation. ';' [I-51 ]
The U.S.-U.S.S.R. space relationship, always a barometer of the overall state of rela-
tions between the two countries, was once again on the upswing. Cooperation increased
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Russia as the inheritor of
most of the former Soviet Union's space capabilities. By the mid-1990s, U.S.-Russian coop-
eration had become the centerpiece of NASA's international space activities, as the two
countries in effect merged their programs of human spaceflight in the period leading to
tile creation of the International Space Station. Initial steps in this direction came in 1992,
when Russia created a civilian space agency and when Russian President Boris Yeltsin and
President George Bush agreed to broaden U.S.-Russian space interactions. [I-52] This
accelerated under President Bill Clinton; the United States and Russia in effect merged
most of their programs of human spaceflight. [I-53, 1-54, 1-55] Russia was invited to
become a key participant in the International Space Station. [I-56]
After almost forty years, cooperation had replaced competition as the central focus of
U.S.-Russian space relations. The January 1961 hopes of President John Kennedy finally
neared realization.
61. George P. Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze, "Agreement Between the United Stales ofAmet ica and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for
Pca{e|ul Puq)oses," April 15, 1987, with attached: "Agreed List of Cooperative Prqjects/' Space Policy Inslitute
[)octllllelltaly I listor,,, Collection.
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Document I-1
Document title: Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President, July 29, 1958.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The congressional drafters of changes to the Eisenhower administration _ version of a bill that set out
the goals and organizational features of the U.S. civilian space program were strong advocates o/
international cooperation in carrying out the new program. They inserted in the bill a provision, con-
tained in Section 205, that appeared to require Senate approval Jor any cooperative agreement into
which the executive branch or the new space agency might enter This was intended to signal con-
gressional interest in international space issues, but legal experts pointed out after the bill had passed
Congress that such approval could be interpreted as trespassing on the power of the president and his
appointees to enter into nontreaty agreements for cooperation. At the time he signed the National
Aeronautics and Space Act oJ1958, President Eisenhower placed this statement on the record to dis-
pel the possibilit,_ of such an interpretation.
[ 1] IMMEDIATE I_I.EASE
James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President
THE WHITE HOUSE.
July 29, 1958
Statement by the President
I have today signed H. R. 12575, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.
The enactment of this legislation is an historic step, flu-the_ equipping the United
States for leadership in the space age. I wish to commend 1tie Congress for the prompt-
ness with which it has created the organization and provided the authority needed for an
effective national effort in the fields of aeronautics and space exploration.
The new Act contains one provision that requires comment. Section 205 authorizes
cooperation with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to the Act
and in the peaceful application of the results of such work, pursuant to international
agreements entered into by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. I
regard this section merely as recognizing that international treaties may be made in this
field, and as not precluding, in appropriate cases, less formal arrangements fo, coopera-
tion. To consuue the section otherwise would raise substantial constitutional questions.
The present National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), with its large and
competent staff and well-equipped laboratories, will provide the nucleus for the NASA.
The NACA has an established record of research performance and of cooperation with
the Armed Services. The combination of space exploration responsibilities with the
NACA's traditional aeronautical research functions is a natural evolution.
The enactment of the law establishing the NACA in 1915 proved a decisive step in the
advancement of our civil and military aviation. The Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958
should have an even greater impact on our furore.
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Document I-2
Document title: Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, NASA, to T. Keith Glennan, et al.,
March 12, 1959.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Document I-3
Office, NASA
Document title: Richard W. Porter, to Professor Dr. H.C. van de Hulst, President,
Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), March 14, 1959.
Source: Archives, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) had managed U.S. participation in the International
Geophysical Year, including related U.S. space activities, and had suggested to the International
Council of Scientific Unions that it establish a continuing Committee on Space Research (COSPAR).
When the new space agency, NASA, was formed, its initial staff handling both space science and
international affairs had close ties to the NAS. Once a decision had been made not to use the, United
Nations for carrying out international space programs, NASA worked closely with the NAS. They
authorized the U.S. delegate to COSPAR, Richard Port_ to invite other members of COSPAR to plan
experiments that would be launched on U.S. boosters and to cooperate with NASA in getting started
in space. NASA 'S head scientist, Homer Newell, attended the COSPAR meeting and stayed in touch
with l)eputy Administrator Hugh Dryden as the U.S. offer took final shape. Drvden in turn informed
others at NASA headquarters about the final changes to the U.S. offer; Administrator T. Keith
Glennan wrote "OK_Good" on his copy of Dryden's memorandum, which is reproduced here. The
final offer came in the form of Richard Porter's letter to COSPAR President H.C. van de Hulst. With
this lett_ the United States initiated a program of productive cooperation in space science that has
continued to the present.
Document I-2
[1] March 12, 1959
Memorandum for Dr. T. Keith Glennan
Mr. Henry E. Billingsley
Mr. Franklyn W. Phillips
Mr. Harold R. Lawrence
1. On March 11 th Homer Newell telephoned me from Holland to ask further advice
on the statements that could be made with respect to cooperation with COSPAR in satel-
lite launchings. The Executive Committee of COSPAR had met during the day in the
absence of the Russian member, Dr. Federov, who arrived after the meeting had
adjourned.
2. We had previously authorized to the U.S. delegation to offer cooperation in the
provision of payload space or possibly a booster for a complete COSPAR payload. The U.S.
delegation felt, h-ore the nature of the discussion at the Executive (]ommittee meeting,
that it would be desirable to make this offcr somewhat more spe(ific. After discussion with
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Newell, I authorized him to make the definite offer for a booster for a COSPAR payload,
the booster not to be named although we have in mind either Scout or Thor Delta. The
payload would be described as 150 to 500 pounds, depending on the specific booster; and
the general nature of the available orbits would be described. The booster would be avail-
able in 1-1/2 to 2 years. It was agreed that the payload should be recommended by
COSPAR, that it should be acceptable to NASA, and that i_ should pass environmental
tests prescribed by NASA.
3. The question was raised as to whether the foreign scientists would be permitted
to be present at the latm_ hing. I suggested that this question be avoided for Ihe present
for we are not in a position to commit the Atlantic or Pacitic Missile Range.
4. The meeting of (:()SPAR itself takes place today.
Hugh L. l)ryden
Depuff Administrator
Document I-3
[1] March 14,1959
Professor Dr. H. C. van de Hulst,
President,
Committee on Space Research (COSPAR),
Paleis Nooreinde 68,
THE HAGUE, The Netherlands.
Dear Mr. President,
COSPAR has a truly historic opportunity to become an effective force for interna-
tional cooperation in space research. This cooperation will be most fruitful and mean-
ingful if the maximum opportunity to participate in, and contribute to, all aspects of space
research can be provided to the entire scientific community. In this regard, COSPAR can
serve as an avenue through which the capabilities of satellite launching nations and the
scientific potential of other nations may be brought together.
The United States will support COSPAR in this objective by undertaking the launch-
ing of suitable and worthy experiments proposed by scientists of other countries. This can
be done by sending into space either single experiments as part of a larger payload or
groups of experiments comprising complete payloads.
In the case of individual experiments to become part of a larger payload, the origi-
nator will be invited to work in a United States laboratory on the construction, calibration,
and installation of the necessary equipment in a U.S. research vehicle. If this is impossi-
ble, a U.S. scientist may be designated to represent the originator, working on the project
in consultation with him. Or, in the last report, the originator might prepare his experi-
ment abroad, supplying the launching group with a final piece of equipment, or "black
box," for installation. However, this last approach may not be practical in most cases.
In the case of complete payloads, the United States also will support COSPAR. As a
first step, the delegate of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences is authorized to state that
the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration will undertake to launch an
entire payload to be recommended by COSPAR. This payload may weigh from 100 to
300 pounds and can be placed in an orbit ranging from 200 to 2,000 miles altitude. It is
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expected that the choice of the experiments and the preparation of the payload may
require a period of 1 1/2 to 2 years. NASA is prepared to advise on the feasibility of pro-
posed experiments, the design and construction of the payload package, and the neces-
sary pre-flight environmental testing. The U.S. delegate will be pleased to receive
COSPAR's recommendations tor the proposed payload when the)' can be readied.
In filrther support of COSPAR, the U.S. delegate would like to call attention to the
availability of resident research associateships at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration in both theoretical and experimental space research. These provide for
stipends of $8000 per annum and up.
Very truly yours,
Richard W. Porter
Document I-4
Document title: T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, NASA, to Professor H.S.W. Massey,
United Kingdom Scientific Ministry, July 6, 1959, with attached: H.S.W. Massey, "U.IL-
U.S. Technical Discussions on Space Research, June 25-July 3, 1959," July 3, 1959.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This exchange of documents constituted what was, in effect, the first (albeit informal) cooperative
agreement concluded by. NASA and a counterpart space organization (in this case, the British
National Space Committee of the nongovernmental Royal Society). Upon its return to the United
Kingdom, the proposals for cooperation developed by Professor Massey and his delegation were quick-
ly approved by the U.K. government, although a formal U.S.-U.K. agreement implementing the coop-
erative program was not signed until 1961. The first mission resulting from this agreement, Ariel 1,
was launched in less than three years, on Ap_l 26, 1962.
[ 1] July 6, 1959
Professor H. S. W. Massey
United Kingdom Scientific Mission
1907 K Street, Northwest
Washington 6, D.C.
Dear Professor Massey:
I have examined your statement of July 3, 1959, of the discussions held here between
your group and our people and find it accurate and acceptable, from my standpoint.
It is nay understanding that this statement represents only an informal technical
understanding between us and does not commit either of our governments to proceeding
with this undertaking until further arrangements have been consummated. On both
sides, it must be recognized that the exact content and pace of the proposed program is
subject to the success we may have with supporting technological developments and the
financial resources made available by our respective governments.
Because of the importance of this matter and its relationship to the improvement of
international understanding between our two countries in this field, 1 hope we shall hear
fiom yon filrther after you have reported the results of our talks to your people in
London.
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I trust this understanding is satisfactory to you and that your trip here has been pleas-
ant and satisfactory" in all regards.
Sincerely,
T. Keith (;lennan
Administrator
[Attachment page 1]
U.K.-U.S. Technical Discussions on Space Research
June 25-July 3, 1959
Discussions have been held between N.A.S.A. and the team of British scientists led by
myself, to consider the offer made by N.A.S.A. to assist other countries in scientific work
with satellites, in the interest of developing a programme of international cooperation in
space research. Specifically, this paper records the outcoine of meetings held in
Washington in late June and early July. As far as the U.K. side is concerned the outcome
of these discussions, as recorded below, will be reported as soon as possible Io tile U.K.
Steering Group on Space Research:
1. N.A.S.A. confirm that they would be ready to oilier tacilities to tile UK. tot launch-
ing U.K. instrumented satellites in the U.S.A. by means of the SCOUT vehicle.
2. The U.K. side consider that three SCOUT satellites should provide sufficient
space for first flights of the instruments which would be' require(t tor a programme of
experiments of the type and range provisionally listed m l)ocument NCSP 41 (59).
3. On present plans, N.A.S.A. hope that the launching of three British-instrument-
ed SCOUT satellites could be completed within 3 to 4 years t-ore now--with the aim that
the first launching would be in about 2 years from now.
4. If it is decided to accept the N.A.S.A. offer, the UK. side would hope to provide
specific proposals for the instrument content of the first salellile in the near future.
Consideration of the possible content of filrlher satellites would proceed as soon as pos-
sible, but would obviously be affected by success or otherwise in launching.
[2] 5. In the first instance, N.A.S.A. would provide tim satellite shell and auxiliary facil-
ities, including solar ceils and batteries, temperature conlr()l and data transmission.
6. During the whole process of planning and constructing the satellites, the U.K.
would do everything possible to maintain the necessary direct scientific and technical
cooperation between the experts.
7. Both sides agreed that a detailed exchange of views was desirable about possible
extension of worldwide tracking and telemetry reception stations.
8. N.A.S.A. said that the financial basis of their offer was "no billing" on either side.
9. In making this offer it is N.A.S.A.'s position that this should be a mutually coop-
erative programme, with benefits flowing to both parties, for tile advancement of science.
It is contemplated that the experiments, conducted with the instruments flown by the
British scientists, would form an integral part of the total spectrum of scientific experi-
ments in space, and nmtually agreed upon as a reasonable and important group of exper-
iments.
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The U.K. side explained that they were not at this stage authorized to come to any
agreement, as this was a matter for the authorities in London.
July 3, 1959 H.S.W. MASSEY
Document I-5
Document tide: Hugh L. Dryden, NASA Deputy Administrator, to Sir Harrie Massey,
European Preparatory Commission for Space Research, June 27, 1962.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
At the urging of man), leading scientists in Europe, the European governments decided in 1962 to
create a multilateral European Space Research Organization as the primary mechanism for car(_,ing
out a European .space science effort. It was general U.S. poll O, to favor the development of multi-
lateral institutions in Europe, and NASA wasted no time in extending to the nezo organization the
same cooperative offer it had earlier extended to individual European countries.
[ l ] .June 27, 1962
Sir Harrie Massey, President
European Preparatory Commission for Space Research
36, rue La Perouse
Paris 16, France
Dear Sir Harrie:
On behalf of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, I should like to
extend felicitations upon the recent signing of the Convention for establishment of the
European Preparatory Commission for Space Research.
NASA will welcome ESRO as a major new force contributing to the advancement of
space science and technology in the context of peacefifl cooperation among nations. It is
our hope that we may participate with ESRO in cooperative efforts which may enhance
our respective programs and our contributions toward this goal. There are many possibil-
ities for specific projects in which we may join our efforts. It may serve a useful purpose
to suggest a few of them:
1. We should be very happy to enter with ESRO into a joint program of the type pro-
posed in COSPAR on our behalf in March 1959. In such a program, NASA would
prm4de a suitable launching vehicle to place in orbit a satellite of scientific inter-
est which might be prepared by ESRO.
2. As you know, NASA plans the launching of complex "Observatory" satellites, each
bearing a variety of experiments. Some of these satellites are to be placed in polar
orbits, others into highly eccentric orbits of lower inclination to the equator. We
would propose to notify ESRO of opportunities for it to recommend the incor-
poration of specific European experiments in these satellites. Such recommen-
dations would be given the same consideration as proposals from American
scientists for the same satellites.
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[2] 3. With the concurrence of the Department of State, certain satellite boosters man-
ufactured in the United States would be available under reasonable conditions for
purchase by ESRO for scientific purposes.
4. NASA is prepared to accommodate in its own laboratories, in conjunction with
agreed programs of the above character, technicians and scientists sponsored and
supported by ESRO for such training and orientation as desired. In addition, fel-
lowships in American university laboratories devoted to space theory and experi-
mentation will continue to be available to ESRO nominees.
I hope that ESRO will soon be prepared to discuss these and other possibilities for use-
ful cooperation. At such time, or at any stage in your preparation for such discussions, we
will be happy to welcome here scientific representatives of ESRO to discuss possible satel-
lite or sounding rocket experiments.
Sincerely yours,
Hugh L. Dryden
Deputy Administrator
Document I-6
Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, to Dean Rusk, Secretary of State,
May 24, 1966.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Beginning in late 1965, the United States tried to expand the scope and intensity of its space science
cooperation with other countries. Initial initiatives were made with Europe, but the hope was to
involve Japan as well. In this letteg, NASA Administrator James E. Webb suggests to Secretary of State
Dean Rusk why he was not optimistic about the potential for enhanced U.S.-Japanese space coopera-
tion. At this point, Japan's space effort was concentrated at an institute of the University of Tokyo.
[1] Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.
Dear Dean:
I share the views expressed in your letter of May 12 regarding the desirability of coop-
eration with Japan in the space field and would be happy to send to Japan a team similar
to that which visited Europe in connection with President Johnson's offer on the occasion
of Chancellor Erhard's December visit. In order to work out an appropriate approach to
the Japanese, I am asking Mr. Arnold Frutkin, Assistant Administrator for International
Affairs, to work with Mr. Pollack.
There are certain limitations with respect to an approach to the Japanese which I
think you will want to consider. As you know, the President's proposals for cooperation on
the European side were of a scale and character necessarily multilateral. Proposals of the
same dimensions could not well be made to the Japanese since Japan could not be expect-
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ed to carry a burden of spacecraft development which would be appropriate to the
combined resources of the leading European nations. Thus, it seems inevitable that the
subject matter of any space cooperation with Japan would have to be scaled down to the
bilateral level, unless Europe itself should imiteJapan to participate in its broader multi-
lateral project.
When the question of Japanese participation with Europe came up in the Advance
Team discussions in Europe last February, the Team made it quite clear that the U.S.
would welcome such an overture by the European countries. Unfortunately, the prospect
of positive European action on the President's proposal is in itself uncertain. While the
matter is probably best not further complicated at this particular time, it may be that the
possibility of Japanese contributions might be reopened in Europe in terms of European
interest.
[2] With regard to bilateral cooperation with the Japanese, the pertinent history is rather
dubious. Over the years, Dr. Dryden and Mr. Frutkin both made strenuous efforts to inter-
estJapan in a bilateral satellite program comparable with those which have been entered
into with virtually all other advanced nations. Japan clearly made a conscious decision to
proceed on its own without involvement with the United States. (At the COSPAR meeting
in Vienna early in May, Japanese scientists for the first time officially reported plans to
launch small satellites this year and next year in the course of a self-contained Japanese
program.) In order to obtain this decision, the dominant figures in Japanese space activi-
ty, particularly Professor hokawa at the University of Japan, have quite consciously
distorted the conditions of cooperation with the United States. Professor Itokawa is under-
stood to have a close family association with the Prime Minister. Professor Kaneshige, with
whom we have maintained very close touch, who is the Japanese Chairman of the US-
Japan Scientific Commission, and who has been the senior Japanese scientific adviser to
the Prime Minister, only last month told me that his continuing efforts to promote space
cooperation with the United States have failed. He frankly confirmed the policy of delib-
erate distortion of our program (a matter which we have sought to bring to Embassy atten-
tion).
It is our understanding that the reception given in Tokyo to the Vice President's
remarks on cooperation was rather cool. In the circumstances, a team, even of the caliber
sent to Europe in February, would almost certainly find its efforts contained within a
Japanese policy of noncooperation at quite senior levels. You may wish then to consider
how persistent the U.S. ought to be and through what channels in pressing an objective
that has met quite calculated and entrenched opposition over a period of years.
Sincerely yours,
James E. Webb
Administrator
Document I-7
Document tide: James E. Webb, NASA Administrator, to U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, May 19, 1966.
Source: Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History
Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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During late 1965 and 1966, the United States considered ways to increase its cooperative activities
in space. Most oJthe Jm-u_ was on increased cooperation with Europe and ]apan. Howev_ there was
interest in involving sommeof the larger developing countries with space ambitions oJ their own, such
as India and Brazil, in cooperative efforts with NASA. This letter outlined for the first time a possi-
ble initiative with India to use a NASA communications satellite to lmmdcast educational program-
ming to Indian villages. Almost a decade after the idea was first broached, between August I, 1975,
and July 31, 1976, the United States and India cooperated on the Satellite Instructional Television
Experiment (SITF). During this experiment, the NASA Applications Technolo_ Satellite ATS-6 was
moved to an orbital position over India, and educational programming was broadcast to more than
5, 000 Indian village_.
[1] May 19, 1966
U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary tor Political Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Alex:
In my letter of April 26, I forwarded to you some thoughts tor extending international
cooperation in space. I would now like to supplement those with an additional suggestion
that could prove valuable in opening new avenues for US-Indian collaboration in the prac-
tical applications of space.
The proposal should be understood on several levels: ( 1) A technical experiment in
direct broadcasting, (2) A pilot project in the social impact of direct broadcasting, (3) A
stimulus to Indian industrial electronics, [and] (4) An attack upon the food and popula-
tion problems of India. The only step proposed is a joint US-India study of feasibility--
which would have political value in and of itself.
If they agree, India and the United States would jointly establish a study group to
examine the feasibility, the advantages and disadvantages, and the trade-off considera-
tions of alternate approaches as these factors relate to a continuing experiment in direct
broadcasting. In this experiment, the US would build and position a synchronous satellite
near India in such a way that broadcasts from it could be received over the major part of
the Indian subcontinent. Most of the basic technology for this experiment exists already
and it should prove possible to beam the broadcasts tightly enough and on such frequen-
cies that no interference would be caused to adjacent nations.
India, for its part, would use its nascent electronics capabili_' now focussed [sic] at the
atomic energy center at Bombay to develop (with some design assistance from the US)
improved television receivers to be established in perhaps a thousand rural population
centers. India has [2] already demonstrated a significant capacity to contribute to such a
task: Bombay is currently turning out analog computers, os(illoscopes, solid state compo-
nents, and the like. In addition, there exists within India a considerable capacity for the
production of radio receivers and other, simpler electronics devices.
The satellitcs would be turned over to India for its own use in broadcasting to its peo-
ple news and other material of an informational and educational value. The US would
probably want to limit its commitment to provide satellites to perhaps two with a total pro-
jected life expectancy of five years. Following this experimental period, India would be
expected to arrange with the US or INTELSAT for continuing service if desired. The cost
to the US would be thai of placing two large synchronous satellites in orbit. The cost to
India would be that of the receivers themselves. One thousand such receivers might cost
about $1.6 million, much of it in rupees. Since there are over 100,000 villages that might
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benefitflomthisprogramitwouldbeuptoIndiatodecidetheextentofitscommitnmnl
beyondtheinitialonethousandreceivers.In any'case,muchcouldbedonebymoving
receiversfromvillagetovillagetomaximizethesizeofaudience.
Iwouldnotunderstatetheproblemswewouldbelikelytoencounter.Thecostofthe
programmightbemorethaneitherweor theIndianGovernmentwouldcaretobear.
Televisionappearstopossessa ignificantinformationalndeducationalpotential,but
theremaybemanypitfallstoitsapplicationonascalesuchasthis.Weshouldcertainly
haveto reachdefiniteprioragreementwiththeIndiansconcerningtheusestowhich
spacebroadcastingwasput.Weobviouslycouldnottolerateitsusetodefameusorour
actionsor toembarrassu inourrelationswithnationsuchasPakistan.Wemightalso
havetofacethequestionofcontinuingsubsidiesaftertheexperimentalsatellitehadgone
dead;Indiamightnotbeabletofinancenewsatellitessolelyfromitsownpocket.We
shouldalsohavetobecarefulthattheexperimentremainedclearlyseparatei-omcom-
mercialcommunicationsprojectsanddidnotprejudicerelationswithINTEI,SATor the
conceptofasingleglobalcommunicationssatellitesystem.
Nevertheless,thereremainpowerfiflargumentsinfavorofdiscussingsuchanexper-
inaentwiththeIndianGovernment.Thediscussionsandtheinstitutionofa.jointstudy
groupwouldbeaconvincingdisplaytothatGovernmentofout"intenttousethemost
adwmcedtechnologiesinhelpingit tocopewithitsurgenthumanproblexns.Thejoint
studyitselfwouldbringIndiansandAmericansintointimatetechnicalcollaboralion.
Indiacouldlearnfromthestudynewtechnologicalandmanagementapproachestoedu-
cationandtotheusesofintormationalmediamweldtogetheranation-state.TireUS
woukt,in turn,learnmoreaboutheIndiansandtheirmostpressingproblems.[3] Shouldtheprojectcometofruition,thenimportantadditionalbenefitswouldtlow.
Indiawould,onitsowninitiativeandwithitsownresources,begintheaccelerateddevel-
opmentofamodernelectronicsindustry.This"bootstrapping"operationwouldmamri-
ally'raiseIndia'stechnologicalbaseandcontributetherebytothedevelopmentofotheh
similarindusuies.SomeIndianenergiesmightalsobedivertedfromconcernwith
nuclearweaponsdevelopment,themoresoperhapsasthesuccessoftheexperimentcon-
tributedto India'sprestigein Asia.Thepostureof tireUSwouldalsobeimproved
throughagenerousdemonstrationfitswillingnessto sharethebenefitsof advanced
spacetechnologywithunderdevelopednations.
AsI viewtheproposal,wewouldatnotimebeexposingourselvesbyunconsidered
commitmentsorprecipitousaction.Eachstep,fromtheinitial,privatediscnssionswith
the Indian Government, through the careful and detailed examination by the joint study
group would provide renewed opportunities to reexamine initial premises and search for
possible flaws in all facets of the proposal. Even should it prove infeasible in tim end, both
we and the Indians could not fail to have profited by the intimacy of our cooperation in
a joint technological venture.
I look forward with interest to hearing your reaction to this proposal. I do want to add
that we are already negotiating or entertaining a number of other prospective projects for
the near or distant future ad so have excluded these possibilities from the category of sug-
gestions for new cooperation ....
Sincerely yours,
.]ames E. Webb
Administrator
26 TtIEDEVELOPMENTOFINTERNATI{)NALSt'A(_1,2(]{){)t'I.2RATI()N
Document I-8
Document tide: Robert J. Allnutt, for A.M. Lovelace, Acting Administrator, NASA, via
Margaret Finarelli, NASA Headquarters, to Erik Quistgaard, Director General, European
Space Agency, Telegraphic Message, February 20, 1981.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
In February 1981, the Office of Management and Budget, under the new administration of President
Ronald Reagan, ordered NASA to cancel one of its major science programs. This represen_d a way of
reducing the NASA lmdget in future years. NASA chose to cancel the spacecraft it wrt_ committed to
provide as part of the International Solar Polar Mission, a joint venture of NASA and the European
Space Agency. Because of the secrecy surrounding budget decisions, NASA was unable to alert ESA of
the possibility of such a cancellation until a telephone call on February 18, the same day that
President I_agan announced the cuts he was making in the budget submitted by.outgoing President
fimmy Carte_. Formal notice of the cancellation was provided t_ this telegram, s_gned by Robert
Allnutt, one of the top staff of NASA's Acting Administrator Alan Lovelace, and forwarded t_.,
Margaret Finarelli of the Office of International Affairs.
[1]
TO: MR. ERIK QUISTGAARD
DIRECTOR GENERAL
EUROPF0kN SPACE AGENCY
8-10 RUE MARIO NIKIS
75738 PARIS CEDEX 15
FRANCE
INFO:
MR. JAMES MORRISON
NASA EUROPEAN REP.
RUFNPS AMEMBASSY
PARIS, FRANCE
MR. WIIYRED MELLORS
ESA WASHINGTON OFFICE
(CODE 1.11)-18 TO MAIL)
As I indicate{I to you in our telephone conversation yesterday, the administration's
budget for FY82 requires severe cuts in the full range of NASA's programs. Because work
on vital shuttle activities must continue, we have been forced to cancel or otherwise forego
a number of major programs in the science and applications areas. We are foregoing starts
for both VOIR and GRO; monies for the development of Spacelab payloads have been cut
back even further: NOSS has been cancelled; and numerous other programs in the appli-
cations area such as our agricultural forecasting program have suffered deep cuts.
[2] We have endeavored, and will continue to endeavor, to honor our international com-
mitments to the fitllest extent possible. Nonetheless, the deep budget cuts have necessi-
tated cancellation of part of the joint NASA/ESA ISPM Mission, namely the US Spacecraft
which was to have participated in the Solar Polar mission. In view of the major scientific
importance of Solar Polar research, we hope that ESA will continue with the mission
which can now be launched in 1986 on a Shuttle/Centaur and that we will be able to
maintain its cooperative nature.
As I indicated to you yesterday, the NASA budget will permit support of the remain-
ing spacecraft, including the U.S. experiments previously planned for the ESA spacecraft.
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[3] As I mentioned to you on the telephone, I propose that Dr. Stofan, NASA's Acting
Associate Administrator for Space Science, and Dr. Trendlenberg, ESA's Director for
Scientific and Meteorological Programs, meet prompdy to review the current spacecraft
situation, assess the impact of the budget reduction on the scientific value of the mission
and determine the most effective way to proceed with the ESA spacecraft. When Stofan
and Trendlenberg have concluded their discussions regarding the spacecraft, you and I
shotfld then discuss the mission further.
I want to assure you that cancellation of the US Spacecraft in the ISPM mission is
taken with great reluctance and was unavoidable given the broad and deep cuts occurring
throughout NASA and throughout the US Government budget. I would like to reiterate
my deep appreciation for ESA's cooperation with NASA in the past and my continuing
sense of commitment to working with ESA on programs of mutual interest.
[4] I share your view about the value of looking closely at our existing consultation pro-
cedures to see if, within the constraints on both sides, improvements can be made. I have
asked Ken Pedersen to be sure this topic gets a high place on the agenda for our informal
talk on March 9. I am looking forward to seeing you again.
RobertJ. Allnutt signed for
A. M. Lovelace
Acting Administrator
Document I-9
Document title: W.J. Mellors, Head, Washington Office, European Space Agency, "Aide
Memoire, International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM)," February 24, 1981.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Not surprisingly, the Eur_Oean Space Agency (ESA) and its member states reacted with outrage to the
U.S. cancellation of its spacecraft contribution to the International Solar Polar Mission. Diplomatic
protests were lodged on a government-to-government basis, and Congress was made aware of Europe's
unhappiness. These notes, prepared by Wilfred Mellors, the head of ESA 's Washington office, zoere the
basis of his initial formal presentation of the ESA response to the cancellation.
[1] 24th February, 1981
Aide Memoire
International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM)
1. Last week the Acting Administrator of NASA informed the Director General of
the European Space Agency that the cuts announced by President Reagan in his speech
on February 18th, 1981 included the cancellation of the US spacecraft and the associated
U.S. experiments for the above mentioned mission. At a meeting held on February 23rd
NASA confirmed this situation.
2. I am to say that:
a) The cancellation of the NASA satellite, which was effected without consulta-
tion, is a unilateral breach of the ISPM MOU; this cancellation is totally
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unacceptable and ESA requests full restoration of the programme to its orig-
inal level.
b) If tile cancellation were permitted to stand, there would be serious long term
damage to European/United States cooperation in space.
c) Naturally, there has been a very unfavorable reaction in Europe. No less than
seventeen European scientific institutes are involved in the United States
spacecraft and would consequently be unable to fly. These experimenters
have already committed more than 50% of the total cost of their experiments.
Indeed, Europe has already made a major investment of tile order of one
hundred millions of US dollars, equivalent to the whole of ESA's annual bud-
get for Space Science, in the ISPM programme.
3. It is to be noted that at the time ESA decided to participate in ISPM, other can-
didate missions were considered, including some purely European projects with no
American participation. However, ESA decided to collaborate with NASA because first,
the ISPM mission--as it was with two spacecraft--was of outstanding value to the scientif-
ic community in Europe and in the United States as it permitted simultaneous measure-
ments over the Northern and Southern hemispheres of the stm and, secondly, (of equal
and even greater importance), it was believed there was great value in such Iransatlantic
cooperation.
[2] 4. I am further to say that this present cancellation of the US spacecraft is not the
first instance of a tmilateral action by the US in this project which has had serious conse-
quences for ESA. l am to point out that in March of 1980 the revision of the NASA FY 81
budget resulted in a delay of two years in the launch date which cost ESA and the
European scientific institutes supporting the mission at least an additional twenty millions
of dollars; while in January of this year a decision was taken to change the upper stage
from the IUS [Inertial Upper Stage] to the CENTAUR vehicle, the full consequences of
which have not yet been established.
5. In view of the above tbe Director General has today requested each Member State
immediately to make thr_ugh its Washington Embassy at Ambassador level, the strongest
possible protest against the announced cancellation and to request a full restoration of
the two spacecraft mission.
6. Finally I am to point out that it is ESA's view that such unilateral actions as now
taken by the United States cotfld destroy the basis for collaborations of this nature in the
fiHure and that the impact could well go beyond the field of scientific space research.
W.J. Mellors
Head, Washington Office
European Space Agency
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 29
Document 1-10
Document title: "Meeting of NASA Administrator and ESA Director General, 17 June
1982, ESA Head Office," with attached: "General Principles for NASA/ESA Cooperative
Agreements."
Source: ESA Collection, European Community Archives, Florence, Italy.
In the months following the cancellation of the International Solar Polar Mission, the. European
Space Agency (ESA) and its member states conducted a comprehensive assessment of the desirability
of continuing Europe's close cooperation zoith the United States. The conclusion of this assessment wc_s
that such cooperation remained desirable but the terms and conditions under which it would Im car-
ried out had to provide more protection to European interests. These terms and conditions were agreed
to at a June 1982 meeting between the heads of NASA and ESA.
[1]
Meeting of NASA Administrator and
ESA Director General
17 June 1982, ESA Head Office
FUTURE NASA/ESA COOPERATION
A. Principles and terms of future agreements.
Having confirmed their intention to continue their long-standing cooperation, ESA
and NASA agreed on the "General Principles for NASA/ESA Cooperative Agreements"
attached to these minutes (Annex 1).
B. Procedures for regular exchange of views on future programmes in space science and applica-
tions.
NASA proposed three measures to set up such procedures:
- schedule regular discussions between the respective division directors responsible
for astrophysics, environmental observations, and earth and planetary explo-
ration programmes;
- encourage exchange of information and ideas among US and European scientists
who participate in the respective NASA and ESA programmes;
- encourage regular meetings between the NASA Associate Administrator for Space
Science and Applications and the ESA Directors of Scientific Programmes and
Application Programmes.
ESA gave a brief outline of ground rules recently approved by its Science Programme
Committee for future scientific cooperation.
These ground rules are attached (Annex 2).
[2] As to applications, ESA stated to be in favor of regular meetings at working level in
the field of earth observation. In the telecommunications sector fiirther ad hoc discus-
sions on specific topics could be envisaged.
ESA agreed to the three measures proposed by NASA and outlined above ....
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[3] I)G/A Meeting
17 June 1982
Annex 1
General Principles for NASA/ESA
Cooperative Agreements
Tile National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the European Space Agency
confirm their desire to continue conducting cooperative space projects. They recognize
that in the past, cooperation has in general, been of great mutual interest to both parties.
NASA and ESA intend to continue formalizing such cooperation through either
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between the two agencies, the standard form of
agreement for joint projects, or, for some specific major programmes, Intergovernmental
Agreements between ESA Member States and the Government of the United States of
America. Before a proposed MOU is concluded, it will be' submitted by NASA to the U.S.
Departmenl of State, which will determine whether it constitutes an international agree-
ment as defined by the provisions of Public law 92-403. This action is necessary because of
Sec. 503 of Public law 92-426, which requires that the Secretary of State be intormed and
consulted before any agency of the United States Govermnent takes any major action, pri-
marily involving science or technology, with respect to an), fi_reign government or interna-
tional organization, and also because of Sec. 504 of that law which stipulates that the
Secretary of State has primary responsibility for coordination and oversight with respect
to all major science or science and technology agreements and activities between the
United States and toreign countries or international organizations. NASA will notify ESA
of the U.S. Department of State opinion before submission of the proposed MOU to the
ESA Council.
As such international agreements have general limitations within the U.S. legal system
and may have to contain, for legal or institutional reasons, specific limitations regarding
their liabilities, the parties note that some degree of risk is involved in joint projects. Thus,
NASA and ESA agree that, in order to alleviate the uncertainties and the risks, they will
from now on apply the following guidelines:
1. In developing the type and degree of assurances to be included in a particular
agreement, NASA and ESA will take into consideration the degree of risk and the
importance of the project for each of the parties. The calculation of risk will
include such factors as the possibility of one party losing all or a major part of its
investment if the other party cannot further fulfill its commitment, the cost bur-
den assumed by each party, the overall cost of the mission, and the time criticali-
ty of the Inission. Both parties, in the process of negotiating an agreement, will
undertake to provide within that agreement for a degree of assurances appropri-
ate to the degree of risk resulting from the factors mentioned above.
[4] 2. NASA and ESA will endeavor to infi)rm each other of any legislative or regulato-
ry provisions existing, or coming into force subsequent to the signing of a[n]
MOU, that might limit or prevent implementation of the agreement's provisions.
3. NASA and ESA recognize the importance of timely and full consultation to the
effective implementation and completion of joint projects. Consultation is par-
ticularly important when one party experiences ditficulties in meeting its obliga-
tions as stated in the project agreement of its annexes, if any. NASA and ESA will,
to the fullest extem practicable in such cases, consuh belore a decision is taken.
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4. NASA and ESA will consider whether a proposed project is suited to being imple-
mented in discrete phases which could be the subject of separate agreements.
The purpose of this approach would be to permit, after conclusion of each phase,
each party to review its interest in continuing with the pr()ject. It is recognized
that many projects will not be amenable to this approach.
5. In the course of negotiation [of filture cooperative project agreements, NASA
and ESA will examine possibilities for proving assurances relative to ahernative
flight opportunities or developed flight hardware in the event the agreement is
not able to be executed in full.
Documenl 1-11
Document title: Burton I. Edelson, Associate Administrator, Space Science Applications,
NASA, and Roger M. Bonnet, Director, Scientific Programme, ESA, "NASA/ESA Space
Science Planning Meeting, ESA Head Office--27th-29th June 1983," June 29, 1983.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
By 1983, the unhappiness of the European Space Agency (ESA) had not completely disappeared with
respect to the 1981 cancellation of the U.S. spacecraft intended as part of the joint NASA-ESA
International Solar Polar Mission. Howeveg, the two organizations still recognized the benefits of reg-
ular consultations on their future space science plans to identify productive synergies and opportuni-
ties jot collaboration. For example, the foUowing minutes of a June 1983 meeting show that together
the two agencies identified areas, such as solar terrestrial research, in which enhanced coopeTvztion
would be frui_d. They also recognized other areas, such as infrared astronomy, in which each would
pursue separate missions.
[1]
NASA/ESA Space Science Planning Meeting
ESA Head Office 27th-29th June 1983
At their meeting on 27th, 28th, 29thJune 1983 in Paris, ESA and NASA reaffirmed
the great advantage of international cooperation in space science which they consider of
particular importance from the point of view of scientific, technological, political and
financial considerations.
The meeting was held with the aim of reaching an in-depth nnderstanding of the
other party's goals on flmdamental as well as more immediate practical issues. Three areas
of cooperation were discussed in more detail:
- Infrared Astronomy
- Solar Terrestrial Research
- Planetary Exploration
Each of these areas is treated in lhe following sections.
1. General Framework of Cooperation between ESA and NASA
It was agreed during the meeting that measures should be taken to improve in 1he
fltture the framework of cooperation between the two parties. Two such measmes have
aheady been identified:
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a) ESA and NASA agree to set up an international committee to advise the two par-
ties on specific issues related to cooperation. The commiltee will be co-chaired by
R. Bonnet from ESA and F. MacDonald from NASA and will include four
American and four European senior scientists with experience in international
cooperative programmes. The committee will in particular analyze the best ways
of implementing tile principle of reciprocity by which American participation in
European programmes is applied in recognition of the US principle of opening
their AOs [Announcements of Opportunity] to the non-US scientific community.
The committee will report to ESA and NASA before the end of January 1984.
b) In order to widen their cooperation at the level of the younger scientists, the two
parties ag,eed to formalize an exchange of fellowship programmes whereby a
number of post-doctoral European fellows will each year be based in NASA cen-
ues and the same number of American fellows based in the Space Science
Department of ESA/ESTEC [European Space Technology Education Centre].
The exact procedure for selection of the scientists and for reviewing their
research programmes will be analyzed in detail before the next bilateral meeting.
Action: NASA, E MacDonald; ESA, D.E. Page
2. Infrared Astronomv
ESA and NASA note the technological and scientific success of IRAS [Infrared
Astronomical Satellite] and reaffirm their commitment to infrared astronomy in space.
[2] They agree to continue to explore further joint effort in infrared space astronomy.
ESA notes NASA's revised plans to make SIRTF [Space Infrared Telescope Facility] a
long duration, reserviceable mission operating in a Shuttle/Space Station compatible
orbit, and NASA's strong interest in collaborating to develop a single major international
infrared Space telescope facility.
NASA notes the firm commitment of ESA to lhe approved Infrared Space
Observatory, ISO, which is an Ariane launched mission with an elliptical orbit.
The parties discussed the possibility for US participation in the IS() mission and
European participation in the SIRTF mission by furnishing focal plane instruments and
exchange of observing time. It is noted that the differences in orbit and launch vehicle
restrict any major hardware collaboration between these two missions as currently
defined.
It is recognised that in the post-IRAS time frame, coordination in programme plan-
ning is desirable to optimize the overall scientific return. It is the,efore agreed to set up a
.joint study team to:
a) analyse the objectives and anticipated performances of IS() and SIRTF to identi-
fy their complementarity;
b) identify characteristics of focal plane instruments in both facilities which could
optimise the overall performance capability of these two missions;
c) identify elements in both programmes which could be considered as reciprocal
contributions.
The joint study team will be headed by Dr. Nancy Boggess of NASA and Dr. Henk
Olthof of ESA and will meet during the autumn with a preliminary report in time for the
next ESA/NASA Space Science Planning Meeting.
3. Future Solar Terrestrial Research
The ESA/NASA representatives surveyed the large number of missions under study
in the USA, Europe and Japan in the area of Solar Terrestrial physics (DISCO, SDO,
SOHO, Cluster, OPEN, OPEN J, Plasma Turbulence Explorer) and agreed that a need
exists for an integrated look at all these missions.
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There seems to be considerable merit in considering a joint NASA/ESA/ISAS
[Institute of Space and Astronautical Science of Japan] mission which would cover major
parts of solar heliospheric physics of DISCO, SDO and SOHO and at the same time cover
magnetospheric and interplanetary physics and thereby replace IPL of OPEN in con-
junction with the utilization of an enhanced OPEN J as the EML portion of OPEN.
[3] It was agreed that NASA and ESA will set up a preparatory meeting, to which ISAS will
be invited, with two or three representatives from each Agency and one or two represen-
tatives from each of the projects mentioned above. The meeting will be organized by
NASA in Washington DC in late September 1983. The goal of this meeting should be Io
look for joint missions which can satisfy the main scientific requirements in a cost-
effective way.
Following reporting to the advisory committees of the Agencies in
October/November, and a further round of meetings of the preparatory committee and
advisory committees in January 1984, the aim is to define missions which can go into ESA
phase A and NASA studies in approximately March 1984.
4. Planetary Exploration
The ESA/NASA representatives reviewed the status of the plans and studies of the two
Agencies in the area of planetary exploration in order to identify mutually beneficial
opportunities tor cooperative missions.
a) Saturn-Titan Probe Mission
Pending the recommendation of ESA's advisory committees, NASA and ESA agree to
undertake a joint assessment study in 1984 of a Saturn-Titan probe mission for launch
around 1992. This mission would call for an FY 1989 NASA new start. The mission would
he based on the ESA Cassini proposal and on the Titan probe mission identified by
NASA's Solar System Exploration Committee, and would take into account the recom-
mendations of the NAS/ESFJoint Working Group.
b) Small Bodies Rendezvous Mission
NASA and ESA plan to undertake a joint assessment study of a small bodies ren-
dezvous mission using a European Solar Electric Propulsion System for launch in the
1990s. The mission would be based on the ESA Agora proposal and on the Multi-Mainbeh
Asteroid mission identified by NASA's Solar System Exploration Committee, and would
take into account the recommendation of the NAS/ESFJoint Working Group. The orga-
nization and timing of this study will be addressed at the next NASA/ESF Space Science
Planning Meeting.
c) Mars Missions
The Announcement of Opportunity (AO) for the NASA Mars Geoscience-
Climatology Orbiter (MGCO) mission is planned for release in 1985 and, as such, is well
timed for coordination with an ESA AO for a 1992 Kepler mission, if this mission is
approved for launch in that year.
[4] 5. ,Next Meeting
The next ESA/NASA Space Science Planning meeting is scheduled to take place in
the US in December 1983/January 1984.
Burton I. Edelson
Associate Administrator
Space Science Applications
NASA
Roger M. Bonnet
Director
Scientific Programme
ESA
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Paris, 29th June 1983
[5] List of Participants
NASA
Burton Edelson
Charles Pellerin
Shelby Tilford
Frank MacDonald
Geff Briggs
Richard Barnes
Lyn Wigbels
ESA
Roger Bonnet
Vittorio Manno
Edgar Page
Henk Olthof
George Haskell
Gordan Whitcomb
Roger Emery
Arne Pedersen
Brian Taylor
Valerie Hood
Document 1-12
Document fl0e: George M. Low, Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program, to Director, Apollo
Spacecraft Program, "Hag for Lunar Landing Mission," January 23, 1969.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
In his Januar*v 20, 1969, Inaugural Address, Richard Nixon had suggested that "as we. explore the
reaches of space, let us go to the new worlds together--not as new worlds to be conquered, but as a new
adventure to be shared. " Unsure of the intent behind the new president's words, NASA headquarters
began to think of how best to make the first lunar landing appear to be more of an international
accomplishment. To those working on the Apollo program who saw the enterprise primarily in nation-
alistic terms, this was a troubling development. This memorandum from George Low, who had
assumed personal direction of the Apollo spacecraft program after the Apollo 204 capsule fire, gives a
sense of this reaction. George Hage, mentioned in the memorandum, was an official of the Apollo
Program Office at NASA headquarters. The Apollo I 1 mission eventually carried very lightweight
flags of every country, which were returned to Earth and presented, along with a small lunar sample,
to heads of state. A plaque saying "We Came in Peace for All Mankind" was attached to the lunar
lander and left on the Moon.
[1]
AA/Director January 23, 1969
In reply refer t<):
PA-9-1-40
PA/Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program
Flag for lunar landing mission
I received a call fiom George Hage indicating that, in light of Nixon's inaugural
address, many questions are being raised in Headquarters as to how we might emphasize
the international flavor of the Apollo hmar landing. Specifically, it was suggested that we
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might paint a United Nations flag on the LM [Lunar Module] descent stage instead of the
United States flag. My response cannot be repeated here. I feel very strongly that planti-
ng the United States flag on the moon represents a most important aspect of all of our
efforts; I indicated that, from a personal point of view, I would have no objection to car-
rying some small United Nations flags to the moon and bringing them back for subse-
quent presentation to the UN (provided, of course, that they don't weigh too mt, ch).
I thought that you should be aware of these discussions since the subject will proba-
bly come tip again on several occasions.
George M. Low
Document 1-13
Document tide: Thomas O. Paine, NASA Acting Administrator, to President Richard
Nixon, February 12, 1969.
Source: Thomas O. Paine Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.
As Richard M. Nixon assumed the presidency on January 20, 1969, interest in space was at a peak.
The December 1968 Apollo 8 circumlunar mission, commanded by astronaut Frank Borman, had
captured the imagination of the world and cleared the way for an initial lunar landing attempt.
Thomas O. Paine, who had been NASA Deputy Administrator since March 1968 and had become
Acting Administrator after James E. Webb retired in November 1968, stayed on during the presiden-
tial transition. In this lett_ Paine provides to the president an assessment of the space situation in
Europe and of U.S.-European space relations. The Dr. DuBridge mentioned in the letter is Lee A.
DuBridge, the president _ science advisor.
[1] February 12,1969
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
Dr. DuBridge has informed me of your desire for a summary of European space activ-
ities in connection with your forthcoming visit abroad and for advice on space-related
matters that might be appropriate for you to discuss with the Europeans.
Frank Borman's visits are being enthusiastically received and may serve to generate
more interest in space at the time of your trip than would otherwise be the case. The
Borman family is now visiting the countries on your itinerary and we have offered ),our
staff any assistance our people in Europe may be able to give in advance work and arrange-
ments for your trip.
The following brief review covers national and regional space activities in Europe,
European cooperative activities with NASA, and suggested positions which you might take
on both European and cooperative space activities. This review has been coordinated with
the State I)epartment people concerned and accords with their views.
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I have also considered two suggestions for additional ways in which you might express
your personal interest in space cooperation while you are in Europe. One would be
through your participation in a ceremony in Rome to confirm two pending agreements.
The other would be to extend personal invitations to the Chiefs of State you meet to
attend the historic: Apollo 11 launch now scheduled to undertake a lunar landing this
summer. The Department of State feels, however, that both suggestions could create prob-
lems that might outweigh the advantages, and we concur in their view that these propos-
als should not he pursued without fi_rther careful consideration by State.
I - General
Ahhough much stucly and discussion has taken place, the European countries have
not yet defined and agreed upon their individual and joint basic policies in space. They
are making limited [2] investments in national programs at a level of about $300 million
annually. They have pooled resources in two intergovernmental regional bodies: the
European Space Research Organization (ESRO), and the European Launcher
Development Organization (ELDO). These are maintained on a marginal basis only, how-
ever, with severe internal divisions as to purpose, structure, funding level, contract-shar-
ing, and fllttlre direction and pace.
The countries you will visit all belong to the 65-nation communications satellite con-
sortium, Intelsat, for which the US Comsat Corporation is manager and NASA is the
launching agency on a reimbursable basis. Intelsat has made excellent progress toward a
global satellite communications system, but certain quarters (particularly France) argue
that the United States unduly dominates Intelsat through its technological advantages,
large voting rights, designation of the US Comsat Corporation as manager, NASA's posi-
tion as the only source of suitable launch vehicles, and by obtaining (competitively) the
largest share of contracts for US industry. These basic issues will be the subjects of nego-
tiating sessions beginning this month in Washington to arrive at definitive arrangements
for Intelsat's future. Also at issue will be the place, if any, for domestic on regional com-
munications satellite systems inside or outside of the Intelsat.
There has been and continues to be significant and productive cooperation between
NASA on the one hand and the European national space agencies and ESRO on the
other. This includes: a dozen European satellites launched or to be launched by NASA
with fnll international data-sharing, some twenty European experiments contributed for
flight on NASA satellites, dozens of joint scientific sounding rocket latmchings, important
support for meteorological and communications experiments, accommodation and oper-
ation of U.S. tracking and data acquisition facilities overseas, advanced information
exchange programs, and joint fellowship and training programs.
Nevertheless, the European nations have still not determined whether they should
rely ultimately on cooperation with the United States or should develop a completely
independent capability for space operations. Near the heart of this issue is the specific
question in Europe whether they should develop an independent launch capability for
communications satellites, or should remain dependent upon U.S. boosters only, thereby
submitting to the alleged American domination of Intelsat.
In the meantime European Space Agency-NASA cooperation proceeds very satisfac-
torily on the technical level and is proving most productive. It appears limited, however,
to essentially small scientific satellites and one larger undertaking now nearing agreement
with Germany until the above fundamental issue is resolved. Efforts on NASA's part to
increase the scale of cooperation in the past several years have been [3] viewed in Europe
against the background of the Intelsat issue. Thus, we have been suspected of attempting
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to divert European activities toward scientific pursuits and away from "high pay-olF' pro-
jects in space communications, and our offers of boosters for'their satellites have been
interpreted in some quarters as calculated to undermine support for EI,DO's develop-
ment of a European booster. In general, however, you will find a positive view of American
space cooperation, and a very enthusiastic view of NASA in the wake of Astronaut
Borman's highly successful Presidential good-will tour.
H - National Situations
Franceis the third "space power" and the only country besides the U.S. and the USSR
to have launched its own satellites with its own launchers. It possesses an excellent space
laboratory at Bretigny and is developing a unique equatorial-polar launch site in (;uiana.
Cooperation between NASA and its French counterpart (CNES) has been professional,
extensive, and scientifically rewarding. The first French scientific satellite, FR-1, was
launched by NASA in December 1965. Another major French satellite, EOLE, is to be
launched by NASA in 1970 to determine the feasibility of a satellite-balloon system for
mapping global winds systems. Of five French scientific experiments accepted for flight on
NASA satellites, four have already flown.
With respect to other space relationships, France has reflected Gaullist policies, has
sought to dominate both ESRO and ELDO, has led the attempt to direct both organiza-
tions toward local communications satellite objectives, and had led the most severe criti-
cism of alleged U.S. domination of Intelsat. France is now engaged with Germany in an
experimental communications satellite, Symphonie. France is the only western nation to
have reached a cooperative agreement with the Soviet Union for the actual development
of a scientific satellite. This was delayed by French budget cuts and by French scientists'
efforts to obtain access to Soviet launch sites necessary for validating their work, and is
now reported abandoned.
The United Kingdom has contributed three scientific satellites for launching by NASA,
agreement has been reached on a fourth, and a fifth is under consideration. British sci-
entists have also contributed eleven outstanding experiments selected for flight on NASA
satellites (more than any other country) and have made major contributions to ESRO
satellites. This is significant, since the contribution of an individual experiment tot a
NASA satellite may cost the contributing country perhaps $300 thousand. Although
Britain initiated ELDO in [4] 1962, it has led the current movement to scuttle the orga-
nization on grounds of excessive cost, poor reliability, and the ready availability of provenU.S. launch vehicles.
Germany was slow to initiate space activity but is now developing the largest space bud-
get in Europe, over $100 million annually. Two small satellites are being prepared for
launching in 1970 and 1972 on NASA launch vehicles. A space probe will be launched in
1970 by another NASA launch vehicle, and an ambitious solar probe, HELIOS, is in the
final stages of joint definition. This will carry German and U.S. experiments closer to the
sun than has yet been done, again using a U.S. launch vehicle. Germany usually aligns
itself with France on European regional space issues and has joined with France in II_e
Symphonie communications satellite project. These projects are straining Germany's pro-
.ject management capability to the utmost.
Italy has focussed [sic] mainly on cooperative satellite agreements with NASA (signed
in Rome by then Vice-President Johnson in 1962). Under these agreements, Italy has
developed an imaginative launch complex on towable platforms moored in the Indian
Ocean off Kenya.
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Here, the San Marco satellite was launched by Italians using a contributed NASA
booster to make unique measurements of the density of tile spatial medium. A jointly-
insuumented satellite will he launched here in the next cooperative effort in 1970. NASA
has a new agreement pending with Italy for the launching of two U.S. spacecraft from this
complex on a reimbursable basis; the platform's location on the equator permits us to use
smaller boosters than would otherwise be required to achieve eqt, atorial orbits, thereby
saving NASA $2-3 million pet- launch. Italy is the weakest suppt_rtcr fiJr EI.DO and ESRO
at the present time.
The Netherlands and Belgium maintain small but high-quality space science programs,
primarily in selected university laboratories. The principal ESRO laboratory is located in
Holland at Noordwijk. Dutch scientific groups have made contributions to FSRO and
NASA satellites out of all proportion to their modest domestic support. Dutch scientific
and industrial interests are pressing their government to propose the cooperative launch-
ing by NASA of a small but sophisticated astronomical satellite. Both Belgium and
Holland possess excellent laboratory facilities in aeronautics as well as in space science.
Both countries support the regional space institutions in Europe, although Belgium has
tended to follow France's hostile lead with regard to lntelsat.
[5] Ill - Regional Organizations
ESRO is a ten-member intergovernmental agency for the development and operation
of spacecraft and sounding rockets for scientific purposes and practical applications. It
spends about $50 million a ),ear and has developed highly professional facilities at
Noordwijk in Holland, other facilities elsewhere, and a small tracking and data acquisition
network. NASA has, on a cooperative basis, launched ESRO's first two scientific satellites
and, on a reimbursable basis, has launched a third. NASA and ESRO have developed a
sophisticated integrated data exchanged system and conduct a jointly-funding training
program. The ELDO crisis and financial and contract-sharing difficulties have strained
ESRO and currently limit opportunities for enlarging the scale of U.S. cooperation.
EL,DO is a seven-member intergovernmental organization, spending now about $90
million annually to develop a large European launch vehicle. England has developed the
first rocket stage with U.S. technology, France the second stage, and Germany the third,
while Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy are contributing ancillary systems. The
Australian launch site at Woomera has been used for test launchings but the vehicle will
ultimately be shifted to the French Guiana range. The three-stage ELDO launch vehicle
falls between the U.S. Thor and Atlas rockets, but has yet lo function successfully as a
whole, though it probably will in time. Severe cost overruns and a decision by the UK to
discontinue membership after 1971 have thrown ELDO into a serious crisis which jeop-
ardizes its future as well as that of ESRO. ELDO has called on NASA only for minor assis-
tance through visits or discussions relating to technical background and management
systems. U.S. policy has supported both ESRO and ELDO as having European
institutional values. Other U.S. policies, however, conflict to the extent that they restrict
technical assistance which might conceivably be used to support European communica-
tions satellite capabilities inconsistent with Intelsat.
NATO. With regard to larger U.S. policy, efforts were made before the establishment
of ELDO and ESRO to develop a European regional space activity based on NATO.
European interests nevertheless insisted on: (1) projecting an uncompromising civilian
posture in space, (2) making it possible for non-NATO nations like Switzerland and
Sweden to join with others, and (3) preserving the option f_)r an independent European
space efforl.
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It is not yet clear whether Europe will be able to save and strengthen ELDO and
ESRO, although efforts are in progress and the situation is very sensitive, particularly with
regard to putative U.S. motivations [6] and European goals. European leaders have dis-
cussed an ultimate possibility that ESRO and ELDO might be merged into a single
European "NASA" but plans for this purpose are not due for consideration until the end
of this year.
IV - Suggested Positions During Your Trip
We anticipate that the lntelsat question would be the major space-related matter that
might arise during your visit. This is a matter of central concern to the Department of
State and other agencies. NASA is in complete agreement with the State Department's
position that the United States should respond to questions and criticisms on Intelsat to
the effect that these matters are negotiable in the Intelsat definitive negotiations begin-
ning later this month. In particular, the French and German space commissions have
.jointly asked NASA whether we would launch their joint experimental colnmunications
satellite, Symphonie, on a reimbursable basis. With the guidance of the Department of
State, we have responded positively. This was considered the best answer under the cir-
cumstances, though it was recognized that some Europeans would interpret this positive
answer as designed to undercut ELDO's European launcher programs,just as they would
have interpreted a negative answer as designed to monopolize satellite communication
experiments by denying launching assistance in this area to European nations. We believe
it important to continue to maintain as positive a posture on this point as possible.
Against this background, it would appear to us desirable if you could reassure
Europeans, wherever space matters arise, that the U.S. is not seeking to impose its will on
the direction of future West European space activities and that we recognize that
European nations should determine their own courses based on their own assessments of
where their interests lie. If U.S. cooperation can figure positively to our mutual advantage,
it will indeed be available. There is a strong positive interest in NASA to filrther develop
international cooperation in space in both the science and applications areas, on the basis of
mutual interest.
Respectfidly yours,
T. O. Paine
Acting Administrator
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Document 1-14
Document fl0e: Thomas O. Paine, NASA Administrator, to the President, August 12, 1969.
Document 1-15
Document tide: Thomas O. Paine, NASA Administrator, to the President, November 7,
1969.
Document 1-16
Document tide: Thomas O. Paine, NASA Administrator, to the President, March 26, 1970.
Source: All in Thomas O. Paine Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.
These three letters record the initiatives that NASA, and particular& Administrator Thomas O.
Paine, took in the aftermath of the Apollo 11 landing to increase international participation in the
U.S. post-ApoUo space program. Paine believed that he had a mandate directly from President Richard
M. Nixon, delivered as the)., .flew to the Apollo II landing (splashdown) in the Pacific Ocean, to
actively seek enhanced international cooperation. Paine based his briefings to leading officials in other
countries on the future plans laid out in the report of the Space Task Group, chaired by Vice President
Spiro T. Agnew. As the Nixon administration made it clear in early 1970 that it did not intend to
approve the program recommended by the Space Task Group and as the president's advisors raised
concerns about the potential r¢ technology transfer to other countries through cooperative space pro-
grams, the ear 6' enthusiasm about the possibility of major cooperative initiatives faded.
Document 1-14
[ 1] August 12, 1969
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
This is a brief status report on our current eftorts and immediate plans to find new
ways to increase international participation in space programs in the favorable situation
generated by Apollo 11.
1. On August 12, I met with Professor Herman Bondi, l)irector General of the
European Space Research Organization (ESRO), briefed him fully on U.S. post-Apollo
thinking and urged him Io begin serious consideration of new approaches to achieve
more substantial European participation in the manned and unmanned exploration and
utilization of major space systems in the 1970's and 1980's. European thinking with
respect to space activity has been relatively restricted heretofore [because] ESRO's cur-
rent annual budget is slightly over $50 million and the European I.at,nch Development
Organization budget is slightly over $90 million. In addition, individual national efforts
total over $160 million, fi)r a total European space effort of something in excess of
$300 million.
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ProfessorBondiagreedthataseriesofpresentationsshouldbemadebytopNASA
personneltoseniorspaceofficialsin Europewithinthenextfewmonthsto raisetheir
sightstomoreadvancedprojectsofgreatermutualvalue.
2. Toinitiatethesepresentationsandtoconductmoredirectandprivatediscussions
withofficialsin thebestpositiontorespondpositively,I plantobriefsenior(government)
officialsof theEuropeanSpaceConferenceonfiltureU.S.programsandtheconcrete
opportunitiestheywill[have]forrewardingparticipation.I willalsotalkwithMinistersof
Sciencein thethreeprincipalcountriesbutespeciallywithMinisterStoltenbergin West
Germany,whichisprobablyin thebestpositiontoconsidersubstantialnewparticipation.
Whilewecannotachieveimmediatecommitmentsofamajorcharacterfromthesefirst
discussions,wedohopetogainearlyagreementtoanarrangementwhichcouldinvolve
theEuropeansevermorecloselywithusandplacethebenefitsofparticipationconstant-
lyin theirview.Tothisend,I plantoproposetotheleadingEuropeanspaceagenciesthat
theyassociatetheirtopspacexpertswithusinphasedprogramstudieswhichwewillbe
undertakingforimportantpost-Apollomissions.Theknowledgeandinterestwhichwejointlydevelopshouldthenopenthedoortomoresubstantial[2] participationi specif-
ic projectswhichflowoutof thesestudies,andwhichwouldbesuitableforEuropean
attentiontotheopportunitieswhichwouldthendeveloptoassociatetheirownastronauts
withusinfutureprogramsin thecontextofsubstantivejointcontributionstospacexplo-
rationandapplication.Thiscouldgenerategreaterpublicinterestandsupportabroadfor
participationwiththeUnitedStatesin thisventure.
3. ProfessorBondi'smissiontotheU.S.wastoobtaininformationeededtodecide
whethertheEuropeanLaunchDevelopmentOrganizationshouldcontinuethecostly
developmentofanalready-outmodedm iumlaunchvehicle,duplicatingthosewehave
hadforyears,or shouldhaltthisworkandrelyonreimbursablelaunchservicesfrom
NASA.Europeanshaveheretoforef aredthattheU.S.wouldnotprovidelaunchingsfor
regionalcommunicationssatellites,whichhasmotivatedthemtowardsmallindependent
effortsratherthanmajorjointventuresalongthelineswewillbeproposing.Aforthcom-
ingresponsetoDr.BondihasnowbeenobtainedfromtheDepartmentofStateandwill,
wehope,removealong-standingegativeelementintheenvironmentandfacilitateour
discussionslookingtomoresignificantcooperation.IfEuropeshouldnowdecidetoaban-
donitstrouble-plaguedandobsolescentlaunchvehicleprogramin favorof purchasing
U.S.launchings,Europeanfundswouldbefreedformoreconstructivecooperativepur-
posesandamodestadditionaldollarmarketwouldbecreatedforourvehiclesandlaunch
services.
4. Among other promising near-term prospects for significant cooperation with
Europe are a prototype North Atlantic Air Traffic Control and Navigation Satellite
Program, and a Synchronous Meteorological Satellite Program. NASA would develop the
former in partnership with ESRO to meet requirements defined by the Department of
Transportation (FAA) and its European counterparts. The latter would be developed with
the French Space Commission as a contribution to the Global Atmospheric Research
Program. We are pursuing both these prospects energetically.
5. We have recently significantly extended our data exchange arrangements with
ESRO to the point where they now constitute, we believe, the most extensive and sophis-
ticated international data system in existence. ESRO uses NASA computer software sys-
tems and formats to collect the European technical literature and feed it into their own
and into NASA's computer banks making possible a totally integrated space pul)lication
and search system. ESRO has also introduced the NASA Recon (Remote Control) System
to Furope. An international on-line compnlerized aerospace information nelwork is lhus
enabling researchers at a number of scattered locations in Europe and in the U.S. to
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retrieve from tile NASA ESRO data bank in "real time," scientific and technical informa-
tion for immediate use. This is the first international system of its kind and is being stud-
ied both in Europe and this conntry as a model for similiar [sic] systems.
6. NASA welcomes and will participate enthusiastically in the review called for by Dr.
Kissinger to consider U.S. policies on space and other technology exports. This is a time-
ly opportunity to clear away unnecessary restrictions which could seriously obstruct the
increased international activity which you have called for.
[3] 7. With regard to potential cooperation with the Soviet Union, ] have recently writ-
ten top Soviet space authorities offering to discuss carrying Soviet scientists' experiments
of future NASA planetary probes. I am now inviting Soviet scientists to attend a prepara-
tory briefing next month for scientists from many other countries on our Viking Mars mis-
sion with a view to discussing possible participation in that mission and the achievement
of some measure of cooperation between U.S. and Soviet planetary programs. Whether
the Apollo 11 success will moderate past Soviet negativists in this area is not yet clear.
8. Japan, Australia, and Canada are the principal remaining areas whose potential
for greater participation will be carefully explored. I believe NASA has contributed to a
reasonable formulation of the new agreement with Japan to initiale that country's pur-
chase of certain space technology here and we will play a role in providing for the imple-
mentation of the agreement. Under your recent directive, we will provide Canada launch
services for her planned communications satellite system; this action has clearly improved
relationships in this area, and we are already discussing with Canadian officials their active
interest in possible participation in our advanced earth resources technolog,_ satellite
series. I discussed yesterday with our new Ambassador to Auslralia the great services that
have been rendered through Australian operation of our large tracking and data acquisi-
tion complex there and our strong interest in further participation. I expect to visit these
three countries at the earliest opportunity for greater international cooperation in those
quarters.
I will, of course, report to you the results of my forthconting visit to Europe immedi-
ately upon my return.
Respectfully yours,
T. O. Paine
Administrator
Document 1-15
[1] Nov. 7, 1989
The President
The White House
Washington, I).C.
Dear Mr. President:
This is to report to you the results of my recent three-day visit to Europe and related
actions seeking to promote greater international participation in fi_ture U.S. space pro-
grams.
1. On ()ctober 13, 14, and 15, I met with Ministers of Science and senior space pro-
gram officials of the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom plus
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tile Committee of Senior Officials of the European Space Conference in Paris. I described
for them the principal elements of our space program in the next decades--the reusable
Space Shuttle, the multi-purpose space station, and the advanced nuclear stage--as rec-
ommended in the Space Task Group Report. I in_ted their careful study of these plans so
that Europeans might assess the implications for their own planning and determine what
interest they may have in constructive participation with us.
Our audiences were clearly impressed by the prospects for development of an eco-
nontic, shuttle-based space transportation system and by the prospects for a space station
as a platform for work in both practical applications and science. The Europeans appear
to recognize that the shuttle and space station together clearly imply the gradual conver-
gence of manned and unmanned flight programs and that this may well outmode their
pre_fious assumption that automated missions might suffice fi_r Europe in the next
decade.
Our fnndamental objective was to stimulate Europeans to rethink their present limit-
ed space objectives, to [2] help them avoid wasting resources on obsolescent develop-
ments, and eventually to establish more considerable prospects for filture international
collaboration on major space projects. In these respects, 1 believe our visits were more
successful than might have been expected in the present circumstances of very linlited
budgets and organizational difficulties in European space affairs. We were given to under-
stand privately that the general reaction to our discussions was that current European
space planning must indeed be thoroughly reassessed in the light of the opportunities
inherent in the proposed U.S. programs. Chancellor Brandt's speech of last week called
tor increased cooperation in direct response to our suggestions.
2. On October 16 and 17, NASA convened in Washington a conference of industri-
al firms to critique concepts for the Space Shuttle and to lay our design considerations for
next steps in the program to develop the shuttle. At our invitation, some 43 foreign par-
ticipants and observers attended from Germany, France, the UK, Netherlands, Canada,
Sweden, and haly, as well as the European Launcher Development Organization. This
event interacted most favorably with my visit to Europe, lending credibility to my state-
ments that the U.S. would welcome broader participation in our overall prograuts. In
turn, the broad opportunities described during the European visit provided a meaningful
framework for international participation in the Space Shuttle conference. We plan to
continue this pattern of activity to the extent that substantive European interest permits.
3. In the area of earth resources surveys by satellite, we have moved forward in sev-
eral respects to follow through on your recent remarks to the United Nations General
Assembly:
(a) An invitation was circulated to the entire UN membership to send observers to
tile 1969 International Symposium on Remote Sensing of the Environment, conducted at
the University of Michigan last week. Some 41 foreign experts from 12 countries attended.
(b) If suitable arrangements can be made, we plan to invite the United Nations
Outer Space Conmtittee and representatives of the UN specialized agencies to inspect
earth resources program work [3] and facilities at NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center in
Houston at an early date.
(c) We are proceeding with several domestic universities to provide a number of
graduate fellowships covering work in the earth resources disciplines; this fact will be
reported to the Outer Space Affairs Group of the United Nations so that training possi-
bilities will be generally known; and
(d) We are also moving forward with plans for an international workshop in 1970
to review the status of research and experimentation in the earth resources field fi)r all
interested nations.
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4. I believe you know already of the agreement signed by NASA and an Indian coun-
terpart agency in mid-September to make available access to a NASA satellite for an exper-
iment in instructional TV broadcasting to 5,000 remote Indian villages, beginning in
1973. Our ability to make available a share of the time of an advanced satellite in the
course of an on-going program and to suggest a programmatic framework for the exper-
iment stimulated India to a very considerable effort which will include the construction
of augmented TV village receivers, the planning of instructional programs, and the logis-
tics system required to coordinate and support all elements of the system. Such programs
have the greatest implications for benefit to the developing world and for political value
to the United States as a generous source of advanced technology, able to serve the inter-
ests of the LDC's.
5. I have in the past weeks written several times to l'resident Keldysh of the Academy
of Sciences of the Soviet Union. We invited him to send Soviet scientists to a briefing on
our Viking Mars mission with a view to discussing possible participation in that mission as
well as possibilities for ct_ordination between American and Soviet planetary programs.
Another letter assured Keldysh that NASA will welcome proposals from Soviet scientists
for the analysis of hmar samples. Finally, I am forwarding to him copies of the Space Task
Group [4] Report, suggesting that this may be an appropriate time for a meeting to dis-
cuss the possibilities of complementary or cooperative space programs. The exchange of
astronaut/cosmonaut visits may indicate a greater receptivity on their part to such discus-
sions.
Beyond this, I plan visits to Canada, Australia and Japan to provide the same sort of
briefing and open the same opportunities to these nations as in my European visit. I shall
continue to report to you as progress is made in any of the relevant areas and in particu-
lar to the extent that any substantial European interest clew'lops.
Respectfully yours,
T. O. Paine
Administrator
Document 1-16
[1] March 26, 1970
The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
My recent talks in Australia and Japan completed the first round of foreign visits to
discuss our space plans for the next decade and to stimulate consideration of new and'
more extensive international participation in the development and realization of those
plans.
In Australia, I met with the Minister of Supply, his principal colleagues, and senior
officials of the Department of Education and Science. A number of representatives of
other agencies with interest in the practical applications of space technology participated
in broader discussions. My impression is that our proposals for increased international
participation in space activities will receive thoughtful consideration. Australian interest
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will probably focus on future application satellite programs and the possibilities for a role
in operational aspects of space station/Space Shnttle activities.
In Japan, my discussions were with the leadership of the Science and Technics Agency,
the Ministries of Education, International Trade, Transport, Posts and Telecommunica-
tions, Foreign Affairs, and with Japan's space agencies. I was encouraged by evidence of
top-level industrial interest in our programs. Our meetings included a filll afternoon ses-
sion with major corporation executives who are members of the Keidanren, the federa-
tion of Japanese industry. Japan clearly construes its interests in participation in the
proposed international program in hard and practical terms. As one deputy minister stat-
ed,Japan realizes that in the future it must go beyond quality initiative work and move on
to nndertake new, highly creative enterprises. Participation in the proposed major space
development projects for the '70s may offer Japanese industry a unique opportunity for
such technical creativity.
[2] Upon my return to Washington, NASA held an important meeting on March 13
attended by 40 space officials and representatives from 17 countries and fiom the three
regional European space organizations: the European [Space] Research Organization,
the European I_auncher Development Organization, and the European Space
Conference. These visitors participated in a quarterly review by NASA management of
contractor design and definition studies for our space station and Space Shuttle pro-
grams. The principal discussion centered on the potential of these new systems for replac-
ing many of the space systems which had previously been proposed in their development
programs for the 1970's. It seems clear that our proposed space station/Space Shuttle sys-
tems would obsolete many of their proposed developments before they became fully oper-
ational. For this reason our proposals for international participation are receiving
thoughtful attention.
The stakes are high and the issues complex here, so we should expect an extended
period of up to a year during which foreign governments and their space agency officials
will be increasing their grasp of the technical details and potentials of our new space sys-
tems for the '70s. European circles are now giving more serious and open consideration
to the possibilities for their participation (an example is the attached item from today's
Christian Science Monitor). The choices are, however, difficult ones. Many in Europe
believe that they must choose either an independent European space effort of a limited
and retrograde character or commit to a much bolder joint program that will be domi-
nated by the United States. We are discussing with the Department of State the kinds of
assurances of access to and use of the proposed jointly developed new systems that we
should be prepared to give foreign collaborators in order to win their participation.
We will continue to involve foreign space interests in government and industry more
closely with us, to stimulate their interest, and to begin to formulate for their considera-
tion more specific proposals and institutional formats for joint development work.
Respectfully yours,
T. O. Paine
Administrator
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Document 1-17
Document title: Secretary of State, Telegram 93721 for U.S. Ambassador, Tokyo, "Space
Cooperation with Japan," January 5, 1968.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.
This telegram transmitted policy guidance to U.S. Ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson regarding
new initiatives in U.S.Japanese space cooperation. Johnson had pressured his colleagues in
Washington to approve firm-to-firm licensing agreements that would help Japan develop launch a
capability equivalent to an early model of the U.S. Delta booste_, as well as application satellite capa-
bility. NASA and the Department of Defense opposed such an arrangement, but Johnson and the
Department of State prevailed. The terms and conditions .suggested in this telegram were incorporat-
ed in a July 31, 1969, exchange of diplomatic notes.
[ l ] R 050540Z Jan 68
FM SecState WashDC
To AmEmbassy Tokyo 0000
Info CINCPAC...
[2] For Ambassador
Subject: Space Cooperation with Japan
Reference: Tokyo 3837
l. Agreement in November 15 communique between President Johnson and Prime
Minister Sato (para 9) opens way for expanded space cooperation with Japan and we
would like to initiate discussion with [the Government of Japan (GOJ)] to this end. We
consider close cooperation with Japan in field of space very much in US interest. Such
cooperation, first, entirely consistent with our basic relationship with Japan and national
policy of closest possible partnership with Japan in both bilateral relations and joint
actions to strengthen non-Communist position in east Asia. [Remainder of paragraph
excised during declassification review]
2. Therefore, on basis of discussions with you here, we have developed following pol-
icy regarding space cooperation with Japan:
A. Under NSAM 338, we are prepared to cooperate in all aspects of communi-
cations satellite development and launch on the assumption that both governments will
continue to act in sphere in conformity with their INTELSAT commitments.
[2] Therefore, we would approve technology transfers only after determining to our sat-
isfaction that it would be used only in (i) purely experimental (as opposed to operational)
systems or (ii) operationally domestic systems compatible with INTELSAT arrangements
as they evolve. FYI--Neither Japanese nor we are in position to predict just what arrange-
ments for satellite ownership and control other than by INTELSAT will be reflected in
renegotiated INTELSAT agreements. However, President Johnson, in his message of
August 14 (CA 1299, dated August 15), committed us t¢_ support continuation of
INTELSAT and to avoid course of action which is incompatible with our support for a
global system. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to indicate to Japanese
that we could not assist them if their policy is to contrary. End FYI.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 47
B. [Paragraph excised during declassification review]
C. Only unclassified US technology is involved.
D. There must be Japanese [government] commitment on third country con-
trols transferes [sic] of technology derived from US cooperation to Communist China and
Soviet Union must be explicitly excluded. Sales or technical exchanges involving other
third countries will require prior US [Government]/GOJ agreement, based on common
policy for US and GOJ suppliers.
E. [Paragraph excised during declassification review]
[4] 3. Guidelines for review of applications for licenses, export of equipment or tech-
nology will be:
A. [Paragraphs A and B excised during declassification review]
C. Licenses for export of equipment or technology will be granted if equipment
or technology is unclassified and related to an identified Japanese peaceful space program
or objective:
and
D. We are satisfied that end-use of technology applied to communications satel-
lites will be consistent with INTELSAT arrangements as they develop.
4. On basis above, we propose moving ahead with GOJ along following lines:
A. We anticipate space cooperation could be extended at two levels: (1) govern-
ment-to-government and/or agency-level agreements in specific joint projects, including
provision of reimbursable launch services and (2) industry-to-industry licensing arrange-
merits requiring government approval under munitions control procedures and consis-
tent with provisions of NSAM 338.
B. We are prepare [sic] to adopt positive position in all areas of peacefill space
cooperation including technology, reimbursable launch services, and assistance in devel-
opment of launch vehicles nessary [sic] for application satelites [sic].
C. The Japanese should understand that we take our commitment to INTELSAT
seriously and would not act inconsistently with it. Therefore, we would approve technolo-
gy transfers [5] only after determining to our satisfaction that it would be used only in
(i) purely experimental (as opposed to operational) systems or (ii) operationally domes-
tic systems compatible in INTELSAT arrangements as they evolve.
D. We would want an agreement with Japanese government (preferably through
exchange of notes) covering two points:
(1) Technology or equipment transferred under either government-to-
government agreements or industry-to-industry arrangements will be for peaceful pur-
poses except as may be otherwise mutually agreed; and,
(2) Technology or equipment derived from US cooperation cannot be trans-
ferred under any circumstances to Communist China or the Soviet Union and can be
transferred to other third countries only after mutual agreement based on common
export policies.
5. We suggest you undertake appropriate discussions with GOJ. If, in your judgment,
GOJ [is] sincere on end-use technology consistent with INTELSAT arrangements, we will
be in position to move ahead vis-a-vis NSAM 338 on government, agency, and later on
industry levels as appropriate. Action on proposals involving NSAM 294 would be under-
taken following appropriate agreement as set forth [in] para 3 D above. When it becomes
clear that such an arrangement is acceptable to the Japanese, we would want to undertake
appropriate congressional consultation prior to formalizing agreement with the Japanese.
(;P-3 Rusk
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Document 1-18
Document Title: Arnold W. Frutkin, NASA Assistant Administrator for International
Affairs, to Administrator, "Canadian Interest in Remote Manipulator Technology to be
Used with the Space Shuttle," April 3, 1972.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
After President Nixon gave his go-ahead to the Space Shuttle program on January 5, 1972, it was
time to decide what contrilmtions, if any, other countries might make to the program. While U.S.-
European negotiations on this question were rather acrimonious, the discussions on a Canadian con-
tribution proceeded relatively smoothly. This memorandum summarizes the prospects for U.S.-
Canadian post-Apollo cooperation as of early 1972; a final agreement that Canada would contribute
a remote manipulator system (later named "Canadarm ") to the Space Transportation System wct_
reached in 1975. NASA Administrator James Fletcher, in a hand_trritten note to NASA staffer Donald
Morris on the first page of this memorandum, stated: "O.K. to start discussions, fret let's not get as
far into it as we have on the shuttle (Post-Apollo) with the Europeans. I don't want any embarrass-
ment if we decide not to go ahead."
[1] APR 3, 1972
Memorandum
TO: A/Administrator
FROM: I/Assistant Administrator for International Affairs
SUBJECT: Canadian interest in remote manipulator technolo_, to be used with the
Space Shuttle
The only result of the NASA offer to the Canadians on post- Apollo participation has
been interest in possible development of remote manipulator equipment which might be
used in the Space Shuttle to service the Large Space Telescope [LST], and possibly other
orbiting spacecraft. This offer stems from a specialized Canadian capability and technol-
ogy resulting from the development of extensible booms for use in space, and the partic-
ular requirements of their nuclear power reactors--which are fi_eled without shutting
down.
Two methods are now under consideration for servicing of the Large Space
Telescope. The first involves a special RAM-telescope combination which would be ser-
viced by technicians entering the RAM from the docked Space Shuttle for fihn and sub-
system recovery and replacement. The second involves the use of an end-effector
deployed by a technician-operator from the Shuttle, and designed to detach and replace
equipment packages on the Large Space Telescope. Current study activity sponsored by
[the Office of Manned Space Flight] is directed to a choice between these two options
sometime next summer.
The Canadian Department of Trade, Industry and Commerce would like to have a
Canadian industry team assist in a Goddard-conducted interface study of the Space
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Shutde and LST, which will explore the second option described above. Their goal is to
indicate sincere Canadian interest in hardware development participation, to promote
better understanding in Canada of the factors which would be involved in possible
Canadian participation in any subsequent development effort, and to demonstrate to
NASA what they have to offer.
[2] In considering possible Canadian association in this early study phase, we have exam-
ined the following factors relevant to subsequent hardware development:
1. Remote manipulator technology related to the LST would not affect tile Space
Shuttle development schedule. It would involve relatively simple interfaces with the
Shuttle itself. The Shuttle Program would develop the basic manipulator and the
Canadians would develop tile end-effector to attach to the manipulator.
2. The development of remote manipulator end-effectors is not comparable to the
kinds of "bits and pieces" of the Space Shutde central to current discussions of post-Apollo
participation. Maniptdator end-effectors are related more to the payloads under consid-
eration than to the development of the Shuttle itself.
3. The Canadians have a very special capability in this field which our people feel
would be of benefit to the program.
4. Canadian association in the study effort and in a subsequent development effort
would not require transfer of US technology to Canada. Interface and parametric data will
be provided.
5. Although the Canadians would expect us to agree to procure a certain number of
production units (in the same manner we have suggested to the Europeans we would be
prepared to do in the case of Sortie modules or Tugs) the ratio of development cost to
production costs is reasonable. Goddard estimates that development of a manipulator to
work with the LST would cost the Canadians about $7-9 million while the cost per unit for
production should be about $2.5 million.
Both [Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight] Dale Myers and I believe this
proposed activity lies more in the area of "separable items" than in "bit and pieces" of the
Shuttle and that NASA would stand to benefit from Canadian participation in develop-
ment of remote manipulators if this option is chosen by [the Office of Manned Space
Flight]. Therefore, unless you feel [3] differently we would propose to respond positively
to the Canadian request to work with us on the current interface study on a no-
commitment basis along the lines of the attached draft letter. I would, of course, discuss
this with State and John Walsh before proceeding.
Arnold W. Frutkin [initialed]
Document 1-19
Document title: Peter M. Flanigan, "Memorandum for John Erlichman," February 16,
1971, with attached: Clay T. Whitehead, "Memorandum for Mr. Peter Flanigan," February
6, 1971.
Source: Nixon Project, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.
Thomas Paine, supported by the Department of State, had taken a bullish approach to expanded
international space cooperation. Paine, howev_ was frustrated by. the Nixon administration _
unwillingness to approve a large post-Apollo space program, and he resigned in September 1970.
Depu(_ Administrator George Low, who had come to Washington from Houston after the Apollo 1 1
mission, became Acting Administratm: Within the _71ite House staff, Assistant to the Pre._ident Peter
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Flanigan had responsibilit_ ['or policy oversight of NASA. His assistant, Clay 7: "Tom" Whitehead,
worked with Flanigan on NASA and telecommunications policy issues, even after he _came the direc-
tor of the newly established Office of Telecommunications Policy. This memorandum is an early indi-
cation of the split within the executive branch over the approach to be taken with respect to European
involvement in the. post-Apollo program. President Nixon had made it clear that he wanted increased
international cooperation, but just what that meant was a subject of some debate within top policy
circles.
[1] February 16, 1971
Memorandum for John Erlichman
FROM: PETER. M. FleXNIGAN
Attached is a thoughtful memorandum which I asked Tom Whitehead to prepare on
NASA. One obvious use of this memorandum is to give it to the new Administrator when
he comes on board (1 am expecting that Jim Fletcher will take the job in about four
weeks).
You will particularly note the discussion starting in the middle of page two regard-
ing international cooperation in space. I suggest that either you or I, or both of us, talk to
the President about this before we get ourselves too deeply committed. If the President is
not, as I suspect, committed to the current sharing program, then I think I should imme-
diately get George Low in and discuss with him the kind of international cooperation that
is desired.
[attachment page 1] February 6, 1971
Memorandum for Mr. Peter Flanigan
This Administration has never really faced up to where we are going in Space. NASA,
with some help fi'om the Vice President, made a try in 1969 to get the President commit-
ted to an "ever-onward-and-upward" post-Apollo program with continued budget growth
into the $6-10 billion range. We were successful in holding that off at least temporarily, but
we have not developed any theme or consistency in policy. As a result, NASA is both drift-
ing and lobbying for bigger things [parenthetical comment: "'the bigger the best' cor-
rect"]--without being forced to focus realistically on what it ought to be doing. They are
playing the President's vaguely defined desire for international cooperation for all it's
worth, and no one is effectively forcing them to put their cooperative schemes in any per-
spective of whether they are good or not so good, what are lheir side effects, and are they
worth the candle. For the last two years, we have cut the NASA budget, hut they manage
each year to get a "compromise" of a few hundred million on their shuttle and space sta-
tion plans, ls the President really going to ignore a billion or so of sunk costs and indus-
try expectations when he gets hit for the really big money in a ),eat or two?
I will try to be constructive by sketching out a few thoughts on the subject that might
suggest what we should do about all this.
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NASA is--or should beimaking a transition from rapid razzle-dazzle growth and
glamour to organizational maturi W and more stable operation for the long term. Such a
transition requires wise and agile management at the top if it is to be achieved successfid-
ly. NASA has not had that. (Tom Paine may have had the ability, but he lacked the incli-
nation-preferring to aim for continued growth.) They have a tremendous overhead
structure, far too large for any reasonable size space program, that will have m be
reduced. There will be internal morale problems of obvious kinds. The bright young
experts attracted by the Apollo adventure are leaving or becoming middle-aged bureau-
crats with vested interests and narrow perspectives. (Remember when atomic power was a
young glamour technology? Look at [the Atomic Energy Commission] now and you see
what NASA could easily become.)
[2] There needs to be a sense of direction, both publicly and within NASA. The
President's statement on the seventies in space laid the groundwork, but no one is fol-
lowing up. What do we expect of a space program? We need to define a balance of sci-
ence, technology development, applications, defense, international prestige and the like;
but someone will have to do that in a way that really controls the program rather than vice-
versa. In particular, we need a new balance of manned and unmanned space activivy, for
that one dimension has big implications for everything else. We need a more sensible bal-
ance of overhead expenditures and money for actual hardware and operations; the aero-
space industry could he getting a lot more business than they are, I suspect, with the same
overall NASA budget if we could get into all that overhead.
NASA is aggressively pursuing European funding for their post-Apollo progra,n. It
superficially sounds like the "cooperation" the President wants, but is this what the
President would really want if we really thought it through? We have not yet decided what
we want our post-Apollo program to be or how fast it will go, but if NASA successfully gets
a European commitment of $1 billion, the President and the Congress will have been
locked into NASA's grand plans because the political cost of reneging would be too high.
l assume the President wants space cooperation as a way of building good will and reduc-
ing international tensions. But it does not follow that all joint ventures will have that
effect. INTELSAT, for example, is a fully cooperative space venture and less political than
the post-Apollo effort now envisaged would be, but most would agree it has been more of
a headache than a joy and has created new tensions and contentions rather than good will
and constructive working relationships. [parenthetical comment: "yes!"] Finally, the U.S.
trade advantage in the future will increasingly depend on our technological know-how.
The kind of cooperation now being talked up will have the effect of giving away our space
launch, space operations, and related know-how at 10 cents on the dollar. [parenthetical
emphasis: "!!"] It does seem to me that taking space operations out of the political realm
and putting it more nearly in the commercial area would diminish international bicker-
ing and give U.S. high technology industries the advantages and opportunities they
deserve; this may or may not prove fully feasible but the point is, no one in this
Administration is seriously trying to find out.
[3] The key thing missing, I think, is management attention to these issues. We need a
new Administrator who will turn down NASA's empire-building fervor and turn his atten-
tion to (1) sensible straightening away of internal management and (2) working with [the
Office of Management and Budget] and White House to show us what broad but concrete
alternative the President has that meet[s] all his various objectives. [parenthetical con>
ment: "implying Paine was not"] In short, we need someone who will work with us rather
than against us, and will seek progress toward the President's stated goals, and will shape
the program to reflect credit on the President rather than embarrassment. We need a gen-
eralist who can understand dedicated technical experts rather than the opposite. But we
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alsoneedsomeonein thcExecutiveOfficewhohasthetime,inclination,andauthorityto
coordinatepolicyaspects.Separatehandlingofpolitical,budget,echnical,andinterna-
tionalaspectsofNASAplanningheremeansthatwehavenoeffectivecontroloverthe
courseofeventsbecansealltheseaspectsareinterrelated.
Wereallyoughtodecideif wemeantomuddlethroughonspacepolicyfortherest
ofthePresident'sterminofficeorwantogetseriousabouti .
ClayT.Whitehead[signed"Tom"]
Document 1-20
Document title: Memorandum from Edward E. David, Jr., Science Advisor, for Henry
Kissinger and Peter Flanigan, "Post-Apollo Space Cooperation with the Europeans," July
23, 1971, with attached: "Technology Transfer in the Post-Apollo Program" and Henry A.
Kissinger, National Security Advisor, to William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, no dates.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Document 1-21
Document tide: George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, to NASA Administrator,
"Items of Interest," August 12, 1971.
Source: James C. Fletcher Papers, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of
Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah.
These two documents give a sense of the state of discussion on post-ApoUo cooperation during the sum-
rner of 1971. The president "sscience advisor, Edward David, was one of those in the White House try-
ing to find a position acceptable to those holding more nationalistic views, such as Peter Flanigan,
and those in the State Department and NASA's international office taking a more internationalist
perspective. James Fletcher had become NASA Administrator in May 1971, and George Low, who had
been Acting Administrator from the time that Thomas Paine left in September 1970 until Fletcher was
sworn in May 1971, had returned to his position as Deputy Administrator. Fletcher and Low worked
closely together in dealings urith the White House and the Executive Office of the President and let each
other know what the, were doing through frequent private memoranda.
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Document 1-20
[t] July 23, 1971
Memorandum for
Henry Kissinger
Peter Flanigan
Subject: Post-Apollo Space Cooperation with the Europeans
Background
It was agreed at our meeting with Jim Fletcher on April 23, 1971, that NASA should
prepare an evaluation of (1) the degree of technology transfer to the Europeans, which
would take place if the proposed U.S.-European cooperation on development of a space
transportation system (STS) were to materialize; and (2) alternative subjects for U.S.-
European cooperation. 1 have now reviewed NASA's informal paper (summary attached)
and discussed the subject with Jim Fletcher, who concurs with the course of action rec-
ommended in this memorandum.
Pending fi_rther consideration of the details of the NASA analysis, and additional dis-
cussions at the technical level between the U.S. and European space groups, I am not pre-
pared to have the U.S. commit itself to this cooperative program of STS development.
Although the NASA study (concurred in by Jim Fletcher) suggests that the technology
transfer question as well as management complications are not of significant proportions,
my personal concerns on these points have not yet been answered to my full satisfaction,
nor can they be answered until there is a better understanding of the potential European
contribution. Furthermore, U.S. shuttle planning is not sufficiently definitive at present
to permit any agreement on the shuttle with the Europeans in the near futt,re.
Nonetheless, I do believe that a resumption of technical-level discussions with the
Europeans would be in order at this time for the purpose of more clearly defining, with-
out any precommitment, the potential interests and contributions of both sides.
[2] It is also apparent from recent telegrams from Europe that a reply to Minister Theo
Lefe_Te's letter to Alex Johnson of March 3, requesting a statement of the U.S. position
on post-Apollo space cooperation, cannot he delayed much longer. Europe's space offi-
cials must move ahead with their own planning for the future. I believe this matter can be
resolved by separating the issue into two components and addressing each separately.
The urgent question before the Europeans is whether U.S. launchers will be available
at a fair price and on a non- discriminatory basis for launching European satellites. If the
answer is no, the Europeans will likely proceed to develop their own EUROPA-III launch
vehicle, with little or no funds left for cooperation with the U.S. in any areas; if yes, they
will most probably abandon their launcher development plans, freeing funds for
increased cooperation with the U.S. and/or for other space developments of their own.
The first alternative would require European expenditures of almost a billion dollars
to build a launch capabilitywhich has already existed in the United States for several years.
In the process, it will doubtless engender some bitterness on the part of those countries
who oppose this choice on practical grounds, but would feel constrained to support it on
political grounds. However, this approach will by 1976-78 provide the Europeans with a
capability to launch their own geosynchronous satellites independently of U.S. vie_,s or
influence.
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The second ahernative would perpetuate European dependence on tile U.S. for
launch services, would generate sales for U.S. booster manufacturing firms, and would
preserve the chance for a major European input to a cooperative program with the U.S.
This alternative would seem more attractive than the first for hmger-range U.S. interests.
Although the availability of U.S. launchers might also enable the Europeans to com-
pete with U.S. firms tor satellite construction contracts fi-om other countries, both the
U.S. aerospace industry and I believe that this would not be a significant commercial
threat, in view of our vastly superiority [sic] satellite technology.
[3] Recommendation
Accordingly, l propose that we separate the two elements of launch assurances and
space cooperation and that State be advised to proceed along the lines of the attached
draft letter to Bill Rogers. If you are in agreement, l believe this course of action provides
a satisfactory exit fiom the present impasse.
Edward E. l)avid, Jr.
Science Advisor
Attachments
[Attachment page I]
Technology Transfer in the Post-Apollo Program
As background for a decision on the course of action to be pursued in defining a
mutually acceptable set of tasks for European participation in the post-Apollo space pro-
gram, NASA was asked to examine the implications of cooperation in Space Shuttle devel-
opment, particularly fiom the standpoint of technology, transfer. The detailed report on
this effort is attached.
One conclusion of the NASA study was that development of specific components of
the shuttle, such as the vertical tail or elements of the attitude control system by the
Europeans could provide technology benefits to both the United States and Europe, and
that the transfer of critical technology to Europe would be a relatively small percentage of
the program value. European development of the space tug might entail a broader range
of technology transfer, but would he amenable to some controls. Other potential cooper-
ative projects in the Post-Apollo Program such as payload modules would generally fall
between these two cases. European cooperation in payload development could vary from
zero transfer to modest transfer, depending on the policies we choose to follow in select-
ing and approving proposals.
In general, it has been understood that the major thrust of our international post-
Apollo effort is to obtain foreign contributions primarily through the exercise of foreign
capabilities and not through utilization of U.S. technology, transferred abroad for that
purpose. It is already widely understood abroad that NASA means to accept foreign par-
ticipation only in those tasks for which Europe has an existing or potential capability and
that this capability must be validated by joint teams from NASA, NASA's contractors, and
the foreign governments concerned. If we could determine in some cases that it is in our
own interest to provide certain elements of a task in order to make possible larger foreign
contribution, we will still retain an option to provide those elements either as technology or,
if they are partictflarly sensitive in character, on a "black-box" or end-product basis.
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[2] It was.judged that the transfer of management knowhow and systems engineering
capability that would occur as a byproduct of European participation with the U.S. ill a
large-scale development such as the shuttle would be one of the principal objectives of
such European participation. The significance of the transfer that might take place is
open to question, and future implications are difficult to assess.
In the longer term, the impact of transfer of technology or management expertise will
depend more upon the degree to which these elements can be transferred to other activ-
ities in the commercial sector, than upon their direct application to advanced space sys-
tems. It has been our experience that transfer of aerospace technical capabilities to other
commercial areas has not been an easy or very successful process.
At the present time, direct commercial benefits from use of space systems have been
restricted to communications satellites operated by the Intelsat Consortium. European
contractors are playing an increasing role in supplying subsystems, satellites and ground
elements of the Intelsat system. In the future, there may be additional space-based systems
that provide income to the supplier from sale of satellites and services in areas such as nav-
igation, traffic control, mobile communications, pollution monitoring, earth resources
and crop surveys, and an increase in technical sophistication in European industry would
enable a greater degree of competition with potential U.S. suppliers. In a meeting with
U.S. aerospace industry managers, it was quite apparent that they are not concerned
about being unable to compete for such contracts with European firms, as a resnh of
cooperation on post-Apollo or the technology transfer which might ensue.
Furthermore, it is characteristic that the service provided by a space system is interna-
tional in nature, requiring agreements and cooperation between nations if the potential
benefits are to be realized. In the future, therefore, the U.S. is likely to depend upon the
ties that can be developed with other nations in order to insure a role for U.S. industry
and U.S. interests in service pro_4ded by space systems. It would be preferable to develop
cooperative programs that foster these tips, rather than to force nations to develop capa-
bilities that permit decisions independent of the U.S. Similarly, in a commercial sense, it
is likely to be of greater value to involve many nations in cooperative systems with shared
contracting than to see separate systems developed that may isolate the U.S.
[3] The previous record of major cooperative development programs, such as Skyboh,
the Main Battle Tank, US/FRG fighter aircraft, and Concorde, have left some doubt
whether such programs foster closer ties between the participants or act as an irritant
which limits flfll development of cooperative relationships. The record of cooperative
space projects conducted by NASA, on the other hand, has been excellent and provides
an indication of those characteristics which produce favorable resuhs fiom cooperative
enterprises. The), are in part:
(1) Mutual interest and mutual benefits.
(2) Financial contributions by both partners--usually no transfer of fimds.
(3) Clearly defined interfaces and objectives.
(4) Capability for performance of agreed tasks can be assured.
While the scale of potential European participation in the shuttle program is much larg-
er than previous programs, it appears possible to define tasks that meet these criteria.
One of the principal European contributions to the Space Shuttle program could be
development of the Space Tug. This propulsion module would represent a major tech-
nological and economic challenge to Europe, and would fit the above criteria--particu-
larly the ability to define interfaces and objectives clearly, since there would be minimum
impact on design characteristics of the respective systems, as a result of changes within
each element. The U.S. will be required to have some technical involvement in the devel-
opment of Ihc Tug, and in general, some technology support would be required for both
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the propulsion and avionics modules, as well as in total systems engineering. As the pro-
gram develops, some additional technology may be required to alleviate unanticipated
problems which arise.
In the filture, it is expected that there will be sustained production of the Space Tug
and that it will be used l_)r both DOD and NASA missions. This would imply dependence
upon a European supplier, or alternatively development of an independent U.S. produc-
tion capability, perhaps on a license basis.
[4] A similar, highly separable component of the shuttle system that would be an attrac-
tive candidate for European development is a Research and Applications Module that
would be used as the payload of a shuttle orbiter, providing a structure for observing
instruments and other experiments, either manned or man-attended. In addition,
European technology appears adequate to support design and construction of major
structural elements of the shuttle such as wing and tail surfaces and the thrusters for the
auxiliary propulsion and control system.
Alternatives to major participation in shuttle system development are limited, partic-
ularly in view of the unique scope, challenge, and economic implication of the shuttle
program; the narrow focus of European space interests; the degree to which the U.S. is
considered abroad to be committed to welcoming post-Apollo participation; and the wide
range of existing international space programs and overtures by the U.S. None of the
alternative cooperative ventures that have been developed appear to be acceptable, either
individually or collectively', as replacements for shuttle participation. They may be pur-
sued, however, on their own merits. If the U.S. should withdraw fiom the Shuttle program
or decide to pursue it unilaterally, discussions of possible other projects would certainly
continue.
A final question concerns launch assurance. It is generally understood that Europe
desires assured access to U.S. launchers on a fee basis if she is to give up the development
of her own launch vehicles so as to free funds for contribution to post-Apollo tasks. The
response which the U.S. gave last September on this question was widely regarded as sat-
isfactory in Europe but has since been reversed in part and become confused.
A restatement of the U.S. policy regarding provision of launch services, valid for all
nations, is being developed through the interagency committee on space cooperation
established under NSSM 72, and, if approved, should reduce European concerns about
launch assurances and separate this issue from the question of post-Apollo cooperation.
The proposed policy statement would have the effect of assuring availability of launch ser-
vices for payloads lhal are for peaceful purposes and are consistent with international
agreements.
[Attachment page 1]
Dear Bill:
Uncertainties in U.S. domestic shuttle planning and a need tor additional review of
the problems of technology transfer and management complications in undertaking a
joint program of space transportation system (STS) developmenl with the Europeans have
delayed this reply to your letter to the President of March 23.
Although that re_5ew is not yet complete, the President feels it is now possible to devel-
op a reply to Minister l.ef_vre and the European Space Conference (ESC) and to resume
a dialogue with the Europeans; however, in a way that d_ws not condition U.S. launch
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assurances for European payloads upon substantial European participation in a joint STS
program, but treats each of these two matters separately.
A first priority would be to prepare a position for discussion with the Europeans, indi-
cating U.S. willingness to provide launch assurances for foreign satellites of a peacefill
nature. Language acceptable to the Europeans, but recognizing overall U.S. obligations
to Intelsat, should be sought for such assurances.
[2] However, one possible formulation which would be acceptable to the President, if
such a degree of assurance is necessary to avoid European charges that the U.S. seeks to
retain a veto over their space plans, would provide for launch services by the U.S. of for-
eign systems approved under Article 14 of the definitive arrangements of Intelsat; and
would permit sale of the necessary launch vehicle for "unapproved" systems, leaving to the
launching nation the interpretation of its obligations under Article 14.
Renewed discussions with the ESC about post-Apollo cooperation should be under-
taken at the technical working level. Their purpose would be to seek to define a possible
cooperative relationship between Europe and the U.S. in a program of STS development,
with full understanding that no commitment on either side is expected or assured until
tile results of these discussions have been referred to the involved governments for review
and final decision. Although no cooperative programs have been discussed in the present
context with the Europeans to compare in magnitude with STS development, it will be
useful in the course of these talks to keep in mind the full range [3] of potential cooper-
ative opportunities, in the eventuality that a satisfactory agreement is not reached on the
STS program and assuming that the Europeans do respond to the offer of U.S. launch
assurances by abandoning EUROPA-III.
The President hopes that this course of action will address the pressing European con-
cern regarding launcher availability, will permit a continued dialogue with the Europeans
directed toward mutually beneficial space cooperation with full protection of U.S. inter-
ests, and will avoid locking the U.S. prematurely into a commitment or schedule for the
STS.
Sincerel_
Henry A. Kissinger
Honorable William E Rogers
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
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Document 1-21
[1] August 12, 1971
Memorandum
TO: A/Administrator
FROM: AD/Deputy Administrator
SUBJECT: Items of Interest
Kissinger Meeting
Attendees were Ed David, Alex Johnson, Tom Whitehead, Herman Pollack, Arnold
Frutkin, Kissinger's new staff man whose name is Michael Guhin, and Low.
On the subject of launch services, Johnson proposed that the United States would
guarantee launch services if (a) there is a positive two-thirds finding by the INTELSAT
body that the launch should proceed; or (b) in the absence of such a finding, if the
United States itself is not opposed to the launch. Johnson believed that in the context of
a post-Apollo participation (which presumably the Europeans want), they would be will-
ing to accept this formula of launch assurances. David and Whitehead, on the other hand,
believed that these assurances do not go far enough, that they constitute a "blatant U.S.
veto," and that we should in addition offer to sell launch vehicles to the Europeans to
launch from their own soil for whatever peaceful purposes they desire.Johnson indicated
that this would be unacceptable to COMSAT and Senator Pastore. Low did not enter into
the discussion in any major way, but did support Ed David's point of view.
On the subject of technology transfer Kissinger understands that this transfer would
not be large and would be essentially controllable. He also understands [2] that what
would be transferred and what is desired by the Europeans is s),stems engineering and sys-
tems management know-how.
On the subject of continuing the technical discussions with the Europeans, David and
Whitehead felt that the shuttle should be de-emphasized in these discussions and that,
instead, the "content" of the space program should be emphasized. After some debate on
this subject, it was agreed that technical discussions on the Space Shuttle/space tug could
be continued, btu that they would be broadened to include payloads as well.
In the context of the technical discussions with the Europeans, I had an opportunity
to mention the significance of our recent budgetary guidelines. Although I did this in a
relatively low key way, Kissinger immediately reached a conclusion that we had been given
a guideline that would essentially stop manned space flight for the United States, which
was confirmed by Whitehead. David, on the other hand, stated that this was only a pre-
liminary guideline to "force NASA to consider alternatives to the \,ery expensive shuttle
concept." Kissinger stated dlat stopping manned space flight in the United States is entire-
ly unsatisfactory, and that he would do everything in his power to prevent this from
happening.
The conclusion of the meeting was that Kissinger would notify Alex Johnson by the
end of the week (by August 13th) of his decisions in all these matters. In the meantime,
the State Department (with Arnold Frutkin's help) is drafting a response to Lefevre's
February letter. In this response, the current United States position on launch assurances
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willbestated,andacontinuationof thetechnicaldiscussionsonpost-Apollo,pluspap
loads,willbeurged.FrutkinunderstandsthatfromNASA'spointofview,wewouldliketo
delaythestartofdiscussionsuntilatleastSeptember30th,sothatwecanhavemadeup
ourownmindconcerningtheshuttlein thecontextof theFiscalYear1973budget
posture....
Document 1-22
Document title: Department of State Telegram, "Johnson Letter to Lefevre," September
7, 1971.
Source: James C. Fletcher Papers, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of
Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah.
This telegram communicated to concerned U.S. officials, including the U.S. embassy in Brussels,
Belgium, the text of a letter from Under Secretar_ of State U. Alexis Johnson to Belgian Minister Theo
Lefevre. As the chairman of the European ,Space Conference, Lefevre led the European delegation in
negotiations with the United States concerning launch assurances and post-Apollo cooperation. This
letter spelled out the conditions under which the United States would provide launch services for
European satellites. It also discussed issues with respect to European participation in the U.S. post-
Apollo program. The letter was the product of more than six months of debate within the executive
branch in Washington. While the launch assurances were not totally acceptable to Europe, the letter
did c&ar the path for additional discussions of post-Apollo cooperation.
[1] R 012307Z Sep 71
FM SecState WashDC
To AmEmhassy Bern . . .
[2] Subject: Johnson Letter to Lefevre
Refs: A) State CA-5237 October 9, 1970
B) State 30947 Feb 24, 1971
C) Brussels 774 Mar 6, 1971
l. Under Secretary Johnson has written a letter to the Honorable Theo Lefevre,
Chairman, European Space Conference, Brussels in response to Lefew'e's letter of March
3, 1971, Ref (C). Instructions for action posts given in paras 7 and 8 below:
2. Letter is dated September 1, 1971 and is marked "confidential" in view of US
desire to avoid public discussion at this time. Text follows:
Quote Dear Minister Lefevre: Para This letter is in response to yours of March 3, 1971,
concerning possible European participation in post-Apollo space programs. It sets out our
current views on the matters of consequence which were involved in our discussions this
past February and in September, 1970. It overtakes my letter to you of October 2, 1970.
Para I regret that it has not been possible to respond to you earlier. We felt that our
mutual interests would be served best if we took sufficient time to review our position care-
fiflly in the light of your letter and of events since our discussions in February. As I stated
during those discussions, our ultimate views on most of these matters remain contingent
on choices yet to he made in Europe as to the measure and character of European par-
ticipation and on fluther development of our own plans for post-Apollo programs.
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Para Since we have understood that the [3] matter of greatest concern to the
European Space Conference is the availability of launchers for European satellite projects,
we have reviewed our position so as to meet the concerns expressed in your letter and dur-
ing our earlier discussions. Our new position in this regard, described in the numbered
paragraphs below, is not conditioned on European participation in post-Apollo programs.
I believe it should provide a basis for confidence in Europe in the a_ilability of US launch
assistance.
Specifically:
Para (1.) We recognize the concern of the European Space Conference with regard
to the availability of launch assistance for European payloads. In this respect US launch
assistance will be available for those satellite projects which are for peaceful purposes and
are consistent with obligations under relevant international agreements and arrange-
ments, subject only to tile following:
Subpara (A) With respect to satellites intended to provide international public
telecommunications services, when the definitive arrangemenLs for INTELSAT come into
force the US will provide appropriate launch assistance for those satellite systems on
which INTELSAT makes a favorable recommendation in accordance with Article XIV of
its definitive arrangements. If launch assistance is requested in the absence of a favorable
recommendation by INTELSAT, we expect that we would provide launch assistance for
those systems which we had supported within INTELSAT so long as the country or
international entity requesting the assistance considers in good faith that it has met its rel-
evant obligations under Article XIV of the definitive arrangements. In those cases where
requests for launch assistance are maintained in the absence of a favorable INTELSAT rec-
ommendation and the US had not supported the proposed system, the United States
would reach a decision on such a request after [4] taking into account the degree to which
the proposed system would be modified in the light of the factors which were the basis for
the lack of support within INTELSAT.
Subpara (B) With respect to future operational satellite applications which do not
have broad international acceptance, we would hope to be able to work with you in seek-
ing such acceptance, and would favorably consider requests for launch assistance when
broad international acceptance has been obtained.
Para (2.) Such launch assistance would be available, consistent with US laws, either
from US launch sites (through the acquisition of US launch services on a cooperative or
reimbursable basis) or from foreign launch sites (by purchase of an appropriate US
launch vehicle). It would not be conditioned on participation in post-Apollo programs. In
the case of launchings from foreign sites the US would require assurance that the launch
vehicles would not be made available to third without prior agreement [with] the US.
Para (3.) With respect to European proposals for satellites intended to provide
international public telecommunications services, we are prepared to consult with the
European Space Conference in advance so as to advise the Conference whether we would
support such proposals within INTELSAT. In this connection we have undertaken a pre-
liminary analysis of the acceptability of European space segment facilities for interna-
tional public telecommunications services separate from those of INTELSAT, in terms of
the conditions established by Article XIV, and find that the "example of a possible opera-
tional system of European communication satellites," which was presented during our dis-
cussions in February, would appear to cause measurable, but not significant, economic
harm to INTELSAT. Thus, if this specific proposal were submitted for our consideration,
we would expect to support it in INTELSAT.
[5] Para (4.) With respect to the financial conditions for reimbursable launch services
from US launch sites, European users would be charged on the same basis as comparable
non-US Government domestic users.
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Para (5.) With respect to the priority and scheduling for launching European pay-
loads at US launch sites, we would deal with these launchings on the same basis as our
own. Each launching would be treated in terms of its own requirements and as an indi-
vidual case. When we know when a payload will become available and what its launch win-
dow requirements will be, we would schedule it for that time. We expect that conflicts
would rarely arise, if at all. If there should be a conflict, we would consult with all inter-
ested parties in order to arrive at an equitable solution. On the basis of our experience in
scheduling launchings, we would not expect any loss of time because of such a conflict to
be significant.
(Note to posts: Remaining paragraphs of this letter are unnumbered.)
Para The United States is considering the timing and manner of public release of this
position. Accordingly, it is requested that there be no public disclosure of this position
without prior agreement with US.
Para With regard to post-Apollo cooperation, as you know, the United States had not
yet taken final decisions with respect to its post-Apollo space programs, nor can we predict
with assurance when such decisions will be taken.
Para With respect to the more detailed questions on post-Apollo collaboration posed
in your letter of March 3, 1971 and in our earlier discussions in September 1970 and
February 1971, our views [6] remain broadly as we put them to you in my letter of October
2, 1970 and in our meetings of last September and February. We would much prefer to
continue the consideration of such questions in the context of specific possibilities for col-
laboration rather than in the abstract.
Para The relationship we are seeking with Europe with respect to post-Apollo space
programs would, we believe, be well served if we can jointly consider the possibilities for
collaboration in the context of a broader examination of the content and purposes of the
space programs of the late 1970s and 1980s.
Para Accordingly, we suggest broadening your earlier suggestion for a joint expert
group to conduct technical discussions. The purpose of these discussions will include the
definition of possible cooperative relationships between Europe and the U.S. in a pro-
gram of development of the space transportation system, but would be broadened to
include an exchange of views regarding the content of space activities in which Europe
might wish to participate in the post-Apollo era. The technical questions relevant to such
participation, including the remaining questions raised in your letter of March 3, would
be examined as well. the joint group would carry on its activities with no commitment on
either side. the US representation would be Charles W. Mathews, Deputy Associate
Administrator, Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA.
Para This group could most usefully commence its work after the end of September
when the results of NASA's current technical studies of space transportation systems
become available.
Para I trust, Mr. Minister, that this summary of our present views is a helpful response
to the matters raised in your letter of March 3. I am pleased to confirm our continuing
interest in [7] cooperating with interested European nations in the further exploration
and use of space. Sincerely, U. Alexis Johnson, Unquote.
3. Comment for posts: It has become evident that the matter of greatest concern to
the ESC is assured availability of launchers for European satellite projects, and it is our
view that the new position set forth above achieves this goal. it important to note that
launch assistance we are prepared to furnish (as given in the numbered paragraphs of the
above letter to I,efevre) is not [repeat] not conditioned on European participation in
post-Apollo programs.
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4. Johnson letter also reiterates our offer made at February meeting with ESC
representatives to consult with ESC in advance so as to advise them whether we would sup-
port within INTELSAT European proposals for satellites intended to provide internation-
al public communications at February meeting, Europeans presented a document
entitled "example of a possible operational system of European communications
satellites." Analysis of this example led to conclusion that we would expect to support such
a proposal if it were submitted to INTELSAT.
5. The new position reserves to the US decisions with respect to "future operational
satellite applications which do not yet have broad international acceptance." In maintain-
ing this reservation we have in mind applications such as direct broadcasting satellites
which do not yet have the broad international acceptance necessary to assure that this
application will not be source of international tensions.
6. Letter to Lefevre also endorses Lefevre's suggestion that joint expert group be
established to consider technical and scientific tasks which Europe might wish to perform
as part of joint program.
Action requested:
7. For Brussels: Pass above text of Under Secretary Johnson's letter to Lefevre as
soon as feasible. Word "confidential" should appear just above salutation. Call Lefevre's
attention to paragraph of this letter requesting that there be no public disclosure of
launch assistance position without prior agreement with US. Ask that his response be sent
through diplomatic channel. Advise Department and other action addressees when deliv-
ery has been made. (Signed copy of letter pouched to Embassy today.)
8. For other action addressees: On the day after receiving Brussels's contirmation
that Lefevre has received the letter, pass copies of text to foreign ministries and other
space-related ministries at highest appropriate level and explain the importance of our
new launch assurance position. Repeat caveat to Brussels (para 7) re: our [8] desire to
avoid publicity at this time. We hope this new position will be widely accepted by the
European nations as a satisfactory basis for confidence in the availability of US launch
assistance. Rogers
Document 1-23
Document title: "Memorandum for Peter Flanigan from the President," November 24,
1969.
Source: Nixon Project, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.
Richard Nixon was intrigued by the possibility of flying non-U.S, astronauts aboard U.S. spacecraft.
Astronaut Frank Borman first suggested this idea after his post-Apollo 8 overseas tour. NASA
Administrator Thomas Paine had interpreted the president's mandate to him, while they traveled to
the Apollo 11 splashdown, in terms of seeking increased international cooperation in space through
cooperation in hardware development. Others believed, howev_ that the president was most interest-
ed in flying foreign astronauts and experiments. This memorandum was directed at getting more
attention paid to the latter possibility.
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November 24, 1969
Memorandum for
Peter Flanigan
from the President
Is there still no feasible way to get multi-national participation in some of our future
space flights? I have raised this with Paine and Borman and I know there are some tech-
nical problems but it is a pet idea of mine and I would like to press it. Raise it with Borman
and see whether we can jog the bureaucracy in that direction.
Document 1-24
Document rifle: George M. Low, Excerpts from Personal Notes: No. 63, February 1, 1972;
No. 67, March 26, 1972; No. 68, April 17, 1962; No. 69, undated; No. 71, June 3, 1972;
No. 72, June 17, 1972.
Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York.
Each week, NASA Deputy Administrator George Low dictated his views on the preceding week's
events. These notes comprise a fascinating first-hand account of personalities and decisions. The
excerpts portray the confused character of the debate over post-Apollo cooperation during the first
months of 1972. Among those mentioned are: Russell Drew, the staffer who handled space in the
White House Office of Science and Technology; Herman Pollack, the top science and technology
official in the Department of State; Phil Culbertson, a top NASA technical manager; and National
Aeronautics and Space Council Executive Secretary Bill Anders.
[1] Personal Notes No. 63...
[2] International Aspects of Post-ApoUo Program
Ever since our visit to San Clemente on January 5, 1972, Arnold Frutkin and the
International people have been pushing for major activities with the Europeans in the
Space Shuttle development. This work has been supported by the State Department, but
has generally been opposed by Tom Whitehead, Bill Anders, and John Walsh, who's work-
ing for Kissinger. Walsh put together a group consisting of Russ Drew, Bill Anders, Arnold
Frutkin, Phil Culbertson, Herman Pollack, Tom Whitehead, and perhaps others to review
the situation. According to Frutkin, this group has now been converted to be in favor of
post Apollo Shuttle development activities with the Europeans. According to Whitehead
and Anders the group is still opposed and NASA would do well to get out of this activity.
In an internal meeting within NASA, Fletcher and I felt that we should only undertake this
work if it were really in the interest of the White House and the State Department to do
so, and that we should not be pushing for it unless we were pushed into it. As a result of
these views, we decided that Fletcher would visit with Henry Kissinger or AI Haig to tell
him about NASA's concerns about full participation by the Europeans for the Shuttle
development, and ask them whether they really want us to do this. We are still under the
impression that we may be getting wrong signals from Frutkin (I have gotten wrong
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signals from Paine before that) and that we're really moving into an area that we don't
want to get into and that the White House also does not want us to get into. At any rate,
we need clarification, which Fletcher will seek before we proceed ....
[1] Personal Notes No. 67...
[2] Post-Apollo International Situation
This matter is still terribly confused. The Flanigan/David Rice side of the White
House feels that NASA pressured the White House into undertaking these international
initiatives "in order to make it less likely to have the shuttle cancelled." NASA's position is
that, at least since Tom Paine left, we have consistently stated we will do what the State
Department and the White House want us to do, but that if we were on our own we would
like to build the shuttle and its equipments all within this country. The State Department
feels that we strung them along and we are now letting them down. Out of all this, Bill
Anders was given the job by Flanigan to pull together a position that would be acceptable
to the White House. The State Department, however, feels it should be its job to pull that
position together, while at least John Rose in the White House is concerned that if the
State Department were allowed to do this a position would be established that is not in the
best interest of the United States. The underlying argument in the White House against
having active participation in the post-Apollo programs is based upon a concern of too
much technology transfer to Europe which is probably not a valid concern as well as a con-
cern about being beholden to the Europeans for their piece of action in case they want to
hold us up for it. The State Department concern on the other hand is that we have now
gone so far that any backing down might cause serious international repercussions. I seem
to be in the middle with Herman Pollack coming to visit me privately for a "nonmeeting"
giving me his concerns and presumably the State Department concerns (Alex Johnson is
still recuperating fiom a heart attack), while Bill Anders calls me and asks for help to con-
solidate the White House position.
In my meeting with Herman Pollack, I once again made it very clear that it was
NASA's view that from the programmatic standpoint we would like to do the whole pro-
gram [3] domestically; however, there are many options of doing things in Europe if it is
in the United States' international interest to do so. I also took the same position in my
recent discussions with Bill Anders. A memo for the record of my latest conversation with
him is attached, as is a copy of a paper that he prepared for Peter Flanigan ....
[1 ] Personal Notes No. 68
These are the personal notes for the week ending April 1, 1972, as well as the week
ending April 15, 1972. (I have already prepared special notes for the week ending
April 8.) ...
[2] International Cooperation
The situation in the post-Apollo international cooperation, primarily with the
Europeans, is still very much up in the air. Bill Anders, in reaction to what he thought was
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Peter Flanigan's request, had prepared a very one-sided document, indicating that at most
we should let the Europeans develop the sortie module. In this document he did not air
the two sides of the story so that it would have been impossible for the President to really
pursue any alternatives. When Flanigan saw the document, he wisely stated that this was
not at all what he wanted and, in effect, sent Bill back to the showers. The over-all situa-
tion is still that we have implied commitments to the Europeans that they could partic-
ipate in the development of bits and pieces of the Shuttle itself, provided they also worked
on either a sortie module or a tug. Our position now is that we don't want them to get
involved in bits and pieces of the Shuttle because it makes for a very difficult technical and
management problem, and at the same time we don't want them involved in the tug
because we think this is too difficult a technical bite for them to take. We think the
Europeans really are no longer deeply interested in working with us either and that, if we
let matters stand as they are, they are going to die of their own weight. However, Bill
Anders feels that this is not the proper way to proceed and that we should indeed take pos-
itive action to turn the Europeans off. Basically my own conclusion is that this is no longer
a matter of substance because we have pretty well decided what to do and don't want the
Europeans to do, and the entire situation merely becomes a matter of tactics.
My latest suggestion to Frutkin was that we should allow the Europeans to participate
in an annual program review with us with the understanding that they would file a report
within [3] 60 days, suggesting solutions to any problems that we might be facing. This they
would do in addition to the development of a sortie module or, if they can demonstrate
competence, the development of a tug ....
[1] Personal Notes No. 69...
Post-Apollo European Cooperation
This subject is still nearly as confused as it has been for a long time.
State Department has now formally taken a position in a letter from Rogers to the
President... that we should encourage the Europeans to participate through the devel-
opment of a sortie can; that we should defer participation on the tug until they have con-
ducted further studies; and that we should allow them to build bits and pieces of the
shuttle, provided this is tied in with participation in the major elements such as the sortie
module.
Peter Flanigan's position protecting the domestic economy is that he has no objection
to Europe's participation in the development of the sortie can, but that we should
absolutely not allow any participation in the tug or bits and pieces of the shuttle. Peter also
believes that Kissinger will defer to him in this area and that his position is the one that
will prevail with the President. Incidentally, Bill Anders has been asked by Flanigan to pre-
pare a Presidential action paper reflecting Flanigan's views.
NASA's position is a fairly straightforward one. First, we state that given our own pref-
erence, in the absence of any international considerations, we would, of course, prefer to
do everything in connection with the shuttle in the United States. Secondly, we state that
given a strong Presidential directive that for international considerations Europe must par-
ticipate in the shuttle, we would first [3] of all prefer their participation in the sortie can;
secondly as a very poor second choice we would allow their participation in the tug, provid-
ed they can demonstrate through studies that they can indeed work on the tug and their
technology is sufficiently advanced to do so; third, we would dislike their participation in bits
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and pieces of the shuttle because this would make our job much more
difficult, but this too could be accomplished if we were directed to do so. Our views were
expressed in a memorandum to Kissinger commenting on Secretary Rogers' memorandum.
At the time of this dictation, John Walsh on Kissinger's staff is preparing two action
papers for the President, presumably they will be signed by both Flanigan and Kissinger.
The first of these, which is the one that Flanigan prefers and the one that will go unless
Kissinger feels strongly enough to get personally into the act, says in effect that the
Europeans should be allowed to participate in the sortie can only, and we should turn off
the tug and the bits and pieces of the shuttle immediately. The second paper also states
that participation in the sortie can should be encouraged; that participation in the tug
should be denied; but that participation in the bits and pieces of the shuttle should be
"discouraged but not excluded." Presumably all of this will be steeled within the next sev-
eral weeks.
In the meantime, the Europeans are champing at the bit because they are trying to
meet a deadline that we have imposed on them to make up their mind by approximately
the first of July. To do this, they need answers to some detailed questions that they posed
to us two weeks ago; however, we, of course, are not in any position to answer these ques-
tions until we have settled our policy issues.
For the record, it might be worthwhile to review a bit of history here also. When I first
came to NASA Headquarters, I learned from Tom Paine that the President was extreme-
ly interested in European participation in Space Shuttle development. I had no reason to
disbelieve this and, as a matter of fact, I had seen letters from Paine to Kissinger report-
ing on his various visits to Europe, Japan, etc. and reports coming back from Kissinger
saying in effect "keep [4] up the good work." When I became Acting Administrator, I con-
tinued what Paine had started and continued to send reports both to Kissinger and to
Peter Flanigan. In all cases, I received replies from Kissinger and Flanigan (generally quite
late) encouraging me to go ahead. However, it wasn't too long before I got views
expressed by both Don Rice and Ed David that what I was doing might not really be what
the President wanted us to do. I then tried for a long time to see Kissinger to get his per-
sonal views on this before continuing any further discussions; however, Kissinger was never
able to see me on this subject. It wasn't until about the time that Fletcher came on board
that we had the first meeting in Kissinger's office involving Kissinger, Whitehead for
Flanigan, and several others where again the views expressed were inconclusive except
that it became quite apparent that the domestic side of the White House was very much
opposed to the kinds of things that Tom Paine had been doing. Ever since then, this had
been tried to be brought to a resolution in the White House, and it may be that we are
now close to this resolution ....
[1] Personal Notes No. 71 ...
Post-Apollo European Cooperation
I forget when I last discussed this situation, but, briefly, the facts are these. We have
been trying to get the White House to resolve the difference of opinion that exists among
NASA, State Department, and some of the White House staff. Basically, the State
Department would like to cooperate to the greatest extent possible. The White House
would like to have an isolationist policy and no cooperation whatsoever. NASA has taken
a "hands off" approach indicating that we would like to undertake a minimum amount of
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cooperation in order to simplify our own problems, but that we could do almost anytbing
that was necessary if the President so directed it because he felt they were overriding in a
national consideration to do it. Out of all of this came a set of instructions signed by
Kissinger which indicated that we should encourage the Europeans to develop one of sev-
eral forms of Sortie modules; that we should discourage but permit European participa-
tion in the development of selected bits and pieces of the Shuttle; that we should under
no conditions let Europe develop the tug; and that for future cooperative ventures we
should concentrate on payloads and not launch systems hardware.
[3] This set of instructions is perfectly acceptable to us and it is now planned to meet with
the Europeans within the next two weeks to respond to their long-standing questions con-
cerning what we would be willing to do in cooperation with them on the post-Apollo pro-
jects.
Incidentally, Europe is quite confused concerning where the United States now stands
with respect to all technological interchanges. I recently met Mr. Boelkow, President of
Messerschmitt, who feels that our recent policies are so isolationist that we are going to
hurt Europe and ourselves. He believes that we could reach agreements, particularly in
aeronautics, that would help both countries both technically and economically. He want-
ed to discuss these with Magruder. However, I told him that Magruder was not the right
person nor do we have a right person to do it. Nobody has really examined both the short-
range and long-range economic effects of technology transfer. I subsequently discussed
this with Fletcher and we decided to try to see Pete Peterson (Secretary of Commerce) to
see whether we can't get him interested in the problem ....
[1] Personal Notes No. 72...
European Post-Apollo Cooperation
After more than a year of indecision, we finally received a memo from Kissinger con-
cerning the extent of European post-Apollo cooperation. Specifically, the memorandum
indicated that we should seek participation in the Sortie Module, should deny the tug to
the Europeans, and should discourage [3] but allow essential participation in bits and
pieces of the Shuttle. This is the package that Jim Fletcher and I had hoped for, and with
the exception of the bits and pieces of the Shuttle, it is exactly how we would like to han-
dle it. Meetings with the Europeans were held during the past week (at the sub-Ministerial
level) and they very quickly got the message. It appears now that they might join us in a
Sortie Module, and we have strongly encouraged them to do so. The real question is
whether they can move quickly enough in pulling themselves together. At their informal
request, we have set a deadline of this summer for them to make up their mind because
the people who were here felt that if we did not do this, Europe would continue to argue
about this for several years to come ....
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Document 1-25
Document tide: William A. Anders, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space
Council, to The Honorable Peter M. Flanigan, March 17, 1972, with attached: "Position
Paper on European Participation in our Post-Apollo Space Program."
Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York.
Document 1-26
Document tide: William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, Memorandum for the President,
"Post-Apollo Relationships With the Europeans," April 29, 1972.
Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York.
Document 1-27
Document tide: James C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator, to Honorable Henry A. Kissinger,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, May 5, 1972, with attached:
"NASA's Comments on Secretary Rogers' Memorandum of April 29, 1972."
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
These documents capture the character of the closing stages of the debate inside the U.S. government
regarding international participation in the post-Apollo program. They demonstrate the concern with
difficulties in completing large-scale technological projects. They also reflect the ever-present worry over
technology transfer and the possibility of the United States losing its edge in a highly competitive
international arena.
Document 1-25
[1] March 17, 1972
Memorandum for
The Honorable Peter M. Flanigan
Pursuant to our conversation at lunch on March 3, I have summarized what I believe
are the issues, objectives, and options for international participation in the post-Apollo
space program. The outstanding problem is that in the past, NASA, interpreting a
Presidential sanction, emphasized joint shuttle development with the Europeans, where-
as our involvement would appear to have been greatly more in tune with the President's
desire if it had been focused on joint manned operations and mutual utilization of space.
Joint European participation in our hardware programs has always seemed to me to
have little national advantage and several drawbacks. However, as a country we have gone
some distance down the pike with the Europeans, and an abrupt, visible change in policy
will probably create a foreign relations problem of measurable but uncertain magnitude.
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Possibly the problem can be reduced by a careflll selection of options and tactics. Taking
the factors I see bearing on the problem into account and weighing them as best I can, I
have proposed a strawman cooperative program in this paper which, if it could be accept-
ed by the Europeans, would be to the net advantage to the U.S. This program, consisting
of payload cooperation and joint manned flight, plus European development of the Sortie
can, is acceptable to NASA from their viewpoint as program managers. State will likely
view this course of action as not responsive to Europe's expectations and as representing
a significant change in previous policy. They can be expected to resist such a change or
urge some intermediate concession by the U.S. A possible concession is discussed in the
attached paper, whereby the U.S. prime contractor for the shuttle does a nominal amount
of subcontracting in Europe; however, NASA would agree to this arrangement only if
directed to as a concession to our foreign relations.
Please excuse the length of the paper, but there is a several year history of the devel-
opment of this issue and a significant difference in motivations that are relevant to an
understanding of our commitment and posture. Your [2] reaction to this paper and the
strawman proposal, which has been coordinated with Jim Fletcher and John Walsh, of
Kissinger's staff, and discussed with others, would be most timely if available by Tuesday
a.m. The State Department has opened the post-Apollo policy for reexamination and will
be meeting that afternoon. Since I will be attending, I could see that your views and what-
ever guidance you may have are put forward. Attention to and resolution of this messy
issue should be soon since decision dates (e.g., NASA selection of prime contractors) are
approaching inexorably and NASA needs a clear directive on how to proceed.
William A. Anders
Enclosure
[Enclosure page 1]
Position Paper on European Participation
in our Post-Apollo Space Program
This paper examines our current position re European participation in our post-
Apollo space program, how we got to this position, what are our commitments, and the
options for decisions. A pragmatic program is proposed, and tactics for its implementa-
tion are discussed. Because of the technical content of the post-Apollo program and some
semantic confusion, a definition of terms is desirable.
Definition of Terms
Post-Apollo literally encompasses all of the U.S. space program that comes after
Apollo, starting in 1973. In the context of European cooperation, however, it has meant,
at various times, the partnership development and utilization of the space station or Space
Shuttle, then the sbutde alone, and now the shuttle, tug, or RAM. These elements of the
post-Apollo system have the following characteristics:
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The Space Station was a multi-manned, permanent orbital laboratory, which was
dropped from NASA's plans on cost grounds, at least until the shuttle is com-
pleted and operational.
The Shuttle is a partially reusable launcher used to put a payload plus upper stage
("tug") into a 100 to 200 mile orbit, and to return them to earth. The shuttle can
also be used to carry, support, and return a small manned space laboratory. The
shuttle and later the tug will be used both in DOD and the civil space program.
Development cost of the shuttle is projected to be $5.5B, unit cost will be $250M
with an anticipated production of 5 units, and the operating cost is estimated
between $10 to $12M per flight.
The Tugis a reusable upper stage, carried and returned in the shuttle payload bay,
which moves payloads from the altitude of the shuttle orbit to higher altitudes,
and returns payloads in the same fashion. Virtually all payloads above 200 n.m.
will use the tug (or an expendable transfer stage), but owing to reuse, the pro-
duction run for the tug will not be great--perhaps 25 altogether. Costs are esti-
mated to be $1B for development, $20M per production unit, and $0.5M per
flight for operations.
[2] RAM (Research and Applications Module) refers to a family of small manned (or
unmanned) laboratories to be carried to orbit and supported there, internally or
externally, by the shuttle, and then returned in the shuttle bay. (The first version
has been referred to as a sortie module or sortie can.) In later versions, the lab-
oratories may be left in orbit independently and recovered on a later shuttle
flight. Because of distinctly different uses of the system, there will be several dif-
ferent versions of RAM, and each version can be developed and equipped inde-
pendently. For each version the production run might be 10 units, development
cost of $150 to $200M, and unit cost $15 to $20M, though a basic "stripped" ver-
sion might be less.
Subcontracts. This term needs to be defined because of the confusion resulting from
its dual usage in the post-Apollo negotiations.
European Contributed "Subcontracts'was until very recently the concept under dis-
cussion, wherein the European governments would pay for their industry to
develop certain parts of the shuttle, which we would then use. This arrangement
was necessitated by the NASA operating rule of no exchange of funds in foreign
cooperative projects. A government-to-government agreement would cover the
arrangement; this type of arrangement is felt to have a number of unattractive
features which are discussed later in this paper under "Options." In February, the
possibility of having more normal (company-to-company) commercial subcon-
tracts was raised by the Europeans, and so now the intended definition of the
term subcontract is further confused in dealing with the Europeans and among
ourselves.
Normal Commercial Subcontracts. Subcontracts of this nature are undertaken
between industries with no unusual government involvement. The prime con-
tractor chooses certain parts of a system for outside development and produc-
tion, selects the winner among bidders for the work (with NASA's concurrence
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in the case of the shuttle contract), and then has sole control of managing and
paying the subcontractor. In this context, European industry would not be pre-
cluded from bidding on the shuttle subcontracts, and under normal economic
pressures to use low bid from a qualified supplier, theycould conceivably win $10
to $100M of the subcontracts. However, because of the nature of [3] R&D con-
tracts, such as for the shuttle, there is little inherent pressure on our industry to
choose low bid subcontractors; rather the most important considerations are
minimizing programmatic, schedule, and management risks, and thereby maxi-
mizing the possibility of receiving their incentive. Historically, Europe has won
no subcontracts of significance on space systems. Relaxation of implied restric-
tions and guidance to our industry to be more receptive to qualified bidders in
Europe could be employed by us as a bargaining tool in the post-Apollo negotia-
tion; and if the dollar flow is considered a problem, it might be balanced through
some reciprocal arrangements. These alternatives are discussed later under
"Options."
U.S. Motivations and Objectives in Post-Apollo Cooperation
It has been U.S. policy and President Nixon's desire to promote international coop-
eration in space and to share the benefits (and burdens) of space with all mankind. It has
also been U.S. policy to strengthen our allies and alliances, and to foster a sense of com-
munity among the Europeans and to encourage their joint undertakings. The desire to
implement these policies and also to make a new program more attractive to Congress
(and also less cancelable), led NASA to seek European partnership in the post-Apollo
space program over two years ago. The prospect of a European financial contribution to
our program was thought to be a further plus. There was, however, ambivalence in our
understanding of how much of the Administration's desire for international participation
in space focused on joint usage and how much on joint development of space hardware.
In recent weeks there has been some clarification of Presidential preference; his interest
is primarily in European involvement in the use of space, coming from the development
of payloads and operations rather than from big joint engineering projects, and specifi-
cally to share in the use of our post-Apollo space systems for internatiohal manned oper-
ations.
Whatever cooperative program is devised, we seek maximum benefit for ourselves in
terms of (1) creating togetherness and good will, or at least minimizing any ill will, (2)
drawing their interest away from undertaking separate space systems (e.g., the Europa III
booster, aerosat, or those competitive with Intelsat), and (3) gaining some technology
from areas of European special qualification, and possibly obtaining some minor compo-
nents at a lower cost. At the same time, we want to minimize (1) increased risk and man-
agement complexity of our development program, (2) technology/dollar/job outflow,
and (3) foreign relations impairment resulting from disputes as the program progresses.
[4] European Motivations and Objectives in Post-Apollo Cooperation
A major European objective is to gain large systems management capability and some
technology. Their government/industry technocrats were very impressed by our success
with Apollo, and they believe that by participating with us in a major systems development,
such as the shuttle, they can learn how to better manage and build their own big techni-
cal projects (Europa III being a possible example). Their willingness to pay for the devel-
opment of part of our shuttle is, in their view, a ticket to participate in or at least get a
front row seat to our management process. A second European objective is to have the use
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of the world's most advanced space system, the shuttle, to carry out more complex science
and applications programs in space, and, in spite of no explicit European plans at this
time, there may be awakening interest in sharing in the prestige and greater capabilities
of manned flight. Finally, the science-technology ministers and the international space
organizations are looking for big projects that their respective governments will support
(bureaucratic empire building). Also, of course, the European aerospace industry, which
is in a decline analogous to ours, wants to get some business, particularly if that business
might have fallout that would improve their competitive posture in other high technolo-
gy areas. The direct business prospect appears to them as twofold: the R&D money from
European governnlents and then the sale of production items to both European and U.S.
users.
The History of the U.S. Commitment to Post-Apollo Cooperation
It has been a U.S. attitude that space like Antarctica is inherently international, only
to be explored for humanitarian reasons. Whatever benefits that derive from being in
space can be benefits to all mankind, except, of course, where military utility is involved.
The one challenge, thus far, to this viewpoint has been in the use of satellites for commu-
nications, where commercial exploitation exists for point-to-point communications and is
in dispute for mobile usage (aerosat). Such challenges will become more common as the
shuttle opens up the commercial utilization of space. All Presidents since the inception of
the space program have called for international cooperation in space, many in Congress
favor it, and the Space Act, which formed NASA, urges it. President Nixon publicly pro-
rooted it in his statement of March 7, 1970.
[5] NASA has had an international outlook and has engaged other nations in many use-
ful joint science projects. Partially because of this international orientation and partially
because of the desire to make the program more attractive (and less cancelable), Tom
Paine in private discussions with President Nixon at the time of Apollo 11 raised the issue
of seeking greater international participation in our space program after Apollo. Paine
reported that the President concurred in the desirability of this course of action, though
it was not made clear as to the relative preference between participation in hardware
development or participation in manned flight and science payloads. Paine then went to
Europe to test and stimulate the Europeans' interest, and at the same time he narrowed
the candidates for cooperation to the joint development and use of the space station or
shuttle, and then only to the latter when the space station was dropped from our plans
due to funding reductions. NASA did report to the White House on its progress in obtain-
ing European involvement, and these reports elicited acknowledgments which were pos-
sibly of a somewhat perfunctory nature. NASA, however, accepted these acknowledgments
as direction to continue. Operating from the same background and with stimulation from
NASA and in response to European overtures, the State Department conducted two min-
ister-level exploratory talks with the Europeans on the basis of U.S. "desire for maximum
partnership in the post-Apollo program consistent with mutual desires and capabilities."
This came to mean to NASA, Europe, and the State Department, a partnership in the
development and construction of the shuttle, with possible involvement in the tug or the
sortie can version of RAM. It was also understood that the U.S. would guarantee to use the
particular European product, if that product was completely satisfactory to us. Talks have
continued between U.S. and European technical groups to define areas of possible coop-
eration, meanwhile the Europeans have spent roughly $5M studying the shuttle and tug
in order to decide where their work might be concentrated. They are now expanding
their tug studies and are also studying RAM (sortie can).
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The initial U.S. stipulations to cooperation were that there be no exchange of fimds
and that the management/technology level of the European undertaking be in keeping
with their current capability and not rely on technology infusion from the U.S. A later stip-
ulation was that the Europeans would have to contribute a significant portion of the effort
(10% of the program's cost). This stipulation was dropped, however, after the U.S. decid-
ed on separating the issues of post-Apollo and launch assurances. (The launch assurance
issue involved Europe's concern about obtaining U.S. launches of their payloads, The U.S.
has now agreed to launch any European payload having a peaceful [6] purpose, except
where we believed the payload violated international agreements (e.g. , military systems
or those competing with Intelsat). These launches would use our present boosters and the
costs would be reimbursed.) Our most recent stipulation is that they would have to com-
mit themselves to a "package deal" for the development of the tug or RAM before we
would settle on their government-supported "subcontractual" involvement in the shuttle.
An implied stipulation was that neither Europe nor we would try to recover our respective
development costs through amortization in the unit or use prices.
There has been growing concern in the Executive Office and with top NASA man-
agement that we are getting ourselves involved in a situation that is not advantageous. A
recent informal sounding of Presidential desire indicated that his interest would be
almost fully served through joint use of space, and partnership construction of complex
space hardware is not a strong motivation. In some response to these feelings, NASA has
been directed to attempt to shift European interest away from the shuttle and onto the
tug or RAM.
Present status is as follows: the Europeans are now trying to decide whether or not to
develop a tug or RAM. If their decision is affirmative, they have been led to believe that
they can, if they wish, develop a few prescribed, "simple" parts of the shuttle, with certain
restrictions on funding control. The Europeans must make up their minds by early sum-
mer if they wish to avail themselves of this "package deal." The decision is very hard for
them because they have not thoroughly studied what is involved in the development of the
tug or RAM, and they are going to have to decide with major technical and cost uncer-
tainties facing them. Meanwhile, our change in signals on aerosat has caused them addi-
tional concern as to our motives in space, and has produced some European "threats"
against post-Apollo; apparently they believe us to be eager for their involvement.
Options for U.S.-European Involvement
The four main options, some having suboptions, that are open to the U.S. are listed
below in increasing order of complexity as far as program management is concerned
(except possibly for 4b).
1. Complete Disengagement. The most obvious option is to disengage and have no
international participation in our space program, other than at the scientific level as we
already have. This option guarantees no technology or dollar outflow, does not restrict
our future political or programmatic decisions, and adds no technical and management
complications to an [7] already complex program. This, in fact, may be the outcome any-
way, since European interests may well not be sufficiently strong to underwrite an expen-
sive program having a nebulous quid pro quo. But if we force this option, the Europeans
will correctly view this as a major shift away from the commitment they accepted from U.S.
officials as our government's policy. Foreign relations harm may result and, in fact, may
have wider effects than space matters usually do because this would closely follow other
unsatisfactory space negotiations in the European view and also may seem to show a
quixotic approach to policy formulation in the U.S.
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2. International Cooperative Payloads. This option is to indicate that our interest in
international participation is focused on the usage of the shuttle for mutual benefit,
including manned flight, and not on development of the hardware. This option probably
should be emphasized whatever else we jointly undertake because it appears to be at the
heart of the President's actual desire. However, the Europeans will probably not view this
as a significant concession since we are talking about events eight years from now, and fur-
thermore the Europeans may believe this already to be U.S. policy.
3. European Development of an Element of the Post-Apollo Program Other than the Shuttle
(Tug or Sortie Can Version of RAM). A third option is to allow the present situation to con-
tinue to the extent that Europe is free to choose between the development of a tug or sor-
tie can, with a U.S. guarantee to use the item if it meets our required specifications. Either
would meet Europe's perception of the U.S. commitment. Tile possible advantages to us
of their undertaking the tug is the savings of a substantial R&D cost and the availability of
the system several years earlier than otherwise. A possible other advantage is that the
diversion of European funds to the tug would preclude their development of Europa III,
and thus limit the expansion of their independent launch capability. (Any lesser commit-
ment of European funds to post-Apollo, such as doing a RAM-sortie can and/or parts of
the shuttle, would leave open the possibility of doing Europa III. However, It is possible
that the cost and difficulty of Europa III will discourage the Europeans from undertaking
it regardless of their post-Apollo involvement; and if undertaken it is even more possible
that it would not be completed, as greater realization of its relative inadequacy became
more apparent.) Any advantages to the U.S. of a European tug project seem to be more
than offset by several disadvantages: the probability of Europe producing an unacceptably
low performance system, the likelihood of technology outflow, the enhancement of their
own booster capability, the dollar outflow to buy production units (perhaps up to $500M),
and the difficulty in accommodating DOD's unwillingness to rely on a foreign supplier.
[8] Concerning the other side of this option, the advantages of Europe developing the
sortie can version of RAM is that the task clearly can be within their capabilities, has min-
imum risk of technology transfer, could contribute a useful element to the post-Apollo
program, and has no military implication. The cost to the U.S. to buy units from Europe
would depend on the degree of equipping but may be fairly nominal, in the range of $20
to $60M over a period of several years. This expenditure would be offset by European pur-
chase of the other versions of RAM produced in the U.S.
Given that the tug is an unacceptable European project for several reasons, and that
the sortie can would be acceptable, a difficult problem faces us in causing redirection of
European interests. We could easily end up with the foreign relations disadvantages listed
under 1 even though we are trying to take a conciliatory approach in offering a moderate
program of participation. This problem is discussed fi_rther under "Tactical
Considerations," but anticipating that discussion, no fully satisfactory tactic is evident.
4. European Involvement in the Development of the Shuttle. This option is in two parts: the
first being a continuation of the current position and the second a possible fallback
maneuver as a possible foreign relations concession.
a. European Government-Supported "Subcontracts." This option is also a con-
tinuation of the current situation, namely, to accept Europe as a limited partner in the
development of the shuttle, with them building at their expense certain "simple" parts of
the hardware. The advantage to us in this arrangement is that it further meets European
understanding of our commitment. It had been a NASA position that sufficiently simple
tasks had been identified to make this arrangement feasible, however, many now feel that
the increased risks and technology/management outflow may well more than offset the
dollar or good wilt value of a European government-supported contribution to the
shuttle. There is also serious concern that the normal supplier problems in big and corn-
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plicated development programs would, on occasion, be elevated into international dis-
putes, thereby producing the reverse of the President's desire for good will. Furthermore,
this arrangement amounts to a U.S. government guarantee to supply certain components
to our prime contractor, thus removing some of our government's leverage and some of
the contractors overall responsibility for the integration and management function.
During the course of the program, the prime contractor could well use this as an excuse
for schedule, cost, or design changes. Withdrawing this option, however, will have a neg-
ative effect on European attitude toward the U.S., and a possible concession to lessen this
impact is suggested by the following option.
[9] b. Normal Commercial Subcontracts (A possible foreign relations concession to
offset the negative impact of withdrawing shuttle participation as an option). If some
European involvement in shuttle development was felt to be necessary as a foreign rela-
tions concession due to our past stimulation and commitments, a possible fallback from
the above government arrangement would be for the prime contractor to do some nom-
inal amount of normal commercial subcontracting with qualified bidders in Europe, once
Europe has committed to a RAM or tug. This would partially satisfy their industry's desire
to do some work on the shuttle, and would not have the serious disadvantage of involving
their governments directly in the arrangements, nor of having European participation in
the management of the overall system. Also, the U.S. might benefit by some minor tech-
nology flow in our direction. To mitigate outward dollar flow, some balancing amount of
work might be subcontracted by Europe in the U.S. on their RAM or tug, though this may
happen anyway depending upon the degree of assistance they need on their task, or bal-
ancing might be achieved through other offset arrangements to achieve no net exchange
of funds. This alternative is not favored by NASA, but if directed to choose between 4a and
4b for foreign relations reasons, this latter alternative is less odious and is doable.
A Proposed Program
A program agreeable to NASA, and which attempts to maximize the net advantage to
the U.S. and at the same time appears to be reasonably attentive to our commitment to
Europe, has been selected from parts of the above options.
System Use: European operational involvement with us in some joint
manned orbital missions, plus reimbursable use of our space
transportation system to orbit their science and applications
satellites, as a natural continuation of our present launch
assurances.
System Development: If European interest continues to include working on hard-
ware development, we should agree only to their building the
sortie can version of the family of RAM's. We would agree to
buy from them the basic components of this item, while other
versions of RAM would be built by the U.S. and would be for
sale to the Europeans.
[ 10] The second part of the above program, system development, has the most immedi-
ate impact and also major difficulties associated with it in a foreign relations sense. In vis-
ibly removing the tug and shuttle from the list of acceptable projects for participation, we
will antagonize the Europeans, even if they were not going to opt for these projects.
Coming on top of the bad deals they believe they have been dealt in aerosat and Intelsat,
a narrowing of our post-Apollo policy in this fashion may well have serious repercussions
in a broader context: we may be increasingly seen as unreliable partners and allies. For
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this reason, some concession may be in order, and the views of [the National Security
Council] and State would help to guide the policy in this regard. A concession could be
made either re the tug or shuttle. However, because of the difficulty of developing a saris-
factory tug and the potential for sizable technology and dollar outflow, and also because
of DOD's concern in this area, we should preclude European development of this project.
We would simply be trading off a short-term foreign relations problem for a longer-term
one. In regard to shuttle involvement, the management and foreign relations problems
associated with government-to-government subcontracting are unacceptable, hut we
might accept European subcontracting on a normal company-to-company basis. Though
not to their liking, NASA could informally direct our U.S. shuttle contractors to select and
use qualified, low-bid European subcontractors on tasks the prime contractors choose,
perhaps up to the level of $50 to $100M out of a $3 to $4B shuttle contract. Dollar outflow
could be balanced by our requirement that the Europeans subcontract at least a com-
pensatory amount in the U.S. for their RAM development, if the two to three year delay
in balancing is acceptable to us. Otherwise, balancing can be achieved through other off-
set arrangements. NASA would prefer not to make a foreign relations concession of this
nature because of their long-standing adherence to an internal rule against exchange of
funds and its potential political impact. If, however, State and [the National Security
Council] urge this concession, NASA sees this arrangement as less odious than govern-
merit-to-government subcontracting, and could implement it.
Strategy and Tactics for Implementing the Proposed Program
Two levels of action should be pursued: a longer-term (months) strategic move to
gain European political appreciation of and accommodation to the differences in
European and U.S. motivations re space, and a short-term (weeks) tactical move to decide
on and offer to the Europeans a moderate program of participation in the post-Apollo
development Phase, having net advantage to the U.S.
1. Strategic Considerations.
Complicating our discussions on space cooperation with the Europeans are the dif-
ferences in our respective backgrounds and orientations with respect to space. To those
who ran the U.S. space program, particularly the Apollo program, and conducted our side
of the talks with the Europeans, space has been a non-commercial venture encompassing
exploration, science, and technology, and space's commercial value has played only an
emerging role in their thinking. Commercial utilization has been handled by our [11 ] pri-
vate sector; while in Europe both the exploration and utilization of space are government
functions. European interest in post-Apollo is more in the vein of commerce than adven-
ture. Obtaining a mutually satisfactory cooperative program has been difficult because the
two sides have seen it as offering different payoffs. Therefore, our strategy must not sim-
ply be to bring a shift in emphasis on what piece of hardware Europe might supply, but
should develop a basic accommodation through mutual understanding and acceptance of
objectives.
We must attempt, for example, to stimulate recognition in European science-
minister/political leaders, and their staffs, of the political-prestige value of manned space
flight. No significant effort has been made by the U.S. to determine the latent political
interest in manned flight, nor has any coordinated attempt been made to guide them per-
suasively into the program. NASA seems to have taken the European view at face value,
and all of our negotiations on cooperation have generally reflected our axiomatic accep-
tance of European disinterest in manned space flight. We also should try to obtain an
understanding with Europe that the development of launchers duplicates skills and equip-
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ment that already are well developed in the U.S., does not really enhance the direct
derivation of benefits from space given the availability of launches, and does heighten U.S.
concern because of technology flow and security considerations. There is some doubt that
Europe can learn our management skills simply by sitting in on the shuttle management,
but it is a risk to us for reasons of future competitive posture. We should attempt to make
it clear that we expect them to join us in a cooperative space program primarily for non-
commercial reasons, and they should disabuse themselves of the idea of making money
from us or learning our technology and know-how. They may feel that it is their financial
contribution to the program that motivates U.S. interest in cooperation, and hence they
are entitled to get something significant and tangible out of the program. They are wrong
on both counts, and we must clarify this matter to them. Discussion should begin infor-
mally and individually, not group-wise, recognizing, however, that the prospects of evan-
gelizing are not great, a priori.
2. Tactical Considerations.
The most immediate problem is to persuade the European space technocrats that a
RAM-sortie can is a challenging and important task, and that it opens the part of the post-
Apollo program having the greatest direct benefit, [12] namely, payload development and
use. The tug should be ruled out because of its difficulty and its high potential for tech-
nology and dollar outflow. If the Europeans insist on also participating in shuttle
development, we can, on grounds of avoiding government involvement in contractor-
subcontractor disputes, offer the possibility of their industry functioning as normal
commercial subcontractors to our U.S. prime contractor at a moderate level ($50 to
$100M). The Europeans have purportedly inquired about this possibility last month, and
so a change in our position of this nature can be offered as acquiescence to their propos-
al. There would be an understanding with Europe that the dollar flow inherent in this
arrangement would have some balance through European subcontracting in the U.S. for
parts of its RAM, or through other offset arrangements.
The fact must be faced that the European technicians have been strongly motivated
toward [a] tug; it is the biggest and most challenging post-Apollo project available to
them, and has the greatest technology stimulation and spin-off to other.high technology
capabilities. Moreover, nothing the U.S. has said to the Europeans in almost two years
would indicate anything other than our desire for them to undertake the tug. And at our
encouragement they have spent $1 to $2M studying their capability for its development.
Changing signals is therefore going to be difficult without irritating them (justifiably).
Because it postpones the problem, there have been suggestions that we wait for Europe to
come to its own understanding or demonstration of its inability to build an acceptable tug.
The Europeans' anger and frustration would increase, though, in proportion to the
amount of time and money they waste on a project we reject. It may be that the best course
is to take the flak now and admit our concern over their abilities and over the technolo-
gy/dollar outflow we envision, and withdraw the tug from consideration. In order to ease
the foreign relations impact and some of the pressure their industry is applying to their
governments to undertake development tasks that are unacceptable to us (tug or
European-contributed shuttle work), we might allow them some normal subcontractor
participation in the shuttle as qualified bidders.
The timing of these tactics is a major difficulty. We would have to get these messages
across and obtain European agreement by July if European subcontractors are to be used
on the shuttle; our prime contractor cannot wait past that period. If Europe only under-
takes a RAM-sortie can, timing is no longer critical to us, but the Europeans themselves
say they must decide by mid-summer because of the coupling with their decision on
whether or not to go ahead with Europa lII.
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[13] The State Department is now reviewing the post-Apollo policy, and the receipt of
directions to propose a modified program to the Europeans would be most timely. Some
resistance within our government to an alteration in direction can be anticipated, if for
no other reason than the psychological momentum of the people that have been involved
in obtaining European participation. Considering the many factors involved, no more
time should lapse before a decision is made and guidance given.
Document1-26
[1]
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Post-Apollo Relationships with the Europeans
I wish to bring to your attention my increasing concern about developing U.S. atti-
tudes toward European participation in the development of the post-Apollo Space
Transportation System and the need for prompt U.S. decisions in this matter, if we are to
control the play of events.
Your name has been closely identified with U.S. efforts over the past several years to
encourage European participation in the development of that System--the Shuttle, the
Tug and associated research applications modules (RAMs). Tom Paine, alluding repeat-
edly to what he described as your views, visited each major European capital to invite such
participation. In October of 1970 and again in February 1971, Alex Johnson and a
sub-cabinet team met with the European space and science Ministers. These and other
activities of responsible U.S. officials, including our Ambassadors, have provided the
Europeans every reason to believe that the U.S. was seriously interested in having them
participate in the development of certain parts of the Shuttle, in one or more of the
RAMs, especially in the Tug. As an indication of their interest the European governments
have already spent or committed a total of$11.5 million on preliminary technical studies.
The European space and science Ministers are scheduled to meet in three weeks (May
19th) to formulate their views with respect to participation, and again in early July to take
a final position. We can expect a visit of a high-level European delegation shortly after the
May meeting.
Within the last several months U.S. views that we should minimize European partic-
ipation have begun to harden. These views hold that we should not permit European par-
ticipation in development of the Shuttle because of domestic economic consideration and
the difficulties of sharing such a task with foreign governments and subcontractors. With
respect to the Tug they hold that the development task will be too [2] difficult technical-
ly to rely on European performance. European participation would thus be limited to
development of one or more of the RAMs.
Were the European share of Shuttle development to be truly substantial, these eco-
nomic and management considerations might well be overriding. However, the extent of
their possible participation is now limited to a few specific projects totaling about $100
million out of the total Shuttle program costing $5.15 billion. The advantages of denying
their participation at this level do not justify the loss of U.S. integrity abroad.
There is no need to reverse our position now on European development of the Tug,
since it is a vary advanced project which will require several more years of design study.
The Europeans are, as yet, not convinced that they should undertake it.
My basic worry is that we will buy more trouble with the Europeans than can be
justified by the ephemeral domestic advantages that we may gain by denying their partic-
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ipation. To limit them now to development of only a RAM would be judged by them as a
clear reversal of our previous policy. Your reputation as a consistent advocate of interna-
tional cooperation in space and specifically with Europe on the post-Apollo program
would inevitably suffer. Furthermore, we ought not to ignore altogether tile very real
political valnes that would result from European participation with us in the development
as well as the use of the Space Transportation System.
Balancing all these considerations I suggest:
1. That we accept, but not encourage, European participation in the tasks in the
development of the shuttle already identified by NASA conditioned on a prior
commitment by the European Space Conference (ESC) that it will undertake the
subsequent development of one or more RAMs.
2. That we bring the Europeans to agree that consideration of their undertaking the
development of the Tug will be deferred pending further mutual study.
[3] 3. That we conduct negotiations on these matters so as to avoid indicating a major
change in our policy toward European participation (i.e.: in the proposals which
we have already made to the ESC).
I urge that you approve this course of action in principle and instruct me to reach
agreement with the Europeans along these lines.
William P. Rogers
Document 1-27
[1] May 5, 1972
Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Henry:
Dr. Walsh of your staff has requested formal comments from NASA on Secretary
Rogers' memorandum to the President of April 29 on Post-Apollo relations with the
Europeans.
Our comments are attached.
SincerelB
James c. Fletcher
Administrator
Enclosure
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[Enclosure Page 1]
NASA's Comments on Secretary Rogers'
Memorandum of April 29, 1972
NASA's comments on Secretary Rogers' memorandum of April 29 for the President,
on the subject of post-Apollo relationships with the Europeans, follow:
Our preferred objective is to obtain European agreement to develop a specified type
of sortie module for use with the shutde, reserving other types for our own development.
We regard this as a desirable contribution to the space transportation system and one
which should present no undue problems technically or managerially.
We agree with the Secretary's letter that the tug requires further study. It is, therefore,
a distinctly, second choice, and much less desirable. We believe that European study of the
tug should be on element of an agreement only if it is clear that tile US commitment to a
European undertaking to develop the tug could be considered only after extensive
European study and only on the basis that we might well decide not to pursue the tug after
such study. The Europeans would have to understand, even before undertaking such a
study, that the definition of the tug and European capability [2] to develop it are uncer-
tain; even in the event we were both persuaded by studies and proposed management
schemes that the project appeared feasible in Europe, we would still want to reserve the
right to escape from an agreement if interim review indicated that the tug would be sub-
stantially delayed or fall short of agreed specifications. Of course, the Europeans might
not wish to participate in the study on such a tenuous basis. Unless directed by the
President, we would not anticipate NASA technical support of the European study. For all
of these reasons, we do not recommend European involvement in the tug.
With regard to specific shuttle tasks that Europe might perform, we continue to feel
such European participation is highly undesirable and that it would complicate our shut-
tle management problems. However, if it is considered by the President, on the basis of
international factors, that Europe's participation in the shuttle itself is of overriding
importance, we believe that we could accept such participation if" suitable management
terms cam be established. In essence, acceptable management terms would call for US
prime contractor selection and direction of European subcontractors, with the [3]
European side responsible for both estimated costs and overruns and the US side respon-
sible only for those out-of-scope changes imposed by us. As stated in the Secretary's letter,
the European performance of shuttle items would be conditioned upon European devel-
opment of a sortie module.
[4] INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION
IN THE SHUTTLE
A. NASA wants:
1. U.S. Shuttle (now)
2. U.S. Sortie
3. U.S. Tug (2-3 years later)
B. NASA can do (if required):
1. A European Sortie Can (no significant management problem)
2. European "bits and pieces" of shuttle (now)
3. Maybe European Tug (later) (Technology and Management Problem)
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C.
O.
[51E.
1.
2.
3.
Europe Wants (?)
1. European Tug
2. "Bits and pieces" of shuttle
a. or involvement some way in shuttle
3. Sortie (?)
U.S. should (1) offer and (2) accept
1. (1) Sortie Can
2. (2) Shuttle Items or C 2 a. Plus D 1
3. (2) Europe study of Tug in full knowledge of questions re definition, European
capability, performance, minimal number of procurements, interim review and
escape procedure for NASA
NASA Position
Sortie OK
Tug only after detailed study, poor second choice, et cetera
We are directable to do shuttle items plus 1 (if we can control management
method)
Document 1-28
Document title: European Space Conference, Committee of Alternates, "Report of the
ESC Delegation on discussions held with the U.S. Delegation on European participation
in the Post-Apollo Program, Washington, 14-16 June 1972," CSE/CS (72) 15, June 22,
1972, excerpts.
Source: ESA Collection, European Community Archives, Florence, Italy.
On June 1, 1972, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger commu-
nicated to the Department of State and NASA, among others, a presidential decision that removed a
reusable space "tug" as a candidate for the European contribution to the Space Transportation
System. President Nixon was also discouraging the idea of European firms building portions of the
space shuttle itself. These preferences were the basis of the U.S. position announced in a meeting with
a European Space Conference delegation on June 14 through June 16. After the meeting, Europe
decided over the next year that its post-Apollo contribution would be a research and applications mod-
ule (subsequently renamed Spacelab).
[1] Neuilly, 22ndJune 1972
Report of the ESC Delegation on discussions
held with the U.S. Delegation on European
participation in the Post-Apollo Program
Washington, 14-16June 1972
1. According to instructions given by ESC Ministers in an informal meeting of 19 May
1972, held in Paris, a European Space Conference Delegation met a U.S. Delegation in
Washington, D.C., 14-15June 1972.
A list of the European and U.S. delegates is attached to this report (Annexes I and II).
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General considerations
2. At the beginning of the discussions, Mr. Herman Pollack, head of the U.S. Delegation,
made an opening statement (see Annex III) in which he recalled the developments which
had occurred since the last meeting between President Lefevre and Under Secretary of
State Johnson in early 1971 and provided a brief overview of the current U.S. attitude
towards cooperation with Europe in the post-Apollo Program:
(1) The concept of European participation in the Shuttle development has changed
considerably and would be subject to such stringent conditions that it may
become almost unattractive for Europeans;
(2) The U.S. has concluded that it is not prudent to continue discussions on the pos-
sibility of tug development by Europe;
(3) The U.S. encourages Europe to undertake the development of one or more of
the Research and Application Modules which in its opinion would constitute a
desirable form of cooperation;
[2] (4) The U.S. also urges Europe to anticipate and make extensive use of the Space
Shuttle system when it becomes operational and to participate in payload devel-
opment, both manned and unmanned. It was mentioned in that respect that par-
ticipation of European astronauts in shuttle flights would be welcomed.
3. In the course of the discussion which followed the statement, it was made clear to the
European Delegation that the U.S. attitude was defined at top governmental level and that
no change in it could be expected; it was also stressed within the limits so described
Europe could submit any proposal of participation.
4. In his concluding remarks (see Annex IV) Mr. Herman Pollack drew the attention of
the European Delegation to the fact that the U.S. feels that the "potential of outer space"
which would become possible through the post Apollo program is so far-reaching that it
can no longer be the subject solely of national decision. This is the reason why the U.S. is
seeking ways to make it possible for other qualified and interested nations to participate
with it in the development and utilization of this new capability.
The enduring nature of the ties that bind the U.S. and Europe motivated the U.S. in
it search for European participation in the post-Apollo program. The motivations were
purely political and commercial or technical factors had practically no influence ....
[ 1] ANNEX lII
Opening Remarks by Mr. Herman Pollack
Meeting with ESC Delegation on Post-Apollo Cooperation
June 14, 1972
Welcome.
Many of us sat in this room for the second of the two meetings between Minister
Lefevre and Under Secretary Johnson and their delegations 16 months ago in early 1971.
A good deal has occurred during those 16 months to enable us all to have a clearer
definition of the post-Apollo program and a somewhat better understanding of each oth-
ers' readiness and interest in cooperating in that program. In retrospect perhaps the most
significant of these developments have been:
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1. The development by the U.S. of a launch assurance policy, which stands inde-
pendent of European participation in the development of the reusable Space
Transportation System or its use. I refer to the launch assurances conveyed in
Under Secretary Johnson's letter to Minister Lefevre of September 1, 1971.
2. The discussions held between NASA and technical representatives of the
European Space Conference.
3. The decision of our President to proceed with the development of the Space
Shuttle System, and the development timetable which follows from that decision.
4. The preparations under way in Europe for Ministerial decisions, prospectively this
summer, on a broad range of matters affecting European space activities.
5. Considerable changes in the economic perceptions and budgetary circumstances
in the U.S. I imagine the same is true in Europe.
We meet now, at your request, specifically to discuss the questions which you have
raised in the agenda before us.
It is our understanding that these discussions are not negotiations. Obviously we will
not reach decisions here. Rather, we anticipate informal and frank exchange of views in
which we seek to understand more precisely each others' preferences and interests on the
matters which you have raised.
In the absence of a clear indication of the measure of European interest in possible
participation, we shall do our best to make the U.S. views regarding the questions you have
raised as helpful as we can. Were it possible during the early part of our discussions to
obtain a clearer understanding of the measure of European interest, and possible partic-
ipation, our views could possibly be more responsive and useful to you.
[2] Now, if I may, I should like to present a brief overview of U.S. attitudes toward coop-
eration with Europe in the post-Apollo program.
1. We urge Europe to anticipate and make extensive use of the Space Shuttle System
when it becomes operational, and to participate in payload development, both
manned and unmanned.
2. We have concluded that from our point of view, as well as yours as we understand
it, that the development by Europe .of one or more of the Research Applications
Modules would constitute a desirable form of cooperation, and we encourage you
to undertake such a task.
3. With the passage of time the concept of European participation in the develop-
ment of the Shuttle itself has changed considerably. We are now strongly
impressed by the potential difficulties that might ensue from an intergovern-
mental effort to produce a relatively small number of components of a massive
piece of highly complex hardware whose timetable is pressing and in whose suc-
cess the political and economic stakes are so high. Cooperation in some of the
Shuttle items is not precluded. However, it will be necessary for Europe to under-
take to meet rather stringent conditions designed to satisfy fully U.S. concerns. In
candor I must report that the conditions the United States finds necessary may
diminish the attractiveness to Europe of participating in the Shuttle items.
4. Since the definition of the Tug is still uncertain and the decision by the United
States to proceed with its development has not yet been made, and there are no
hard predictions as to when it will be made, the United States has concluded that
it is not prudent to continue discussions of the possibility of cooperation on this
task.
As I indicated earlier I have presented this overview in the interests of making our dis-
cussion here today more constructive and to help illuminate the responses we shall make
to the questions you have raised.
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I have, as you know, participated in these discussions from their outset. If words alone
were all that were required to get cooperation under way we would be in full orbit by now.
I want to assure you that European cooperation in this program, while evolving in form
with passing time and changing circumstances, continues to be an objective of the United
States. Let me say, however, that this is not essentially a commercial transaction we are dis-
cussing. Above all, it is a political act. In the absence of mutual political will to achieve a
state of cooperation the real and apparent hazards and pitfalls will assume inordinate pro-
portions and I fear that this venture will founder. It is my hope that our discussion today,
and any that may subsequently follow, will be strongly motivated by a mutual desire to find
a basis for agreement.
That concludes my opening remarks.
[ 1 ] ANNEX IV
Concluding Remarks by Mr. Herman Pollack
Meeting with ESC Delegation on Post-Apollo Cooperation
June 16, 1972
In this meeting we have tried to be entirely forthcoming, realizing fully the difficulty
and the importance of the decisions that are to be made in Europe and the value to you
of the clearest possible understanding of what the United States has in mind. It is our
hope that we have provided the facts you are seeking and that they will enable your
Governments to arrive at affirmative decisions when your Ministers meet in July. Some of
the facts, however, which I think are relevant to the decisions of }'our Governments can-
not be expressed with mathematical precision but are nevertheless important, and per-
haps fundamentally of greater importance than some of the hard information we have
provided you with during this meeting.
For example, it is important that both sides keep in mind the basic, enduring nature
of the ties that bind the United States and Europe. These are well understood on both
sides of the Atlandc and need not be elaborated here. But, it is this compelling and fun-
damental fact of life that above all else has motivated the United States in its search for
European participation in the Post-Apollo program.
Another major but somewhat ineffable motivation arises out of the awe which United
States leaders viewed the potential of outer space which would become possible once
capability such as that contemplated in the post-Apollo program became a part of
mankind's competence. We felt then and continue to feel now that this potential is too
great, its implications to mankind too far reaching to be properly the subject solely of
national decision. We therefore began to seek ways to make it possible for other qualified
and interested nations to participate with us in the development and utilization of this
new capability.
I repeat my statement made on the first day that commercial or technical factors have
practically no influence in motivating our desire for European participation in a post-
Apollo program. Rather, the considerations I mentioned above have generated this objec-
tive and keep it alive and strong today.
When we began our discussions with Europe we ourselves did not fully understand the
nature of the system whose construction we shall embark on this summer.
Furthermore, it is clear in retrospect, that we approached these opportunities in
prospect of a considerable interest abroad in participating in the development and use of
a new Space Transportation System.
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[2]Youhaveparticipatedwithusin thepreliminarydefinitionof thatSystemand,
indeed,havemadesignificantcontributionstoourchangingperspectivesanddeepening
understandingofit.Positionswhichoriginatedseveralyearsagoreliedheavilyonpredic-
tions-indeedspeculation--bothastotheSystemitselfandyourinterestinit.Theseposi-
tionhavebeenalteredandmodifiedasourmutualcomprehensiongrew.
Thuswehavearrivedatapointin timeatwhichyourparticipationi thedevelop-
mentoftheShuttleonasignificantscale,asoriginallyconceived,hasbeenovertakenby
timeand,forthereasonswehavenumeratedduringourdiscussions,cannolongerbe
encouragedbyusevenonthelimitedscalewearestilldiscussing.Considerationfmutu-
al developmentof theTughasof necessitybeensetaside.Theopportunitytodevelop
Sortiemodulesandtoplantogetherfortheuseoftheover-allSpaceShuttleSystemand
actuallytomakeuseofit, nonethelessconstituteamajorchallengeandwouldbeasig-
nificantresponseto ourearlierexpectations.Wehopewehavemadeit clearthatwe
wouldwarmlywelcomeyourparticipationi thesetwoareas.
Finally,letmerepeatthatforovertwoyearswehavesoughtEuropeanparticipation
in thisprogramandletmeemphasizethatwecontinuetodoso.It ismyhopethatfor
yourownreasonsaswellasforthosewhichmoveus,weshallbeabletocomethissum-
mertoanagreementtomoveforwardtogetheronthishistoricproject.
Document 1-29
Document title: Arnold W. Frutkin, Assistant Administrator for International Affairs,
NASA, Memorandum to Administrator, "Government Level Negotiations on Sortie Lab,"
May 9, 1973.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This memorandum describes the final issues that had to be resolved before the United States and
Europe couM sign a memorandum of understanding regarding European development of the Spacelab
(SL). The French L3S vehicle mentioned in the memorandum was later renamed Ariane. AEROSA T
was a proposed cooperative satellite system for air traffic control, which was controversial at the time
this memorandum was written; the United States later withdrew from discussions regarding the devel-
opment of this system.
[1] May9,1973
Memorandum
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
A/Administrator
I/Asst. Administrator for International Affairs
Government Level Negotiations on Sortie Lab
Formal but secondary level efforts to arrive at a consolidated US/European text
between the European side and the US side were carried out on May 2-3 in Washington.
Pollack chaired the US side (myself, Elliott, Rattinger) and Trella chaired the European
side (with representation from seven countries).
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A large number of essentially cosmetic changes were made in tile existing US draft to
accommodate European interests. In the end the European side cited three "reserva-
tions." It was agreed the European side would attempt to respond in about two weeks to
indicate whether the reservations stood so as to require further discussion or were
removed.
Among the many cosmetic changes were the following:
1. The words "United States" were dropped where they preceded space shuttle sys-
tem in order to parallel our removal of the word "European" before Spacelab. We do not
want to emphasize ownership of the Spacelab by Europe and feel there is no need, in view
of all the facts of life, to emphasize US ownership of the Shuttle.
2. Under obligations of the US, "assistance" was removed to come under a require-
ment for mutual agreement and relevant US law and regulation.
3. We agreed that the US right to provide assistance as hardware rather than know-
how could be exercised "in exceptional cases." In fact, we do not now know of any require-
ments for such reservations.
4. We agreed to state the legal situation in response to the European request for
technology beyond that necessary to execute the SL program, namely, that the US will
consider [2] such requests on a case-by-case basis.
5. We made the same arrangement for the use of required technology for addition-
al purposes outside the SL.
6. We agreed that cooperative (non-reimbursable) European proposals would be
given preference over third countries if at least equal in merit, but that cost reimbursable
proposals by Europe will get such preference in the event of payload limitations or sched-
uling conflicts. This was agreed by our side to be only what would be the case under the
President's launch assurance policy in practice.
7. It is specified, again pursuant to the President's launch policy, that commercial
use of Shuttles and SLs will be non-discriminatory.
8. On the first SL we get "full control.., including the right to make final determi-
nation as to its use..." and, except for joint planning of the first flight on a cooperative
basis and encouragement of cooperative use of the first SL unit throughout its life, we get
"unrestricted use of the first SL free of cost." It is made clear that we may charge Europe
for use of the first SL.
9. The term of agreement--five years after the first operational flight of the
Shuttle--is restated as lasting until January 1, 1985 but at least for five years following the
first flight.
The European chairman ended with three reservations:
1. The group was not convinced that the European risk or contribution was ade-
quately balanced by European benefits. He was specifically referring to their hope that we
would agree to try to balance the European procurements in the US with US procure-
ments in Europe. We said this is out of the question.
2. The Europeans feel that the agreement ought to extend to 1988 in order to draw
out our obligation to buy SLs. We feel that a term beyond 1985 is totally unrealistic in the
light of our present knowledge and future uncertainties.
g. The European side would still hope to improve the US launch assurance policy.
We've made clear that it is totally impractical to think of working out changes in the US
Government on this policy at this time.
[3] My own assessment is that the three reservations are tactical, to keep things open,
while the final arrangements in Europe fall into place on such matters as funding of the
French L3S launch vehicle. I believe that the European leaders are essentially committed
to participation with us and that only unexpected rebuffs by us, congressional reversal, or
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a serious falling out in Europe can change this. The AEROSAT problem is one such threat
on the horizon.
Arnold W. Frutkin
Document 1-30
Document title: Arnold W. Frutkin, Assistant Administrator for International Affairs,
NASA, Memorandum to Deputy Administrator, "International Space Station Approach,"
June 7, 1974.
Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York.
This memorandum, prepared by longtime NASA Assistant Administrator for International Affairs
Arnold Frutkin, contains some of the earliest thinking within top NASA circles with respect to what
was expected to be the major "post-shuttle" program---a space station.
[1] June 7, 1974
TO: AD/Deputy Administrator
FROM: I/Asst. Administrator for International Affairs
SUBJECT: International Space Station Approach
REF: Your Oral Request of May 15
Note: I have assumed that it would be easier to get domestic clearance to explore a
space station internationally than to get domestic approval for a space station per se
before inviting international participation. Therefore, we propose an approach here in
which all elements of the project would be attacked on an international basis:justification,
definition, design, construction, operation and use.
1. Prospective Partners
The three plausible partners for an international space station effort would be the US,
the Soviet Union, and the European Space Agency. All have space experience, will have
had manned flight experience, and have the necessary resources. (Canada is extremely
limited in resources and Japan has shown no disposition to contribute to a non-national
space purpose. The possible participation on a secondary level of these and other coun-
tries will be discussed later.)
There are a number of options as to how to approach participation by the senior
three. We could approach either the USSR or Europe bilaterally, but I believe that each
would be reluctant to enter into a strictly bilateral arrangement in the foreseeable
future--Europe because of conservative space funding views and current space commit-
ments, the Soviet Union because of political and security considerations. I do not think
we should put the USSR forward as the senior partner since Europe would be quite
offended (in view of the Spacelab agreement). Moreover, Europe might really be a better
partner operationally, technically, financially and politically.
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[9] Our best bet would be to approach both Europe and the USSR simultaneously, hold-
ing over each the possibility that we might be going ahead with the other. On this basis,
we may be able to motivate both to work with us on a tripartite basis. This would give us the
strongest basis for a large undertaking--economically and politically. Our approach
(below) is calculated to make the USSR and Europe feel they have very little to lose and
perhaps something to gain by entering into the particular procedure we are proposing.
2. Domestic Clearance
The multi-step approach outlined below would, of course, have to be cleared domes-
tically with the usual offices. The prospects for such clearance would be greatly improved
for the following reasons:
(a) No significant funds would be required until about the fourth year of the rela-
tionship.
(b) The procedure would advance us vary cautiously, step by step, into the project,
with a long-deferred final commitment, and ample and specific opportunity to decide not
to proceed beyond any given step.
3. Initial International Approach
After obtaining clearance, NASA would approach the Soviet Academy (or Aerospace
Ministry) and the ESA (with backup visit at least to the principal ESA members---
Germany, UK, France and Italy) on the following basis:
"I'he next major step in space, following the Shuttle/Spacelab, could well be a space
station--'permanent,' resuppliable, recycling, etc. Such a space station would represent a
facility of very wide interest and potential value to nations. As a very considerable and ben-
eficial undertaking, it would require and deserve the pooling of resources. Accordingly,
we feel that the question of such a space station should be explored as a possible interna-
tional undertaking.
"We recognize that it is entirely too early for any nation to consider any commitment
whatever to such a project. At the same time, in view of the protracted study and devel-
opment which would be required before a space station could become a reality, it is out
too early to undertake the very first preliminary inquiries regarding the purposes and
character of such a facility.
[3] "We propose a very cautiously and conservatively structure[d] approach which would
allow the three principal space power centers to examine into the question. They would
begin independently, coordinate their next steps and, assuming that progress is satisfac-
tory, proceed on an increasingly integrated basis.
"Thus, we are asking you, the USSR and Europe to agree to explore with us, accord-
ing to a very highly protective procedure, your possible interest in proceeding into the
design, development and operation of a truly international space station."
4. Detailed International Procedure
This procedure would proceed on two separate tracks. The first track would move
from study and definition to planning the design, construction and establishment of the
space station. The second track would aim at setting up the relationships and arrange-
ments among the participants for undertaking, managing, and operating the space
station.
The two-track approach is designed to separate the technical from the political prob-
lems in the early phases of the project. The second track, on management and operation,
begins only at a specific point, when it should be clear whether the first track is making
satisfactory progress.
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This arrangement will give us the best chance to see if we can agree on what it is that
we might want to do together. We could then turn to how we want to do it. Our entire
experience, especially the Spacelab negotiations, demonstrates that if you get into how
before what, you argue about abstractions and principles and problems which will never
arise instead of arguing about a specific job to be done.
Farther down the road, the two tracks must be brought together so that we end up
with a coherent plan and program.
(a) First Track
i. The three participants would initiate independent conceptual (pre-phase A)
studies of a space station in order to develop their own very preliminary notions of its pos-
sible objectives, benefits, character and use, configuration and approach to placing and
maintaining the station on orbit. (3/75)
ii. The participants would interchange their independent studies and consider
them. (9/75)
[4] iii. The participants would form a (technical) joint study group to produce a
single "strawman" concept. This would have no necessary relationship to the prior inde-
pendent studies nor would the participants be bound by the views of their technical
representatives. (12/75)
iv. The participants would independently review the "strawman" study. (9/76)
v. Technical representatives of the three participants would convene to formu-
late plans for a formal Phase A conceptual study to be conducted on an integrated (joint)
basis. These plans would provide for integrated management of the study with a joint pro-
ject team supported by "contractors," public or private, in the three countries. (12/76)
vi. Implementation of the Phase A study per above. (3/76-3/78)
vii. Those participants prepared to proceed, on the basis of Phase A results, to
formulate a Phase B plan would do so. (They would do whatever might be appropriate to
preserve the participation of any member with reservations at any step.) (6/78)
viii. Implementation of Phase II Program. (6/78-6/80)
ix. Review of Phase B program in manner similar to the review of Phase A above.
(6/80-9/80)
x. Formulation of Phase C/D program. (9/80-3/81)
xi. Review of formulation and commitment to Phase C/D. (3/81-6/81)
(b) Second Track
i. At approximately the time when the formal Phase A study is agreed in Track
One, the parties would convene a separate Joint Implementation Working Group to initi-
ate an implementation plan for managing a possible Phase B and beyond.
ii. The Joint Implementation Working Group would address the financial
arrangements, the form and location of management, method of decision making, provi-
sion for a systems integration mechanism, the division of labor among the participants,
the degree to which management [5] authority should reflect the relative responsibility of
the parties, questions of mutual access, and ultimately the operation and use of the
system. The target for final agreement on an implementation plan would be the conclu-
sion of the formal study of Phase A.
5. Technology Transfer
Each participant will expect the ultimate space station to be fully available for his use,
alone or in concert with the other participants. Therefore, each will want essentially a total
knowledge of the system. In all likelihood, narrow commercial processes could be held
back as proprietary. I believe we should face this prospect squarely--in approaching
domestic clearances and later in reaching understandings with the other participants.
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Thus, for the present, we would not hold out any tenuous, complex or artificial prospects
for restricting technology in the course of the program. I believe we could support such a
policy on the basis that the space station itself would be a valuable consideration and that
the technology entering into its structure would be unlikely to have significant commer-
cial application. I propose, however, to keep this question under review to see if an alter-
native is feasible.
6. Additional Accessions
The question of participation by additional countries might be handled in the fol-
lowing way:
(a) In the design and development phase, any one of the three major participants
could absorb personnel from additional countries within its own participation without in
any way reducing its own responsibilities. It could not sub-contract its responsibilities to
foreign companies or the equivalent without the specific knowledge and consent of the
other major participants.
(b) In the use phase, other nations might apply for use of the system to a combined
use-control board composed of the major participants according to provisions which
would have to be worked out by the Joint Implementation Working Group.
7. Assurances
The participants would have to exchange government-level assurances relating to
peaceful purposes, the openness of scientific results, [and] descriptive information of
technical [6] activities (allowing for reservation of proprietary rights to industrial process-
es tested or employed in space, etc.).
Arnold W. Frutkin
Document 1-31
Document rifle: Kenneth S. Pedersen, Director of International Affairs, NASA, to
Director, Space Station Task Force, "Strategy for International Cooperation in Space
Station Planning," undated [August 1982].
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This memorandum by NASA Director of International Affairs Kenneth Pedersen, who had joined the
space agency in 1979, was prepared in response to a query from John Hodge, Director of NASA's
Space Station Task Force, about the elements of a strategy for international cooperation in a possible
station program. The Space Station Task Force had been established earlier in 1982 as a focal point
for developing a NASA proposal for such an undertaking, which new Administrator James Beggs and
Deputy Administrator Hans Mark had made a top priority in their approach to the space agency's
future.
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[1]
TO: MFA-13/Director, Space Station Task Force
FROM: LI-15/Director of International Affairs
SUBJECT: Strategy for International Cooperation in Space Station Planning
In your July 30 memo, you raised some interesting questions concerning internation-
al cooperation strategies. I would like to set down some thoughts on the matter, beginning
with a quick look back to how we proceeded during Post-Apollo planning.
LESSONS LEARNED.
The most important lesson is to avoid making premature commitments or promises.
Along with this, we must be careful to avoid broad statements that can be misconstrued.
Based on long-standing U.S. policy to cooperate internationally in space (that was
reconfirmed in a 1969 White House Space Task Force report) and to encourage a
European community, President Nixon told NASA that the U.S. should have European
participation in Post-Apollo activities. NASA, as a result, immediately began to seek
European cooperation in its Shuttle and Space Station activities. In late 1971, NASA and
the European Space Conference (ESC) agreed that Europe would study a Tug and RAM
(a Spacelab-like module that could either be operated within the Shuttle bay or on a space
station), and that European companies would formally team with U.S. companies during
Phase A and look at specific parts of the Shuttle (i.e., tail, payload bay doors). Also, NASA
and European labs engaged in studying technologies needed for Post-Apollo activities. All
in all, Europe spent about $20M on these Phase A (and in some cases, Phase B) studies.
In the end, Europe's main interest was to develop the Tug.
Meanwhile, the U.S. position with respect to the level and kind of European partic-
ipation it wanted crystallized. First, the Administration's interest in cooperating was later
interpreted as an interest in European involvement in the use of space; i.e., the develop-
ment of payloads and international manned operations rather than joint engineering pro-
jects. Second, [2] NASA, through an extensive review of European industry, found that
European industry lagged approximately five to ten years behind U.S. industry.
Therefore, NASA dropped the idea of joint development of technology, speculating that
the U.S. might stand to lose more than it would gain. Third, NASA also decided that it did
not want to depend on foreign countries for critical items on the Shuttle, so that the
Shuttle could fly independent of foreign activities. Fourth, NASA decided that, for safety
reasons, it did not want to fly a Tug using liquid propellants, the only type Europe was
studying. Moreover, there was real concern that Europe did not have all the technology to
develop a Tug.
A smaller lesson learned was the undesirability of formal teaming in the study phase.
While this teaming was for joint development of [the] Shuttle, which was eventually
dropped for the reason stated above, it did reveal the possibility of losing flexibility in
subsequent development. NASA might prefer certain European companies while not
wanting to choose the U.S. companies with which they were teamed, or vice versa. Most
important, individual European companies could be denied participation in the program
if they had prematurely teamed with a U.S. company which did not end up winning the
bid.
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The U.S. Government thus found itself in the position of having to walk back from
the European perception of the cooperative possibilities in Post-Apollo that were encour-
aged by the way the U.S. and Europe had proceeded to define that cooperation. In some
quarters in Europe, these misperceptions still exist, particularly as they concern the rea-
sons why we rejected European development of the Tug.
Therefore, it must be decided whether certain systems and subsystems are going to be
off-limits before we enter Phase B, so that we can avoid not only clashed expectations but
also the possibility of missused [sic] foreign funding. I,ooking at it from the positive side,
we should seek to identify, as soon as possible after we understand the basic design of the
space station and before Phase B, what systems are realistic possibilities for foreign coop-
eration.
Further along in our program as we begin our negotiations with potential partners on
an MOU, we need also to avoid some of the features which have proved troublesome in
the Spacelab agreement. Neither NASA nor potential foreign partners will want an
arrangement where one piece of hardware is contributed, and NASA is obligated to buy
the additional units. Instead, our foreign partners will probably want preferential or free
access to the Space Station as the quid pro quo. As an internal exercise, they will proba-
bly want to assure themselves there will be industrial spin-offs for their industry. And while
NASA may indeed want to buy additional units from the fi)reign source, it is not desirable
for NASA to be either [3] obligated to do so or restricted from developing similar types
of hardware.
MISSION REQUIRFMENTS STUDIES... HOW WE'VE PROCF_J)EI) 7"0 DATE.
The first key step was to involve foreigners early on in the process. This is responsive
to their longtime requests for earlier participation in major NASA projects. It creates some
ambiguity such as schedules, false starts, etc., but not enough so that it outweighs the ben-
efits of beginning this way. Therefore, I think we are on the right track.
Each space agency that is undertaking a parallel mission requirements study has made
the mission requirements aspect the first effort of its study, so that the results of its study
can be factored into NASA's similar efforts. This results from the numerous times NASA
has emphasized in its discussions with foreign officials the importance of identifying the
potential uses of a space station, and from the realization by foreign officials that key U.S.
players need to be apprised of the requirements that justify developing a space station.
Nonetheless, these same space agencies are also studying possible hardware contri-
butions to a NASA space station. These efforts result from their own political realities at
home; i.e., they have to justify spending their resources in a space station not only on
potential space station utilization, but on potential industrial return as well. It also derives
from the fact that if NASA is successful in its attempts to get Phase B approval for FY84,
then they are going to have to move quickly to get big bucks from their governments to
fund their Phase B activities. Thus, they are preparing the information necessary for their
governments to determine if they are interested.
While this is acceptable, we must not let the emphasis on requirements get lost in the
next several months. We can accomplish this by immediately addressing the question of
how we plan to exchange results of the studies, thus reenforcing [sic] in the foreign space
officials' minds that we are most interested in this aspect. I believe we will accomplish this
at the September 13 meeting. I have outlined a proposal ibr this in the next section.
EXPLOR[NGTHEUNKNOWN 93
HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED FROM HERE.
Phase A
We have already laid the groundwork for this Phase. We saw an intense interest in our
Space Station plans, and we have effectively translated that interest into several foreign
mission requirements studies which are useful to both NASA and our potential partners.
The complementary studies are designed to determine how much foreign interest exists
in contributing to and using a U.S. Space Station. The results of these [4] studies will help
both NASA and the potential partners decide if there is mutual interest in continuing
cooperative activities in Phase B.
The next eight months--the duration of the mission requirements studies--are a very
important time. It is incumbent upon NASA to maintain the emphasis on these require-
ments studies. I believe we have to continue to demonstrate that these studies are impor-
tant for all the reasons we discussed at the beginning.
Thus, the scenario I would like to see happen for the rest of Phase A is as follows.
Since the mid-term review of the U.S. contractors will be done individually with each con-
tractor, it is not appropriate to invite our potential partners to observe this review.
However, immediately following these reviews, I propose we invite the agencies which are
undertaking parallel studies to a NASA summary of the mid-term reviews, and in turn,
request each potential partner to brief us on their mid-term results. The final review of
the U.S. contractors, I understand, will be an open review with all contractors reporting at
the same forum. Thus, it is appropriate to invite our foreign agency study managers to
attend this review, and present the final results of their studies. Finally, just as the U.S. con-
tractors will prepare a final report on their studies, we should request copies of the reports
of the foreign studies. We should also offer to provide to them the unclassified portion of
the U.S. contractors' reports.
In addition to the above, we should use any of our NASA trips abroad in the next year
as an opportunity to pulse the progress of these foreign studies. Likewise, we should wel-
come any requests to meet with us at NASA Headquarters to discuss the status of our
Space Station planning activities. Given that the current space station activities are being
run out of NASA Headquarters, I believe we should request foreign visitors to meet with
Headquarters rather than Center personnel. Our foreign visitors should not be needless-
ly exposed to the Center politics now going on, which could only arouse further confu-
sion as to NASA's objectives at the present time. In addition, if opportunities for NASA
personnel to address conferences arise that are attractive and useful, we should accept
them, and use the conferences as additional opportunities to meet offline with foreign
officials. In particular, we should attempt to find conferences that include potential for-
eign users of a Space Station: scientists, business groups, and applications-oriented
groups. This office will be on the lookout for all such possibilities. Finally, this office will
ensure that all foreign visitors to NASA are apprised of our Space Station planning activi-
ties and, where relevant, set up meetings with Space Station Task Force personnel. We may
be able to identify new potential users through this process.
[5] As we planned for our Phase A activities, we discussed with our potential foreign part-
ners the best way for NASA to work with them and with foreign industry. Based on these
and our own internal discussions, we decided that NASA would work directly with the for-
eign agencies, which in turn would keep their respective industries informed. In this way,
NASA maintains its ties with its foreign space agency partners. And, since we do not want
any formal industry teaming during Phase A, this strategy best suits our objectives. I
believe we should maintain this strategy throughout Phase A. However, if a foreign part-
ner invites NASA to address a meeting it has convened for its foreign industry, it might be
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beneficial for us to attend. But if we decide to accept one, we must be ready to respond
positively to all such foreign requests. Finally, we should encourage foreign space agencies
to invite foreign industry to the planned January NASA industrial symposium that the
[American Institnte of Aeronautics and Astronautics] is arranging for us.
Phase B
The following discussion on Phase B presupposes that we get the go-ahead for Phase
B in FY84. If not, then NASA would in effect be winding down Phase A activities or stretch-
ing them out another year. Our potential foreign partners will only proceed beyond these
requirement studies when NASA gets Phase B approval.
Planning for and discussions with our potential partners on Phase B should rightly
take place as Phase A winds down and as we have a better fix on the conduct of Phase B.
I believe it is too early now to begin publicly speculating in great detail about how Phase
B might look. This would only result in the danger of appearing to be overcommitting,
and may, in fact, raise expectations in our potential foreign partners that we should not
now raise. Although we must begin developing our views on how collaboration in Phase B
would look, it would be premature to talk at length with our potential foreign partners at
this stage.
The way our potential partners interact with NASA in Phase B is largely dependent on
the management scheme we choose. I understand that one of the Task Force's working
groups is now looking at various Phase B management schemes and that choice will prob-
ably be made around January. However, I would like to set clown a few thoughts that I have
concerning the way the international aspect of this Phase should proceed, regardless of
the management approach chosen.
By the time we reach Phase B, special foreign interests in system and subsystem areas
will probably have developed. These can be explicitly recognized within an agreement and
used to focus respective studies, but no commitments to hardware development should be
made. In a sense, this second phase would be the time when NASA and the potential part-
ners would be [6] trying each other out, to see if cooperation really makes sense, both in
the hardware and in the policy sense. But neither side will be quite ready to make a for-
mal commitment.
While the main focus of Phase B is on designing hardware concepts, I believe each
party should continue to refine requirements. Mission requirements analysis efforts
should be an ongoing activity throughout the life of the Space Station program. In Phase
B, we will be farther along in our design of the Space Station, which should help us dis-
cover additional uses. In addition, results from past Shuttle flights and other space endeav-
ors should reveal new uses.
Whatever Phase B management scheme we decide upon, it may be desirable to avoid
formal teaming of U.S. and foreign industry. The Shuttle experience suggests that it can
reduce NASA's flexibility to choose certain foreign proposals because they are so tied to
U.S. companies that eventually lose out in the development Phase. We all realize, however,
how hard discouraging formal teaming will be, given our recent experience with Phase A.
If foreign space agencies fund Phase B activities, then they are halfway there in see-
ing the merits of cooperating on the development phase. However, they will need to be
convinced that a) the piece they eventually build is of significant value to the total system
and, b) the returns to them are worth the costs of building it. Thus, regular discussions
with our potential partners throughout Phase B is important to ensure that we mutually
determine the best possible combination of cooperative possibilities that satisfy all our
needs. Thus, in addition to meeting with our potential partners on the specifics of the
Space Station activities, we must also use these opportunities to begin this type of
dialogue.
EXPLORINGTHE UNKNOWN 95
Phase C/D
While MOU negotiations are at least 1 1/2 to two years away, over the next year,
International Affairs will be re-examining past cooperative agreements (in particular
Spacelab) to determine what features NASA Ought to retain or avoid. In addition, we will
be holding informal discussions with our potential partners to determine the things they
will be looking for in their MOU's. As we proceed, we will continue to consult with you.
GUIDELINES FOR COOPERATIVE PROPOSALS.
First, we must determine if each specific proposal is beneficial to the U.S.; i.e., con-
tributes to the overall objectives of the Space Station Program, to NASA's scientific and
technological goals, and in a broader sense to overall U.S. foreign policy objectives. From
our experience, a proposal can be beneficial by:
[7] - encouraging foreign STS and space station use on both a cooperative and reim-
bursable basis, thus tying other countries' programs to ours;
- sharing the cost of U.S. programs by stimulating contributions from abroad;
- extending ties among scientific and national communities;
- enlarging the potential for the development of the state-of-the-art;
- supporting U.S. foreign relations and foreign policy.
Second, we should be confident that the industrial and technological infrastructure
exists within a foreign country in order to handle the tasks proposed. This point is cru-
cial, because it is one of the most important ways we assure ourselves that little or no tech-
nology will be transferred. During the Post-Apollo discussions, we were not that familiar
with the European aerospace industry and subsequently toured that industry to make an
assessment. We are much more fortunate today in that we have now worked with both
European and Canadian industry on STS, and with Japanese industry on several scientif-
ic and applications projects. Thus, our analysis will probably be done much more quickly
this time around.
We should also assure ourselves that the proposals are realistic in terms of the pro-
jected costs involved. ESA, for example, sets ceilings on the amount of money a program
will cost. Yet, many times, unforeseen design changes or launch slips will push that cost
up. We would want to make sure that the proposals' cost projections include an adequate
contingency to hopefully avoid the potential problem of foreign attempts to have NASA
pay for these charges and slips.
Finally, while it might be attractive if the potential partner proposed hardware that
matched its utilization requirements, I believe that we should be satisfied that the partner
has utilization requirements for the Space Station system as a whole, and that its specific
proposal contributes to that system.
OTHER US. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
The decision to involve international partners in NASA's Post-Apollo Program was
made before that program was either defined or approved. The White House Space Task
Force Group headed by Vice President Agnew confirmed that there would continue to be
international involvement in NASA's Post-Apollo programs, and President Nixon rein-
forced this to Administrator Tom Paine. Afterwards, there was a long, intensive intera-
gency review to determine just what President Nixon meant when he [8] said he wanted
international involvement in the Post-Apollo Program. As the program was defined,
NASA, too, determined what it thought the optimal international involvement should be.
As the development evolved, some conclusions were confirmed, and others were identi-
fied as things to avoid in future undertakings.
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The 1958 Space Act gave NASA the statutory responsibility to seek international coop-
eration in its space activities. This policy was interpreted by the Nixon Administration as
applying to NASA's Post-Apollo activities. President Reagan's July 4 space policy statement
reconfirmed that policy with respect to present and future NASA activities. Therefore,
NASA should proceed with pursuing the best possible international involvement in a
space station that is beneficial to U.S. interests.
Given this, NASA is responsible for making sure that all U.S. Government agencies or
portions thereof that have foreign policy responsibilities are kept informed of our activi-
ties. Furthermore, informing them early on in the planning process gives us a much bet-
ter opportunity to have them onboard as potential supporters for this program.
We started by briefing the interested offices within the State Department. The Space
Station Task Force has kept the relevant DOD offices informed of NASA's international
activities. NASA is briefing the export control community since U.S. companies are now
seeking approval for information exchange agreements during the Phase A mission
requirements study. Other agencies such as OSTP, OMB, DOD, NSC and ACDA are prob-
ably interested in the international aspects as well as the programmatic ones. We should
consider augmenting the briefings the Task Force is giving to these organizations. Further,
we typically prepare briefing materials for White House and other U.S. Government
agency personnel as they attend foreign and international S&T conferences, summits,
etc.; we will include in these materials information on the Space Station activities being
undertaken by foreign space agencies.
As we proceed towards designing the Space Station, we will be much more aware of
the level and type of DOD involvement expected. It is possible that DOD may express con-
cerns that might drive an interagency review of the international component of a Space
Station similar to the type experienced in Post-Apollo planning. Otherwise, I expect the
international aspect will be considered within the context of the overall decision on the
Space Station program. NASA's best strategy in such a policy review would have to be
determined once we saw how the arguments were shaping up.
In terms of the normal State Department review of NASA's international agreements,
it will only review the final MOUs.
[9] SPACE STATION APPROVAL--CAN FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT HELP?
From the onset, we must be fully aware that a Space Station will be built by the U.S.
Government because the U.S. needs and wants it. However, "after having said that, I believe
there are several ways our potential parmers can help NASA gain approval to proceed with
building it.
The first is already underway. If the foreign requirements studies reveal that the
potential foreign utilization rate is large or moderate, then this can help bolster NASA's
contention that it is timely to develop a Space Station. Foreign industrial support can help
expand the overall industrial interest in a Space Station and willingness to fund space
R&D that can contribute to Space Station utilization. Thus, a larger corps of domestic
industry (besides aerospace) may visibly support the Space Station.
Second, foreign contributions will reduce the cost to the U.S. of the Space Station
program, something that can help us in our budget deliberations with both OMB and the
Congress.
On a different level, the fact that foreign governments are willing to put funds into a
U.S. program again shows additional support for the Space Station concept.
Our development of foreign cooperative relationships must be consistent with U.S.
foreign policy objectives. While making the argument that this is politically feasible and
desirable will never be a sole justification for the program, it is important to recognize that
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it could help NASA bring in members of the foreign policy community as supporters, and
help produce a willing Presidential ear.
Congress has consistently been an ardent supporter of international space programs.
Foreign involvement in a U.S. Space Station will be kindly received there. Moreover, it may
help allay Congressional fears that the civil space program is being unduly influenced by
the military. Thus, we could see active Congressional support both before and after
Presidential approval of the program.
FOREIGN REACTION TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
This is an important issue, since the interest and debate over the militarization of
space is at an all-time high--much more intense than during the Post-Apollo planning
activities. Foreign reaction to military involvement in a U.S. Space Station will largely rest
on three factors: 1) the nature of the military involvement and the architecture of the
Space Station; 2) the manner in which these countries already interact with the U.S. mil-
itary; and 3) the tradeoff these countries perceive between: (a) the benefits from partic-
ipating and (b) the domestic and foreign reaction to such participation.
The first depends on the final Space Station design and how the U.S. structures mili-
tary involvement. If military operational weapons systems are to be part of one U.S. space
station, other countries would probably be reluctant to join since doing so would consti-
tute tacit acceptance of weapons activities in space. They might also be concerned that the
station could be considered an attractive military target. If DOD use of a single space sta-
tion were restricted to peaceful military purposes (i.e., reconnaissance and communica-
tions), the reluctance would be greatly reduced since both of the above concerns would
be lessened. If there are two space stations (one military and one civil), foreign participa-
tion on the civil unit should pose no problem to anyone.
In that case, we must then look at our potential partners' current activities with and
attitudes toward the U.S. military. [10]
Most member nations of ESA are also members of NATO (exceptions being Austria,
Sweden and Switzerland; France, while still a NATO member, has withdrawn from all
NATO military activities). Therefore, most of the ESA member states have a long-
standing involvement and NATO commitment to work with the U.S. militarily. Thus,
while ESA is a civilian space agency, there is solid foundation among a majority of its
member states to cooperate in a program that may have some military aspects. In fact,
ESA did make that decision a decade ago when it decided to cooperate with NASA on
STS and contribute Spacelab, despite the fact that the U.S. military would use STS and
possibly Spacelab. In fact, ESA wanted the Spacelab MOU and Intergovernmental
Agreement to state that Spacelab would be used by the U.S. Government (not just
NASA) for peaceful purposes. However, it is important to point out that, on the one
hand, Sweden chose not to participate in Spacelab because it did not want to con-
tribute to any system which would be used by the U.S. military; on the other hand,
neutral Switzerland has participated. Thus, we can foresee a situation where ESA
might sign on, while some of its individual member countries might choose not to
participate for political reasons. France has raised an additional concern; that is, the
possibility that military involvement would mean that international users could be
bumped. In fact, this is a current Ariane claim with respect to STS reliability to pro-
vide launch services to domestic and international commercial users. The question of
how military inw)lvement would infringe on access rights to the station is a vital
issue--probably in the end the single most important factor influencing fi)reign
participation.
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The Science Minister of the ruling LDP Party in Japan has recently stated that Japan's
participation in cooperative projects such as space station would be "unavoidably nar-
rowed" if the U.S. plans to use them for largely military purposes. This statement is
not unexpected. Since World War II, Japan has been consistent in not wanting for
political and economic reason to divert national resources for military reasons, even
[ 11 ] if defensive in nature. The LDP is extremely sensitive to opposition party charges
that its policies are tied too much to what the U.S. wants. For mainly economic rea-
sons, Japan needs to be highly sensitive to Third World attitudes, including the cur-
rent focus on "the militarization of space."Japan is critically dependent on the Third
World suppliers for virtually all of its energy needs and raw materials. Given Japanese
interest in the Third World as both a supplier and a consumer, Japan could thus be
expected to be very cautious about participating with the U.S. in a space station per-
ceived as largely military. However, the above has to be balanced with Japan's strong
ties to the U.S. for defense. Therefore, Japan's participation will largely depend on
the tradeoff between the benefits it sees from a Space Station and potential domestic
and foreign negative reaction if the station has obvious military roles. Japan's assess-
ment of involvement in a Space Station will also be driven by a frank eagerness to join
the U.S. and other developed countries in the next major step, since Japan feels it
missed a key opportunity to participate in the Shuttle.
Canada is probably the country that would least object to any military involvement in
a space station. Canada is also a member of NATO, but even more than that, is part
of NORAD and has several defense sharing agreements with the U.S. The line
between civil and military for Canada is probably slightly fuzzier than ours.
Furthermore, Canada strongly supports DOD use of [the Remote Manipulator System
(RMS)], and would work hard to ensure that DOD did not use an alternative.
When making an analysis like this, we must keep in mind that this is the situation as
we perceive it today. Who knows what the political situation might be like a few years from
now when we are ready to make a commitment to cooperate? In the interim, these coun-
tries will stay in the game because they do not want to be the only developed country to
miss out and because they want to make sure they are ready to participate when the time
comes to sign on the dotted line. It is at that point that each country will weigh the pros
and cons of their participation.
From NASA's perspective, I believe it is important to be fairly straightforward at all
times on the probability and level of DOD involvement expected. Since NASA wants to
maintain and even strengthen the civil role of space activities in the next few years, it is to
our advantage to actively seek and encourage international civil involvement in our next
major step. We should be working to accommodate both civil and military uses within the
basic design of the space station, so that one does not make the other impossible.
[12] TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.
The greatest source of technology transfer, in my mind, is through industry to indus-
try relationships. NASA's cooperative programs have been structured carefully to avoid
technology transfer. Historically, our partners have agreed to provide a discrete piece of
the overall project, and have then been fully responsible for the R&D on that piece. Only
the minimum amount of technical information necessary to achieve a successful interface
among the various elements of a project has been exchanged.
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Secondly, while it might have been true ten years ago that U.S. industry was several
years ahead of foreign industry overall, I do not think the same claim can be made today.
During the past decade, we have seen measurable growth in foreign space budgets and
capabilities. European,Japanese and Canadian industries are challenging U.S. industry in
several fields: communications, remote sensing and launch vehicle development. We see
increasing evidence that foreign governments are adopting sophisticated strategies to
enhance their aerospace industries' competitive positions. Many foreign governments
support their space industry not only through direct R&D funding (which often is target-
ed to areas with demonstrable commercial payoff), but also by price subsidization and
financing assistance, development of attractive package deals, and creation of quasi-
governmental marketing organizations. As a result, the U.S. probably stands to gain as
much as our potential partners.
I want to reemphasize what I said earlier, that one of the more important criteria we
should use in evaluating specific proposals for cooperation is that the cooperating coun-
try has the necessary industrial and technological infrastructure to successfully complete
the job. If we carefully choose the cooperative arrangements--for example, we might
make sure that they are discrete hardware pieces with minimal interfaces--we can mini-
mize the potential for technology transfer in the normal conduct of the project.
However, even if we at NASA are satisfied we have structured a program which mini-
mizes the opportunity for technology transfer, we must be sensitive to the growing inter-
est in this topic throughout the government. Evidence of closer application of existing
export guidelines and review of appropriate future steps in staunching the flow of
advanced technology is readily apparent. In a long-term, multi-faceted program of this
t)q3e, we must maintain close and continuing contacts with the export control communi-
ty. Thus, we must keep the export control community continually informed on our activ-
ities and our efforts to protect against technology transfer. As I mentioned above, this
process has been initiated.
[ 13 ] POTENTIAL FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO SPACE STATION.
An assessment of potential foreign contributions to a U.S. Space Station can only be
a speculative one. Foreign decisions and commitments on participation will be reached
during the end of Phase B, at least two years away. Impacting each country's decision will
be the domestic and international economic situation at that time.
However, it is possible to make some assumptions based on the size of foreign space
budgets and the level of contributions already made to NASA STS-related programs.
Ultimately, the size of the contributions will be related to the potential benefits perceived
by the contributors and the terms of cooperation proposed by NASA.
ESA's current annual budget is approximately $750 million a year. In addition, the
combined space budgets of the ESA Member States is approximately $1.5 billion, appor-
tioned between ESA contributions and individual space programs.
Canada recently increased its space budget by one third to almost $500 million for the
next four years. Japan's annual space budgets for recent years have been on the order of
$500 million and could be expected to remain at least at that level.
In sum, our potential partners now have moderate-sized space budgets that have
greatly increased over the past decade, reflecting a realization by these nations of the
importance and benefits from space activities.
Our STS partners contributed roughly 11-12% of the cost of the development pro-
gram. ESA contributed a $1 billion Spacelab and Canada contributed a $100 million RMS.
Italy currently plans to contribute $30 million to Tether. I believe it is reasonable to expect
similar percentage contributions from these countries to Space Station, if they choose to
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cooperate.Japan's GNP is roughly half that of the ESA Member States. Thus, it is not unre-
alistic to expect them to contribute half the European contribution. Furthermore,
Japanese space industry has advocated doubling its space budget in the near future.
Therefore, a 20% increase (approximately $100 million/year) for Space Station activities
would not be unrealistic, given a strong Japanese industrial interest in a Space Station.
We should keep in mind that other space activities and comparable competing con-
cepts for these funds exist. The Canadian Minister for Science and Technology recently
told Mr. Beggs that while Canada is interested in cooperating on a Space Station, Canada
is already planning several communications and remote sensing missions. Its economy
would have to improve before it could take on new space projects. ESA will be consider-
ing additional Ariane upgrades at the same time it will [14] consider participating in a
NASA Space Station. France has been studying its own robotics-space station, Solaris.
Ultimately, the willingness of these countries to contribute will depend on both pre-
vailing economic conditions and the perceived benefits. Foreign partners will be willing
to consider large investments only if they will lead to direct quid pro quos which are high-
ly attractive, such as preferred or free access to the station, and also to spin off benefits
which magnify the returns to their industry.
I would be happy to discuss with you any of these topics in greater detail.
Kenneth S. Pedersen
Document 1-32
Document title: NASA Fact Sheet, "Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy," August 6,
1982.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This statement of U.S. policy concerning launch assistance and international cooperation was an
update and revision of a similar policy approved by the Nixon administration on August 30, 1972,
and contained in National Secutty Decision Memorandum 187. The earlier policy statement for-
malized the modified U.S. approach to international space issues adopted in the post-Apollo period,
and the 1982 revision made fezo changes in the basic principles set out a decade earli_
[1] August 6, 1982
Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy
I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental aspects of National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 187
of August 30, 1972, as they apply to today's international space activity have been
reviewed. This review highlighted the substantial lead the U.S. enjoys in a wide variety of
technological and space related areas--a lead which should be maintained when consid-
ering and implementing any international activity or transfer governed by the following
directive. Based upon this review, this directive which replaces NSDM 187 is approved and
provides general guidance for U.S. space launch assistance; space hardware, software and
related technologies assistance; and international space cooperation. Specific imple-
menting guidelines are being issued by the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.
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II. POLICY GOVERNING SPACE LAUNCH ASSISTANCE
In dealing with requests from foreign governments, international organizations or
foreign business entities for assistance in launching foreign spacecraft, the following gen-
eral policy guidance is provided.
[Paragraph excised in declassification review]
[2] III. POLICY GOVERNING SPACE HARDWARE AND RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
ASSISTANCE
In dealing with requests for the transfer of, or other assistance in the field of space
hardware, software and related technologies, the following general policy guidance is pro-
vided.
Sales of unclassified U.S. space hardware, software, and related technologies for use
in foreign space projects will be for peaceful purposes; will be consistent with relevant
international agreements and arrangements and relevant bilateral agreements and
arrangements; [phrase excised in declassification review] will contain restrictions on third
country transfers; will favor transfers of hardware over transfers of technology; will not
adversely affect U.S. national security, foreign policy, or trade interests through diffusion
of technology in which the U.S. has international leadership; and will continue to be sub-
ject to the export control process. A special interagency coordinating group chaired by
the Department of State will be established to consider special bilateral agreements cov-
ering the transfer of space hardware, software, and related technologies.
IV. OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE ACTIVITIES
The broad objectives of the United States in international cooperation in space activ-
ities are to protect national security; promote foreign policy considerations; advance
national science and technology; and maximize national economic benefits, including
domestic considerations. The suitability of each cooperative space activity must be judged
within the framework of all of these objectives.
[Attachment page 1]
Implementing Guidelines to the Space Assistance
and Cooperation Policy
A. Policy Governing Space Launch Assistance
1. Space launch assistance will be available, consistent with U.S. laws, either from
U.S. launch sites through the acquisition of U.S. launch services on a cooperative or reim-
bursable basis or from foreign launch sites by purchase of an appropriate U.S. launch
vehicle (see policy guidance under Section B). In the case of launchings from foreign
sites, the U.S. will require assurance that the launch vehicles will be used solely for peace-
ful purposes and will not be made available to third parties without prior agreement of
the U.S.
2. Although due consideration is to be given to Intelsat definitive arrangements, the
absence of a favorable Intelsat recommendation regarding such arrangements should not
necessarily preclude U.S. launching of public domestic or international telecommunica-
tions satellites when such launching is determined to be in the best interests of the U.S.
3. With respect to the financial conditions for reimbursable launch services from
U.S. launch sites, foreign users (including international organizations) will be charged on
the same basis as comparable non-U.S. Government domestic users.
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4. With respect to the priority and scheduling for launching foreign payloads at U.S.
launch sites, such launchings will be dealt with on the same basis as U.S. launchings. Each
launching will be treated in terms of its own requirements and as an individual case. Once
a payload is scheduled for launch, the launching agency will use its best efforts to meet
the scheduling commitments. Should events arise which require rescheduling, such as
national security missions, the U.S. will consult with all affected users in an attempt to
meet the needs of the users in an equitable manner.
5. Interface drawings and hardware (i.e., spacecraft attach fittings, etc.) provided in
connection with the launch assistance provisions of this policy shall be exempt from the
provisions of Section B.
B. Space Hardware, and Related Technologies Assistance
1. For the purpose of this policy, the following distinctions are recognized:
[2] a. Hardware, software, and related technical information include:
(1) Equipment in the form of launch vehicle components and spacecraft
including subsystems and components thereof, associated production and support equip-
ment.
(2) General physical and performance specifications, and operating and
maintenance information on the above equipment.
b. Technical assistance technology, data and know-how necessary for design,
development and production of space hardware and software, including pertinent labo-
ratory and test equipment or performance of functions and/or the conveyance of oral,
visual or documentary information involving the disclosure of information relating to:
(1) Development and testing activities, detailed design drawings and specifi-
cations, managerial and engineering know-how and problem solving techniques.
(2) Production activities in the form of licenses, detailed production draw-
ings, process specifications, and identification of requirements for production equipment.
2. [Sentence excised in declassification review] This does not mean that transfer of
certain "technical assistance" under appropriate safeguards should not be considered on
a case-by-case basis. In those cases in which "technical assistance" is provided, it should be
done under safeguards which ensure protection of U.S. national security and foreign pol-
icy interests. Thus, whether the sale involves "hardware, software and related technical
information," or "technical assistance," or some combination, adequate assurances to con-
trol replication and retransfer and ensure peaceful use must be provided in advance of
the transfer through bilateral agreements, export licensing procedures or other mecha-
nisms. [Sentence excised in declassification review]
[3] 3. All requests for the export or exchange of either space "hardware, software and
related technical information" or "technical assistance" as defined above must specify the
end use for which it is sought.
4. All such requests shall be examined on a case-by-case basis in accordance with
applicable U.S. laws and regulations to determine the net advantage to the U.S. The deter-
mination shall take into account relevant international agreements and arrangements,
relevant bilateral agreements and arrangements, and our objectives for international
cooperation in space activities (see Section C).
5. U.S. space "hardware, software and related technical information" or "technical
assistance" as defined above shall be made available solely for peaceful purposes. No U.S.
space "hardware, software and related technical information" or "technical assistance" as
defined above shall be made available by a recipient to a third party without the express
prior agreement of the U.S. This includes any cases where U.S. space hardware is
launched from a foreign site.
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6. U.S. space "hardware, software and related technical information" or "technical
assistance" as defined above, or any hardware, software, or technical information and
processes derived from such transfers, will not be used to contribute to or assist in the
development of any foreign weapon delivery system. Further, any officially promulgated
national security policy directive is overriding with respect to the transfer of military-relat-
ed missile hardware, information or technology within its purview.
7. In view of the sensitivity of space technology, the following distinctions shall be
applied in reaching decisions as to its export. These distinctions shall apply both to trans-
fer abroad by federal agencies and to commercial export.
a. Proposals or requests for the export of space "hardware, software and related
technical information" should be met, when in the interests of the U.S., through the pro-
vision of "hardware, software and related technical information" rather than "technical
assistance" as defined above, whenever possible and reasonable to do so.
b. 'q'echnical assistance" as defined above shall be exported only under ade-
quate safeguards providing for its use and protection.
[4] 8. In instances where space "hardware, software and related technical information"
and "technical assistance" are intended specifically for use in operational communication
satellite projects to provide public domestic or international telecommunications services,
its export shall be governed as specified in Section III of the Space Assistance and
Cooperation Policy and Section A, paragraph 2 above.
9. Recognizing distinct U.S. national interests, special bilateral agreements covering
the transfer of space launch vehicle "hardware, software and related technical informa-
tion" or "technical assistance" may be considered under the following guidance:
a. The Department of State will convene and chair a special interagency coor-
dinating group consisting of representatives from DOD, ACDA, NASA, NSC, OSTP, DCI,
and other interested agencies as appropriate to recommend policy and to decide upon,
formulate, negotiate, and provide general guidance on implementation oversight acting-
ties regarding bilateral agreements covering transfer to selected foreign governments and
international organizations.
b. Such agreements with selected foreign governments and international orga-
nizations will contain provisions for peaceful use assurances, restrictions on third country
transfers and other appropriate safeguards as may be deemed necessary and mutually
agreed.
c. Any agreements that would result in funding demands on the U.S.
Government must be approved through the budgetary process prior to any commitment
with a foreign entity.
d. Transfer of specific space "hardware, software and related technical informa-
tion" and "technical assistance" under such agreements will continue to be subject to the
export control review process.
10. The U.S. should encourage other supplier nations of space "hardware and relat-
ed technical information" and "technical assistance" to establish controls on their exports
which are comparable to those set forth in this policy.
C. Objectives of International Cooperation in Space Activities National Security Objectives
[Paragraph excised in declassification review]
[5] Foreign Policy Objectives
a. To gain other countries' support for the U.S. in general by promoting the
U.S. national interest through bilateral and muhilateral cooperation.
b. To assist in the achievement of foreign policy objectives through:
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(1) Strengthening our allies and improving our working relationships with
them.
(2) Promoting multilateral cooperation with, and among, other nations sim-
ilar to ongoing U.S. cooperation with the European Space Agency
through suitable cooperation with their programs, on a commercial or
joint program basis, in the event they desire such cooperation.
c. To encourage other countries to associate their interests with our space
program.
d. To enhance U.S. prestige and ensure the U.S. position as the world's leader
in science and technology.
e. [Paragraph excised during declassification review]
f. To demonstrate that the U.S. is a reliable partner in international ventures.
Scientific and Technological Objectives
a. To foster cooperation in basic scientific research.
b. To develop precedents and experience in substantial cooperative undertak-
ings which will lend themselves to other international scientific and technological
activities.
[6] c. To obtain support and assistance in the development of our national
program through (1) acqnisition of scientific and technical contributions from areas of
excellence abroad and (2) use of facilities abroad that are necessary for mission support--
tracking stations, overflights, contingency recovery, etc.
Economic Objectives
a. To maximize economic benefit by appropriately weighing:
(1) Implications of releasing technology which involves commercial "know-
how";
(2) [Paragraph excised during declassification review]
(3) ensuring a reasonable return on the American investment in space tech-
nology; and
(4) promoting positive effects on domestic employment and our balance of
payments.
[Paragraph excised during declassification review]
To seek opportunities to enhance our overall competitive position in space
b.
c.
technology.
d.
and skills.
e.
f.
To seek more productive aggregate use of American and foreign resources
[Paragraph excised during declassification review]
To enhance the cost-effectiveness of space systems through increased and
more effective use.
D. Effective immediately, National Security Decision Memorandum 187 is rescinded.
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[Attachmentpage1]
Fact Sheet
Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy
Introduction
On August 6, 1982, the President signed a directive which establishes U.S. national
space assistance and cooperation. This policy directive highlights tile substantial lead the
U.S. enjoys in a wide variety of technological and space related areas--a lead which should
be maintained when considering and implementing any international activity or transfer.
This directive provides general guidance for U.S. space launch assistance; space hardware,
software and related technologies assistance; and international space cooperation.
Policy Governing Space Launch Assistance
In dealing with requests from foreign governments, international organizations or
foreign business entities for those space projects which are for peaceful purposes and are
consistent with U.S. laws and obligations under relevant international agreements and
arrangements (such as Intelsat) as determined by the U.S. Government.
Policy Governing Space Hardware, and Related Technologies Assistance
In dealing with requests for the transfer of, or other assistance in the field of space hard-
ware, software and related technologies, the following general policy guidance is provided.
Sales of unclassified U.S. space hardware, software, and related technologies for use
in foreign space projects will be for peaceful purposes; will be consistent with relevant
bilateral and international agreements and arrangements; will serve U.S. objectives for
international cooperation in space activities (see the following section); will contain
restrictions of third country transfer; will favor transfers of hardware over transfers of tech-
nology; will not adversely affect U.S. national security, foreign policy, or trade interests
through diffusion of technology in which the U.S. has international leadership; and will
continue to be subject to the export control process. The Department of State will chair
an interagency coordinating group when it becomes necessary to consider bilateral agree-
ments which cover the transfer of space hardware, software, and related technologies.
[2] Objectives of International Cooperation in Space Activities
The broad objectives of the United States in international cooperation in space activ-
ities are to protect national security; promote foreign policy consideration; advance
national science and technology; and maximize national economic benefits, including
domestic considerations. The suitability of each cooperative space activity must be judged
within the framework of all these objectives.
Document 1-33
Document fl0e: James M. Beggs, NASA Administrator, to Honorable George P. Shultz,
Secretary of State, March 16, 1984.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
From March 3 to 13, 1984, a NASA delegation led by Administrator James Beggs visited London,
Rome, Bonn, Paris, and Tokyo to extend personally President Ronald Reagan's invitation to U.S.
"fTiends and allies" to participate in the U.S. space station program that Reagan had announced in
his January 25, 1984, State of the Union address. (The group visited Ottawa later in March.) In
this letter to the Secretary of State, Beggs reported the results of his trip.
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[1] MAR16,1984
Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, DC 20520
Dear George:
As you recall, the President recently asked me to visit certain of our Allies to invite
international participation in our Space Station program. This followed up, of course, on
the President's announcement of this initiative during January's state of the Union
address. I've just come back from Europe and Japan. Beibre heading off to Ottawa next
week, I wanted to fill you in on the first stage of our consultations.
The reaction so far to the President's call for international cooperation has been both
strongly positive and openly appreciative. It has been positive in the sense that our prin-
cipal Allies are moving quickly, or have already moved, to take political decisions to
participate. And their reactions clearly show appreciation for the major foreign policy
benefits that will flow from open and collaborative cooperation on such a bold, imagina-
tive and visible project. I heard nothing but praise and admiration for the President's fore-
sight and leadership in making this decision. Prime Minister Nakasome and other
Japanese officials, while still cautious in public, made it obvious that Japan will participate
in a significant way. The Japanese believe they made a mistake in not joining us on the
Shuttle and are determined not to be left behind again. In Europe, Italian Prime Minister
Craxi was openly ebullient about the prospect of cooperation and strong Italian partic-
ipation is assured. Mitterrand and Cheysson were both well informed and prepared to
move ahead. Mitterrand, in particular, has obviously thought deeply about the need to
press ahead with the exploration and exploitation of space. The French will be tough bar-
gainers, and obviously intend to pursue their own independent space programs, but I am
confident that we can agree on mutually beneficial terms for cooperation. By the way, you
will be interested that Mitterrand observed to me that his recent proposal for a European
military space station fell on deaf ears in Europe.
[2] Chancellor Kohl was in Washington during my stop in Bonn, but the relevant
Ministers were quite clear that a major German contribution will be forthcoming. The
British were more cautious, and, while I believe they will participate, it will probably be on
the same terms that have marked their recent space-related activities--relatively small
scale projects done on a multilateral basis.
While in Paris, I also met with the executive leadership of the European Space Agency
(ESA) and with delegates from the Agency's eleven member countries--encompassing
essentially all of our friends and allies in Western Europe. Here, too, the reception was
warm and positive. ESA will ahnost certainly play a key role in managing Europe's Space
Station participation, just as it did in the highly successful Spacelab project.
As businessmen, we both understand the importance of protecting intellectual prop-
erty if we're to motivate private sector investment in this program. Not surprisingly, the
Europeans and the Japanese are as concerned about this---from their point of view--as we
are. The whole technology transfer question will obviously be an area where I will look to
you, and other relevant agencies, for advice as discussions on the details of cooperation
get more specific in the months ahead. I also explained our policy on the possibility of
military use of the Space Station. I was pleased to find, even in.Japan where the need for
caution is clear, general acceptance of our announced position: that while no military use
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iscontemplated,theSpaceStationwillbea nationalfacilityopento anypayingcus-
tomers-includingDOD--forpeacefulses.
Asafinalitem,I raisedthePresident'sdesiretohavetheLondonEconomicSummit
endorsetheprinciplethatmemberswillcooperateindevelopinganinternationalSpace
Station.Germany,Italy,FranceandJapanwereallsupportive.Again,theBritishwere
morecautiousandwillneedmoreconvincing.Thenextstephere--aslaidoutbyBud
McFarlane--isforNASA,withState'shelp,toprepareareportonapproachestointerna-
tionalcollaborationbeforetheSummit.I plantopresentthatreportothePresidentand
alsotoreportohimonmytrip.I hopeyouwilljoinmein thatmeeting.
I'd liketothankyoufortheexcellentsupportprovidedbytheDepartmentandbyour
Embassiesateverystepoftheway.I especiallywantoexpressmyappreciationa dgrati-
tudeforthefineworkdonebyMarkPlattandMikeMichalakwhoaccompaniedmeon
thetrip.Theyaretrueprofessionalswhose[3]involvementwasinstrumentalinhelping
toproducethepositiver ceptionthePresident'sinitiativereceived.I lookforwardtocon-
tinuingtoworkwithyouandyourstaffin themonthsaheadin thesameproductiveand
cooperativespirit.
Sincerely,
JamesM.BeggsAdministrator
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Document title: James M. Beggs, Administrator, NASA, to Kenneth Baker, MP, Minister of
State for Industry with Special Responsibility for Space and Information Technology,
April 6, 1984.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
After his initial round of visits in Europe, Japan, and Canada to extend President Reagan's invita-
tion to participate in the U.S. space station program, NASA Administrator Beggs wrote essentially
identical letters to the most senior official with whom he had met in each country visited. The follow-
ing is the letter to the minister in charge of space matters for the United Kingdom (U.K.), Kenneth
Baker In his letters, Beggs spelled out what he believed were the results of his visits, and he restated
the basic U.S. policy with respect to the station program and international participation in it. He also
outlined the next steps in the process of developing international station partnerships.
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[ 1 ] Office of the Administrator APR 6, 1984
Mr. Kenneth Baker, MP
Minister of State tor Industry with Special Responsibility
for Space and Information Technology
Department of Industry
Ashdown House
123 Victoria Street
London SWIE 6RB
UNITED KINGDOM
Dear Mr. Minister:
Having recently returned from my visit to Europe, Japan and Canada, I wish to take
this opportunity to summarize my impressions of the trip and to express my appreciation
for your generous hospitality. Overall, I was extremely pleased by the reactions I received
to President Reagan's Space Station initiative. Government and industry leaders at each
of my stops exhibited great interest in the possibilities for an international Space Station.
I believe this reflects the successful legacy of cooperation already established among us in
the space age, as well as the groundwork we have laid together over the past two years for
embracing this challenge. I hope you feel as I do that our discussions were quite useful for
getting the dialogue started for our next step in the planning process. I am quite opti-
mistic about the prospects for international cooperation on the Space Station project, and
will soon be sharing these views with the President.
As we discussed, the President believes that international participation in the manned
Space Station program can provide a highly positive centerpiece for demonstrating Free
World unity, goodwill and technological progress. He has proposed that the internation-
al Space Station be discussed at the London Economic Summit with an eye towards agree-
ment in principle that Summit partners will participate in the development of the station.
A Summit declaration will serve us all well by establishing the political underpinnings for
this joint technological venture. With this firm basis for our collaboration, we will be able
to arrange mechanisms that will allow us to interact more closely during the planning
phase of the Space Station project.
I believe that onr working closely together over the next year is extremely important.
This will ensure that our respective planning activities and definition studies are [2] com-
plementary. During the next two years, NASA will conduct an extended definition phase
study of the Space Station in order to design the Station best capable of meeting require-
ments, facilitating management and providing flexibility for growth. As time goes on,
there will be less and less flexibility in the Space Station design to accommodate the inter°
ests and needs of potential partners. Early participation in the planning process, either
directly or through ESA, is therefore essential. I believe insight into this planning process
will allow participants to hone their ideas for participation; it will also allow them to speak
directly to their proposals so that the final Space Station design can accommodate them.
As I mentioned, NASA will hold frequent international workshops over the next two
years to permit this cross-fertilization to occur. We will hold the first such workshop in
June at which time we can all review our activities. For our part, we will brief you on our
preparation of the domestic U.S. "Request for Proposals" for Phase B. These RFP's will
cover the $8B fully functional Space Station that the U.S. will provide. As I described to
you, President Reagan has committed the U.S. to building an $8B fully ftmctional Space
Station to be operational by the early 1990's, but has also set the stage for working togeth-
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er to develop a more expansive international Space Station with even greater benefits and
capabilities for us all to use. Thus, we are inviting your Government to take a close look at
our plans and concepts and then, based on your long-term interests and goals, share with
us your ideas for cooperation that will expand the capabilities of the Space Station.
Also during the June meeting, we will discuss additional mechanisms for working
together over the next two years. In the course of my trip, I heard many proposals for such
mechanisms which we are currently evaluating. Mr. Kenneth Pedersen, NASA Director of
International Affairs, will be contacting you in the near future with the necessary details
on the June meeting.
During the past 18 months, we have worked hard to make sure that our Space Station
concepts are compatible with and responsive to user communities. We will continue this
emphasis in the next two years of planning as well as throughout the lifetime of the Space
Station program. As I mentioned, the U.S. is committed to maintaining a strong space sci-
ence and applications program. I have received a commitment from the President that the
NASA budget will grow 1% per year in real terms in order to maintain a balanced space
program. Indeed, this year, the President requested Congress to authorize two new starts
in space science along with the Space Station.
Because I understand that the relationship between scientific objectives and the Space
Station program is [3] important to you, I would be pleased for you to designate an
observer to our Space Station Science Advisory Committee, chaired by Professor Peter
Banks, which was recently established to assist NASA in scientific planning for the Space
Station. As you know, ESA has already designated two observers, so you may wish to work
through them. The first meeting of the Banks Committee will take place at NASA
Headquarters on April 25 and 26. A second meeting is planned in June. There will also be
a week-long workshop held later this summer. One of the key early objectives of the
Committee is to influence the Space Station Phase B RFP so that the Space Station is
designed to optimize space science and application uses. In addition, an Industrial
Committee similar to the Peter Banks Committee will be established to ensure that the
Space Station maximizes the commercial opportunities of space, another important
objective that we all share. We will welcome observers on that Committee, as well. Once
we agree more formally on our respective activities during the planning phase, then we
would look forward to having our partners as permanent members on both Committees.
Another topic which we discussed is the importance of protecting against the unwar-
ranted transfer of technology. Technology transfer has been an increasing concern on all
our parts in the past few years, and we will need to work together to make sure we arc pro-
tecting our respective technology bases in this partnership. Major international partners
in the Space Station will receive assured access to the Station. Therefore, protection of
intellectual property is a prime requirement if we are to stimulate private sector invest-
ment and involvement in this program over the long term.
During my trip I was also asked frequently about the extent of U.S. military involve-
ment in the U.S. Space Station. The U.S. Space Station program is a civil program which
will be funded entirely out of NASA's budget, with no national security funds to be used.
While the Defense Department worked with NASA in the early planning for [the] Space
Station by reviewing their near- and long-term requirements for space, they concluded
they had no requirements for a manned Space Station. NASA, therefore, constructed its
proposal to the President on the basis of civil and commercial requirements. The Space
Station that the President directed NASA to build is a civil Space Station. Of course, like
the Shuttle, the Space Station will be available for users. If there are any national security
users, like national and international users, they will be able to pay to use the facility. As
provided in the Outer Space Treaty, however, all activity on the Space Station will be lim-
ited to peaceful, non-aggressive functions.
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Finally, on behalf of the U.S. Delegation, I would like to thank you for your gracious
hospitality during our visit. I especially appreciated your giving me the opportunity to
meet [4] numerous U.K. Government and industrial representatives at the fine luncheon
you hosted. It was a pleasure seeing you, and I am looking forward to seeing you again
soon in the near future.
With warm personal regards.
Sincerely,
James M. Beggs
Administrator
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Document title: Dale D. Myers, NASA, and Reimar Leust, European Space Agency (ESA),
"Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States National Aeronautics and
Space Administration and the European Space Agency on Cooperation in the Detailed
Design, Development, Operation and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space
Station," September 29, 1988.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This NASA-ESA memorandum of understanding (MOU) and two similar documents--one between
NASA and the Science and Technology Agency of Japan and the other between NASA and the
Canadian Ministry of State for Science and Technology--contained the detailed agreements that
would guide the international partners during the lifetime, of the space station program. The MOUs
were the end product of lengthy and contentious negotiations between NASA and its potential station
partners. These MOUs operated within a policy and legal framework established by a multilateral
intergovernmental agreement signed at the same time by representatives of the governments (rather
than of the respective space agencies). The intergovernmental agreement and the three MOUs estab-
lished the most ambitious experiment in international technological cooperation ever undertaken.
Memorandum of Understanding Between the
United States National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the European Space Agency
on Cooperation in the Detailed Design,
Development, Operation and Utilization of the
Permanently Manned Civil Space Station
[1] The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (hereinafter "NASA") and the
European Space Agency (hereinafter "ESA"),
Recalling that in his State of the Union Address of January 25, 1984, the President of
the United States directed NASA to develop and place into orbit within a decade a per-
manendy manned Space Station and invited friends and allies of the United States to
participate in its development and use and to share in the benefits thereof, in order to
promote peace, prosperity, and freedom,
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 11 1
Recalling the terms of Resolution Number 2 adopted on 31 January 1985 by the ESA
Council meeting at ministerial level on participation in the Space Station program,
Recalling the terms of Resolution Number 2 adopted on 10 November 1987 by the
ESA Council meeting at ministerial level on participation in the Space Station program,
Recalling the NASA Administrator's letter of April 6, 1984, to the ESA Director
General,
Having successfully implemented the Memorandum of Understanding between
NASA and ESA for the Conduct of Parallel Detailed Definition and Preliminary Design
Studies (Phase B) Leading toward Further Cooperation in the Development, Operation
and Utilization of a Permanently Manned Space Station, which entered into force on June
3, 1985,
Considering the Agreement among the Government of the United States of America,
Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan
and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development,
Operation and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station (hereinafter
"the Intergovernmental Agreement") and particularly Article 4 thereof,
[2] Considering the Memorandum of Understanding between NASA and the Science and
Technology Agency of Japan (STA) for the Cooperative Program Concerning Detailed
Definition and Preliminary Design Activities of a Permanently Manned Space Station,
which entered into force on May 9, 1985, and the Memorandum of Understanding
between NASA and the Ministry of State for Science and Technology of Canada
(MOSST), for a Cooperative Program Concerning Detailed Definition and Preliminary
Design (Phase B) of a Permanently Manned Space Station, which entered into force on
April 16, 1985,
Considering the Memorandum of Understanding between NASA and the
Government of Japan (the GOJ) on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development,
Operation and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station and recogniz-
ing that the GOJ has designated STA in that Memorandum of Understanding as its
Cooperating Agency, as provided for in Article 4 of the Intergovernmental Agreement,
Considering also the Memorandum of Understanding between NASA and MOSST on
Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, Operation and Utilization of the
Permanently Manned Civil Space Station,
Convinced that this cooperation among NASA, ESA, STA and MOSST implementing
the provisions established in the Intergovernmental Agreement will further expand coop-
eration through the establishment of a long-term and mutually beneficial relationship
and will further promote cooperation in the exploration and peaceful use of outer space,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I - Purpose and Objectives
1.1. The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is, pursuant to
Article 4 of the Intergovernmental Agreement and on the basis of genuine parmership,
to establish arrangements between NASA and ESA (hereinafter "the Parties") imple-
menting the provisions of the Intergovernmental Agreement concerning the detailed
design, development, operation and utilization of the permanently manned civil Space
Station for peaceful purposes, in accordance with international law. In drafting this MOU,
the Parties intended it to be consistent with the provisions of the Intergovernmental
Agreement. This MOU will be subject to the provisions of the Intergovernmental
Agreement. It defines [3] the nature of the genuine partnership, including the respective
rights and obligations of the Parties to this MOU.
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1.2. The specific objectives of this MOU are:
- to detail the roles and responsibilities of NASA, ESA, STA and MOSST (here-
inafter the "partners") in the detailed design, development, operation and utilization of
the Space Station and also to record the commitments of NASA and ESA to each other
and to STA and MOSST;
- to establish the management structure and interfaces necessary to ensure
effective planning and coordination in the conduct of the detailed design, development,
operation and utilization of the Space Station;
- to provide a framework that maximizes the total capability of the Space
Station to accommodate user needs and that ensures that the Space Station is operated in
a manner that is safe, efficient and effective for both Space Station users and Space
Station operators; and
- to provide a general description of the Space Station and the elements com-
prising it.
1.3. Relevant definitions and explanations are to be found in Article 22.
Article 2 - General Description of the Space Station
2.1. NASA has a Space Station program which will produce a core U.S. Space Station.
ESA has a Columbus program, and STA and MOSST also have space programs to produce
significant elements which, together with the core U.S. Space Station, will create an
international Space Station complex with greater capabilities that will enhance the use of
space for the benefit of all participating nations and humanity. MOSST's contribution will
be an essential part of the infrastructure of the permanently manned civil international
Space Station complex (hereinafter "the Space Station").
2.2. The Space Station will be a unique, multi-use facility in low-Earth orbit, compris-
ing both manned and unmanned elements: a permanently manned base comprising
elements provided by all the partners; unmanned platforms in near-polar orbit; a man-
tended free-flying laboratory to be serviced at the manned base; and Space Station-unique
ground elements to support the operation and utilization of the elements on orbit.
[4] 2.3. The Space Station will enable its users to take advantage of human ingenuity in
connection with its low-gravity environment, the near-perfect vacuum of space and the
vantage point for observing the Earth and the rest of the Universe. Specifically, the Space
Station and its evolutionary additions could provide for a variety of capabilities, for exam-
ple:
- a laboratory in space, for the conduct of science and applications and the
development of new technologies;
- a permanent observatory, with elements in low inclination and near-polar
orbits, from which to observe Earth, the Solar System and the rest of the Universe;
- a transportation node where payloads and vehicles are stationed, assembled,
processed and deployed to their destination;
- a servicing capability from which payloads and vetficles are maintained,
repaired, replenished and refurbished;
- an assembly capability from which large space structures and systems are
assembled and verified;
- a research and manufacturing capability in space, where the unique space
environment enhances commercial opportunities;
- an infrastructure to encourage commercial investment in space;
- a storage depot for consumables, payloads and spares; and
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- astagingbaseforpossiblefuturemissions,suchasapermanentlunarbase,a
mannedmissiontoMars,unmannedplanetaryprobes,amannedsurveyoftheasteroids,
andamannedscientificandcommunicationsfacilityingeosynchronousrbit.
Article 3 - Space Station Elements
3.1. The Space Station will consist of elements comprising both flight elements and
Space Station-unique ground elements. The elements are summarized in the Annex to
the Intergovernmental Agreement and are further elaborated in this Article. Their
requirements are defined and controlled in appropriate program documentation as pro-
vided for in Article 7.
[5] 3.2. NASA Space Station Flight Elements: NASA will design, develop and provide the
following flight elements including subsystems, the Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) system,
the Space Station Information System, flight software and spares as required:
- one permanently attached Habitation Module with complete basic function-
al outfitting to support habitation for a crew of up to eight, including primary storage of
crew provisions
- one permanently attached multipurpose Laboratory Module, located so as to
contain the center of gravity of the manned base, with complete basic functional outfit-
ting and including provisions for storage of NASA spares, secondary storage of crew pro-
visions, and storage for safe haven capability
- two sets of Attached Payload Accommodation Equipment for accommoda-
tion of payloads externally attached to the Space Station Truss Assembly
- four Resource Nodes which provide pressurized volume for crew and equip-
ment, connections between manned base pressurized elements and support of pressur-
ized attached payloads
- Truss Assembly which is the manned base structural framework
- Solar Photovoltaic Power Moduleg which serve as the manned base electrical
power source, providing 75kw of total power
- Propulsion Assembly
- at least three sets of Logistics Elements (pressurized and unpressurized
Integrated Logistics System carriers) which provide systems operation support and user
ground-to-orbit and return logistics and on-orbit supply for extended periods
- Airlock/Hyperbaric Airlock for purposes of crew and equipment transfer
- one Flight Telerobotic System (FTS)
- one Mobile Transporter which will serve to provide translation capability for
the Mobile Servicing Center
- one Polar Platform to work together with the ESA-provided Polar Platform
[6] 3.3. ESA Space Station Flight Elements: ESA will design, develop and provide the fol-
lowing flight elements including subsystems, flight software and spares as required:
- one Attached Pressurized Module (APM), with volume equivalent to that of
four Spacelab segments, permanently attached to the manned base, with complete basic
functional outfitting and including provisions for storage of ESA spares, secondary stor-
age of crew provisions, and storage for safe haven capability
- one Polar Platform to work together with the NASA-provided Polar Platform
- one Man-Tended Free Flyer (MTFF), including a pressurized module, with
volume equivalent to that of two Spacelab segments, capable of autonomous operational
periods of six months or longer
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3.4. STA and MOSST Space Station Flight Elements: As reflected in the MOU
between NASA and the GOJ and in the MOU between NASA and MOSST:
3.4.a. STA Space Station Flight Elements: STA will design, develop and provide the fol-
lowing flight elements including subsystems, flight software and spares as required:
- one Japanese Experiment Module (JEM), a permanently attached multipur-
pose research and development laboratory, consisting of a pressurized module and an
Exposed Facility, at least two Experiment Logistic Modules, and including a scientific
equipment airlock, theJEM remote manipulator and IVA control/monitoring of theJEM
Remote Manipulator System (JEM-RMS), with complete basic functional outfitting,
including provisions for storage of STA spares, secondary storage of crew provisions, and
storage for safe haven capability
3.4.b. MOSST Space Station Flight Elements: Canadian elements will be developed to
play the predominant role in satisfying the following functions for the Space Station:
- attached payload servicing (external)
- Space Station assembly
- Space Station maintenance (external)
- transportation on Space Station
- deployment and retrieval functions
- EVA support
3.4.b. 1. MOSST will design, develop and provide the following flight elements, including
subsystems, flight software and spares as required:
[7] - one Mobile Servicing Center (MSC) which comprises a Mobile Remote
Servicer (MRS) and the NASA-provided Mobile Transporter
- one MSC Maintenance Depot (MMD), primarily for maintenance of the
MSC, including external storage of MOSST element spares. (Necessary internal storage
of MOSST element spares will be provided in the NASA-provided elements.)
- one Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (SPDM)
3.5. Space Station-unique ground elements will be provided by NASA, ESA and the
other partners. These elements will be adequate to support the design and development
(including assembly and verification), the continuing operation and the full internation-
al utilization of each partner's flight elements listed above. The requirements for these
elements will be defined and controlled in appropriate program documentation as pro-
vided for in Article 7.
3.5.a. NASA will provide the following Space Station-unique ground elements to sup-
port the flight elements listed in Article 3.2: equipment required for specialized or unique
integration or launch; ground support equipment (GSE) and flight support equipment
(FSE) including necessary logistics; engineering support centers and user support cen-
ters; a polar platform control center; and test equipment, mock-ups, simulators, crew
training equipment, software and any facilities necessary to house these items. To support
the Space Station as a whole, NASA will provide Space Station-unique ground elements
including the Space Station Control Center (SSCC), the Payload Operations Integration
Center (POIC), subsystem testbeds and elements related to logistics support and to soft-
ware development including the Software Support Environment.
3.5.b. As will be agreed and documented in the program documentation as provided for
in Article 7, ESA will provide, at defined locations, a defined capacity of the following
Space Station-unique ground elements to support the ESA flight elements listed in Article
3.3: equipment required for specialized or unique integration or, as the case may be, for
launch or return to Earth; GSE and FSE including necessary logistics; operations control
centers, engineering support centers and user support centers; and test equipment, mock-
ups, simulators, crew training equipment, software and any facilities necessary to house
these items.
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3.5.c. As reflected in the MOU between NASA end the GOJ and in the MOU between
NASA and MOSST, STA and MOSST will provide, at defined locations, a defined capacity
of the following Space [8] Station-unique ground elements to support their flight ele-
ments listed in Article 3.4: equipment required for specialized or unique integration or,
as the case may be, for Launch or return to Earth; GSE and FSE including necessary logis-
tics; engineering support centers and user support centers; and test equipment, mock-
ups, simulators, crew training equipment, software and any facilities necessary to house
these items.
Article 4 - Access to and Use of the Space Station
4.1. NASA and ESA will each assure access to and use of their Space Station flight ele-
ments listed in Article 3, in accordance with allocation commitments detailed in Articles
8.3.a, 8.3.b, and 8.3.c. Beyond these allocation commitments, the capabilities of the Space
Station will be made available to the parmers subject to specific arrangement between the
relevant partners.
4.2. The partners' utilization of flight elements listed in Article 3 will be equitable, as
provided in the allocation commitments set forth in Article 8 of this MOU and of the cor-
responding MOU's between NASA and the GOJ and between NASA and MOSST.
4.3. In accordance with the procedures in Article 8, NASA and ESA will each assure
access to and use of their Space Station-unique ground elements referred to in Article 3.5
by each other and the other partners in order to support fully the utilization of the flight
elements in accordance with the Consolidated Operations and Utilization Plan provided
for in Article 8.1.c. As provided in Article 8, NASA and ESA will each also assure access to
and use of their Space Station-unique ground elements by each other and the other part-
ners for system operations support.
4.4. As requested by ESA for its design and development activities, access to and use
of the Space Station-unique ground elements provided by NASA to support the Space
Station as a whole will be provided for in appropriate program documentation as provid-
ed for in Article 7. Access by ESA and NASA to each other's remaining Space Station-
unique ground elements for design and development activities will be subject to specific
arrangements on a space-available basis.
[9] Article 5 - Major Program Milestones
5.1. The Space Station program of NASA and the Columbus program of ESA each
include detailed design and development. The NASA and ESA programs also include
Space Station operation and utilization. Because of the extended period required to
assemble the Space Station, the design and development activities will overlap the opera-
tion and utilization activities. After the completion of detailed design and development
which includes assembly of the Space Station and one year of initial operational verifica-
tion (Phase C/D), mature operations and utilization (Phase E) will begin.
5.2. Major target milestones for the Space Station are as follows:
- Initiation of NASA's Phase C/D Dec 1987
- Initiation of ESA's Phase C/D Feb 1988
- NASA-provided Polar Platform
Preliminary Design Review Jan 1989
- First Space Station Element Launch Jan 1994
- NASA-provided Laboratory Module Launch Jan 1995
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- Permanently Manned Capability Oct 1995
- NASA-provided Polar Platform Launch Oct 1995
- ESA-provided APM Launch Oct 1996
- Completion of Manned Base Assembly Nov 1996
- ESA-provided Polar Platform Launch Mar 1997
- Completion of NASA's Phase C/D;
Initiation of Phase E Nov 1997
- First Station Servicing of MTFF Jun 1998
5.3. NASA and ESA will develop, maintain and exchange coordinated implementa-
tion schedules. These schedules, including the dates for the above milestones, the deliv-
ery dates for the ESA-provided elements and the assembly sequence for all elements of the
Space Station, will be updated as necessary and formally controlled in appropriate pro-
gram documentation as provided for in Article 7.
Article 6 - Respective Responsibilities
6.1.a. While undertaking the detailed design and developmenl of the Space Station ele-
ments described in Articles 3.2 and 3.5.a, and within the scope of the Parties' responsibil-
ities established elsewhere in this MOU, NASA will:
[10] 1. provide overall program coordination and direction;
2. perform overall system engineering and integration and perform system engineering
and integration for NASA-provided elements consistent with these responsibilities;
3. establish, in consultation with the other partners, overall verification, safety, reliabili-
ty, quality assurance and maintainability requirements and plans and develop verification,
safety, reliability, quality assurance and maintainability requirements and plans for the
NASA-provided elements that meet or exceed these overall requirements and plans,
which address the elements in Articles 3.2 and 3.5.5;
4. confirm that the ESA verification, safety, reliability, quality assurance and maintain-
ability requirements and plans for the APM, for the MTFF insofar as it has effects on the
manned base associated with its servicing at the manned base, and for the ESA-provided
Polar Platform insofar as it has effects on the NASA Space Transportation System (STS)
associated with its servicing by the STS, developed by ESA in accordance with Article
6.2.a.5, meet or exceed the overall Space Station verification, safety, reliability, quality
assurance and maintainability requirements and plans;
5. provide regular progress and status information on NASA Space Station program
activities and plans;
6. provide, as applicable, program information, systems requirements information and
technical interface information necessary for the integration of ESA-provided elements
described in Article 3.3 into the Space Station and/or the coordinated operation and uti-
lization of ESA-provided elements;
7. develop, with ESA, the agreed joint documentation described in Article 7.1;
8. perform ground integration tests as necessary to assure on-orbit compatibility and
perform verification and acceptance tests for the flight elements in Article 3.2 and accom-
modate ESA representation at such tests as necessary for NASA and ESA to fulfill their
respective responsibilities under this MOU;
9. conduct overall Space Station preliminary design reviews, critical design reviews,
design certification [11] reviews, safety, reliability and quality assurance reviews, opera-
tions readiness reviews and flight readiness reviews in order for NASA to certify, following
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the certifications at element level provided by NASA and the other partners, that all Space
Station elements to be launched on the STS, including the ESA-provided APM, are
acceptable for launch, on-orbit assembly and orbital operations; that the ESA-provided
Polar Platform, to be launched on Ariane-5, is acceptable for servicing by STS; and that
the ESA-provided MTFF, to be launched by Ariane-5, is acceptable for servicing at the
manned base; and accommodate ESA representation as necessary for NASA and ESA to
fulfill their respective responsibilities under this MOU;
10. conduct for the elements it provides preliminary design reviews, critical design
reviews, design certification reviews, and safety, reliability and quality assurance reviews;
and accommodate ESA representatives as necessary for NASA and ESA to fulfill their
respective responsibilities under this MOU;
11. support, as appropriate, and provide information necessary for ESA to conduct the
reviews identified in Article 6.2.a.11;
12. deliver on-orbit the ESA-provided APM and its initial outfitting in accordance with
Article 12 and the assembly sequence controlled in appropriate program documentation
as provided for in Article 7; [and] assemble on-orbit and verify interfaces of Space Station
flight elements, including the flight elements that ESA will provide, with assistance from
ESA, in accordance with agreed assembly, activation and verification plans;
13. assist in the on-orbit activation and performance verification of the APM provided by
ESA in accordance with agreed assembly, activation and verification plans;
14. for each NASA-provided flight element, provide necessary ground and flight support
equipment and initial spares; and perform qualification and acceptance tests of this
equipment according to Space Station program requirements and interfaces as set forth
in the documents described in Article 7.1;
15. establish in Europe and accommodate in the U.S. agreed liaison personnel as pro-
vided in Article 7.2;
[ 12] 16. participate with ESA and the other partners in Space Station management mech-
anisms as provided in Articles 7 and 8, including the development of the Operations
Management Plan and the Utilization Management Plan;
17. work with ESA and the other partners to ensure that the Space Station Composite
Utilization Plan described in Article 8.3.f can be accommodated by the elements provid-
ed by NASA, ESA and the other partners---in particular, work with ESA and the other part-
ners to establish standard interfaces between the elements and user-provided hardware
and software; provide standard and special user integration and user operations support
as described in Articles 8.3.e, 8.3.h, and 8.3.1 to users of the other partners or the other
partners as users who are to use the NASA-provided flight elements; perform rack-level
physical integration on the ground of NASA users of the APM; plan and conduct user
operations; and make available Space Station-unique ground elements to support the
Space Station Composite Utilization Plan. In addition, NASA will work with ESA in order
that NASA and MOSST, respectively, may establish the capabilities to distribute data to
NASA and MOSST users of the APM directly from the NASA Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite System (TDRSS) space network and to process NASA and MOSST user com-
mands to the APM through the TDRSS space network;
18. establish in consultation with ESA and the other partners, information format and
communication standards for a technical and management information system, and
establish and maintain a computerized technical and management information system.
This system is to work in conjunction with a compatible ESA computerized information
s)'_tem in accordance with the documents described in Article 7.1;
19. develop a Space Station Information System (SSIS) architecture for the end-to-end
data transmission between the Space Station data source and the data user; [and]
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establish and maintain a Software Support Environment (SSE), including necessary hard-
ware and Space Station software standards to be established by NASA in consultation with
ESA and the other partners, to work in conjunction with an ESA software development
facility, in accordance with the documents described in Article 7.1;
20. develop and maintain flight and ground software related to elements it provides in
accordance with Space Station software standards described in Article 6.1.a.19;
[13] 21. develop an Integrated Logistics System for the manned base in accordance with
the documents described in Article 7.1;
92. provide spares for the NASA-provided elements as required to support assembly and
initial operational verification;
93. provide operations support and logistics support for the NASA-provided flight ele-
ments; and
24. develop and provide to the System Operations Panel described in Article 8 baseline
operations plans and maintenance plans for the NASA-provided elements describing rou-
fine systems capabilities and defining maintenance requirements, including logistics
requirements, necessary for sustaining their functional performance.
6.1.b. Beginning upon the initiation of Space Station operations and utilization, and
within the scope of the Parties' responsibilities established elsewhere in this MOU, NASA
will:
1. participate in Space Station management mechanisms and development of docu-
mentation as provided in Articles 7 and 8, and in the sharing of Space Station operations
costs as provided in Article 9;
2. provide sustaining engineering, spares, operations support and logistics support for
the Space Station elements it provides;
3. maintain overall systems engineering, integration and operations support capability
for Space Station operations and utilization;
4. provide resnpply and logistics management/integration support for Space Station
operations;
5. work with ESA and the other partners to prepare and implement plans for the inte-
gration and operation of user activities in the Space Station Consolidated Operations and
Utilization Plan described in Article 8.1.c. In order to accomplish this, provide standard
and special user integration and user operations support as described in Articles 8.3.e,
8.3.h, and 8.3.1; perform rack-level physical integration on the ground of NASA users of
the APM; make available its Space Station-unique ground elements to support this
Consolidated Plan; support planning for future utilization activities; and, using the capa-
bilities provided for in Article 6.1.a.17, NASA and MOSST, respectively, may distribute
data to NASA and MOSST [14] users of the APM directly from the TDRSS space network
and process NASA and MOSST user commands to the APM through the TDRSS space net-
work;
6. provide logistics flights for the NASA-provided elements in accordance with Articles 9
and 12, and provide logistics flights for the ESA-provided elements in accordance with
Articles 9 and 12;
7. provide the Space Station Control Center and the Payload Operations Integration
Center for manned base operations control; a polar platform control center for the
NAsA-provided Polar Platform; and engineering support centers for the NASA-provided
elements as provided in Article 8;
8. maintain the Software Support Environment including hardware and software stan-
dards for the support of Space Station operations;
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9. maintain its flight and ground software in accordance with the Space Station software
standards described in Article 6.1.a.19;
10. upon completion of manned base assembly plus a one-year operational verification
period, provide docking, access and servicing for the MTFF at the manned base as
required by ESA, however, no more frequently than once every six months; and
11. if appropriate STS capability exists, provide for STS servicing of the NASA-provided
Polar Platform and, if ESA selects to use this STS capability and with details to be agreed
by NASA and ESA, provide STS servicing of the ESA-provided Polar Platform in accor-
dance with Articles 9 and 12.
6.2.a. While undertaking the detailed design and development of the Space Station ele°
ments described in Articles 3.3 and 3.5.b, and within the scope of the Parties' responsi-
bilities established elsewhere in this MOU, ESA will:
1. perform system engineering and integration for the APM consistent with NASA's
overall system engineering and integration responsibilities;
2. design the APM to be compatible with the STS and with the Space Station
Information System which includes use of TDRSS;
3. design and develop the ESA-provided MTFF; insofar as the MTFF has effects on the
manned base associated with its [15] servicing at the manned base, the design and devel-
opment of the MTFF will comply with otherwise established manned base requirements,
capabilities and interfaces, including safety; the MTFF will be capable of autonomous
operational periods of six months or longer;
4. design and develop the ESA-provided Polar Platform; insofar as the ESA-provided
Polar Platform has effects on the STS associated with its servicing by the STS, its design
and development will comply with the operational and safety requirements of the STS;
5. develop, in consultation with NASA, verification, safety, reliability, quality assurance
and maintainability requirements and plans for the APM, for the MTFF insofar as it has
effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned base, and for the
ESA-provided Polar Platform insofar as it has effects on the STS associated with its servic-
ing by the STS that meet or exceed the overall Space Station verification, safety, reliabili-
ty, quality assurance and maintainability requirements and plans established in Article
6.1.a.3, which address the elements in Articles 3.3 and 3.5.b;
6. provide regular progress and status information on Columbus Program activities and
plans;
7. provide, as applicable, program information, systems requirements information and
technical interface information necessary to understand the impact of the ESA-provided
flight elements on the Space Station configuration and/or on the coordinated operation
and utilization of the Space Station, and necessary to integrate those flight elements into
the Space Station;
8. develop, with NASA, the agreed joint documentation described in Article 7.1;
9. perform interface verification tests as necessary to assure on-orbit compatibility and
perform verification and acceptance tests for the flight elements in Article 3.3, and accom-
modate NASA representation at such tests as necessary for NASA and ESA to fulfill their
respective responsibilities under this MOU;
10. maintain, and provide to NASA on request, ground and on-orbit verification test pro-
cedures and results as necessary to assess that the ESA-provided APM complies with over-
all Space Station program requirements and interface requirements, and, insofar as they
have effects on the STS and the manned base, that the [16] ESA-provided Polar Platform
and MTFF comply with the operational and safety requirements associated with servicing
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of these ESA-provided elements by the STS and at the manned base, respectively, as set
forth in the documents described in Article 7.1;
11. conduct for the elements it provides preliminary design reviews, critical design
reviews and other reviews as set forth in the documents described in Article 7.1 which will
include review of safety, reliability and quality assurance, and accommodate NASA repre-
sentation as necessary for NASA and ESA to fulfill their respective responsibilities under
this MOU;
12. support as appropriate, and provide information necessary tot NASA to conduct, the
reviews identified in Article 6.1.a.9;
13. support, as appropriate, and provide information necessary for NASA to conduct the
reviews identified in Article 6.1.a.10;
14. following design and development of the APM, arrange for the on-orbit delivery of
the APM and its initial outfitting in accordance with Article 12 and in accordance with the
assembly sequence controlled by appropriate program documentation as described in
Article 7;
15. launch and operate the MTFF so that its first servicing at the manned base will be no
earlier than the completion of the one-year manned base operational verification period,
and launch and operate the ESA-provided Polar Platform;
16. assist in the on-orbit assembly and interface verification of the ESA-provided APM in
accordance with agreed assembly, activation and verification plans;
17. activate on-orbit and verify performance of the ESA-provided APM, with assistance
from NASA, in accordance with agreed assembly, activation and verification plans; activate
on-orbit and verify performance of the ESA-provided MTFF, in accordance with the
appropriate program documentation as described in Article 7 which addresses the MTFF
insofar as it has effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned
base; and activate on-orbit and verify performance of the ESA-provided Polar Platform;
18. for each ESA-provided flight element, provide necessary ground and flight support
equipment and initial spares; [17] and perform qualification and acceptance tests of this
equipment according to Space Station program requirements and interfaces as set forth
in the documents described in Article 7.1;
19. establish in the United States and accommodate in Europe agreed liaison personnel
as provided in Article 7.2;
20. participate with NASA and the other partners in Space Station management mecha-
nisms as provided in Articles 7 and 8, including the development of the Operations
Management Plan and the Utilization Management Plan;
21. work with NASA and the other partners to ensure that the Space Station Composite
Utilization Plan described in Article 8.3.f can be accommodated by the elements provid-
ed by NASA, ESA and the other partners--in particular, work with NASA and the other
partners to establish standard interfaces between the elements and user-provided hard-
ware and software; provide standard and special user integration and user operations
support as described in Articles 8.3.e, 8.3.h, and 8.3.1 to users of the other partners or the
other partners as users who are to use the ESA-provided flight elements; support and
provide information necessary for NASA and MOSST to perform rack-level physical inte-
gration on the ground of NASA and MOSST users of the APM; plan and conduct user
operations; make available Space Station-unique ground elements to support the Space
Station Composite Utilization Plan; and support and provide information necessary for
NASA and MOSST, respectively, to establish the capabilities to distribute data to NASA
and MOSST users of the APM directly from the TDRSS space network and to process
NASA and MOSST user commands to the APM through the TDRSS space network;
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22. establish and maintain, in accordance with the documents described in Article 7.1, a
compatible computerized technical and management information system to work in
conjunction with the NASA computerized information system referred to in Article
6.1.a.18; ESA will be responsible for the provision of necessary hardware and software
based on information format and communication standards established by NASA, in con-
sultation with ESA and the other partners;
23. establish and maintain the necessary hardware and software for software production
to work in conjunction with the Software Support Environment;
[ 18] 24. develop and maintain flight and ground software related to elements it provides;
for the ESA-provided APM, the development and maintenance of this software will be in
accordance with Space Station software standards described in Article 6.1.a.19;
25. provide spares for the ESA-provided elements as required to support initial opera-
tional verifications, including assembly for the APM;
26. provide operations support and logistics support for the ESA-provided flight ele-
ments; and
27. develop and provide to the System Operations Panel described in Article 8 baseline
operations plans and maintenance plans describing routine systems capabilities and defin-
ing maintenance requirements, including logistics requirements, necessary for sustaining
the functional performance of the ESA-provided APM, for the MTFF insofar as it has
effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned base and for the
ESA-provided Polar Platform insofar as it has effects on the STS associated with its servic-
ing by the STS.
6.2.b. Beginning upon the initiation of Space Station operations and utilization, and
within the scope of the Parties' responsibilities established elsewhere in this MOU, ESA
will:
1. participate in Space Station management mechanisms and development of docu-
mentation as provided in Articles 7 and 8, and in the sharing of Space Station operations
costs as provided in Article 9;
2. provide sustaining engineering, spares, operations support and logistics support for
the Space Station elements it provides;
3. work with NASA and the other partners to prepare and implement plans for the inte-
gration and operation of user activities in the Space Station Consolidated Operations and
Utilization Plan described in Article 8.1.c. In order to accomplish this, provide standard
and special user integration and user operations support as described in Articles 8.3.e,
8.3.h, and 8.3.1; support and provide information necessary for NASA and MOSST to per-
form rack-level physical integration on the ground of NASA and MOSST users of the
APM; make available its Space Station-unique ground elements to support this
Consolidated Plan; support planning for future utilization activities; and support and pro-
vide information necessary for NASA and MOSST, respectively, to distribute data to NASA
and MOSST users of the APM [19] directly from the TDRSS space network and to process
NASA and MOSST user commands to the APM through the TDRSS space network;
4. arrange for logistics flights related to the ESA-provided elements in accordance with
Articles 9 and 12;
5. provide operations control centers and engineering support centers for the ESA-
provided APM, Polar Platform and MTFF, as provided in Article 8; and
6. maintain its flight and ground software for the elements it provides; for the ESA-
provided APM, the maintenance of this software will be in accordance with Space Station
software standards described in Article 6.1 .a. 19.
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Article 7- Management Aspects of the ,Space ,Station ProKram
Primarily Related to Detailed Design and Development
7.1. Management/Reviews
7.1.a. NASA and ESA are each responsible for the management of their respective
Space Station Phase C/D activities consistent with the provisions of this MOU. This Article
establishes the management mechanisms to coordinate the respective Space Station
design and development (including assembly and verification) activities of NASA and
ESA, to establish applicable requirements, to assure safe operations, to establish the inter-
faces between the Space Station elements, to review decisions, to establish schedules, to
review the status of activities, to report progress and to resolve issues and technical prob-
lems as they arise.
7.1.b. The NASA/ESA Program Coordination Committee (PCC), co-chaired by the
NASA Associate Administrator for Space Station and the ESA Director of Space Station
and Platforms, will meet periodically throughout the lifetime of the program or prompt-
ly at the request of either Party to review the Parties' respective design and development
activities. The Co-Chairmen will together take those decisions necessary to assure imple-
mentation of the cooperative design and development activities related to Space Station
flight elements and to Space Station-unique ground elements provided by the Parties,
including, as appropriate, to design changes of the Parties' flight elements during Phase
E. In taking decisions regarding design and development, the PCC will consider operation
and utilization impacts, and will [20] also consider design and development recommen-
dations from the Mnhilateral Coordination Board described in Article 8.1.b. However,
decisions regarding operation and utilization activities will be taken in accordance with
Article 8. The Co-Chairmen will each designate their respective members and will decide
on the location of meetings. If the Co-Chairmen agree that a specific design and devel-
opment issue or decision requires consideration by another partner at the PCC level, the
NASA/ESA PCC may meet jointly with the NASA/STA PCC and/or the NASA/MOSST
PCC.
7.1.c. Multilateral Program Reviews will be organized by NASA and will meet as neces-
sary at the request of any partner so that the Parties to this MOU and the other partners
can report progress and discuss the status of their Phase C/D program activities.
7.1.d. The manned base and NAsA-provided Polar Platform requirements, configura-
tion, housekeeping resource allocations for design purposes, and element interfaces will
be controlled by the Space Station Control Board (SSCB) chaired by NASA. The SSCB will
also control Space Station activities through the completion of assembly and initial oper-
ational verification, and other Space Station configuration control activities related to the
manned base, related to the MTFF insofar as it has effects on the manned base associated
with its servicing at the manned base, and related to the ESA-provided Polar Platform
insofar as it has effects on the STS associated with its servicing by the STS. ESA will be a
member of the SSCB, and of such subordinate boards thereof as may be agreed, attend-
ing and participating when these boards consider items which affect the APM, interfaces
between the NASA-provided and the ESA-provided elements, interfaces between the ESA-
provided elements and the STS, interfaces between the ESA-provided elements and other
partner-provided elements, or the accommodation on the manned base of the Composite
Utilization Plan and the Composite Operations Plan described in Article 8. Decisions by
the SSCB Chairman may be appealed to the PCC, although it is the duty of the SSCB
Chairman to make every effort to reach consensus with ESA rather than have issues
referred to the PCC. Such appeals will be made and processed expeditiously. Pending res-
olution of appeals, ESA need not proceed with the implementation of an SSCB decision
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as far as its provided elements are concerned; NASA may, however, proceed with an SSCB
decision as far as its provided elements are concerned. NASA will be a member of the
Columbus Control Board chaired by ESA, and of such subordinate boards thereof as may
be agreed, attending and participating as appropriate. As far as the elements separated
from the manned base are concerned, NASA will assume management responsibility for
the design and development of the NASA-provided Polar Platform, including meeting
requirements related to polar [21] platform user interfaces and polar platform STS ser-
vicing; ESA will assume management responsibility for the design and development of the
ESA-provided Polar Platform, including meeting requirements related to polar platform
user interfaces and polar platform STS servicing; [and] ESA will also assume management
responsibility for the design and development of the MTFF and for meeting requirements
related to its effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned base.
7.1.e. NASA will develop an overall Program Plan for Space Station design and devel-
opment based on information provided by all the partners detailing overall program con-
tent, implementation approach and schedules. ESA will develop a Columbus Program
Plan for design and development detailing ESA program content, implementation
approach and schedules. A Joint Program Plan [JPP] for design and development, signed
by the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Station and the ESA Director of Space
Station and Platforms, will cover the interrelationship between the ESA program and the
overall program. Any modification or any addition to theJPP will be approved by the PCC.
7.1.f. NASA will develop a Program Requirements Document (PRD) based on infor-
mation provided by all the partners providing the programmatic basis for the overall con-
duct of Phase C/D. A Joint PRD (JPRD), signed by the NASA Associate Administrator for
Space Station and the ESA Director of Space Station and Platforms, will represent the top-
level requirements related to the APM, the MTFF insofar as it has effects on the manned
base associated with its servicing at the manned base and the ESA-provided Polar Platform
insofar as it has effects on the STS associated with its servicing by the STS. The JPRD will
identify the applicability to the ESA program of all paragraphs in the PRD, including any
which are added or modified. Any modification or any addition to the JPRD will be
approved by the PCC.
7.1 .g. NASA has developed an overall Program Definition and Requirements Document
(PDRD) based on information provided by all the partners which contains requirements
for Space Station flight element hardware and software and provides the technical basis
for the overall conduct of Phase C/D. A Joint PDRD (JPDRD), signed by the NASA
Program Director and the ESA Program Manager, contains the detailed requirements
related to the APM, the MTFF insofar as it has effects on the manned base associated with
its servicing at the manned base and the ESA-provided Polar Platform insofar as it has
effects on the STS associated with its servicing by the STS. The JPDRD identifies the
applicability to the ESA program of all paragraphs in the PDRD including any which are
added or modified. Any modification to the PDRD will be approved by the SSCB. Any
modification or any addition to the co-signed JPDRD will be mutually agreed and
[22] jointly signed by the NASA Program Director and the ESA Program Manager.
7.1.h. NASA will develop Architectural Control Documents (ACD's) which define and
control the end-to-end architecture of the manned base distributed systems and control
the interfaces of these systems with each other and with the flight elements. In addition,
NASA will develop, in consultation with the appropriate partners, Interface Control
Documents (ICD's) which control interfaces between: the flight elements comprising
infrastructural elements and the flight elements comprising accommodations elements as
defined in Article 8.1.d; between the flight elements comprising infrastructural elements;
and, as appropriate, between any other flight elements, between flight and ground
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or among ground elements. NASA will also develop a Baseline Configuration Document
(BCD) based on information provided by all the partners which controls the configura-
tion of the manned base and of the NASA-provided Polar Platform. The ACD's and the
BCD will be developed by the start of NASA's Phase C/D; the ICD's will be developed early
in Phase C/D. Any modification or any addition to the ACD's, the BCD and the ICD's will
be approved by the SSCB. Joint interface documentation, which identifies the applicabil-
ity to the ESA-provided APM of all interfaces in the ACD's, BCD and ICD's, including any
which are modified, will be developed by NASA and ESA. This joint interface documen-
tation will be mutually agreed and jointly signed by the NASA Program Director and the
ESA Program Manager. Any modification or any addition to this joint interface docu-
mentation will be mutually agreed and jointly signed by the NASA Program Director and
the ESA Program Manager. NASA and ESA willjoindy develop an ICD which will govern
the interfaces between the ESA-provided MTFF and the manned base in connection with
the docking, access and servicing of the MTFF at the manned base, in accordance with
Article 6.2.a.3. NASA and ESA will also jointly develop an ICD in which they will agree on
standard user interfaces for the polar platforms they provide; this ICD will also govern the
interfaces between the ESA-provided Polar Platform and the STS. The MTFF ICD will be
developed early in Phase C/D; the Polar Platform ICD will be established no later than
the Preliminary Design Review for the NASA-provided Polar Platform. The MTFF and
Polar Platform ICD's will be mutually agreed and jointly signed by the NASA Program
Director and the ESA Program Manager. Any modification or addition to these docu-
ments will be mutually agreed and jointly signed by the NASA Program Director and the
ESA Program Manager.
7.1.i. Program Management Reviews will be held as necessary at which the NASA
Program Director and the Program Managers representing ESA and the other partners
will report on the status of their respective design and development activities, including
schedule, element performance parameters and element [23] interface requirements.
These formal Program Management Reviews will be held at least quarterly and will be
chaired by NASA. Less formal status reviews will be held monthly; representatives of the
partners' Program Managers will attend these reviews.
7.l.j. ESA will participate in selected NASA reviews on Space Station requirements,
architecture and interfaces as defined in theJPP. Similarly, NASA will participate in select-
ed ESA reviews as defined in theJPP; the other partners will participate as appropriate.
7.1.k. Through participation in the above management mechanisms, NASA and ESA
agree to achieve commonality on the manned base as required by the overall Space
Station safety requirements as defined pursuant to Article 10. NASA and ESA also agree
to provide standard interfaces for Space Station users both in the permanently attached
pressurized laboratories and on the polar platforms. Exceptions to these requirements for
commonality may be agreed on a case-by-case basis between NASA and ESA. In addition,
NASA and ESA will work through the above management mechanisms to seek agreement
on a case-by-case basis regarding the use of interchangeable hardware and software in
order to promote efficient and effective Space Station operations, including reducing the
burden on the Space Station logistics system.
7.2. Liaison. The NASA Office of Space Station and ESA Space Station and Platforms
Directorate are responsible for NASA/ESA liaison activities. ESA may provide representa-
tive(s) to NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and NASA may provide representa-
tive(s) to ESA Headquarters in Paris. In order to facilitate the working relationships
between the NASA Program Director and the ESA Program Manager, ESA will provide
and NASA will accommodate ESA liaison to the NASA Space Station Program Office.
Similarly, NASA will provide and ESA will accommodate NASA liaison to the ESA Space
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Station Program Office. In addition, by mutual agreement, ESA may provide and NASA
will accommodate ESA liaison to NASA Centers involved in the Space Station program,
and NASA may provide and ESA will accommodate liaison to ESA Centers involved in the
ESA Space Station program. Arrangements specifying all conditions relating to the liaison
relationships will be agreed and co-signed by the Co-Chairmen of the PCC.
Article 8 - Management Aspects of the Space Station Program
Primahly Related to Operations and Utilization
8.1. General
8.1.a. NASA and ESA each have responsibilities regarding the management of their
respective operations and utilization [24] activities and the overall Space Station opera-
tions and utilization activities, in accordance with the provisions of this MOU. NASA will
have the responsibility for the overall planning for and direction of the operation of the
manned base (including all elements within the operational Command and Control Zone
(CCZ) of the manned base as defined in the program documentation provided for in
Article 7) and the NASA-provided Polar Platform. ESA will have the responsibility for the
planning for and direction of the operation of the elements it provides which are sepa-
rated from the manned base (specifically, the MTFF when outside the operational CCZ of
the manned base and the ESA-provided Polar Platform when outside the operational CCZ
of the STS, as defined in the program documentation provided for in Article 7).
Operations and utilization activities will comprise long-range planning and top-level direc-
tion and coordination, which will be performed by the strategic-level organizations;
detailed planning and support to the strategic-level organizations which will be per-
formed by the tactical-level organizations; and implementation of these plans which will
be performed by the execution-level organizations.
8.1.b. A Multilateral Coordination Board (MCB) will be established as soon as possible
after the start of NASA's Phase C/D and will meet periodically over the lifetime of the
program or promptly at the request of any partner with the task to ensure coordination
of the activities of the partners related to the operation and utilization of the Space
Station. The Parties to this MOU and the other partners will plan and coordinate activi-
ties affecting the safe, efficient and effective operation and utilization of the Space Station
through the MCB, except as otherwise specifically provided in this MOU. The MCB will
comprise the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Station; the ESA Director of Space
Station and Platforms; the MOSST Deputy Secretary, Space Policy Sector; and the STA
Director-General of the Research and Development Bureau. The NASA Associate
Administrator for Space Station will chair he MCB. The Parties agree that all MCB deci-
sions should be made by consensus. However, where consensus cannot be achieved on any
specific issue within the purview of the MCB within the time required, the Chairman is
authorized to take decisions. The Parties agree that, in order to protect the interests of all
partners in the program, the operation and utilization of the Space Station will be most
successful when consensus is reached and when the affected partners' interests are taken
into account. MCB decisions will not modify rights of the partners specifically provided in
this MOU. Decisions regarding the operation and utilization of the ESA-provided ele-
ments which are separated from the manned base and which do not have effects on the
manned base associated with servicing at the manned base or have effects on the STS asso-
ciated with servicing by the STS will be taken by ESA, except as otherwise specifically pro-
vided in Article 8.3.
[25] 8.1.c. The MCB will establish Panels which will be responsible for the long-range
strategic coordination of the operation and utilization of the Space Station, to be called
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theSystemOperationsPanelandtheUser Operations Panel respectively, described in
detail below. The MCB will develop a charter that will define tile organizational relation-
ships and responsibilities of these Panels, and the organizational relationships of these
Panels with the tactical- and execution-level organizations described below. Any modifica-
tions to the charter will be approved by the MCB. The MCB will approve, on an annual
basis, a Consolidated Operations and Utilization Plan (COUP) for the Space Station
based on the annual Composite Operations Plan and the annual Composite Utilization
Plan developed by the Panels and described below. In doing so, the MCB will be respon-
sible for resolving any conflicts between the Composite Operations Plan and the
Composite Utilization Plan which cannot be resolved by the Panels. The COUP will be
prepared by the User Operations Panel and agreed to by the System Operations Panel.
The charter for these Panels will also delineate the Panels' delegated responsibilities with
respect to adjustment of the COUP. The COUP will be implemented by the appropriate
tactical- and execution-level organizations.
8.1.d. Manned Base Hardware. The following is provided to explain the relationships
between the different types of elements on the manned base which are allocated for use
by the partners. The Space Station manned base includes:
- accommodations elements; and
- infrastructural elements.
The accommodations elements are the NASA-provided Laboratory Module, the ESA-pro-
vided APM, the STA-provided JEM including the Exposed Facility and the Experiment
Logistics Modules, and the NASA-provided Attached Payload Accommodation
Equipment. The infrastructural elements comprise all other manned base elements,
including servicing elements and other elements that produce resources which permit all
manned base elements to be operated and used.
8.1.d.1. Housekeeping. Both accommodations elements and infrastructural elements will
be used for assembly, for verification and for maintenance of the manned base in an oper-
ational status, and also for the storage of element spares, crew provisions and safe haven
capability, with secondary storage of crew provisions to be distributed equally among the
three laboratories. In such use, they are referred to, respectively, as providing:
[26] - housekeeping accommodations; and
- housekeeping resources.
During Phase C/D, these housekeeping accommodations and housekeeping resources
will be controlled in appropriate program documentation as provided for in Article 7.
During Phase E, these housekeeping accommodations and housekeeping resources will
be controlled according to the mechanisms in Article 8.2.d.
8.1.d.2. Utilization. The accommodations and resources not required to maintain the
manned base in an operational status will be used in connection with Space Station uti-
lization, and are referred to, respectively, as:
- user accommodations; and
- utilization resources.
Details regarding the allocation of the Space Station user accommodations and utilization
resources are provided in Article 8.3. NASA and ESA agree to seek to minimize the
demands for housekeeping accommodations and housekeeping resources in order to
maximize those available for utilization.
8.1.e. Platforms and MTFE Because of the different character of the platforms and the
MTFF, differentiation between accommodations and resources is not required.
Mechanisms governing the operation of these elements are to be found in Article 8.2 and
mechanisms governing the utilization of these elements are to be found in Article 8.3.
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8.2. Operations
8.2.a. It is the goal of the Parties to this MOU to operate the Space Station in a manner
that is safe, efficient and effective for both Space Station users and Space Station opera-
tors. To accomplish this, the MCB will establish, within three months of its establishment,
a System Operations Panel (SOP) to coordinate strategic-level operations activities and
operations planning activities as provided for in Article 8.1.c.
8.2.b. The SOP will comprise one member each from NASA, ESA and the other part-
ners. Members may send designated alternates to SOP meetings. In addition, each part-
ner may call upon relevant expertise as necessary to support SOP activities. The SOP will
take decisions by consensus; in the event of failure to reach consensus on an), issue, the
issue will be forwarded to the MCB for resolution. In the interest of efficient manage-
ment, NASA and ESA recognize that the SOP should take the responsibility routinely to
resolve all operations issues as expeditiously as possible rather than refer such issues to the
MCB.
[27] 8.2.c. The SOP will develop, approve and maintain an Operations Management
Plan for the operation, maintenance and refurbishment of and logistics for the manned
base, the NASA-provided Polar Platform and the ESA-provided Polar Platform insofar as
these platforms have effects on the STS associated with their servicing by the STS, and the
MTFF insofar as it has effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the
manned base during Phase E. This Plan will describe relationships among the strategic,
tactical and execution levels of operations management, where the strategic level is coor-
dinated by the SOP; the tactical level, by the tactical operations organization referred to
in Article 8.2.e; and the execution level, by implementing organizations and field centers.
Consistent with the other provisions of this Article, the Operations Management Plan will
also address operational requirements for the manned base, the NASA-provided Polar
Platform and the ESA-provided Polar Platform insofar as these platforms have effects on
the STS associated with their servicing by the STS, [and] the MTFF insofar as it has effects
on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned base and Space Station-
unique ground elements. The Operations Management Plan will provide the procedures
for preparation of the baseline operations plans and maintenance plans provided for in
Articles 6.1.a.24 and 6.2.a.27, annual refinements to these baseline plans, and the
Composite Operations Plan described in Article 8.2.d, including procedures for adjust-
ment of these plans as further information becomes available.
8.2.d. On an annual basis, NASA and ESA will each provide to the SOP any significant
refinements to their baseline operations plans and maintenance plans five years in
advance. Using the operations and maintenance plans and these refinements provided by
all of the partners, including requirements for use of Space Station-unique ground
elements, the SOP will develop and approve an annual Space Station Composite
Operations Plan (COP) consistent with the annual Space Station Composite Utilization
Plan described in Article 8.3.f. The COP will also identify the housekeeping accommoda-
tions and housekeeping resources required for maintenance of the manned base in an
operational status. Compatibility of the COP and the Composite Utilization Plan must be
assured through coordination between the SOP and the User Operations Panel,
described in Article 8.3.d, during the preparation and approval process.
8.2.e. NASA, with the participation of all the partners, will be responsible for integrat-
ed tactical-level activities for Space Station manned base operations. To this end, NASA
will establish an integrated tactical operations organization and the other partners will
participate in discharging the responsibilities of this organization. ESA and the other part-
ners will provide personnel to the integrated tactical operations organization who will
bring expertise on the elements [28] each provides and will participate in overall inte-
grated tactical operations activities. NASA and ESA will consult and agree regarding the
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responsibilitiestobedischargedbytheESApersonnel.NASAandESAwillalsoconsult
andagreeregardingthenumberofESApersonnelandalladministrativeconditionsrelat-
edtothesepersonnel.In conjunctionwiththeintegratedactivities,NASA,ESAandthe
otherpartnerswilleachperformdistributedtactical-levelactivitiesrelatedtotheelements
eachprovides,uchasdecentralizedsystemoperationssupportplanning,usersupportplanning,logisticsplanning,andtheaccommodationsas essmentsde cribedinArticle
8.3.h.Tactical-levelactivitieswillincludeplanningforsystemoperationsandforusersup-
portactivitiesacrossallmannedbaselements.Tactical-levelactivitiesforelementssepa-
ratedfromthemannedbasewhenoutsidetheoperationalCCZoftheSTSorthemanned
base,asdefinedin theprogramdocumentationprovidedforin Article7,willbeper-
formedbytheelementprovider.However,wherethesameservices,suchastransporta-
tion,logisticsandcommunications,arerequiredbyboththemannedbaseandelements
whichareoperatingseparatedfromthemannedbase,planningfortheseserviceswillbe
performedbytheintegratedtacticaloperationsorganization.
8.2.f. TacticalOperationsPlans(TOP's)forthemannedbaseandfortheMTFFinso-
farasit haseffectsonthemannedbaseassociatedwithitsservicingatthemannedbase
willbedeveloped by the tactical operations organization described in Article 8.2.e to
implement the COUP. Each TOP will include Increment Plans (IP's) for a period of two
years prior to launch of the STS to the manned base for a specific increment. (An incre-
ment is normally the interval between visits of the STS for the purpose of resupply in sup-
port of manned base operations and utilization as approved in the COUP.) Each IP will
describe the detailed manifest of user payloads, systems support equipment and supplies
needed to support the increment. Each IP will also describe changes to the complement
of hardware and software to be flown during that increment and the payload and system
support activities needed to carry out the activities approved in the COUP for that incre-
ment. The IP will identify the crew complement and define logistics requirements includ-
ing STS interface requirements, changes to housekeeping resource requirements,
changes to housekeeping accommodation requirements and communication require-
men[s, including TDRSS use and requirements for distribution of data, to support the
subject increment.
8.2.g. NASA, with the participation of all the partners, will be responsible for integrat-
ed execution-level planning for and execution of the day-to-day operation of the manned
base. ESA and the other partners will participate in discharging the responsibilities of the
Space Station Control Center (SSCC), [29] established and managed by NASA, which will
conduct execution-level activities and support tactical planning. ESA and the other part-
ners will provide personnel to the SSCC. These personnel will [)ring expertise on the
elements that partner provides, will participate in overall SSCC-based activities, and will
support real-time on-orbit activities with emphasis on the elements each provides. NASA
and ESA will consult and agree regarding the responsibilities to be discharged by the ESA
personnel. NASA and ESA will also consult and agree regarding the number of ESA per-
sonnel and all administrative conditions related to these personnel. In conjunction with
the integrated activities, NASA, ESA and the other partners will each perform distributed
execution-level activities related to the elements each provides, such as monitoring and
support of real-time systems operations. NASA, ESA and the other partners will provide
engineering support centers to perform detailed engineering assessments and real-time
operations support to the SSCC required for the operational control of the manned base
elements they provide. Execution-level activities for elements separated from the manned
base when outside the operational CCZ of the STS or the manned base, as defined in the
program documentation provided for in Article 7, will be the responsibility of the element
provider. The partners may also participate in and provide personnel to other execution-
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level activities at other sites as agreed.
8.2.h. The International Operational Concepts Working Group (IOCWG), established
by the Space Station Phase B MOU's, will continue to advise the Parties to this MOU in
planning for the establishment of the SOP. Once the SOP is established, the activities of
the IOCWG will end.
8.3. Utilization
8.3.a. Manned Base
8.3.a.1. NASA and MOSST will provide Space Station manned base infrastructural ele-
ments to assemble, maintain, operate and service the manned base; NASA and MOSST
will also provide resources derived from these infrastructural elements to the other part-
ners as provided in Article 8.3.a.2. ESA will retain the use of 41% of the user accommo-
dations on its APM; NASA will retain the use of 97% of the user accommodations on its
accommodations elements; NASA and ESA will each provide MOSST 3% of the user
accommodations on their accommodations elements; and ESA will provide NASA the
remaining user accommodations on its APM. NASA, ESA and MOSST will each control
the selection of users for their allocations of user accommodations; such NASA, ESA and
MOSST control of the selection of users for their allocation of user accommodations will
he exercised in accordance with the procedures in this MOU and in the NASA-MOSST
MOU for developing the Composite Utilization Plan.
[30] 8.3.a.2. Allocation of manned base resources among the partners will be in accor-
dance with the following approach. Housekeeping resources required by all elements, and
provided as noted in Article 8.1.d. 1, will be set aside. The utilization resources will be allo-
cated as follows: 20% of utilization resources will be allocated to NASA because of its
Attached Payload Accommodation Equipment; 3% of utilization resources will be allocat-
ed to MOSST; [and] the remaining utilization resources will be apportioned equally
among the three laboratory modules. ESA will be allocated 50% of the utilization
resources apportioned to the ESA-provided APM and STA will be allocated 50% of the uti-
lization resources apportioned to the ESA-providedJEM. NASA will be allocated 100% of
the utilization resources apportioned to the NASA-provided Laboratory Module, the
remaining 50% of the utilization resources apportioned to the ESA-provided APM and the
remaining 50% of the utilization resources apportioned to the ESA-provided JEM. The
above allocation of utilization resources is to the partner, not to the elements, and may be
used by the partner on any Space Station element consistent with the COP and the
Composite Utilization Plan. More than this allocation of any utilization resource may be
gained by each partner through barter or purchase from other partners.
8.3.a.3. ESA's allocation of user accommodations and utilization resources will begin
once the APM is verified following assembly to the manned base.
8.3.a.4. Manned base utilization resources are power, user servicing capacity, heat rejec-
tion capacity, data handling capacity, total crew time and EVA capacity. The initial list of
manned base utilization resources to be allocated is power, user servicing capacity and
total crew time. All other manned base utilization resources may be used without alloca-
tion. To support the operation and full international utilization of the Space Station
manned base as defined in Article 3, NASA plans to provide the number of STS flights per
year baselined by the SSCB during Phase C/D. From the total Space Station user payload
capacity available on STS flights actually flown to and from the manned base each year,
each partner will have the right to purchase STS launch and return services for its Space
Station utilization activities, up to its allocated percentage of utilization resources. (The
foregoing does not apply to STS launch and return capacity provided to and from the
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manned base in connection with Space Station evolutionary additions.) Similarly, the
partners will have the right to purchase, up to their allocated percentage of utilization
resources, TDRSS data transmission capacity available to the manned base. The User
Operations Panel, defined in Article 8.3.d, will update the lists of utilization resources and
allocated utilization resources as necessary as NASA and the other partners gain experi-
ence.
[31] 8.3.b. Platforms
8.3.b. 1. In recognition of the fact that platforms are separate elements that do not require
extensive support from the infrastructural elements of the manned base, platforms are
treated separately from the manned base.
8.3.b.2. NASA and ESA will share the use of each other's polar platforms on a balanced
reciprocal basis, recognizing that the two platforms may have different capabilities and
that the user community may propose specific splits based on actual payloads; such pro-
posals must be agreed to by NASA and ESA, and by MOSST with respect to its 3% utiliza-
tion of the polar platforms provided for in Article 8.3.b.3, and processed by the User
Operations Panel as part of the development of the Composite Utilization Plan provided
in Article 8.3.£2. NASA and ESA will also provide associated user integration and user
operations support to each other and each other's users.
8.3.b.3. MOSST will be provided 3% utilization of both the NASA and ESA polar plat-
forms together with the associated user integration and user operations support. STA may
purchase, barter or enter into other arrangements for platform utilization.
8.3.c. Man-Tended Free Flyer
8.3.c.1. ESA will retain the total use of the MTFF it provides.
8.3.c.2. Notwithstanding Article 8.3.c.1, each year, NASA will have an option to use up to
25% of MTFF utilization capacity by purchase at prices ESA routinely charges comparable
customers or by barter such as for an amount of utilization resources and/or user accom-
modations. The conditions of such purchase or barter will be agreed between NASA and
ESA.
8.3.c.3. In case of total use of the MTFF by ESA, all accommodations and resources
required to service the MTFF at the manned base will come out of the user accommoda-
tions and utilization resources available to ESA as provided in Article 8.3.a.
8.3.d. It is the goal of the Parties to use the Space Station in a safe, efficient and effec-
tive manner. To accomplish this, the MCB will establish, within three months of its estab-
lishment, a User Operations Panel (UOP), to assure the compatibility of utilization
activities of the manned base, the polar platforms, and use by the MTFF of manned base
utilization resources and user accommodations. The UOP will comprise one member
each from NASA, ESA and the other partners. Members may send designated alternates
to UOP meetings. In addition, each parmer may call upon relevant expertise as necessary
to support [32] UOP activities. The UOP will take decisions by consensus; except as noted
in Article 8.3.t".2, in the event of failure to reach consensus on any issue, the issue will be
forwarded to the MCB for resolution. In the interest of efficient management, NASA and
ESA recognize that the UOP should take the responsibility to routinely resolve all utiliza-
tion issues as expeditiously as possible rather than refer such issues to the MCB.
8.3.e. The UOP will develop, approve and maintain a Utilization Management Plan
which will describe relationships among the strategic, tactical and execution levels of uti-
lization management, where the strategic level is coordinated by the UOP; the tactical
level, by the integrated tactical operations organization described in Article 8.2.e; and the
execution level, by implementing organizations and field centers. The Plan will also estab-
lish processes for utilization of the Space Station elements, including the user support
centers and other Space Station-unique ground elements provided by all the partners,
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consistent with Article 8.5.d; define standard user integration and user operations sup-
port; and describe the approach to distributed user integration and operations. The Plan
will provide procedures for preparation of the partners' Utilization Plans and Composite
Utilization Plan described in Article 8.5.f, including procedures for adjustment of these
Plans as further information becomes available.
8.35. Utilization Plan for the Manned Base and the Polar Platforms
8.3.f.1. On an annual basis, five years in advance, NASA and ESA each will develop a
Utilization Plan for all proposed uses of its allocation of manned base user accommoda-
tions and utilization resources, for all proposed uses of unallocated manned base utiliza-
tion resources and Space Station-unique ground elements, and for all uses of the polar
platforms. Each partner will satisfy the requirements of its users for storage within the user
accommodations available to that partner, with the exception of temporary on-orbit stor-
age in the Integrated Logistics System carriers in which user equipment, including MTFF
equipment, is launched or returned to Earth as specified in the applicable Increment
Plan. As regards the MTFF, the ESA Utilization Plan will include all uses of manned base
user accommodations and utilization resources required to service the MTFF at the
manned base, information necessary to determine whether any planned utilization of the
MTFF would have effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned
base, and information related to Article 9.8(e) of the Intergovernmental Agreement.
NASA and ESA each will prioritize and propose appropriate schedules for the user activi-
ties in its Utilization Plan, including the use of user support centers and other Space
Station-unique ground elements to support the [33] utilization of the flight elements.
These individual Utilization Plans will take into consideration all factors necessary to
assure successful implementation of the user activities, including any relevant information
regarding crew skills and special requirements associated with the proposed payloads.
8.3.f.2. NASA and ESA each will forward its Utilization Plan to the UOP. Using the
Utilization Plans of NASA, ESA and the other partners, the UOP will develop the
Composite Utilization Plan (CUP), covering the use of both flight and Space Station-
unique ground elements, based on all relevant factors, including each element-provider's
recommendations regarding resolution of technical and operational incompatibilities
among the users proposed for its elements. In its use of the Space Station, each partner
will seek, through the mechanisms established in this MOU, to avoid causing serious
adverse effects on the use of the Space Station by the other partners. In the event of fail-
ure of the UOP to reach consensus on the utilization of the manned base and/or related
Space Station-unique ground elements, the issue will be forwarded to the MCB for reso-
lution. In the event of failure of the UOP to reach consensus on the utilization of the ESA-
provided Polar Platform, ESA will take the decision, and in the event of failure of the UOP
to reach consensus on the utilization of the NASA-provided Polar Platform, NASA will
take the decision; however, in either event, NASA and ESA will respect the utilization
rights of Canada and of each other in any such decisions.
8.35.3. Utilization Plans proposed by NASA, ESA and the other partners which fall com-
pletely within their respective allocations and do not conflict operationally or technically
with one another's Utilization Plans will be automatically approved. However, Articles
9.8(a), 9.8 (b) and 9.11 of the Intergovernmental Agreement will apply.
8.3.g. Utilization Plan for the MTFF
8.3.g. 1. The MTFF Utilization Plan will be developed and approved by ESA. As appropri-
ate, MTFF utilization will be consistent with Articles 8.3.c.2 and 8.S.f.1.
8.3.h. Each partner will participate in integrated tactical-level planning of user activities.
To this end, each partner will provide personnel to the operations organization described
in Article 8.2.e. These personnel will participate in integrated tactical-level planning of
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user activities; they will also support the strategic-level planning of user activities. NASA
and ESA will consult and agree regarding the responsibilities to be discharged by the ESA
personnel. NASA and ESA will also consult and agree regarding the number of ESA per-
sonnel and all administrative conditions related to these personnel. In addition, partners
providing user accommodations [34] will be responsible for providing standard user inte-
gration and user operations support to users of other partners or other partners as users,
including conducting assessments of the flow of payload integration activities for all pay-
loads manifested in the user accommodations they provide. Accommodation assessments
for individual payloads manifested in a laboratory module covering engineering, opera-
tions and software compatibility will also be performed by the partner providing that lab-
oratory module in support of the preparation and execution of Tactical Operations Plans
and Increment Plans. Similarly, MOSST will be responsible for providing standard user
integration and user operations support for users of the other partners or other partners
as users of the flight elements provided by MOSST; and NASA will be responsible for pro-
viding standard user integration and user operations support for users of the other part-
ners or other partners as users of the manned base systems/subsystems provided by NASA.
8.3.i. Each partner will participate in discharging the responsibilities of the Payload
Operations Integration Center (POIC) established and managed by NASA which will be
responsible for assistance to manned base users in planning and executing user activities
on the manned base, for overall direction of the execution of user activities on the
manned base, and for interaction with the SSCC in order to coordinate user activities with
systems operations activities. Each partner will provide personnel to the POIC. NASA and
ESA will consult and agree regarding the responsibilities to be discharged by the ESA per-
sonnel. NASA and ESA will also consult and agree regarding the number of ESA person-
nel and all administrative conditions related to these personnel. The interaction between
the POIC and SSCC will be described in the Operations Management Plan. Both NASA
and ESA will provide user support centers which will function within the framework of
NASA's responsibilities for the POIC. The interactions between the user support centers
and the POIC will be described in the Utilization Management Plan. NASA and ESA will
each be responsible, relative to the elements they provide which are separated from the
manned base, for assistance to users in planning and executing user activities, for direc-
tion of the execution of user activities and for interaction with the MTFF and polar plat-
form control centers to coordinate user and element operations activities.
8.3.j. In working out problems which may arise after the development of the COUP, in
the case of a technical or operational incompatibility between users, the partner(s) pro-
viding the element(s) in which the users have accommodations, as well as other impacted
partners, will provide appropriate analyses and recommendations to the appropriate
strategic-, tactical- or execution-level organization for resolution of conflicts. However, if
such conflict only has impacts within a single manned base element and only impacts
users of the [35] provider of that element, the partner providing that manned base ele-
ment will be responsible for resolving such conflicts in accordance with the content of the
COUP; conflicts related to proposed polar platform utilization will be resolved as provid-
ed in Article 8.3.f.2.
8.3.k. NASA, ESA and the other partners may at any time barter for, sell to one anoth-
er or enter into other arrangements for any portion of their Space Station allocations, and
are free to market the use of their allocations individually or collectively, according to the
procedures established in the Utilization Management Plan. The terms and conditions of
any barter or sale will be determined on a case-by-case basis by the parties to the transac-
tion. The partner providing allocations will ensure that the obligations it has undertaken
under this MOU are met. NASA, ESA and the other partners each may retain the revenues
they derive from such marketing.
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8.3.1. NASA and ESA will make their Space Station-unique ground elements, including
user support centers, available for use by each other and the other partners in order to
support fully both the standard and special user integration and operations support
approved in the CUP and the requirements in the COP. Any special user integration or
user operations support provided by a partner to users of the other partners or other part-
ners as users will be provided on a reimbursable basis at prices routinely charged compa-
rable users for similar services.
8.3.m. The International Utilization Coordination Working Group (IUCWG), estab-
lished by the Space Station Phase B MOU's, will continue to advise the Parties to this
MOU in planning for the establishment of the UOP. Once the UOP is established, the
activities of the IUCWG will end.
8.4. In order to protect the intellectual property of Space Station users, procedures
covering all personnel, including Space Station crew, who have access to data will be devel-
oped by the MCB.
8.5. The partners will seek to outfit the NASA-provided Laboratory Module, the ESA-
provided APM and the STA-providedJEM to equivalent levels by the end of Space Station
assembly in Phase C/D.
Article 9 - Operations Costs Responsibilities
9.1. The Parties will seek to minimize operations costs for the Space Station. The
Parties will also seek to minimize the exchange of funds, for example, through the per-
formance of specific operations activities.
[36] 9.1.a. The costs associated with ESA's providing personnel to undertake integrated
tactical- and execution-level activities as provided for in Articles 8.2.e, 8.2.g, 8.3.h, and
8.3.i will be agreed between NASA and ESA and will be a contribution towards the satis-
faction of ESA's common system operations costs responsibilities established below.
9.2. Element operations costs
9.2.a. NASA and ESA will each have operational responsibilities for the elements it pro-
vides as detailed in Article 8. Such operational responsibilities mean that NASA and ESA
will each be financially responsible for element operations costs, that is, costs attributed
to operating and to sustaining the functional performance of the flight elements that it
provides, such as ground-based maintenance, sustaining engineering, provision of spares,
launch and return costs for spares, launch and return costs of the fraction of the
Integrated Logistics System carriers provided for in Article 3.2 that is attributable to
spares, and also costs attributed to the maintenance and operation of element-unique
ground centers.
9.3. Common system operations costs
9.3.a. Manned Base. Other than the element operations costs covered in Article 9.2.a,
NASA, ESA and the other partners will equitably share the common system operations
costs; that is, the costs attributed to the operation of the manned base as a whole. The cat-
egories comprising common system operations costs are: integrated tactical planning
activities performed by the integrated tacdcal operations organization provided for in
Article 8.2.e, including user integration planning and maintenance of common docu-
mentation; space systems operations (SSCC-based operations, SSCC maintenance and
common elements of the Software Support Environment); POIC-based operations and
POIC maintenance; Integrated Logistics System operations, including consumables and
common inventory management activities; prelaunch/post landing processing of logistics
carriers; launch to orbit and return of consumables, crew and crew logistics, and launch
and return of the fraction of the Integrated Logistics System carriers provided [or in
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Article 3.2 that is attributable to consumables and crew logistics; and transmission of
housekeeping data between the manned base and the ground (SSCC, POIC and launch
and landing sites). Each partner will be responsible for a percentage of common system
operations costs equal to the percentage of Space Station utilization resources allocated
to it in Article 8.3.a.2. ESA's responsibility for sharing common system operations costs will
begin following the assembly and verification of the APM.
[37] 9.3.b. Platforms. NASA and ESA will each be responsible for the common system
operations costs for the platforms which they provide.
9.3.c. Man-Tended Free Flyer. ESA will be responsible fi)r the common system opera-
tions costs for the MTFF it provides.
9.3.d. Any changes to the list of common system operations costs in this Article will be
made by agreement among the partners.
9.4. The Parties to this MOU and the other partners will work through the SOP to
identify the detailed contents to be included in each common system operations cost cat-
egory. The partners will also, each year, report to the SOP on their forecasts for future
years for all costs included in the common system operations costs of the manned base
and on their identified actual annual common system operations costs. The SOP will
develop detailed procedures for implementing this Article. If possible, after the partners
have gained experience in the operation of the Space Station, the SOP will endeavor to
establish a fixed value for the annual common system operations costs.
9.5. Costs of user activities such as payload/experiment design, development, test and
evaluation (DDT&E); payload ground processing; provision of payload/experiment
spares and associated equipment; launch and return of payloads/experiments, spares and
associated equipment; launch and return of the fraction of the Integrated Logistics
System carriers provided for in Article 3.2 that is attributable to user payloads/experi-
ments, spares and associated equipment; and any special user integration or user opera-
tions support, including specialized crew training, will be the responsibility of Space
Station users of the partners or of individual partners as users. Such costs will not be
shared among NASA, ESA and the other partners, nor will such costs contribute toward
the satisfaction of common system operations costs responsibilities. In addition, the
DDT&E and operations costs of the users' support centers will not be shared among
NASA, ESA and the other partners.
9.6. NASA, ESA and the other partners will not recoup their DDT&E costs for their
elements from one another in the operation and utilization of the Space Station.
9.7. In case of failure of any partner to perform its operations responsibilities or to
provide for its share of common system operations costs, the partners will meet to discuss
what action should be taken. Such action could result in, for example, an appropriate
reduction of the failing partner's rights to its allocations.
[38] Article 10- Safety
10.1. In order to assure safety, NASA has the responsibility, working with the other part-
ners, to establish overall Space Station safety requirements and plans covering Phase C/D
and Phase E. Such requirements and plans for Phase C/D have been established, and
development of further safety requirements and plans for Phase C/D and Phase E and
changes to safety requirements and plans will be processed, according to the procedures
in Articles 7 and 8. As far as the elements separated from the manned base and their pay-
loads are concerned, NASA has the responsibility to establish and implement overall safe-
ty requirements and plans governing the NASA-provided Polar Platform, and ESA has the
responsibility to establish and implement overall safety requirements and plans governing
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the ESA-provided Polar Platform and the M'TFF. The overall Space Station safety require-
ments and plans will be applicable to the MTFF insofar as it has effects on the manned
base associated with its servicing at the manned base. STS safety requirements will be
applicable to the ESA-provided Polar Platform insofar as it has effects on the STS associ-
ated with its servicing by the STS.
10.2. Each partner will develop detailed safety requirements and plans, using its own
standards where practicable, for its manned base hardware and software that meet or
exceed the overall Space Station safety requirements and plans. Each partner will have the
responsibility to implement applicable overall and detailed Space Station safety require-
ments and plans throughout the lifetime of the program, and to certify that such safety
requirements and plans have been met with respect to the Space Station manned base ele-
ments and payloads it provides. ESA will have the responsibility to certify that the MTFF
and ESA-provided Polar Platform and their payloads are safe. However, NASA will have
the overall responsibility to certify that all Space Station manned base elements and pay-
loads are safe, including the MTFF and its payloads insofar as they have effects on the
manned base associated with their servicing at the manned base. NASA will also have the
responsibility to certify that the ESA-provided Polar Platform and its payloads are safe
insofar as they have effects on the STS associated with their servicing by the STS.
10.3. NASA will conduct system safety reviews which ESA will support. NASA, ESA and
the other partners will also conduct safety reviews of the elements and payloads they pro-
vide; NASA will participate in and support such reviews by the other partners. MOSST will
also participate in and support safety reviews by the other partners as appropriate related
to the MOSST-provided elements and MOSST payloads. NASA and MOSST [39] support
to such safety reviews will include provision of necessary safety-related information to
enable the other partners to conduct their reviews. Furthermore, status reports on safety
requirements and plans will be a standard agenda item at the Program Management
Reviews provided for in Article 7.1.i. The partners will participate as appropriate in any
Space Station safety review boards established by NASA.
10.4. NASA will have the responsibility for taking any decision necessary to protect the
safety of the manned base, including all elements operating in conjunction with the
manned base, or its crew in an emergency.
Article 11 - Space Station Crew
11.1. ESA has the right to provide personnel to serve as Space Station crew from the
time that ESA begins to share common system operations costs as provided in Article
9.3.5. NASA will provide flight opportunities for ESA Space Station crew satisfying the per-
centage of the total crew requirement equal to the percentage of manned base utilization
resources allocated to ESA in Article 8.3.a.2. Flight of ESA Space Station crew will be sat-
isfied over time, not necessarily on each specific crew rotation cycle. The SOP will review
the implementation of this paragraph on a biennial basis.
11.2. During assembly and verification, a fully trained ESA crew member will partic-
ipate in the on-orbit assembly and system verification of the ESA-provided APM and other
assigned flight element assembly and system verification tasks planned during that on-
orbit period as provided in the verification plan described in Articles 6.1.a.4. and 6.2.a.3.
Further, during the first two servicings of the MTFF at the manned base, a fully trained
ESA crew member will participate in the relevant activities.
11.3. Space Station crew will meet medical standards and security and suitability
requirements developed by NASA in consultation with ESA and the other partners regard-
ing Space Station crew qualifications for long-term manned space flight. NASA and ESA
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willjointlycertifythatthesestandardsandrequirementshavebeenmetbytheESASpace
Stationcrew.Furthermore,theMCBmayestablishadditionalcriteriaforSpaceStation
crew.Followingcertification,allSpaceStationcrewwillenterintoanappropriateraining
cyclein ordertoacquiretheskillsnecessarytoconductSpaceStationoperationsand
utilization.Suchtrainingwillbeconductedingroups,subjecttotherequirementsofdif-
ferentfunctionalspecializations.Thetrainingwill includeintegratedmannedsystems
operationstrainingconductedprimarilyatNASAcenters[40]andelement-specificoper-
ationstrainingconductedprimarilybythepartnerprovidingtheelementatappropriate
centersof allof thepartners.In full consultationwithESAregardingtheflightassign-
mentsofESAcrewmembers,NASAwilldesignate,fromamongthecertifiedSpaceStation
crew,specificrewcomplements,whichincludetheSpaceStationCommander,for
specificcrewrotationcycles,consistentwithArticle11.1.NASAwilldesignatespecificcrew
complementstosupportpayloadrequirementsidentifiedin theCOUP.A specificrew
complementwillbetrainedasateaminpreparationforaspecificcrewrotationcycle,sub-jecttorequirementsofdifferentfunctionalspecializations.
11.4. NASAandESAwill befinanciallyresponsiblefor all compensation,medical
expenses,subsistencecostsonEarth,andtrainingforSpaceStationcrewwhichtheypro-
vide.Fulltrainingforallassigneddutieswillberequired.
11.5. TheCodeofConductfortheSpaceStationwillbedevelopedbyNASA,withthe
full involvementofESA,MOSSTandtheGOJ,andapprovedfortheSpaceStationpro-graminaccordancewiththeprinciplesforreachingdecisionse tablishedinArticle8.1.b.
It will, interalia:establishaclearchainofcommand;setforthstandardsforworkand
activitiesin space,and,asappropriate,on theground;establishresponsibilitieswith
respecttoelementsandequipment;setforthdisciplinaryegulations;establishphysical
andinformationsecurityguidelines;andprovidetheSpaceStationCommanderappro-
priateauthorityandresponsibility,onbehalfofalltheparmers,toenforcesafetyproce-
duresandphysicalndinformationsecurityproceduresinorontheSpaceStation.
11.6. ESAcrewselectedforoperatingtheMTFFoutsidetheoperationalCCZof the
mannedbasearenotconsideredSpaceStationcrew,pursuanttothisArticle,forthepur-posesofthatactivity.
Article 12- Transportation, Communications
and Other Non-Space Station Facilities
12.1. Transportation
12.1.a. For purposes of design of Space Station elements and payloads, NASA's STS is the
baseline launch and return transportation system for the Space Station manned base and
for the NAsA-provided Polar Platform. ESA's Space Transportation System is the baseline
launch transportation system for the MTFF and the ESA-provided Polar Platform.
12.1.b. NASA will provide reimbursable STS launch services to ESA in connection with
the assembly of the ESA-provided APM to the manned base and its initial outfitting in
accordance with the program documentation described in Article 7.1. NASA will [41] also
provide reimbursable launch and return services in connection with the logistics require-
ments of manned base elements. NASA will also provide reimbursable launch and return
services in connection with the MTFF when it is serviced at the manned base and in con-
nection with manned base users; availability of STS services for such purposes is as pro-
vided in Articles 8.3.a.4 and 8.3.c. NASA will also provide reimbursable launch services in
connection with servicing of the ESA-provided Polar Platform, with details to be agreed
by NASA and ESA, if appropriate STS capability exists and if ESA selects to use this capa-
bility. Reimbursement for such launch services may be in cash or agreed kind. All reim-
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bursable STS services will be provided under launch services agreements. NASA will also
provide launch and return services in connection with manned base common system
operations logistics; costs for such services will be shared among the partners as provided
in Article 9.3. ESA will provide the initial launch of the MTFF and the ESA-provided Polar
Platform. ESA will also provide launch andreturn services in connection with the logistics
requirements of the MTFF when it is not serviced at the manned base.
12.1.c. Other government or private sector space transportation systems of partners may
be used in connection with the Space Station if they are compatible with the Space
Station. Specifically, ESA will have the right of access to the Space Station manned base
using the ESA Space Transportation System, including Ariane and Hermes. Recognizing
that the responsibility for developing these systems and for making them technically and
operationally compatible with the manned base rests with ESA, NASA will provide to ESA
that information necessary for ESA to make them compatible. Technical, operational and
safety requirements for access to the manned base will be controlled in appropriate pro-
gram documentation as provided for in Articles 7 and 8.
12.1.d. With respect to financial conditions, NASA and ESA will provide reimbursable
launch and return services to each other, to the other partners and to each other's and
the other partners' users at prices they routinely charge comparable users. Launch and
return services related to manned base common system operations logistics will also be
made available by NASA on the same basis.
12.1.e. Both NASA and ESAwill use their best efforts to accommodate additional launch
and return requirements in relation to the Space Station, as well as proposed require-
ments and flight schedules related to the Space Station activities described above.
12.1.1". Each partner will respect the proprietary rights in and confidentiality of appro-
priately marked data and goods to be transported on its space transportation system.
[42] 12.2. Communications
12.2.a. Space Station communications will involve space-to-ground, ground-to-space,
ground-to-ground and space-to-space data transmission. The TDRSS space network is the
baseline communication system for the manried base elements and payloads, as well as for
the NASA-provided Polar Platform and its payloads. ESA's Data Relay Satellite system
(EDRS) is the baseline communication system for the ESA-provided Polar Platform and
the MTFF and their payloads. ESA will be responsible for ensuring communications com-
patibility of the MTFF with the manned base for proximity operations, docking and ser-
vicing and of the ESA-provided Polar Platform with the STS for servicing as applicable. On
a reimbursable basis, NASA and ESA will use their best efforts to accommodate, with their
respective communication systems, specific Space Station-related requirements of each
other and the other partners. With respect to financial conditions, NASA and ESA will
provide such communication services at prices no higher than those they routinely charge
comparable customers. Other communication systems may be used on the manned base
by ESA, the other partners or Space Station users if such communication systems are com-
patible with the manned base and manned base use of TDRSS. Technical and operational
requirements related to Space Station communications will be controlled in appropriate
program documentation as provided for in Articles 7 and 8.
12.2.b. NASA and ESA will consult regarding the possible future addition of manned
base capability to accommodate ESA-provided facilities permitting manned base use of
EDRS, if compatible with the manned base and with manned base use of TDRSS.
12.2.c. Unless otherwise agreed by NASA and ESA, ground-to-ground transmission of
polar platform data from one partner to the other partners or the other partners' users
will conform to the communications transportation formats, protocols and standards
agreed to by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS).
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12.2.d.Partnersandusersofthepartnersmayimplementmeasurestoensureconfiden-
tialityoftheirutilizationdatapassingthroughtheSpaceStationInformationSystemand
othercommunicationsystemsbeingusedin connectionwith the SpaceStation.(Notwithstandingtheforegoing,datawhicharenecessarytoassuresafeoperationswillbe
madeavailableaccordingtoproceduresintheUtilizationManagementPlanandtheiruse
willberestrictedtosafetypurposesonly.)Eachpartnerwillrespecttheproprietaryrights
in,andtheconfidentialityOf,theutilizationdatapassingthroughitscommunicationsys-
tems,includingitsgroundnetworkandthecommunicationsystemsof itscontractors,
whenprovidingcommunicationservicestoanotherpartner.[43]12.3. OtherNon-SpaceStationFacilities
12.3.a.ShouldESAdesiretousetheSpaceShuttle,Spacelab,orotherNASA facilities on
a cooperative or reimbursable basis to support the development of its Space Station
Utilization Plan or to support its Space Station detailed design or development activities,
NASA will use its best efforts to accommodate ESA's proposed requirements and
schedules. Likewise, should NASA desire to use Ariane, Hermes or other ESA facilities on
a cooperative or reimbursable basis to support the development of its Space Station
Utilization Plan or to support its Space Station detailed design or development activities,
ESA will use its best efforts to accommodate NASA's proposed requirements and
schedules.
12.3.b. If NASA and ESA agree that it is appropriate and necessary for the conduct of the
cooperative program, NASA and ESA will use their good offices in connection with
attempting to arrange for the use of U.S. and European Governments' or contractors'
facilities by the Parties and/or their contractors. Such use will be subject to separate
arrangements between the user and the owner of the facilities.
Article 13 - Advanced Development Program
13.1. NASA and ESA each are conducting Space Station advanced development pro-
grams in support of their respective detailed design and development activities.
Cooperation in such advanced development activities will be considered on a case-by-case
basis and entered into where it is advantageous to both sides and where there are recip-
rocal opportunities.
13.2. ESA proposals to use NASA advanced development test beds or other NASA facil-
ities in support of ESA's Space Station advanced development program will be considered
on a case-by-case basis either on a cooperative or reimbursable basis. Likewise, NASA pro-
posals to use ESA's facilities in support of NASA's Space Station advanced development
program will be considered on a case-by-case basis either on a cooperative or reimbursable
basis.
13.3. Should ESA desire to use the Space Shuttle or Spacelab on a cooperative or reim-
bursable basis to support ESA Space Station advanced development activities, NASA will
use its best efforts to accommodate ESA's proposed requirements and flight schedules.
Likewise, should NASA desire to use ESA launch vehicles on a cooperative or reim-
bursable basis to support NASA Space Station advanced development activities, ESA will
use its best efforts to accommodate NASA's proposed requirements and flight schedules.
[44] Article 14 - Space Station Evolution
14.1. The parmers intend that the Space Station will evolve through the addition of
capability and will strive to maximize the likelihood that such evolution will be effected
through contributions from all the partners. To this end, it will be the object of the Parties
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 139
tO provide, where appropriate, the opportunity to the other partners to cooperate in their
respective proposals for additions of evolutionary capability. The Space Station together
with its additions of evolutionary capability will remain a civil station, and its operation
and utilization will be for peaceful purposes, in accordance with international law.
14.2. This MOU sets forth rights and obligations concerning only the elements listed
in Article 3, except that this Article and Article 16 of the Intergovernmental Agreement
will apply to any additions of evolutionary capability. As such, this MOU does not commit
either Party to participate in, or grant either Party rights in, the addition of evolutionary
capability.
14.3. NASA and ESA agree to study evolution concepts for the Space Station during
Phase C/D and Phase E. NASA will be responsible for development of overall manned
base evolution concepts, in consultation with ESA and the other partners, and for inte-
grating ESA's and the other partners' evolution concepts into an overall manned base
evolution plan. ESA will be responsible for development and decision on subsequent
implementation of evolution concepts for the ESA-provided Polar Platform and for the
MTFF insofar as they have no technical or operational impacts on the STS or the manned
base, in accordance with Articles 14.6 and 14.7.
14.4. NASA, ESA, and the other partners will participate in an International Evolution
Working Group (IEWG) to coordinate their respective evolution studies and to consider
overall Space Station evolution concepts and planning activities.
14.5. The MCB will review specific evolutionary capabilities proposed by any partner,
assess the impacts of those plans on the .other .partners' elements and on the manned
base, and review recommendation for mmlmLzlng potential impacts on Space Station
activity during the addition of evolutionary capabilities.
14.6. Following the review and assessment provided for in Article 14.5, and consistent
with the provisions of the Intergovernmental Agreement, cooperation between or among
partners regarding the sharing of addition (s) of evolutionary capability will require either
amendment of the relevant NASA-ESA, NASA-GOJ and NASA-MOSST MOU's or a sepa-
rate agreement to which, to the extent that such addition is on the manned base or has a
technical or operational impact on the STS or the manned base, NASA is a party to ensure
that such addition is [45] consistent with NASA's overall programmatic responsibilities as
detailed in this MOU.
14.7. Following the review and assessment provided for in Article 14.5, and consistent
with the provisions of the Intergovernmental Agreement, the addition of evolutionary
capability by one partner will require prior notification of the other partners, and, to the
extent that such addition is on the manned base or has a technical or operational impact
on the STS or the manned base, an agreement with NASA to ensure that such addition is
consistent with NASA's overall programmatic responsibilities as detailed in this MOU.
14.8. The addition of evolutionary capability will in no event alter the rights and oblig-
ations of either Party to this MOU concerning the elements listed in Article 3, unless oth-
erwise agreed by the affected Party.
Article 15 - Cross-Waiver of Liability: Exchange of Data and Goods;
Treatment of Data and Goods in Transit; Customs and Immigration;
Intellectual Property; Criminal Jurisdiction
The Parties note that, with respect to the cross-waiver of liability, exchange of data and
goods, treatment of data and goods in transit, customs and immigration, intellectual
property and criminal jurisdiction, the relevant provisions of the Intergovernmental
Agreement apply.
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Article 16 - Financial Arrangements
16.1. Each Party will bear the costs of fulfilling its responsibilities, including but not
limited to costs of compensation, travel and subsistence of its own personnel and trans-
portation of all equipment and other items for which it is responsible under this MOU.
However, as provided in Article 9.3, the partners will equitably share common system
operations costs.
16.2. The ability of each Party to carry out its obligations is subject to its funding pro-
cedures and the availability of appropriated funds.
16.3. In the event that funding problems are arising that may affect a partner's ability
to fulfill its responsibilities under this MOU, that partner will promptly notify and consult
with the other partners. Further, the Parties undertake to grant high priority to their
Space Station programs in developing their budgetary plans.
[46]
16.4. The Parties will seek to minimize the exchange of funds while carrying out their
respective responsibilities in this cooperative program, including, if they agree, through
the use of barter, that is, the provision of goods or services.
Article 17 - Public Information
17.1. NASA and ESA will be responsible for the development of an agreed Public
Affairs Plan that will specify guidelines for NASA/ESA cooperative public affairs activities
during the detailed design, development, operation and utilization of the Space Station.
17.2. Within the Public Affairs Plan guidelines, both NASA and ESA will retain the
right to release public information on their respective portions of the program. NASA and
ESA will undertake to coordinate with each other, and, as appropriate, with the other part-
ners, in advance concerning public information activities which relate to each other's
responsibilities or performance in the Space Station program.
Article 18 - Consultation and Settlement of Disputes
18.1. The Parties agree to consult with each other and with the other partners
promptly when events occur or matters arise which may occasion a question of interpre-
tation or implementation of the terms of this MOU.
18.2. In the case of a question of interpretation or implementation of the terms of
this MOU, such question will be first referred to the NASA Associate Administrator for
Space Station and the ESA Director of Space Station and Platforms for settlement. The
Parties recognize that in the case of a question concerning the commitments made in this
MOU to STA and/or MOSST, the consultations will be broadened so as to include the STA
Director General of the Research and Development Bureau and/or the MOSST Deputy
Secretary, Space Policy Sector.
18.3. Any question of interpretation or implementation of the terms of this MOU
which has not been settled in accordance with Article 18.2 will be referred to the NASA
Administrator and the ESA Director General for settlement. The Parties recognize that in
case of a question concerning the commitments made in this MOU to STA and/or
MOSST, the matter will also be referred to the Minister of State for Science and
Technology of Japan and/or the Secretary of MOSST.
18.4. Any issues arising out of this MOU not satisfactorily settled through consultation,
pursuant to this Article may be [47] pursued in accordance with the relevant provisions
of the Intergovernmental Agreement.
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18.5. Unless otherwise agreed between NASA and ESA, implementation of decisions
made pursuant to mechanisms provided for in this MOU will not be held in abeyance
pending settlement of issues under this Article.
Article 19- Entry into Force
19.1. Pursuant to the Arrangement Concerning Application of the Space Station
Intergovernmental Agreement Pending its Entry into Force, which became effective on
September 29, 1988, this MOU will enter into force after signature of both the NASA
Administrator or his designee and the ESA Director General or his designee, upon _Tit-
ten notification by each Party to the other that all procedures necessary for its entry into
force have been completed.
19.2. Pending the entry into force of the Intergovernmental Agreement between the
United States and the European Partner in accordance with Article 25 of that Agreement,
the Parties agree to abide by the relevant terms of that Agreement.
19.3. If the United States or the European Partner withdraws from the Arrangement
Concerning Application of the Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement Pending its
Entry into Force, the corresponding Cooperating Agency will be deemed to have with-
drawn from this MOU effective from the same date.
19.4. If, by December 31, 1992, the Intergovernmental Agreement has not yet entered
into force between the United States and the European Partner in accordance with Article
25 of that Agreement, the Parties will consider what steps are necessary and appropriate
to take account of that circumstance.
19.5. If the United States or the European Partner gives notice of withdrawal from the
Intergovernmental Agreement in accordance with Article 21 of that Agreement, the cor-
responding Cooperating Agency will be deemed to have withdrawn from this MOU effec-
tive from the same date.
Article 20- MOU Amendments
This MOU may be amended at any time by written agreement of the Parties. Any
amendment must be consistent with the Intergovernmental Agreement. To the extent
that a provision of this MOU creates specific rights or obligations accepted by another
partner, that provision may be amended only with the written consent of that partner.
[48] Article 21 - Review
Upon the request of either Party, the Parties will meet for the purpose of reviewing
and promoting cooperation in the Space Station. In the process of this review, the Parties
may consider amendments to this MOU.
Article 22 - Definitions and Explanations
22.1. In addition to the definitions specified in the Intergovernmental Agreement, the
following definitions will apply to this MOU:
"international Space Station complex," also "Space Station," means the collection
of elements listed in Article 3;
"manned base" means Space Station flight elements excluding the polar plat-
forms and the MTFF;
"Parties" means NASA and ESA;
"partners" means NASA, ESA, STA and MOSST.
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22.2. Explanation of the following terms may be found in this MOU in the Articles
noted:
"Accommodations" - Article 8.1.d
"Command and Control Zone (CCZ)"-Article 8.1.a
"Common system operations costs" - Article 9.3
"Composite Operations Plan (COP)" - Article 8.2.d
"Composite Utilization Plan (CUP)"-Article 8.3.f
"Consolidated Operations and Utilization Plan (COUP)" - Article 8.1.c
"Flight elements" - Article 3
"Increment Plan (IP)" - Article 8.2.f
"Infrastructure" - Article 8.1.b
"Multilateral Coordination Board (MCB)" - Article 8.1.b
"Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC)" - Article 8.3.i
"Program Coordination Committee (PCC)" - Article 7.1.b
"Resources" - Article 8.1.d and Article 8.3.a.4
"Space Station Control Board (SSCB)" - Article 7.1 .d
"Space Station Control Center (SSCC)"-Article 8.2.g
"Space Station-unique ground elements" - Article 3
"System Operations Panel (SOP)" - Article 8.2.a and Article 8.2.b
'q'actical Operations Plan (TOP)" - Article 8.2.f
"User Operations Panel (UOP)" - Article 8.3.d
[49] DONE at Washington, this 29th clay of September, 1988, in two originals in the
English, French, German and Italian languages, each version being equally authentic.
[50] FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EUROPEAN SPACE
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND AGENCY:
SPACE ADMINISTRATION:
POUR L'ADMINISTRATION NATIONALE
DE L'AERONAUTIQUE ET DE
L'ESPACE DES ETATS UNIS:
FOR DEI NATIONALE LUFT UND
RAUMFAHRTORGAN ISATI ON DER
VEREINIGTEN STAATEN:
POUR L'AGENCE SPATIALE
EUROPEENNE:
FOR DEI EUROPAISE
WELTRAUMO RGAN ISATION:
PER L'AMMINISTRAZIONE
NAZIONALE PER L'AERONAUTICA
STATI UNITI:
PER L'AGENZIA SPAZIALE
EUROPEA:
signed by Dale D. Myers signed by Reimar Leust
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Document 1-36
Document fl0e: "Draft Proposals for US-USSR Space Cooperation," April 4, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
President John F. Kennedy called for U.S.-Soviet space cooperation in his January 20, 1961, inau-
gural address and his first State of the Union address a few days later. To examine the possibilities for
such cooperation, presidential science advisor Jerome Wiesner set up both an external advisory group
and an internal government study group. A number of drafts of a white paper on the topic were pre-
pared. As the white paper was nearing completion, the Soviet Union launched Yuri Gagarin into orbit
on April 12, 1961. A few days later, President Kennedy decided that he had to compete--not cooper-
ate-in space, and the white paper was temporarily set aside.
[1] April 4, 1961
Draft Proposals for US-USSR Space Cooperation
OBJECTIVES
The objectives are to confirm concretely the U.S. preference for a cooperative rather
than competitive approach to space exploration, to contribute to reduction of cold war
tensions by demonstrating the possibility of cooperative enterprise between the U.S. and
the USSR in a field of major public concern, and to achieve the substantive advantages of
cooperation that in major projects would impose more of a strain on economic and man-
power resources if carried out unilaterally.
GUIDELINES
The proposals seek to (a) maximize acceptability by the USSR, and (b) minimize the
potential for misunderstanding and obstructionism which must be recognized to exist in
any joint program with the Soviet Union. The proposals therefore have, in general, the
following character:
(1) Valid scientific objectives.
(2) Comparable contributions by U.S. and USSR.
(3) Technical and economic feasibility for U.S. portion.
(4) Minimal interference with on-going U.S. programs.
(5) Minimal grounds for Soviet suspicions of U.S. motives (success, surveillance, etc.)
(6) Opportunities for third-nation participation at appropriate time.
The proposals fall into three categories:
(a) The employment of existing or easily attainable ground facilities for exchange of
information and services in support of orbiting experiments.
(b) The coordination of independently-launched satellite experiments so as to
achieve simultaneous but complementary coverage of agreed phenomena.
[2] (c) Coordination of or cooperation in ambitious projects for the manned exploration
of the moon and the unmanned exploration of the planets.
The three categories of proposals are advanced in order to offer the Soviet Union a
wide range of choice and avoid the appearance of "pushing" a pre-selected objective.
While the costs are estimated by NASA to range from relatively insignificant levels in
Category (a) to $15-20 million in Category (b) and, very roughly, $10 billion in Category
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(c), it may be assumed that the Soviet Union as well as ourselves is likely to pursue the
more costly programs in any event.
Such cooperation as is discussed here should be proposed and carried out on the
basis of an expanding U.S. program of space science and exploration, and without preju-
dice to continuing joint enterprise with and assistance to the free world.
PROCEDURE
Overtures should be made at Governmental levels, inviting the USSR to engage in
cooperative enterprise such as the proposals below. Soviet counter-suggestions of areas of
cooperation would also be invited. The initial discussions would seek a go-ahead for
exploratory technical talks preliminary to agreements in principle. Privacy in all such dis-
cussions would appear to enhance the chances of success. Technical advice should be
available at all times.
[3] PROPOSALS
Category (a)
These proposals for the most part call for the use of ground facilities for mutual
service:
(i) The U.S. and the USSR might agree to provide ground-based support on a reci-
procal basis for space experiments, e.g.,
- When either nation launches a satellite or probe carrying a magnetometer exper-
iment, the other would collect rapid-run magnetograms at its ground observato-
ries. (A Soviet scientist has recently promised to do this in connection with the
U.S. P-14 probe, following a private request.)
- When either nation launches a meteorological satellite, the other would carry out
routine and special (airborne, balloon-borne, all-sky camera) weather observa-
tions synchronized with the passes of the satellite, analyze the data from both
sources, and participate in scientific exchanges of the results.
- Similar arrangements would be useful in connection with ionospheric, auroral,
and other geophysical researches.
(ii) The U.S. and the USSR could agree to record telemetry from each other's satel-
lites, exchanging the resulting tapes as requested. Each would furnish the necessary
orbital information and telemetry calibrations to the other. This would be of particular
value in sun-related experiments and could extend to the exchange of command signals
to permit the best-situated nation to energize a given experiment under certain condi-
tions of solar activity.
(iii) In the communications field, the USSR may wish to employ a ground facility for
long-distance experimental transmission of voice or TV signals by means of communica-
tions satellites to be launched by NASA after mid-1962 (Projects Relay/Rebound). Such
facilities are being prepared also by the U.K. and France. Transmissions may be effected
between the latter and the USSR (by means of a U.S. satellite) as usefully as between the
U.S. and the USSR. (If supplementary equipment peculiar to such experimental testing in
this case is required by the USSR, NASA could provide it at costs ranging up to $2 mil-
lion.)
[4] The exchanges proposals in (a) have been sought, almost with complete unsuccess, at
government agency and scientific society levels since the beginning of the IGY. They are
included because of their inherent desirability and because a somewhat greater chance of
acceptance may follow if initiated at higher levels. (The programs in Categories (b) and
(c) have not yet been proposed to the Soviet Union.)
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The proposals made in Category (a) are for coordinated rather than interdependent
efforts and thus would avoid difficulties which may be associated with the latter type of
cooperation with the USSR.
[5] Category (b)
(i) Weather satellites promise broad near-future benefits to the peoples of the world.
Equal participation by the U.S. and the USSR in coordinated launching of experimental
satellites capable of providing typhoon warnings, etc., would have great impact.*
One specific proposal is that the U.S. and the USSR each place in polar orbit a mete-
orological satellite to record cloud-cover and radiation-balance data, such that
- The two satellites have reasonably overlapping lifetimes (at least three months).
- The satellites orbit in planes at right angles to each other, providing at least six-
hour coverage of the earth.
- The data characteristics permit reception and analysis interchangeably, if possible.
- Each country may receive telemetry from the other's satellite through continuous
readout if power sources permit or by command if otherwise.
- Camera resolutions are appropriate only for the objective--photographs of cloud
cover.
- The results are to be made available to the scientific community (World Data
Centers and WMO).
(ii) Coordinated programs including experimental or research satellite launchings in
other fields than meteorology (e.g., communications) could also be of value. In the field
of geophysics, for example, there are possibilities for the useful coordination of the orbits
of contemporaneous satellites so as to obtain measurements under contrasting or com-
plementary conditions.
(iii) Simultaneous and coordinated rocket launchings from a number of stations cov-
ering a wide range of latitudes and longitudes would for the first time provide a global pic-
ture of the properties of the atmosphere at a given instant of time, if conducted on a scale
greater than now done during International Rocket Weeks.
[6] The first proposal in Category (b) above falls in the meteorological field, in which the
U.S. appears to lead. While the USSR has not yet done anything in this field, it has on one
occasion indicated at the highest scientific level that space meteorology is favorably viewed
as an area for cooperation. A generous time-scale (or offer to provide instrumentation)
might moderate the negative factor.
The proposals made in Category (b) are, like those in Category (a), for coordinated
rather than interdependent efforts and thus would avoid difficulties which may be associat-
ed with the latter type of cooperation with the USSR.
[7] Category (c)
These proposals related to the exploration of celestial bodies.
(i) Mars or Venus Programs.
Planetary investigations are immensely difficult undertakings requiring protracted
programs of great complexity and variety, progressing through fly-bys, orbiters, hard and
soft landings, and surface prospecting. The U.S. and the USSR could coordinate their
independent programs so as to provide for a useful sequencing and, perhaps, sharing of
experimental missions, with scientific benefits and economics. Full data exchange, guar-
anteed by provision of telemetry calibrations, should be provided. If cooperation is inter-
rupted, no less is sustained and the programs may proceed independently.
The U.S. and USSR could, alternatively, enter into a joint program that would mean
more intimate involvement; such a program would include cooperative development of
* Broader cooperation in meteorolog)' is possible and desirable. A specific proposal t'ol a majo_ world-
wide cooperative meteorological program, in which satellites would I_ a part, is l_qng developed separately.
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equipment and sharing of experimental missions, and would point toward eventual joint
launching of probes.
(ii) Manned Exploration of Moon.
The presence of man will immeasurably enhance the scientific investigation of the
Moon--so critical for understanding the origin of the solar system--by providing the
resourcefulness, flexibility and opportunity for improvisation available only with man.
As a first step in non-limited cooperative effort, the U.S. and the USSR would each
undertake to place a small party (about 3) of men on the moon for scientific purposes and
return them to earth.
As in planetary programs, a more extensive cooperative program could also be envis-
aged in which the U.S. and USSR enter into a joint manned lunar program, including
cooperative development, planning, and international exploration.
The proposals made in Category (c), in the lunar and planetary fields, suggest pro-
grams for which the USSR has demonstrably greater existing capability. Inclusion of both
categories in proposals to the USSR may therefore be effective.
[8] No significant Mars probe capability now exits in the U.S. By 1964, Centaur should
permit significant fly-bys only, while Saturn C-1 would put about 300 pound payloads in
orbit after 1964.
The Mars/Venus program is a long-range one whose cost varies widely with numbers
of launchings, nature of payloads, and extent of back-up. A balanced program
(unmanned), including some 15 Venus shots and 8 Mars shots in the next decade, may
cost in the order of $1 billion.
Neither country now possesses a capability for a manned lunar project. It will require
boosters of the order of Saturn C-2 using orbital rendezvous and refueling techniques
(still to be attempted and perfected) for the upper stages. At least six Saturn C-2's would
be required for a single mission, plus appropriate back-up. The time-scale is probably a
decade, during which some 70-80 Saturns would be required for developmental purpos-
es, and the cost is roughly of the order of $10 billion. During the decade, alternative
vehicle systems may conceivably become available, obviating the difficult rendezvous
requirement.
In the suggestions for cooperation given above, it can be seen that the degree of
involvement between the U.S. and the USSR can in principle be varied from coordination
of national programs to full cooperation on joint endeavors.
It is possible to restrict proposals which may be made to the Soviet Union to the level
of coordination of essentially independent programs. Benefits would derive from joint
planning and organization of such coordinated efforts. This might have the advantages of
greater acceptability in the U.S. and in the Soviet Union (where suspicions of U.S. moti-
vations would be present in any case). It may also be more realistic in terms of the tech-
nical exchange and access which may be feasible.
On the other hand, it would be possible to indicate a range of possible relationships
to the Soviet Union, extending to interdependent programs and leaving it to them to
select the starting level.
As we contemplate programs that involve greater degrees of cooperation, we must
also anticipate certain increased difficulties. These would include the risk that the whole
program would be lost if one or the other participant withdrew because of political or
other reasons: the fact that we would have to be prepared to admit Russians to installa-
tions such as Cape Canaveral and to show them details of our booster and payload systems
(of course, the Russians [9] would have to do the same if they agreed to intimate cooper-
ation), and the possibility that Congressional, scientific and public support might also be
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more difficult because of the very high costs involved, coupled with the potential damage
to our program if the Soviets became obstructive or withdraw. Positive factors must also be
considered, of course, such as the impact on U.S./USSR relations growing out of intimate
cooperation on large and meaningful projects, and the advantages occurring to both
countries in carrying out space programs utilizing the best of what each has to offer with-
out unnecessary time pressures.
At any level of relationships, proposals for cooperation in Category (a) have the great-
est potential for matching the President's theme that "Both nations would help them-
selves as well as other nations by removing those endeavors from the bitter and wasteful
competition of the Cold War." The United States considers exploration of the celestial
bodies, particularly manned space exploration, to be perhaps the most challenging adven-
ture of this century. This venture should be conducted on behalf of the human race and
the earth as a whole, not on behalf of any single nation. The vigorous and accelerating
United States space exploration program is proceeding in this spirit. If the Soviet Union
shares this conception, then planning should be undertaken promptly for cooperative
manned exploration of the moon and unmanned exploration of Mars and Venus. These
projects should of course be open to the participation of all interested countries [and
might come under the auspices of the United Nations]. They could, however, be
undertaken most constructively only if the United States and the Soviet Union agree on
objectives and on coordination of their efforts for the most rapid progress and the most
efficient use of human and natural resources.
Document 1-37
Document title: John E Kennedy, to Soviet Union Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, March 7,
1962.
Source:NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
From the day he was inaugurated, President John E Kennedy had hoped that the Soviet Union would
be willing to cooperate with the United States in space exploration and exploitation. Kennedy decided
in 1961 that he had to compete with the Soviet Union in dramatic space achievements, but he still
hoped that other areas of space could serve as arenas for cooperation. Nikita Khrushchev seemed to
open the door to such cooperation in his February 21, 1962, message to Kennedy, which congratu-
lated the United States on its first human orbital flight, the Freedom 7 Mercury mission of John
Glenn. Kennedy replied immediately, telling the Soviet premier that the United States would soon for-
ward specific proposals for cooperation. After a rapid review of cooperative possibilities within the U.S.
government, Kennedy forwarded this letter on March 7, proposing specific cooperative initiatives to
the Soviet Union. This letter marked the beginning of substantive cooperation between the two space
supe,pow_rs.
[1] Dear Mr. Chairman:
On February twenty-second last I wrote you that I was instructing appropriate officers
of this Government to prepare concrete proposals for immediate projects of common
action in the exploration of space. I now present such proposals to you.
The exploration of space is a broad and varied activity and the possibilities for coop-
eration are many. In suggesting the possible first steps which are set out below, I do not
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intendtolimitourmutualconsiderationfdesirablecooperativeactivities.Onthecon-
trary,I willwelcomeyourconcretesuggestionsalongtheseorotherlines.
1. Perhapswecouldrendernogreaterservicetomankindthroughourspacepro-
gramsthanbythejointestablishmentof anearlyoperationalweathersatellitesystem.
Suchasystemwouldbedesignedtoprovideglobalweatherdataforpromptusebyany
nation.Toinitiatethisservice,I proposethatheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnioneach
launchasatellitetophotographcloudcoverandprovideotheragreedmeteorologicalser-
vicesfor allnations.Thetwosatelliteswouldbeplacedin near-polaro bitsin planes
approximatelyperpendiculartoeachother,thusprovidingregularcoverageofallareas.
Thisimmenselyvaluabledatawouldthenbedisseminatedhroughnormalinternational
meteorologicalhannelsandwouldmakeasignificantcontributionto theresearchand
serviceprogramsnowunderstudybytheWorldMeteorologicalOrganizationinresponse
toResolution1721(XVI)adoptedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyonDecember
20,1961.
2. It wouldbeofgreatinteresttothoseresponsiblefortheconductof ourrespec-
tivespaceprogramsif theycouldobtainoperationaltrackingservicesfromeachother's
territories.Accordingly,I proposethateachofourcountriesestablishandoperatearadio
trackingstationtoprovidetrackingservicestotheother,utilizingequipmentwhichwe
wouldeachprovideto theother.Thus,theUnitedStateswouldprovidethetechnical
equipmentforatrackingstationtobeestablishedin theSovietUnionandtobeoperat-
edbySoviettechnicians.TheUnitedStateswouldin turnestablishandoperatearadio
trackingstationutilizingSovietequipment.Eachcountrywouldtraintheother'stechni-
ciansin theoperationofitsequipment,wouldutilizethestationlocatedonitsterritory
toprovidetrackingservicestotheother,andwould"affordsuchaccessasmaybeneces-
sarytoaccommodatemodificationandmaintenanceofequipmentfromtimetotime.[2]3. In thefieldof theearthsciences,theprecisecharacteroftheearth'smagnetic
fieldiscentraltomanyscientificproblems.I proposethereforethatwecooperateinmap-
pingtheearth'smagneticfieldinspacebyutilizingtwosatellites,oneinanear-earthorbit
andthesecondinamoredistantorbit.TheUnitedStateswouldlaunchoneofthesesatel-
liteswhiletheSovietUnionwouldlaunchtheother.Thedatawouldbeexchanged
throughouttheworldscientificcommunity,andopportunityfor correlationof support-
ingdataobtainedonthegroundwouldbearranged.
4. In thefieldof experimentalcommunicationsby atellite,theUnitedStateshas
alreadyundertakenarrangementsto testanddemonstratethefeasibilityof interconti-
nentaltransmissions.Anumberofcountriesareconstructingequipmentsuitableforpar-
ticipationinsuchtesting.IwouldwelcometheSovietUnion'sjoiningin thiscooperative
effortwhichwillbeasteptowardmeetingtheobjective,containedin UnitedNations
GeneralAssemblyResolution1721(XVI),thatcommunicationsbymeansof satellites
shouldbeavailableto thenationsof theworldassoonaspracticableonaglobaland
non-discriminatorybasis.I notealsothatSecretaryRuskhasbroachedthesubjectofcoop-
erationin thisfieldwithMinisterGromykoandthatMr.Gromykohasexpressedsome
interest.Ourtechnicalrepresentativesmightnowdiscusspecificpossibilitiesinthisfield.
5. Givenourcommoninterestinmannedspaceflightsandin insuring[sic]man's
abilityto survivein spaceandreturnsafely,I proposethatwepooloureffortsand
exchangeourknowledgeinthefieldofspacemedicine,wherefutureresearchanbepur-
suedin cooperationwithscientistsfromvariouscountries.
Beyondthesespecificprojectswearepreparednowtodiscussbroadercooperationi
thestillmorechallengingprojectswhichmustbeundertakeni theexplorationofouter
space.Thetasksaresochallenging,thecostsogreat,andtherisktothebravemenwho
engageinspacexplorationsograve,thatwemustinallgoodconsciencetryeverypossi-
bilityofsharingthesetasksandcostsandofminimizingtheserisks.LeadersoftheUnited
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States space program have developed detailed plans for an orderly sequence of manned
and unmanned flights for exploration of space and the planets. Out of discussion of these
plans, and of our own, for undertaking the tasks of this decade would undoubtedly
emerge possibilities for substantive scientific and technical cooperation in manned and
unmanned space investigation. Some possibilities are not yet precisely identifiable, but
should become clear as the space programs of our two countries proceed.
[3] In the case of others it may be possible to start planning together now. For example,
we might cooperate in unmanned exploration of the lunar surface, or we might com-
mence now the mutual definition of steps to be taken in sequence for an exhaustive sci-
entific investigation of the planet Mars or Venus, including consideration of the possible
utility of manned flight in such programs. When a proper sequence for experiments has
been determined, we might share responsibility for the necessary projects. All data would
be made freely available.
I believe it is both appropriate and desirable that we take full cognizance of the sci-
entific and other contributions which other states the world over might be able to make
in such programs. As agreements are reached between us on any parts of these or similar
programs, I propose that we report them to the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Committee offers a variety of additional opportunities
for joint cooperative efforts within the framework of its mandate as sets forth in General
Assembly Resolutions 1472 (XIV) and 1721 (XVI).
I am designating technical representatives who will be prepared to meet and discuss
with your representatives our ideas and yours in a spirit of practical cooperation. In order
to accomplish this at an early date I suggest that the representatives of our countries, who
will be coming to New York to take part in the United Nations Outer Space Committee,
meet privately to discuss the proposals set forth in this letter.
Sincerel_
John E Kennedy
Document 1-38
Document tide: Nikita Khrushchev, to President John E Kennedy, March 20, 1962.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Nikita Khrushchev replied to President Kennedy's March 7 letter within two weeks. With his accep-
tance in principle of the concept of U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation, discussions could begin between
NASA and its Soviet counterparts regarding specific cooperative undertakings. While the need for
progress on disarmament was mentioned in the Khrushchev lette_, it was not made a precondition for
cooperation.
[1] Dear Mr. President:
Having carefully familiarized myself with your message of March 7 of this year, I note
with satisfaction that my communication to you of February 21 containing the proposal
that our two countries unite their efforts for the conquest of space has met with the nec-
essary understanding on the part of the Government of the United States.
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In advancing this proposal, we proceeded from the fact that all peoples and all
mankind are interested in achieving the objective of exploration and peaceful use of outer
space, and that the enormous scale of this task, as well as the enormous difficulties which
must be overcome, urgently demand broad unification of the scientific, technical, and
material capabilities and resources of nations. Now, at a time when the space age is just
dawning, it is already evident how much men will be called upon to accomplish. If today
the genius of man has created space ships capable of reaching the surface of the moon
with great accuracy and of launching the first cosmonauts into orbit around the earth,
then tomorrow manned spacecraft will be able to race to Mars and Venus, and the farther
they travel the wider and more immense the prospects will become, for man's penetration
into the depths of the universe.
The greater the number of countries making their contribution to this truly compli-
cated endeavor, which involves great expense, the more swiftly will the conquest of space
in the interests of all humanity proceed. And this means that equal opportunities should
be made available for all countries to participate in international cooperation in this field.
It is precisely this kind of international cooperation that the Soviet Union unswervingly
advocates, true to its policy of developing and strengthening friendship between peoples.
As far back as the beginning of 1958 the Soviet Government proposed the conclusion of
a broad international agreement on cooperation in the field of the study and peaceful use
of outer space and took the initiative in raising this question for examination by the
United Nations. In 1961, immediately after the first space flight by man had been achieved
in the Soviet Union, we reaffirmed our readiness to cooperate and unite our efforts with
those of other countries, and most of all with your country, which was then making prepa-
rations for similar flights. My message to you of February 91, 1969 was dictated by these
same aspirations and directed toward this same purpose.
[2] The Soviet Government considers and has always considered the successes of our
country in the field of space exploration as achievements not only of the Soviet people but
of all mankind. The Soviet Union is taking practical steps to the end that the fruits of the
labor of Soviet scientists shall become the property of all countries. We widely publish
notification of all launchings of satellites, space ships and space rockets, reporting all data
pertaining to the orbit of flight, weight of space devices launched, radio frequencies, etc.
Soviet scientists have established fruitful professional contact with their foreign col-
leagues, including scientists of your country, in such international organizations as the
Committee of Outer Space Research and the International Astronautical Federation.
It seems to me, Mr. President, that the necessity is now generally recognized for fur-
ther practical steps in the noble cause of developing international cooperation in space
research for peaceful purposes. Your message shows that the direction of your thoughts
does not differ in essence from what we conceive to be practical measures in the field of
such cooperation. What, then, should be our starting point?
In this connection I should like to name several problems of research and peaceful use
of space, for whose solution it would in our opinion be important to unite the efforts of
nations. Some of them, which are encompassed by the recent U.N. General Assembly res-
olution adopted at the initiative of our two countries, are also mentioned in your message.
1. Scientists consider that the use of artificial earth satellites for the creation of
international systems of long-distance communication is entirely realistic at the present
stage of space research. Realization of such projects can lead to a significant improvement
in the means of communication and television all over the globe. People would be pro-
vided with a reliable means of communication and hitherto unknown opportunities for
broadening contacts between nations would be opened. So let us begin by specifying the
definite opportunities for cooperation in solving this problem. As I understood from your
message, the U.S.A. is also prepared to do this.
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2. It is difficult to overestimate the advantage that people would derive from the
organization of a world-wide weather observation service using artificial earth satellites.
Precise and timely weather prediction would be still another important step on the path
to man's subjugation of the forces of nature; it would permit him to combat more suc-
cessfully the [3] calamities of the elements and would give new prospects for advancing
the well-being of mankind. Let us also cooperate in this field.
3. It seems to us that it would be expedient to agree upon organizing the observa-
tion of objects launched in the direction of the moon, Mars, Venus, and other planets of
the solar system, by radio-technical and optical means, through a joint program.
As our scientists see it, undoubted advantage would be gained by uniting the efforts
of nations for the purpose of hastening scientific progress in the study of the physics of
interplanetary space and heaven[ly] bodies.
4. At the present stage of man's penetration into space, it would be most desirable
to draw up and conclude an international agreement providing for aid in searching for
and rescuing space ships, satellites and capsules that have accidentally fallen. Such an
agreement appears all the more necessary, since it might involve saving the lives of cos-
monauts, those courageous explorers of the far reaches of the universe.
5. Your message contains proposals for cooperation between our countries in com-
piling charts of the earth's magnetic field in outer space by means of satellites, and also
for exchanging knowledge in the field of space medicine. I can say that Soviet scientists
are prepared to cooperate in this and to exchange data regarding such questions with sci-
entists of other countries.
6. I think, Mr. President, that the time has also come for our two countries, which
have advanced further than others in space research, to try to find a common approach
to the solution of the important legal problem with which life itself has confronted the
nations in the space age. In this connection I find it a positive fact that at the UN General
Assembly's 16th session the Soviet Union and the United States were able to agree upon
a proposal on the first principles of space law which was then unanimously approved by
the members of the UN: a proposal on the applicability of international law, including the
UN charter, in outer space and on heavenly bodies; on the accessibility of outer space and
heavenly bodies for research and use by all nations in accordance with international law;
and on the fact that space is not subject to appropriation by nations.
Now, in our opinion, it is necessary to go further.
[4] Expansion of space research being carried out by nations definitely makes it necessary
to agree also that in conducting experiments in outer space no one should create obsta-
cles for space study and research for peaceful purposes by other nations. Perhaps it should
be stipulated that those experiments in space that might complicate space research by
other countries should be the subject of preliminary discussion and agreement on an
appropriate international basis.
I have named, Mr. President, only some of the questions whose solution has, in our
view, now become urgent and requires cooperation between our countries. In the future,
international cooperation in the conquest of space will undoubtedly extend to ever newer
fields of space exploration if we can now lay a firm foundation for it. We hope that scien-
tists of the USSR and the U.S.A. will be able to engage in working out and realizing the
many projects for the conquest of outer space hand in hand, and together with scientists
of other countries.
Representatives of the USSR on the UN Space Committee will be given instructions
to meet with representatives of the United States in order to discuss concrete questions of
cooperation in research and peaceful use of outer space that are of interest to our coun-
tries.
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Thus, Mr. President, do we conceive of--shall we say--heavenly matters. We sincerely
desire that the establishment of cooperation in the field of peaceful use of outer space
facilitate the improvement of relations between our countries, the easing of international
tension and the creation of a favorable situation for the peaceful settlement of urgent
problems here on our own earth.
At the same time it appears obvious to me that the scale of our cooperation in the
peaceful conquest of space, as well as the choice of the lines along which such coopera-
tion would seem possible is to a certain extent related to the solution of the disarmament
problem. Until an agreement in general and complete disarmament is achieved, both our
countries will, nevertheless, be limited in their abilities to cooperate in the field of peace-
tiff use of outer space. It is no secret that rockets for military purposes and spacecraft
launched for peaceful purposes are based on common scientific and technical achieve-
ments. It is true that there are some distinctions here; space rockets require more power-
ful engines, since by this means they carry greater payloads and attain a higher altitude,
while military rockets in general do not require such powerful engines---engines already
in existence can carry warheads of great destructive force and assure their arrival at any
point, on the globe.
[5] However, both you and we know, Mr. President, that the principles for designing and
producing military rockets and space rockets are the same.
I am expressing these considerations for the simple reason that it would be better if"
we saw all sides of the question realistically. We should try to overcome any obstacles which
may arise in the path of international cooperation in the peaceful conquest of space. It is
possible that we shall succeed in doing this, and that will be useful. Considerably broader
prospects for cooperation and uniting our scientific-technological achievements, up to
and including joint construction of spacecraft for reaching other planets--the moon,
Venus, Mars--will arise when agreement on disarmament has been achieved.
We hope that agreement on general and complete disarmament will be achieved; we
are exerting and will continue to exert every effort toward this end. I should like to believe
that you also, Mr. President, will spare no effort in acting along these lines.
Yours respectfully,
N. Khrushchev
Moscow, March 20, 1962
Documenl 1-39
Document title: "Record of the US-USSR Talks on Space Cooperation," March 27, 28, and
30, 1962, with attached: Arnold W. Frutkin, Director, Office of International Programs,
NASA, "Topical Summary of Bilateral Discussions With Soviet Union," May 1, 1962.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Following up on the exchange of letters between John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, both the
United States and the Soviet Union appointed delegations to begin discussions on space cooperation
possibilities. NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden headed the U.S. delegation, while
Professor Anatoli A. Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Science led the Soviet delegation. This
document records their first three days of meetings, which laid the foundation for more formal negoti-
ations a few months later..
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Record of the US-USSR Talks on Space Cooperation
Held in New York City
on March 27, 28 and 30, 1962
First Meeting - March 27
Participants: United States
Dr. Hugh Dryden
Dr. John W. Townsend
Dr. Donald E Hornig
Mr. Lewis Bowden
Mr. Peter Thacher
USSR
Prof. A. A. Blagonravov
Mr. Y. A. Barinov
Mr. Roland H. Timerbaev
Mr. Valentin A. Zaitzev
Mr. G. S. Strashevsky
(Interpreter)
The first in a series of bilateral conversations between the US and the USSR was held
March 27 at USUN [United Nations]. It was agreed at the outset by Dryden and
Blagonravov that these were preliminary, informal talks designed to prepare the basis for
further, formal negotiations between US and Soviet experts to discuss specific areas of
practical cooperation in outer space as suggested in the exchange of correspondence
between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. Blagonravov stressed the need for ini-
tial cooperation in practical fields, such as weather satellites and communication systems,
which would be meaningful to the man in the street. They agreed to take up the subject
of meteorological satellites at the outset.
Meteorological Satellites. Dryden suggested that the US and the USSR put up meteoro-
logical satellites in complimentary [sic] orbits. The US TIROS satellite was a relatively
crude, experimental craft, and we had in mind making NIMBUS the basis of our contri-
bution to an operational system. The first launching of NIMBUS would be within a year.
It would be stabilized as to scan the earth continuously from a polar orbit, and we had in
mind equipment which would permit transmittal of data direct to any nation's ground
station, including pictures of overhead cloud cover. We would in addition, of course, trans-
mit information to WMO [the World Meteorological Organization].
[2] Blagonravov made what appeared to be a general statement to the effect that coop-
eration must develop stage by stage; he noted that launch systems were closely related to
other aspects (military); therefore the achievement of broadest cooperation will be
related to progress in disarmament. Conversely, progress in cooperation will aid the devel-
opment of mutual trust between nations.
Turning to the meteorological project, the USSR will transmit to the US all data they
receive from NIMBUS. They expect to launch their own meteorological satellite and are
prepared to come to an agreement on coordination of orbits. They will transmit all mete-
orological data from their own system to other countries. He noted that speedy transmit-
tal of data is essential.
Dryden commented that he had in mind the problem of access to launch sites and
therefore was proposing only coordination; in any case, we will not seek information the
Soviets do not wish to give. He noted that the recent Soviet launch, which was first in a
new series, was said to include devices for measurement of cloud coverage.
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Blagonravov said that they intend to launch meteorological satellites on a national
basis and to exchange data. He had in mind that WMO would insure [sic] the proper
transmittal of information to other countries.
Dryden questioned what the next step might be. Should there be a meeting of both
sides' experts at the time of the coming COSPAR [Committee on Space Research]
Conference in Washington, or should the problem be left to WMO? Blagonravov said the
best way would be to continue through WMO. He drew attention to an April 23 sympo-
sium scheduled for Washington. Dryden asked if there should be private meetings
between US and Soviet experts at that time. Blagonravov said this particular symposium
will not attract experts in the field of satellite weather forecasting, but nonetheless the
experts present could explore the problem in a preliminary way.
Dryden noted that the SYG of WMO has obtained the presence of two US and Soviet
meteorological experts in Geneva to help with the preparation of WMO's report on this
subject. Blagonravov said he had no information about the details of their discussion and
was unable to judge the results.
[3] Dr. Hornig commented that success in this field will depend in large part on the com-
patibility of information sought and obtained. He asked if we could discuss this aspect
with a view to standardizing equipment in satellites. Blagonravov preferred to leave the job
of determining technical requirements to WMO experts.
Communications Satellites. Blagonravov said they are ready to take part in studies of
principles and of design plans for a system which should be organized through ITU [the
International Telecommunications Union]. They are ready to take part in experimental
projects, and they are ready to supply information to the US on radio signals bounced off
ECHO. He thought the time had come to make a "symbolic start" in this field.
Dryden noted that ECHO has become smaller, and the surface is considerably wrin-
kled; it is therefore less satisfactory for radio relay purposes. We plan to launch within a
year a large, 140-foot sphere which will be more rigid and therefore more suitable.
Blagonravov indicated that they were agreeable to using the larger sphere.
Dryden suggested the USSR might wish to join experiments with active relays.
Blagonravov said they lack experience. Dryden said we also lack experience but noted that
several European states are building ground stations for this purpose and suggested that
the USSR might also. Blagonravov noted that active relays require extensive equipment
somewhat like the enormous receivers that the USSR is now building for deep space
probes, such as to Venus. Dryden suggested it might be possible to modify some of these
large dishes so that they could receive signals from active-relay satellites. Blagonravov said
they would prefer to leave it up to ITU experts to organize cooperation in this field.
Townsend noted this would be difficult for ITU because the problem is one essentially of
equipment, a subject ITU does not normally handle.
Dryden felt the subject needed further bilateral discussions between experts. He noted
that CCIR has recently been discussing the problem of the sharing of frequencies between
satellite and ground-based microwave systems. He thought that both countries might coop-
erate in studying this possible source of interference, a subject also suitable for [4] bilat-
eral discussion. Blagonravov noted the problem is already under review by ITU. Dryden
said we do not presently have any active communications satellites; they are at present only
in a research and development phase which will include one low-altitude launch later this
year. Blagonravov commented this first experiment may help to clarify the situation.
Geomagnetic Research. Dryden noted the desirability of coordinating data gathering in
this field. Blagonravov said he could not yet say when the USSR will be prepared to launch
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research vehicles to measure the earth's magnetic field. Their first interest will be the
measurement of field components; later they will seek to measure the dimension of the
total field. Nonetheless, the time is now right to organize an exchange of data on geo-
magnetic measurements. Dryden thought this was already on the agenda of COSPAR and
wondered if Soviet experts would be present at the COSPAR meeting. It was agreed that
Dryden and Biagonravov would meet with their experts during COSPAR. Townsend asked
if the USSR had decided which orbit, high or low, they would undertake. Biagonravov
replied that it does not make much difference; they could do it at any altitude. He noted
that at a previous COSPAR meeting US experts had suggested that the Soviet Union take
the high orbits but no decision had been reached. Dryden commented that this sugges-
tion had been in recognition of greater Soviet thrust capabilities. Although not exciting
for the man in the street, Dryden felt this is a field of great interest to scientists.
Space Medicine. Dryden announced that the US will publish on April 6 a detailed
report containing all medical information resulting from the Glenn flight. He said
Blagonravov and other Soviet scientists would be welcome at the time. On the US side
many ideas for cooperation in this field are being discussed, such as the establishment of
an international laboratory, and possible coordination in manned-flight experiments, but
he suspected that the Soviets might prefer an exchange of information. Blagonravov
expressed preference for a broad exchange of information. Dr. Hornig noted that much
background other than from manned-flight space is available; he hoped that the
exchange would include ground laboratory and animal data. Blagonravov agreed. Dryden
asked if Blagonravov had considered visits to laboratory facilities. Blagonravov said he had
not discussed this subject with appropriate Soviet experts before leaving Moscow and,
therefore, could not answer.
[5] Salvage and Rescue. Blagonravov raised the problem of insuring [sic] the return of
astronauts and vehicles from other states. Dryden noted this was largely a legal and polit-
ical problem, but worth exploring here. Blagonravov said their ideas had not advanced
beyond general terms. Dryden said it was no question but that the US would use its facil-
ities to aid a Soviet astronaut in difficulty and he hoped the same would be true for
Americans. Blagonravov stated this would, of course, be so. Dryden asked if the Soviets
favor some form of international agreement or treaty, of the sort, for example, which gov-
ern civil aircraft. Blagonravov felt some means should be found to assure that all UN mem-
bers agree to the return of capsules. Dryden called on Thacher who suggested that it
might be appropriate for the UN Outer Space Committee to recommend an appropriate
resolution for adoption at the next session of the General Assembly. Timerbaev felt he and
Thacher should discuss this bilaterally in the context of the committee.
It was agreed that there should be no announcement made to the press concerning
these talks and that the next meeting would take place on March 28 at the Soviet Mission.
Participants:
Second Meeting- March 28
United States USSR
Dr. Dryden Prof. Blagonravov
Dr. Townsend Mr. Barinov
Dr. Hornig Mr. Timerbaev
Mr. Frutkin Mr. Zaitzev
Mr. Bowden Mr. Aldoshin
Dr. Porter Mr. Strashevsky
Mr. Thacher (Interpreter)
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The second in a series of US-Soviet bilateral discussions about possible cooperation in
outer space matters was held at the Soviet Mission to the UN during the morning of
March 28.
[6] Contamination of Space. Blagonravov believed the problem of pollution deserves study-
ing. He had in mind radioactive contamination, bacteriological contamination, interfer-
ence with radio transmission from the earth to satellites and from satellites to the earth,
and possible physical interference of the sort many feared would result from Project
WESTFORD. He commented that there were grounds for fear of interference by the nee-
dles on two counts: radio astronomy, and physical damage to other satellites, particularly
optical equipment. He did not feel it necessary to exclude this type of experiment, rather
he felt there should be some procedure for preliminary discussion which would analyze
all possible harmful effects and thereby dispel the fears of interested scientists. Dryden
noted that in his letter, Khrushchev bad placed the subjects of radioactive and bacterio-
logical contaminations primarily in a legal context. He noted that there is broad consul-
tation by the US with interested scientists and, on the international level, through
COSPAR which is a useful means of bringing about understanding of the scientific aspects
of experiments. Blagonravov and Dryden agreed that nuclear engines would be needed
for long distance probes and presented a number of technical problems. Dryden com-
mented these were primarily problems relating to contamination of the surface of the
moon and planets, not of intervening space. Porter noted that in Florence he and
Blagonravov had agreed on three principles: (1) radioactive components should be so
packaged as to prevent dispersal in case of impact; (2) radioactive materials should be
chosen with short half-life times; and (3) radioactive materials should be chosen which did
not occur in nature. Dryden felt there was not much left to discuss about radioactive and
bacteriological contamination and asked if we should consider the problem of frequency
allocation. Thacher noted that the UN Committee would probably consider the problem
of contamination in its technical subcommittee. Porter suggested it might be wise to del-
egate to COSPAR the task of studying this problem. Dryden felt that the ultimate decision
must rest with launching states. As to the problem of terminating satellite transmissions,
he found it hard to make a general rule where so much depends on the precise nature of
the experiment. For example, it did not seem desirable arbitrarily to exclude experiments
from which continual transmission could be expected. Blagonravov agreed and said the
Soviet idea is mainly to stress the importance of preliminary [7] exchanges which can dis-
pel apprehensions whenever they seem likely. Although thankful for information given
him by Porter about the problem of physical interference by WESTFORD, apprehension
nonetheless arose and Blagonravov felt it might be necessary to have meetings between
scientists. Porter invited Blagonravov to express these apprehensions as soon as they arise
to the National Academy of Sciences.
Tracking for Deep Space Probes. After Blagonravov appeared to have completed his
remarks, Dryden noted that in the course of conversation all but one of the general top-
ics suggested in the letters of President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev had been
touched upon. The one remaining was Khrushchev's suggestion which appeared to relate
to tracking facilities for deep space probes. He turned to Blagonravov.
Blagonravov said he would prefer to hear Dryden first. Dryden said that President
Kennedy had suggested an exchange of "tracking stations" but that our interest was more
in the field of telemetry data rather than in observation of satellite orbits. This is particu-
larly true with regard to those scientific satellites, such as Van Allen's which broadcast
continuously and do not store data. He noted that emphasis was placed in Khrushchev's
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letteron theneed for observation and contact with deep space shots. It seemed logical
that useful exchange could be found. Dryden commented that to a large extent the tech-
nical problem in following a deep space probe relates to the transmitter. Our stations in
Southern California, Australia and South Africa, for example, are equipped to handle
only certain frequencies which cannot easily be altered. Therefore, if our receivers were
to be of help, the satellite transmitter should be at appropriate frequencies. He wondered
if this presented any technical problems for the Soviets.
Blagonravov replied there is no problem in tracking US satellites over the USSR, and
if the US supplied frequencies the USSR will devote the necessary facilities to track them
and receive them, and will supply resulting data. Conversely, when the Soviets are inter-
ested in receiving data from us they will supply the frequencies and the codes to us.
[8] Dryden commented this could be done in two ways, either by recording telemetry sig-
nals on tape and sending the tape to the launchers, or by supplying the code, in which
case the recipient could reduce the data for the launchers. Blagonravov asked which
Dryden preferred.
Dryden commented we found our own scientists prefer to work out their own results.
He cited as an example the case of Van Allen and the Japanese scientist who had been
given the code but whose results were out of line because he had not realized that one of
the channels was malfunctioning. Blagonravov felt that both ways were possible and that
the decision would depend on the specifics in each case. Townsend suggested this would
be a good area for progress.
Next Steps. Dryden asked where we were to go from here. Blagonravov replied our
approach may vary from problem to problem. Some, as had been suggested, may be
appropriate for COSPAR; the general subject of frequency allocation is appropriate for
ITU; others are appropriate for WMO experts.
Dryden agreed that discussions ultimately should take place with other states in an
appropriate international forum. But we felt it more useful to start bilateral talks at the
time of the COSPAR meeting. For example, it might then be useful to start discussions on
meteorological satellites and geomagnetic research. So far as the meteorological satellite
is concerned, he felt it would be wise to distinguish between the research and develop-
ment phase, and the operational system. He thought talk should start without delay about
the experimental stage; as a result the two sides could come to an agreement on the type
of information to be sought. Continuing with the general outline, Dryden suggested there
might be later discussion in Moscow about such matters as coordination of planetary
exploration. In the meantime, he thought it would be helpful if we could follow up the
general discussion of the past days with specific discussions on certain subjects. He asked
if it would be possible to agree to try to arrange discussions at the time of the COSPAR
meeting on meteorological satellites and geomagnetic research.
[9] Blagonravov drew attention to his inability to consult with appropriate experts but
said be would be prepared to get in touch with Dryden. It would be helpful if Dryden
could list his ideas as to the priority of subjects which he could take with him to Moscow,
and later he, Blagonravov, could respond with proposals. Dryden suggested that he could
prepare plans and meet with Blagonravov again next week. Blagonravov said he would be
leaving for Moscow this weekend, and it would be desirable to receive a list before that
time. Dryden suggested we could select a few steps, although we are to respond to all, and
suggested meeting again on March 30.
Blagonravov made an evasive reply. Dryden said we therefore would prepare and give
to Blagonravov on Friday specific proposals for later discussion by the experts during the
COSPAR meeting in Washington. These proposals would involve meteorological satellites,
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geomagnetic research and the general area of telemetry. At the same time, we would be
prepared for later discussions, perhaps in Moscow, regarding communication satellites,
space medicine, and inter-planetary exploration.
It was agreed that the next meeting would take on "neutral ground" (at the Soviet's
insistence), i.e. at the UN. It was agreed that Thacher and Timerbaev should prepare a
joint press release for issuance after the following meeting which would respond to the
desires of both countries for forward movement in the area of US-Soviet cooperation.
Military Reconnaissance. During the course of general conversation which followed,
Blagonravov commented that the climate for cooperation would be greatly improved if
both sides would issue a declaration to the effect that neither would use satellites for the
purpose of military reconnaissance. Blagonravov expressed himself as certain that Dryden
was not in a position to comment on this aspect of outer space. Nonetheless, Biagonravov
hoped that the US Government was as attentive to the opinion of its scientists as was his,
the Soviet, Government. Before coming to New York, his colleagues had asked him to
urge his American colleagues to persuade the US Government to issue such a declaration.
(The translator failed to make clear, as had Blagonravov in Russian, that he had been
instructed by his Government to raise this matter.)
[10] Third Meeting - March 30
Participants: United States USSR
Dr. Dryden Prof. Blagonravov
Dr. Townsend Mr. Barinov
Dr. Hornig Mr. Timerbaev
Mr. Frutkin Mr. Zaitzev
Mr. Bowden Mr. Strashevsky
Dr. Porter (Interpreter)
Mr. Thacher
The third in a series of US-Soviet bilateral discussions about possible cooperation in
outer space matters was held at the United Nations Headquarters during the afternoon of
March 30.
Dryden presented to Blagonravov the three tentative proposals worked out by the
American side on collaboration in the fields of weather satellites, geomagnetic survey, and
telemetry. Dryden pointed out that these proposals were being handed to the Soviets in
order that they might study them and be prepared to discuss them in a concrete fashion
at the April COSPAR meeting and in other forums. Blagonravo_; with the aid of his inter-
preter, scanned the tentative proposals quickly and said that he would take them back to
Moscow and discuss them with the relevant Soviet specialists.
While Biagonravov was reading our proposals, Thacher of USUN and Timerbaev of
the Soviet UN Mission attempted to come to agreement on the wording of the joint state-
ment to be made upon the conclusion of the talks that day. The US draft had proposed
listing the three topics mentioned above since these were the fields in which further con-
crete talks were planned. Timerbaev insisted that if topics touched on in the three days of
talks were listed they would necessarily have to include mention of military intelligence
reconnaissance satellites. Thacher and Timerhaev did not reach an accord on the matter,
and it was placed before Dryden and Blagonravov. The latter reiterated Timerbaev's stand
and Dryden demurred, pointing out that the subject of military reconnaissance satellites
did not fall within the frame of reference agreed to for the talks. Agreement was finally
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reached that the statement issued would simply say that the items mentioned in the
Kennedy and Khrushchev letters respectively had been discussed, as well as additional top-
ics. The problem of listing the specific items touched on was, therefore, obviated.
Dryden and Blagonravov then met with the press and released their statement.*
[Attachment page 1]
Topical Summary of Bilateral Discussions
With Soviet Union
(Note: For negotiations of March 27, 28, 30, 1962)
1. Meteorological Satellites
Blagonravov indicated that a series of scientific satellites which had just begun with
the launching of COSMOS I would seek meteorological data, although this was not nec-
essarily true of the first launching in the series. The Soviet Union intends to launch mete-
orological satellites to photograph cloud cover and would be agreeable to coordinating
their orbits and other details with the US and to exchange the data. Like the US, the USSR
would wish to relate any such program to WMO activities and sponsorship. Blagonravov
said that meteorological satellites should be launched on a national basis with data coor-
dination through WMO. (Subsequent private discussions suggest that the USSR never-
theless recognizes the fundamental necessity of bilateral coordination in flight programs.)
Dr. Dryden suggested the possibility of using Nimbus as a basis for the joint program in
about a year.
2. Communications Satellites
Khrushchev had given priority to cooperation in the field of communications
satellites, and Blagonravov indicated that the Soviet Union would desire to take part in
experimental projects. Nevertheless, he was not yet ready to identify suitable modes of
cooperation in this field. He said that (Soviet) experience was lacking on active repeaters
and seemed to feel that a position must be worked out on communications systems in the
ITU before such could be done. The Soviet interest in communications satellites cooper-
ation actually appeared directed primarily toward operational matters rather than exper-
imental. As a "symbolic" gesture, however, Blagonravov made a point of expressing
readiness to utilize the US ECHO satellite for a communication demonstration between
the US and the Soviet Union. (It should be noted that Blagonravov later stated that he did
not mean, by the use of the word symbolic, that the cooperative use of ECHO would not
have real value.) The US delegation considered that ECHO had deteriorated too much to
permit a satisfactory demonstration, and the two sides agreed to look toward the ECHO
follow-on program for such a demonstration. There was some indication that the Russians
would wish to utilize a new deep space probe dish, or dishes, which they are now con-
structing for communications experiments.
[2] 3. Magnetic Field Survey
The Soviets would be willing to coordinate with the US in an effort in which each
country placed a satellite in orbit to measure the Earth's field. Blagonravov said that the
Soviets could place a satellite at either of the higher or lower altitudes required for this
project and could measure the field components as well as strength. It is still undecided
whether the USSR would devote a special satellite for the program or join the experiment
* See "Preliminary Summary Report" of these conversations prepared by Dr, Dryden.
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with others in a multi-purpose satellite. There vas some indication that the Soviets would
measure the field components as early as, or earlier than, the scalar values. When it was
suggested that the standards established for the World Magnetic Survey for measurement
of vectors were quite stringent, Blagonravov said he was not personally familiar with them
but would make sure that they were brought to the attention of the proper scientists of
the USSR.
4. Data Acquisition
Blagonravov made clear that the Soviet Union was not ready to exchange tracking and
data acquisition station equipment. Instead, he said that the Soviet Union would make
available on its own territory equipment to American specifications to provide desired ser-
vices. Blagonravov did not exclude the possibility of equipment exchange at a later stage.
Soviet interests were clearly directed more toward deep space tracking and data acquisi-
tion than toward the acquisition of telemetry for scientific satellites as desired by the US.
There was some appearance of the possibility of an agreement for appropriate trade-offs
here. The question of exchanging telemetry codes along with the exchange of telemetry
tapes was discussed, and it was agreed that such exchanges would have to be worked cut
on a case-by-case basis. Dr. Dryden pointed out that there was some difficulty in providing
calibrations for telemetry, both because of the sensitivities of prime experimenters and
the empirical requirements for calibration adjustment in the period after satellite launch.
Dr. Dryden pointed out, in addition, that public errors had been made, as by the
Japanese, in using calibrations not fully understood by them. With regard to deep space
probe tracking and telemetry, it appeared that some activity is going on in the Soviet
Union to strengthen its capabilities. It was also understood that both sides would be
launching deep space probes at approximately the same periods due to the "window" sit-
uation and that therefore each country might be limited in providing services to the
other.
[3] 5. Deep Space Activities
With regard to cooperation in lunar and planetary activities per se, Blagonravov stat-
ed that current programs were too far along to permit coordination at this date. The coor-
dination of future progress with respect to physical quantities measured by the probes
launched by the US and USSR seemed possible.
6. Space Medicine
There was relatively little discussion of space medicine. Dr. Dryden suggested this
might be an appropriate area for broad exchanges. He indicated that some people in this
country feel it may be useful to exchange laboratory visits. Blagonravov appeared to
believe that laboratory visits would not be easy to arrange at this stage but rested on a lack
of information as to the situation in his own country. The matter was left for further def-
inition.
7. "Pollution" of Space
Blagonravov expressed concern about several types of possible interference in the
space activities of one country by reason of the activities of another. In this category, he
included biological contamination, radio nuisances and interference, and the dispersion
of particles as in Project WESTFORD. It is not clear whether he had in mind legal prohi-
bitions. Specifically, with regard to Project WESTFORD, Blagonravov indicated fear of
damage or interference with optical experiments in satellites. It was clear that he did not
argue to prohibit WESTFORD but rather to provide for preliminary discussion to avoid
harmful effects. Dr. Dryden reviewed the procedures followed in the US to assure that the
scientific community has no substantial concerns regarding any proposed experiment,
referred to the descriptions by a [Jet Propulsion Laboratory] representative of our conta-
mination procedures at a recent meeting in the So_iet Union, to continuing considera-
tion by COSPAR of this subject, and to the coordination of radio frequency uses by the
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ITU. The US delegation indicated its belief that the technical aspects were largely for the
Technical Subcommittee. Dr. Dryden concluded with the observation that each launch-
ing country would undoubtedly expect tO retain the final judgment over action to be
taken in any given case of possible or alleged pollution. Blagonravov seemed to be in com-
plete agreement. Dr. Dryden explored Soviet attitude toward the use of nuclear power or
propulsion sources. Blagonravov agreed that there was no objection to these per se,
assuming general safeguards. His response to this was so prompt as to reflect current
Soviet consideration of nuclear propulsion or power sources.
[4] 8. Spy Satellites
During the session held at the Soviet UN Mission, Blagonravov brought up, almost
apologetically, a proposal which he stated he had been "instructed" to raise. He said that
it would be desirable if the scientists of the US would join with those of the Soviet Union
in a pledge to reserve space for peaceful purpose and to prohibit the use of satellites for
surveillance purposes. Blagonravov suggested that Dr. Dryden might not be prepared to
comment on this. Dr. Dryden replied that the subject was outside the scope of the present
technical discussions. There was some further discussion in a rather bantering vein about
this subject with Blagonravov expressing the belief that scientists in his country could not
devote themselves to non-peaceful purposes in space research. Dr. Dryden observed that
this was an interesting remark to come from an old artillery observer. The subject was
raised again by Blagonravov at the end of a subsequent session as an item to be included
in the joint press release at the end of the first round of discussions. It was offered as a
counterproposal to the US desire to specify the three subjects of greatest [discussion, with
plans for future talks,] identified in the negotiations. The Soviets wished then to include
all other subjects, plus the spy-in-the-sky pledge, or, in the alternative, remove the specif-
ic references to subjects discussed. The US side held to the position that the press release
should not go beyond those matters discussed in the letters. The implication left in the
press release was that the current, as well as future, discussions would be based upon the
matters identified in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence.
9. Balloons
When the question relating to balloon-borne experiments arose, Blagonravov made
clear the Soviet dislike for the use of balloons.
10. Procedures
It was agreed that the first round of discussions constituted informal exploratory talks
prior to formal negotiations. Dr. Dryden's official summary of the opening sessions and
the text of the press release which terminated them are attached. These indicate that for-
mal negotiations will begin either at the time of the COSPAR meeting in Washington at
the end of April or at the time of the meeting of the Technical and Legal Subcommittees
of the UN Outer Space Committee in Geneva at the end of May. Continuity between the
two separate sessions was assured by (1) leading the Soviet delegation to agree privately to
the identification of three subjects as most promising for early and [5] more detailed
investigation, and (2) providing to the USSR somewhat expanded papers on each of these
three subjects for their study and future comments. It was agreed that Soviet scientists
would consider these papers and Blagonravov indicated that his side would provide simi-
lar papers. It was agreed that the working papers would not be published. It should be
noted, however, that none of the subjects indicated in the Kennedy-Khrushchev corre-
spondence is excluded from further investigation, although Dr. Dryden indicated that cer-
tain aspects might be more appropriate for the Legal Subcommittee of the UN or other
forms.
Dr. Dryden specifically asked Blagonravov whether the Soviet view would permit
agreement on individual cooperative projects as agreement could be reached upon tbem
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or whether the Soviets felt it was necessary to achieve a total package before any agree-
ment could be reached. Blagonravov strongly indicated his belief that the first procedure
should be followed. This may be interpreted as a hopeful sign, particularly in view of the
fact that this discussion followed immediately upon the heels of Blagonravov's efforts to
write a spy-in-the-sky pledge into a final joint press release. The sequence would suggest
that the Soviets do not at this time mean to impose political preconditions upon cooper-
ative projects of the character discussed in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence.
With regard to locations of meetings, Dr. Dryden indicated readiness to hold a future
meeting in Moscow, after the Washington or Geneva meeting. The Soviets welcomed this
since they appear to attach .some value to rotating meetings at among western, neutral and
Soviet sites.
1 1. General
While political considerations were trotted out by Blagonravov at various times during
the course of the discussions, they did not appear ever to be raised with the purpose of
obstructing conversation. Biagonravov repeated Khrushchev's statement that more ambi-
tious cooperative efforts would have to wait upon disarmament. The spy-in-the-sky pledge
discussed above was raised with good humor and appeared to have been fitted in outside
the central framework of the negotiations. In the formulation of the press release, the
Soviet political offices did ask to reverse the priority of the references to Kennedy and
Khrnshche_; presumably on the basis of Khrushchev's initiation of their correspondence.
[6] On several occasions, the junior member of the Soviet delegation Barinov indicated
he was considerably impressed by the scope and size of the NASA program as reflected in
the briefings given during the week for the Outer Space Committee at the US Mission.
At one point, Dr. Dryden described in detail the US working relations with the UK on
their joint satellite program. Blagonravov stated that he hoped for similar relationships
between the US and the USSR.
Arnold W. Frutkin, Director
Office of International Programs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Document 1-40
May 1, 1962
Document tide: McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, July 13, 1962, with
attached: George Ball, Under Secretary of State, Memorandum for the President,
"Bilateral Talks Concerning US-USSR Cooperation in Outer Space Activities," July 5,
1962.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The White House monitored closely the initial U.S.-U.S.S.R. talks on space cooperation to make sure
that any agreements reached did not go beyond the bounds of political feasibility in the United States.
McGeorge Bundy was President John E Kennedy's Assistant for National ,Security Affairs. With this
memorandum, he forwarded to Kennedy the Department of State's report on the initial talks and
agreements between NASA's Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden and Soviet representative Anatoli
Blagonravov.
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[1] July 13, 1962
Memorandum for the President
Here for your approval is a memorandum from George Ball on the results of the
Dryden and Blagonravov outer space negotiations. At pages three and four it gives rec-
ommended procedure from here on out.
I know you have been concerned lest Dryden make agreements that might come
under political attack. I believe these three specific projects are quite safe. They have been
reviewed with a beady eye by CIA and Defense, and they have been reported in detail to
determined and watchful Congressmen like Tiger Teague, with no criticism. In essence
they provide for the kind of cooperation in which we get as much as we give, and in which
neither our advanced techniques nor our cognate reconnaissance capabilities will he com-
promised.
McG. B.
[Attachment page 1] July 5, 1962
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Bilateral Talks Concerning US-USSR Cooperation in Outer Space Activities
On May 15 the Secretary wrote to you describing the developments in this matter
prior to the recent talks in Geneva between Dr. Dryden and Professor Blagonravov. These
talks commenced on May 29 and continued concurrently with meetings of the subcom-
mittees of the UN Outer Space Committee. As a result, technical arrangements for three
specific cooperative projects were agreed ad referendum to the US and Soviet
Governments in a joint memorandum signed by Dr. Dryden and Professor Blagonravov
on June 8. (See Enclosure 1.) On the same day, Dr. Dryden and Professor Blagonravov
issued a joint Press Communique summarizing briefly the results of these discussions.
(See Enclosure 2.)
The three projects involve (1) exchange of weather data from satellites and the even-
tual coordinated launching of meteorological satellites, (2) a joint effort to map the mag-
netic field of the earth by means of coordinated launchings of geomagnetic satellites and
related ground observations, and (3) cooperation in the experimental relay of communi-
cations via the ECHO satellite. It was also agreed that there should be further discussion
of the possibility of broader cooperation in experiments using active communications
satellites to be launched in the future. These arrangements are quite limited in [2] scope
and have been drawn carefully to assure reciprocal benefit. They have been developed in
the context of multilateral programs (e.g., the program of the World Meteorological
Organization for the acquisition and world-wide distribution of weather data, and the pro-
gram being planned by the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics for a world
geomagnetic survey). The Soviets appeared quite anxious to achieve these agreements.
The arrangements proposed in the joint Dryden-Blagonravov memorandum repre-
sent a sound way of proceeding so long as they are adhered to by the Soviet Government
and are developed in such a way as not to foster an impression abroad that they represent
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a more significant step toward US-Soviet cooperation than they actually do or that US-
USSR cooperation will in any way preempt the cooperation already being developed with
other countries.
There remain three other specific projects which were suggested in your exchange of
correspondence with Chairman Khrushchev last March, but on which no specific conclu-
sions or proposals have been reached during the technical discussions so far, i.e.: (1) the
acquisition of data obtained through tracking facilities located in each other's countries
but operated by tile host governments, (2) joint observation of solar and interplanetary
probes, and (3) space medicine. Mthough it seems clear that the Soviets are not interest-
ed in cooperating in tracking and it appears doubtful that they are really interested in
joint observation of space probes, it would be well to afford them the opportunity to dis-
cuss all these projects further.
Upon Dr. Dryden's return from Geneva, Under Secretary McGhee, who is coordinat-
ing this matter for the Department, [3] convened a meeting of the interested agencies of
government in which Dr. Dryden, Dr. Welsh, Dr. Reichelderfer, and representatives of Dr.
Wiesner, Mr. Bundy, the Defense Department, the Air Force and CIA participated. A
review of the recent discussions in Geneva and of the specific proposals contained in the
joint Dryden-Blagonravov memorandum resulted in agreement to proceed as follows:
1. After a reasonable interval and if no serious objections have been raised by any of
the interested agencies, Dr. Dryden will inform Professor Blagonravov that we have no
changes to suggest in their joint memorandum. (The memorandum provided for a two-
month waiting period during which either party could propose changes.)
2. Upon notification from Professor Blagonravov that the Soviets do not desire
changes which would be unacceptable to us (or at the conclusion of the two-month wait-
ing period), we will, assuming the Soviets still wish to proceed, exchange notes with the
Soviet Government to confirm government-level agreement to these proposals.
3. It was suggested that when that agreement has been obtained, you may wish to
write to Chairman Khrushchev noting both the agreement to proceed with the specific
arrangements at hand and the prospects of further technical discussions on additional
topics. A draft of such a letter will be submitted for your approval.
4. Meanwhile, Under Secretary McGhee and Dr. Dryden will report these develop-
ments to members of Congress who have a specific interest and responsibility in this field,
and the Deparm_ent will prepare a report to be sent to the Secretary General of the
United Nations when formal agreement has been reached with the Soviets.
5. Dr. Dryden will, in cooperation with the interested agencies, proceed now to
arrange nominations for US membership in the joint U_Soviet working groups which are
to [4] develop the detailed implementation of the meteorological and geomagnetic pro-
posals. These working groups will not, however, be activated until formal agreement has
been reached with the Soviet Government.
6. The joint Dryden-Blagonravov memorandum will be treated as CONFIDENTIAL,
pending government-level agreement by the Soviets or earlier Soviet public release.
7. After formal agreement has been obtained, Dr. Dryden will arrange directly with
Professor Blagonravov for further technical discussions, possibly in Moscow this fall, con-
cerning broader cooperation in communication via satellites and the possibility of coop-
eration in such of the remaining topics dealt with in your exchange of letters with
Chairman Khrushchev as may seem worthwhile to pursue further.
It is our feeling that the present low key, step-by-step approach through informal talks
by scientific representatives continues to be the preferable means of moving toward fur-
ther cooperation and that we should plan to proceed on this basis after government-level
agreement has been reached on the specific arrangements already proposed.
George Ball
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Document 1-41
Document tide: McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, "Your 11 a.m.
appointment with Jim Webb," September 18, 1963.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The possibility of turning Project Apollo into a cooperative undertaking with the Soviet Union was
under active consideration in NASA and the White House as President John E Kennedy met with
NASA Administrator James E. Webb on September 15, 1963. The political climate was much differ-
ent than it had been in 1961, when the President had decided to race the Soviet Union to the Moon;
the high levels of spending for Apollo were coming under criticism in the United States. Kennedy's
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy suggested to the President that a cooperative mission was
desirable, if technically, institutionally, and politically feasible. Two days lat_ in an address to the
United Nations General Assembly, Kennedy suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union
take the lead in making the first human voyages to the Moon an undertaking of aU countries.
[1] September 18, 1963
Memorandum for the President
SUBJECT: Your 11 a.m. appointment with fim Webb
Webb called me yesterday to comment on three interconnected aspects of the space
problem that he thinks may be of importance in his talk with you:
1. Money. The space authorization is passed at $5.350 billion, and he expects the
appropriation to come out at about $5.150 billion. While the estimates are not complete,
his current guess is that in early '64 he will require a supplemental of $400 million ($200
million requiring authorization and $200 million appropriation only) in order to keep
our commitment to a lunar landing in the 1960's.
2. The Soviets. He reports more forthcoming noises about cooperation from
Blagonravov in the UN, and I am trying to run down a report in today's Times (attached)
that we have rebuffed the Soviets on this. Webb himself is quite open to an exploration of
possible cooperation with the Soviets and thinks that they might wish to use our big rock-
et, and offer in exchange the advanced technology which they are likely to get in the
immediate future. (For example, Webb expects a Soviet landing of instruments on the
moon to establish moon-earth communications almost any time.)
The obvious choice is whether to press for cooperation or to continue to use the
Soviet space effort as a spur to our own. The Times story suggests that there is already low-
level disagreement on exactly this point.
3. The Military Role. Webb reports that the discontent of the military with their lim-
ited role in space damaged the bill on the Hill this year, with no corresponding advantage
to the military. He thinks this point can and should be made to the Air Force, and he
believes that the thing to do is to offer the military an increased role somehow. He has
already had private exploratory talks with Ros Gilpatric for this purpose.
[2] Webb thinks the best place for a military effort in space would be in the design and
manning of a space craft in which gravity could be simulated, in preparation for later
explorations. He thinks such a space craft may be the next logical step after Gemini. On
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the other hand, he is quite cool about the use of Titan III and Dinosoar [sic] and would
be glad to see them both cancelled. You will recall that McNamara has just come out on
the other side on Titan III.
My own hasty judgment is that the central question here is whether to compete or to
cooperate with the Soviets in a manned lunar landing:
1. lfwe compete, we should do everything we can to unify all agencies of the United
States Government in a combined space program which comes as near to our existing
pledges as possible.
2. If we cooperate, the pressure comes off, and we can easily argue that it was our crash
effort on '61 and '62 which made the Soviets ready to cooperate.
I am for cooperation if it is possible, and I think we need to make a really major effort
inside and outside the government to find out whether in fact it can be done. Conceivably
this is a better job for Harriman than East-West trade, which might almost as well be given
to George Ball.
McG. B.
Document 1-42
Document title: National Security Action Memorandum No. 271, "Cooperation with the
USSR on Outer Space Matters," November 12, 1963, with attached: Charles E. Johnson,
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, December 16, 1963.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Ten days before he was assassinated, President John E Kennedy signed this memorandum giving the
NASA Administrator the lead within the Executive Branch in developing substantive proposals for
enhanced U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation. This action was a followup to Kennedy's September 20
speech before the United Nations. Note that the attached memorandum from Charles Johnson to
McGeorge Bundy has Anatoli Blagonravov's last name misspelled twice.
[1] November 12, 1963
National Security Action Memorandum No. 271
Memorandum for the Administrator,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
SUBJECT: Cooperation with the USSR on Outer Space Matters
I would like you to assume personally the initiative and central responsibility within
the Government for the development of a program of substantive cooperation with the
Soviet Union in the field of outer space, including the development of specific technical
proposals. I assume that you will work closely with the Department of State and other
agencies as appropriate.
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These proposals should be developed with a view to their possible discussion with the
Soviet Union as a direct outcome of my September 20 proposal for broader cooperation
between the United States and the USSR in outer space, including cooperation in lunar
landing programs. All proposals or suggestions originating within the Government relat-
ing to this general subject will be referred to you for your consideration and evaluation.
In addition to developing substantive proposals, I expect that you will assist the
Secretary of State in exploring problems of procedure and timing connected with hold-
ing discussions with the Soviet Union and in proposing for my consideration the channels
which would be most desirable from our point of view. In this connection the channel of
contact developed [2] by Dr. Dryden between NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences
has been quite effective, and I believe that we should continue to utilize it as appropriate
as a means of continuing the dialogue between the scientists of both countries.
I would like an interim report on the progress of our planning by December 15.
Information copies to:
Chairman, National Aeronautics and Space Council
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Director, National Science Foundation
Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Director, U.S. Information Agency
[Attachment page 1] December 16, 1963
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy
Macp
The attached interim report to the President from NASA in response to NSAM 271
follows the line I suggested to NASA. It is intended to show that work is actively progress-
ing on the development of a concrete approach to the Soviets following on the Kennedy-
Johnson initiatives. I am following the progress of this project and will try to ensure that
it stays on the timetable described by Dryden.
There has been an additional development since the preparation of the interim
report. Our Embassy Moscow reports the receipt of a letter from Blaganravov to Dryden,
the cable is attached. This is the first communication from Blaganravov in eight months.
NASA still has its institutional fingers crossed as to whether this represents a substantive
response on the part of the Soviets. They are awaiting the final text (being pouched)
before reacting to the letter.
Charles E. Johnson [initialed]
168 TIlEDEVEtX)PMENTOFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION
Document 1-43
Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, to the President, January 31, 1964,
with attached: "US-USSR Cooperation in Space Research Programs."
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This letter from NASA Administrator Webb transmitted to President Lyndon Johnson the report on
possible U.S.-Soviet cooperative initiatives related to the lunar landing program that had been request-
ed by President Kennedy in November 1963. It also summarized the contents of the lengthy report.
None of the suggested cooperative initiatives was ever implemented because the Soviet Union decided
in 1964 to carrv out its own lunar landing program on a crash basis.
[1]
The President
The White House
JAN31,1964
Dear Mr. President:
The attached report on possible projects for substantive co-operation with the Soviet
Union in the field of outer space is provided to you in accordance with National Security
Action Memorandum 271, dated November 12, 1963, and my interim report to you of
December 13, 1963. It has been coordinated with the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, the Executive Secretary of the Space Council, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Science Adviser, and White House staff.
Since space technology is closely related to and in some measure interchangeable
with technology of military interest, careful examination of the attached report is desir-
able in connection with further initiative in this field.
1. An appendix to the report reviews the status of agreements already reached
between NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences for cooperation in three areas: (1)
coordinated meteorological satellite program; (2) passive communications satellite exper-
iments with the ECHO II satellite launched this month; and (3) geomagnetic satellite data
exchange. The appendix also reviews Soviet rejection of numerous specific offers of space
cooperation made in the past by the US. At this writing, the Soviet Academy, while in com-
munication with NASA in regard to the agreements between us, has failed to meet time
limits on most agreed action items but has conducted optical observations of the ECHO
II satellite as agreed and apparently intends to proceed with communications experiments
between the USSR and the Jodrell Bank Observatory. Other tests of Soviet intentions
under these agreements will materialize shortly.
2. The report focuses upon possible cooperation in manned and related unmanned
lunar programs. (Possibilities for cooperation in other space programs have been and will
continue to be advanced in the channel between NASA and the Soviet Academy.)
[2] 3. The report recommends these guidelines to govern foreseeable negotiations with
the Soviet Union in the space field: substantive rather than propaganda objectives alone;
well-defined and comparable obligations for both sides; freedom to take independent
action; protection of national and military security interests; opportunity for participation
by friendly nations; and open dissemination of scientific results.
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4. Thereport recognizes that cooperation with the Soviet Union must ultimately
rest on specific projects. However, the advantages and disadvantages of specific proposals
are not absolute. They may vary significantly, depending upon Soviet objectives, tech-
niques, procedures, and schedules relative to ours. Lacking sufficient information of these
factors, we remain uncertain of the security and tactical aspects of specific proposals which
might be advanced to the Soviets.
5. Accordingly, the report outlines a preferred structured approach calculated to
determine a level of confidence in any Soviet response, to gain information on basic ele-
ments of the Soviet program, and to merit confidence and support by the public and the
Congress.
Briefly, this approach provides for maximum exchange of past results (generally sub-
ject to verification from other US sources), proceeds then to sufficient disclosure of the
future planning of both sides to identify areas favorable for cooperation, and concludes
with the joint definition of specific projects. Examples of specific projects would be put
forward in the initial presentation of this approach to lend credibility and substance to it.
6. The report recognizes that the Soviet Union is unlikely to be amenable to such
an approach. In that case, it would be possible to proceed directly to specific proposals.
Some 15 examples of possible projects are described in the report and evaluated in such
terms as our current knowledge of the Soviet program permits.
However, limitations (described in the report) attach to virtually all these proposals.
These limitations reflect the general climate of US-Soviet relations and are therefore
subject to change--which might bring any of the proposals within the range of realistic
negotiation. At present, a change in sentiment appears necessary even for small steps in
cooperation; for example, in the exchange of purely scientific data relating to solar radi-
ation and micrometeorites, the Soviet Union has within the past year declined to provide
details of instrumentation and calibration required for their understanding. Given a
change in sentiment, however, such [3] exchanges would be useful and some cooperation
might be proposed and developed in several areas including those listed below and, in
addition, mutual tracking support and the recovery and return of manned capsules after
their return to earth.
7. On balance, the most realistic and constructive group of proposals which might
be advanced to the Soviet Union, with due regard for the uncertainties and limitations dis-
cussed above and detailed in the report, relates to a joint program of unmanned flight
projects to support a manned lunar landing. These projects should be linked so far as pos-
sible to a step-by-step approach, ranging from exchange of data already obtained to joint
planning of future flight missions. They include projects for the determination of:
(a) Micrometeoroid density in space between earth and moon.
(b) The radiation and energetic particle environment between earth and moon.
(c) The character of the lunar surface.
(d) The selection of lunar landing sites.
8. I believe this affords flexibility for positive action, utilizing either a variant of the
structured approach (paragraph 5) or, with necessarily greater caution, selected specific
proposals without reference to the structured approach (paragraph 7).
9. With regard to the timing and form of further US initiatives toward the Soviet
Union, the report recommends the following:
(a) Continuing interest should be expressed through the existing NASA-Soviet
Academy channel, in a positive Soviet response to the proposals for cooperation already
made by President Kennedy and by you.
(b) No new high-level US initiative is recommended until the Soviet Union has
had a further opportunity (possibly three months) to discharge its current obligations
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under the existing NASA-USSR Academy agreement, or, in the alternative, until the
Soviets respond affirmatively to the proposal you have already made in the UN.
(c) If Soviet performance under the existing agreement is unsatisfactory, a high-
level initiative on a non- [4] public basis would seem desirable to prod the Soviet Union
to better performance; additional public steps might bc considered if this proves unavail-
ing.
(d) If Soviet performance under the existing agreement proves satisfactory, per-
sonal initiative by you would still be required to extend this success to cooperation in
manned lunar programs. Because the scope of initiative by Soviet Academy representa-
tives seems limited, Mr. Khrushchev's personal interest and support would also seem to be
required for any significant extension of joint activity. It is believed that your initiative will
be more effective if taken privately in the first instance.
(e) A US initiative should establish our interest in the preferred structured
approach described above. If it then becomes feasible to proceed with technical negotia-
tions, the NASA-Soviet Academy channel should continue to be the vehicle used; as in the
past, technical proposals to be considered in such negotiations should be made available
for prior interdepartmental comment. (It may become appropriate to consider an effort
to induce the Soviet Union to make personnel available who are closer to their technical
program.)
(f) Agreements reached in technical negotiations should be embodied in memo-
randa of understanding, explicitly subject to review and confirmation by governments.
(g) To demonstrate the serious intentions of the US with regard to international
cooperation in space and to maintain some pressure upon the Sox4et Union to follow suit,
we should continue to expand our current and successful joint projects with other nations
to the degree possible.
This report will be kept under continuing review in NASA in concert with other inter-
ested offices and agencies, and we shall keep you advised of our progress with the Soviet
Academy under the current agreement between us. I believe we are well prepared to sup-
port whatever initiative you determine to be appropriate in light of this report and stand
ready to provide such additional information and judgment as you may require.
Respectfully yours,
James E. Webb
Administrator
Enclosure
[Enclosure page 1]
US-USSR Cooperation in Space Research Programs
President Kennedy and President Johnson have affirmed and reaffirmed the
desirability of exploring further joint efforts with the Soviet Union and other countries in
cooperative space activities, including manned lunar programs. (See Appendix I.) In sup-
port of these initiatives and in anticipation of possible discussions with the Soviet Union,
this report examines technical proposals which might be put forward by the United States,
as well as other considerations appropriate to such discussions.
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For two reasons, this report concentrates upon possible cooperation in lunar pro-
grams: (1) cooperation in lunar programs was the focus of President Kennedy's
September 1963 initiative and of President Johnson's confirmation of that initiative and,
in particular, of his State-of-the-Union reference to the subject; (2) cooperation in other
areas of space research and exploration was covered in the Kennedy-Khrushchev corre-
spondence of February-March 1962 in both specific and general terms, has progressed to
the point of firm agreement on three projects, and is the subject of an apparently con-
tinuing relationship pursuant to that correspondence and agreement. At issue now is an
extension of this relationship to the only major field effectively excluded from it, i.e.,
manned lunar programs and related unmanned efforts. (A brief review of the current
relationship [2] appears in Appendix II.)
This report necessarily assumes that the Soviet Union is engaged to some degree in a
program looking toward eventual manned lunar landings. Soviet statements on this point
have been ambiguous as to timing and status but clearly positive on balance. If there is not
a Soviet program, the Soviet Union will probably confuse the issue for an indefinite peri-
od. (In that case, it has been suggested that US pressure for cooperation might even
induce the Soviet to undertake manned lunar efforts not now planned. Viewed positively,
this could divert Soviet resources from less desirable preoccupations; seen negatively, it
could lead the Soviet Union into new technology. We believe that the safest assumption is
that the Soviet Union does not exclude a manned lunar program and that no significant
danger to us is involved if this assumption is incorrect.)
Guidelines which have been applied in the preparation of this report follow:
(1) The central objective is to bring about continuing cooperation with the Soviet
Union, rather than to achieve propaganda gains as such. (In his September 20 speech at
the UN, President Kennedy stated, "... we must not put forward proposals merely for pro-
paganda purposes;").
(2) In order to achieve real gains, we should press for [3] substantive rather than
token cooperation.
(3) Cooperation with the Soviet Union should be well defined and the obligations of
both sides made clear and comparable. (This will facilitate implementation as well as clar-
ify responsibility in the event of failure and withdrawal.)
(4) In the present state of US-Soviet relations, we should undertake no project or
other arrangement which night make us dependent upon Soviet performance, thereby
impairing or limiting our independent capability in space.
(5) National security interests and military potential must be fully protected. No
exchanges impinging upon security should be considered in the absence of certain, com-
parable, and verifiable information from the Soviet side.
(6) Opportunity for participation by other countries should be preserved and all
results made available to them.
II.
Ultimately, any program of substantive cooperation with the Soviet Union must rest
upon positive proposals of specific character. Such specific proposals can be defined
almost without limit, and numerous examples of different modes of cooperation with the
Soviet Union are provided in this report. Howev_ the advantages and disadvantages of specific
proposals are not fixed by the terms of those proposals in an absolute sense. The positive and
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negative [4] values to us may vary markedly, depending upon Soviet objectives, tech-
niques, procedures, and schedules relative to ours. It is therefore most desirable that we
seek information on these aspects of the Soviet program so that we can evaluate and shape
our own proposals effectively and prudently. Lacking such information, we would
inevitably remain uncertain in matters of security, tactics, and bona tides.
Accordingly, we should define, and attempt to hold to, an approach to the Soviet
Union which is calculated to (1) determine the level of confidence which we can place in the
Soviet Union in this subject area, (2) provide information of the basic elements of the Soviet
program, and (3) merit the confidence and support of the public and the Congress.
An approach structured to achieve these ends is spelled out in the next section of this
report. If such a structured approach is not acceptable in whole or in part to the Soviet Union, the
President and the Department of State may, nevertheless, depending upon the circumstances and
apparent attitude of the Soviet Union, determine that technical negotiators should proceed to the direct
presentation of specific proposals. Such flexibility is desirable_-tmt with clear recognition that differ-
ent considerations will apply to the same proposals, depending upon whether they are offered with [5]
or without some confidence and knowledge of Soviet plans.
III.
The preferred approach to negotiations with the Soviet Union entails the discharge
of outstanding obligations, followed by an escalating series of exchanges which are, in the
initial stages, subject to verification. It is thus calculated to build a level of confidence
upon which progressively significant cooperative activities may be based.
Since negotiation on manned lunar programs necessarily presages significant new
relationships with the Soviet Union, requiring evidences of good faith, the first steps
should be directed to clearing the slate as much as possible.
A most desirable first step would be material progress on both sides to implement the
existing bilateral (Dryden-Blagonravov) space agreement in which the Soviets remain, at
this writing, delinquent (although they have resumed communication).
A second step more directly following upon the US overtures in the UN would be the
detailed exchange of data and information of the two countries' manned space programs
to date. (This should include past flight, biomedical, and training data and could extend
to early spacecraft technology.) The virtues of this step would be that it would represent a
clean start, requiring from ns little new information yet obliging the Soviet Union to pre-
sent [6] considerable information not previously made available publicly. Since elements
of the USSR contribution at this stage would be subject to verification through indepen-
dent sources, a practical and useful test of Soviet intentions would be available at the ear-
liest contact, and a first confidence level could be established.
If this step should prove a significant obstacle to further progress, it might, in the
interests of flexibility, be downgraded, as it were, and subsumed quite naturally under the
third step (below). It should, in any event, be tested since other means of determining the
degree of Soviet good faith are not readily apparent. Opportunities for establishing a con-
fidence level for dealing further with the Soviets would be diminished in proportion to de-
emphasis of this second step.
The third step would be the exchange of gross descriptions of our respective manned
lunar programs. Again, this step would not place an undue burden upon us because of
the publicity already given to our own intentions, but it would for the first time require
the Soviet Union to describe its conceptual approach to the lunar landing problem. This
step appears virtually indispensable for it is hardly possible to proceed intelligently or safe-
ly to coordinated, cooperative, or joint effort without some over-view of the proposed
Soviet program.
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The fourth step would seek, through more precise descriptions of our respective
lunar programs, to isolate [7] elements of conflict or duplication and to discover oppor-
tunities for trade-off, complementary procedure, or joint action. Significant security
considerations do not arise until this step is reached.
Examples of cooperative relationships that might develop at various stages of the
above procedure follow:
- Conflict between the two programs could arise, as a crude illustration, through
plans to use the same '_window" for independent lunar missions on the same radio fre-
quencies. It would be of mutual interest to eliminate any such conflicts.
- Unnecessary duplication, illustrated by independent but adequate programs for
exploration of the lunar surface, would offer opportunities for thinning out or otherwise
adjusting our respective programs so as to provide, together, only required information--
the exact degree of thinning out depending upon the confidence level established at the
time.
- In other cases, a desirable redundancy of effort might be recognized and specif-
ic provisions for data exchange made to increase reliability and confidence.
- Discovery that both sides planned to apply limited resources to the same facet of
a broader problem (e.g., examination of the lunar surface in a relatively narrow region)
would permit a reordering of efforts to cover additional facets of the problem on a shared-
effort basis, with subsequent exchange of the results.
[8] - Some tradeoffs can be visualized, arising from differentials in schedules and capa-
bility in the two programs; e.g., the possibility that the Soviet Union might acquire a sam-
ple of the lunar surface before the United States, taken together with our twenty-four
hour deep space tracking capability, suggests a trade-off between the two; medical data
obtained in the Vostok flights might be.traded for radiation or micrometeorite data
obtained in our scientific program.
If an improved confidence level is achieved through the mod.est but meaningful
arrangements suggested above, progress toward more advanced, integrated relationships
could be made.
IV.
At various steps in the above procedure, specific projects should be put forward as
appropriate to lend concrete substance to the negotiations. A relatively detailed descrip-
tion of such projects follows:
(Negative or uncertain values reflected in this description follow from our current
lack of knowledge of Soviet plans; a more positive evaluation should be possible in each
case if serious intentions on the part of the Soviet Union motivate a sufficient exchange
of the necessary background information. A negative assessment of Soviet interest or
desire in a given case does not necessarily mean that the proposal should not be put for-
ward; it is intended [9] solely to reflect realistically the present prospects for a substantive
advance of our purpose. These apparent prospects may well change in light of any infor-
mation forthcoming from the Soviet side relative to their program and interests. Close
examination of the comments provided in each case will show that the framing of pro-
posals with positive appeal to both sides requires knowledge of the objectives, modes of
attack, and relevant schedules of both sides. The same knowledge is necessary to determine
what critical tactical orsecurit_ advantages may be conferred or lost in a given project. These
defects grow in direct proportion to the significance of the proposal contemplated.)
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A. Data Exchange
1. On Micrometeoroid Flux---Both the US and the USSR could profit from a full
exchange of information on the temporal and spatial distribution, mass penetration char-
acteristics, and shielding of micrometeorites in earth-to-moon space. The security aspects
are minimal, and present indications are that information obtained will not present radi-
cal problems of an tmexpected nature. However, as recently as June 1963, Soviet scientists,
in precisely such an exchange relating to their Mars and our Venus flights, declined to give
us instrumentation and programming information necessary for meaningful interpreta-
tion of their data. Mso, the USSR must be expected to be quite [10] reluctant to provide
data on shielding materials and results.
2. On Radiation and SolarEvents---Both sides seek greater knowledge of radiation
end particle fluxes in cislunar space, particularly that associated with solar proton events.
Such information is necessary to improve the predictability of proton showers so as to fix
manned flight schedules safely and permit the design of optimum shielding. This is like-
ly to be a long-range program requiring constant monitoring and predisposes both sides
to welcome an exchange of information. We could advance a proposal to define a project
of investigation and exchange on this subject to be carried forward by a joint working
group consisting of designated representatives of both sides. There is some question, how-
ever, whether the Soviets are yet on a par with us in this work. Also, we anticipate that the
USSR will continue [to be] reluctant to discuss the detailed interrelationships of data,
instrumentation, and programming in adequate depth. Nor could we be sanguine about
exchange relating to shielding or other countermeasures.
3. Lunar Surface Characteristics---Both sides require information on the charac-
teristics of the lunar surface for final design of spacecraft to land on the moon. Whether
there is the basis for an exchange relationship depends in part on the relative schedules
of the two programs; if the Soviets are ahead of us, as is possible at this early stage, they
will have acquired intelligence [ 11] of the lunar surface before we do and have little inter-
est in any contribution we can make on this point. On the other hand, if we are on
similar schedules and the lunar surface is discovered to have radical characteristics not
anticipated, such information could become critical to equipment design and even mis-
sion success. It could thus become an important element in the space race itself, with crit-
ical tactical and even security value. Either side might well wish to withhold knowledge of
this kind.
4. Selection of Lunar Landing Sites---The same considerations discussed immedi-
ately above apply to exchange of information in the survey and selection of lunar landing
sites. Assuming a Soviet lunar landing program, both sides are faced with the same gross
requirement, and thus there should be in principle a basis for cooperation. However, the
actual degree of interest and potential for cooperation would depend in good part upon
technical requirements and relative time schedules; if the latter are not close, the leading
side could be expected to be relatively disinterested, whereas if they are close, information
on a suitable site could become critical in a closely competitive situation.
5. Astronaut Training and ExperL_ce--Each side must be assumed in principle to
have interest in the other's astronaut training techniques, flight experience, space medi-
cine results, and spacecraft technology. The US has already been quite open in publish-
ing its material along [12] these lines, and has not yet had comparable periods in orbit.
The Soviet Union must therefore be presumed to have less interest than we. Indeed, a
Soviet representative to a very recent International Academy of Astronautics meeting
declined to participate in a second conference on manned flight, asserting that there was
little new to be expected from the American program in the next year or so. (No addi-
tional manned flights can be expected in the US program for upwards of a year.) In sum,
it would appear that we cannot offer mutuality for a considerable time in flight results and
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space medicine. Indeed, we would appear to be leading from weakness if we pushed for
exchanges in these fields. Exchanges in the related areas of astronaut training and space-
craft technology would, if they were to be meaningful, impinge upon flight systems, secu-
rity considerations, and simulator techniques, and must be regarded as most difficult to
approach in the initial instance with the Soviet Union.
B. Operational Cooperation
1. Mutual Tracking Supp0rt----Several modes of cooperation in tracking and data
acquisition have been explored from time to time with the Soviet Union: the USSR was
offered the support of the Mercury network for any manned flight of their own, with no
strings attached (Glennan); it was asked to consider an exchange of tracking stations, each
side to place a station in the other country, each to operate its own station (Kennedy) ; and
the USSR itself [13] suggested cooperation in the tracking of deep space probes
(Khrushchev), but later retracted this offer, privately implying security considerations.
Despite seeming Soviet disinterest in this area and the fact that lunar missions are con-
ducted at particular times (windows) when both sides may launch missions of their own,
it seems probable that both could gain from mutual tracking arrangements. Since win-
dows are a function of launch site and tracking station locations, mission profile and
objectives, and payload capabilities, the two sides would probably utilize somewhat differ-
ent windows. We might then provide twenty-four hour ground coverage (lacked by the
USSR in exchange for greater flexibility afforded by use of their land and ship-based
nets.
2. Capsule Recovery (earth)---Both sides face the possibility of spacecraft returns to
earth m areas not planned. Accordingly, they might both have an interest in exchanging
the signals and recovery procedures to be utilized in emergency recoveries. Either side
could then proceed to the rescue of astronauts in areas under their control. The exchange
of such signals could in principle also permit either side, somewhat more readily than
now, to interfere with recovery operations by the other. However, this appears a very small
risk and one which might very well be taken. Such a project would appear to have few neg-
ative aspects, little prospect for wide implementation, but possibly considerable public
value.
[14] 3. Capsule Recovery (space)--It is possible to frame a proposal that both sides
agree upon common docking hardware so as to permit either to "rescue" the spacecraft
of the other in distress. In fact, it is not known whether hardware common to the two com-
peting systems would be feasible, but assuming it is, rescue operations of this kind, given
current limits to spacecraft maneuverability, would require compatible trajectories and
orbits, compatible oxygen supply arrangements, an agreed communications, rendezvous,
and docking procedure, common training, and possibly compatible aerodynamic config-
urations for re-entry purposes. At a minimum, guidance systems, docking hardware, and
rendezvous and docking techniques, capabilities and limitations would all appear, at early
stages, to be of security concern. A proposal of this sort would,, therefore, not be attractive
to either side.
4. Lunar Logistics--Following the first manned lunar landings, it would appear
possible to define a proposal for sharing logistic support for more ambitious lunar explo-
ration. Such a proposal could be shaped in terms of a division of the logistic responsibili-
ties or a division of responsibility as between logistics and personnel. A proposal of this
type would have some appeal if the two sides were on roughly similar schedules and
shared ambitious plans for lunar stations or exploration, something not known to be
planned in either case. If one were well ahead [15] of the other or had no current plans
for ambitious follow-on lunar projects, it would have relatively little appeal. A proposal of
this type would have the disadvantage of subjecting us to reliance on the honorable and
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competent discharge by the USSR of its responsibilities over a period of years. In any case,
the proposal would not appear to promise early realization and should be deferred for
subsequent consideration in the course of a progressive and satisfactory development of
more immediate projects.
5. Trade-Offs--Where mutual benefits cannot be established in symmetrical pro-
jects, it may be possible to relate dissimilar activities to a single balanced cooperative
effort. For example, we could offer the Soviets the support of our twenty-four hour deep
space tracking capability (in periods when it is not directed to our own use) in exchange
for data (or samples) of the lunar surface, which the Soviets might acquire before the US.
C. Integrated Projects
Substantial integration of major elements of flight configurations is circum-
scribed by two factors: (1) virtually all major contracts for accomplishment of project
APOLLO have already bean placed, establishing a hea_ T and costly commitment in design
and development; (2) the placement of responsibility in the Soviet Union for integral
elements of our own program would enable the Soviets to obstruct our progress while pro-
ceeding [16] clandestinely on their own. Nevertheless, certain cooperative projects requir-
ing close integration are widely entertained and some comment is appropriate. More
important, there may be some integrated effort which is, nevertheless, possible at a rela-
tively early stage. At least one proposal of this type is noted below.
1. USSR Booster US Spacecraft,---It has been widely proposed that we suggest to the
Soviet Union a manned lunar effort based upon the use of their greater boosting capa-
bility and the most advanced spacecraft of the US. The Soviet Union is not now known to
possess a booster capable of manned lunar landing and return although they are devel-
oping engines which, if clustered, could provide this capability. The US is building such a
booster. It is not consistent with the US objective of achieving a leading space capability
to delegate the development of an adequate booster to the Soviet Union. A reversal of the
proposal would not appear to be in the national interest since it would employ an
advanced US capability to place a Soviet spacecraft first on the moon. It would also entail
Soviet access to US launching sites and techniques without the possibility of access to
USSR sites under comparable circumstances.
The heart of the problem posed by a proposal of this type lies in the very exten-
sive exchange of technology required to integrate the spacecraft of one side with the
booster of the other. Such an exchange applies to all [ 17] significant characteristics of the
booster system in design and performance, including guidance, and requires the launch-
ing authority to have full information of the spacecraft system. A continuing and exten-
sive mutual interplay on technical terms is known (through experience in domestic as well
as international satellite programs with friendly nations) to be required for spacecraft-
booster integration if success and avoidance of recrimination are to be achieved.
Extensive access would be required by both sides to the launch site, and, by reason of the
unsymmetrical basis for the project, such access would be one-sided. The experience with
the Soviet Union in areas with (or, indeed, without) military implications suggests that
even a small fraction of the interchange required would be forthcoming from them.
2. Turner Proposal--A Republic Aviation engineer, Thomas Turner, has pro-
posed in Life (October 11, 1963) a cooperative effort to circumvent (some of) the diffi-
culties noted immediately above. According to his proposal, the US would forego the
development of a large booster and concentrate simply on placing its lunar excursion
module (LEM) in earth orbit. The Soviet Union would at the same time place a very large
and powerful spacecraft in earth orbit. The two would rendezvous, then utilize the Soviet's
spacecraft propulsion to transfer to a lunar orbit, at which time the LEM would separate
and descend to the lunar surface with both a Soviet and an American aboard. It would
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then [18] return to lunar orbit, the occupants would transfer to the Soviet spacecraft,
abandoning the LEM, and return to earth. According to Turner, the sole requirements
are common docking hardware and a communications agreement. The proposal is an
ingenious one but implies that neither side would develop the total resources to conduct
a manned lunar program by itself. We regard this, at this time and in the present context,
as an unacceptable interdependence, prejudicing seriously our ability to proceed with our
own program in the event that the Soviets do not live up to their agreement over the
extended period of years required to implement it. The US requires a major booster for
its own posture and broad national interest. Thus, no real saving would be effected by the
Turner proposal. The notion that the necessary lunar orbit docking could be conducted
without common training and practice procedures on earth is not tenable. In addition,
this raises most of the questions which are specified in item B.(3) above. Our conclusion
is that the Turner proposal is neither practicable nor desirable at this stage in US/USSR
relationships. It could be held in abeyance until a progressive improvement in the dis-
charge of cooperative obligations by the USSR warrants its consideration at a later date.
3. Interchange of Astronauts--The US could propose a reciprocal arrangement
under which astronauts of each side are accepted by the other for extended periods [ 19]
of training leading to participation in flight missions. It is apparent that such an exchange
would entail long-term and extensive access to training facilities and programs, flight
hardware and systems, launching sites, and so forth, as well as language preparation; how-
ever, reciprocity might be assured through synchronized phasing of the program in both
countries. The US would have far more to gain than to lose from such reciprocity in view
of the relative secrecy of the Soviet program to date. The prospect is particularly attractive
because of its implications for opening up Soviet operations. We are informed, however,
that it may be politically premature.
As always in dealing with the Soviet Union, it may be feared that comparable
access, information, and training will not be afforded the American astronaut(s)
exchanged with the Soviet Union. The concept of synchronized phasing of the training of
the two would go a long way to correct this, since the two astronauts would move from one
phase to another of the two countries' programs on a par and we could withdraw our man
if we were dissatisfied. The prospects of such dissatisfaction must be regarded as rather
high, given experience with exchange programs with the Soviets in the past. It may be,
therefore, that greater success could be had with this same project if, again, it were devel-
oped in the course of a progressively improving relationship with Soviet space authorities.
It remains, in any case, one of the more attractive possibilities. [20] In fact, early instruc-
tion of selected astronauts in the Russian language has been suggested to remove at least
one obstacle to its realization.
g.
Questions of initiative, timing, and procedure for negotiations with the Soviet Union
have been considered. (The pertinent background and status of past negotiations with the
USSR is briefly summarized in Appendix II.)
1. As contacts continue at the agency (Dryden-Blagonravov) level, we should clear-
ly express our continuing interest in a response from the Soviet Union on the question of
extending cooperation to lunar programming and other subjects.
2. No new top-level action (by the President, Secretary of State, or Ambassador) is
recommended until-
(a) the Soviet Union is given a further opportunity to evidence the discharge of
its obligations under the existing NASA-USSR Academy space agreement, o___r
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(b) the Soviets respond to US initiatives already taken in the UN.
3. After the Soviet Union has had a further opportunity to deliver or default on the
existing agreement, a further top level initiative would seem appropriate.
The nature of such a US initiative might be along the following lines:
(a) In the event of continued failure of the Soviet Union to discharge existing
obligations in the Dryden- [21] Blagonravov agreement, a top level US/USSR initiative
would seem desirable, privately in the first instance. If Soviet intransigence persists, it may
then become appropriate to tax the Soviet Union publicly with their failure in matters of
cooperation.
(b) If the prospects for an extension of existing agreements to the manned lunar
landing area become promising---either because of performance in the existing agree-
ment or because of a response from the Soviet Union to our UN initiative--a further top
level US action should be taken, privately in the first instance. For example, the President
may wish to inform Khrushchev that we propose an orderly, structured approach toward
a developing cooperation, beginning with the maximum exchange of past results, pro-
ceeding to sufficient description of future planning to permit identification of possible
areas of cooperation, and concluding with the definition of specific projects. (Examples
of possible projects would be included in the presentation of this structured approach to
lend it credibility.) Again, if the Soviets are intransigent, consideration might be given to
stating our position publicly in order to increase pressure on the Soviet Union. In such a
public statement, the US approach could be openly described to domestic and foreign
advantage.
[22] 4. Whether a further US initiative is taken or a specific Soviet response to the
President's UN offer received, in either case making negotiations possible, it is then our
considered view that our action should be for the express purpose of preparing the way
for technical discussions. The NASA-Soviet Academy channel, which has been successful-
ly opened by Dr. Dryden, should continue to be the vehicle for technical exploration and
negotiation of the possibilities for cooperation with the Soviet Union. (If it should prove
technically desirable or necessary, consideration should be given to requesting the Soviets
to assign to the negotiations personnel closer to the technology of their program.) As in
the past, proposals to be considered in such negotiations should be made available for
prior inter-departmental consideration.
5. Any agreements reached at this technical level should be embodied in memo-
randa of understanding, explicitly subject to review and confirmation by governments.
6. As a tactical device, calculated to put pressure upon the Soviet Union, demon-
strate our serious intentions, and gain good will from certain nations, consideration
should be given to means by which "other countries" than the Soviet Union might be fur-
ther identified with our lunar programs. (See Appendix III.)
[1]
Appendix I
(A) President Kennedy made the following statement regarding United States-Soviet
cooperation in outer space in his address before the United Nations General Assembly on
September 20, 1963:
"Finally, in afield where the United States and the Soviet Union have a special capac-
ity--the field of space--there is room for new cooperation, for further joint efforts in the reg-
ulation and exploration o]space. I include among these possibilities a joint expedition to the
moon.
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"Space offers no problem of sovereignty; by resolution of this Assembly, the members of
the United Nations have foresworn [sic] any claims to territorial rights in outer space or on
celestial bodies, and declared that international law and the U. N. charter will apply. Why
should the United States and the Soviet Union, in preparing for such expeditions, become
involved in immense duplications of research, construction and expenditure? Surely we
should explore whether the scientists and astronauts of our two countries--indeed, of aU the
world--cannot work together in the conquest of space, sending some day in this decade to the
moon, not the representatives of a single nation, but the representatives of aU humanity. "
[2] (B) President Johnson reaffirmed the above statement through Ambassador Adlai E.
Stevenson who made the following remarks in Committee I of the United Nations General
Assembly during debate on international cooperation on outer space, on December 2,
1963:
"As you also know, President Kennedy proposed before the General Assembly last
September to explore with the Soviet Union opportunities for working together in the conquest
of space, including the sending of men to the moon as representatives of all our countries.
President Johnson has instructed me to reaffirm that offer today. If giant strides cannot be
taken at once, we hope that shorter steps can. We believe there are areas of work--short of
integrating the two national programs--from which all could benefit. We should explore the
opportunities for practical cooperation, beginning with small steps and hopefully leading to
larger ones.
"In any event, our policy of engaging in mutually beneficial and mutually supporting
cooperation in outer space--with the Soviet Union as with all nations----does not begin or
end with a manned moon landing. There is plenty of work yet to come before that---and there
will be even more afterward. "
[3] (C) In his State-of-the-Union address to the Congress on January 8, 1964, President
Johnson said,
"Fourth, we must assure our preeminence in the peaceful exploration of outer space,
focusing on an expedition to the moon in this decade----in cooperation with other powers if
possible, alone if necessary. "
[1]
Appendix H
The background of experience in negotiations with the USSR is briefly summarized: Progress at
all levels has almost invariably required US initiative. It appears that new initiatives are suc-
cessful only if the way is paved at the very highest levels. Negotiations are seriously ham-
pered by the fact that Soviet representatives are drawn from the Academy complex which
seems to be once removed from the actual conduct of the Soviet space program. (Soviet
scien lists do not often appear well informed of flight conditions or hardware.) Soviet reac-
tion time to US initiatives and correspondence has been extremely slow. The USSR is cur-
rently delinquent on most action items scheduled in the Dryden-Blagonravov agreements;
however, correspondence has been resumed by Blagonravov after more than three
months of silence and agreed optical observations of the ECHO II satellite have now been
performed by the Soviet Union.
The basic Soviet line for the past four years has been that significant cooperation can-
not precede major improvements in the political atmosphere, including disarmament.
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(The US proposals which led to the Dryden-Blagonravov agreement were apparently
regarded as sufficiently modest to permit some departure from this line--though at least
one of the agreed projects could lead to a joint global meteorological satellite system.)
[2] At various times the Soviet Union has rejected US offers of tracking support for
manned flights, an interchange of overseas tracking stations for earth satellites or deep
space probes, formal participation with NASA and other countries in experimental com-
munication satellite tests, exchanges on standards and techniques to preclude contami-
nation of the lunar and Martian environments, and repeated open-end offers to explore
any items of interest to the Soviet Union.
With regard to Soviet plans for a manned lunar program, Khrushchev has said little
more than that the USSR will not proceed until they are ready and that they are working
on the problem, but it is not known whether they are developing a large enough booster
although engines suitable for clustering for that purpose are reportedly under develop-
ment. Khrushchev has spoken only ambiguously about cooperation and has actually
seemed to accept competition as desirable.
On the other hand, some softening of the Soviet line may be indicated, not only by
the Dryden-Blagonravov agreement, but also by the recent willingness of the Soviet Union
to reach agreement on legal principles to apply to space activity and on radio frequencies
to be used in space communications and research. Tile requirements for these agree-
ments, however, are far from comparable to those applicable to cooperation in manned
lunar programs.
A brief summary and evaluation of the status and content of the Dryden-Blagonravov agreementfollows:
[3] A first US-USSR Bilateral Space Agreement was reached on June 6, 1962 and was then
supplemented by an implementing Memorandum of Understanding which became effec-
tive August 1, 1963. Together, these agreements set forth the technical details and
arrangements for cooperation in three areas:
1. Coordinated Meteorological Satellite Program
- Exchange of cloud cover photographs and weather situation analyses gained
from each country's experimental meteorological satellites;
- Establishment of a full-time, conventional, facsimile quality communications
link between Washington and Moscow for two-way transmission of these data;
- Coordinated launchings of future experimental weather satellites, and ulti-
mately, of operational weather satellites.
2. Communications Satellite-Experiments
- Experimental transmissions at 162 mc/s between the USSR and theJodrell
Bank Ohservatory in England using the US passive reflector satellite ECHO
II;
- USSR to consider experiments at higher frequencies;
[4] - USSR to consider radar and optical observation of ECHO II;
- Future negotiations on possible joint experiments with active communica-
tions satellites.
3. Geomagnetic Satellite Data
- Launching by each country of a satellite equipped to measure the earth's
magnetic field as part of research planned for the International Year of the
Quiet Sun in 1965;
- Exchange of results of satellite measurements;
- Exchange of data from magnetic surveys of other types.
Dr. Dryden wrote Blagonravov in mid-August listing action items requiring early com-
pletion if the agreed deadlines for joint action were to be met, and conveying the United
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States position on each. This communication went unanswered until December when
Blagonravov acknowledged the letter, apologized for delay, indicated substantive replies
were being prepared, and asked for the launch date for ECHO II. Dr. Dryden replied
immediately by cable, giving the launch window and nominal orbital elements for the
ECHO II satellite, and reiterating NASA's request for Soviet radar cross-section and opti-
cal observation of the satellite during the inflation stage (which occurs in part over the
USSR on the first orbit). [5] This cable was immediately acknowledged by Blagonravov; as
of this writing, he has provided a statement of intention to discharge at least the minimum
requirements upon the Soviet Union for observation of ECHO II and communications
tests with that satellite. He remains delinquent in other outstanding matters.
Although all joint action has slipped several months because of Soviet dilatoriness,
this need not affect any of the proposed cooperative efforts substantively but may only
delay their implementation. At this time, it seems likely that Soviet performance will con-
tinue [to be] ragged, with little regard for deadlines. The remoteness of the relationship
maintained by the USSR detracts in some degree from the positive value of the coopera-
tive association established; nevertheless, satisfactory completion of any of the steps pre-
scribed in the agreements should provide the best basis for improved relationships and
further progress.
[1]
Appendix III
Besides inviting the Soviet Union to cooperate in the lunar program in his recent UN
speech, the President expressed a desire to bring other countries in as well. The possibil-
ities include the following:
1. Tracking and data acquisition--We already enjoy the cooperation of a number of
countries in the accommodation and operation of manned flight tracking and data acqui-
sition stations and should publicize this fact along with our interest in extending the pre-
sent level of participation.
2. Scientific experiments---We now give foreign scientists a chance to compete for
space for their experiments in our observatory satellites. We should consider extending
this practice to Gemini and Apollo, noting that these opportunities may be very limited
even for our own scientists. (In addition to space and weight limitations, there could be
difficulties growing out of Air Force participation in Gemini).
3. Contracts--If they materialize in sufficient number, publicity can be given to cer-
tain subcontracts entered into with foreign contractors (e.g., Canadian companies are
developing and providing extensible antennae for the Gemini and Apollo missions,
including the antenna to be used for rendezvous missions.) In addition, consideration
[2] could be given to offering foreign governments the opportunity to take on the devel-
opment and production of subsystems and parts, on a cooperative basis (i.e., at their own
expense), to meet our design, standard, and schedule requirements. The technical and
contracting limitations would, however, be severe and the takers few.
4. Astronaut orientation--A program might be organized under which foreign high
performance pilots might be brought together for observation of, and limited participa-
tion in, NASA astronaut training (only) programs as a familiarization and orientation
effort on a continuing basis (e.g., successive three-month classes).
5. Astronaut training and flight--The numerous and valid objections heretofore
raised against including foreign pilots in our astronaut program are recognized.
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The negative aspects are these: rivalry among interested foreign nations; further pres-
sure upon our limited flight opportunities; resentment by current US astronauts; difficul-
ties in application of commercial benefits to astronauts; security questions; pressures for
flight priorities; feminist and congressional criticism; absence of practical application
abroad for the training given here.
The positive aspects are these: few other single actions could more dramatically
express the President's deep desire for cooperation; few other single actions could equal
[3] the boost given by this one to US relations with Latin America or Asia, if pilots from
those regions (many already trained here) were chosen; few other actions could do more
in the next few years to eclipse Soviet propaganda in this area---or protect us more effec-
tively against a similar Soviet move.
On balance, technical and political considerations suggest a negative conclusion on
an offer of this kind and preference for the proposal reflected in item 4 above.
:_1¢$
Perhaps the most acceptable position to meet the issue of the third country partic-
ipation is represented by the recent statement of Senator Clinton P. Anderson before the
AIAA, January 1964:
"... we can give validity to this nation's policy to internationalize space by asserting
that the United States will accept offers of support from any nation which can contribute to
the space program. "
Such contributions should continue to be organized and implemented within the
policies already applicable to existing (and uniformly successful) international programs
of NASA.
Document 1-44
Document title: Thomas O. Paine, NASA Administrator, to Academician M.V. Keldysh,
President, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, July 31, 1970.
Source: Thomas O. Paine Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.
In this lett_ NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine, the successor to James E. Webb in 1968, foL
lowed up on earlim;, more general overtures to the Soviet Union for enhanced post-Apollo cooperation.
This was a specific proposal for cooperation in compatible docking arrangements between U.S. and
Soviet spacecraft. Paine had also just announced his intention to resign as NASA Administrator in
September, and he wanted to assure Keldysh that the desire for enhanced cooperation was a U.S. gov-
ernment position, not just his own preference. The Soviet reply to this letter was positive, and the two
countries began discussions in October 1970 that led to the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.
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[1]
Academician M.V. Keldysh
President, Academy of Sciences of the USSR
Leninsky Prospect 14
Moscow, U-71, USSR
JUL 31, 1970
Dear Academician Keldysh:
We were encouraged to learn of the inquiries by your Embassy to the National
Academy of Sciences regarding possible discussions of compatible docking arrangements
in space. I had mentioned the subject to Dr. Handler as a possible item for consideration
by NASA and your Academy prior to his recent trip to the Soviet Union.
As the government agency responsible for civil space activities, NASA has direct
responsibility for any discussions with Soviet officials regarding actions we might take
together to assure compatible docking systems in our respective manned space flight pro-
grams. If you agree that this subject should be discussed between us in the meeting which
we have had in view for some time, we will be glad, in order to facilitate adequate mutual
preparation, to receive two Soviet engineers at our Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston
in the very nearest future to examine NASA's current spacecraft designs for docking pur-
poses and to discuss future docking techniques. In the next step we would propose to pro-
ceed with the responsible Soviet officials to discuss our respective views with regard to the
achievement of compatible docking configurations and techniques. If we can indeed
agree on common systems, and I foresee no particular technical difficulty, we will have
made an important step toward increased safety and additional cooperative activities in
future space operations. This is particularly timely in my view as we proceed toward the
initial experiments leading to the orbiting space station.
[2] You may already know that I have submitted my resignation as Administrator of NASA
to the President for personal reasons. This, of course, will not change the policies and
interests of NASA with respect to international cooperation in space. Thus, you should
understand our past and current correspondence on [an] official rather than personal
[basis], although this matter has my wholehearted personal support. I regret very much
that I will not have the opportunity to carry through personally our discussions with you
to fruition, but am optimistic that much can be accomplished and hope that we can con-
tinue to make progress in the next month.
Sincerel_
T.O. Paine
Administrator
Document 1-45
Document title: Glynn S. Lunney, "Trip Report--Delegation to Moscow to Discuss
Possible Compatibility in Docking," November 5, 1970.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Glynn Lunney, who headed the Flight Director's Office at NASA 's Manned Spacecraft Center in
Houston--renamed the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in 1973--was part of the first-ever
delegation of NASA engTneers and other officials who traveled to Moscow, October 26 to 28, 1970.
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The purpose of the trip was for the initial discussions of the feasibility of a U.S.-Soviet cooperative pro-
ject regarding compatible docking between the two countries' spacecraft. This trip report captures both
the human and the technical aspects of the NASA team's three days in Moscow. The figures referred
to in the text have been omitted.
[1]
MEMORANDUM TO: See attached list
FROM: FC/Glynn S. Lunney
SUBJECT: Trip Report--Delegation to Moscow to Discuss
Possible Compatibility in Docking
Before I discuss our technical meetings, so many people have asked me about
personal observations that I have included some of these at the beginning. In general,
everything was done to make our visit pleasant and productive. General comments are as
follows.
1. Our time was scheduled very well, and we kept a busy schedule.
2. Transportation and a guide/interpreter were always at the ready.
3. Weather was mostly overcast and occasional drizzle, but just "raincoat" cold.
4. We stayed in a very large, modern hotel (the Russiya---4000 rooms) and the quar-
ters were very adequate.
5. Breakfast was a buffet arrangement in the hotel.
6. Lunch in the middle of the afternoon and dinner in the late evening were sched-
uled each day at various places. The food was delicious, the Russian vodka is an excellent
drink; the caviar is worth eating also.
7. There is a fair amount of apartment building going on in Moscow. From what we
saw, there were essentially no single-family dwellings in the city; the 7 million population
apparently lives in the apartment buildings. We were in only one apartment building
which is provided specifically for the foreign embassy people. The rooms were comfort-
able and about the size of Houston apartments.
8. We did not see any downtown or remote shopping center areas. Mostly, there
were shops of different merchandise in some of the first floors of buildings we passed.
[2] 9. There is a very extensive subway system we did not see, and there never was any
real traffic problems although it slowed a little around quitting time. Their car, the Volga,
is about the size of a 4-door Mustang if you can imagine that.
10. The people generally seemed to me to be more serious or somber than you might
find in our country (outside New York), but that is really hard to justify on very limited
contact in a large city.
11. The Bolshoi Theater is a beautiful place. For the talks, we met with the same
So_iet delegation on all three days. These same men also accompanied us on most of our
unofficial stops.
General comments are as follows.
1. The official people we visited were friendly and openly discussed various aspects
of their program. They presented and answered questions on their technical areas.
2. They were also very interested in bringing our first talks to a productive conclu-
sion and to provide the framework for future discussions. In attempting to summarize the
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technical discussions, I will include the impressions from our visit to Star City where their
cosmonauts live and train. We visited there on Sunday and were greeted by the
Commandant, General K. , General Beregovoy, who was in the U.S. last year,
and Colonel Shatalov, the rendezvous pilot on Soyoz [sic] 4 and 5 flights, [who] were our
principal escorts. Star City is 40 minutes out of central Moscow in pleasant woods country.
There were 3 or 4 apartment buildings (about 8 stories) and another one being finished
(probably a sign of continued progress in manned space). We visited their exhibit area, a
memorial area for Yuri Gagarin, saw a Gagarin film and, the highlight for me, visited two
[3] different simulators. The first was a general purpose simulator for all bases including
docking. With reference to Figure 1, this simulator has the command module below and
the orbital module attached above (with a hatch to pass through).
In the order I visited them, the orbital module was a sphere about 7-8 feet in diame-
ter. A sketch of it is shown in Figure 2, and the inflight films and stills would indicate the
flight vehicle being very similar to these simulators. The walls were covered with a light-
colored, felt-like material much like the ceiling covering in some of our earlier cars. The
flight atmosphere is an air mixture, slightly greater then one atmosphere, I believe. In the
sketch, you can see the central trench area with the hatch in the floor. From this view, the
left compartment has a hinged lid for stowage. (I imagine their space suits are stowed in
there.) The right compartment is a work area, with a top like a desk and a slightly-inclined-
from-the-vertical control panel. I believe there is some access to the volume underneath
from the side of the central trench. There was also a manual handle in this area for water
condensation removal. (Sounded like a manually operated squeezer, but I could not tell
if that was their primary mode--I doubt it.) There were 4 portholes (approximately
10" diameter) 90 ° apart and an ECS inlet and CO_ scrubber against the wall on the oppo-
site side of the central trench from the EVA hatch. The side (?) view in Figure 2 attempts
to show that. Based on the answers given, they do not use replaceable cartridges but add
other inlets and scrubber units, dependent on the flight. I am still a little surprized [sic]
by that, but maybe we lost something in the translation.
The overall impression of this module is one of simplicity, and I will try to convey that
by a discussion of what I will call the control area [4] on the right-hand compartment.
This is shown in Figure 2 from memory, and we did not hear what all the buttons were for.
From the front, the central panel has a stowage compartment on the left side with a food
warmer mounted on the wall behind it. The control panel has buttons, a C&W panel
(about 6x6 lights), a speaker for A/G voice and one of the very few gauges in the ship.
The gauge has three readouts---command module pressure, orbital module pressure, and
ECS pressure (source or regulated--I am not sure). An identical gauge exists in the com-
mand module.
The hatch can be operated remotely from the control panel by several buttons--for
depress, open and close hatch (although I did not hear this, these functions are probably
repeated in the command module). The depress and hatch actuation can also be done
with manual valves, handles on the hatch itself. The hatch opened into the cabin. Several
other buttons on the control panel were labeled for use with the TV camera mounted on
the far right of the control panel and with a long length of power cord stowed in the com-
partment underneath. On the tabletop in front of the control panels were several switch-
es and a small electrical package, apparently for experiments.
From their flight films, the orbital module is the living, sleeping, and experiment area
where the crew spends most of their time. It, of course, is also an airlock. I think it is worth
repeating how it impressed us--a roomy area with very simple controls and instruments,
probably all of which were devoted to airlock, experiment, living and sleeping functions
(as opposed to attitude control, etc.).
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[5] Next, George Hardy and I went down to the command module with Colonel Shatalov.
For three men this is a small volume, but is only used during takeoff, landing, rendezvous,
and periodically in orbit (see Figure 3); and, since they wear flight coveralls for these por-
tions, it is adequate. Also, the couches are essentially against the floor for most flight phas-
es. Dr. Gilruth found out that the couches are raised toward the control panel for attenu-
ation travel at some point in the deorbit-landing phase.
Again, the very strong impression is one of simplicity--no circuit breaker panels, no
large number of switches, not many displays. The couches are not exactly parallel to the
display panel. As a matter of fact, we almost sat on the horizontal couches to view the
panel with the upper hatch to the orbital module overhead. In Figure 3, I have sketched
the control/display panel as I remember it. From the left top, the G&N area had a
6-8" diameter globe of the earth which obviously rotated with the orbital position. There
were several digital readouts in this area like latitude, longitude, altitude, period, and
maybe one or two others. I could not determine exactly how these readouts were driven.
From the rest of what I learned, I would guess they were set up manually (probably from
ground instructions) and then are driven in some approximate way to provide the pilots
with general navigation data. There was a round-face clock with, I believe, a couple of con-
trois below that. There was a C&W panel (maybe about 6x8) with red, yellow, and blue
lights from the top down which is also used in some fashion in periodic systems checkout.
The TV screen showing the target vehicles was approximately 5-6" square and driven from
either of two TV cameras up in the nose of the ship, around the probe or drogue mecha-
nisms. Below this screen was a range/range rate meter. On [6] the upper right were 6 dig-
ital readouts with controls for setting them. I had the impression these were digital inputs
to the control system for attitude and/or translation maneuvers, but I may not have that
quite right. I believe there was something in the lower right which I cannot recall--per-
haps radio controls. Below the panel and above the center conch right knee was the
periscope view of the target. (We were concentrating on the rendezvous and docking
aspects, but I gathered that they use it for earth observation also.) The identical pressure
gauge was on top of the panel, and there was a "sun lamp" above that. George Hardy was
questioning about that and I did not hear the conversation. My guess is that it was a device
for the pilot to see how close the vehicle alignment was for solar inertial holds for their
solar panels. As in ours, the left-hand T-handle was for translation, although some switch-
es had to be used for fore-aft braking. The right hand T-handle device was for rotation.
On the right and left of the main display panel was the control device which I figured
to be the heart of the ship control. There were about 12 buttons down the left side of the
device which seemed to be used for operating a given phase. As a phase was selected; e.g.,
manual docking, the pilot would punch one of these buttons. Then, next to the buttons,
a set of display windows with labels on them would be mechanically rotated into view.
Some of these windows would be lit, some blue, and some not lit. Although it was difficult
to get a clear understanding, this device seemed to be used for whatever configuring
would be necessary (perhaps deadbands, for example) and for displaying and executing
any sequential functions. These could be automatic or backed up manually. There were
two columns of [7] buttons to the right of these windows which seem to be this manual
function. I asked if a different phase; e.g., landing, would be selected on this panel and
got an affirmative. I kind of concluded that this device, then, was used to select the flight
phasehsome automatic configuring is probably done according to the phase; and there
can be auto or manual sequential functions performed. So, it seemed to be a combination
of a sequence controller and a vehicle configurer according to the flight phase.
(Admittedly, this is some extrapolation on my part.) The flight films we saw showed the
pilots using this device in their periodic systems checkout. So I would also guess that the
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light patters there and on the C&W panel represented a checkout, monitoring tool. Also,
one row of buttons across horizontally were red, indicating special precaution.
All in all, this was a fairly simple cockpit and we watched a docking exercise from
about several hundred feet out into docking. Much as you would expect, the pilot moni-
tored the TV, the periscope, and the range/range rate meter and brought the ship in to
docking. Roll is easy with the displays, and at docking the periscope cross hairs were lined
up on a flashing light on one of the other ships' booms. Again, no circuit breaker panels,
few displays, and control switches, no attitude reference display (except periscope and
perhaps sun lamp).
The second set of simulators were two command module elements--one active and
one passive. There were 2 parallel tracks per module on which a model of the Soyoz [sic]
spacecraft was brought towards the simulator, from about 150' away. One track was
watched by the TV, the other through the periscope. The images were magnified to prop-
er scale on the cockpit instruments. Inside the cockpit, all was very similar to the general
[8] simulator and I concluded that this was a more accurate docking trainer, with a greater
separation distance simulated than the general-purpose simulator. Roll control only needs
to be within 15 ° but the cosmonauts always try for and generally make approximately
1 degree.
This simulator work was a great help in the following days of discussion. It was easy to
watch and understand what was happening, but, in real specifics, it was more difficult to
understand that sequencer, for example, with the time we had and the need to translate
everything.
For our technical discussions with the Soviet delegation, two days were planned for a
mutual exchange of experience and to outline a framework for future activities. On the
third day, Wednesday, October 28, it was planned to formalize our discussions by approv-
ing a document containing the framework and schedule for future work. The members of
two delegations were:
Dr. Robert Gilruth B.N. Petrov
(Academician--National Academy of Sciences)
Arnold W. Frutkin K. P. Feoktistov
(Deputy Director--Manned Space Program)
George K. Hardy V. S. Syromyamikov
(Docking Assembly)
Caldwell C. Johnson V. V. Suslennikov
(Radio Guidance Equipment)
Glynn S. Lunney V. A. Lavrow
(Foreign Affairs)
On the first day, the U.S. side presented two discussions:
1. Rendezvous experience and techniques. (General vehicle capabilities, ren-
dezvous techniques.)
[9] 2. Docking assemblies. (Gemini, Apollo designs, future possibilities.) The Soviet
side presented two discussions, essentially parallel to our presentations, but with no refer-
ence to any future programs. Dr. Feoktistov presented the rendezvous discussion; Dr.
Syromyamikov presented the docking hardware discussion. Papers were given to us on
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each of these subjects and on the radio guidance system presentation on the next day. We
are in the translation process now, and these papers will be available.
With reference to rendezvous, the Soviet approach is to build a system for both
unmanned and manned use. They view the rendezvous process in three distinct phases.
1. Delivery of the active vehicle to the vicinity of the target. (Done in either direct
ascent fashion, or a re-rendezvous vectored from the ground.)
2. The zone of automatic rendezvous to station keeping. (The limits of this zone
were not specifically identified, but the range was on the order of tens of kilometers and
tens of meters per second.)
3. Station keeping from about 300 meters to docking. (Relative velocity is very low
during this phase.) The system discussion primarily centered around phases 2 and 3, and
I understood the second phase discussion best. Phase 3 is easy manually, but I did not fully
understand the implementation for the automatic option. The automatic rendezvous is
started when the two vehicles acquire each other and orient nose-to-nose. This is done
with 2 acquisition-type antennas, giving spherical coverage. The radio guidance radar
heads are then locked to each other. The active ship has a gimballing head and [10] the
passive ship has a fixed head with vehicle orientation to keep the nose pointed at the
active ship. Range, range rate and the relative angular motion is measured by the active
ship. The relative angular motion is then used to continually establish the plane in which
the guidance system solves the problem. The mechanization of the guidance scheme is to
establish and maintain a range/range rate corridor and to keep the relative angular
motion within some deadband. This is done by firing the main engine (of which there are
two [?] of about 800# thrust) in the direction required to satisfy the range corridor or the
line of site motion deadband. This is an iterative, driving technique to bring the vehicles
within a few hundred meters.
Once in this zone of docking, small thrusters of 20# are used and relative roll control
is established for docking assembly. This can be done either automatically or manually,
and, I believe, signal strengths to mutually aligned antennas are used in the auto mode
although I am not real positive of that. The manual mode we watched in the simulators
was a very reasonable one and the bright flashing lights can be used on tile lit side of the
earth.
Dr. Syromyatnikov presented a discussion of the docking assembly--a probe and
drogue device very similar to ours, with a few exceptions.
1. It was not designed to be removed for a tunnel transfer. (They use an EVA transfer)
2. They use an electric motor for retracting which permit.s unlimited reuse.
3. The docking interface automatically includes the mating of four electrical umbil-
icals with on the order of 20-30 pins apiece.
Once the head of the probe is engaged, there are mechanical guide pins (6" long,
1" diameter, approximately) for further alignment and then grooves to get down to a
1-minute accuracy. This must be required for [11 ] only the electrical umbilicals and I get
a little fuzzy here. I believe that the umbilicals alone are controlled to 1 minute and the
rest of the mechanism is a 1-degree fit, but I pass to Dr.Johnson who understood this por-
tion very well. Their alignment and velocity tolerances seemed to be about the same as
Apollo.
On the second day of discussions George Hardy presented a discussion of the Skylab
program, and I think the long term aspects of this flight intrigued the Soviets, especially
after the Soyoz [sic] 9 18-day flight. After this discussion, Dr. Suslennikov presented a
more detailed paper on the radio guidance equipment used in the automatic rendezvous.
This paper did not add much to my understanding of the rendezvous but did discuss some
of the fimctional elements within the radio guidance equipment--modulators, doppler
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shift extraction, etc. After this discussion, the Soviets requested similar kind of informa-
tion on our system which we agreed to do. The kind of information is in the Russian text
and is available in many of our block diagrams.
After these exchange discussions, we entertained the subject of what areas to study for
compatibility and how to proceed. We had previously discussed the subjects which would
require attention and the Soviet delegation had essentially the same ones. We grouped
these subjects into logical groups such that three working groups could handle the range
of subject matter. There would be some overlap between groups, and the three groups
suggested are:
1. Group to assure compatibility of overallmethods and means for rendezvous, dock-
ing, and life support.
[12] 2. Group to assure compatibility of radio, optical guidance systems and communi-
cations.
3. Group to assure compatibility of docking assembly and tunnel.
The groups, a more detailed definition of the work required, and the proposed sched-
ule is contained in a summary of results signed by both delegations. This summary is being
presented to Dr. Low of NASA and Academician Keldysh of the National Academy of
Sciences. Once agreed to by these two parties, I envision the work proceeding along the
lines expressed therein. It is my belief that this effort will involve a rigorous, full-time effort
by a relatively small number of personnel, but with the support of many other elements.
This effort will be similar to early mission and techniques planning combined with ICD
tradeoffs and definition and, finally, preliminary system design to assure compatibili W.
Glynn S. Lunney
Document 1-46
Document rifle: George M. Low, "Visit to Moscow, April 1972, to Discuss Compatible
Docking Systems for US and USSR Manned Spacecraft," April 4-6, 1972, with attached:
"Addendum, Moscow Trip, April 4-6, 1972," May 30, 1972.
Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Space Collections, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York.
NASA Deputy Administrator George M. Low led a three-person NASA delegation on an April 1972
trip to Moscow to make a final technical determination of whether the United States and the Soviet
Union should agree to a joint test flight. This would involve an in-orbit docking of a U.S. Apollo
spacecraft and a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft. Low concluded that such a test flight was indeed desirable
and feasible, and NASA recommended to the White House that the United States agree to it. The U.S.-
Soviet agreement to carry out the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project was announced just as an overall agree-
ment on space cooperation was signed at a U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit meeting in May 1972.
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[1] April 4-6, 1972
Visit to Moscow, April 1972,
to Discuss Compatible Docking Systems
for US and USSR Manned Spacecraft
Su?/tma_y
In early April 1972, Arnold Frutkin, Glynn Lunney and I went to Moscow to meet with
representatives of the Soviet Academy of Sciences on the subject of compatible docking
systems for US and USSR manned spacecraft. The specific purpose of the trip was to deter-
mine whether the US side was ready to make a commitment to a joint test flight in 1975
involving a rendezvous and docking of US and USSR spacecraft in earth orbit. Such a
commitment could be made in the forthcoming summit talks at the end of May 1972.
As a result of three days of meetings, we reached agreement on technical matters, as
well as on the principles of managing and scheduling and conducting a 1975 joint test
flight. Both sides affirmed the desirability of such a test flight and are ready to proceed
with preparations for the flight on the basis of a prospective government-to-government
agreement.
Background
Initial discussions concerning compatible docking systems, for future manned space-
craft took place in October 1970. Following those discussions, Bob Gilruth, who headed
the US team to Moscow in October 1970, recommended that an early test flight using
Apollo and Soyuz hardware would be highly desirable. After discussions with Henry
Kissinger in San Clemente early in January 1971, I proposed such a joint test flight to
Keldysh in Moscow when I was there to negotiate the Low/Keldysh agreement. During the
next set of talks on the compatible docking systems in Houston in June 1971, the Soviet
side agreed that an earl)" test flight would be highly desirable, but suggested that the Salyut
space station (which was then on its first and only flight) be used instead of the Soyuz
spacecraft. Detailed work on an Apoilo/Salyut mission for the 1975 time period contin-
ued into the Fall of 1971, and during meetings in Moscow in November/December 1971,
the US and USSR agreed that such a mission would be technically feasible and desirable.
[2] In the Fall of 1971, NASA also recommended to the White House that a final agree-
ment on a test mission might be included in the agenda for the May 1972 summit meet-
ing. As a result of several discussions on the subject, we were asked to make a firm
recommendation by April 15, 1972, concerning the feasibility of conducting such a
mission.
Lunney recommended that in order to assure this feasibility, we should get agreement
in principle at least on three basic documents: a project technical proposal document, an
organization plan, and a project schedules document. Draft versions of these documents
had been prepared by MSC [the Manned Spacecraft Center] and had been transmitted
to Moscow in late March 1972. At the same time, we asked for a meeting with Keldysh to
explain the purpose of the documents and to establish a firm basis for discussing them. It
turned out, however, that Keldysh had just entered the hospital and would not be avail-
able until early April.
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We therefore decided that Frutkin, Lunney and I would go to Moscow during the
week of April 2nd to discuss the documents, to reach agreement on the most important
points, and especially to determine whether the Soviets really understood what we were
talking about.
We decided that we would not publicize this trip, [Handwritten footnote: '¢Fhis was at
the request of the White House, because we were to discuss a possible agenda item for the
following summit meeting." (footnote added 1-10-76) ] this was at the request of the White
House, because we were to discern a possible agenda item for the forthcoming summit
meeting, and it took pains to make sure that only the smallest possible number of people
would know that we had gone to Moscow. For example, insofar as MSC was concerned,
Lunney was visiting Washington. In my own case I was on leave "to take care of family busi-
ness." Then, on the day we left the United States, the New York Times carried a front-page
story of an interview between John Noble Wilford and Petrov. In this interview, Petrov stat-
ed that there would be meetings in Moscow during the coming week on the compatible
docking systems. Fortunately, however, at least at the time of this writing, nobody has yet
asked whether anyone had indeed gone to Moscow or who had gone.
Chronology of Events
We left Washington via TWA on Easter Sunday, April 2, 1972, and arrived in Paris early
the following morning. From Paris to Moscow, we were on Aeroflot (an Iluyshian 62) and
arrived [3] in Moscow approximately 5:30 Monday evening, Moscow time. There we were
met by Petrov, Vereshchetin, and Bushuyev. On the way to Moscow, Petrov told me that
Keldysh was still in the hospital but that I would meet with the Acting President of the
Academy, Academician Kotelnikov; however, Kotelnikov would not be available until
Tuesday noon, and our meetings would start at that time.
Tuesday morning we had a brief meeting with Ambassador Beam, during the course
of which he invited us to a luncheon on Thursday. I later found out that one of the invit-
ed guests was Bob Kaiser, the Washington Post correspondent in Moscow. I went back to
see the Ambassador and told him in view of the White House and State Department desire
not to publicize our trip, I felt this was a bad idea. The Ambassador assured me that this
would be a purely social occasion, that he would take personal responsibility, and that Bob
Kaiser would not know the purpose of our trip nor would he say anything about it.
Although I was extremely skeptical about this, I had no way of avoiding the invitation.
Tuesday from noon to approximately 2 o'clock, we met with Kotelnikov, Petrov,
Bushuyev, Rumyantsev, Vereshchetin, with Zonov as their interpreter. (We had also
brought along our own interpreter, Cyril Murumcev.) From that session, we went to a typ-
ical Moscow luncheon at the Club of Scientists, which, I guess, is Moscow's Cosmos Club.
After lunch we continued the discussions, with Petrov taking charge on the Soviet side and
without Kotelnikov. We adjourned at close to 7 p.m. that evening.
We reconvened at 9:30 Wednesday morning, held discussions until approximately
2 o'clock, at which time we adjourned for lunch. The American party went to the U.S.
Embassy for a quick lunch in their snack bar, as well as a complete reworking of our final
document. The afternoon session started at 4 p.m. and lasted only until about 6. However,
as a result of the document we had prepared during lunch, and as a result of the basic
understandings reached in previous discussions, we were able to conclude the substance
of our talks at that time.
[4] On Thursday morning, Frutkin and Vereshchetin worked on the editing of the final
document, with the help of Jack Tech, who is the Science Attache at the American
Embassy. Lunney and I continued our discussions until about 1 o'clock. This was followed
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by luncheon at the American Embassy Residence (Spaso House) while the English version
of the summary of the results of the talks was being typed at the Embassy.
Following lunch, we returned to the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences
(where all of the discussions had been held) in order to sign the documents. This was the
usual signing ceremony in which each of us signed two English and two Russian texts.
Incidentally, this signing ceremony took place in Kotelnikov's office, which he claims
Napoleon used as his bedroom during his last night in Moscow on the way back to France.
I also learned that the large table that | used in signing the Keldysh/Low agreement had
been a desk used by Napoleon.
Thursday evening we had a farewell dinner with Kotelnikov, Petrov and the rest of the
Russian delegation. There were the usual toasts, as there had been at the luncheon on
Tuesday afternoon. (At the Tuesday luncheon, I had made a toast, stating that we here
had an opportunity to make history and that the results of what we were trying to accom-
plish would probably be much more far reaching than any of us could at that time even
imagine. During the Thursday evening dinner, Kotelnikov said in a toast that the true
importance of what we were doing was that this could be an important step in bringing
peace to men everywhere.)
Early Friday morning we left Moscow via Aeroflot to London, Pan Am to New York,
and then back to Washington.
Highlights of the Talks
Tuesday Noon. This was the meeting with Kotelnikov, Petrov, Bushuyev, and
Rumyantsev. After a brief welcome by Kotelnikov, I gave a brief opening statement in
which I reviewed the history of 18 months of technical discussions and that the possibili-
ty now existed to reach a government-to-government agreement, perhaps during the
forthcoming summit talks. I went on to say that before such an agreement can be reached,
it is essential that we both understand that [5] this mission can indeed be carried out and
that my specific assignment in these talks was to determine whether we are now ready to
proceed. I pointed out that we had high confidence in understanding each other on tech-
nical matters, but that I was s011 less sure of a complete understanding on matters of
schedule and organization. I concluded by stating that it was my hope that in these talks
we could gain a common understanding of the basic principles for organizing, develop-
ing, scheduling and conducting a test mission so that I can advise the White House that
we are indeed ready to commit to such a mission.
Kotelnikov, in his opening statement, said that they had reached a very important con-
clusion that they would like to lay on the table at this time. The conclusion was that they
would use the Soyuz spacecraft instead of the Salyut space station for their rendezvousing
vehicle.
This, of course, came as a major surprise, and we had a long discussion on the sub-
ject. The reasons for the switch, they said, were "technical and economic." They explained
that the Salyut space station only had one docking port and that it would have to be
redesigned completely to accept a second docked vehicle. This was a major redesign that
would be extremely costly. They then took a close look at the Soyuz and found that it
could be modified with all of the modifications that had already been discussed for the
Salyut, and that they were prepared to do so. They were quite strong in stating that there
would be no difference in any of the things that had already been agreed to. (My own
assessment is that there are three possible reasons for the switch. These are: (1) the actu-
al reason given by them; (2) major difficulties with Salyut identified during its first flight;
and (3) the "political reason" that since we will not have a Skylab available for a future
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flight, they are unwilling to commit a Salyut to such a mission. My inclination is to believe
that the reason they gave is the actual one.) I stated that barring any technical difficulties,
Lunney would have to certify that the switch from Salyut to Soyuz would be acceptable to
the United States and, in fact, reminded the Soviets that this was the vehicle that we had
recommended in the first instance in January 1971. From the technical point of view,
Lunney was unable to identify any difficulties with this mission and, in fact, [6] pointed
out that operationally this could present a simpler problem, since it would involve only
two coordinated launches (Apollo and Soyuz) and not three (Apollo, Salyut and Soyuz).
I also tried to think through any "political" implications and found none. It would still be
possible to exchange crews, which will have the major public impact of this mission. And
having a Soyuz, instead of a Salyut, will have the added benefit of not calling attention to
the fact that they have a space station flying at the time when we do not.
After we had settled this issue, I stated that I wanted to bring up another matter;
namely, that of the lack of the Soviet responsiveness to our proposals concerning direct
voice communications between the two project managers on a regular basis. (For back-
ground, this item had been proposed by us during the November/December 1971 talks
and was supposed to be confirmed by the Soviets when the agreement of those talks was
confirmed. This was not done, and I sent a telegram to Keldysh asking for confirmation.
As of now, we have not received a response to that telegram.) I mentioned that I was not
only interested in the substance of the issue but also concerned about the lack of respon-
siveness on their part which, if indicative of future relationships, would make it difficult to
conduct the joint mission. Kotelnikov quickly understood why I attached importance to
the issue and said we should settle it right then, which we did after considerable debate
and discussion.
Finally, during the first session, we determined the agenda for the remaining stay in
Moscow. Specifically, we agreed that we would attempt to reach an agreement on the basic
principles of the "organizational plan"; the level of detail to he included in the schedules;
and any technical matters that might have come about as a result of the switch from Salyut
to Soyuz. Both sides also agreed that with the exception of any new technical problems
that might have resulted from the switch, we knew of no other outstanding difficulties.
Tuesday Afternoon. The discussion proceeded after lunch, with the same participants
with the exception of Kotelnikov. Lunney had prepared a document entitled,
Apollo/Salyut Test Mission Consideration, dated March 23, 1972, a [7] copy of which is
attached to these notes. This document essentially is a summary of the organizational
plan, and we had hoped to agree to this plan in detail to make it part of our agreement
of these Moscow talks. At this point, however, things got to be quite confusing, and we
started spending an inordinate amount of time quibbling over the exact wording of each
sentence. We quickly saw that we would be in Moscow for weeks rather than days were we
to proceed in this way.
We had also brought along a "Summary of Results" which was to be the basic docu-
ment of agreement concerning these talks. At this point in our proceedings, we, there-
fore, called for a quick recess to discuss our strategy for the meeting and to show the
Soviets that what we really intended to sign was something like the Summary of Results.
Further, we indicated that the document which I previously discussed we had hoped to
make part of this summary and to include it as an appendix. Finally I pointed out that it
would be most important to reach agreement and a full understanding of the "twelve prin-
ciples governing mission conduct" which were an enclosure to the Apollo/Salyut Test
Mission Consideration document, and that I felt it would be best if we started discussing
those. The Soviet side agreed with this recommendation.
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We had no problems in reaching a very quick understanding and agreement on the
first six of the principles, which concern command, control, and communications. By that
time, however, it was getting late, and we decided to review the remaining six principles
only very quickly for subsequent discussion in tomorrow's meeting, In this quick review,
however, we determined that we might have major problems on item seven concerning
astronaut training and item 12 concerning public information release.
Wednesday Morning. On Wednesday morning, we continued the discussions of Tuesday
afternoon, starting out with a detailed discussion of astronaut familiarization and training.
After an in depth discussion, we did agree that it would be essential to identify candidate
crews one to two years before the flight and that these crews would have to be trained in
the other country on the other country's normal training equipment. The discussions
continued then [8] with a relatively quick understanding on the need to transmit televi-
sion downlinks from one control center to the other; the need to gain participation by
flight operational personnel in the talks; and the need to have the flight crews understand
the other country's language. We did have some difficulty in the discussion concerning
the desire to locate a small team of flight-oriented personnel from each country in the
other country's control center during the flight, but, on our side, decided this was not
essential and, therefore, did not pursue the point but rather left it for further discussion
by the project managers. Finally, on the point of public releases we again held a rather
lengthy discussion. The Soviets agreed that everything during a normal flight should be
released immediately and also pointed out that during a major disaster they would be will-
ing to have speedy releases just as they did in the case of the deaths of the Soyuz 11 cos-
monauts. Their main concern seems to be with minor abnormalities during a flight,
which, in their words, might be misunderstood by the general public. They indicated,
however, that in all areas of public information, they were loosening up and cited the
recent announcement of the intended objective of the Venera 8 as an example. I, in turn,
pointed out absolute need for us to continue to disclose publicly all information that is
available at the American control center and received at American tracking stations. At
the conclusion of the discussions, we agreed that we would develop a public information
plan which would take into account the obligations and practices of both sides.
After we finished discussing the 12 basic principles, it became time to start thinking
about the wording in the summary of the results of the talks. In the meantime, the Soviets
had translated our draft summary and had made a number of changes in it, and then
retranslated it back into English. This was to be the basis for our joint document. However,
we quickly found that the document had been weakened to the point where it really said
nothing of substance. To be a little more charitable, it said that we understood each other,
but it didn't say that we had agreed to anything. After a long discussion on this point, I
said that the document as written by the Russians was totally unacceptable to us and that
unless we could come out of this meeting with a firm agreement on at least basic princi-
ples of organi- [9] zation, as well as on the need to firm documentation and schedules, I
would be in no position to recommend that we are ready to proceed with a test mission,
and, in fact, would make a negative report when I returned to the United States. I further
stated that I was prepared to stay in Moscow until we had hammered out the necessary
words; that I believed that we did understand each other and it was now time to put all of
this down on paper. Thereupon we adjourned for lunch.
Wednesday Lunch. We had a quick bite to eat in the Embassy snack bar, and then
Frutkin, Lunney and I each took a piece of the summary of results that we had prepared
before we left Washington and modified it to include all of the 12 basic principles, togeth-
er with any changes that we had made in these principles during our previous discussions
in Moscow. All of this, of course, had to be done in a great hurry, and the document was
retyped before we returned to the Presidium at 4 o'clock tot the afternoon session.
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Wednesday Afternoon. When we returned with our new document, this came as a com-
plete surprise to the Soviet side. It was just unthinkable for them that anybody could have
recast the entire document so quickly. After a quick verbal translation by Zonov, the
Soviets called for a recess of half an hour. During the course of that recess, they studied
the document in detail, and when they returned, told us that the document was com-
pletely acceptable to them with the exception of some minor editorial changes. We then
adjourned for the evening and agreed that Frutkin and Vereshchetin would form an edi-
torial committee of two that would meet in the morning to go over the final document.
Thursday Morning. While Frutkin and Vereshchetin were editing the document,
Lunney and I continued the discussions with Petrov, Bushuyev, and Rumyantsev. First,
Bushuyev responded to the schedules document and gave an excellent discussion of his
views of the need to control schedules. During the course of the scheduling discussion, we
also discussed design reviews, which were understood and agreed to by both sides; joint
testing, which was also understood and agreed to; and finally, the Soviet side stated that
they agreed in principle to the entire organizational plan.
[10] Next I raised a question concerning the Soviet organization to do this mission. I
pointed out that they knew clearly where each of us fit into our organization and what our
responsibilities were. I asked if it would be possible to get the same kind of understanding
of their organization. Petrov responded in some detail, but really said nothing. He said
that Keldysh, as President of the Academy of Sciences, reported to the Council of
Ministers, and had been charged with being responsible for the US/USSR cooperation in
space. Petrov, in turn, reported directly to Keldysh, and Bushuyev to Petrov. I asked
whether the same organization would be in force during the hardware and flight opera-
tional phase, and the answer was in the affirmative. Petrov indicated that they would bring
additional people into the organization at that time, but that these people would still
report to Bushuyev.
By this time, Vereshchetin and Frutkin had finished editing the "Summary of Results"
and had prepared identical documents in English and in Russian. We reviewed these doc-
uments, had a few questions but no major hangups. Both sides agreed with the documents
as they had been prepared.
Finally, Thursday morning Bushuyev discussed technically the Soyuz system and gave
Lunney a document describing those systems. For the test mission in 1975, the Soyuz
would fly only two men for a five-day period, plus one day in reserve. They proposed also
that the Apollo spacecraft should be launched first and that the Apollo would be active in
the rendezvous and docking maneuver. (In subsequent discussions with Lunney, I told
him that from a policy point of view, I would actually prefer to have the Apollo launched
first as the Soviets now recommended and that unless there is a good technical reason not
to do so, we should accept this recommendation.)
Thursday Afternoon. After lunch at the American Embassy Residence, we returned to
the Presidium to sign the Summary of Results. After the signing ceremony and after
making the usual speeches, I discussed with Kotelnikov and the group the public posture
relative to the meetings we had just completed. I mentioned, first, that we intended no
public release of the meetings at all; second, that we do not intend to mention the fact
that we were now discussing Soyuz instead of [11] Salyut; third, I indicated that if pressed
and if we had to admit that meetings took place in Moscow during this week, we would say
that we were preparing the agenda for the July meeting but that we could not discuss the
content of the agenda; fourth, that if we were to take any different action from the above,
we would so notify Petrov; and, fifth, that we would intend to remain in this posture until
after the summit meeting. Kotelnikov completely agreed with this proposal, and with this
we ended our formal discussions in Moscow.
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Conclusions
A copy of the Summary of Results that was signed in Moscow is attached. From this,
and particularly from the discussions that went along with the agreements that were
reached and documented, I have reached the conclusion that we are ready to undertake
this test mission. Insofar as hardware matters are concerned, we have reached an under-
standing and agreement on all issues which have been identified so far, and, furthermore,
don't see any issues that we will be unable to agree on. On the management side, we have
reached agreement on such matters as regular and direct contact through frequent
telephone and telex communications, as well as visits; the requirement for and control of
formal documentation; .joint reviews of designs and hardware at various stages of devel-
opment; the requirement for joint tests of interconnecting systems; early participation by
flight operations specialists; the development of crew training plans; and the training in
each country of the other country's flight crew and operations personnel. We also
reached agreement on the requirement for and the level of detail of project schedules.
Finally, in the area of flight operations, we reached agreement on the principles of com-
munications command and control of the flight; the requirement for flight plans and mis-
sion rules for both normal and contingency situations; the immediate transmission of
flight television received in one country to the other country's control center; the lan-
guage problem; and the need to develop a public information plan, taking into account
the obligations and practices of both sides.
Based on all of these agreements, it was my recommendation that the United States is
ready to execute a government-to-government agreement and should now do so.
[Attachment page 1] May 30, 1972
Addendum
Moscow Trip, April 4-6, 1972
This is an Epilogue to the special notes I prepared after my trip to the Soviet Union
on April 4-6, 1972.
During the course of that visit to Moscow we reached an agreement (signed by
Kotelnikov, the then Acting President of the USSR Academy of Sciences and myself) on
matters concerning the technical details, the organization, management, operational
details, and scheduling of a possible joint docking mission involving the United States
Apollo spacecraft and the Soviet Union's Soyuz spacecraft. Upon my return from Moscow
we recommended to the White House (Henry Kissinger) that, from NASA's point of view,
we were prepared to proceed with such a mission in the 1975 time period, that no further
NASA/USSR Academy meetings would be required, and that the torm of the agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union could be a relatively simple and straight-
forward one. A copy of our proposed wording for that agreement is attached.
Between the middle of April and the middle of May (the summit meeting started on
May 22), there was a great deal of interest by the press in the possibility of having a joint
docking mission on the summit agenda, and a large number of interviews with NASA peo-
ple was held. In all of these interviews, there was a great deal of speculation about the pos-
sibility of an agreement on the docking mission at the summit, but there was never any
hint of the April 4-6 meeting, nor was there ever any hint that during that meeting the
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Soyuz spacecraft was substituted by the Russians by the Salyut. In other words, from
NASA's side we were able to avoid any discussions of NASA's preparation for the summit
meedng or of the form that any agreement might take. This was possible only because
such a very small number of NASA people had been involved in the activities leading up
to the summit.
[2] It was only during the week before the summit meeting that the State Department
worked on the specific wording of the agreement and made only minor changes in our
previously submitted wording. Apparently State and the White House started coordinat-
ing the words with the Soviet Union only on the 18th or 19th of May (we have no idea in
NASA why this was undertaken only at this late date). On May 20, the USSR responded to
our proposed wording with a much lengthier document, which among other things,
included the Keldvsh-Low agreement of January 21, 1971, in addition to the docking
agreement. Furthermore, with respect to the docking agreement, the Soviet words did not
include by reference our previous meetings and, instead, some rather cumbersome word-
ing was substituted.
Apparently when the Soviet response was received by our State Department, it was
immediately discussed with Kissinger and Rogers, who were at the time over the Atlantic
on their way to Salzburg, astop on the way to Moscow. Kissinger asked that we prepare an
appropriate response but that insofar as possible, we should not change the wording in
the Soviet text. All of this was done in a meeting at State Department starting at 2:30
Saturday afternoon, the 20th, and ending in the middle of the night. During that time we
straightened out the wording in the Preamble but kept by and large the Soviet meaning.
With respect to the Keldysh-Low Agreement, we did not make any significant changes,
with one exception. The Soviet document had incorporated words concerning commu-
nications satellites which had not been part of the January 21, 1971, agreement, and we
therefore deleted these words. Finally, with respect to the docking agreement, we select-
ed words similar to those that we had propo.sed in April in our memorandum to Kissinger
and especially incorporated in that article the April 4-6 agreement by reference. This doc-
ument, together with the clarifying document, was forwarded to the White
House/Salzburg late that night. In the clarifying document we stated that NASA had no
objection to the inclusion of the Keldysh-Low Agreement in the government-to-
government agreement, but [3] pointed out that this was not necessary, nor had it been
the intent. State Department on the other hand felt that it should not be included because
it would make our relationships with the Europeans even more difficult in light of our
recent lack of enthusiasm for space cooperation with the Europeans. With respect to the
April 6 agreement, we stated in the clarifying telegram that NASA insisted that it be
included by reference.
Following the Saturday meeting we had no additional information except persistent
signals that the space agreement was scheduled to be signed in Moscow on Wednesday,
the 24th. On the 23rd, I left for the West Coast for a talk in San Diego on the evening of
the 23rd, and then a visit toJPL [the Jet Propulsion Laboratory] on the 24th. During the
course of the evening in San Diego (after dinner and during the preliminaries leading up
to my talk), I received a telephone call, through the State Department Operations Center,
involving Arnold Frutkin, somebody in State Department, and myself. State had just
received a final text as it had been agreed to tentatively in Moscow. In this text the Keldysb-
Low Agreement was still included and there were words acceptable to us with respect to
the docking mission. The April 6th agreement was specifically included. I accepted the
words as they had been read to me just in time to get back into the ballroom (I had taken
the telephone call at a hallway outside) to hear myself introduced as the evening's main
speaker. It is interesting to note that by this time it was 6 a.m. in Moscow on the day that
the agreement was actually signed.
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On the next day, May 24, I went toJPL and soon learned that the agreement actually
had been signed in Moscow at apparently 11 o'clock a.m. EDT. At 2:25 p.m. EDT, the Vice
President introduced Jim Fletcher, Jim McDivitt, and Glynn Lunney, who held a press con-
ference at the Executive Office Building. Sometime thereafter, Fletcher held another
press conference at NASA Headquarters, and simultaneously, I held one atJPL.
[4] There has been no adverse criticism in this country concerning the space agreement
in general, or the Apollo/Soyuz test project in particular, and, in fact, there has been a
great deal of overwhelmingly favorable editorial comment ....
Documenl 1-47
Document title: Henry A. Kissinger, to the President, "US-Soviet Space Cooperation,"
May 17, 1972, with attached: "Draft Agreement."
Source: Nixon Project, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.
The final decision to proceed with what became known as the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project was not made
until shortly before the May 1972 U.S.-US.S.R. summit meeting in Moscow. This decision memo-
randum, when approved by President Nixon, was the basis for project approval.
[1]
FROM:
SUBJECT:
May17,1972
Memorandum for the President
Henry A. Kissinger
US-Soviet Space Cooperation
In NSDM 153, you directed NASA and State to explore with the Soviets the possibili-
ty of a US-Soviet agreement on the desirability of a joint, manned space docking mission,
so as to provide you with the option of announcing this agreement during the Moscow
visit.
NASA's Deputy Administrator, Dr. George Low, held detailed talks on the possible
joint mission with representatives of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow from April
4-6. Both sides had earlier agreed that such a mission was technically feasible and
desirable. NASA Administrator Fletcher now reports that Dr. Low's April mission was suc-
cessful; he was able to reach agreement on the principles of managing, scheduling and
conducting a joint space docking mission.
The Soviets have informed NASA that they would like to reach formal agreement on space coop-
eration, including the joint manned mission, during the Moscow Summit. Programmatically, the US
is ready to execute such an agreement, and NASA recommends that this be done..
The costs involved with the joint manned mission, which would be scheduled for
1975, are now estimated by NASA to be approximately $250 million. This estimate has
been developed in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget.
Clark MacGregor has taken soundings to determine the likely Congressional reaction
to the proposed joint mission. These soundings indicate that the proposal would gain
acceptance by a 3-1 or 4-1 margin.
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Thetextoftheproposedspaceagreementcouldbequitebrief,alongthelinesofthe
draftatTabA.I recommendthatyouapprovetheproposed[2]US-Sovietspaceagree-
ment,permittingthenecessarystepstobetakenpriortoyourMoscowvisitoprovideyou
withtheoptionofannouncingtheagreementattheSummit.
Approve Disapprove
Withyourapproval,IwillforwardacopyofthismemorandumtotheDirector,Office
ofManagementa dBudget,withtherequestthathearrangetotakesuchbudgetarysteps
asmaybenecessarytoprovideforimplementationftheagreement.
Approve Disapprove
[Attachmentpage1]
Draft Agreement
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to a
program of joint activities designed to enhance the safety of manned flight in space and
provide a basis for possible cooperative space projects of mutual benefit.
Toward these goals, it is agreed that rendezvous and docking systems of future gener-
ations of manned spacecraft of both countries will be compatible, to permit rendezvous,
docking, rescue, and possible joint experiments in space. It is further agreed that the first
flight to test these future systems will be carried out in 1975, using specially modified
Apollo-type and Soyuz-type spacecraft. In this flight the two spacecraft will rendezvous and
dock in space, and cosmonauts and astronauts will visit in each other's spacecraft. This
joint project will be conducted in accordance with the Summary of Results of the Meeting
Between Representatives of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration and
the USSR Academy of Sciences held in Moscow on April 4 to 6, 1972.
Document 1-48
Document title: George M. Low, Memorandmn for the Record, "Visit to Moscow, October
14-19, 1973," November 1, 1973.
Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York.
Once the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to carry out the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project,
there were frequent interchanges of personnel between NASA and its counterparts in the U.S.S.R.
NASA Deput_ Administrator George Low made. an October 1973 visit to Moscow for a top-level mid-
term project review. This detailed memorandurn for the record contains Low's observations on his time
in Moscow.
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[1] November 1, 1973
Memorandum for the Record
SUBJECT: Visit to Moscow, October 14-19, 1973
BA CKGR 0 UND
On August 14, I had written to Academician H. V. Keldysh, President of the USSR
Academy of Sciences, suggesting a mid-term review of tile Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. A
copy of my letter to Keldysh is attached. In the letter I also stated that in addition to review-
ing the current status of the project, I would like to discuss in detail four specific subjects:
system failures; participation in and observation of the test activity and flight preparation;
project milestones; and the preparation of documentation. I further asked if it would be
possible to visit some Soviet space facilities during the course of my visit. Keldysh respond-
ed favorably on August 30. (A copy of his letter is also attached.) Then, about a week
before my visit, I received a telephone call from Chet Lee, who was already in Moscow,
indicating that Keldysh was ill and would be unable to see me. He added, however, that
the Soviet side clearly wanted me to come ahead and urged him to convey to me that this
is not a "diplomatic illness" and that my visit would be most worthwhile. In order to fur-
ther make it desirable for me to come, they promised that they would take me to the
Soviet Mission Control Center near Moscow. The telephone call was followed by an offi-
cial telegram from Keldysh and after discussions with Arnold Frutkin we decided that 1
should go ahead with the visit as planned. (Both Arnold and I asked about Keldysh's
health on many occasions after we arrived in Moscow. The response we both received was
that Keldysh is not really ill in the true sense of the word but is extremely tired and run-
down. He had not taken a vacation after his major operation earlier this year and had
worked extremely hard ever since then. He was therefore "ordered" by his physicians to
take a rest and not to participate in any of the meetings with me. During the course of my
visit, his office was always dark, his secretary was nowhere in sight, and it was quite clear
that he was completely away from the office during this week.)
[2] SUMMARY OF VISIT
Sunday, October 14
Arrived in Moscow with Frutkin early in the evening. Met at airport by Boris Petrov,
Vereshchetin, Jack Tech from the U.S. Embassy, and one or two others. Rode to Hotel
Rossia in Petrov's car and, as we had requested, did not participate in any official func-
tions that evening.
Monday, October 15, 7:00 a.m.
Executive Session at Hotel Rossia with Lunney and his Working Group chairmen.
According to Lunney, the two weeks of preparatory meetings had gone extremely well and
much had been accomplished. The "Summery of Results" of their meetings had been pre-
pared and a copy of this is attached. In addition, Donnelly had negotiated a first-phase
(pre-flight) Public Affairs Plan which was to be ratified by Petrov and me. We discussed
some of the technical results of the meeting but I will cover these later as I discuss each
specific item.
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Monday, October 15, 9.'00 a.m.
We met at the Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences for the Apollo-Soyuz "Mid-
term Review." Participating on our side were Low, Frutkin, Lee, Lunney, Cernan, Stafford,
Smylie, Dietz, and Frank. Soviet attendees included Petrov, Bushuyev, Vereshchetin,
Rumyantsev, Abduyevski (the Deputy Director of the Control Center), Cosmonaut
Yeliseyev (the Flight Director), Cosmonaut Leonov (the Soyuz Commander); Tulin,
Tsorev, and Kozorev of Intercosmos; Working Group Chairmen Timchenko, Legostaev,
Syromyamikov, Nikitin, Galin, and Lavrov; and their interpreter Zonov. During the course
of the meetings, Bushuyev, Lunney and alternate Working Group Chairmen gave a tech-
nical review using a notebook of "Vu-graphs." Notebooks had been prepared in both lan-
guages so that all of us could follow the review.
Monday, October 15, lunch time
Frutkin, Lee, Lunney, and I joined Petrov, Bushuyev, and Vereshchetin for a small lun-
cheon at the "Club of Scientists." [3] Even though this was very informal and there were
not too many toasts, it was nevertheless a Soviet-size dinner, with five or six courses, which
consumed the better part of two hours.
Monday, October 15, 3:00p.m.
We returned to the Presidium for another session involving all participants. This was
a relatively brief session with only a few questions asked by our side and responses given
by their side. At the conclusion of the session, both Petrov and I agreed that good progress
had been made in ASTP, that there were no open questions other than those raised by the
technical Project Directors in their Summary, and that we had high confidence in meet-
ing our launch date of July 15, 1975.
Monday, October 15, 4:00p.m.
I had asked for an Executive Session to discuss some of the points raised in my letter
to Keldysh which were not brought out during the technical meeting. Participating on our
side were Low, Frutkin, Lee, and Lunney, and on their side Petrov, Bushuyev,
Vereshchetin, Rumyantsev, Tulin, Tsorev, and Kozorev. During the course of this meeting,
! brought up the subjects of systems failures, participation in factory installation of U.S.
equipment, documentation, Stafford's desire to see actual spacecraft hardware and not
only mock-ups, and the desirability of a press conference before our departure fiom
Moscow. This was a very frank and forceful discussion with our side politely but firmly
insisting on responsiveness by the Soviet side.
Monday, October 15, 7:00p.m.
The Charge d'Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow had invited the two delegations
for a small reception at the Embassy. This was quite informal and friendly with no detailed
discussions about the business at hand. There was great interest in Skylab and the well-
being of the Skylab's three astronauts on the part of a number of the Soviet delegation
and they appeared to be amazed how well Bean and his crew had done after 59 1/2 days
in space. I also picked up the following incidental piece of information from Petrov: It is
the Soviet's view that TU-144 [4] accident was caused by a small French aircraft which flew
into the TU-144's flight path. The TU-144 had to veer off and thus flew into the ground.
Monday, October 15, 8:00p.m.
I met in my hotel room with Donnelly, Shafer, Frutkin, and Lee to discuss the Public
Affairs Plan. Donnelly and Shafer appeared to be quite disturbed by some of the things
that had happened while they were in Moscow but we agreed not to discuss this any fur-
ther until we returned to Washington. We then discussed the substance of the Public
Affairs Plan and agreed that it was not yet ready for ratification without further clarifica-
tion.
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Tuesday, October 16, 9:00 a.m.
I paid a brief call on Academician Kotelnikof, the Acting President of the Academy of
Sciences. This was only a courtesy visit, with some small talk but no substance.
Tuesday, October 16, 10:00 a.m.
Visited the Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry of the Academy of
Sciences. Vinogradov was to have been our host, but we were told that he suffered a bad
cold and we therefore met with his Deputy, whose name I believe is Sorkhov.
Tuesday, October 16, 11:00 a.m.
Next we visited the Institute of Space Research of the Academy of Sciences and met
its new head, Prof. R. S. Sagdeyev. Sagdeyev speaks good English, is friendly and open, and
looks like the sort of person with whom we ought to be able to develop good relationships.
Tuesday, October 16, 3:00p.m.
Visited Academician V. A. Kirillin, the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers
and Chairman of the State Committee for [5] Science and Technology. I had asked for
this courtesy visit prior to my arrival in Moscow and as soon as I arrived there were many
questions as to why I wanted to see Kirillin. I assured everybody that this was really only a
courtesy visit.
Tuesday, October 16, 7:00p.m.
Went to the ballet in the Kremlin and saw "Don Quixote" for the second time during
one of my Moscow visits. For one who doesn't like ballet, this should be considered to be
above and beyond the call of duty.
Wednesday, October 17, 8:45 a.m.
Left the hotel to visit the cosmonauts' training center at Star City. At Star City we were
met by General Beregovoy since General Shatalov, who is now in charge, was visiting in
Japan. We also met the Soyuz 12 cosmonauts, Lazarev and Makarov, as well as ASTP cos-
monauts Leonov, Kubasev, and Filipchenko. Petrov and Bushuyev were with us, and we
were also joined by Feoktistov, whom I had not seen since my January 1971 visit. The rea-
son for this became apparent later. Feoktistov was there to show us through the Salyut
mock-up. He knew Salyut as well as I had at one time known Apollo, and obviously is either
the Chief Engineer or Program Manager on Salyut.
At Star City we had a sit-down briefing, a visit to the Soyuz simulators and docking
trainers, a discussion of the ASTP version of Soyuz, and then a very detailed description
of Salyut, with a tour of its high fidelity mock-up. We were also shown the Soyuz 12 space
suit. We then had a quick tour of the museum and the usual seven- or eight-course dinner
with the usual number (15 or 20) of toasts. I was a lot smarter this time, though, then I
had been on the last visit to Star City. I did not participate in any of the "bottoms up" toasts
and merely sipped my vodka politely each time.
Wednesday, October 17, 4:00p.m.
I had asked for discussion on the ASTP Public Affairs Plan and Petrov and I decided
to have this meeting while we were at [6] Star City. Participating in this meeting were the
same ones who participated in the Executive Session on Monday aflernoon. At the com-
pletion of this meeting we left for Moscow.
Wednesday, October 17, evening
The evening was free but Arnold Frutkin and I met in our hotel room for further dis-
cussions on the Public Affairs Plan. Here we wrote some words which we hoped would
clarify the Plan, for additional discussions the next morning.
Thursday, October 18, 9:00 a.m.
Frutkin and I met with Petrov, Vereshchetin, and Rumyantsev on the ASTP Public
Affairs Plan. During the course of this discussion, we reached a complete understanding
of all points but did not reach agreement on them. Unfortunately, Donnelly had already
left Moscow so he was unable to participate with us.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOV_,I 203
Thursday, October 18, 10:15 a.m.
We left the hotel for the visit to the Soviet Mission Control Center. This was a first for
any Western visitors and, of course, of great interest to us. We arrived there approximate-
ly 45 minutes later and had a very detailed tour of the Center. Following the tour, at 2:00
p.m., we had lunch at the Control Center, complete with eight different wine, vodka, and
brandy glasses in front of us, and served by waiters in dinner jackets. It was again a dinner
with many, many courses and many, many toasts. Chris Kraft's cafeteria in the Houston
Mission Control Center was really put to shame.
Thursday, October 18, 3:30p.m.
We visited the Cosmos Pavilion of the USSR Exhibition of Achievements in National
Economy. This is the USSR Space Museum, which I had seen once before. I, therefore,
looked at only the new exhibits, which included Mars 3, Lunokhod, and several other less-
er exhibits. We also were shown a countdown and launch [7] demonstration using a com-
plete working model of the Baikonur launch complex.
Thursday, October 15, 5:15 p.m.
We were back at the Presidium for the "signing ceremony." Here we signed the
Summary of Results of our meeting which, in this case, was very brief since the detailed
Summary had been signed by Lunney and Bushuyev. The Summary, as well as the press
release, had been worked out by Frutkin and Vereshchetin and had been previously
approved by Petrov and me during our meeting at Star City. (Copies attached.)
Thursday, October 18, 5:30p.m.
Petrov and I, in the company of Lunney and Bushuyev, held a press conference at the
Presidium. Petrov preferred to call this a "meeting" with the press because he did not
invite the foreign press corps (other than U.S.) nor many of the Soviet press corps. We
had, however, insisted that the entire American press corps would be invited. After a brief
introduction by Petrov, I gave an opening statement summarizing our entire visit. We then
opened it up to questions. Unfortunately, the American press wasn't smart enough to ask
some of the more difficult questions like "Where is the Mission Control Center?" or "What
did you learn about the Soyuz II failure?" We were prepared on both of these questions.
However, Lunney did talk to some of the American press after the press conference and
did at that time get into the record that we had indeed been given a detailed report on
the Soyuz II failure.
Thursday, October 18, 7:00p.m.
The Soviet delegation had a dinner and reception in our honor at the "Hall of
Mirrors" of the Hotel Prague. This was another formal sit-down dinner with many more
toasts and, I might add, the second big dinner of the day. Somehow we all survived.
Friday, October 19, &O0 a.m.
We left Moscow Airport on an Aeroflot flight for London and from there back to the
U.S.
[8] GENERAL 0 BSER VA TIONS
Moscow
Moscow seemed to be a friendlier place this time than I remembered it from my pre-
vious visits. There were more cars, more lights, people appeared to be livelier, and even
the hotel staff appeared to be less dour. Either there has been a change or perhaps we
have become accustomed to their way of life. The fact that I could understand their lan-
guage this time, at least at times, and the fact that I could speak it well enough to order
breakfast, get my room key, and leave a wake-up call, may also have had something to do
with the apparent change in attitude.
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Relations with Academy oJ Sciences and ASTP Personnel
In general, both sides seemed to get to the point quicker and easier and appeared to
reach a fuller understanding of each issue. Discussions were more direct and more open
and frank. Each side made a special effort to make sure that there would be no misun-
derstandings in the agreements which were reached. (The single exception appeared to
be in the negotiation of the Public Affairs Plan where our people have less experience in
working with the Soviets.)
NASA Contingent
The NASA contingent under Glynn Lunney is doing an outstanding job. They are
diplomatic but firm in all their dealings with their Soviet counterparts. They excel not
only during the course of technical discussions but also at social functions.
USSR Reaction
The general reaction to us and to our work still appears to he one of inferiority, but
at the same time one that seeks parity. After each visit we were asked, "How did you like
it?" "What did you think?" "How does it compare with yours?"
International Situation
We were in Moscow at the height of the Middle East conflict and at a time when
Handler and Keldysh were exchanging rather firm [9] letters on the Sakharov affair. Yet
neither one of these subjects came up at any time during our visit and the situation
appeared to be perfectly normal. (From our side, of course, we missed getting any news
about the Middle East situation.) As a matter of fact, the New York Times concluded '"Fhe
warm treatment of Mr. Low and a team of American specialists, working with their Soviet
counterparts to prepare for the Apollo-Soyuz mission, was read as a deliberate gesture by
Moscow to emphasize its interest in Soviet-American cooperation and the detente despite
the frictions of the Middle East conflict."
Personal Reaction
I had learned a great deal about how to "survive" for a week in Moscow since my first
visit and, therefore, this visit was very much easier than previous ones had been. Generally,
I had only one meal per day, that is lunch, which, as I have mentioned previously, was
always a full dinner. (On Thursday, however, we had two of these dinners.) I always had
only a very minimal breakfast of tea, bread, and butter at the hotel "cafeteria" and more
often than not no evening meal at all. I also learned that l could coax a single vodka
through many toasts.
TECHNICAL STATUS OF ASTP
During the course of the status review, Bushuyev gave a basic introduction which was
followed by status reports on internal preparations in the U.S. and USSR given by Lunney
and Bushuyev, respectively. Next, each of the Working Group chairmen (either a Russian
or an American) gave a progress report for their respective groups: mission model, oper-
ations plans, experiments, and spacecraft integration; guidance and control, and docking
aids; mechanical design; communications and tracking; and life support and crew trans-
fer. Each group gave a detailed schedule and report of progress against that schedule. By
and large, all milestones were met and when they were not being met workarounds were
available.
Agreements have been reached on five joint experiments; on reciprocal participation
of specialists as observers during life support system tests of Apollo and Soyuz; participa-
tion in joint seal tests; on a number of safety assessment reports and others [10] that yet
had to be written; on studies for the need of electro-magnetic compatibility tests of the
cable communications system; and on the participation by U.S. specialists at the Soviet
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launch site during the pre-flight checkout of the VHF AM equipment. In addition, draw-
ings had been exchanged on the Soyuz orbital module and the Apollo docking module.
The problem of mixed crew descent had been discussed and it was decided that this would
be considered an "unexamined contingency situation." Another area open for further dis-
cussion is additional dockings subsequent to the first undocking.
At the conclusion of the meeting, four potential problem areas were described. These
were: documentation; the desirability of U.S. access to the factory in the event of problems
during the installation of the VHF equipment; the launch window; and the need for con-
tinuing timely exchange of ground and flight test data on ASTP-type Soyuz and Apollo
vehicles and systems.
The subject of documentation was discussed during the main meeting as well as dur-
ing the executive session. I also brought it up privately with Petrov. It seems that a great
deal of progress has been made by the Soviets in recent weeks in catching up in all areas
where they were behind on documentation. Nevertheless, Lunney is concerned that as
time grows shorter they will once again fall behind and we may stub our toe on the entire
project. The Soviet solution to the problem is a better forecast of documentation require-
ments. We agree with this point of view but we say that this is not the complete solution
because we can't possibly foresee all problem areas. I believe that Petrov finally under-
stood what we were getting at and promised to personally keep an eye on the situation.
On the subject of access of U.S. specialists during the installation of the U.S. provid-
ed VHF equipment, it is quite clear that they do not want our people in their factory but
have no objection to their presence at the launch site. We told them that we accepted their
view on this but that they should consider now what they would do in the event they were
to run into trouble and then really required our presence at the factory. I later told Petrov
during the executive session that we understood that this might present difficulties and
that he would be wise to work these out now for the contingency situation which might
require our presence.
[ 11 ] Insofar as the launch window is concerned, it now closes on September 22 as a result
of lighting constraints in the recovery area. Both sides agreed to work on this to see
whether it cannot be extended into December.
The last point concerning the timely exchange of ground and flight test data is close°
ly related to the documentation question which | have already discussed.
VISITS TO USSR FACILITIES
The present Soviet decision is that Star City, the Control Center, and the launch site
will be open to our technical people. The Soyuz factory will not. Although we reached
agreement only on pre-flight activities insofar as the launch site is concerned, Petrov let it
be known during the press conference that there would be no problem with our special-
ists staying there during the time of the launch. Insofar as access for the news media is con-
cerned, the present decision seems to be that Star City, or at least parts thereof, will he
open to the news media but the Control Center and the launch site will not.
Tom Stafford had also voiced a concern to me about the fact that he would only see
Soyuz simulators and never actual Soyuz flight hardware. I discussed this concern during
the executive session. We were told that simulators really were exactly like the flight hard-
ware but nevertheless I said that Stafford was looking for subtle differences and that it was
quite important to him to see the actual flight hardware. I suggested perhaps that this too
would be possible at the launch site since their spacecraft arrived there some four to six
months before the launch. During the course of the executive session, Pelrov ,agreed to
look into this and later told Stafford that he. thought this would be possible.
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SOVIET FAIL URES
During the course of the technical visits preceding my review, the Soviets had made a
detailed presentation of the Soyuz II failure and had given us a copy of their failure report.
They had not discussed any other failures. In the failure report, they also stated that
Cosmos 496 and Cosmos 573 were both [12] unmanned test flights of the changes made
after the Soyuz II failure and prior to the Soyuz 12 flight. During the course of the tech-
nical review they also stated that there will be two or three more manned Soyuz flights in
1974 and prior to the ASTP flight. Soyuz 12, by the way, did not incorporate a docking sys-
tem while the 1974 flights will incorporate the ASTP-type docking system.
During the course of the executive session, I told Petrov that we greatly appreciated
their report on the Soyuz II failure but that we were also concerned about additional fail-
ures reported in the American press during the summer of 1973. ! specifically mentioned
Salyut 2, which the press had reported as a failure, and Cosmos 557, which some American
press reports had also called a Salyut-type vehicle.
Petrov was obviously prepared for the Salyut 2 question, but not for the Cosmos 557
question. On Salyut 2, he said that this bore no relation to the Soyuz which we will use in
our joint mission. He stated that Salyut 2 was an improved modernized version of the
Salyut. Because of the significant changes, the Salyut 2 flight had been planned from the
beginning as an automated flight and was never intended to be manned. We were told
that many of the changes were in the automatic control system and these changes clearly
required an unmanned flight. To add emphasis, this point was repeated many times.
Petrov went on to say that Salyut 2 should be considered a flight for the development of
future space stations, that the Salyut is completely independent of the Soyuz, and, finally,
that it was not important where it returned to the earth, merely that it returned some
place in the open sea.
In summary, it was never clearly said whether Salyut 2 was a failure or a success, but
only that whatever it was did not concern us because it did not relate to Soyuz.
I again brought up the subject of Cosmos 557 since there was no response on this
question. Petrov did not respond, but another in the group--I believe it was Tsorev---did.
He said that Cosmos 557 bore no relation to a manned flight and was neither related to
Salyut nor to Soyuz. He said the reports in our press obviously were mistaken.
[ 13] STAR CITY
I saw more of Star City this time than I had during my previous visit. Of major signif-
icance is the amount of new construction underway at the present time. A new training
building is being put up especially for ASTP training. It is a 4-story building which will
include classrooms, lecture halls, display rooms for our spacecraft subsystems, etc. In addi-
tion, they are building a new hotel and dispensary for the United States team. I think both
of these projects are underway so that astronaut treatment at Star City won't appear to be
shabby in comparison to cosmonaut treatment in Houston. In addition, two or three
other large buildings for training or to house simulators are under construction, as well
as a large centrifuge with a capability of up to 20 g's at an onset rate of 2 g's per second
for personnel or 4 g's per second for equipment. Both the ASTP classroom and the ASTP
hotel buildings were started after the ASTP agreement had been reached, and neither will
be quite ready at the time of the November visit but should be ready for the second visit
of our astronauts.
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Soyuz Simulator and Docking Simulator
I had seen both of these on my previous visit to Star City in January 1971. Leonov con-
ducted the briefings on both. The basic change in the Soyuz reentry module is that it is
equipped for only two cosmonauts now while it had room for three during my previous
visit. There are also provisions to connect pressure suits and the new pressure relief and
shut-offvalves which were installed subsequent to the Soyuz II failure are very evident. We
were told that the simulator was currently in the Soyuz 12 configuration. This configura-
tion did not include a docking hatch. In the orbital module, we were shown the potassi-
um superoxide air regeneration system and during the course of the discussion there was
much talk about condensation removal. This must at one time have been a problem. On
the way to the orbital module simulators, one passes through the room in which the opti-
cal systems for the displays are mounted. These included both Soyuz and Salyut models.
The docking trainer also showed no difference from 1971 except that the visual tar-
gets for docking now included both the Soyuz and the Salyut, whereas only the Soyuz was
included in 1971.
[14] Mock-up Area
We next went to the mock-up area where Busbuyev went over the Paris Air Show dis-
play of the Soyuz with the new docking system, as well as an "external mock-up" of each
of the two Soyuz modules. 1 put the words "external mock-up" in quotes because for all I
know this might have been flight hardware. Of interest on this external mock-up was the
external insulation, which is a fabric blanket, and the fact that the orbital module had an
old style docking system, and it too was said to be in the Soyuz 12 configuration. Again we
were told that the ASTP docking system will not be flown until 1974. Bushuyev also indi-
cated that in the Soyuz 12 configuration, Soyuz is a 4-day vehicle if flown alone and a
60-day vehicle if flown with Salyut.
.Space Suit
This was modeled by a technician and described by Cosmonaut Kubasev. It is a fairly
lightweight garment which, according to Leonov, takes five minutes to don. It will be the
type of garment used in ASTP. It is expected to be worn only for about two hours at any
one time and, therefore, has no provisions for sanitation. The outer garment provides the
strength. The inner garment is a thin rubber bladder, which is sealed by gathering up a
bunch of rubber, twisting it, and then tying it with a large rubber band. This sealed gar-
ment is then tucked underneath the folds of the external garment which is laced shut.
The suit is worn for launch, docking, undocking, and reentry.
Salyut
In the same mock-up building with the Soyuz Paris Air Show exhibit is also the Salyut
mock-up. Incidentally, this is a fairly new building in which the ASTP training will also be
conducted. It has a glass partition and we were told that the news media will be able to
watch from behind that partition when our crews are there. (Even though the building is
fairly new, somehow they managed to make the bathrooms look as though they were twen-
ty years old.) Feoktistov was our guide around and through Salyut. (He had already met
with Lunney earlier during the visit because Lunney had asked why we never see him any-
more. At that time, [15] Lunney asked him when he would again visit the U.S. Feoktistov
responded that he had many very serious problems and thought that he would not be able
to visit for a long time to come.) Externally, the Salyut we saw differed from the pictures
I had previously seen in that it had three solar panels mounted on the main part of the
body. Two were mounted horizontally like wings on an airplane and the third vertically
but in the same section as the horizontal ones. The horizontal ones could be pivoted to
get a better exposure to the sun even while the Salyut was flying at an angle. (I don't recall
whether the vertical one could also be pivoted.) Feoktistov told us that Salyut could fly in
any attitude for an indefinite period of time without thermal problems.
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We entered Salyut through a hatch on the side of what in Skylab would be the multi-
ple docking adapter. I forgot to ask, however, whether it was possible to dock with more
than one spacecraft at a time. I don't believe it is. We then went into the main section and
first looked at the instrument panel which is very similar to that of the Soyuz. In fact, many
of the instruments are identical, as are many of the subsystems. The propulsion system, for
example, we were told is exactly like the Soyuz system, and the ECS is a version of the
Soyuz system. In response to my question, Feoktistov said that Salyut nominally had a
60-day lifetime but that this could easily be extended to four months by trading on-board
consumables for propellants. He also mentioned that food, water, and the air generation
system could be resupplied but the propellant could not be resupplied. However, if the
Salyut is in a sufficiently high orbit the amount of propellant used for attitude stabiliza-
tion is minimal. There are no control moment gyros. We saw two rather primitive fire
extinguishers, a bungie cord exerciser, including a treadmill, and a wall chart indicating
the exercises to be taken. Sleep stations are tucked away around a I 0-meter focal length
solar telescope. There were a number of other scientific instruments--spectrometers,
cameras, star sensors, sun sensors, etc.--all of which were explained in detail by
Feoktistov. There is also a refrigerator and a food warmer. Finally, the bathroom is at the
very tail end of the station and does not appear to be as complete as the Skylab bathroom.
Also at the tail end of the station are two trash air-locks, both used for dumping garbage
in bags to the outside. They are at approximately + 45 ° from the vertical and appear to be
of inordinately heavy construction.
[ 16] Incidentally, Lunney told me that he inferred from some discussions that there might
be some heavy flight actisSty in the March-April time period next year since many of the
specialists with whom he normally deals will then not be available.
SOVIET MISSION CONTROL CENTER
The drive to the Mission Control Center from the hotel took approximately 45 min-
utes. We headed out of town in a northerly direction, passed the Exhibition of
Achievements in the National Economy (Space Museum), then the Moscow city limits,
and then drove for another five minutes or so. The Center is located in the village of
Kaliningrad. (After leaving the Center and on the way to the press conference, I asked
Petrov how I should respond to a question concerning the Control Center's location. At
first he stated that I should merely say that it is at the outskirts of Moscow, but apparently
he checked this out after we reached the Academy of Sciences again and then told me that
I could state, if asked, that it is in Kaliningrad. I was not asked.)
The Center is located within a large complex of buildings surrounded by a security
wall. The way we entered and left the area it was difficult to see much of the other build-
ings. They all are several stories high and could house all sorts of equipment. There were
no antennas in evidence. Some new construction is also going on. Within the Control
Center building, all of the curtains on the street side were open but all of the curtains fac-
ing the rest of the complex were conspicuously drawn. The Control Center building is
approximately three or four years old. It had been used in the past for the control of
unmanned flights but the first manned flight under control of this Center was Soyuz 12.
We were told that it would be used for all future manned flights, Soyuz as well as Salyut,
but that not all Salyut flights would be controlled from there. Apparently, there will be
some unmanned Salyut flights to be controlled from somewhere else. The building itself
is well-constructed and well-appointed. (I will later describe the Institute of Space
Research, which is very poorly constructed. By contrast, a lot more money was spent on
the physical building of the Control Center than on the Institute of Space Research.) We
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were first taken into tile conference room on the second floor where we were greeted by
Abduvevski (the Deputy Director of the Control Center). Abduyevski was with us all of the
lime I_nt answered few,'if any, [17] questions. I have the feeling that he is relatively new in
the Control Center and does not know a great deal about it yet. In fact, he may be there
solely for the purpose of dealing with NASA. Next we were briefed by Yeliseyev, the Flight
Director. He used three charts which had been prepared in English as well as in Russian.
These charts depicted how the Control Center fits within the overall operations (launch,
network, communications, control, etc.); the flow of information within the Control
Center; and the organization of flight controllers within the mission operations control
room. In the first order, there is no difference in any of these areas from the way we oper-
ate in Houston. h is possible, however, that some of the functions that are performed at
(;oddard for manned flight control in the U.S. are actually performed within this Control
Center in the USSR.
Data flow fi-om the tracking stations apparently without any preprocessing at the sta-
tions. They are then manipulated and formatted within various parts of the Control
Center an_t finally displayed in digital form on "I'M displays in the Mission Operations
Conu-ot Room. Voice transmissions to the spacecraft flow in the opposite direction. There
are no electronic commands generated within the Control Center. Command decisions
are made at the Control Center, of course, but the electronic command generation takes
place at the tracking stations.
_A'e left the conference room through a second door and found ourselves in the view-
ing room of the Mission Operations Control Room. This is on a balcony overlooking the
main floor of the Control Room. I don't know exactly what I expected to see when I
entered the Control Room, but somehow I was surprised and had the feeling that I had
wound up in the midst of a Hollywood set. The Control Room is extremely well-
appointed and well-outfitted. It is not very different in appear.ance from our Control
Room in Houston. On the front wall there are a number of large screens for either opti-
cal or telmision displays. Television displays are handled with an eidophorjust as they are
in our case.
As we entered the Control Room, a playback of the Soyuz 12 final countdown was in
progress. Across the top of the front wall are a number of clocks showing Moscow time,
elapsed time, station acquisition time, and station loss-of-signal time. On the left hand
screen were displayed a number of trajectory parameters_apogee, perigee, period, etc.
The top of the center screen was [18] a world map with a lighted dot indicating the space-
craft location. The bottom part of the screen was a piece of flight plan concentrating on
the "d_amic mode" which refers to the type of control of the spacecraft, as well as a dis-
play concerning the type of data being displayed (real time, playback, etc.). On the right
hand screen the top half was a television display of the booster at the launch site (later on
it switched to onboard television), while the bottom half of the right hand screen con-
tained additional flight planning parameters. (We saw later that there was access to at least
this screen from a typewriter at the hack of the Control Room, and they were able to type
the message "Welcome American colleagues" on that screen.
On the floor were four rows of consoles. The very back row, which is out of sight from
the balcony, is for the people who set up the communications and data flow within the
Control Center. Also the Project Director (Bushuyev) will sit in this back row. The Flight
Director is in the next row fi-om the back and is the focal point for all activity in the
Control Center. To his left and right, and in the two rows of consoles in front of him, are
the various support functions, which are pretty much the same as the functions within our
mvn Control (;enter, except that there is no launch vehicle console. Each console has a
number of television screens, and the Flight Controller at that console calls up all sorts of
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displays, either out of the computers or from any one of a number of hard copy projec-
tors. Real time data apparently are only a few seconds behind the actual event. They are
also able to generate within the computer a display which merely indicates whether all
parameters on a given subsystem are normal or abnormal. If they are normal, that's the
end of it. If the), are abnormal, the Flight Controller can then go to another display to find
out which function is specifically abnormal. There are no warning tones with any of the
displays. The communications system allows the Flight Director to talk to any or all of the
other consoles as well as to the back rooms. We learned that the Control Center takes over
after the spacecraft has been separated from the launch vehicle in orbit. Until that time,
the flight is under full control of the Launch Center. The reason for this was explained to
us as follows:
First, there are no booster functions that can be performed by the astronauts them-
selves. Second, spacecraft functions must also be read out at the Launch Center for check-
out purposes, and spacecraft experts are at the Launch Center for checkout purposes.
[19] For both of these reasons it was more convenient then to handle all abort control at
the launch site and not at the Mission Control Center. These facts were further borne out
when we saw the onboard TV of the Soyuz 12 launch. The cosmonauts were lying in their
couches with their hands folded in their laps. They are obviously just passengers during
the launch phase.
In the Mission Operations Control Room Yeliseyev answered all questions concerning
flight control. He has obviously been there before and has obviously worked in the
Control Center on at least some simulations if not on Soyuz 12. The questions concern-
ing the Control Center itself were answered by the "Deputy Flight Director for
Measurements." I believe his name was Miltsin, but I am not sure of this. At any rate, he
obviously knew the Control Center well and was able to answer every question which we
asked. There was no holding back.
We left the Control Room floor and went behind the large screen where we saw the
display projectors. From there we looked into a large number of rooms housing, first,
communications equipment, and then computing equipment. We also went to one of the
staff support rooms, which was located quite a distance from the Control Room floor, but
was equipped with consoles similar or identical to those in the Control Room.
Communications gear included a large number of teletype machines as well as all sorts of
terminals, recorders, strip charts, and the kind of gear you see in any communications
center.
We also saw rooms where all of the onboard tapes were being processed, but none for
photographic processing. MI of the computing equipment appeared to be made in the
Soviet Union. There are three large digital computers, and my guess would be that they
are of the generation we used for Mercury and Gemini and not of the Apollo generation.
The external memory is a drum memory with 16 drums, each storing 39,000 48-bit words
for each of the computers. I don't recall the numbers for the internal memories. In addi-
tion to the main computers, there are quite a few peripheral computers used for special
tasks. The computers are used for trajectory as welt as telemetry work.
As I said earlier, every one of our questions was answered in detail, and if there is any-
thing we don't know it is only because we didn't have enough time or didn't know to ask
the [20] right questions. Lunney and Frank, both of whom are very familiar with our own
Control Center, should, of course, have a much better view of the real significance of what
we saw. It was also of interest that the Control Center was obviously not controlling a flight
while we were there. There was very little activity, although one or two people were in evi-
dence in each or the rooms where we opened a door.
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Duringoneof thetoastsatlunch,Abduyevskiaidthatfranklytheyhadbeenquite
concernedaboutourvisitbecausetheyknewofourwonderfultechnologyandhopedthat
theycomparedfavorably.Manyoftheprivatequestionswewereaskedafterwardsalsocon-
cernedourviewsoftheirCenter.Theyareobviouslyveryproudofit.
VISIT TO INSTITUTE OF GEOCHEMISTRY
This is Vinogradov's institute where lunar samples are being analyzed. The area of
sample handling and preliminary analysis is extremely primitive. Samples from Luna 16
and 20 and from Apollos 11 through 17 were all in storage. The various tools for sample
analysis throughout the institute also appeared to be extremely primitive and mostly for-
eign made. We were shown equipment for spectrographic analysis, a scanning electron
microscope, and equipment to measure magnetic spin resonance. I was impressed by nei-
ther the people nor the equipment.
INSTITUTE OF SPACE RESEARCH
This institute is in a brand new building which is not yet fully in operation. Apparently
the building was constructed by a military labor battalion. It is the shoddiest construction
I have ever seen.
We were taken to various laboratories in the Institute and saw flight instrumentation
used in gamma ray astronomy, X-ray astronomy, particles and fields measurements, and
ionospheric measurements. We also saw some of the instruments which are now on their
way to Mars. Incidentally, I asked Sagdeyev whether the newspaper reports to the effect
that no life sensing instruments were on the present Mars spacecraft were indeed true,
and he said yes, they were not yet ready to send any instruments [21] that were capable of
searching for life. He implied, however, that they were working on such instruments for
the next Mars opportunity. He also asked how long it had taken us to develop the instru-
ments we intend to fly on Viking. There was some additional discussion about the present
flights to Mars and apparently one of the four spacecraft is having telemetry difficulties
which have not yet been resolved.
The X-ray type instrumentation we saw apparently has already been flown and some
results have been published. By their own admission, however, these results are not as
good as those obtained with Uhuru. They indicated that since their satellite was not in an
equatorial orbit and was only in orbit for a short period of time, they could not match
Uhuru's results. The gamma ray instrumentation we saw had not yet flown on a satellite.
Insofar as ionospheric measurements are concerned, they apparently have a very active
program, both with sounding rockets and with satellites.
In summary, we saw instruments of the type flown in our physics and astronomy and
planetary programs. Although earth resources work is also going on in the same institute,
this was not discussed nor were we shown any of the work. Our guess is that they just don't
have anything worth seeing.
The remaining time at the Institute of Space Research was spent on a discussion of
the results of the Venus 8 spacecraft. (Sagdeyev pointed out that this was done especially
at the request of Keldysh since we had discussed our Mars results with Keldysh.) The brief-
ing was given by Abduyevskl, who, as I mentioned earlier, is now the Deputy Director of
the Control Center. Whereas he was a novice at the Control Center business, he knew all
about the engineering of the Venus 8 spacecraft as well as the details of the scientific
results. My guess is that he was deeply involved in the Venus 8 flight.
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The Venus 8 spacecraft was designed to withstand the Venus surface temperatures for
a short period of time (approximately 1 hour). This was achieved with good insulation
and through precooling the spacecraft for several days be[bre it arrived at Venus.
Abduyevski made a major point of the fact that the insulating properties of the insulation
change drastically witla increasing pressures of the kind encountered at the surface of
Venus (90 atmospheres), and that new materials with lower "filtration constants" had to
be designed.
[22] The most interesting result was the measurement of surface lighting in an area near
the Venus terminater. The conclusion is that there is adequate lighting on the surface of
Venus for television, even near the terminater.
VISH" WITH KIRILLIN
As I mentioned before, this was a courtesy visit made at my request. After a few words
of welcome by Kirillin, ! opened the discussion by reviewing the status of ASTP and other
joint projects.
Kirillin then asked my views concerning the practical rest, Its of the exploration of
space. I spoke of the usual things----communications, weather, and earth resources--as
well as the potential long-range results of some of the scientific efforts in space. Kirillin
came back to the point that the future of space must be practical and added one subject
which I had left out of my discussions of earth resources, and that is geology. He felt that
major contributions to geology can be made from space.
I then asked Kirillin where he thought our future cooperation in space might go. My
purpose in asking this question was to find out whether he had given the matter any
thought. Apparently he had not and gave only a very vague answer.
Finally, I brought up the subject of aeronautics, reminding Kirillin that NASA, of
course, has a major effort in aeronautics research and asking whether he had ever con-
sidered any cooperation in this area. His eyes immediately lit up and he started talking
about some of the commercial discussions now underway with Boeing, General Dynamics,
and McDonnell Douglas, but he wondered what I had in mind and how NASA might fit
in. I told him that I had really nothing specific in mind when 1 brought up the subject but
that any cooperative efforts with NASA would have to be in the areas of aeronautical
research as opposed to in the commercial areas. Both of us agreed to think about future
possibilities in possible cooperation in aeronautics and said that we might pursue this at a
later time.
[23] PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN
Donnelly had negotiated the first phase of a Public Affairs Plan covering preflight
activities. This plan had been signed by Lunney and Bushuyev; it was to be confirmed by
Petrov and me. When I met with Donnelly to review the plan he was concerned that the
definition of news media in the plan was not clear and that it was quite likely that the
Soviet side would not permit television cameramen to accompany television correspon-
dents. Instead, he felt that they would want to impose on us the usual practice of having
the Soviets take all television film and of selling that film through Novesty news agency.
Donnelly, therefore, suggested that we should not confirm the plan until this issue had
been settled. (Since this was an open issue, it is still not clear to me why he asked Lunney
to approve the plan in the first place.)
In subsequent discussions with Petrov, it became clear to me that the plan as signed
lacked in two other respects: first, it would be quite possible that the Soviet side would
admit its own news media to a joint function without at the same time admitting U.S. news
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media; and secondly, Donnelly indicated that he had verbal agreements that our astro-
nauts could be accompanied by their own documentary photographer. This was not writ-
ten down in the plan.
In my first meeting with Petrov (the meeting at Star City), he appeared to understand
all the points that needed to be covered, and also appeared to be in agreement with them.
We adjourned our meeting at Star City, and Frutkin and I wrote additions to the
Public Affairs Plan in the area of the three points mentioned; that is, the definition of
news media, the participation of news media from both sides in joint activities, and the
possibility of bringing along a documentary photographer. When we met again the next
morning, Petrov was not as willing to include these new additions as he had implied the
night before. Obviously, he must have checked into this with somebody better versed in
the ways of the press in the Soviet Union. He threw up a smoke screen abot, t things like
the copyright agreement and the lighting required whenever TV cameramen were pre-
sent. I told him that I wanted him to understand that there is only one serious issue in the
definition of news media and that concerns television [24] cameramen. Will U.S. cam-
eramen be allowed in the Soviet Union or not? The meeting broke up without reaching
any conclusion. Subsequently, Frutkin had additional discussions with Vereshchetin, and
I had additional discussions with Petrov. Vereshchetin assured Frutkin before we left
Moscow that they agreed in principle with all of our points, but they were not sure
whether they could agree exactly with our language. They promised that they would send,
at an early date, a new version of the Public Affairs Plan, incorporating the stthstance of
our additions. We could then either confirm the plan or, if we still did not like it, we would
have to have further negotiations.
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS
Comet Kohoutek
I gave Petrov several reprints of the Kohoutek article which appeared in the October
issue of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and asked whether the USSR would have any interest
in participating in the planned observations. On the following day Petrov informed me
that they would ordinarily be quite interested in participating, thanked me for the invita-
tion, but told me that during the time of the Comet the weather would be so bad in the
Soviet Union that it was unlikely that any of their ground observatories would be able to
see it. I took this as a polite way of saying "no."
Reaffirmation of the Low-Keldysh Agreement
Frutkin informed me that he believed that the Low-Keldysh Agreement needed to be
reaffirmed three years after it was approved, or in the spring of 1974. Although I was not
quite sure that this was the case, I did bring up the subject with Petrov. He implied that
the spring of 1974 would be a bad time because this will be the 250th Anniversary of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, and Keldysh is expected to be very busy. However, he sug-
gested that we might get together in the summer or fall of 1974. Although he assumed
that we would get together in the Soviet Union, I issued an invitation to do this in the
United States. However, I am not sure how necessary it is to do anything other than to
exchange letters on the subject.
George M. Low
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Document 1-49
Document fl0e: George M. Low, Deputy Administrator, NASA, to Academician M.V.
Keldysh, President, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, March 24, 1975.
Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York.
The United States viewed the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project as only the first step in an ambitious program
of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. As indicated in this lett_ the United States was eager to begin
discussing next cooperative steps with the Soviet Union even before the Apollo-Soyuz mission was
completed.
[1]
Academician M. V. Keldysh
President
Academy of Sciences of the USSR
Leninsky Prospect 14
Moscow, V-71, USSR
March 24, 1975
Dear Academician Keldysh:
I understand that the ASTP Technical Directors have now agreed on the schedule of
activities for the May meetings in the Soviet Union. Accordingly, I plan to arrive in
Moscow on May 17 and to join in the visit to the launch area scheduled for May 19. I would
return with the Technical Directors to Moscow and remain for the Flight Readiness
Review on May 23.
This schedule would make May 21 and 22 available for other business. I understand
from Academician Petrov your wish to defer the meeting of full delegations for detailed
discussions of fiJture cooperation because of the demands of ASTP on the time of your
specialists and because of the demands of the Academy elections on your own time. We,
of course, will accede to your wishes in this respect. At the same time, I believe it would be
most desirable for us to take advantage of this opportunity to meet briefly.
To assure that your concerns are met, our meeting could be entirely informal in char-
acter, with no written record. I would plan to be accompanied only by Mr. Frutkin and our
interpreter. I would expect to outline the status of our thinking here with regard to future
possibilities for cooperation. You would, of course, be free to comment or to indicate
Soviet thinking in the degree you wish. It would be understood that no commitments of
any kind were implied by either side.
Our own present thinking, which I would expand on in our meeting, is along three
lines:
1. Projects in the area of manned space flight--We would be prepared to consider
cooperative exploratory [2] studies of future space stations, with a view to pursuing such
studies to further steps, if warranted. We are prepared also to consider such possible inter-
im steps as a Space Shuttle/Salyut mission, as well as Soviet use of the Shuttle in coopera-
tive projects of mutual value.
2. Projects in the area of unmanned scientific missions--We have in mind the pos-
sibility of a lunar farside sample return mission, and we continue to find the long-term
goal of a fi_ture Mars surface sample return mission attractive.
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3. Projects in the area of space applications--Here we have in mind such possibili-
ties as coordinated environmental monitoring missions and the exchange of data relating
to radiation balance, stratospheric ozone monitoring, and search and rescue.
In the informal conversation which I suggest, we might also refer to a subject which
Dr. Lunney has already taken up with Prof. Bushuyev in a preliminary way. If the first
NASA Space Shuttle mission is to have rendezvous and docking capability compatible with
Soviet spacecraft of the 1979-80 time period, we would need, for development purposes,
to have agreement by January 1976 on such parameters as diameter of the passageway,
load factors, communications interface, and atmospheric pressures. To this purpose, we
would want to put discussion of such parameters by our specialists on a schedule consis-
tent with design and development requirements.
I hope it would be possible to use the occasion of my presence in Moscow for such an
informal constructive conversation so that we can preserve the momentum which has
been generated by our cooperation in ASTP.
Sincerely,
George M. Low
Deputy Administrator
Document 1-50
Document title: A_P. Aleksandrov, USSR Academy of Sciences, and A.M. Lovelace, NASA,
"Agreement Between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration of the USA on Cooperation in the Area of Manned Space Flight,"
May 11, 1977.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This agreement was the result of almost two years of discussions between the United States and the
Soviet Union. It was signed at the time that the renewal of the U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation
Agreement for a second five-year term was announced. The agreement was never implemented. Carter
administration displeasure with the Soviet record on human rights and then with Soviet involvement
in Afghanistan led to low priority being given to U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation overall.
[1]
Agreement Between the USSR Academy of
Sciences and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration of the USA on Cooperation in the
Area of Manned Space Flight
In accordance with the Agreement on Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes between the USSR and the USA, dated May 24, 1972,
and taking into account the results of discussions held in Washington, October 19-22,
1976, between the delegation of the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by the Chairman
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of the lntercosmos Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician B. N. Petrov,
and the delegation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the USA,
headed by the NASA Deputy Administrator, Dr. A. M. Lovelace, the Academy of Sciences
and NASA agree to undertake the following steps for further development of cooperation
between the USSR and USA in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful pur-
poses.
I. Study of the Objectives, Feasibility and Means of Accomplishing Joint Experimental Flights of a
Long-Duration Station of the Salyut-Type and a Reusable "Shuttle" Spacecraft (Salyut-Shuttle
Program)
In view of the fact that the long orbital stay-time of the Salyut-type station and the
capabilities of the Shuttle Spacecraft commend their use for joint scientific and applied
experiments and for filrther development of means for rendezvous and docking of space-
craft and stations of both [2] nations, the two sides agree to establish two joint working
groups (]WGs) of specialists, charging them with studying the objectives, feasibility and
means of carrying out a joint experimental program using the Soyuz/Salyut and Shuttle
spacecraft:
- aJWG for basic and applied scientific experiments.
- aJWG for operations.
Within 30 days after the Agreement becomes effective, the sides will inform each
other of the initial leaders and composition of these JWGs. The work of both Joint
Working Groups should begin simultaneously. The composition of the JWGs can be
changed or enlarged at any time as necessary. Appropriate sub-groups can be formed.
In their studies, theJWGs should proceed on the assumption that the first flight would
occur in 1981. The final date would be set in the course of the joint work.
First Phase of the Joint Working Groups'Activity
The following preliminary project documents should be prepared within 6-12 months
after the agreement comes into effect:
- preliminary proposals for scientific experiments;
- preliminary technical proposals for carrying out the program;
- preliminary schedules for implementing the program.
[3] Second Phase of the Joint Working Groups'Activity
TheJWGs should prepare the following definitive documents within one year of joint
work in the second phase:
- a technical description of the joint program and its realization;
- a scientific program for the joint flight;
- a schedule for conducting the joint work;
- an organizational basis for implementing the program;
- a list of additional joint technical documentation which may be required.
The sides will make the final decision on implementing the program at the end of the
second phase of theJWGs' activity.
The working period of theJWGs in the first and second phases of their activities can
be shortened.
Each side will consider the accommodation on its spacecraft of payloads proposed by
the other side for flight in the Shuttle-Salyut program. Such accommodation will be
undertaken where both sides agree that the payloads concerned are of mutual value and
interest.
II. Consideration of the Feasibility of Developing an International Space Platform in the Future
(International Space Platform Program)
Both sides recognize that no commitments are made at [4] this stage concerning the
realization of any project for creating an international space platform.
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The sides agree to establish a Joint Working Group of specialists for preliminary con-
sideration of the feasibility of developing an International Space Platform on a bilateral
or multilateral basis in the future.
The JWG will carry out its work on the basis of studies conducted by each side inde-
pendently and also by the two sides jointly, proceeding from each of the following stages
to the next as may be mutually agreed:
- define at the first stage the scientific and technical objectives which would warrant
the use of such a space platform.
- consider possible configurations appropriate to the objectives identified.
- formulate proposals on the feasibility and character of filrther.joint work which
may be desirable in this field.
At the first stage of its activity, the group will work in close coordination and contact
with the JWGs set up to consider ways to realize the Salyut-Shuttle program.
The sides will appoint the initial leaders and members of the JWG for this program
within two months after the Agreement goes into effect. ThisJWG should formulate pre-
liminary proposals on possible scientific-technical objectives which could be achieved by
an international station one year after beginning its work.
[5] This Agreement comes into force at the moment it is signed by both sides.
For the USSR Academy
of Sciences
For the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration of the USA
A. P. Aleksandrov A. M. Lovelace
Document 1-51
Document title: George P. Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze, "Agreement Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning
Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes," April 15,
1987, with attached: "Agreed List of Cooperative Projects."
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
As part of its overall hostile stance toward the Soviet Union, the administration of President Ronald
Reagan allowed the basic U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1972 and renewed in
1977, to lapse when it came up for renewal in 1982. U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.IL became much
more friendly after Mikhail Gorbachev came into power in 1985, and by 1987 the two countries had
agreed to restart formal cooperative activities in space. This agreement, signed by the U.S. secretary of
state and the Soviet foreign minist_ provided the framework for such cooperation, and an attached
list identifies an initial sixteen areas of possible cooperation.
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[1]
Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter
referred to as the Parties;
Considering the role of the two States in the exploration and use of outer space for
peaceful purposes;
Desiring to make the results of the exploration and use of outer space available for
the benefit of the peoples of the two States and of all peoples of the world;
Taking into consideration the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, and other multilateral agreements regarding the exploration and
use of outer space to which both States are Parties;
Noting the General Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Contacts,
Exchanges, and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and other
fields, signed on November 21, 1985;
Have agreed as follows:
[2] ARTICLE 1
The Parties shall carry out cooperation in such fields of space science as solar system
exploration, space astronomy and astrophysics, earth sciences, solar-terrestrial physics,
and space biology and medicine.
The initial agreed list of cooperative projects is attached as an Annex.
ARTICLE 2
The Parties shall carry out cooperation by means of mutual exchanges of scientific
information and delegations, meetings of scientists and specialists and in such other ways
as may be mutually agreed, including exchange of scientific equipment where appropri-
ate. The Parties, acting through their designated cooperating agencies, shall form joint
working groups for the implementation of cooperation in each of the fields listed in
Article 1. The recommendations of the joint working groups shall be subject to the
approval of each Party in accordance with its appropriate national procedures prior to
implementation. The designated cooperating agencies shall notify each other of the
action taken by the parties on the recommendations within three months of their adop-
tion by the .joint working groups.
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[31 ARTICLE 3
The joint working groups shall begin their work with the projects listed in the Annex
to this Agreement. Revisions to the list of projects in the Annex, which may include the
identification of other projects in which cooperation would be of mutual benefit, may be
effected by written agreement between the Parties through a procedure to be determined
by them.
ARTICLE 4
Cooperative activities under this Agreement, including exchanges of technical infor-
mation, equipment and data, shall be conducted in accordance with international law as
well as the international obligations, national laws, and regulations of each Party, and with-
in the limits of available funds.
ARTICLE 5
This Agreement shall be without prejudice to the cooperation of either Party with
other States and international organizations.
ARTICLE 6
The Parties shall encourage international cooperation in the study of legal questions
of mutual interest which may arise in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes.
[4] ARTICLE 7
This Agreement will enter into force on the date of signature by the Parties and will
remain in force for five years. It may be extended for further five-year periods by an
exchange of notes between the Parties. Either Party may notify the other in writing of its
intent to terminate this Agreement at any time effective six months after receipt of such
notices by the other Party.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective
Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE at Moscow, in duplicate, this 15th day of April, 1987, in the English and
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
[signed George P. Shultz] [signed Eduard Shevardnadze}
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
AMERICA: SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
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[Attachment page 1]
Agreed List of Cooperative Projects
1. Coordination of the Phobos, Vesta, and Mars Observer missions and the
exchange of scientific data resulting from them.
2. Utilization of the U.S. Deep Space Network for position tracking of the Phobos
and Vesta landers and subsequent exchange of scientific data.
3. Invitation, by mutual agreement, of co-investigators and/or interdisciplinary sci-
entists' participation in the Mars Observer and the Phobos and Vesta missions.
4. Joint studies to identify the most promising landing sites on Mars.
5. Exchange of scientific data on the exploration of the Venusian surface.
6. Exchange of scientific data on cosmic dust, meteorites and lunar materials.
7. Exchange of scientific data in the field of radio astronomy.
8. Exchange of scientific data in the fields of cosmic gamma-ray x-ray, and sub-
millimeter astronomy.
9. Exchange of scientific data and coordination of programs and investigations rel-
ative to studies of gamma-ray burst data.
10. Coordination of observations from solar terrestrial physics missions and the sub-
sequent exchange of appropriate scientific data.
1 1. Coordination of activities in the study of global changes of the natural environ-
ment.
12. Cooperation in the Cosmos biosatellite program.
13. Exchange of appropriate biomedical data from U.S. and U.S.S.R. manned space
flights.
14. Exchange of data arising from studies of space tlight-induced changes of metab-
olism, including the metabolism of calcium, from both space flight and ground experi-
ments.
15. Exploration of the feasibility of joint fundamental and applied biomedical exper-
iments on the ground and in various types of spacecraft, including exobiology.
16. Preparation and publication of a second amplified edition of the joint study
"Fundamentals of Space Biology and Medicine."
Document 1-52
Document title: Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, "Joint Statement on
Cooperation in Space," June 17, 1992.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation as its primary
successor opened new prospects for space cooperation. The Russian Federation created a civilian space
agency, the Russian Space Agency, in April 1992; its head was Yuri Koptev, formerly an official of
the Soviet Ministry of General Machine Building. On April I, 1992, a new NASA Administrator,
Daniel S. Goldin, took office. The two agency heads met for the first time in June 1992 and quickly
agreed that there were man), opportunities for enhanced cooperation, particularly in the area of
human spaceflight. During a summit meeting between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S.
President George Bush a few days lat_ the two countries announced their intention to broaden coop-
erative relations in space.
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[1] June 17, 1992
Joint Statement on Cooperation in Space
-- The United States and the Russian Federation have agreed on steps to broaden coop-
eration in the use and exploration of outer space:
- Space Agree_nt: A new space agreement has been signed today that puts space
cooperation between the two countries on a new footing, reflecting their new
relationship.
- The new agreement provides a broad framework for NASA and the Russian Space
Agency to map out new projects in a full range of fields; space science, space
exploration, space applications and the use of space technology.
- Cooperation may include human and robotic spaceflight projects, ground-based
operations and experiments and other important activities, such as monitoring
the global environment from space, Mir Space station and Space Shuttle missions
involving the participation of U.S. astronauts and Russian cosmonauts, safety of
spaceflight activities, and space biology and medicine.
- Pursuant to the agreement, the two governments will give consideration to the
following:
• flights of Russian cosmonauts aboard a Space Shuttle mission (STS 60), and
U.S. astronauts aboard the Mir Space Station in 1993; and
• a rendezvous docking mission between the Mir and the Space Shuttle in 1994
or 1995.
- An important part of the agreement involves annual subcabinet consultations led
at the Under Secretary of State/Deputy Foreign Minister level, a new mechanism
for high level government review of the bilateral civil space relationship between
the two cotmtries.
-- Joint Study of Space Technology: The two governments are also announcing detailed tech-
nical studies of the possible use of space technology.
- NASA is awarding a contract to the Russian firm NPO Energiya; the principal area
being examined in the Russian Soyuz-TM spacecraft as an interim crew return
vehicle for Space Station Freedom.
[2] - Other important areas to be studied are the suitability of the Russian developed
Automated Rendezvous and Docking System in support of NASA spaceflight activities,
the use of the Mir Space Station for long-lead time medical experiments, and other
applications by NASA of Russian hardware.
-- Space Commerce: Both governments also agreed on steps to encourage private compa-
nies to expand their search for new commercial space business.
- The United States has accepted an invitation from the Russian Federation for
American businessmen to visit Russia. The Department of Commerce will lead a
delegation of U.S. aerospace firms to Russia in the near future on a space tech-
nology assessment mission.
- The Russian Federation has accepted an invitation from the United States to send
a delegation of business leaders to the United states to meet with their counter-
parts in the American aerospace private sector.
-- Space Launch: Reflecting its support for economic reform in Russia, the United States
has decided to consider favorably a decision expected by the INMARSAT
Organization in July 1992 to launch one of the INMARSAT 3 satellites from Russia.
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- The INMARSAT 3 satellite is manufactured primarily in the United States. If
approved by INMARSAT, this would mark the first time that a U.S. manufactured
commercial satellite would be launched from Russia.
- The United States and Russia have agreed to negotiate a bilateral agreement on
technology safeguards for the INMARSAT 3 satellite to enable issuance of a U.S.
export license.
- The United States and the Russian Federation support the application of market
principles to international competition in the provision of launch services,
including avoidance of unfair trade practices.
- Recognizing Russia's current transition to a market economy, and in order to
allow consideration of future proposals involving Russian launch of U.S. satellites,
the Russian Federation and the United States have agreed to enter into interna-
tional negotiations on an expeditious basis to develop international guidelines
concerning competition in the launch of commercial satellites.
- In the case of INMARSAT, the Russian Federation has also assured the United
States that the terms and conditions of the Russian proposal, including pricing, are
consistent with those that would normally be offered in the international market.
Document 1-53
Document title: "Implementing Agreement Between the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration of the United States of America and the Russian Space Agency of the
Russian Federation on Human Space Flight Cooperation," October 5, 1992.
Document 1-54
Document title: Office of the Vice President, The White House, "United States-Russian
Joint Commission on Energy and Space--Joint Statement on Cooperation in Space,"
September 2, 1993.
Document 1-55
Document ritie: "Protocol to the Implementing Agreement Between the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States of America and the Russian
Space Agency of the Russian Federation on Human Space Flight Cooperation of October
5, 1992," December 16, 1993.
Source: All in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
As a result of the U.S.-Russian dialogue on expanded space cooperation initiated in June 1992,
NASA and the Russian Space Agency signed an agreement in October 1992 to exchange cosmonauts
and astronauts on each others' human spaceflight missions and to dock the Space Shuttle with the
Russian space station Mir. During its first year in office, the administration of President Bill Clinton
and Vice President Al Gore moved to expand substantially existing U.S.-Russian cooperation in
human spaceflight, in effect merging large portions of the efforts of the only two countries with the
capability of sending people into space; such a move was announced in September 1993. The politi-
cal decision to undertake this expansion was linked to broader U.S.-Russian foreign policy concerns,
such as stemming the proliferation of missile technology, capability and providing job opportunities for
the Russian aerospace sect_ The United States agreed to provide funding for various Russian
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activities and hardware associated with the expanded cooperation; this transfer broke with the long-
standing NASA tradition that its cooperative programs did not involve an exchange of funds. After
a few more months of discussion, NASA and the Russian Space Agency decided to increase the inten-
sitv of their interactions, particularly with respect to flights of the U.S. Space Shuttle to dock with the
Russian space station Mir. On December 16, 1993, the heads of the two agencies signed a protocol to
the October 1992 agreement that reflected this new level of activity.
Document1-53
[1]
Implementing Agreement Between the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
of the United States of America and the
Russian Space Agency of the Russian Federation on
Human Space Flight Cooperation
PREAMBLE
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (hereafter referred to as
"NASA") and the Russian Space Agency (hereafter referred to as "RSA"),jointly referred
to as "The Parties," have agreed to cooperate in the area of human space flight. This coop-
erative program consists of three inter-related projects: the flight of Russian cosmonauts
on the U.S. Space Shuttle; the flight of U.S. astronauts on the Mir Space Station; and a
.joint mission involving the rendezvous and docking of the U.S. Space Shuttle with the Mir
Space Station. These will be jointly referred to in the future as the "Shuttle-Mir Program."
The Parties have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I: DESCRIPTION OF COOPERATION
1. The cooperation set forth in this Implementing Agreement will be undertaken in
accordance with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation concerning Cooperation in the Exploration andUse of Outer Space for
Peaceful Purposes, of June 17, 1992 (hereinafter the June 17, 1992 Agreement).
2. An experienced cosmonaut will fly aboard the Space Shuttle on the STS-60 mis-
sion, which is currently scheduled for November 1993. The cosmonaut will be an integral
member of the orbiter crew, and will be trained as a Mission Specialist on Shuttle systems,
flight operations, and manifested payload procedures following existing Shuttle practices.
3. The RSA will nominate two cosmonauts, for approval by NASA as candidates for
the STY60 Space Shuttle mission. In accordance with Article IV, one of the two cosmo-
nauts will be designated the Primary Russian-sponsored crewmember, with the other
being designated as a backup crewmember. Both crewmembers will receive [2] Mission
Specialist Astronaut training, until the time that the STS-60 crew begins dedicated mission
training. From that point, the backup crewmember will receive as much training as prac-
tical. The two cosmonauts will be scheduled for arrival at the Johnson Space Center in
Houston, Texas, in October, 1992. Their names, experience and personal history will be
provided to NASA by the RSA prior to the initiation of training.
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4. An experienced NASA astronaut will fly on the Mir Space Station as an integral
long-duration crewmember (e.g., longer than 90 days) participating as an integral mem-
ber of the crew in a variety of operations and experiments. The timing of this flight will
be consistent with a Shuttle docking flight in 1994 or 1995. The astronaut will be flown to
the Mir on a Soyuz transportation system. Special emphasis will be placed on science, par-
ticularly life science, as well as engineering and operational objectives. Astronaut and cos-
monaut participation before, during and after the long-duration flight will be emphasized
to accomplish all flight objectives.
5. NASA will nominate two astronauts for approval by RSA as candidates for a long-
duration Mir mission (e.g., longer than 90 days) to occur in conjunction with the ren-
dezvous and docking of the Space Shuttle with Mir. In accordance with Article IV, one of
the two astronauts will be designated as the primary U.S.-sponsored crewmember, with the
other being designated as the backup crewmember. Both crewmembers will receive full
cosmonaut training with their cosmonaut crew.
The two astronauts will be scheduled to begin training no later than 12 months prior
to the agreed upon flight date. They will be U.S. citizens, and their names, experience and
personal history will be provided to RSA by NASA no later than one month prior to the
initiation of training.
6. The Space Shuttle will rendezvous and dock with Mir in conjunction with the
flight of the NASA astronaut aboard Mir. NASA will transport two Russian cosmonauts in
the Shuttle tO replace the two cosmonauts on board Mir. Training for these cosmonauts
will be in accordance with Article V of this Implementing Agreement. Life sciences exper-
iments involving the NASA astronaut and the two cosmonauts who have been on board
the Mir for 90 days or more will be conducted while the Shuttle is docked to the Mir. The
NASA astronaut and the two cosmonauts who have been on the Mir for 90 days or more
will be returned in the Shuttle for continued postflight life sciences experiments.
7. As part of the technical discussions leading up to the Mir rendezvous,joint imple-
mentation teams will explore the use of the Androgynous Peripheral Docking Assembly
developed by NPO Energiya, consistent with the June 17, 1992 Agreement and this
Implementing Agreement. (If such used appears technically [3] feasible, NPO Energiya
will enter into a separate contract with an American company to provide, modify or inte-
grate this device or its derivatives with the Shuttle.)
8. Joint implementation teams will also consider exchange of Mir crewmembers,
transportation of experimental and logistic equipment, and Extra Vehicular Activity
(EVA), and will define the respective responsibilities of the Parties, consistent with the
June 17, 1992 Agreement and this Implementing Agreement. The implementation teams
will jointly develop a contingency plan which will cover procedures for investigation, con-
sultation, and exchange of data in the event of a mishap which causes damage to equip-
ment or injury to personnel during the conduct of the Shuttle-Mir Program.
9. Consistent with the June 17, 1992 Agreement, each Party will be responsible for
funding its respective responsibilities, consistent with its domestic laws and regulations,
and subject to the availability of appropriated funds. All training, in-country travel and liv-
ing arrangements, flight and other associated posts for each Party's crew members and
dependents will be borne by the host country, in a manner it deems appropriate, at a stan-
dard afforded its own flight crews.
ARTICLE II: DESIGNATION OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ORGANIZATIONS
Designated Points of Contact for the implementation of the activities described here-
in are contained in Annex 1 to this Implementing Agreement. Annex 1 may be modified
by, either Party upon notification to the other Party. NPO Energiya and the Yuri Gagarin
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CosmonautTrainingFacilitywillbetheleadtechnicalimplementorsof theShuttle-Mir
PrograminRussia.
ARTICLEIII:JOINTIMPLEMENTATIONTEAMS
ThePartiesagreetoestablishjointimplementationteamsto coordinateandimple-
mentheactivitiesdescribedherein.Designatedteammemberswillbeidentifiedbyeach
sidewithin30daysof theentryintoforceofthisImplementingAgreement.EachParty
maymodifythemembershipofitsjointimplementationteamsatitsdiscretion.Thejoint
implementationteamswilldevelopaplanforimplementationftheactivitiesdescribed
hereinonthebasisofequality,reciprocityandmutualbenefit,consistentwiththeJune
17,1992agreement.
ARTICLEIV:SELECTIONOFCANDIDATES
1. Selectionof flightcandidateswillbebasedonmutualagreementpriorto any
announcement.Candidatesselectedwillbe[4] current,activemembersof eachside's
astronautorcosmonautcorps.
2. Flightcandidatesselectedwillhavepreviousspaceflightexperience.Thecosmo-
nautselectedfortrainingshallhavesufficientknowledgeinverbalandwrittenEnglish.
TheNASAastronautsselectedfortrainingshallhavesufficientknowledgeinverbaland
writtenRussian.Informationthateachside'scandidatesmeethecriteriain thisArticle
shallbeexchangedpriortoanyannouncemento crewselections.
ARTICLEV:TRAINING
1. Throughouttheirtrainingprograms,theRussiancosmonautswillbebasedatthe
JohnsonSpaceCenterinHouston,Texas,andwillbeassignedtotheAstronautOfficein
theFlightCrewOperationsDirectorate.TheNASAastronautswill bebasedat Yuri
GagarinCosmonautTrainingFacility("StarCity")in theMoscowRegion.
2. Atthebeginningofthetrainingprograms,eachPartywillrequireitscandidates
toenterintoaStandardsofConductAgreementwiththeotherParty,whichwillinclude,
interalia,installationsafetyandsecuritymatters,provisionsrelatedtoprohibitionsonuse
ofpositionforprivategain,authorityoftheMissionCommander,andlimitationsonuse
ofinformationreceivedduringtrainingandflight.EachPartywillensurethatitscandi-
datescomplywiththeprovisionsofsuchanagreement.3. Thecandidateswillhavecompletedallaspectsoftherequiredtrainingtothefull
andfinalsatisfactionfthehostPartypriortocertificationforflight.
4. Bymutualagreement,thePartieswillidentifyanysupportpersonnelrequiredfor
theflightcandidatesselected.
ARTICLEVI:SCIENCE
1. ThePartieswillestablishaScientificWorkingGrouptocoordinateappropriate
scientificexperimentsandactivitiestobeconductedbyeachsideontherespectivemis-
sions.Designatedworkingroupmemberswillbeidentifiedbyeachsidewithin30clays
oftheentryintoforceofthisImplementingA reement.EachPartymaymodifythemem-
bershipofitsScientificWorkingGroup at its discretion.
2. Results of the scientific experiments conducted by each Party under this
Implementing Agreement will be made available to the scientific community in general
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through publication in appropriate journals of other established channels. In the event
[5] such reports or publications are copyrighted, NASA and RSA shall have a royalty-free
right under the copyright to reproduce, distribute and use such copyrighted work for
their own purposes.
ARTICLE VII: LIABILITY
1. A comprehensive cross-waiver of liability between the two Parties and their relat-
ed entities (e.g., contractors, subcontractors, and other participating entities associated
with the Parties including any state from which RSA procures a launch to carry out its
obligations under this agreement) shall apply to the activities under this agreement. The
cross-waiver of liability shall be broadly construed. The terms of the waiver are set out in
Annex 2.
2. Except as provided in Annex 2, the Government of the United States and the
Government of the Russian Federation will remain liable in accordance with the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the "Liability
Convention") of March 29, 1972. In the event of a claim arising out of the Liability
Convention, the governments will consult promptly on any potential liability, on any
apportionment of such liability, and on the defense of such claim.
ARTICLE VIII: INVENTION AND PATENT RIGHTS
1. With the exception of the intellectual property rights referred to in Article X,
Exchange of Technical Data and Goods, and subject to national laws and regulations, pro-
visions for the protection and allocation of intellectual property rights created during the
course of cooperation under this Implementing Agreement are set forth in Annex 1 of
the June 17, 1992 Agreement.
2. Except as set forth in paragraph 1, nothing in this Implementing Agreement shall
be construed as granting or implying any rights to, or interest in, patents or inventions of
the Parties or their contractors and subcontractors.
ARTICLE IX: PUBLIC INFORMATION
Release of public information regarding these joint activities may be made by the
appropriate agency for its own portion of the program as desired and, insofar as partic-
ipation of the other is involved, after suitable consultation.
[6] ARTICLE X: EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL DATA AND GOODS
Each Party is obligated to transfer to the other Part)' only those technical data and
goods which both Parties agree are necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of the transfer-
ring Party under this Implementing Agreement, subject to the following:
1. Interface, integration, training and safety data (excluding detailed design, manu-
facturing, and processing data, and associated software) will be exchanged by the Parties
without restrictions as to use or disclosure, except as otherwise restricted by national laws
or regulations relating to export controls.
2. In the event a Party finds it necessary to transfer technical data other than that
specified in paragraph 1 above, in carrying out its responsibilities under this
Implementing Agreement that are proprietary, and for which protection is to be main-
tained, such technical data will be marked with a notice indicating that it shall be used and
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disclosedbythereceivingPartyanditscontractorsandsubcontractorsnlyforthepur-
posesof flllfilling the receivingParty'sresponsibilitiesunderthis Implementing
Agreement,andthatthetechnicaldatashallnotbedisclosedorretransferredto any
otherentitywithoutpriorwrittenpermissionf thefurnishingParty.ThereceivingParty
agreestoabidebythetermsofthenotice,andtoprotectanysuchmarkedtechnicaldata
fromunauthorizeduseanddisclosure.
3. In theeventa Partyfindsit necessaryto transfertechnicaldataandgoodsin
carryingout itsresponsibilitiesunderthisImplementingAgreementthatareexport-
controlled,andforwhichprotectionisdesired,thefurnishingPartywillmarksuchtech-
nicaldatawithanoticeandidentifysuchgoods.Thenoticeoridentificationwillindicate
thatsuchtechnicaldataandgoodswillbeusedandsuchtechnicaldatawillbedisclosed
bythereceivingPartyanditscontractorsandsubcontractorsnlyforthepurposesoffill-
filling thereceivingParty'sresponsibilitiesunderthisImplementingAgreement.The
noticeoridentificationwillalsoprovidethatsuchtechnicaldatawillnotbedisclosed,and
suchtechnicaldataandgoodswillnotberetransferred,toanyotherentitywithoutprior
writtenpermissionof thefurnishingParty.ThePartieswillabidebythetermsof the
noticeor identificationandwillprotectanysuchmarkedtechnicaldataandidentified
goods.
4.ThePartiesareundernoobligationto protectanyunmarkedtechnicaldataor
unidentifiedgoods.
[7]ARTICLEXI:CUSTOMSANDIMMIGRATION
1. EachPartywillfacilitatethemovementofpersonsandgoodsnecessary to imple-
ment this Implementing Agreement into and out of its territory, subject to its laws and reg-
ulations. The RSA will take steps to expedite such movement of persons and goods to
launch facilities it will utilize to fulfill its obligations under this Implementing Agreement.
2. Subject to its laws and regulations, each Party will facilitate provision of the appro-
priate entry and residence documentation for the other Party's nationals and families of
nationals who enter, exit, or reside within its territory in order to carry out the activities
under this implementing Agreement. The RSA will take steps to arrange for such prox_i-
sion for such activities at launch facilities it will utilize to fulfill its obligations under this
Implementing Agreement.
3. The Parties agree to arrange for free customs clearance for entrances to, and exits
from, their respective countries for equipment required for implementation of the activi-
ties described herein. The RSA will take steps to arrange for such clearances to and from
launch facilities it will utilize to fulfill its obligations nnder this Implementing Agreement.
ARTICLE XII: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
1. The Parties will consult promptly with each other on all issues involving interpre-
tation or implementation of this Implementing Agreement. In the case of a continuing
dispute, such matters will first be referred to the Points of Contact identified in Annex 1.
2. Any matter which has not been settled in accordance with the above paragraph
will be referred to the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight and the First Deputy
of the General Director of the RSA, or their designees, for resolution. Issues not resolved
at this level will be referred to the NASA Administrator and the RSA General Director.
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ARTICLE XIII: DURATION OF IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT
1. This Implementing Agreement will terminate five (5) years following its entry
into force or upon completion of all activities covered by this Implementing Agreement,
whichever comes first. This Implementing Agreement may be extended or amended by
written agreement of the Parties.
[8] 2. Either Party may terminate this Implementing Agreement upon six months writ-
ten notice to the other Party. Termination of this Implementing Agreement shall not
affect the Parties' continuing obligations under Articles VII, VIII and X, unless otherwise
agreed to by the Parties.
ARTICLE XIV: ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Implementing Agreement will enter into force upon an exchange of diplomatic
notes between the Governments of the United States of America and the Russian
Federation confirming acceptance of its terms and that all necessary legal requirements
for entry into force have been fulfilled.
IN _qTNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective
Governments, have signed this Implementing Agreement.
Done at Moscow, in duplicate, this 5th day of October, 1992, in Russian and English
languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Daniel S. Goldin
FOR THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Yuri Koptev
FOR THE RUSSIAN SPACE AGENCY
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
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[1] THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Vice President
September 2, 1993
United States-Russian Joint Commission
on Energy and Space
Joint Statement on Cooperation in Space
Having reviewed the status of the agreement between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes dated June 17, 1992, the Parties note with satisfaction
past agreement on the following: the flight of a Russian cosmonaut on the Space Shuttle
System in 1993 and 1994, and American astronauts on the MIR station, the docking and
a joint flight of these two space complexes in 1995. These activities are consistent with the
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national space programs of both countries and the overall development of a spirit of trust,
partnership, and long-term political and scientific and technological cooperation
between Russia and the United States.
Based on the agreement reached at a meeting of the U.S. and Russian Presidents in
Vancouver on April 3-4, 1993 and June 17, 1992, the Parties see great promise and mutu-
al benefit through cooperation in space science and exploration activities.
Given the particular importance for Russia and the U.S. of their respective efforts in
developing a new generation of orbital stations for scientific and technological progress
and human activities in space, the Parties regard further cooperation in this area as most
important, and consistent with the interests of both Russia and tile U.S., as well as the
broader international community.
With this in mind it is the intent of the U.S. and Russia to undertake a cooperative
human space flight program. Interim investigation has already indicated potential advan-
tages of joint cooperative activities in a truly international space station program. The
Parties intend to pursue such cooperation in accordance with the following principles:
- joining on a mutually beneficial basis the resources and the scientific, technolog-
ical, and industrial potentials of Russia and the U.S. in space activities to carry out
a large-scale program of scientific, technical, and technological research;
- working with each of our current partners, and in accordance with earlier
international obligations assumed by each of the Parties under the Freedom and
MIR projects;
[2] - operating in an orbit which is accessible by both U.S. and Russian resources;
- utilizing compatible service systems, enhancing reliability of the station and
increasing the flexibility of transportation and technical maintenance;
- performing activities under cooperative programs on mutually beneficial terms,
and including on a contract basis the procurement of individual systems and units
or the provision of services.
The first phase of our joint programs begins immediately and is designed to form a
basis for resolution of engineering and technical problems. This initial phase encompass-
es an expansion of our bilateral program involving the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Russian
MIR Space Station. The MIR will be made available for U.S. experiments for up to two
years of total U.S. astronaut stay time. The number of Space Shuttle flights and the length
of crew stay time will depend upon the details of the experiments to be defined by
November 1, 1993. During phase one, the use of the Russian modules "Priroda" and
"Spektr," equipped with U.S. experiments, could undertake a wide-scale research pro-
gram. These missions will provide valuable in-orbit experience in rendezvous, docking,
and joint space-based research in life sciences, microgravity, and Earth resources. It will
bring to reality performance of large-scale space operations in the future. The Parties con-
sider it is reasonable to initiate in 1993 the joint development of a solar dynamic power
system with a test flight on the Space Shuttle and MIR in 1996, the joint development of
environmental control and life support systems, and the joint development of a common
space suit.
Subsequent joint efforts on the second phase will be directed to the use of a Russian
MIR module of the next generation, in conjunction with a U.S. laboratory module and
the U.S. Space Shuttle. This facility would provide an interim human-tended space science
capability where significant scientific experimentation can take place in a microgravity
environment and also provide practical experience gained out of the use of different
transportation systems (including the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Russian Proton), per-
formance of complex construction and assembly efforts and command and control
process of orbital structure of considerable complexity. Successful implementation of this
phase could constitute a key element of a truly international space station.
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It isenvisionedthatthe U.S. will provide compensation to Russia for services to be
provided during phase one in the amount of $100 million dollars in FY 1994. Additional
funding of $300 million dollars, for compensation of phase one and for mutually
[3] agreed upon phase two activities, will be provided through 1991. This funding and
appropriate agreements will be confirmed and signed by no later than November 1, 1993.
Other forms of mutual cooperation and compensation will be considered as appropriate.
All the above programs are mutually connected and are considered as a single pack-
age, the main goal of which is to create an effective scientific research complex earlier and
with less cost than if done separately. The Parties are convinced that a unified Space
Station can offer significant advantages to all concerned, including current U.S. partners,
Canada, Europe, and Japan.
The precise planning process and organization of drafted phases of joint activity will
give the opportunity to benefit both countries through expanded cooperative efforts on
the space station project.
The Parties hereby instruct NASA and RSA, in pursuance of this Joint statement, to
develop by November 1, 1993, a detailed plan of activities for an international space sta-
tion. This will serve as the basis for early review and decision within each government and
as the basis for consultations with the international partners. Upon conclusion of the
process of government approval and consultation, appropriate implementing agreements
will be signed. NASA and RSA will include within the plan overall configuration, volumes,
and forms of conuibutions and mutual compensation for Russian and U.S. activities.
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[1]
Protocol to the Implementing Agreement Between the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the
United States of America and the
Russian Space Agency of the Russian Federation
on Space Flight Cooperation
of October 5, 1992
PREAMBLE
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (hereafter referred to as
"NASA") and the Russian Space Agency (hereafter referred to as "RSA"),jointly referred
to as "the Parties";
Consistent with the Joint statement on Cooperation in Space issued by Vice President
Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on September 2, 1993; desiring to broaden the
scope of the Implementing Agreement of October 5, 1992, on Human Space Flight
Cooperation (hereinafter the October 5, 1992 Agreement) to encompass an expanded
program of activities for cooperation involving the Russian Mir-I Space Station and the
U.S. Space Shuttle Program;
Having decided that the enhanced cooperative program will consist of a number of
inter-related projects in two phases;
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Having determined that Phase One will include those activities described in the
October 5, 1992, Agreement and known as the Shuttle-Mir Program, including the
exchange of the Russian Mir-1 crew and crew member participation in joint mission sci-
ence, as well as additional astronaut flights, Space Shuttle dockings with Mir-1, and other
activities;
Having further determined that Phase Two of the enhanced cooperative program will
involve use of a Russian Mir module of the next generation mated with a U.S. laboratory
module operated on a human-tended basis in conjunction with the Space Shuttle, oper-
ating in a 51.6 degree orbit which is accessible by both U.S. and Russian resources, to per-
form precursor activities for future space station-related activities of each Party, with
launch to occur in 1997; and
Intending that activities in Phase Two would be effected through subsequent specific
agreements between the Parties.
Have agreed as follows:
[2] ARTICLE I: DESCRIPTION OF ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES
1. This Protocol forms an integral part of the October 5, 1992 Agreement.
2. An additional Russian cosmonaut flight on the Space Shuttle will take place in
1995. The back-up cosmonaut currently in training at NASA's Johnson Space Center will
be the primary cosmonaut for that flight, with the STS-60 primary cosmonaut acting as
back-up. During this mission, the Shuttle will perform a rendezvous with the Mir-1 Space
Station and will approach to a safe distance, as determined by the Flight Operations and
Systems Integration Joint Working Group established pursuant to the October 5, 1992
Agreement.
3. The Space Shuttle will rendezvous and dock with Mir-1 in October-November
1995, and, if necessary, the crew will include Russian cosmonauts. Mir-1 equipment,
including power supply and life support system elements, will also be carried. The crew
will return on the same Space Shuttle mission. This mission will include activities on Mir-
1 and possible extravehicular activities to upgrade solar arrays. The extravehicular activi-
ties may involve astronauts of other international partners of the Parties.
4. NASA-designated astronauts will fly on the Mir-1 space station for an additional
21 months for a Phase One total of two years. This will include at least four astronaut
flights. Additional flights will be by mutual agreement.
5. The Space Shuttle will dock with Mir-1 up to ten times. The Shuttle flights will be
used for crew exchange, technological experiments, logistics or sample return. Some of
those flights will be dedicated to resources and equipment necessary for life extension of
MirA. For schedule adjustments of less than two weeks, both sides agree to attempt to
accommodate such adjustments without impacting the overall schedule of flights.
Schedule adjustments of greater than two weeks will be resolved on a case-by-case basis
through consultations between NASA and RSA.
6. A specific program of technological and scientific research, including utilization
of the Mir-1 Spektr and Priroda modules, equipped with U.S. experiments, to undertake
a wide-scale research program, will be developed by the Mission Science Joint Working
Group established pursuant to the October 5, 1992 Agreement. The activities carried out
in this program will expand ongoing research in biotechnology, materials sciences, bio-
medical sciences, Earth observations and technology.
7. Technology and engineering demonstrations applicable to future space station
activities will be defined. Potential areas include but are not limited to: automated ren-
dezvous and docking, electrical power systems, life support, command and [3] control,
232 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL St'At:E COOPERATION
microgravity isolation system, and data management and collection.Joint crew operations
will be examined as well.
8. The Parties consider it reasonable to initiate in 1993 the joint development of a
solar dynamic power system with a test flight on the Space Shuttle and Mir in 1996, the
joint development of spacecraft environmental control and life support systems, and the
joint development of a common space suit.
9. The Parties will initiate a joint crew medical support program for the benefit of
both sides' crew members, including the development of common standards, require-
ments, procedures, databases, and countermeasures. Supporting ground systems may also
be jointly operated, including telemedicine links and other activities.
10. The Space Shuttle will support the above activities, including launch and return
transportation of hardware, material, and crew members. The Shuttle may also support
extravehicular and other space activities.
11. Consistent with U.S. law, and subject to the availability of appropriated funds,
NASA will provide both compensation to the RSA for services to I_e provided during Phase
One in the amount of US $100 million in FY 1994, and additional funding of US $300 mil-
lion for compensation of Phase One and for mutually-agreed upon Phase Two activities
will be provided through 1997. This funding will take place through subsequent NASA-
RSA and/or through industry-to-industry arrangements. Reimbursable activities covered
by the above arrangements and described in paragraphs 3-8 will proceed after these
arrangements are in place and after this Protocol enters into force in accordance with
Article III. Specific Phase One activities, schedules and financial plans will be included in
separate documents.
12. Implementation decisions on each part of this program will be based on the cost
of each part of the program, relative benefits to each Party, and relationship to future
space station activities of the Parties.
13. The additional activities will not interfere with or otherwise affect any existing,
independent obligations either Party may have to other international partners.
ARTICLE II: JOINT IMPLEMENTATION TEAMS
The coordination and implementation of the activities described herein will be con-
ducted through the Joint Working Groups established pursuant to the October 5, 1992
Agreement or such other joint bodies as may be established by mutual agreement.
[4] ARTICLE III: ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Protocol will enter into force upon an exchange of diplomatic notes between the
Governments of the United States of America and the Russian Federation confirming
acceptance of its terms and that all necessary legal requirements tot entry into force have
been fiflfilled.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective
Governments, have signed this Protocol. Done at Moscow, in duplicate, this sixteenth day
of December, 1993, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
FOR THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Daniel S. Goldin
FOR THE RUSSIAN SPACE
AGENCY
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
Yuri Koptev
Chapter Two
Invitation to Struggle:
The History of Civilian-Military
Relations in Space
by Dwayne A. Day
The history of American civilian and military cooperation in space is one of compet-
ing interests, priorities, and justifications at the upper policy levels, combined with a
remarkable degree of cooperation and coordination at virtually all operational levels. It is
a history of the evolution of responsibility for space exploration. Both the Eisenhower and
Kennedy administrations gradually decided which organization should be responsible for
which activities, eventually establishing these responsibilities as fact. This process did not
result in a smooth transition; first the Army and then the Air Force saw its hopes for assum-
ing the predominant role in space exploration subsumed to larger national priorities. It
proved to be most painful for the Air Force, which had the biggest dreams for space and
saw them dashed as NASA achieved all of the glory during the Cold War space race.
This history can be separated into two broad eras---cooperation prior to NASA's cre-
ation and cooperation between NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD), with a
transition period in between. This transition is. an aspect that is frequently overlooked in
discussions of the subject, for civil-military cooperation in space did not begin with the
establishment of NASA--it changed with the creation of NASA, and it did so dramatically.
Prior to NASA's establishment, the military had had the upper hand in determining all
space priorities, and civilian interests, when considered at all, were clearly secondary.
There were also multiple military space actors--primarily the Air Force and the Army--
and it was not clear which would emerge dominant. After NASA was created, the Army
space program largely disappeared--being subsumed by NASA. The Air Force became the
dominant military space actor and often found itself playing a secondary, supporting role
to the civilian program.
This history is also the history of the evolution of an idea--that space exploration,
particularly human exploration, should be a civilian pursuit. Throughout history there is
ample precedent for both civilians and the military undertaking exploratory missions with
government support, but early American plans for human space exploration centered on
military missions. Wernher yon Braun's wheeled space station and planned trips to the
Moon all involved the use of military crews in what were envisioned as essentially military
missions. The popular culture of the day echoed this vision, as in B-grade science fiction
films such as Project Moonbase and The Conquest of Space. Also, science fiction and pseudo-
news articles depicted a military space force dedicated to conquering the heavens. Human
space exploration seemed, at least in much of the popular consciousness, to be a logical
evolution of existing military missions and an extension of the idea of military pacifica-
tion of the frontier. Certainly, this was the view of the uniformed leadership of the Air
Force immediately after Sputnik.
Reality was to prove to be more complex and more nuanced than the popular vision,
however, in large part because of the desire to make the American space program stand
as a positive, peaceful beacon for Western-style democracy. The U.S. Air Force strove to
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find a military mission for humans in space. It could not. Once the two main reasons to
place humans in space--science and prestige--became civilian pursuits, the Air Force,
after more than a decade trying, could find no cost-effective reason to place humans in
orbit.
The idea that there was no role for military officers in space found resistance within
the Air Force, which tried unsuccessfully to portray space as merely an expansion of its
current operating realm. Prior to Sputnik, there was only limited enthusiasm within the
Air Force for space programs and expenditures. There was a core group of space enthu-
siasts within the Air Force, but they lacked both authority and resources. After Sputnik,
the top brass---particularly the Air Staff---embraced space, with a strong emphasis on
human spaceflight. But it did so at precisely the same time that the political wind was shift-
ing, and human spaceflight was determined to be better as a civilian, rather than a mili-
tary, mission.
This essay also highlights the difference between the civilian and uniformed leader-
ship of the military--particularly in the Air Force. Throughout the 1945-1988 period,
both the civilian and uniformed leaders of the Air Force made major decisions concern-
ing space, but most of the major policy decisions were made by the civilian leadership, not
those in uniform, who had different priorities, biases, and interests.
Yet one of the important differences to note is that the uniformed officers represent
the institutional memory of a military service. Secretaries of DOD, service secretaries, and
undersecretaries come and go, making decisions during their reign of which they usually
do not have to bear the consequences later. But military officers--particularly mid-
ranking officers hoping to make general officer rank---often see the decisions get made,
are responsible for implementing them, and then have to live with the consequences as
they rise up through the ranks. The result is that uniformed officers may eventually resent
decisions made by civilian officials long before their time; this can color their outlook as
they rise to leadership positions. There is no better example of this than the Space Shuttle
experience, which continues to shape NASA-DOD relations to this day.
Finally, this is a history of the attention to, and ignorance of, the issue of duplication
by the civilian and military space programs. Virtually every presidential administration has
referred to the "national space program" as if the separate civilian, military, and intelli-
gence space programs were part of a unified whole. This was certainly the intent of the
Eisenhower administration. But the creation of NASA itself duplicated missions that were
already being addressed by DOD. Other policy decisions, such as giving NASA its own
rocket development capability, created further redundancy.
This issue really came to the fore during the Kennedy administration. Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara sought to eliminate duplication among the parts of the
"national space program," but with only limited success---killing the Dyna-Soar space
plane while attempting to reduce duplication between DOD and civilian organizations,
such as NASA and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However, while he attempted
to reduce duplication in certain aspects, McNamara allowed further divergence on
rocket development. Finally, perhaps the biggest attempt to eliminate the duplication of
functions---the Space Shuttle--failed spectacularly at that task and made the future con-
vergence of military and civilian functions all the more difficult.
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The First Era--Pre-NASA
The true genesis of the U.S. military space program predates Sputnik and even pre-
dates the well-known V-2 rocket research at White Sands at the end of World War II.
American military rocket research began at the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory at
the California Institute of Technology (GALCIT), under Frank Malina, Hsue-shen Tsien,
and others in the late 1930s and early 1940s/Malina and Tsien speculated about the pos-
sibilities of ballistic missiles at GALCIT, an Army laboratory renamed the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL) in 1943. But the U.S. military chose not to follow the German path of
investing heavily in an immature technology with only limited immediate payoff. Instead,
the military focused research on the development of a much more promising weapon, the
atomic bomb. '_As a result, U.S. rocket research during the war centered on more imme-
diate and practical, if rather mundane, applications, such as short-range rocket projectiles
and the misnamed jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) rockets for heavily laden aircraft.
In the immediate post-war years, the U.S. military conducted extensive research with
captured German rocket technology. It was during this time that a precedent was estab-
lished that would have a significant impact a decade later. Colonel Holger Toftoy, chief of
the Army Ordnance Enemy Equipment Intelligence Section, had acquired the parts and
documentation to assemble more than 100 captured V-2 rockets. Toftoy invited scientists
from various organizations to participate in V-2 launches by providing test payloads and
instrumentation for everything from upper atmosphere research to radio and radar prop-
agation experiments.' The field of rocketry was so new that basic research was a high pri-
ority and the involvement of scientific groups was only natural. Out of this emerged the
precedent for civilian government scientists to provide scientific payloads for military
rockets, and indeed this was the genesis of a U.S. space science community.
Close military-civilian cooperation in basic research in many fields was a result of
World War II, and a number of government-university research centers evolved. In the avi-
ation field, the military already had a long track record of working with the civilian
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). The military--primarily the U.S.
Air Force--conducted a large number of aeronautics test and development projects with
NACA throughout the 1950s.
It was from this early cooperation on space and aeronautics-related research that the
NASA-military relationship was to expand and evolve. But early American proposals for
the development of satellites and rockets were entirely military in nature.
1. An early GALCIT report can be found as Document 1-12 in Volume 1 of this series. See John M.
Logsdon, gen. ed., with LindaJ. Lear, ]annelle Warren-Findley, Ray A. Williamson, and Dwayne A. Day, Expl_rring
the Unknown: Selected Document._ in the'History o[ the U.S. Civil Spac, e Program, Volume I: Orl_ranizing.]_rr Expl_wation
(Washington, DC: NASA Special Publication (SP)-4407, 1995), h 153-76.
2. For a discussion of the limited military utility and tremendous drain on German resources of the V-
2, see Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemfinde and the Coming _(the Ballistic Misgile ;gra (New York:
Free Press, 1995).
3. David H. DeVorkin, Science With a l_nge.ancae: How the U.S. Military Created Spate Scienc_ After W_rrbl
War 11 (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992), pp. 59-61. See also Homer E. Newell, Beyorul the AtmoqJhere: The l".arlv
Years o]'Space Science (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4211, 1980).
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The Air Force and Army Space Studies
In May 1945, German rocket expert Wernher von Braun, who was brought to the
United States after the war, prepared a report for the U.S. Army discussing the potential
of Earth-orbiting satellites. In October, the U.S. Navy proposed its own satellite. In
November, Army Air Force General H. H. "Hap" Arnold declared that a spaceship was
entirely "practicable today. TM
On April 9, 1946, the Army-Navy Aeronautical Board discussed the subject and decid-
ed to reconsider it a month later on May 14. Immediately after the first meeting, Major
General Curtis E. LeMay, Director of Research and Development of the Army Air Forces,
decided to commission an independent study of the issue. It was to be a three-week crash
effort to return a report before the second Aeronautical Board meeting, apparently with
the intention of securing this new field for the Army Air Forces.
Project RAND, a division of Douglas Aircraft Company's Santa Monica research labo-
ratories, which had been established to serve as a "think tank" for the Army Air Forces,
was given the responsibility for the satellite study. The result was the report titled
"Preliminary Design for an Experimental World Circling Spaceship," issued on May 2,
1946. This was RAND's first study. In 324 pages, it concluded that it was entirely possible,
using existing technology, to develop a satellite system, although the payload would be
limited to less than 2,000 pounds. The satellite could be used to gather scientific infor-
mation, as well as to conduct weather reconnaissance, weapons delivery, attack assess-
ment, communications, and "observation." The report further noted that "the satellite
offers an observation aircraft which cannot be brought down by an enemy who has not
mastered similar techniques. "_
If LeMay's concern had been to maneuver the Navy out of the satellite business, his
tactic apparently worked, for Navy efforts soon disappeared. However, while the first study
had concluded that a satellite vehicle was practical, it failed to create any great enthusiasm
for it in the Army Air Forces, which did not want to ignore the possibilities of satellites---
particularly for satellite reconnaissance--but was unwilling to pursue it in any meaningful
way. The Army Air Forces ordered a second study, and RAND produced a series of docu-
ments on the subject during the winter of 1946-1947. One document noted that a satellite
in polar orbit would be ideal for scanning the oceans for ships. Another noted that a satel-
lite equipped with television equipment and one or more cameras could be used for
reconnaissance. In September 1947, the Air Staff of the newly formed Air Force ordered
the Air Materiel Command to evaluate RAND's studies. The Air Materiel Command
returned a cautious report noting that the practicality of such systems was questionable
and recommended a further study to establish Air Force requirements ,,
In January 1948, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Vice Chief of Staff of the newly creat-
ed U.S. Air Force, signed a "Statement of Policy for a Satellite Vehicle." This statement
declared that the Air Force "as the Service dealing primarily with air weapons---especially
strategic--has logical responsibility for the Satellite." The document also stated that the
technology was immature and that a development decision lay some time in the future.
4. R. Cargill Hall, "Early U.S. Satellite Proposals," Technology and Culture4 (Fall 1963): 410-34. See also
R. Cargill Hall, "Earth Satellites: A First Look by the United States Navy," in R. Cargill Hall, ed., History of Rocketry
and Astronautics: Proceedings of the Third through the Sixth History Symposia o] the Internati_mal Academy of Astronautic_
(San Diego, CA: Univelt, Inc., 1986), A.AS History Series, Vol. 7, Part II, pp. 253-78.
5. Document II-2 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Expltrringthe Unknown, 1: 23645.
6. Merton E. Davies and William R. Harris, RAND _ Ro& in the Et,oluti(rn ofBall_rn arul ,Satellite Observation
Sy_tents arul Related U.S. S/race 7bchnology (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1988), p. 15.
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Until that time, the issue would be studied "with a view to keeping an optimum design
abreast of the art, to determine the military worth of the vehicle--considering its utility
and probable cost--to insure [sic] development in critical components, if indicated, and
to recommend initiation of the development phases of the project at the proper time."
[II-ll
With a very clearly stated position on the matter, the Air Force asked RAND in
February 1948 to conduct further studies on the satellite. RAND contracted with several
other organizations, including North American Aviation, the Radio Corporation of
America (RCA), the Ohio University Research Foundation, and Boston University. This
was a classic early Cold War research effort, uniting government, industry, and academia•
By 1950, RAND's research was bearing fruit; in November, the Air Force Directorate of
Intelligence recommended that further research and development was justified. 7
The primary use envisioned for a satellite was reconnaissance. In February 1951,
Colonel Bernard A. Schriever organized a conference during which he established sever-
al criteria for a satellite reconnaissance system. Early the next month, tests were conduct-
ed using television cameras to establish further baselines for these criteria. In April 1951,
RAND released two further reports. The first, Feasibility of Weather Reconnaissance from a
Satellite Vehicle, examined the requirements and value of weather forecasting from space.
In particular, such a system enabled weather reconnaissance behind enemy lines, some-
thing crucial to strategic bombing campaigns. The second study was Utility of a Satellite
Vehtcle for Reconna_ssan •
This study led to yet another study, which eventually became known as Project Feed
Back; it was presented to the Air Force in 1954. The report demonstrated that a space
reconnaissance satellite was feasible, and it outlined the steps to develop it. In December
1948, the "first report" of the Secretary of Defense stated:
The Earth Satellite Vehicle Program, which was being carried out independently by each military.
service, was assigned to the Committee on Guided Missiles for coordination. To provide an integrat-
ed program with resultant elimination of duplication, the committee recommended that current efforts
in this field be limited to studies and component designs; weU-defined areas of such research have been
allocated to each of the three military departments, g
This statement seems to have been an anomaly, because the three services continued
their individual studies on their own. Why it was written remains unknown. The Air
Force's clearly stated claim on the satellite mission may have prompted it. But after the
publication of the report, nothing changed--there was no centralization of the satellite
mission, and the services continued their separate low-level studies. The report apparent-
ly was completely overlooked.
In the meantime, others in the civilian world had been working on different satellite
ideas. During a spring 1950 meeting at scientist James A. Van Allen's home, the prospect
of an International Geophysical Year (IGY) was discussed. S. Fred Singer, a physicist at the
University of Maryland, proposed building a satellite for the IGY. Singer later proposed a
Minimum Orbital Unmanned Satellite of the Earth (MOUSE) at the fourth Congress of
the International Astronautical Federation in Zurich, Switzerland, in 195370 Singer's
7. ll,id., pp. 17-19.
8. llrid., pp. 23-30.
9. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fi_t Rep¢rrto[ the Department ¢_[Defen.w(Washington, DC: Office of
the Secretary of Defense, December 1948), p. 129.
10. Document ILl I in Logsdon, gen. ed., l';_Im4ng the Unknown, l: 314-24.
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paper was based on a study prepared two years earlier by members of the British
Interplanetary Society.
On June 23, 1954, Frederick C. Durant III, former president of the American Rocket
Society and then president of the International Astronautical Federation, called Wernher
yon Braun at the Redstone Arsenal and invited him to a meeting two clays later in
Washington, D.C., at the Office of Naval Research, which had been involved in the earli-
er V-2 upper atmosphere experiments. At this meeting, plans were discussed for develop-
ing a satellite program using already existing rocket components. Further meetings
followed at which the Army gave tentative approval, provided that the cost was not too
great and the plan did not interfere with missile development. Von Braun's secret report,
A Minimum Satellite Vehicle: Based on Components available from missile developments of the Army
Ordnance Corps, was submitted to the ArmyY It summarized what he had said at earlier
meetings. The Air Force's declaration six years before that it was responsible for satellite
development was either unknown or ignored by the Army. '_
Sometime in 1952, President Truman discussed the satellite issue with his personal
physician, Brigadier General Wallace Graham. Graham persuaded Truman to commission
a study from Aristid Grosse, a chemical engineer who had worked on some military pro-
jects. Grosse conducted extensive discussions with Wernher yon Braun. He delivered his
rather slim report not to Truman, but to the Eisenhower administration.,, Despite years
of research on the subject, the space issue never reached the upper levels of the Truman
White House. '4 There was no Truman space policy, and space issues remained largely the
realm of a small group of engineers and analysts.
However, to say that the Grosse report had no effect is to overlook one key fact:
although not delivered to the administration for which it was intended, it was delivered to
the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, Donald A.
Quarles. In the Eisenhower administration, Quarles was to play a major role in establish-
ing the American space program.
The Killian Report
In September 1954, the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense
Mobilization, under orders from President Eisenhower, began a study of the problem of
surprise attack. '_' One of the major reasons behind this study was the surprises the Soviet
Union had achieved in regard to atomic weapon development. The main task of the com-
mittee was "obtaining before it is launched more adequate foreknowledge of a surprise
attack, should one be planned, obtaining better knowledge of enemy capabilities."
This special group was headed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
President James R. Killian, who later became Eisenhower's science advisor. The group
became known as the Technological Capabilities Panel, and it issued its report, rifled
"Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack," on February 14, 1955. Eisenhower and others
often referred to this document as the "Killian Report."
11. Document II-7 in itnd., l: 274-81.
12. The earlier Air Force declaration was also apparently more of an internal document intended to
authorize further Air Force studies of the issue rather than an external statement of policy; ib/d.13. Document 1I-5 in lind.. 1: 266-69.
14. Rip Bulkeley. The Spattnik_ Crisis and Early United Sta_._Spact Policy (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress. 1991), p. 83.
15. J.R. Killian, Jr., to General Curtis E. LeMay, September 2, 1954, Papers of Curtis LeMay, Box 205,
Folder B-39356, Manuscript Division. Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
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During the course of deliberations, the intelligence panel, headed by Polaroid's Din
Land, became aware of two advanced proposals for intelligence collection. One was the
nuclear-powered reconnaissance satellite using a television camera outlined in the Project
Feed Back study. The other idea was for a high-flying strategic reconnaissance aircraft
then under consideration by the Air Force. While investigating the latter, Land's panel
became aware of a proposal by the Lockheed Skunk Works for its own high-flying strate-
gic reconnaissance aircraft known as the CL-282. They brought this to the attention of
President Eisenhower. Unlike the Air Force program, the CL-282 would be configured for
strategic reconnaissance prior to hostilities--what was referred to as "pre-D-Day recon-
naissance." This was a mission that the Strategic Air Command had previously rejected.
Eisenhower approved the CL-282 in the fall of 1954, and he placed it under the
charge of the CIA. It eventually became known as the U-2, and Richard Bissell, a new-
comer to the CIA was to manage the program. When the report was issued in the spring
of 1955, it apparently never mentioned the aircraft, which was, however, detailed in a clas-
sified annex to the report. This was most likely for the "eyes only" of President Eisenhower,
and he probably destroyed it along with another classified annex on submarine-launched
ballistic missiles. "_
It was obvious to those involved in the issue that overflight of another nation's terri-
tory by such an aircraft would constitute a clear violation of international law and could
also be viewed as a hostile act. In fact, such issues were not abstract, because American air-
craft flying on the periphery of the Soviet Union were being fired on and even occasion-
ally shot down.
However, the other advanced reconnaissance proposal--a satellite--would fly much
higher and would not necessarily violate international law because no clear definition
existed of where "airspace" ended and "space" began. Realizing this, Land and the others
on his panel decided to attempt to strongly influence the evolution of international law.
They proposed that the United States first launch a scientific satellite to establish
"Freedom of Space." By doing so, later military and intelligence sateilites_would be able to
overfly Soviet territory following the precedent established by the earlier civilian satellite.
The report's recommendation 9.b read:
Freedom of Space. The present possibility of launching a small artificial satellite into an orbit
about the earth presents an early opportunity to establish a precedent for distinguishing between
"national air" and "international space," a distinction which could be to our advantage at some
future date when we might employ larger sateUites for intelligence purposes. [II-2]
Land and others considered the reconnaissance satellite to be technologically
unrealistic in the near future, but that should not prevent the United States from helping
to establish the right to overfly other nations in space. This was best done with a satellite
that was nonmilitary in nature.
Ithou h the intelligence section of the Technological Capabilities Panel report remains classified,
• 16. A g_ ..... _ "_-- -dex has been declassified. It includes the word "satelhtes, but apparently
awaiting review as Ol mto-l_O, tH_ tll " "
in the context of satellite countries of the Soviet Union. Those who have seen the report confirm that it men-
tioned balloon and satellite programs, but it apparently did not mention the U-2 aircraft, except in a separate
appendix that Eisenhower most likely destroyed. The information about the separate "eyes only" reports given
to Eisenhower is contained in an interview with Killian. Other documents concerning the recommendations of
the intelligence committee have also been released. "The Report to the President by the Technological
Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee," February 14, 1955, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records
of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew|. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell, 1952-61, Subject Series,
Alphabetical Subseries, Box 16, "Killian Report--Technological Capabilities Panel (2)/' Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library, Abilene, Kansas.
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The Scientific Satellite Program
In August and September of 1954, Wernher yon Braun and his colleagues at the Army
Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) in Huntsville, Alabama, teamed up with the Office of
Naval Research to propose a satellite called Orb/ter. This was essentially a slight re-work of
von Braun's Minimum Unmanned Satellite Vehicle. Orb/ter was to be a scientific satellite
only, essentially mirroring the earlier upper atmosphere research conducted with the V-2
rockets at White Sands. Later in the year, the American Rocket Society prepared a detailed
survey of possible scientific and other uses of a satellite and proposed it to the U.S.
National Committee for the IGY, a group under the National Academy of Sciences(NAS). '7
As it was, 1954 proved to be a very important year fi_r the generation of significant
ideas concerning scientific and intelligence collection systems. In addition to both the
Project Feed Back and the Lockheed CL-282 ideas, the NAS was now considering a scien-
tific satellite as well. These projects were inextricably linked politically.
While the Project Feed Back study and the Killian Report were both highly secret,
Orb/terwas not. The CL-282, in particular, was known to only a handful of people. One per-
son who did know of all three projects, as well as the Technological Capabilities Panel
report, was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, Donald
Quarles. He was in charge of virtually all defense research projects.
On the same day as the release of the Technological Capabilities Panel report, the
U.S. National Committee for the IGY presented a recommendation to National Science
Foundation Director Alan T. Waterman at the NAS. The committee recommended that a
scientific satellite be launched as part of the IGY?" Quarles lobbied Waterman to suggest
this idea to the National Security Council (NSC), and four days later, Waterman sent a let-
ter to Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, proposing that the United States
conduct such a scientific missionY'
Four days later, Murphy met with Waterman, NAS President Detlev Bronk, and Lloyd
Berkner (who at the time was a member of the U.S. National Committee for the IGY) to
discuss the issue. In a letter one month later, Murphy stated that such a proposal would
"as a matter of fact, undoubtedly add to the scientific prestige of the United States, and it
would have a considerable propaganda value in the cold war. ''_' Having gained the con-
currence of the Department of State, Waterman then discussed the issue once again with
Quarles, who suggested that he consult CIA Director Allen Dulles on how to proceed.
Waterman did so and gained Duiles's support for the program. He also spoke with Bureau
of the Budget Director Percival Brundage to gain his cooperation when needed. Thus, the
proposal now had the support of the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and the
Bureau of the Budget. Waterman also agreed to formally propose the full program to an
executive session of the National Science Board on May 20, and he notified Quarles of
these events on May t3, 1955. ='j
17. Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A tti.*tory (Washington, DC:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971), pp. 22-23.
18. Joseph Kaplan, Chairman, United States National Committee, International Geophysical Year 1957-
58, National Academy of Sciences, to Dr. A.T. Waterman, Director, National Science Foundation, March 14,
1955, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection, Washington, DC.
19. Alan T. Waterman, Director, Memorandum for Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of
State, 18 March, 1955, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection.
20. Robert Murphy, "Memorandum for Dr. Alan T. Waterman, Director, National Science Foundation,"
April 27, 1955, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection.
21. Alan T. Waterman, Director, to Donald A. Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and
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On May 20, 1955, the NSC approved a top-level policy document known as NSC 5520,
"Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program," which stated that the
United States should develop a small scientific satellite weighing 5 to 10 pounds7 _
Paragraph number 2 of the document stated (the newly released part is in roman type):
The report of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee
recommended that intelligence applications warrant an immediate program leading to a very
small satellite in orbit around the earth, and that re-examination should be made of the principles or
practices of international law with regard to "Freedom of Space" from the standpoint of recent
advances in weapon technology.
The other major declassified portion of the document (paragraph number 5) stated:
From a military ._tandpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated their belief that intelligence
applications strongly warrant the construction of a large surveillance satellite. While a small scien-
tific satellite cannot carry surveillance equipment and therefore will have no direct intelligence poten-
tial, it does represent a technological step toward the achievement of the large surveillance satellite,
and will be helpful to this end so long as the small scientific satellite program does not impede devel-
opment of the large surveillance satellite.
NSC 5520 also stated (starting at the end of paragraph number 6):
Furthermore, a small scientific satellite will provide a test of the principle of "Freedom of Space. "
The implications of this principle are being studied within the Executive Branch. Howev_ prelimi-
nary studies indicate that there is no obstacle under international law to the launching of such a
satellite.
7. It should be emphasized that a satellite would constitute no active military offensive threat to
any country over which it might pass. Although a large satellite might conceivably serve to launch a
guided missile at a ground target, it will always be a poor choice for the purpose. A bomb could not
be dropped from a satellite on a target below, because anything dropped from a satellite would simply
continue alongside in the orbit) _
Although the document correctly noted the limited utility of satellites as active mili-
tary offensive threats, this was not the purpose of the program. Also included in NSC 5520
was the clear stipulation that the program was not to interfere in any way with the ballis-
tic missile programs.
Establishing a right of overflight was important, but developing the intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) and the intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) was consid-
ered even more important. Both considerations later established a framework for
conducting the program--the U.S. scientific satellite, although developed by the U.S.
military, would be handled in such a way as to both seem as disassociated from ballistic
missiles as possible and interfere in their development as little as possible.
. ' sdon en. ed, F,xpl,rrinK the Unknman, 1: 308-14.
22. Document I1 10 m l,og. _, g ._ _m,l_ 59 Ceneral Records of the DepaltmenU of Slate; Records
23. NSC 5520, May 20 lu._, r, ecor, ...... v " "' " " " Security
Relating to Slate Department Participation in the Operations Coordinating Board and the National
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Quarles oversaw the selection process that followed. It involved the creation of the
Committee on Special Capabilities, headed by Homer Stewart. This committee evaluated
the various proposals and rejected the Army's Jupiter rocket for reasons that included its
obvious military tiesJ _
It was determined that the scientific satellite program should look as nonmilitary as
possible---a rocket vehicle that was not the direct development of a ballistic missile was
considered the best way to do this. The result was the selection of the Navy's Vanguard
rocket, which had its genesis in a pure research program and would be developed virtu-
ally from the ground up as a space vehicle. _
At the time, there was no clear distinction made between military and civilian space
exploration. The military was to bear responsibility for launching all U.S. payloads. The
payloads could be either civilian, such as the NAS satellite, or military, such as the Project
Feed Back satellite, but all would fly on military rockets. Meanwhile, a distinction was
made among different degrees of what can only be labeled "militaristic" involvement. The
Vanguard rocket, although developed by the Navy, had no direct connections to a
weapons system. It was therefore a better choice politically to peacefully establish the right
to overfly foreign territory. Fundamental to Eisenhower's philosophy at this time was not
to inflame the superpower rivalry unnecessarily. Keeping the rocket program as far away
from weapons development was an outgrowth of this attitude.
Lukewarm Military Enthusiasm for Space
The Air Force had made only a half-hearted effort at submitting a proposal for the sci-
entific satellite program. At the time, the program was apparently too uninteresting to gar-
ner top-level Air Force support. General Bernard A. Schriever, commander of the Western
Development Division and head of U.S. ICBM development, thought that the Air Force
should concentrate on the military satellite instead. On March 16, 1955, the Air Force
issued General Operational Requirement No. 80. Up until this time, the approval for
24. Charles A. Lindbergh wrote in the foreword to the most detailed t_)ok on the Vanguard program
(Green and Lomask, Vanguard: A Histmy), which was written before the recent revelations on the origins of theprogram, stated on page vi:
Why wttv the Red,tone-yon Braun satellite project not ._up]xrrted? An._wer_ vary with the person talked to: The Navy's
trrilliant development_ in vatellite irt_trumentation had tipped the choice to Vanguard, and tmdgetary reMTictions had prevented
a parallelingproject. The name Redstone was too close0 associated with military mi._*iles. Vanguard offered lower costv, m_re
growth potential, longer duration o[ ¢rd_iting. We w_mld eventual_ gain nurre scientifi_ reformation thr(mgh Vanguard than
through Red, tone. 7b thenceoh_ervatior_, I can addfrmn my own experience that inter-.wrtnce rivalry exerted strong influence,.
also, that any conclusion drawn wtmld he incomplete withtntt taking into account the antag_mivm _till exiMing toward vrm
Braun and his co-work_g t_ecause of their service on the Gernmn .tide _( W,rdd War II.
25. Eisenhower's staff secretary, then-Colonel Andrew C,oodpaster, provided some insight into the
Huntsville Germans' views and their lobbying on behalf of their work in a memorandum written in the summerof 1956:
On May 28th Secretary [Deputy ,_cretary of State] Hoover called me. over to mention a rqmrt he had received from a
firrmer associate in the engineering and development field regarding the earth _atellite pr¢_ect. 7"he l_st estimate iv that the ]rre-
.vent project would not & retMy until the end of '57 at the earlier, and probably well into '58 Red_t_me had a project _ll
advanc_l when the new one wa_- vet up. A t minimal expense ($2-$_ million) they cembt have a _atellite ready fi_r fi6ng by the
erul o]" 1956 errJanuary 1957. The Red._tone project ls one essentiaUy of ( ;erman s,_entz_t_ _md it is American envy _( themthat has led to a duplicative/m_ect.
I spoke to the lare_'ident abaut thi._ to ._e what wcndd be the best way to act on the matter He asked me. to talk to Seo'emry
Wilson. In the latter's absence, I talked to Secretary Robertson today and he raid he wouM go _nto the matter fully and care-
ful_ to try to ascertain the lacts. In order to establish the substance o[ thi._ report, I tom him it came through Mr. Hoover (Mr
Ho_roer had said I might d;_._o if lplt it necessary).
Quoted in Colonel AJ. Goodpaster, "Memorandum for Record," lune 7, 1956, White House Office, Office
of the Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-1961, Box 6, "Missiles and Satellites," Eisenhowe_ Library.
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further satellite studies had been from a low level of the Air Force bureaucracy; now tile
go-ahead came from the top. On April 2, 1956, Schriever and General Thomas Power, the
commander of the Air Research and Development Command, approved a full-scale devel-
opment plan for what was called '_VVeapons System l17L" (WS-117L), a reconnaissance
satellite program. It would utilize an Atlas launch vehicle and was to be fully operational
by 1963. Air Force headquarters approved the plan on July 24, 1956, and allocated $3 mil-
lion. This proved to be a major disappointment to all involved, because itwas less than 10
percent as much as was needed to go to full-scale develop ment?'_
The Air Force, as a young organization that owed its very existence to modern tech-
nology, was also the most logical of the services to embrace new technology such as satel-
lites and long-range rockets. But at the same time, the Air Force was also dominated by
the culture of the manned strategic bomber, and any new missions often had to serve this
culture. Thus, the concept of strategic rocketry was not one that was adopted readily or
without resistance by the Air Force? 7
The Air Force's strategic bombing emphasis had been one of the main reasons that
the Western Development Division had been set up on the west coast instead of the pre-
existing development operation at Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio. The satellite program
was also more likely to receive the support it needed there than at Wright Field. But
Donald Quarles, who had been promoted to Secretary of the Air Force in July 1955, appar-
ently felt that reconnaissance satellites, although a very promising idea, were still a long
way from being practical, and he did not provide the money for full-scale development.
In 1956, the Air Force also directed Bell Aircraft Company to conduct a study of a
manned boost-glide reconnaissance system known as "Brass Bell." An earlier study, known
as BOMI, evolved into a concept known as ROBO, for "rocket bomber." The Air Research
and Development Command also issued a system requirement for a hypersonic research
and development vehicle known as "Hywards." But the Air Force did not allocate any
money to manned space operations in fiscal year 1957. _"
Similarly, the early RAND studies about the possibilities of space did not receive an
enthusiastic response from top leaders of the Air Force. Space was still an expensive and
dubious proposition for the Air Force, which was more interested in spending its money
on strategic bombers and, to a much lesser extent, the Atlas ICBM. As long as neither the
Navy nor the Army was developing a military satellite system, the Air Force did not show
much enthusiasm for the various military satellite systems--human and robotic--that it
was evaluating. The WS-117L proceeded, and the Air Force even selected Lockheed as the
prime contractor for the vehicle. One of the losers in the competition, RCA, then looked
elsewhere for an agency to pay it to build a television-equipped satellite. It found the
receptive ear of Wernher yon Braun. In April 1957, the Army produced the Janus report,
which was essentially the RCA bid for the WS-117L. _'
ies and Harris RAND'* Ro& pp. 73-74.
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Thus, various space programs within the military services received support, but pri-
marily only for continued study, not for substantial development. These programs also
produced core groups of enthusiasts. Schriever and his people at the Western
Development Division in California were the Air Force space enthusiasts. Von Braun and
his ABMA team in Huntsville were the Army space enthusiasts. But in the case of the Air
Force, the program lacked support from both the top-level career military officers in the
Air Staff and the civilian leadership. Schriever had mentioned satellites in a speech in
Febrnary 1957. The Office of the Secretary of Defense told him not to mention "space"
again--this was not a military priority for the administration, and Eisenhower did not
want anyone to think it was, particularly when the White House was concerned about
peacefully establishing "'Freedom of Space. TM In the case of the Army, the ABMA was
specifically forbidden by the White House to develop satellites. The only satellite program
that had all the money it needed was the Navy's Vanguard program, and it quickly ran way
over its early estimated budget.
Even though yon Braun and the Army were officially precluded from developing a
satellite, he and his rocket team lacked faith in the Vanguard Project. In the spring of
1956, they lobbied for a reconsideration to allow the Army to attempt to launch a satellite
atop aJupiter-C missile. This proposal was rejected in the' summer of 19567 _
In late 1956, "after the Vanguard Project was well under way and running into cost
overruns, one of yon Braun's closest associates, Ernst Stuhlinger, made contact with James
Van Allen, who in 1950 bad shown an interest in a scientific satellite. Stuhlinger informed
Van Allen that, although von Braun had been ordered not to place a satellite in orbit with
the Jupiter-C, the team had grave doubts about the officially sanctioned Vanguard Project.
Stuhlinger discussed possible scientific payloads capable o(being carried atop aJupiter-C.
On November 23, 1956, he sent a letter to Van Allen thanking him for the meeting and
proposing that Van Allen visit the ABMA to view their operations. Van Alien apparentlydid?"
Van Allen responded on February 13, 1957, with a list of possible scientific payloads.
This letter was sent to William Pickering, Director of the Aamy'sJet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL) of the California Institute of Technology (the renamed GAI.CIT operation)._ It was
JPL that had begun to build the Explorer I satellite--work that was both clandestine and
forbidden at the time. Also, at some point during this period, yon Braun's team enter-
tained RGA, reviewing its failed bid for the WS-117L program.
Meanwhile, establishing "Freedom of Space" continued to be an active concern in
policy planning circles in Washington; the legal ramifications were being worked out in
the State Department and elsewhere. [II-3] Furthermore Vanguard ran severel over
get. The initial estimate had been $15 to °0 --:' ..... _' . y bud-
. a ,.mon Ior me program. By late 1957, the cost
was esumated at ten times that amount. Money had to be found in various budgets to pay
for it. Budget Director Percival Brundage said: "Apparently, both the Department of
Defense and the National Science Foundation are very reluctant Io continue to finance
30. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich, p. 181.
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this project to completion. But each is quite prepared to have the other do so." The two
had supplied some supplementary funds to the program, and, surprisingly, even the CIA
contributed $2.5 million in funds. [lI-4]
Why this was done is unknown. CIA Director Richard Bissell was kept abreast of the
developments and may have realized the importance of "Freedom of Space" to future
reconnaissance efforts. It is also true that he had a substantial discretionary fund to spend
on unforeseen problems. This fund contained around $100 million and was often used to
address pressing national security needs. Completing the Vanguard mission of shaping
international law was considered a national security issue, and this may have been why CIA
money funded part of the U.S. satellite for the IGY. What it certainly does illustrate, how-
ever, is the confluence of both civilian and national security interests in the early space
program.
By the end of September 1957, the framework of the American space program was
pretty much in place. The military was responsible for launching and supporting all satel-
lites. Scientific satellites would be developed and manufactured by civilian scientists, most
likely under the auspices of the NAS or at universities. The Army was not officially
involved in any space programs. It was, however, actively studying large rocket proposals
and also conducting numerous studies of possible satellite payloads.
The Air Force had the WS-117L under way but was underfunding it. In the summer
of 1957, a proposal for a faster, interim reconnaissance satellite using film-return tech-
niques was not received enthusiastically by the Air Force. The Air Force was also under-
taking the ROBO, Hywards, and Brass Bell studies, but not at a significant level. Overall,
the service's commitment to military space programs was weakmboth in the Air Staff and
in the civilian Office of the Secretary of the Air Force• At the same time, although military
space programs had not received much high-level support in either the Air Force or the
Army, within each service core groups of. officers and scientists had formed--space enthu-
siasts who constantly advocated for bigger programs.
Under the restrictions of both NSC 5520 and President Eisenhower's conservative
spending priorities, space seemed unlikely to become a major enterprise. Even after the
scientific satellite had flown and established "Freedom of Space," it was unlikely that
things would change substantially for either the Air Force or the Army. Both would have
to face the continued fiscal conservatism of the president and the civilian and military
leadership at the Pentagon. Sputnik changed all of that.
Turbulent Transition
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik. The launch itself was not a
great surprise to U.S. intelligence, which had ample warning that the Soviets were capable
of launching a satellite? 4 The public reaction to the launch was greater than the adminis-
tration expected, despite plenty of warning in various top-level policy documents ?_
Eisenhower had failed to realize the degree to which a Soviet first in space could
undercut his domestic priorities. He attempted to downplay the significance of Sputnik so
• " Lo sdon en. ed. Expbn'ing the Unknown, 1: 329.
34. Document 11-|3 m g ' g - ' ...... r'-^anaster Eisenhower's staff secretary, stated
35 Document II-5 in ibid., 1: 266-69. General _n_arev* ,.-v_v , , .......
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that he could "head off a stampede on the Treasury. ''_ But if the public reaction was bad
enough after Sputnik, it would soon get much worse. On November 3, the Soviets orbit-
ed Sputnik II, which weighed 1,121 pounds and carried the dog Laika. The sophistication
and size of this satellite (pardy because the upper stage remained attached to the payload)
left no doubt in the minds of many that the Soviet Union possessed tremendous superi-
ority in space launchers. The public uproar, and Khrushchev's gloating, took on even big-
ger dimensions when the Vanguard TV-3 launch--billed as a fully operational vehicle and
broadcast on national television at the White House's urgings (and the muted protests of
the engineers)--blew up on the launch pad on December 6.
The reaction to Sputnik within the military services was swift and startling--and
alarmed even Eisenhower. On October 10, the Air Force rolled its three human space-
flight proposals into one and labeled it "Dyna-Soar," for "dynamic soaring." In mid-
October, someone leaked information to Aviation Week magazine about the WS-117L--
including the involvement of Lockheed? 7 On October 26, the Army made a presentation
to the Committee on Special Capabilities (which had rejected the Army's earlier scientif-
ic satellite proposal), recommending the development of its Janus reconnaissance satel-
lite that would use a television system to photograph the Soviet Union. On December 10,
the Air Force created in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff/Development a new
department called the Directorate of Astronautics.
This enthusiastic response, particularly within the Air Force, came from the career
military officers and not the civilian leadership, who shared Eisenhower's skepticism.
After objections from Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles and others, the order estab-
lishing the Directorate of Astronautics in the Air Force was revoked only three days afterit was issued?"
Eisenhower clearly liked none of this. Soon after Sputnik, he admonished his officials
not to comment on the issue of whether the United States could have "beaten" the Soviets
into space. The reason was that talk about whether or not the Army could have launched
a satellite sooner tended to make the matter look like a race, which was exactly what hewanted to avoid?"
By sheer coincidence, soon-to-be Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy was having din-
ner with ABMA Director General John Medaris and Wernher yon Braun when the
announcement of the Sputnik launch was made. Von Braun immediately pressured
McElroy to let the ABMA team launch a satellite into orbit; they received permission on
November 8. The ABMA's military leaders apparently had their own satellite in mind for
the mission. But yon Braun and JPL's leadership had their own, and this was initially
named "Deal-l." As in a game of poker, if you are dealt a bad hand--as the country had
been dealt with both Sputniks I and II--you fold and tell the person to deal you another.
JPL Director William Picketing was able to convince ABMA Director Medaris that their
satellite was the better choice)" Deal-1 was soon renamed Explorer I, and it was launched
into orbit on January 31, 1958.
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The New Military Space Agency
In November, newly appointed Secretary of Defense McElroy proposed centralizing
control of the various American space projects then under way, such as Vanguard and the
WS-117L, along with advanced ballistic missile development. They would be placed into a
Defense Special Projects Agency, which would be responsible for whatever projects the
secretary would assign to it. The idea for this agency apparently arose from the President's
Science Advisory Council in mid-October, just days after both Sputnik and McEIroy's nom-
ination." Eisenhower himself expressed the opinion that a fourth service should be estab-
lished to handle the "missiles activity. ''4_ McElroy said that he was thinking about a
"Manhattan Project" for anti-ballistic missiles. The president thought that a separate orga-
nization might be a good idea for this problem. '_ In testimony before Congress, Quarles,
who might easily have been regarded as an Air Force partisan, stated that long-range, sur-
face-to-surface missiles had been assigned to the Air Force because it possessed the tar-
geting and reconnaissance capabilities to use them, not because it was uniquely an Air
Force mission? 4 Space could conceivably be treated in the same way.
Killian and the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization
found McElroy more receptive than his predecessor? _ On November 7, in a national tele-
vision address, Eisenhower announced that he was elevating Killian to the position of
Special Assistant for Science and Technology and head of the President's Science Advisory
Committee. The press quickly labeled Killian the "Missile Czar." By this time, Killian was
probably pushing the idea of a separate agency for space as well.4'_
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The Defense Special Projects Agency would act as a central authority t_)r all U.S. space
programs and would essentially contract out missions to the separate services, civilian gov-
ernment agencies, and even universities and private industry. "Above tile level of the three
military services," McEhoy said, "having its own budget, it would be able to concentrate
on the new and the unknown without involvement in immediate requirements and inter
service rivalries." McElroy also stated in front of Congress that "the vast weapons systems
of the future in our judgment need to be the responsibility of a separate part of the
Defense Department.'" This proposal was placed in a DOD reorganization bill. At this
point, it was still assumed that the entire American space program would remain under
military control, although at the level of the secretary of defense, in an office specially cre-
ated to manage it.
On December 6, McElroy received a letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating their
opposition to the creation of the Defense Special Projects Agency. They felt that line
authority fl)r space programs should remain within the services themselves. Schriever also
objected. He wanted an authority that would be able to set policy, but not one that would
actually manage programs for astronautics. This, he felt, would duplicate capabilities
already within his own organization.'" McElroy--and, more importantly, Eisenhower--did
not agree. Tiffs was to be a constant source of contention for the next year and a half.
All of these events apparently were having a cumulative effect on Eisenhower, who was
concerned that the military services were less focused on their missions and more inter-
ested in grabbing this newly opening frontier as their own turf. For Eisenhower, this was
a constant worry. He had always been concerned about the parochialism and turf-
building impulses of the military and became convinced that he was seeing it again. A sep-
arate military space agency seemed to be the way to avoid it.
A Separate Civilian Agency
At the end of December 1957, Killian drafted a "Memorandum on Organizational
Alternatives for Space Research and Development." In it, be argued that the Defense
Special Projects Agency was a good idea and should house the DOD space program. In
addition, much space-related research and development properly belonged in such an
agency. At the same time, however, the scientific community was arguing that purely sci-
entific and nonmilitary aspects of space research should not be under the control of the
military. There were two options for addressing this. The first option was to establish a
central space laboratory within DOD with a broad charter that included basic space
research. The second option was to establish a new civilian space agency formed around
NACA.
Although Killian did not specifically recommend one option over the other, he con-
cluded:
The overall plan, then, must keep steadily in view the need for those means and programs which
will command the interest and participation of our best scientists. We must have far more than a pro-
gram which appeals to the "space cadets. "It must invoke, in the deepest sense, the attention of our
best scientific minds if we as a nation are to become a leader in this field. If we do not achieve this,
then other nations will continue to hold the leadership. '_'
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In January 1958, the Senate began a series of public hearings on the country's space
program. They were ostensibly intended to investigate the status of the U.S. missile and
space programs and to determine why the United States was apparently so far behind the
Soxfet Union in space. But Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson also wanted to use
them to publicly embarrass Eisenhower.
Before the hearings began, on January 7, 1958, McElroy requested that all three ser-
vices list their proposed space projects. The ABMA, under yon Braun, had an extensive
list, such as reconnaissance, meteorology, basic science, and extensive rocket development
• r _lb
for space missions, including the delivery of supplies to paratroopers in enemy terrlto y.
The Navy was already responsible for the one satellite program that was actually building
hardware and was not itself adverse to expanding its slice of the pie.
The Air Force expected to be lead agency in the new space program. The Air Staff by
now had ambitious space plans that included reconnaissance, early warning, and hyper-
sonic space planes. It also had expanded its wish list to include nuclear rockets to service
lunar bases and soon added a proposal for placing an American in space sooner than the
Dyna-Soar schedule would allow. The uniformed Air Force interpreted this request as an
indication that not only was it being named lead agency for space, but that its grandiose
program was about to be approved2 _This propensity of the Air Force for thinking big was
well known in the White House, and members of the President's Science Advisory
Committee felt they had an obligation to "ridicule the occasional wild-blue-yonder pro-
posals by a few Air Force officers for the exploitation of space for military purpose s,'_"
At the same time, the Air Force signed several agreements with NACA concerning the
Dyna-Soar program (also known as Weapons System 464L). [II-5, II-6, II-7] The Air Force
was interested in the strategic bombardment aspects of the program, while NACA was
interested in the possible civil applications of such a vehicle. What differentiated these
agreements from earlier space cooperation was that both the military and civilian agen-
cies were to cooperate on the development of a space payload, not simply focus individu-
ally on the payload or the launch vehicle. The precedent for this cooperation came from
the previous Air Force-NACA work on the X-plane series, particularly the challenging
X-15 program.
Discussion of the Defense Special Projects Agency continued within the administra-
tion. Its name was changed to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), and
Eisenhower sent a message to Congress on January 7, 1958, requesting supplemental
appropriations for the agency2 _ In early January, the newly created President's Science
Advisory Committee addressed the issue of ARPA. Other than opposing the placement of
advanced ICBM research into a separate agency instead of keeping it with the current
ICBM programs, the committee had no objection to ARPA.
On February 4, 1958, during a White House meeting between Eisenhower and
key Senate Republicans to discuss legislation currently before Congress, the issue of space
came up again. Eisenhower felt that all of the nation's space programs could be ade-
quately housed within DOD, presumably with ARPA in charge. Eisenhower wanted to
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avoid duplication of effort, and because military space programs were of paramount
importance, he saw no need for creating a civilian space agency outside DOD?'
Killian expressed some reservations at having the military run the U.S. space pro-
gram. The interests of civilian scientists were unlikely to be represented in such an orga-
nization, and Killian was, after all, a scientist himself. But it was Vice President Richard
Nixon who stated that it was important for the United States to have a civilian space pro-
gram entirely separate from the military. This, Nixon argued, would advance the
American position in the world the most? s
On February 7, 1958, James Killian and Din Land, who was also a member of the
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, met with Eisenhower
and his staff secretary, General Andrew Goodpaster. They briefed him on the potential of
both a recoverable space capsule and a supersonic reconnaissance aircraft program, sug-
gesting that to speed up the development of a reconnaissance satellite, the United States
should pursue the recoverable capsule idea as an "interim" solution. Eisenhower appar-
ently accepted this recommendation at that time.
An equally important result of this first meeting was the decision to finalize Secretary
of Defense McElroy's proposal and create ARPA to house highly technical defense
research programs. General Electric executive Roy W.Johnson was to serve as its director.
Eisenhower decided to give ARPA control of all military space programs. The military
"man-in-space" program, meteorological programs, and the WS-I 17L would all be turned
over to ARPA.
During a second conference on February 8 concerning the recoverable satellite pro-
gram, Eisenhower said "emphatically that he believed the project should be centered in
the new Defense space agency, doing what CIA wanted them to do. ''_ This was a major
shift in the development of the reconnaissance satellite program; not only did it give it
top-level approval, it also removed responsibility for the film-return satellite from the Air
Force and granted it to the CIA, mirroring the earlier U-2 decision.
The importance of these meetings in early February cannot be overemphasized. In
the course of only a few days, Eisenhower had not only taken the entire military space pro-
gram, particularly the Air Force's ambitious plans, and given it to a newly created DOD
agency, but he had also taken a key project in that program and given it to the CIA. Both
decisions later had profound effects on the shape of the American military and civilian
space programs. In addition, the president had begun to address the issue of creating a
separate civilian space agency. This was being heavily discussed in Congress and the press,
but until the February 4 meeting, Eisenhower apparently thought that the issue of dupli-
cation of effort justified keeping all space research located in DOD, centralized at a level
above any of the rival armed services.
A month later, on the same day that the Air Force proposed the approval of a "man-
in-space" program, Eisenhower announced his decision to create a separate civilian space
agency, with NACA as its core. This was to forever change the nature of civil-military coop-
eration in the American space program.
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Sputnik brought space to the attention of the top military and civilian Air Force lead-
ership. It was suddenly a highly visible and exciting endeavor and one in which top Air
Force officers naturally felt that the service should lead. As a result, the dreams of the set-
rice's space enthusiasts suddenly received high-level attention. Chief among these was the
plan to place a human--an Air Force pilot, no less---in orbit around the Earth.
Sputnik also re-focused attention on Wernher yon Braun's rocket team at the
ABMA--a highly capable team of engineers who dramatically enhanced their reputation
by launching Explorer I. The Army hoped that the ABMA would be the flag-carrier for a
significant Army role in space. _
However, the ambitious plans ot both the Air Force and Army ran headlong into real-
ity-and the civilian leadership of DOD. In February 1958, ARPA was formally created,
and the interim reconnaissance satellite program (later called CORONA) was placed
under CIA control. ARPA assumed control of the manned ballistic capsule project as well.
One by one, the Air Force's other plans were gradually stripped away. The Army's pro-
grams did not receive serious support; despite its impressive capabilities, the "ground ser-
vice" was not considered particularly well-suited to lead the country into space.
Thus, in the immediate post-Sputnik period, the Air Force saw its plans for becoming
an "aerospace force" emerge and then quickly vanish---one by one lost to other agencies.
In many of the programs that it had conceived and pioneered, it was thus reduced to a
support role--almost the same as a contractor. Over the next few months, it became obvi-
ous that the projects it did not lose to ARPA would be lost anyway to the new civilian
agency.The one program of which the Air Force did maintain exclusive control was the Dyna-
Soar project. This was not simply a consolation prize; it was, in fact, the most important
mission to many within the Air Force space community. It had everything that an Air
Force space program was expected to have--wings and a human in the cockpit. What it
lacked was a clearly defined mission.
The Transition
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 established a purposely blurry line
between NASA and the military space programs. Under the "Declaration of Policy and
Purpose," the Space Act states:
, he eneral wel(are and security of the United States require that ade-
The Congress declares that t g, . , J ..... .vL_ p ...... ¢,, declares that such
quate provision be made for aeronauticat ana space actwmes, i r_e _u,o_, .... s-rther
activities shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, a civilian agency exercising control
over aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the United States, except that activities peculiar
or p,_marily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defenSnmefOito . " cludin the research and development necessary to m.ake effective provis_
of the Unzted States (m g ........... :_1:,., or and shall be azrectea try, the _,epu, ....
the defense of the United States) snatt oe _ne respon_ ..... oy 7,
of Defense; and that determination as to which such agency has responsibility for and direction of any
such activity shall be made by the President in conformity with section 201 (e). _7
This was not terribly clear policy guidance, particularly as the entire nature of
space exploration and exploitation was still vague and under development. It was also not
very clear considering that the entire issue of which organization--ARPA or NASA--
57. Document 11-17 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Expbmng the Unkn_nan, 1: 33445.
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would be responsible for human spaceflight was unresolved. For the time being, the mili-
tary space program was under the control of ARPA in the ()ffice of the Secretary of
Defense. This was not popular with the military services, but it did serve to mitigate turf
disputes over the proper location of space programs. Such decisions were made at the
national level, and the services on their own were incapable of making significant move-
ment on space programs with ARPA in control of initiating and budgeting programs. The
Space Act made it clear that it was up to the president to decide which programs belongedwher .
More importantly, the establishment of NASA to conduct scientific experiments in
space undercut much of the Air Force's emerging justification for human spaceflight. The
Air Force had proposed human spaceflight less for mission reasons than as an extension
of aeronautical medicine--to study the reaction of the human body to spaceflight. This
was now a mission that NASA was more appropriately suited to accomplish. Furthermore,
if people were to be placed in space for prestige reasons, the civilian program was more
suitable for this from a propaganda standpoint. The Air Force was thus largely left with
the search for a practical reason to put people in space. As robotic systems improved, this
practical justification became more and more elusive. Finally, in August 1958, Eisenhower
formally assigned the role of human spaceflight to NASA?"
Over time, the issue of where to conduct human spaceflight began to be resolved by
top officials. For instance, by November 1958, only two months after NASA officially came
into being, NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan and ARPA Director Roy Johnson signed
a memorandum of understanding concerning a "Program for a Manned Orbital Vehicle."
[II-8] This was to supplement the Dyna-Soar vehicle development (whose exact status had
not been clearly defined, although it stayed within the Air Force and did not come under
the control of ARPA). Eventually, the ballistic capsule concept totally migrated over to
NASA. As long as the Air Force continued to have its own human spaceflight program, top
Air Force officials did not complain too much about losing the less interesting ballisticcapsule vehicle.
Other areas proved more contentious, however. NASA had acquired the three NACA
research centers and their heavy emphasis on aeronautics research. But the new space
agency lacked expertise in other areas, particularly the key ones of satellite and rocket
development. It became obvious that NASA would have to acquire these as well. In the
meantime, the Army was launching lunar and scientific probes on behalf of NASA, includ-
ing Pioneer IIl, which traveled 63,580 miles toward the Moon, and Explorer IV, which
took radiation measurements in space.
The obvious choice was for NASA to acquire the Army's JPI_., which had technical
expertise in the areas of guidance, communications, telemetry, rocket propellants, and
satellites. JPL was primarily a research center, and the Army could continue to benefit
from its research no matter who operated it. On December 3, 1958, the Army transferred
JPL to NASA, along with its Explorer satellite program.St, [II-9]
The other obvious entity to turn over to NASA was the ABMA in Huntsville, Alabama,
which had produced the Jupiter and Redstone rockets.Jupiter was an IRBM and fulfilled
the same role as the Air Force's Thor. Its days as a weapons system were limited. The
ABMA had other rocket programs in the works. In October 1958, with the concurrence
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of ARPA, the ABMA had initiated an effort known as Juno V, which was soon to be
renamed Saturn. Juno V was a space rocket, not a missile, and the ABMA's other work was
not in tile IRBM or ICBM field (the latter being the exclusive domain of the Air Force).
However, the ABMA represented the Army's last vestige of long-range missile work, a
concept that it had pioneered in the post-war years. Unlike JPL, it was also a major devel-
opment command and, as such, represented a significant amount of money. The Army
was therefore reluctant to give it up, especially if the money would no longer appear in
the Army budget as well. There was even the appalling (for the Army) possibility that the
Saturn rocket conld be turned over to the Air Force.
Rather than turning the center over to NASA immediately, the Army negotiated to do
this gradually. Eisenhower disagreed with this strategy, but he was willing to let NASA
Administrator T. Keith Glennan work it out. [lI-10] The Redstone program was trans-
ferred to NASA on December 3, 1958, and then the Saturn program was transferred in
November 1959. Finally, from March through July 1960, the Army transferred the ABMA
Development Operations Division, which included the 150 German scientists and engi-
neers, 3,900 ABMA personnel, and 2,500 missile and satellite technicians. [II-11] The
Army was officially out of the space business.
While NASA was busy acquiring facilities and personnel from the Army, it was also
using the services of the Air Force and forging various agreements with that military ser-
vice, particularly for the use of its powerful missile, the Atlas, as well as its ground stations.
Paying for these systems became an issue; NASA and DOD signed an agreement in
November 1959 for the reimbursement of costs. [II-12]
The move of the ABMA to NASA was the second important step in the creation of
duplicative tasks for the civilian and military space programs. But it seems to have aroused
little concern within the Eisenhower administration.
Although the core of NASA consisted of NACA, as the organization grew, it took on
aspects of both the Army and the Air Force approaches to ballistic missile development.
The Army approach centered on the arsenal system, which involved hea_3' in-house devel-
opment of weapons using both uniformed personnel as well as civilian Army employees,
but relatively few outside contractors. The Air Force adopted a more open, contractor-ori-
ented approach; direction remained within the military, but civilian contractors did a
large amount of the research and development work. NASA adopted both of these prac-
tices over time. As it rapidly acquired former Army laboratories, it developed a strong in-
house technical capability for the development of hardware. But key NASA managers also
came to the agency from the Air Force and brought with them both their experience and
expertise of working with aerospace contractors, as well as long-standing close relation-
ships with such contractors/_
A Rocky Road to Cooperation
The Space Act included provisions for a "Civilian-Military Liaison Committee," in
which NASA and DOD were expected to "advise and consult with each other on all mat-
ters within their respective jurisdictions relating to aeronautical and space activities and
shall keep each other fully and currently informed with respect to such activities." But
almost from the beginning, this committee did not work very well.
60. For a discussion of the evolution of N.MSA as an institution, see Chapter IV in Logsdon, gen. ed.,
l';xpl¢_r_ng the Unknonm, 1:611-29.
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In a December 15, 1958, interagency meeting on U.S. launch vehicles, represen-
tatives of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD), speaking for ARPA, had dis-
cussed their upper stage vehicles with NASA. However, they failed to mention the Agena
B vehicle, which at the time was being considered for the CORONA and SAMOS recon-
naissance satellites, as well as other payloads. NASA representatives discussed their Atlas-
Vega vehicle. Vega was to be a two-stage addition to the Atlas. The second stage would be
powered by a 33,000-pound thrust, liquid oxygen-kerosene engine. The third stage was to
be a restartable 6,000-pound thrust, storable-propellant engine developed byJPL.
On January 16, 1959, the AFBMD ordered Lockheed to initiate a study and a test pro-
gram for a restartable booster. This occurred only a clay after Convair submitted a pro-
posal for a medium-energy upper stage for the Atlas-Vega. A week and a half later, on
January 27, NASA listed the Atlas-Vega as the first in a series of upper stage vehicles for
use in the national space program. ';_ NASA signed contracts for the Atlas-Vega in March
and May of that year. In April and June, the AFBMD had worked out details for the Agena
B with Lockheed and authorized formal development work--without notifying NASA.,_
Gradually, word of the Agena B reached NASA officials, and by December 1959, NASA
canceled the Vega as redundant. This duplication of effort had cost the country $16 mil-
lion. A Government Accounting Office review of the program placed most of the blame
on the Air Force for not informing NASA of its ongoing program. ,_,The Civilian-Military
Liaison Committee had been intended to preclude just such a duplication of effort, and
it had failed because the Air Force decided to keep part of its program secret from anoth-
er government agency. A year later, in September 1960, the Civilian-Military Liaison
Committee was eliminated, and NASA and DOD signed an agreement creating an
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board. [II-13] Over the years, the importance
of the board has varied, depending on the issue and the personnel participating in it.
Taking the Military Space Program Away From ARPA
ARPA was never very popular with the military services. It removed a number of
key space programs from service control and placed it within DOD itself. Although the
services bowed to this reality, it became increasingly irksome to them as time went on. In
March 1958, soon after its creation, Director Roy Johnson informed the service secretaries
that he would bypass the service chiefs and deal with the heads of the commands direct-
ly. '_ Soon thereafter, the services began losing each of their programs.
When the structure of ARPA came up for review a year later, Air Force Brigadier
General James F. Whisenand, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stated
in a February 1959 memorandum to General Nathan Twining (the Chairman): "From the
military viewpoint, we would hope that ARPA would be phased out eventually and that
[the Office of the Secretary of Defense] could get back solely to policy direction. '',,_
There was also concern that the Air Force would predominate once ARPA was
eliminated. A Department of the Army space policy in February clearly stated that the
Army would have a subordinate role in the national space program. But it also stated that
in its view, "Space is a new largely unknown medium which transcends the exclusive inter-
61. '% National Space Vehicle Program," NASA, .January 27. 1959. NASA Historical Reference
Collection. NASA History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D( 2.
62. Paul Means. "How the Two Programs Progressed," Mmile._and l¢o¢:ket_..[nne20, 1960, p. 20.
63. Paul Means. %rega-Agena.B Mix-Up Cost Millions," Mi_.*il*_aTul I¢tu-keta, June 20. 1960, p. 19.
64. Bowen, The 7"hresh_ldof Sparse,p. 24.
65. Bligadier General James F. Whisenand, Special Assistant to Chairmarl, Memorandum for General
Twining, "DOD Charter for ARPA," February 16, 1959, Record Group 218, Re_ords of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Chairman's File. (;eneral Twining, 1957-1960, Box 34, "471.94 (1959)." National Archives.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 255
est of any service .... No military department should be assigned sole responsibility for
space acuwue .
This situation also was unacceptable for the Na_ T. In April 1959, the chief of naval
operations urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to create a single military space agency. The
Army, rapidly losing its space program to NASA, agreed• The Air Force chief of st',df
objected that this would remove the weapons systems from the unified commands. By July
1959, White House and DOD officials began evaluating this separate military space
agency. It would report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and command would rotate
among the services. It was tentatively called the Defense Astronautical Agency. "7[II-14]
In September 1959, Defense Secretary Nell McElroy rejected the proposal for a sepa-
rate military space agency. Furthermore, he removed military space from ARIA and gave
it back to the separate ser_ices. Booster development was transferred to the Air Force, and
payload development went to the Army, Navy, and Air Force based on competence and
primary interest. Under this plan, the Saturn rocket was expected to be turned over to the
Air Force. This ultimately did not happen, however, as administration leaders recognized
that there was no military need for such a large booster; a month later, Saturn was turned
over to NASA. '_
During the first two years after Sputnik, there was a considerable philosophical
change in the Eisenhower administration's approach toward space. Eisenhower had ini-
tially opposed the creation of a separate civilian space agency, which he thought would
duplicate capabilities already at DOD. Yet he had been convinced to create NASA. His top
officials, such as Killian, had also initially opposed the idea of giving NASA programs that
duplicated those in the military services. However, first the ballistic space capsule and
then Saturn and ABMA's rocket development facilities were given to NASA.
These later moves, in particular, were a much more dramatic shift. Giving NASA its
own rocket development capability directly duplicated capabilities that could have been
left solely with the Air Force, but they were not. This split--and the establishment of sep-
arate civilian and military rocket production facilities--was to have a profound effect on
the relationship between NASA and the Air Force for years to come. In military terms, it
created separate "stovepipes" that duplicated missions and capabilities. The creation of
the National Reconnaissance Office only a few years later added a third stovepipe to the
national space program, adding even more duplication. Gradually, by accretion and usu-
ally without much second thought, the separate programs grew beyond what Eisenhower
had originally wanted when he created ARIA in early 1958.
The New Era
By the end of 1959, the Air Force had regained from ARPA control over most of its
space program. Furthermore, it had been made lead authority for developing large mili-
tary boosters. With the Army out of the picture, the Air Force was now clearly the premier
military space agency.
The Air Force also had not abandoned some of the expansive dreaming that had
begun in the immediate post-Spumik period. In April 1960, the AFBMD produced a
secret report for a "Military Lunar Base Program or S.R. 183 Lunar Observatory Study."
66. Office of the Adjutant General, Headquarters, Department of the Army, D_artment _![ the Army'.s
lntere._t, ('apatrility, and Rde in Space, February 25, 1959, Record Group 218, Records of the U.S..Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Chairman's File, General Twining, 1957-1960, Box 34, "471.94 (1959)," National Archives.
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[II-15] The base was billed as a "manned intelligence observatory" that could be devel-
oped into a "Iamar Based Earth Bombardment System." According to the report, the deci-
sion to place strategic weapons on the Moon could be deferred [br a few years. "However,
the program to establish a lunar base must not be delayed and the initial base design must
meet military requirements. For example, the base should be designed as a permanent
installation, it should be underground, it should strive to be completely self-supporting,
and it shonld prmfide suitable accommodations to support extended tours of duty." The
report recommended that "[t]he program for establishing a military lunar base be rec-
ognized as an Air Force requirement."_,
The Air Force clearly still had its own designs on a large human spaceflight program.
Within this atmosphere, on April 14, 1960, Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas D. White sent
a letter to his staff, stating:
I am convinc, d that one of the major long range elements of the AirForceJuture lies in space. R
is also obvious that NASA will play a large part in the national effort in this direction and, more-
oveg inevitably tt_ll be closely associated, if not eventually combined with the military. It is perfectly
clear to me that particular& in these formative years the Air Force must, for its own good as well as
for national interest, cooperate to the maximum extent with NASA, to include the furnishing of key
personnel even at the expense of some Air Force dilution of technical talent. [II-I 6]-
Unfortunately for White and the Air Force, the memorandum was leaked to
Congressman Overton Brooks, the chair of the House Committee on Science and
Astronautics. As Brooks characterized it, the statement indicated that White thought "that
the military would ultimately take over . there was also much speculation withinNASA '" ....
the press a_)out the possible consolidation of the military and civilian space programs.
69. The ideas of milital y bases on the Moon and orbital weapons were not new. One of the first men-
tions of orbital bombardment weapons appeared in F_*rl*_smagazine m 1946 (see Document ll-I in Logsdon,
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appeared in Collier'._ magazine in 1948 (see Robert S. Richardson, "Rocket Blitz From the Moon," Collier'.,,
October 23, 1948, pp. 24-25; 4446). Noted science fiction author Robert A. Ifeinlein used the idea of space bom-
bardment in a short story called "The Long Watch" in American 1.el,non Magazine in December 1949--and again
in his popular novel 3_haee (_,let. The same week that the creation of ARPA was being finalized, Brigadier General
Homer A. Boushey, Air Force Depu_ Director for Research and Development, wrote an article that advocated a
lunar base as the ultimale deterrent (see Brig. Gen. Homer A. Boushey, "Who Controls the Moon Controls the
Earth," U.S. N,m,s & l,_rrM Relnrrt ' February 7, 1958, p. 54). See also Lt. Col. S.E. Singer, "The Military Potential
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justifications was the basing of weapons on the Moon to provide qntelnational Law Enforcement" (lSojett
H_rdzon, Phtt_e I ICqJ_rrt,Volume I. June 8, 1959, Space Poli O, Institute Documentary History Collection). Rather
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inslance, S'pace Infirrmation Briefing, March 30, 1966, Future Weapons Office, R&D Directorate, U.S. Army
Weapons Command, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection).
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Robert S. McNamara and the
"National Space Program"
Soon after the Kennedy administration took office on January 20, 1961, newly
appointed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara quickly put his own imprint on the mil-
itary space program. On March 6, he issued a directive to the secretaries of the military
services stating: "I have decided to assign space development programs and projects to lhe
Department of the Air Force, except under unusual circumstances.'"' Such assignment,
McNamara stated, was not to predetermine the assignment of operational responsibilities
for the space systems. In addition, preliminary research could still be conducted by the
individual services, but it would eventually have to be transferred to the newly created
director of defense research and engineering for evaluation before proceeding to devel-
opment. In light of that, "[r]esearch, development, test, and engineering of Department
of Defense space development programs or projects, which are approved hereafter, will be
the responsibility of the Department of the Air Force." [II-17]
Taken together, both memoranda made outside observers believe that the Air Force
was about to attempt to take control of the majority of the civilian space program. In
March 1961, Overton Brooks called hearings to discuss the issue. He was also concerned
about the report of President Kennedy's transition group for space, which indicated that
NASA was to be responsible for scientific research, while the military would play the pre-
dominant role in developing space systems. Shordy before the hearings began, he sent a
letter to Kennedy asking for clarification on the matter. [II-18]
During the course of the hearings, General Thomas D. White declared that the leaked
memorandum, which had caused such consternation in the press and the committee, was
only a general marching order to his staff to improve its cooperation with NASA; it did not
indicate any planning to take over NASA. General Bernard Schriever, then commander of
the Air Research and Development Command, admitted that he was mostly to blame for
White's memorandum, because he had resisted the transfer of Air Force personnel to
NASA. White was trying to indicate to Schl'iever that he was not happy with this lack of
cooperation. However, given the Air Force's secrecy over the Agena B, and its continuing
expansive space plans, it was conceivable that the service's top officials had at least some
designs on NASA's turf. TM
The result of the hearings, and of Brooks's letter to Kennedy, came in Kennedy's reply
on March 23, the final day of the hearings. Kennedy stated:
71. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military
Departments, et al., March 6, 1961, reprinted in itml., p. 2.
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It is not now, nor has it ever been, my intention to subordinate the activities in space of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration to those of the Department of Defense. I believe, as
you do, that there are legitimate missions in space for which the military services should assume
responsibility, but that there are major missions, such as the scientific unmanned and manned explo-
ration of space and the application of space technology to the conduct of peaceful activities, which
should be carried forward by our civilian space agency. [II-19]
Kennedy's letter thus made it clear to the/kit- Force that NASA would have primary
responsibility for both human spaceflight and the development of space technology in
general. At the same time, he acknowledged a clear military role in space. This attitude
would become clearer less than two months later with a joint memorandum to the presi-
dent from NASA Administrator James E. Webb and Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara. The '"¢¢ebb-McNamara Memo," as it became known, stated that space projects
could be undertaken for one of four possible reasons. The first was scientific knowledge,
the second was commercial/civilian value, and the third was military missions. The final
reason was for purposes of national prestige. Such missions were "part of the battle alongthe fluid front of the cold war. ''_
This was in stark contrast to the position of President Eisenhower, who had explicidy
rejected national prestige as a reason for space exploration and attempted to restrict both
NASA and the military to strict utilitarian missions. By embracing their own view, and by
calling explicitly for an "integrated" space program, Webb and McNamara also indicated
that large, "prestige" missions were best carried out within NASA. They essentially applied
a "strict scrutiny" approach to military space programs. If the programs did not serve clear
military needs, then they should be either turned over to NASA or abandoned altogether.
Blue Gemini
On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy committed the United States to a major new
undertaking in space, expressly for the purposes of national prestige. TM Project Apollo
resulted in a dramatic infusion of funds to NASA, along with the decision to ensure that
the United States was ahead in every area of space technology. NASA was selected as the
primary_and most _isible_instrument for accomplishing this. As NASA's leadership
planned out its program for reaching the Moon, it became obvious that certain tech-
nologies and capabilities would have to be developed. Foremost among these was ren-
dezvous in orbit. NASA quickly decided to develop a more advanced space vehicle than
the Mercury to develop these new techniques and technologies. This first "operational"
spacecraft was soon named Gemini.
As NASA increased in size and assumed a predominant role, its interests also tended
to diverge at key points from those of DOD. On July 7, 1961, NASA Associate
Administrator Robert Seamans proposed a joint study to determine mission models and
requirements affecting the selection of large launch vehicles. NASA's Nicholas Golovin
directed the study. As this study progressed, the different requirements and institutional
interests of NASA and DOD became clear. Both agencies distanced themselves from the
contents of the report. By the time the report was released on September 24, 1962, almost
73. Document II1-11 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Exploring the Unknor,rn, 1: 43%52.
74. Document Ill-12 in ifnd., 1: 453-54.
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a year later, it had been obvious for some time that there would be very little cooperation
between NASA and DOD on large launch vehicles. [II-20] The result was a furthe, solidi-
fication of entirely separate and redundant rocket development programs in the civil and
military spheres.
In February 1962, during congressional hearings on the Air Force space plan, Air
Force officials first broached the idea of an Air Force version of the Gemini spacecraft.
The idea became firmer in June when the Air Force's Space Systems Division began look-
ing at the use of Gemini hardware for a preliminary Air Force space station known as
MODS (Manned Orbital Development System). The Space Systems Division had been
given the task of acting as a contractor to NASA for providing launch and target vehicles
for Gemini. In August, those at the Space Systems Division started referring to the Air
Force plan as "Blue Gemini. ''7'
Although not officially sanctioned at the top levels of the Air Force, Blue Gemini
became more appealing as other Air Force programs were cut back or slipped in sched-
ule. A planned satellite interceptor was cut in the fall of 1962, and Dyna-Soar was still a
long way from its first flight. The possibility of acquiring a simpler vehicle than Dyna-Soar
to accomplish the rendezvous and reconnaissance agendas for the other two programs
became very appealing at many levels of the Air Force. 7'_
Many at NASA did not oppose the possibility of the Air Force taking a bigger role in
the development of Gemini; they thought that DOD money flowing into the program
could only help its development. In November 1962, the NASA Gemini program team
met with representatives of the Air Force's Space Systems Division to discuss the coordi-
nation between the agencies. Soon after, NASA Administrator James Webb and Associate
Administrator Robert Seamans visited the Pentagon to discuss increased DOD participa-
tion in Gemini with Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric. However, Secre.tary
of Defense McNamara was also there, and he surprised all of them by proposing the merg-
ing of the NASA Gemini program office with the Air Force office and moving it all to
DOD. :7
Retired Admiral W. Fred Boone became NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for
Defense Affairs on December 1, 1962. Boone soon began working in earnest to build sup-
port against such a move. In early January 1963, NASA officials met with Pentagon offi-
cials and convinced them that taking over Gemini was a bad idea. McNamara and
Gilpatric backed away from the takeover idea, but McNamara pushed for a joint manage-
ment board for GeminiD
In January 1963, Webb wrote Secretary of Defense McNamara and stated unequivo-
cally his opposition to the joint management board for Gemini. Ill-21, II-22, II-23] Webb
had a major argument on his side; Gemini was vital to achieving the lunar goal, and DOD
could not interfere with that mission. For DOD, Gemini was intended to be used to
explore the utility of human spaceflight for the military--it was a much more open-ended
and ambiguous mission. At the same time, there were those in the Air Force who were
opposed to taking over Gemini because it would increase the chance of Dyna-Soar being
killed. McNamara had to back away from the Gemini takeover attempt and ultimately
accepted the creation of a Gemini Program Planning Board, which did not significantly
alter the relationship between the actors. _'
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In this context, and as Dyna-Soar moved toward the construction of hardware, that
program became increasingly difficult for the Mr Force to justify convincingly. Its propo-
nents were forced to grasp at whatever justification the), cot_ld find. Dyna-Soar was to be a
reconnaissance craft. It was to be an offensive weapon, _apable of striking the Soviet
Union from virtually any direction, dropping up to two nuclear warheads. It was also to be
an anti-satellite weapon, capable of destroying Soviet reconnaissance satellites. Some of
these missions, however, could be accomplished more cheaply and more immediately with
robotic spacecraft. Others, such as the bombing mission, were not really needed.
Furthermore, as long as the fundamental utility of human spacecraft for military missions
was in doubt, it made no sense to rely on a technologically challenging program to prove
their worth. Gemini was perfect at the time for demonstrating the military value of human
spaceflight because it was cheaper and easier than I)yna-St_ar. The Air Force still remained
wedded to the image of flying Air Force pilots in space, but this was an image that was
more emotional than logical.
In April 1963, President Kennedy asked Vice President Johnson to conduct, in his role
as chair of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, an overall review of the "nation-
al space program." [II-24] McNamara was asked to report to Johnson tm this issue and did
so, commenting that he and NASA Administrator Webh had worked hard to eliminate
duplication between the ci_41ian and military space programs. [II-25] The idea of a
"national space program" was not McNamara's alone; indeed, the term had been used
during the prior administration. But McNamara, with his dedication to efficiency, was the
person most concerned about eliminating duplicative and wasteful programs.""
McNamara was expansive in his view of his mission as well, and he was willing to reach
beyond the DOD budget and programs to attempt to acquire or even to eliminate pro-
grams in other organizations that he did not see as worthwhile. Striving for McNamara's
definition of "efficiency" was not always easy, but this was a central factor in I)OD-NASA
relations during much of the first decade of the space program."'
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In March 1963, McNamara still had not made up his mind about the desirability of
Dyna-Soar. He felt that the Air Force had not concentrated enough on exactly what it was
to do in orbit, focusing solely on its flying characteristics. He suggested several missions
that should be evaluated, including inspection and kill, reconnaissance, the x+ulnerability
of space vehicles, and orbital weapons. But he was also interested in the test bed possibil-
ities of any spacecraft and voiced this in a meeting with Boeing and NASA officials. One
NASA official stated that according to the Space Act, such joint use might create a con-
flict, because regulations dictated that NASA was not to be involved in weapons develop-
ment. McNamara responded to this with scorn, stating that he was willing to change theindeed.
• r _'_law If necessa y- " His view of his authority and mission was quite expansive
During the summer of 1963, the Air Force began to seriously consider an orbital space
station. It received authorization from the director of defense research and engineering
to study the issue. The space station was not to be an end in itself; rather, it was to be used
to "demonstrate and assess qualitatively the utility of man for military purposes in space."'
The Air Force's initial study was completed by November, and it assessed a number of
options, including the use of Gemini and Apollo spacecraft to service the military space
station.
Dyna-Soar was an arguably duplicative program and also one that was becoming
increasingly expensive as it moved away from purely theoretical research and into the
development phase• In addition, Kennedy had been elected to some degree on the pro-
paganda scare of a nonexistent "missile gap," from which he and McNamara later had to
retreat. Kennedy's actions after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty of 1963 also symbolized a movement away from boisterous displays of nuclear capa-
bilities. In light of these events, as well as ongoing public and congressional concerns
about "the militarization of space," the image of a piloted space bomber swooping in from
orbit to obliterate Moscow became distinctly unattractive to the administration.
Another problem with Dyna-Soar was that the basic utility of humans for military
space missions was in doubt. It was to be proven or disproven with the military space sta-
tion, which was itself an experimental vehicle. Identifying the utility issue did not require
an experimental vehicle, and using an experimental spacecraft to service an experimen-
tal space station seemed to be too risky and too expensive.
By 1963, the Kennedy administration was very aware of the value of satellite recon-
naissance. It had even evaluated the possibility of sharing U.S. reconnaissance data with
other nations. Satellite reconnaissance was viewed as a valuable national asset, not merely
a military war-fighting tool. But the Air Force apparently continued to view reconnais-
sance solely in terms of military capabilities and thus sought a way of neutralizing Soviet
reconnaissance satellites--doing so in a highly visible manner.
In short, Dyna-Soar would militarize space in all the ways that the administration did
not want to see it militarized. It was largely unjustified and duplicative of missions that
NASA was already conducting. It also now stood in the way of identifying clear military
space missions for humans• Thus, by late 1963, Dyna-Soar was in clear trouble with
Defense Secretary McNamara. The response from the Air Staff was a letter to the secre-
tary of the Air Force outlining several space station missions, all involving Dyna-Soar. If
money was a problem for the national space program, suggested the assistant to the vice
82. Brockway McMillan, Assistanl Secretary for Research and Development, "Memorandum for
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Brown Director of Detense Research and Engineering, to Secretary of fl_e Ai* Force,
83. tlarold ' , .... o. ,q_,0, Snace Policy Institute Documentary History Co|leclion.
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chief of staff, then it was always possible to cancel Gemini (its role in the Apollo program
was ignored)." This last ditch, vindictive effort to save Dyna-Soar failed.
On December 10, 1963, McNamara canceled the Dyna-Soar program. As consolation
to the Air Force, DOD authorized money for a Manned Orbital Laboratory program uti-
lizing the Gemini spacecraft. This laboratory program would continue for another five
years, serving as the Air Force's hope for flying its own pilots in space. The laboratory was
to serve as an occupied, real-time reconnaissance spacecraft with muhiple cameras,
demonstrating various reconnaissance and surveillance technologies. However, at the
beginning of its life, the Manned Orbital Laboratory, similar to Dyna-Soar, was amor-
phous, with no clear, overriding purpose other than technology development and the
ever-persistent Air Force desire to fly its own astronauts in space.
At the same time, NASA was investigating the possibility of developing a space station,
and cooperation with DOD on this matter was only natural. [II-26, II-27] The two organi-
zations even signed an agreement for the creation of a Manned Space Flight Experiments
Board. [II-28] The agreement established the principle of reciprocity and the sharing of
flight opportunities between NASA and DOD for both Apollo and the Manned Orbital
Laboratory.
By 1968, the Manned Orbital Laboratory had solidified significantly and was to
include a massive camera system with a ground resolution of four inches. The officers
aboard it were to provide near real-time reconnaissance of the Earth. This had been an
early goal of the Air Force's WS-117L and SAMOS programs, but it had proven a difficult
one to achieve because of the technological challenges. The CIA had successfully devel-
oped its CORONA reconnaissance system, which, by the late 1960s, had already flown
more than 100 missions and proved an astounding success. The Air Force had chosen
another route, developing "close-look" systems for the technical assessment of Soviet
weapons, but the service bad never abandoned its desire for real-time reconnaissance.
CORONA photographs could take more than a day to reach Washington and photo-
interpreters. The Air Force wanted to reduce this to hours or less; such a quick
turn-around would enable the photographs to be used in battlefield operations. This
coincided well with the Air Force's dream of flying Air Force officers in space--hence a
major impetus behind Dyna-Soar and, later, the Manned Orbital Laboratory.
With the Vietnam War waging, the DOD budget was under extreme pressure. The
Manned Orbital Laboratory was the largest single item in the DOD budget and therefore
an obvious target for being cut. In 1968, the laboratory was doomed, but it survived for
one more year and the election of another president (Richard Nixon). Then it was killed.
Once again, the Air Force's attempt to fly military officers in space had been thwarted., _,
84. Major General J.K. Hester, Assistant, Vice Chief of Staff, HQ, Air Force, Memorandum to the
Secretary of the Air Force, "Approaches to Manned Military Space Programs," December 4, 1963, Space PolicyInstitute Documentary History Collection.
85. The Manned Orbital Laboratory had also run afoul of other developments and a shortage of funds,
this time not because of NASA, but from a different source entirely--the CIA. By the late 1960s, the CIA was
beginning to develop its follow-on to the highly successful CORONA series of wide-area surveillance satellites.
The CORONA follow-on and the Manned Orbital Laboratory, which were intended to perform entirely differ-
ent missions, were competing with each other for funding within the highly secret world of the National
Reconnaissance Office. Furthermore, the laboratory ran into some of the same problems as its linear predeces-
sor, Dyna-Soar; it was far too visible for its own good, especially for a reconnaissance system. In a contentious
meeting at the National Photographic Interpretation Center in 1968, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, chair
of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, repeatedly complained that the Manned Orbital Laboratory
would not be able to fly without "Walter Cronkite looking over your shoulder." While the nation's other recon-
naissance satellite programs had remained remarkably Secret, the laboratory had attracted much attention with-
in the press and Congress. It had become a political football in Congress, where angry Florida Senators and
repreSentatives wanted to know why the space station had to fly out of Vandenberg Ail Force Base, California.
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Humanspaceflightwasoneofthekeyissuesofmilitary-civiliancooperation.During
the1960s,NASAhadclearjustificationsforflyinghumansinspace--medicalresearch
andprestige.TheAirForcedidnothavetheseclearjustifications,anditshumanspace-
flightprogramwasthusfocusedfirstondemonstratingtheutilityofastronautsformili-
taryspacemissions.Intheend,theAirForcefailed even to justify flying astronauts simply to
perform this evaluation, let alone to serve practical purposes in space. Robotic spacecraft as
well as NASA experiments undercut the tenuous justifications the Air Force had advanced
even for experimental missions. The costs were simply too high and the benefits viewed as
too elusive. The experience with both Dyna-Soar and the Manned Orbital Laboratory
apparently taught the senior uniformed leadership at the Air Force a lesson, and they
were forever after very skeptical of human spaceflight.
The Military and the Space Shuttle
In early 1969, President-elect Richard Nixon appointed a Space Task Group to
address the issue of the post-Apollo space program. Vice President-elect Spiro Agnew was
appointed chair of the group, and its other members were NASA Administrator
Thomas O. Paine and Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans (who had been
deputy administrator at NASA). On March 22, 1969, the Space Task Group met to discuss
the joint development of a Space Transportation System (STS). Less than two weeks later,
on April 4, Paine asked Seamans to approve a joint NASA-Air Force study of an STSY +
The conclusion of the Space Task Group was that the country should undertake an
ambitious space exploration program involving landing humans on Mars and developing
a hmar base and space station. These missions would be serviced by a reusable Space
Shuttle, intended to reduce the costs of transportation. President Nixon, however, did not
accept this report and only gave his initial approval to the space station and shuttle
options, postponing the former and tentatively agreeing to the latter. "7
NASA and the Air Force had diverged on the issue of large launch vehicle develop-
ment seven years before. While NASA developed the Saturn IB and the much larger
Saturn V, the Air Force developed its Titan series of boosters. Versions of the Titan were
used for ICBMs and various reconnaissance missions, and even larger versions were devel-
oped first for Dyna-Soar and later the Manned Orbital Laboratory and CORONA follow-
on. By early 1970, NASA officials such as Paine had recognized that DOD support would
likely be essential for obtaining White House approval for the Space Shuttle program.
NASA and Air Force officials met a number of times to discuss the design of the Space
Shuttle and to establish terms of reference for such a system. [II-29]
In February 1970, NASA and the Air Force signed a joint agreement to cooperate by
establishing a NASA-Air Force Space Transportation System Committee (STS
Committee). They agreed that the program would be unclassified and would also involve
international cooperation. Furthermore, both NASA and DOD would make substantial
t ontributions to shuttle development and operations--which later became important for
the establishment of shuttle pricing agreements. [II-30, II-31, II-32] The STS Committee
was the mechanism through which the Air Force informed NASA of its requirements for
• _ _ assise reoort for the Space Task Group, which served as a basis for transporta-86 DOD prepared a m ' r . ,, _:°+:-_ _ _n ,_ ssible DOD missions
1io1'_ mission models for the space shuttle. This document was essentlany a n_tHq6 _ .... i -°- , '
over the next several years• "DOD Space Programs, Options, Recommendations," August 7, 1969, Space 1 olicy
Institute Documentary History Collection.
87. Documents II1-25 and 1II-26 in Logsdon, gen. ed., lixpbrring the Unknorvn, 1: 522-46.
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the Space Shuttle. During its first year of operation, the STS Committee laid considerable
groundwork for the shuttle's design.
NASA initially wanted a smaller shuttle with only limited cross-range (that is, the
ability of the shuttle to travel to either side of its ground track during landing). Low cross-
range meant relatively small, straight wings, while high cross-range meant larger, delta-
shaped wings for more maneuvering. Smaller payload size and smaller wings would
presumably result in a smaller, easier (to build), and, hopefully, cheaper shuttle.
The Air Force, however, had two primary requirements. One was the ability to launch
the largest payload in its inventory, by then the CORONA folk)w-on satellite (which the
CIA had eventually turned over to the Air Force for development), with a little extra room
and weight for growth. The second was the ability to launch polar-orbiting reconnaissance
satellites. Polar orbit could not be reached from Cape Canaveral without overflying inhab-
ited areas, and such launches therefore flew out of Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California, heading south. For the shuttle, this proved problematic, for if there was an
abort during liftoff, the shuttle had to be capable of returning to California to avoid land-
ing with a highly classified payload in the Soviet Union. The rotation of the Earth would
cause California to move during that time period, and the shuttle needed to catch up with
it. It therefore needed a high cross-range capability--l,100 miles--in addition to the largepayload capability.
NASA's initial proposal was for a shuttle with a 14-fool by 45-foot payload bay, which
would eventually be expanded to 15 feet by 60 feet at a future date. The Air Force strong-
ly objected to this, because it could not use a payload bay smaller than 15 feet by 60 feet
for key missions. The Air Force stated that of the 149 military payloads forecast to be flown
between 1981 and 1990, 71 would not fit in the smaller payload bay. Without the larger
bay, these missions would have to fly on Titan III boosters instead, undercutting the justi-fication for the Space Shuttle."
To gain the Air Force's support for the development of the shuttle, NASA agreed to
both the payload and cross-range design requirements '' [II-33] In addition, to place large
payloads in high-Earth orbit, a "space tug" was needed. NASA and DOD began negotiat-
ing on the development of this vehicle as well. [II-34]
According to NASA's early cost models for the shuttle's development, virtually all
American payloads had to be shifted to the shuttle for the vehicle to be cost-effective. This
meant, in effect, that other launch vehicle production had to be eliminated, but the Air
Force had not explicitly agreed to this. In 1973, Malcolm R. Currie, Director of Defense
Research and Engineering, wrote to the secretary of the Air Force stating, that uncertain-
ties about the operational availability of the shuttle dictated the maintenance of a back-up
launch capability using expendable launch vehiclesY' With congressional pressure mount-
ing on NASA because of rising shuttle costs, NASA Administrator James Fletcher wrote to
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, asking for his continued support of the shuttle,
as well as continued dialogue with NASA on the issue. [II-35] Schlesinger, along with
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements, met with Fletcher in August 1976 to dis-
cuss the shuttle issue.
88. For a fuller discussion of the technical tradeoffs involved in the shuttle design, see M. Scott Pace,
"Engineering Design and Political Choice: the Space Shuttle 1969-1972/' M.A. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology, 1982.
89. Documents I11-28and I11-32 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Fxploring the Unknown, 1: 546-59.
90. Malcolm Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to Dr. Robert C. Seamans,
Secretary of the Air Force, "DOD Space Shuttle P anning," August 7, 1973, Space Polio¢ Institute DocumentaryHistory Collection.
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In alettertoFletcher,Clementsstatedforthefirst time: "Once the Shuttle's capabil-
ities and low operating cost are demonstrated we expect to launch essentially all of our
military space payloads on this new vehicle and phase ont of inventory our current
expendable launch vehicles." [II-36] This letter, although not a specific policy directive, is
apparently the first clear statement of DOD intent to rely exclusively on the shuttle for
access to space. This policy was not quickly or easily accepted within the Air Force, and
even two and a half years later, a joint memorandum of understanding on the manage-
ment and operation of the shuttle notably did not state that the shuttle would be the
exclusive means for access to space. [II-37]
Two months later, John J. Martin, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and
Development), and John F. Yardley, NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight,
signed an agreement that determined what DOD would pay for shuttle launch services.
For the first six years of operation, DOD would pay NASA what amounted to the incre-
mental costs of materials and services. [II-38] This later led to charges in Congress and
the press that NASA was giving the Air Force a preferential deal on shuttle flights to main-
tain its continued support. However, the Air Force had already agreed to significant costs
of its own for using the shuttle.
The effects of the Air Force decision to cooperate with NASA on the shuttle were not
felt for some time. There were gradual indications that this had been a mistake. The cost
of developing a separate launch and landing facility at Vandenberg Air Force Base was
increasing. It was planned that the shuttle use Space Launch Complex-6 (known as "Slick
Six") at Vandenberg, which had originally been intended for Dyna-Soar, was then modi-
fied for the Manned Orbital Laboratory, and had never launched a single rocket despite
the expenditure of billions of dollars. The modification of "Slick Six" was expected to cost
even more money than planned.
In addition, the Air Force was looking at the possible procurement of its own orbiters,
hut as the development cost rose, this became less attractive. Finally, the decision to coop-
erate on the shuttle did not necessarily constitute an Air Force decision to make exclusive
use of the shuttle for launching all payloads. However, the cost of supporting both the
shuttle and the Air Force fleet of expendable boosters was also becoming apparent. By
1974, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and Secretary of the Air Force Malcolm
Currie were becoming increasingly concerned about all of these costs.
NASA-AIr Force relations during this time were not always cordial. As the shuttle
design matured, NASA managers frequently made changes without including the Air
Force in the decisions, only informing the service after the fact. Furthermore, the initial
launch rate for the shuttle was set at 60 flights per year, with 40 from Kennedy Space
Center and 20 from Vandenberg. NASA soon determined that this flight rate was
unachievable without a five-orbiter fleet; in 1976, the space agency began calling for a fifth
orbiter, expecting the Air Force to pay for it. The DOD leadership refused to acknowledge
that its mission model dictated tile need for the fifth orbiter, which it feared it would haw_
to procure on its own. [II-39]
In 1977, Hans Mark became the new under secretary of the Air Force and the direc-
tor of the National Reconnaissance Office. Mark previously had directed NASA's Ames
Research Center and felt that the shuttle was in the best interests of the country. He
entered office at a time when the shuttle was coming under increasing pressure from the
new administration of President Jimmy Carter over cost increases and schedule delays. _u
91. Documcnl II1-37,in [.ogsdon. gcn. ed., Explonng the {.'_known, 1: 559-7,t.
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Mark was an ardent shuttle supporter and argued thal the vehicle itself was an impor-
tant contributor to national defense: _To further justify the shuttle, Mark chose to elimi-
nate the option of "dual-compatibility" and shift key national security payloads to a
"shuttle-compatible" only policy. According to a report at the time, this meant "a payload
design compatible with shuttle launch: it may or may not be compatible with [expendable
launch vehicle] launch. The term 'Shuttle optimized' implies a payload designed to
exploit the unique capabilities of the shuttle--i.e., retrieval, on-orbit service, large weight
and volume, etc. The 'Shuttle optimized' payload is not likely to be compatible with exist-
ing [expendable launch vehicle] launch capability. '"'_ In anticipation of using tile shuttle's
unique capabilities, the procurement rate of national security satellites was reduced dur-
ing the 1970s until the shuttle became operational. The result of this decision was a "bow
wave" of unfunded requirements that drove up DOD space spending in the 1980s:"
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan, despite the objections of the uniformed Air Force,
directed the transition of all U.S. government payloads to the Space Shuttle as expedi-
tiously as possible, once "the capabilities of the STS are sufficient to meet its needs and
obligations.'_':' As a result, a number of national security payloads were modified so that
they could only fly on tile Space Shuttle. This was to have a profound effect on the mili-
tary and intelligence space programs later in the 1980s.
The Death of Military Human Spaceflight
By the time tile Space Shuttle became operational in tile early 1980s, it had changed
considerably fi-om what the Air Force had originally anticipated. The Air Force faced
launch costs totaling nearly $300 million per flight. In August 1982, Air Force Systems
Command Commander General Robert T. Marsh, who had responsibility for Air Force
.participation in the STS, informed Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Gabriel of ris-
ing shuttle costs. [II-40] The shuttle did not fare well when compared to the Air Force's
other heavy booster, the Titan III. Not only had shuttle costs risen, but when added to the
Air Force's internal costs for personnel, hardware, mission control, and so on, the overall
cost to the Air Force was much higher than expected. It was becoming obvious to many
within the Air Force that the shuttle posed a major budgetary burden. In addition, the
shuttle program was also considerably behind schedule and was unlikely to meet antici-
pated flight rates.
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In March 1983, Lieutenant General Richard C. Henry, Commander of the Air Force
Space Division, wrote a letter to General Marsh at the Systems Command. Henry
expressed growing concern that carrying humans aboard a vehicle designed merely to
deliver payloads to orbit created an unnecessary expense. After the initial ground-
processing delays of the shuttle Challeng_ Henry wrote:
A four orbiter-only fleet, experiencing problems similar to those of Challenger, would develop a
backlog of launches that would take months to years to work off This represents a considerable threat
to the continued vitality of the national space program and in particular, could impact national secu-
rity through inadequate launch support of priority DOD spacecraft.
Henry's letter outlined for the first time the idea of a "mixed fleet" of launch vehicles
and also mentioned the possibility of commercializing launch vehicles, such as the Delta
and the Atlas. [II-41] This was at a time when the Air Force was rapidly preparing to close
down its expendable launch vehicle production lines.
DOD continued to support the shuttle despite strong reservations, particularly among
top Air Force officers. In early 1984, however, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
issued a directive that established a need for a complementary expendable launch vehicle
to supplement the Space Shuttle. [II-42] This move was not popular with top NASA offi-
cials, who viewed it, correctly, as a lack of faith in the Space Shuttle, but they could not
address the problem because it was an Air Force policy issue. In the Air Force's view, the
Space Shuttle was nowhere near reaching its definition of "operational status," even more
than three years since the first launch. [II-43] DOD initially ordered ten complementary
expendable launch vehicles, based on a modified Titan 34D design. This eventually
became known as the Titan IV.
A ),ear after the complementary expendable launch vehicle decision, Undersecretary
of the Air Force Edward C. Aldridge, who was also the director of the National
Reconnaissance Office, discussed with NASA Administrator James Beggs the possibility of
preserving other expendable launch vehicle lines in addition to the Titan. Having com-
pleted a competition to select the complementary expendable launch vehicle, Aldridge
needed NASA to concur with the decision. He reached an agreement with Beggs, and this
was taken to the National Security Council for the president's signature. It became
National Security Decision Directive 164 (NSDD 164), "National Security Launch
Strategy," signed on February 25, 1985, which stated that the shuttle would continue to be
the primary space launch system for both the military and civilian space programs. This
directive authorized DOD to develop the complementary expendable launch vehicle; it
also stated that the two organizations should begin developing a second-generation STS.
[II-44]
After the Challenger accident, however, the military was placed in a tremendous bind.
Although DOD had already begun shifting some of its payloads away from the shuttle, it
had also designed a number of them so that they could be carried only by the shuttle. With
the primary launch vehicle for many of these payloads out of service for an indeterminate
amount of time, the depth of the shuttle cooperation mistake became apparent to virtu-
ally everyone in the Air Force and DOD. Classified satellites that could only fly on the shut-
tle began to pile up at various "clean rooms" around the country, creating a backlog of
payloads that needed to be in orbit. Furthermore, several other expendable launch vehi-
cle failures at the same time left the United States grounded and resulted in the destruc-
tion of several valuable reconnaissance payloads. Finally, the on-orbit constellation of
reconnaissance, early warning, communications, and other satellites continued to age.
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For a period of several )'ears, the United States was left with only one reconnaissance satel-
lite in orbit, a situation that was totally unacceptable flom a national security point of
_,tew.-
The Shuttle Legacy for NASA-DOD Relations
Air Force involvement in the shuttle came largely at the urging of the civilian leader-
ship of the service, not the general officers or the Air Staff. This is not terribly surprising
because the shuttle was a NASA-initiated program, and NASA officials had negotiated with
their civilian counterparts in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force Grant Hansen was one of the prin'cipal contacts with NASA dur-
ing early negotiations, as was Secretary Seamans. Later in the 1970s, Undersecretary of the
Air Force Hans Mark fltrther entwined the Air Force's fate with the performance of the
Space Shuttle.
At the same time, support for involvement with the shuttle received only lukewarm
response from uniformed personnel. This represented a decided shift from the previous
major military space initiatives in the Air Force, where the uniformed officers had been
pushing the programs and the civilian leadership---both at the secretary level and in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense--had opposed them. This characteristic had begun
with the WS-117L reconnaissance program, which had been underfunded by Secretary of
the Air Force Quarles. It was also seen in such instances as General Schriever being
warned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense not to use the word "space" in speeches.
It was certainly common in the immediate post-Spumik era, when the Air Staff had lob-
bied extensively for a number of new space missions, only to see its authority stripped by
Secretary of Defense McElroy with the creation of ARPA. And it was in evidence under
McNamara, when the Air Staff had bold plans for Dyna-Soar, which met opposition among
the civilian leadership. It even applied to areas that were well within the Air Force's space
mission, such as the development of the MIDAS early warning satellite, which McNamara
refused to approve for operational development over the objections of Schriever and oth-
ers: By the time that the shuttle decision was made, however, the Air Staff had apparent-
ly lost much of its enthusiasm for space, particularly for human spaceflight missions. Why
this is so is not clear. At the very least, solely military "man-in-space" missions were appar-
ently out of the question, and cooperative missions with NASA were not particularly attrac-
tive to the uniformed military•
96. A report by the Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board in June 1983 further symbolized the uniformed
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This is not to say that the civilian leadership of DOD in general, or the Air Force in
particular, rushed enthusiastically into a major development project with NASA. Certain
important members of DOD required much convincing before signing the agreements
that increased cooperation with NASA on the Space Shuttle. Later on, in the 1980s, par-
ticularly under the leadership of first Undersecretary and then Secretary of the Air Force
Edward Aldridge, the civilian leadership at the Air Force became particularly suspicious
and distrustful of the total reliance on the Space Shuttle. It is also true that by the 1980s,
the military space program had clear priority within the White House. Even the policy-
making apparatus for space decisions, centered as it was in the National Security Council,
was biased in favor of DOD over NASA.
The ChaUeng;eraccident did not create the problems for DOD in general and the Air
Force in particular in terms of cooperation with NASA. However, it did throw them into
harsh relief; it confirmed the grumblings and second-thoughts of much of the uniformed
military. All of this is important to recognize with respect to what happened later to Air
Force-NASA relations--Challengerwas not the cause, merely the most blatant symptom of
a long-standing tension.
Civilian DOD officials typically serve no more than a single presidential term in office.
Occasionally, they move to higher positions, but it is far more common that they leave the
government altogether. They therefore rarely have to live with the long-term conse-
quences of the policy decisions they make. The uniformed officers in a service, however,
do remain. The mid-level officers frequently are given the task of implementing decisions
made at higher levels and then may rise to general officer rank themselves years later,
when they are faced with the consequences of the decisions made earlier. In the case of
the shuttle decision, many Air Force officers who were colonels and lieutenant colonels at
the time later rose to general officer rank when the true effects of the shuttle decision--
particularly the higher costs and the schedule delays--were being felt. At that point, they
were inclined to heavily resist any further cooperative efforts with NASA.
This was the legacy that NASA and DOD faced as the 1990s began. The situation was
akin to what Mark Twain once said about a cat that sits on a hot stove top: it will never sit
on a hot stove top again, but neither will it sit on a cold one. Thus, despite the change of
the civilian political leadership at both DOD and NASA from both the change of admin-
istrations and simple personnel turnover, the institutional memory of the Air Force--its
uniformed officers--remained highly distrustful of any cooperative agreement foisted on
them by civilians.
Conclusion
The civilian-military relationship in space has been one that has evolved over time and
continues to evolve to this day. Determining whether it has been a success or not is large-
ly impossible, because the question depends on at what level one wants to look.
At the operational level, there has been much successful cooperation on all aspects of
the space program. DOD provided facilities, material, and personnel in support of the
civilian space agency. Navy ships conducted retrieval operations for NASA missions. Air
Force personnel served in important positions in the Apollo program. DOD and NASA
shared tracking and communications facilities for each other's programs. Even the high-
ly secretive "black" intelligence programs have been used in the civilian space program.
Optics developed for reconnaissance satellites found their way into Apollo and other
sp_ce science missions. In fact, a reconnaissance satellite was even used to photograph the
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Skylabspacestationsoonafterlaunch to assess the damage it incurred during liftoff. The
photographs were used to train the NASA astronauts who flew the repair mission. _*
At the policy level, it has been a different story. From the Air Force's perspective, the
service has largely come up short--being relegated to less glamorous, but more vital roles
in space, while also being forced to serve in a support capacity for NASA, which managed
to take much of the credit. For the first decade of its existence, NASA reaped the fruits of
much military spending and research on space and was frequently predominant in policy
disputes. Beginning with the shutde, NASA's dependence on the military for more than
just operational support became blatantly clear. In the end, however, the Air Force seems
to have suffered more from this situation as well.
By the early 1990s, the situation had become much more complex. Both NASA and
DOD needed each other to find a solution to tile problem of excessive launch costs.
Perhaps more importantly, NASA began the painful transformation to a post--Cold War
world much earlier than the military space program. Whether the military can learn from
NASA's example awaits to be seen.
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Document I1-1
Document tide: Major General L.C. Craigie, Director of Research and Development
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, to Brig. Gen. Alden R. Crawford, Air Materiel
Command, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, "Satellite Vehicles," January 16, 1948, with
attached: Memorandum for the Vice Chief of Staff, "Earth Satellite Vehicles," January 12,
1948, and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force,
"Statement of Policy for a Satellite Vehicle."
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Following RAND's study titled "Preliminary Design of an Experimental World Circling Spaceship, "
published as Document 11-2 in Volume I 0fExploring the Unknown, RAND conducted several
more studies. The staff of Headquarters United States Air Force ordered the Air Materiel Command
to evaluate RAND's studies. The Materiel Command returned a cautious report stating that the prac-
ticality' of satellites was questionable and advised further study. As a result, the Air Staff authorized
further study of the subject try RAND, and also stated that the Air Force was the logical service for
developing sateUite systems. This was the first definitive statement by the Air Force that it should have
primacy in space systems.
[no pagination]
SUBJECT: Satellite Vehicles
TO:
16January 1948
Commanding General
Air Materiel Command
Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio
Atm: Brig Gen Alden R. Crawford
1. Reference is made to memorandum dated 8 December 1947, file TSKON-9/
MSR/loa, subject as above.
2. In line with the contents of referenced letter, the attempted statement of policy cov-
ering this matter has been formulated and approved.
3. It is requested that this policy be implemented by action under the RAND contract.
This matter has been co-ordinated [sic] with the local RAND office.
4. The classification of this subject may be considered confidential with the exception
of the attached policy statement.
BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:
L.C. CRAIGIE
Major General, U.S. Air Force
Director of Research and Development
()ffice, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel
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[no pagination ] 12.JAN 1948
Memorandum for the Vice Chief of Staff
SUBJECT: Earth Satellite Vehicles.
DISCUSSION.
1. Progress in guided missile research and development by the Air Force, the Navy
and other agencies is now at a point where the actual design, construction, and launching
of an Earth Satellite Vehicle is technically, although not necessarily, possible. The passage
of time, with accompanying technical progress, will gradually bring the cost of such a mis-
sile within feasible bounds.
2. It seems therefore, imperative, in order that the USAF maintain its present position
in aeronautics and prepare for a future role in astronautics, that a USAF policy regarding
Earth Satellite Vehicles be promulgated. A suggested policy is attached hereto.
RECOMMENDATION.
That the inclosed [sic] policy be approved.
[no pagination]
Statement of Policy for a Satellite Vehicle
The USAF, as the Service dealing primarily with air weapons---especially strategic--
has logical responsibility for the Satellite.
Research and development will be pursued as rapidly as progress is guided missiles are
justifies and requirements dictate. To this end the problem will be continually studied with
a view to keeping an optimum design abreast of the art, to determine the military worth
of the vehicle--considering its utility and probably cost--to insure development in criti-
cal components, if indicated, and to recommend initiation of the development phases of
the project at the propel time.
HOYT S. VANDENBERG
General, United States Air Force
Vice Chief of Staff
Document 11-2
Document title: Robert R. Bowie, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State,
"Memorandum for Mr. Phleger," March 28, 1955.
Source: State Department Central Decimal Files (711.5/3-2855), Record Group 59,
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.
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Document 11-3
Document title: Robert R. Bowie, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, to Secretary
of State, "Recommendations in the Report to the President by the Technological
Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, ODM (Killian Committee): Item
2--Nsc Agenda 10/4/56," October 2, 1956.
Source: Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State: Records Relating
to State Department Participation in the Operations Coordinating Board and the National
Security Council, 1947-1963, Box 87, "NSC 5522 Memoranda," National Archives and
Records Administration, Washington, D.C.
In February 1955, the Technological Capabilities Panel, headed by MIT professor James R. Killian,
produced a report on the threat of surprise attack on the United States. The report made a number of
recommendations on how to reduce this threat, including the development of radar early warning
systems and better intelligence collection methods. One recommendation was the establishment of the
concept of "Freedom of Space" by first orbiting a scientific satellite before orbiting an intelligence
satellite. This recommendation resulted in the signing of NSC 5520, "Draft Statement of Policy on
U.S. Scientific Satellite Program," published as Document 11-10 in Volume I of Exploring the
Unknown. Prior to the s_gning of this document, the Department of State was requested to study the
issue and report to the National Security Council (NSC), as stated in the recently declassified top secret
letter by Robert Bowie to Assistant Secretary of State Herman Phleger. The Policy Planning Staff at
the Department of State continued to study the issue, along with several other recommendations in the
Technological Capabilities Panel's report, and issued further reports on their status, also recently
declassified from "Top ,Secret status, "including the "Freedom of Space" recommendation. "Freedom of
Space" continued to be an issue for several years after Sputnik.
Document 11-2
[no pagination] March 28, 1955
Memorandum for Mr. Phleger
At a recent meeting, the NSC considered a report to the President by a panel of the
Science Advisory Committee on threat of surprise attack.
Recommendations No. 9 and B. 12b of the report read as follows:
"9. A re-examination be made of the following principles or practices of internation-
al law from the standpoint of recent advances in weapons technology:
"a. Freedom of the Seas. Radical extension of the 'three-mile limit' to permit con-
trol of surface and subsurface traffic from the coastline to beyond the likely striking
range of sea-launched nuclear missiles.
"b. Freedom of Space. The present possibility of launching a small artificial satel-
lite into an orbit about the earth presents an early opportunity to establish a prece-
dent for distinguishing between 'national air' and 'international space,' a distinction
which could be to our advantage at some future date when we might employ larger
satellites for intelligence purposes."
"B. 12b. Studies should be made of appropriate changes in the concept of the 'three-
mile limit' to permit actions in keeping with the threat; for realistic implementations of
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anypolicychanges,themissionsof theCoastGuardandNa_Tmustbeamendedand
forcesincreasedtoequalthetasksofinspectionandcontrol."
TheDepartmentof Statehasbeenrequestedto studytheserecommendations,i
coordinationwiththeDepartmentsofDefense,Treasury,andJustice,andto submita
reportandrecommendationstotheNSConoraboutMay15,1955.
It seemsclearthatI.shouldundertakethetwostudiesinvolved,workingwithother
interesteddivisionsandofficesoftheDepartment.
RobertR.Bowie
Document 11-3
[no pagination] October 2, 1956
TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: S/P - Robert R. Bowie
SUBJECT: Recommendations in the Report to the President by the Technological
Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, ODM (Killian
Committee): Item 2--NSC Agenda 10/4/56
1. The Council is asked to note the status of implementations of the Technological
Capabilities Panel (TCP) recommendations on "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack,"
as presented in the several agency reports contained in NSC 5611 ("Status of National
Security Programs on June 30, 1956"). Oral reports may be given to the Council by
Defense, AEC, ODM, FCDA [Federal Civil Defense Authority] and CIA.
2. The draft Record of Action, which the Council will be asked to approve:
a) noted a number of changes in programs to carry out that is assigned to
Defense;
b) requests Defense to supplement its Council briefing, in December, on the
ICBM, with a report on the anti-missile missile program; and
c) defers decision on a follow-up study to the Killian Report, which the TCP rec-
ommended '_vithin two years."
Defense and ODM differ as to the need for this: The Planning Board agreed to defer
a recommendation to the Council until the ODM consults its Science Advisory
Committee, the TCP parent, on whether technological advance in the past two years jus-
tifies initiation of another study at this time.)
3. Five TCP Recommendations were assigned as our primary responsibility by NSC
Action 1355. We do not make an annual Status Report and therefore have not submitted
an accounting. In the event that questions arise concerning their status, I am attaching a
brief memorandum of comments you may care to use.
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Status of Implementation of TCP Recommendations
Assigned to the Department of State
General Recommendation 7 a - b - c:
'_The NSG initiate preparatory studies of the problems of international negotiations
in the following areas growing out of recommendations of this Report."
a. "Atomic weapons in air defense negotiations with Canada to provide our air defense
forces with authority to use atomic warheads over Canada."
Status: Under current negotiation with the Canadian Government.
Comment: Preliminary negotiations were opened last month between the Department
and the Canadian Ambassador to discuss the integration of atomic weapons in joint
US-Canadian air arrangements. The Ambassador was informed of new weapons devel-
opments and their implications for air defense. We pointed out in particular that US
forces must have advance authority to overfly Canada with atomic weapons and to use
such weapons over Canadian territory in air defense. The conversations covered other
aspects of the problem including the compatibility of Ganadian aircraft for US
weapons, the training of Canadian personnel, the storage of weapons on Canadian
soil, and the availability of the weapons to Canadian forces. The Canadian
Ambassador stressed the political sensitivity of the problem and stated that he would
report to his government and reply to the US how it thought the matter might best
be studied.
b. "Extension of the Planned Early Warning Line - International negotiations for the sea-
ward extension of the distant Early Warning Line from Greenland via Iceland and the
Faroes to join future NATO warning systems."
Status: a) Denmark: Under current negotiation with the Danish Government;
b) Iceland: in abeyance pending political developments with respect to the base prob-
lem; c) UK: awaiting a Defense report of current conversations between the US and
UK Chiefs of Staff.
[2] Comment: With respect to the requirements in Greenland (6 radar sites and their asso-
ciated communication facilities), the Danish Foreign Office has recently granted
approval for the conduct of technical and engineering surveys by US military author-
ities but has made clear that the approval is without prejudice to final decision of the
Danish Government regarding the establish-merit location and operation of the pro-
posed radar stations. With respect to the programmed Northwest radar site in
Iceland, the present situation is obscure in view of the uncertain future status of US
and NATO defense installations in Iceland. With regard to requirements in the
Faroes, the Depart-ment has recently requested information from the Department of
Defense of the details of these requirements in order that they may be considered
from the political viewpoint. With respect to the termination of the DEW Line in the
United Kingdom, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed the British Chiefs of Staff
of the general nature of this proposal, and are currently awaiting a reply. The
Department of Defense has been requested to inform the Department of State as
soon as the reply is received. The Department of State has also asked for information
from Defense on the relation-ship of the proposed DEW Line extension both to
SHAPE's plans and to SACIJkNT's plans, both of which contain NAT() requirements
for early warning facilities.
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c. "RemoteSea Monitor Line - International negotiations fi)r the installation of a sub-
merged, sea traffic monitor line extending from Greenland to Iceland and to the United
Kingdom."
Status: The Department is awaiting definitions of defense requirements, which, it
understands, are now being worked out in service to service discussions.
General Recommendation 9 - b:
"Freedom of Space- The present possibility of launching a small artificial satellite into an
orbit about the earth presents an early opportunity to establish a precedent for distin-
guishing between 'national air' and 'international space,' a distinction which could be to
our advantage at some fiitt_re time when we might employ larger satellites for intelligence
purposes."
[3] Status: The Department's Legal Adviser has this problem under current review. State
has participated with Defense, the National Science Foundation, and the National
Academy of Science in planning the program for launching an earth satellite as part
of the US participation in the International Geophysical Year 1957-58. Our studies are
continuing in cooperation with the interested agencies.
Comment: So for as law is concerned, space beyond the earth is an uncharted region
concerning which no firm rules have been established. The law on the subject will
necessarily differ with the passage of time and with practical efforts at space naviga-
tion. Various theories have been advanced concerning the upper limits of a state's
.jurisdiction, but no firm conclusions are now possible.
A few tentative observations may be made: (1) A state could scarcely claim territorial
sovereignty at ahitudes where orbital velocity of an object is practicable (perhaps
somewhere in the neighborhood of 200 miles); (2) a state would, however, be on
strong ground in claiming territorial sovereignty up through the "air space" (perhaps
ultimately to be fixed somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 miles); (3) regions of
space which are eventually established to be free for navigation without regard to ter-
ritorial jurisdiction will be open not only to one country or a few, but to all; (4) if, con-
trary to planning and expectation, a satellite launched from the earth should not be
consumed upon reentering the atmosphere, and should fall to the earth and do dam-
age, the question of liability on the part of the launching authority would arise.
General Recommendation 2B- I 2-a:
"We recommend that comprehensive programs be instituted to provide effective con-
trol of surface and, so far as possible, sub-surface traffic in both oceans from the coastlines
to beyond the likely striking range of sea-launched attacks. For proper implementation:
"a. international arrangements should be made for the establishment of information
reporting procedures and of control measures."
[4] Status: The Department is awaiting the results of other studies, assigned to Defense,
which will bear on the scope and type of the "international arrangements" desired. It
is our understanding that Defense has recently consuhed with Treasury to ascertain
whether international arrangements for search and rescue operations could be
expanded to satisfy defense requirements.
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Document 11-4
Document title: Percival Brundage, Director, Bureau of the Budget, to the President,
"Project Vanguard," April 30, 1957.
Source: Bureau of the Budget Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
Project Vanguard was the result of NSC 5520 and was intended to establish "Freedom of Space "--the
_4ght to overfly foreign territory for future intelligence satellites. The initial estimate of its cost was $15
to $20 million, but by mid-1956 the program was already over budget, and estimates of its total costs
continued to grow. In April 1957, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Percival Brundage, wrote
President Eisenhower explaining the costs of the program and zohere additional funding had been
found. His memorandum provides a good insight into the close relationship between the National
Academy of Sciences and the Department of Defense. It also indicates that $2.5 million for the
Scientific Satellite Program came from the Central Intelligence Agency. Finally, Brundage notes that
work on the Air Force reconnaissance satellite was funded for the. next fiscal year and that if the
Vanguard satellite was not completed, satellite research would still continue.
[1]
Memorandum for the President
April 30, 1957
Subject: Project VANGUARD
The Department of Defense advises that developmental difficulties requiring addi-
tional time and effort have resulted in further re_ision of the estimated total cost of
Project VANGUARD and that it will not be possible to complete the presently authorized
six vehicle project within the January estimate of $83.6 million for the total cost. Arrange-
ments have been made to fund approximately $70 million to date. Of this amount, some
$50 million is being provided by the Department of Defense for the launching vehicles
and related activities, of which $25 million was advanced from the fiscal year 1957
Department of Defense emergency fund and has not been replaced. A fiscal year 1956
supplemental appropriation for the National Science Foundation has provided funds for
the satellites themselves and the scientific instrumentation and ground observations.
We have been advised that it is currently estimated that if no further major develop-
mental problems are encountered, the project may be completed within a total of $110
million. With respect to the probability of success of the project within this level of fund-
ing, the Department of Defense has reviewed and reconfirmed its statement to the
National Security Council at the meeting of January 24, 1957, that in the technical judg-
ment of Defense scientists and their consultants at least one successful satellite should
result from six launchings of the presently planned Project VANGUARD launching vehi-
cle. Since arrangements have been made to fund approximately $70 million, an addi-
tional amount of $40 million would be required to complete the project on present
assumptions.
While no further major technical difficulties are now anticipated, it must be recog-
nized that flight tests have not yet been completed. We have been advised that in the event
unforeseeable developments should make it necessary to incorporate flmdameutal
changes in the present approach or to employ an alternative approach, substantial addi-
tional funds beyond the $110 million estimate might be required.
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When continuation of the policy established under NSC 5520 [was] considered at the
NSC meeting of May 8, 1956, it was decided that this policy should be continued "with the
understanding that tile program developed thereunder will not be allowed to interfere
with the ICBM and IRBM programs but will be given sufficient priority by the Department
of Defense in relation to other weapon systems to achieve the objectives of NSC 5520."
The use of Department of Defense emergency funds in late fiscal year 1956 as well as
during fiscal year 1957 was necessary because costs of [2] development and procurement
of the launching vehicles increased much higher than the original estimate. The Central
Intelligence Agency had made $2.5 million available to the Department of Defense, and
the National Science Foundation was able to transfer $5.8 million when the decision was
made to plan for no more than six launchings. It is the position of the Department that
use of its funds was not based on any understanding by the Department that it had a con-
tinuing responsibility for funding this project but rather that the Department has used its
funds thus far because no other clear-cut assignment of responsibility for funding the
launching vehicles has been made and because it was assured that funds advanced to this
project would be replaced, at least insofar as advances were made from fiscal year 1957funds.
The Secretary of Defense has now concluded that it is not advisable for the
Department to provide further support of the project in fiscal year 1957 or future years
from the emergency fired. In addition to the fact that the l)eparlment does not consider
that it has a continuing responsibility for the project, tire Secretary's position is under-
stood to result from the fact that the Department has not been reimbursed tor fiscal year
1957 emergency funds already provided as well as from congressional criticism of the use
of emergency fimds for this purpose. In this connection it is noted that in view of estab-
lished fiscal policies limiting supplemental appropriations to the most urgent cases, the
Bureau of the Budget recently disapproved a request of the Department of Defense to
reimburse the emergency fund.
The Bureau of the Budget has reviewed this problem with staff of the Department of
Defense and the National Science Foundation. From the evidence at hand, the Bureau of
the Budget believes that the project cannot go forward without additional funding.
Taking into consideration the fact that this project has all the elements of a guided mis-
sile development program together with additional problems of a novel and difficult char-
acter, it is not surprising that substantial cost increases have occurred. However, inasmuch
as the Department is now well into the project and states that it has already resolved a
number of the technical problems, the present estimate of$110 million may be more reli-
able than previous estimates.
On the other hand, in the light of past experience with this project and in the absence
of flight test results confirming the soundness of the present approach, I believe that it
should be recognized that the cost of the project may be as high as $150 to $200 million.
In weighing the benefits deemed to be derived from the project and its priority in com-
parison with all the other current projects, it was initially approved in the expectation that
the cost would be between $15 and $20 million. I question very much whether it would
have been authorized, at least on a crash basis, if the actual cost had been known at thattime.
[3] It is hoped that in the future more careful estimates will be made as to the total cost
or range in possible costs before such projects are initially approved. Furthermore, this
seems to offer an opportunity to give up a desirable project for something else which is
considered to be of higher priority in relation to cost and benefits to be derived. We are
presently developing nine intercontinental and intermediate missiles with a range of over
1,000 miles, some of which involve comparable techniques and which will require difficult
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priority decisions as to programming and funding. Some eliminations will have to be
made.
The Department of Defense has indicated interest in this program to about the same
degree it has shown on some other basic research projects, but has stated that its interest
is not sufficient to justify the project's continuance with Department of Defense financing.
Therefore, the Department believes that the program must be justified on the basis of the
several national objectives stated in NSC 5520 rather than on the Department's interest.
The Department of Defense believes that to prosecute the balance of the program
successfully, adequate financing should be arranged by supplemental requests submitted
for appropriation to the National Science Foundation, which the Department considers
to be the sponsor of the program. The Department would assist in justifying the supple-
mental requests of the National Science Foundation by assuming the burden of justifica-
tion as to the technical difficulties encountered and the cost elements involved.
It should be noted that one of the important considerations has been and is the com-
pletion of the project during the period of the International Geophysical Year. If you
desire the project to be continued in accordance with the existing policy under NSC 5520,
it is suggested that the following actions could resolve the current financing problem:
1. The Department of Defense should be directed to provide immediately $5.8 mil-
lion from the emergency fund to continue the project from May 1 through
approximately August 1. The Department feels it must clear this use of the emer-
gency fund with the Appropriations Committees who have questioned the pro-
priety of its use for this purpose. It should be recognized that the Department
would prefer that these funds be replaced.
2. A fiscal year 1958 budget amendment should he submitted requesting an addi-
tional $34.2 million for appropriation to the National Science Foundation to
cover costs to completion of the project, assuming that current cost estimates are
valid, that no further major difficulties are encountered in the course of com-
pleting the development, and that the [4] Department of Defense would contin-
ue to provide general support for which no special funding has been considered
necessary. Upon availability to the National Science Foundation these funds
would be transferred to the Department of the Navy to complete the program.
The National Science Foundation believes that in view of the national interests
involved the program cannot be permitted to fail at this stage. If it were the only possible
alternative to cancellation of the project, the National Science Foundation would consid-
er it necessary in the total national interest to request a supplemental appropriation to
cover the costs required to complete the responsibilities undertaken by the Department
of Defense under NSC 5520. Moreover, the National Science Foundation recommends
that the Department of Defense provide the necessary funds to complete the project for
the following reasons: (1) the Department of Defense is responsible under the present
terms of NSC 5520 for the portion of the program requiring additional funds; (2) the
Department of Defense is best qualified to justify to the Congress the reasons for present
cost increases.
Apparentl); both the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation
are very reluctant to continue to finance this project to completion. But each is quite pre-
pared to have the other do so.
General Cutler believes the following considerations are particularly relevant to a
decision in this matter:
"1. The substantive scientific information concerning upper atmospheres which
might be acquired by the launching of a successful satellite. Included in this infor-
mation would be data as to the content of the upper atmosphere (such as invisible
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heavenly bodies) through which the very costly intercontinental ballistic missiles, if
perfected, must pass.
"2. The world reaction to an abandonment by the U.S. in mid-stage of the satellite
program. A conclusion that the richest nation in the world could not afford to com-
plete this scientific undertaking would be unfortunate. Even more unfortunate would
be an inevitable inference that American scientists were not up to bringing the pro-ject to a successful conclusion.
"3. The reaction of the scientific community to the abandonment by the U.S. in mid-
stage of the satellite program. A time when the Free World is coming more and more
to depend on advanced technology and scientific accomplishment is not a time to
alienate the scientific community at home and lead it to believe that the Government
has lost faith in scientific accom/alishment. [5] From what I hear and read, the scien-
tific community and those in highly technical industry who work with them are
already sensitive in this regard.
"4. A final decision on the satellite program should be made by the President on an
integrated presentation of the views of all concerned in this matter. The integrated
process of presentation, such as is illustrated in the National Security Council, is a
primary achievement of this Administration. Where so much, beyond financial
considerations alone, is at stake, the President should have the benefit of an integrat-
ed presentation and discussion. This point of view is important, irrespective of what
the President's decision might ultimately be."
It should be noted that the Air Force has already started its own project for a much
larger reconnaissance satellite vehicle and is spending approximately $10 million in fiscal
year 1957 and is currently planning additional funding of at least $10 million for fiscal
year 1958. Therefore, whether or not the International Geophysical Year satellite project
is completed, research in this area will not be dropped.
Percival Brundage
Director
Document 11-5
Document title: Lieutenant General Donald L. Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff, Development,
U.S. Air Force, to Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Director, National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics, January 31, 1958.
Document 11-6
Document title: Gen. Donald L. Putt, to Commander, Air Research and Development
Command, "Advanced Hypersonic Research Aircraft," January 31, 1958.
Document 11-7
Document title: General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, USAF, and Hugh L. Dryden,
Director, NACA, "Memorandum of Understanding: Principles for Participation of NACA
in Development and Testing of the 'Air Force System 464L Hypersonic Boost Glide
Vehicle (Dyna-Soar I),' " May 20, 1958.
Source: All in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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Even before NASA was created, the Department of Defense (DOD) and National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics (NA CA ) were cooperating on space-related developments. The letter from Lt. General
Putt, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, opened the possibility for NA ca participation in
a potential X-series aircraft with the qualities of both a spacecraft and an airplane. Technically a
hypersonic boost-glide vehicle, its flight characteristics were termed "dynamic soaring"for its ability to
skim the thin air of the upper atmosphere. It was given the nickname of "Dyna-Soar. " While the moti-
vation from the DOD side was the development of technologies for an orbital bombing aircraft and
related missions, NA CA participation was intended to benefit civil applications. Dyna-Soar was not
covered in the original agreements creating NASA that outlined transferring or sharing programs
with DOD. Dyna-Soar's importance was its demonstration of the possibility of joint development of a
major new system, despite widely differing reasons for cooperation. Although the program was can-
celed in 1963for technical and cost reasons, it set a precedent for future cooperation.
Document 11-5
[1]
Dr. Hugh L. Dryden
Director
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
1512 H Street, N.W.
Washington 25, D.C.
31 January 1958
Dear Dr. Dryden:
In the last few months the dimensions of the contest for superiority in aircraft and
missile technology have suddenly and drastically expanded.
This letter is addressed to a particularly.important event in this contest--the matter
of a research vehicle program to explore and solve the problems of manned space flight.
Specifically, the Air Force is convinced that we must undertake at once a research vehicle
program having as its objective the earliest possible manned orbital flight which will con-
tribute substantially and essentially to follow-on scientific and military space systems.
The Air Force has set up a design competition for a hypersonic boost glide vehicle
nicknamed Dyna Soar I. The objectives of this program closely conform to the recom-
mendations of the NACA report of last summer. It appears probable that this vehicle will
be able to orbit as a satellite since the aerodynamic heating problems of re-entry appear
less severe than those of the Dyna Soar I flight profile. However, it may be feasible to
demonstrate an orbital flight appreciably earlier with a vehicle designed only for the satel-
lite mission than would be possible with a vehicle capable of the boost-glide mission as
well. It is necessary, therefore, to determine whether a research aircraft designed only as
a satellite will give us an orbital flight of technical significance enough sooner than a vehi-
cle designed for the glide mission to warrant a separate development.
Both the NACA and the Air Force are well along in investigations seeking the best
approach to the design of a manned earth orbiting research vehicle. We earnestly believe
that these efforts should be joined at once and brought promptly to a conclusion.
Accordingly the NACA is invited to collaborate with the Air Research and Development
Command [ARDC] in this important task. Because of the advanced stages to which the
individual NACA and ARDC investigations have already [2] progressed and because of the
urgency of getting on with the job, we believe that the evaluation should be confined to
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existing and planned projects, appropriate available proposals, and competitive approach-
es already under study. We visualize that any program growing out of this joint evaluation
will best be presented, managed and funded along the lines of the X-15 effort, with the
Navy being brought into the picture as soon as possible without delaying the evaluation.
To provide filrther insight into Air Force thinking on this matter, the concluding para-
graphs of the letter directing ARDC to make this evaluation are quoted:
"4 .... it is desired that the evaluation consider separately the following approaches:
"a. What is the best design concept, the minimum time to first orbital flight and the
dollar cost of demonstrating a manned one-orbit flight in a vehicle capable only of a satel-
lite orbit? Time is a primary consideration, but to qualify, an approach must offer
prospects of tangible contributions to the over-all astronautics program.
"b. What is the minimum time to first orbital flight and dollar cost of demonstrating
a manned one-orbit flight with a vehicle designed to utilize the boost-glide concept? In
this approach it is not necessary that the first orbit flight be made within the atmosphere
if an "outside" orbit offered the possibility of an earlier successfill flight.
"5. The following additional guidance is provided:
"a. The program to meet the stated objective should be the minimum consistent with
a high degree of confidence that the objective will be met. Maximum practical use must
be made of existing components and technology and of the momentum of existing pro-
grams.
"b. The hazard at launch and during flight will not be greater than that dictated by
good engineering and flight safety practice. If feasible, in order to save time and money,
pilot safety may be provided by emergency escape systems rather than insisting on stan-
dards of component reliability normally required for routine repetitive flights of weapon
systems. This statement is particularly pointed at the problem of qualifying boosters for
initial orbital flights.
"6. It is requested that this Headquarters be furnished the results of your evaluation
of each of the approaches specified in paragraph 4. Finally, your over-all conclusions and
recommendations for accomplishing the objective stated in paragraph 1 are desired.
[3] "7. The requested information should be forwarded at the earliest practicable date,
but in no event later than 15 March 1958."
It is hoped that the Air Force-NACA team relationship which has proven so effective
in earlier programs of the X-airplane series can be continued in the conception and con-
duct of this and other research vehicle programs directed to the extension of our knowl-
edge and capability in upper atmosphere and space operations.
We look forward to receiving your comments and suggestions to this proposed course
of action.
Sincerel_
D. L. Putt
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Development
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Document 11-6
31 January 1958
[1]
SUBJECT: Advanced Hypersonic Research Aircraft
TO: Commander
Air Research and Development Command
Andrews Air Force Base
Washington 25, D.C.
1. It is desired that ARDC in collaboration with the NACA expedite the evaluation
of existing or planned projects, appropriate available proposals and other competitive
approaches with a view to providing an experimental system capable of an early flight of
a manned vehicle making an orbit of the earth. The Mr Force-NACA team relationship
which has proven so productive in earlier programs of the X-airplane series will be con-
tinued in the conception and conduct of this new program. A letter, copy attached, has
been sent to invite NACA collaboration. It is contemplated that as soon as possible with-
out delaying the evaluation, the Research Aircraft Committee will be convened to invite
Na_' participation.
2. A manned orbital flight, whether by a glide vehicle or by a minimum altitude
satellite essentially outside the earth's atmosphere is a significant technical milestone in
the USAF space program. It is also vital to the prestige of the nation that such a feat be
accomplished at the earliest technically practicable date--if at all possible before the
Russians. However, it should be clearly understood that only those approaches to an early
demonstration of manned orbital flight will be considered which can be expected to con-
tribute information of a substantial value to follow-on systems.
3. It is understood that the boost-glide test vehicle which will be developed under
the Dyna-Soar I program will be able to orbit as a satellite. It is also understood, however,
that the problems associated with a manned orbital flight as a satellite, [are] outside the
stringent design requirements than the lower altitude, hypersonic Dyna-Soar I flight pro-
file. Consequently, it may be feasible to demonstrate an orbital flight appreciably earlier
with a vehicle designed only for the satellite mission than would be possible with a vehicle
capable of executing the boost-glide mission as well. An important objective of the evalu-
ation, then, will be to determine whether a test vehicle designed only as a satellite will give
us an orbital flight of technical significance enough sooner than a vehicle designed for the
glide mission to warrant a separate development. Consequently, it is desired that the eval-
uation consider separately the following approaches:
a. What is the best design concept, the minimum time to first orbital flight and
the dollar cost of demonstrating a manned one-orbit flight in a vehicle capable only of a
satellite orbit? Time [2] is a primary consideration, but to qualify, an approach must offer
prospects of tangible contributions to the over-all astronautics program.
b. What is the minimum time to first orbital flight and dollar cost of demon-
strating a manned one-orbit flight with a vehicle designed to utilize the boost-glide con-
cept? In this approach it is not necessary that the first orbit flight be made within the
atmosphere under typical boost glide conditions--it could be made outside the atmos-
phere if an "outside" orbit offered the possibility of an earlier successful flight ....
5. The following additional guidance is provided:
a. The program to meet the stated objective should be the minimum consistent
with a high degree of confidence that the objective will be reel. Maximum practical use
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must be made of exisling components and technolob, D, and of lhe momentum of existingprograms.
b. The hazard at launch and during flight will not be greater than that desired
by good engineering and flight safety practice. If feasible, in order to save time and
money, pilot satk-ty may be provided by emergency escape systems rather than insisting on
standards ot component reliability normally required for romine repetitive flights of
weapon systems. This statement is particularly pointed al the problem of qualifying boost-
ers for inisial [sic] orbital flights.
6. It is requested that this Headquarters be fl_rnished the results of your evaluation
of each of the approaches specified in paragraph 4. Finally, your over-all conclusions and
recommendations for accomplishing the objective stated in paragraph 1 are desired.
7. The requested information should be forwarded at the earliest practicable date,
but in no event laler than 15 March 1958.
[11
Subject:
FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:
Gen. Donald L. Putt
Document 11-7
Memorandum of Understanding
Principles for Participation of NACA in Development and Testing of the "Air
Force System 464L Hypersonic Boost Glide Vehicle (Dyna Soar I)."
1. System 464L is being developed to:
a. Determine the military potential of hypersonic boost glide type weapon systems
and provide a basis for such developments.
b. Research characteristics and problems of flight in the boost glide flight regime up
to and including orbital flight outside of the earth's atmosphere.
9. The following principles will be applied in conduct of the project:
a. The project will be conducted as a joint Air Force-NACA project.
b. Overall technical control of the project will rest with the Air Force, acting with the
advice and assistance of the NACA. The two partners willjointly participate in the
technical development to maximize the vehicle's capabilities from both the mili-
tary weapon system development and aeronautical-astronautical research view-
points.
c. Financing of the design, construction, and Air Force test operation of the vehi-
cles will be borne by the Air Force.
d. Management of the'project will be conducted by an Air Force project office with-
in the Directorate of Systems Management, Hq ARDC. The NACA will provide
liaison representation in the project office and provide the chairman of the tech-
nical team responsible for data transmission and research instrumentation.
e. Design and construction of the system will be conducted through a negotiated
contract with a prime contractor selected by the USAF on the basis of the recom-
mendations of the ARDC,-AMC-SAC Source Selection Board, acting with the con-
sultation of the NACA.
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[2] f. Flighttestof thevehicleandrelatedequipmentswillbeaccomplishedbythe
NACA,theUSAF,andtheprimecontractorin acombinedtestprogramunder
theoverallcontrolofajointNACA-USAFCommittee,chairedbytheAirForce.
GeneralThomasD.White
ChiefofStaff,USAF
13May1958
HughL.Dryden
Director,NACA
20May1958
Document 11-8
Document title: T. Keith Glennan, NASA Administrator, and Roy W. Johnson, Director,
Advanced Research Projects Agency, "Memorandum of Understanding: Program for a
Manned Orbital Vehicle," November 20, 1958.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
NASA Administrator Glennan and Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) Director Roy
Johnson agreed in mid-September 1958 that their two agencies would cooperate on a "man-in-space"
program based on the development of space capsules; this program would complement the Air Force
Dyna-Soar program. The_ established a joint NASA-ARPA Manned Satellite Panel, which included
six representatives from f(ASA and two from ARPA, reflecting the Eisenhower Administration's desire
to have NASA primarily responsible for manned spaceflight. This memorandum of understanding
established g.uidelines for this early cooperation.
[no pagination] November 20, 1958
Memorandum of Understanding
SUBJECT: Program for a Manned Orbital Vehicle
1. The Administrator of NASA is responsible for management and technical direc-
tion of a program for a manned orbital vehicle to be conducted in cooperation with the
Department of Defense. The objectives of the program are to achieve, at the earliest prac-
ticable date, orbital flight and successful recovery of a manned satellite and to investigate
the capabilities of man in this environment. The accomplishment of the program is a mat-
ter of national urgency.
2. In carrying out the program, the Administrator of NASA intends to make full use
of the background and capabilities existing in the Department of Defense.
3. The Department of Defense will support the program until it is terminated by the
achievement of a sufficient number of manned orbital flights to accomplish the above
obiectives.
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4. $8,000,000ofFY1959fundswillbecontributedbyARPA in support of the pro-
gram and will be made available by appropriation transfer to NASA. NASA will budget for
and fund all subsequent years' costs.
5. A working committee consisting of members of tile staff of NASA and ARPA will
be established to advise the Administrator of NASA on technical and management aspects
of the program. The chairman of the committee will be a member of the NASA staff.
T. Keith Glennan
Administrator
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Roy W. Johnson
Director
Advanced Research Projects
Agency
Document 11-9
Document title: T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, NASA, and Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary
of the Army, "Cooperative Agreement on Jet Propulsion Laboratory Between the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of the Army," December 3,1958.
Document 11-10
Document title: T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, and Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the
Army, "Cooperative Agreement on Army Ordnance Missile Command Between the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of the Army,"December 3, 1958.
Source: Both from NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
In 1958, the Army was called on to transfer two major development agencies to the newly created
NASA. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory OrpL) was part of the California Institute of Technology, with
expertise in guidance, communications, telemetry, and rocket propellants. All agreed that JPL was a
center of technical expertise important to the future of NASA and the space program, and the trans-
fer was complete and immediate. In contrast, the transfer of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency
(ABMA) generated substantial controversy, because it was the major development arm of the Army
Ordnance Missile Command, and the Army leadership considered it too important to relinquish.
ABMA's development work included weather satellite programs _ueh as TIROS, rocket engine work
such as the F-1 engine (which later powered the Saturn V), and the booster development group head-
ed by Wernher yon Braun. The Army was reluctant to lose yon Braun and his team of talented engt-
neers. The Department of Defense had been willing to transfer to NASA such research work as that
performed by JPL, recognizing that it could still benefit from the research performed. Howeveg, the
Army resisted losing a major development group such as ABMA, de._pite its unsure budgetary footing.
The Army's initial intransigence eventually required presidential intervention to resolve the situation.
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Document 11-9
[1]
Cooperative Agreement on Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Between the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the Department of the Army
A. A UTHORFF1ES
This agreement is authorized by Public Law 85-568 as implemented by Executive
Order 1079_.__.___3,dated 3 Dec 1958.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this agreement is to establish the relationships between the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of the Army (Army)
that will govern the following:
1. Implementation of Executive Order No. 10793 dated 3 Dec 5..__._____._.8_8,which is incorpo-
rated herein by reference.
2. Planning for the orderly transition from current Army military operations and
weapons systems development program to programs predominately in the field of explo-
ration and exploitation of space science and technology for peaceful purposes under
NASA direction.
3. Provision for certain Army administrative and logistical support desired by NASA in
the operation of JPL
C. POLICY
The Army states and NASA recognizes that an abrupt transfer or cessation of Army
activities relating to military operations and weapons systems development programs per-
formed at theJPL would be deleterious to both national defense and the accomplishment
of NASA objectives. Both NASA and the Army recognize that NASA is not fully staffed to
perform certain administrative functions and to provide the administrative and logistical
support essential to the uninterrupted operation of JPL and that NASA may request that
certain services and support be provided by the Army.
D. OPERATING CONCEPTS
1. NASA will provide for the general management and technical direction of theJPL,
except as to projects relating to military operations and weapons systems development
programs.
[2] 2. For Calendar Year 1959 the Army will continue its contractual relations with the
California Institute of Technology for continued effort by the JPL on the following pro-
grams which are specifically related to military operations and weapons systems develop-
ment programs:
a. The SERGEANT guided missile program.
b. Special intelligence investigations.
c. Secure communications research.
d. Aerodynamic testing and research.
It is expected that these specific Army activities will be largely phased out during CY
59; however, if it is necessary to continue certain activities for a longer period of time, this
may be done by direct Army contract or through NASA as may he mutually agreed by
NASA and the Army.
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3. The Army budgets on a program basis and Army installations receive funds on the
basis of assigned program activities. Traditionally, the Army has funded the activities per-
formed atJPL on a Calendar rather than Fiscal Year basis. For these reasons, a firm 1959
program had been agreed to by the Army andJPL prior to tile publishing of the Executive
Order effecting transfer of JPL. NASA, through assumption of technical direction of the
general supporting research portion of the program on I January 1958, can reorient the
effort toward NASA objectives by the end of the first half of the Calendar Year 1959.
Therefore, the Army and NASA reached prior agreement and the Executive Order pro-
vided tor transfer of Army fimds in the amount of $4,078,250 to NASA for this general
supporting research program for the first half of Calendar Year 1959. The additional
flmds for general supporting research during CY 1958 will be provided by NASA.
4. NASA may request from time to time, and the Army agrees, that certain adminis-
trative and logistical support can and will be furnished to NASA on a non-reimburseable
[sic] basis tot servicing contract activities atJPL for Calendar Year 1959. Provision of this
support may require in certain instances delegations of authority from NASA to the Army
where appropriate to the service or support action requested. After Calendar Year 1959
such services and support may be provided in such scope and under such conditions as
may be mutually agreed upon.
The following types of services and support are contemplatccl:
[3] a. Contract administration;
b. l'roperty transfer; and
c. Such other matters as fall within the purview of this instrument.
The Administrator, NASA, and the Secretary of the Army hereby designate respec-
tively the Director of Business Administration, NASA, and the Chief of Ordnance, Army,
to jointly formulate the necessary teams to effectuate this Agreement.
5. It is understood and agreed that the Administrator will delegate to the Secretary of
the Army, or his designee, such authority as may be required to authorize the Arm), to ful-
fill the intent and purposes of this Agreement.
Date: 3 December 1958
Washington, D.C.
T. KEITH GLENNAN
Administrator, NASA
WILBER M. BRUCKER
Secretary of the Army
Document I1-10
[1]
Cooperative Agreement on Army Ordnance Missile
Command Between the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration and the Department of the Army
A. AUTHORITY
This agreement is authorized by public Law 85-583.
B. PURPOSE
This agreement is for the purpose of establishing relationships between the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of the Army for the efficient
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utilizationofUnitedStatesArmy resources in the accomplishment of the purposes of the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. This agreement is intended to provide for
relationships in the national interest that will prevent undue delay of progress in the
national space program, and prevent undesirable disruption of military programs. This
agreement is also intended to contribute to effective utilization of the scientific and engi-
neering resources of the country by fostering close cooperation among the interested
agencies in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities.
C. POLICY
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of
the Armv recognize the often inseparable nature of the efforts of this Nation in meeting
military and scientific objectives in the missile and space field. Continuation of the orga-
nizational strength of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) of the U.S. Army
Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) and its established contractor structure and sup-
port from other elements of the Army has been stated by the Defense Department to he
essential to the Defense mission. The proper provisions for asking the capabilities of this
organization available for meeting objectives of NASA permit the application of these
resources to the needs of both civilian space activities and essential military requirements.
Accordingly, this agreement establishes relationships between NASA and the Department
of the Army which make the AOMC and its subordinate organizations immediately, direct-
ly, and continuously responsive to NASA requirements.
D. PROCEDURES
1. The CG, AOMC, will have full authority, as the principal agent of the Army, to uti-
lize the resources of his Command, those organizations [2] directly under his control
through contractual structure, and other elements of the Department of the Army with
which he deals directly, for the accomplishment of assigned NASA projects.
9. Key personnel of AOMC and appropriate subordinate elements, as may be
requested by NASA, will serve on technical committees under the chairmanship of NASA,
or on advisory groups, or will serve as individual consultants to:
a. Assist in the development of broad requirements and objectives in space pro-
grams.
b. Assist in the determination of specific projects and specific methods (including
hardware development) by which NASA may accomplish its overall objective.
3. Specific orders for projects to be accomplished for NASA will be placed direct by
NASA upon AOMC with provision of funds for their accomplishment. AOMC will accept
full responsibility for the fulfillment of the assigned projects as accepted from NASA.
4. NASA will have direct and continuing access, through visits or resident personnel,
for technical contact and direction of effort on assigned NASA projects. In this connec-
tion, NASA is invited to place a small staff in residence at AOMC. This staff will provide
for a continuing exchange of information on all projects assigned by NASA, as well as
exchange of information on supporting research in the entire missile and space field.
5. On request by NASA, in connection with projects funded by NASA, the prime and
sub-contractor facilities of the Army in weapons systems and other programs, including
scientific and educational institutions and private industry, will be made available through
identical procurement channels and with use of the special authorities delegated to the
CG, AOMC, by the Secretary of the Army. In addition, resources of other elements of the
Army, available to AOMC on a direct basis for space and missile system development, will
be used as deemed necessary in the fulfillment of assigned NASA projects.
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6. The CG, AOMC, is responsible for scheduling tile space and missile activities
under his control to meet the priority requirements of NASA in a inanner consistent with
overall National priorities. He is further responsible for anticipating in advance any pos-
sible conflict in the commitment of effort to NASA and Defense programs, and for pro-
viding a timely report to NASA, as well as to the Deparuncnt of the Army, for the purpose
of resolving such conflicts.
[3] 7. Public information and historical and technical documentation of assigned NASA
projects will be trader tile direction and control of NASA.
8. The CG, AOMC, is authorized to enter into specific: agreements with the duly des-
ignated representative of the Administrator, NASA, in in)plementation of this agreement.
Date: 3 December 1958
Washington, D.C.
T. KEITH GLENNAN
Administrator
WILBER M. BRUCKER
Secretary of the Army
Document I1-11
Document rifle: T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, NASA, and Thomas S. Gates, Acting
Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the President, "Responsibility and Organization
for Certain Activities," October 21, 1959.
Source: Presidential Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
The Army had been reluctant to transfer the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic
Missile Agency (ABMA) to NASA; it required presidential intervention to settle the matter. This joint
agreement finally settled the issue of the transfer of the Development Operations Division headed ta'
Wernher yon Braun and the assignment to NASA as the lead in developing a U.S. heavy-lift booster.
President Eisenhower approved the proposals outlined in this memorandum on November 2, 1952.
[1]
October 21, 1959
Memorandum for the President
SUBJECT: Responsibility and Organization for Certain Space Activities
The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA have agreed upon, and recom-
mend to the President, certain actions designed to clarify responsibilities, improve coor-
dination, and enhance the national space effort. The actions recommended below are
consistent with the steps taken by the Secretary of Defense to clarify responsibilities and
assignments in the field of military space applications within the Department of Defense.
The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator have agreed upon and recommend to
the President the following actions:
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A. TheassignmenttoNASAofsoleresponsibilityforthedevelopmentofnewspace
boostervehiclesystemsofveryhighthrust.BoththeDODandNASAwillcontinue
withacoordinatedprogramforthedevelopmentofspacevehiclesbasedonthecur-
rentICBMandIRBMmissilesandgrowthversionsofthosemissiles.
B. ThetransferfromtheDepartmentof theArmytoNASAof theDevelopment
OperationsDivisionoftheArmyBallisticMissileAgency,includingitspersonneland
suchfacilitiesandequipmentwhicharepresentlyassignedandrequiredfor the
futureuseofNASAatthetransferredactivity,andsuchotherpersonnel,facilitiesand
equipmentforadministrativeand[2] technicalsupportofthetransferredactivityas
maybeagreedupon.C. TheprovisionbytheArmytoNASAof suchadministratives rvicesasmaybe
agreedupontoeffectasmoothtransitionofmanagementa dfundingresponsibility
ofthetransferredactivity.
TheSecretaryofDefenseandtheAdministratorfNASAareinagreementonthefol-
lowing:
1. Thenationrequiresandmustbuildatleastonesuperboosterandresponsibilityfor
thisactivityshouldbevestedinoneagency.Thereis,atpresent,noclearmilitaryrequire-
mentforsuperboosters,althoughthereisarealpossibilityhatthefuturewillbringmil-
itaryweaponssystemsrequirements.However,thereisadefiniteneedforsuperboosters
forcivilianspacexplorationpurposesbothmannedandunmanned.Accordingly,it is
agreedthattheresponsibilityforthesuperboosterprogramshouldbevestedinNASA.It
isagreedthattherecommendationstocenterthisfunctioninNASAandtotransferthe
DevelopmentOperationsDivisionofABMAtoNASAareindependentofanydecisionson
whethereitherorbothofthesuperboostersystemscurrentlyunderdevelopmentarecon-
tinuedin theirpresentlyconceivedform.
2. ThetransferoftheDevelopmentOperationsDivisionofABMAshallincludetransfer
ofresponsibilityforSaturn,togetherwith1960fundsallocatedfortheproject,andtrans-fertotheNASA1961budgetofsuchamountsasmaybeapprovedforthisprojectin the
1961DepartmentofDefensebudget.
3. In carryingoutitsresponsibilities,NASAwillkeeptheDepartmentofDefensethor-
oughlyandcompletelyinformedonitsboosterprogramandwill [3] befullyresponsive
to specificrequirementsof theDepartmentof Defensefor thedevelopmentof super
boostersforfuturemilitarymissionsasrequestedbytheSecretaryofDefense.
4. It isNASA'sintenttocenteratthetransferredactivitythebulkofitsspacebooster
vehiclesystemswork,includinganappropriater searchanddevelopmentffort,andulti-
mately,substantialresponsibilityforNASAlaunchoperations.
5. It is agreed that NASA wall provide support to the Department of Defense and mili-
tary services at the transferred activity in the same manner as it now does at all other field
centers.
6. The management and employment of the transferred activity will be the responsibili-
ty of NASA, and no commitment is possible with respect to levels of staffing or funding for
the operation. NASA, however, will make every possible effort within its responsibilities
and resources to utilize the capabilities of the Development Operations Division of ABMA.
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7. Thetransferofpersonnel,facilities,endequipmentwillheonanonreimbursablebasis.
8. TheDepartmentof the Army will provide and maintain on a reimbursable basis sta-
tion-wide services as required by NASA within the Redstone Arsenal complex.
9. NASA will provide for continuation, transfer, or phasing out of military projects under
way at the transferred activity as may be requested and to the extent funded by the
Department of Defense, and will undertake at the transferred activity such additional mil-
itarv projects as may be agreed upon bv NASA and the [4] Department of Defense./
10. The Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, and NASA, recognizing
the value to the nation's space program of maintaining at a high level the present com-
petence of ABMA, will (;()operate to preserve the continuity of 01(" technical and adminis-
trative leadership of the group.
11. The detailed implementation of the actions proposed will be accomplished through
the subsequent negotiation of cooperative agreemems between the Department ofDefense and NASA.
The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA have reached agreement and
recommend approval of the above actions in the firm belief that the national space effort
requires a strong civilian agency and progress and a strong military space effort by the
Department of Defense, and clear lines of responsibility, and authority if the U.S. is to
employ its best efforts in the exploration of outer space and to assure the defense of the
nation.
If the President approves the recommended actions set forth in A, B, and C above, the
Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA will proceed immediately to form
the necessary staff teams to develop the required implementing documents.
Administrator, NASA Acting Secretary of Defense
OCT 30 1959
[Handwritten presidential note: "Approved Dwight Eisenhower 2 Nov 59"]
Documen111-12
Document tide: T. Keith Glennan, NASA Administrator, "DOD-NASA Agreement--
Reimbursement of Costs," NASA Management Instruction 1052.14, November 17, 1959,
with attached: Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, and T. Keith Glennan,
NASA Administrator, "Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Principles Governing Reimbursement
of Costs," November 12, 1959.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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As resources from other government agencies were being allocated to NASA, it became imperative to
draw up policies outlining reimbursement procedures. These agreements represented the first compre-
hensive policy on reimbursement between the Department of Defense and NASA that did not apply to
a specific program. They also demonstrated the dominant role of the Defense Department as a provider
of various services to NASA in the early years.
[11
SUBJECT:
November 17, 1959
Management Instruction
DOD-NASA A GREEMENT--REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS
1. PURPOSE
This Instruction incorporates into the NASA Issuance System an agreement entered into
between the Department of Defense (DOD) end NASA for the reimbursement of certain
costs incurred by either agency in providing services, equipment, supplies, personnel, and
facilities for use by the other agency. Provisions of the agreement are effective as of
November 12, 1959.
2. AUTHORFI'Y
Section 203(b)(6) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 U.S.C.
2473(b) (6)).
3. SCOPE
a.
b,
Principles set forth in the DOD-NASA agreement, which is included as
Attachment A, shall govern the reimbursement of costs incurred by NASA or
DOD in providing services, equipment, supplies, personnel, and facilities of the
types and for the purposes described therein for use by the other agency.
The agreement shall not apply to existing agreements or arrangements already
[agreed] upon between NASA and the military departments or the Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) which may not yet be formalized. However, all
future arrang '_-cnts, agreements, and amendments of existing agreements
between N,k_A and the military departments or ARPA shall conform to the pro-
visions of Attachment A.
[2] 4. IMPLEMENTATION...
5. CANCELLATION
NASA Management Manual Instruction 2-3-5 (TS 43), November 17, 1959.
Administrator
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[1]
Attachment A to NMI 1052.14
Agreement Between the Department of Defense
and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Concerning Principles Governing
Reimbursement of Costs
1. Purpose.
Section 203(b)(6) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, authorizes the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) "to use, with their consent, the
services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of other Federal agencies with or without
reimbursement, and on a similar basis to cooperate with other public and private agencies
and instrumentalities in the use of services, equipment,and facilities." Federal agencies
are also required to cooperate fully with NASA in making their services, equipment, per-
sonnel, and facilities available, and are authorized by this statute "to transfer to or to
receive from NASA, without reimbursement, aeronautical and space vehicles, and sup-
plies and equipment other than administrative supplies or equipment." It is the purpose
of this Agreement to set forth the general principles governing the reimbursement of
costs incurred by DOD or NASA in providing for use by the other of its services, equip-
ment, personnel and facilities and in transferring equipment and supplies.
2. P_nciples Governing Reimbursement.
Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 hereof, DOD and NASA agree upon the fol-
lowing general principles governing the reimbursement of costs:
[2] A. Orders Contracted Out. Where DOD or NASA places an order with the other which
is contracted out (in whole or in part) to industry, reimbursement will be limited
to the direct costs to the contracting agency of the contract, or the standard price
established for the item being procured where procurement is accomplished
through consolidated contracts covering the same or similar items (or compo-
nents thereof) for the contracting agency. Except as otherwise provided in
subparagraph E below, the agency placing the contract shall bear without reim-
bursement therefor the administrative costs incidental to its procurement of
material or services for the ordering agency. As used in the foregoing sentence
the term, "administrative costs" includes the normal administrative services per-
formed in connection with placing, administering or terminating contracts, and
such related administrative services as security, contract auditing, inspection, etc.
(not all inclusive). Administrative costs are to be distinguished from the procure-
ment costs of end items or services, the latter being appropriate for reimburse-
ment under the provisions of this subparagraph.
B. Orders Performed "In-House." Where DOD performs an "in-house order" for NASA
and the order is performed (in whole or in part) in facilities using an industrial-
type cost accounting system, the basis of billing will be the same as that used for
all customers of the Federal Government. Where the order is performed in facil-
ities not using an industrial-type cost accounting system, reimbursement [3] will
be limited to the direct costs (including an allowance for annual and sick leave,
holidays, contributions for group life insurance and civil ser_4ce retirement, etc.)
attributable to the performance of the order. In no case, however, will charges be
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made for depreciation or rent for use of facilities and equipment in connection
with the performance of orders.
C. Administration of Other Agency's Contract. Where DOD or NASA assigns one of its
contracts to the other for purposes of administration, the administering agency
may be reimbursed for the cost of contract administration services performed in
connection with the contract to the extent of the special direct costs incurred in
providing these services to the other and mutually agreed upon as clearly identi-
fied added costs.
D. Material. Where DOD or NASA provides the other with materials, supplies or
equipment from stock, reimbursement will be made in accordance with estab-
lished agency pricing practice. DOD materials, supplies or equipment which are
in excess of DOD requirements (called "transferable-nonreimbursable" property
in the DOD), will be filrnished without charge, except that the furnishing agency
may require reimbursement for transportation and handling costs. DOD may
loan equipment to NASA without charge, subject to return in the same condition
as when loaned, normal wear and tear excepted. The return of such equipment
may be waived by DOD under the circumstances set forth in paragraph 3 of this
Agreement. Where the loaned equipment is not returned, DOD will [be] reim-
bursed for the value thereof, unless the return of the equipment has been specif-
ically waived by DOD under the circumstances set forth in paragraph 3 of this
Agreement. [4] Where the loaned equipment is returned in a damaged condi-
tion, DOD will be reimbursed for the cost of restoring it to the same condition as
when loaned, unless such reimbursement has been waived under the provisions
of paragraph 3 of this Agreement, or waived on the basis that the equipment, at
the time of return, is excess to the requirements of DOD.
E. Travel. In connection with the services covered by subparagraphs A, B, and C
above, special travel costs attributable to the performance of these services will be
reimbursed.
E Construction or Public Works. Construction or public works projects undertaken by
the DOD for NASA will be charged directly to NASA funds (or where appropriate
will be reimbursed) on the basis of "project costs," the customary basis used by the
DOD for charging DOD sponsored projects.
G. Tenancy on Installation. Except where other arrangements are in existence or are
agreed upon, where either DOD or NASA is a tenant on an installation of the
other, all direct costs or increases in direct costs attributable to such tenancy will
be reimbursed.
H. Use of Governmcnt-OwnedFacilities. No charge will be made for rent o1 depreciation
in connection with the use by either DOD or NASA of Government owned facili-
ties under their cognizance whether operated by the government or by a con-
tractor.
3. Exceptions.
The foregoing principles do not apply to work or services, materials, supplies or
equipment furnished to NASA or DOD for use in connection with specific projects of
either agency, which are mutual interest and benefit to each. In such cases, work or ser-
xfices, materials, supplies or equipment furnished by one agency to the other will be on a
non-reimbursable basis to the extent of the furnishing agency's interest in the particular
project.
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4. Effective Date.
This Agreement is effective immediately, but it does not apply to existing agreements
or arrangements already agreed upon which may not yet be formalized between NASA
and the military department or ARPA. However, all future arrangements, agreements and
amendments of existing agreements between NASA and the military departments or
ARPA shall conform to the provisions of the Agreement.
5. Duration of Agreement.
The provisions of the Agreement may be revised at any time, based upon further
experience of the two agencies.
Deputy Secretary of Defense
NOV 12 1959
Date
Administrator
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Document 11-13
Document fl0e: I". Keith Glennan, NASA Administrator, and James H. Douglas, Deputy
Secretary of Defense, "Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning the Aeronautics and Astronautics
Coordinating Board," reprinted in: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and
Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, "The NASA-DOD Relationship," 88th
Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 10-11.
The drafters of the 1958 Space Act considered it necessary to have close coordination of activities
between NASA and the Department of Defense; therefore, a liaison board was provided for in the Act.
By 1960, this liaison board was no longer effective and was replaced by. the Aeronautics and
Astronautics Coordinating Board. Over the years since then, the board has varied in its importance
in coordinating cooperation between NASA and the Defense Department.
[10]
Agreement Between the Department of Defense and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Concerning the Aeronautics and Astronautics
Coordinating Board
I. POLICIES AND PURPOSE
(a) It is essential that the aeronautical and space activities of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and the Department of Defense be coordinated at all manage-
ment and technical levels. Where policy issues and management decisions are not
involved, it is important that liaison be achieved in the most direct manner possible, and
that it continue to be accomplished as in the past between project level personnel on a
day-to-day basis.
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(b) It is essential that [a] close working relationship between decision-making offi-
cials within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of
Defense be developed at all management levels. Where policy issues and management
decisions are involved, it is important that the planning and coordination of activities, the
identification of problems, and the exchange of information be facilitated between offi-
cials having the authority and responsibility for decisions within their respective offices.
(c) To implement the forgoing [sic] policies it is the purpose of this agreement to
establish the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BOARD
There is hereby established the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board,
which shall be responsible for facilitating
(1) the planning of activities by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the Department of Defense to avoid undesirable duplication and
to achieve efficient utilization of available resources;
(2) the coordination of activities in areas of common interest to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense;
(3) the identification of problems requiring solution by either the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration or the Department of Defense; and
(4) the exchange of information between the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the Department of Defense.
III. COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD
(a) The Board shall be headed by the Deputy Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering as Cochairmen.
(b) The other Board members shall consist of chairmen of panels as hereinafter
established, and a minimum number of additional members as may be equipped to insure
that each military department is represented and that the National Aeronautics and Space
[ 11 ] Administration and Department of Defense have an equal number of members.
(c) The members of the Board, other than the Cochairmen, shall be appointed by
the Administrator and the Secretary of Defense,jointly.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION
(a) Panels of the Board shall be established by the Administrator and the Secretary
of Defense and, initially, shall include the following:
(1) Manned Space Flight.
(2) Spacecraft)
(3) Launch Vehicles.
(5) Supporting Space Research and Technology.
(6) Aeronautics.
(b) Terms of reference shall be prescribed for each panel by the cochairmen of the
Board. The members of each panel shall be designated by the cochairmen of the Board.
l. For purposes of clalily, lhe name of the Panel was changed to thunanned S[)aceclaft by tile
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board at tl_e second meeting on July 26, 1960.
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(C) The board shall meet at the call of the Cochairmen, at least bimonthly, and the
cochairmen shall alternately preside over the meetings. Only Board members, and such
others as the cochairmen specifically approve, may attend meetings.
(d) The cochairmen shall establish a small secretariat to maintain records of the
meetings of the Board and of its panels and to perform such other duties as the cochair-
men may direct.
(e) The board, its panels, and the secretariat shall make full use of available facilities
within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of
Defense, and all elements of the Administration and the Department of Defense shall
cooperate fully with the board, its panels, and the secretariat.
(f) Actions based on consideration of matters by the board may be taken by individ-
ual members utilizing the authority vested in them by their respective agencies.
For the National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
For the Department of Defense:
T. KEITH GLENNAN,
Administrator.
JAMES H. DOUGLAS,
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Promulgated this 13th day of September 1960.
Document 11-14
Document title: "General Proposal for Organization for Command and Control of
Military Operations in Space," with attached: "Schematic Diagrams of Proposed
Organization for Command and Control of Mifitary Operations in Space," no date.
Source: White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology,
Records (James R. Killian and George B. Kistiakowsky, 1957-61), Box 15, "Space [July-
December 1959] (7)," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
A RPA was created in February 1958 to manage all the military space programs. Once NASA was cre-
ated, several programs were taken from ARPA and given to the civilian space agency. ARPA did
maintain managerial control of the military space program, but this was not popular with the mili-
tary services. The Army and the Navy were concerned, howev_ that if ARPA was eliminated, the Air
Force would be given control of all space programs. In April 1959, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Arleigh Burke urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to create a single military space agency. The
Army leadership agreed, but the Air Force chief of staff objected that this would remove the weapons
systems from the unified commands. By July 1959, White House and Department of Defense officials
began evaluating this separate military space agency. It would report directly to the Joint Chiefs, and
command would rotate among the military services. It was to be known as the Defense Astronautical
Agency. The authorship of this document is unknown, but it was probably presented to the President's
Science Advisory Committee in the summer of 1959. The idea was ultimately rejected, and the space
programs were returned to the services. The Air Force was given control of most of the military space
program, with the Army and Navy responsible for developing payloa_ for their own use.
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[1]
General Proposal for Organization for Command and
Control of Military Operations in Space
Encl: (1) Schematic Diagrams of Proposed Organization for Command and Control of
Military Operations in Space
The rapid advances achieved by our research and development agencies need to be
exploited by the uniformed services. A whole family of militarily useful satellite vehicles is
now coming into being. Facilities for launching, tracking, data acquisition and recovery of
satellite and space vehicles are now in operation. In the very near future these new capa-
bilities will become accepted operational techniques of the Army, Navy and Air Force
units deployed over the oceans and land masses of the Free World. The military implica-
tions of these developments to the National Security dictate the command attention of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The basic facilities required for conducting satellite and space vehicle operations are:
launching equipment with associated safety and control instrumentation, tracking, data
acquisition and communication networks and coordinated vehicle recovery equipment
located on land, sea and in the air. The compression of time in relation to the new space
era, wherein satellites encircle the globe in 90 minutes, dictates the need for integrating
all satellite and space vehicle facilities under one military commander. Each of the
3 national missile range commanders, presently has the facilities for conducting, in at least
a limited capability, satellite and space vehicle operations. The global nature of military
satellite and space vehicle operations, particularly satellite vehicle recovery operations,
requires that the 3 national missile range commanders be incorporated into one over-all
military command.
It is recommended that a joint command for the coordination of military operations
in space be established incorporating the following features:
[2] 1. That the commander report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. That the command position he rotated among the services.
3. That a Scientific Director be designated as a staff assistant to the Space
Commander whose prime function would be scientific direction and the assurance of
rapid military exploitation of technological breakthroughs in astronautics. The incum-
bent of this position would be designated by NASA or ARPA and would be satisfactory to
those two agencies. The incumbent could fill joint positions on the Space Command and
NASA similar to joint military and AEC billets.
4. That the joint headquarters be located at the primary space surveillance control
center to minimize time involved in receipt and processing of intelligence and the trans-
mission of command decisions.
5. That consideration be given to locating this control center within reasonable dis-
tance from Washington D.C. to simplify liaison with all the Services and with NASA.
6. That the space surveillance control center be manned by a group consisting of
personnel from the 3 services.
7. That all the facilities of each particular service related to satellite and space track-
ing, data acquisition and communications continue to function within that service, but
under the respective range commander for operational control by the joint command.
8. That all research and development and training activity continue as heretofore
on a not-to-interfere basis with the national security responsibilities of the joint space
command.
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9. Thateachnational range commander report directly to the commander of the
.joint space command for operational control, and to his normal commander for other
control.
[3] The commander of the space command force would perform the following 5 func-tions:
1. Under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, command the 3 national ranges
in-so-far as they contribute operationally to our national security.
2. Review and approve the planned operation of the 3 national ranges to assure con-
sonance with the operational requirements of over-all national security.
3. Review the annual budgetary requirements of the 3 national ranges for national
priority, scope and adequacy in support of national securi_, objectives and make recom-
mendations accordingly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff would submit the annual budgetary requirements to the
Secretary of Defense who in turn would submit the requirements to the National Security
Council for review concerning national priority, scope and adequacy for support of
national security objectives and for financial coordinalion with the Atomic Energ T
Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Bureau of the
Budget.
4. Integrate satellite and space vehicle tracking, data acquisition and communica-
tions control into one centralized global system.
5. Provide for the participation by all services, as appropriate, for indoctrination and
training in the field of satellite and space vehicle operations.
The following advantages would accrue for national security by the establishment of
a joint task force:
1. A central command, responsive directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would insure
the earliest possible military effectiveness of satellite and space vehicles.
2. Parallel developments and duplicative installations for R&I) with [an] expensive
network of communications, launching facilities and logistics systems would be eliminat-
ed. •
[4] 3. Indoctrination and training of the uniformed services in all aspects of space oper-
ations would be insured.
4. The evolution of sound military requirements would be improved.
5. The relative importance of military space operations in national security would be
responsibly defined•
It is to be noted that since ARPA does not actually operate an), facilities it is not
involved in this type of operational chain of command.
Regarding the tie-in with NASA's facilities, it is proposed that consideration be given
that NASA facilities be controlled in a manner similar to the relationship between the
Coast Guard and the Nax3,. That is, in time of emergency operationally useful equipment
and facilities would be at the disposal of the joint space commander.
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• Would Improve Evolution of Sound Operational Requirements
• Would Define Relative Importance of Military Space Operations
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Document 11-15
Document title: "Military Lunar Base Program or S.R. 183 Lunar Observatory Study,"
Study Summary and Program Plan, Air Research and Development Command, Project
No. 7987, Task No. 19769, Directorate of Space Planning and Analysis, Air Force Ballistic
MissUe Division, April 1960, pp. 1-9.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The Space Act did not settle the issue of which organization NASA or the Air Force would conduct
human spaceflight. The Space Act clearly indicated, howev_ that NASA would be responsible for most
basic science in space. This created a much higher standard of justification of humans in space for
the Air Force, which searched for practical missions requinng piloted spacecraft. In April 1960, the
Air Research and Development Command completed a report on the feasibility of establishing a lunar
base and argued that it should be recognized as an Air Force requirement. The base could serve as the
site of a lunar-based Earth bombardment system capable of launching nuclear missiles with an accu-
racy of two to five nautical miles. Echoing the a_uments made for many civilian manned space pro-
grams, the report noted that the cost of such a base ($8.14 billion over ten years) was less than the
annual cost of the Farm Subsidy Program. It was more ambiguous about the need for such a base.
[1]
Study Summary
The purpose of this study was to "determine an economical and sound approach for
establishing a manned intelligence observatory on the moon." Normally the end product
of this type of study is an Evaluation Report. However, due to the importance of the study
conclusions and the significance of time, it was decided to prepare a preliminary Program
Plan, as part of the final Report.
The final report has been prepared in two volumes. Volume I includes this Study
Summary and the Program Plan. Volume II consists of the Technical Requirements to
support the Program Plan. The Technical Requirements are presented in "technical pack-
ages" that cover each of the major technical areas. Each package includes the character-
istics and required development schedules for all known items within the specific
technical area, as well as the development philosophy to be followed.
The "technical packages" have been prepared to assist the appropriate development
agencies to initiate the required applied research and technical development programs.
The complete Military Lunar Base Program Report is suitable for use by personnel in a
Program Office to establish a Lunar Base Program, or to coordinate Air Force lunar
requirements with the NASA.
Based on present knowledge, the study has concluded that it is technically feasible to
establish a manned base on the moon. "Technically feasible" is not meant to imply that
the equipments are available, or the techniques are completely known. Actually it means
that the problems have been analyzed, and logical and reasonable extensions to the "state-
of-the-art" should provide the desired techniques and equipments and this is comparable
to the establishment of the original "design objectives" for the Ballistic Missile Programs
in the year, 1954.
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As the study progressed it became obvious that this is not a program "far off in the
future." Actually the long lead development items should be started immediately if maxi-
mum military advantage is to be derived from a lunar program. If this is done the United
States could send a man to the moon and return him to the earth during the last quarter
of 1967.
The final decision concerning the types of strategic systems to be placed on the moon
(such as a Lunar Based Earth Bombardment System) can be safely deferred for three to
four years. However, the program to establish a lunar base must not be delayed and the
initial base design must meet military requirements. For example, the base should be
designed as a permanent installation, it should be underground, it should strive to be
completely self-supporting, and it should provide suitable accommodations to support
extended tours of duty. A companion study of Strategic Lunar Systems (SR-192) has shown
that the lunar base is the most time-critical part of the system, so it is obvious that any delay
in initiating the base development program will proportionally delay the final operational
capability.
The subject of establishing a military lunar base is extremely complex and includes
almost every known technical discipline. For the technical portion of this report the tech-
nical problems have been categorized as Propulsion, Secondary Power, Guidance, Life
Support, Communications and Data Handling, Sensors, Materials and Resources, Lunar
Base Design, and Environmentl However, the general subject can be simply described as
searching for the answers to the following four questions.
1. HOW can a manned base be established on the moon?
2. WHEN can a manned base be established on the moon?
3. HOW MUCH will it cost to establish a manned lunar base?
4. WHY should a manned base be established on the moon?
A majority of the study effort was expended on the question of "How can a manned
base be established on the moon?" The first step'was to perform a Transportation Analysis
and determine [9] the most advantageous method of transporting men and materials to
the moon and returning the men to earth. All conceivable chemical, nuclear and ion
propulsion systems, using earth and lunar satellites, as well as "direct shot" trajectories,
were considered. In addition, every reasonable technical perturbation was considered. As
a result of the analysis it was conclusively shown that the "direct shot" to the moon, using afive stage
chemically propelled vehicle, is the most desirable. This was not the expected conclusion since
the establishment and use of a manned earth satellite-refueling station has been proposed
for many years as the best way for man to travel to the moon. However, these original pro-
posals did not have the benefit of a detailed analysis like the one performed in this study.
The analysis indicated the nuclear propulsion system could not be operational before
1970, so it was not advisable to rely on this system to establish the lunar base. However, if
a nuclear system is available as expected in 1970, it could be used as indicated on the
Master Program Schedule to logistically support the base.
With the "direct shot" determined to be the most desirable approach, it was possible
to develop a vehicle concept. Based on technical and payload considerations, as well as the
psychologists['] philosophy on "ideal crew size," it was concluded that a three-man aero-
dynamic re-entry vehicle would be the best method for transporting men to the moon and
for returning them to the earth. This vehicle would weigh approximately 30,000 pounds
as it enters the earth's atmosphere, and it would be capable of completely automatic-
unmanned-10 day flights. The initial unmanned earth re-entry flights will require a land-
ing area of 10 x 20 miles. When mail has been included in the system a more conventional
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landing strip will be usable, but to meet both of these requirements a facility like Edwards
Air Force Base will be necessary.
The vehicle would be launched as the payload of a fire stage system that has six mil-
lion pounds of thrust in the first stage. All stages of the system would use liquid hydrogen
and oxygen for propulsion, since this combination has about a 3 to 1 payload advantage
over the more conventional liquid oxygen and RP-1 combination. It was determined that
the proposed NOVA vehicles using liquid oxygen and RP-1 in the first stage would not be
adequate for supporting manned lunar base operations. Therefore, it is desirable to go
completely to the use of liquid hydrogen and oxygen as soon as possible.
The first four stages of this same system will provide the capability of soft landing a
payload of 50,000 to 80,000 pounds at a preselected lunar site. This provides a configura-
tion suitable for transporting large cargo payloads to the moon for use in constructing the
permanent lunar base. Approximately one million pounds of cargo will need to be deliv-
ered to the lunar surface in order to construct and support the permanent base. Part of
this cargo will consist of telescopic and sensing equipment for performing "surveillance
and control" of cislunar space.
An analysis of the functions that are necessary to operate a hmar base has shown that
a base complement of 21 personnel will be required. The tour of duty for space person-
nel is extremely critical, since "personnel transport" is one of the most important cost fac-
tors in a space program. Present studies show the maximum tour of duty on an orbiting
space satellite is in the neighborhood of 30 days. However, it seems reasonable to expect
tours of 7 to 9 months on a lunar base due to the possibility of better living conditions,
availability of a natural gravity environment, and greater protection from natural hazards
while in the underground base.
Once the decision was made to use a "direct shot" chemical system and a vehicle con-
figuration was determined, it became possible to outline a program for development
equipments and a plan for establishing the lunar base. The program broke down into six
logical phases with each phase designed to meet a specific secondary objective. These
objectives all lead directly to the prime objective of establishing a manned military lunar
base.
Basic to each phase of the program is our present knowledge of the environment in
space and on the moon. Therefore, as part of this study all existing space and lunar envi-
ronment knowledge [3] was surveyed, analyzed, summarized and applied to the program
plan. The environmental data obtained from each phase of the program will add to this
knowledge and assist in the design of equipments for the following phases.
Reliability and safety are of basic importance to each program phase. Reliability is
equally essential to the unmanned as well as the manned flights. However, when man is
placed in the vehicles safety becomes of prime importance. It was determined that the
multi-engine vehicles should be capable of performing the mission even following the loss
of one engine. Normally the loss in payload and efficiency to achieve an "engine out"
capability is undesirable, but in this program where large quantities of hydrogen and oxy-
gen are part of the regular payload to support the base, the corresponding loss in payload
to provide extra fuel and oxidizer is not a disadvantage. Actually a "real" payload loss will
only take place when a catastrophic engine failure occurs. In the cases of non-catastrophic
failure, the mission will still be accomplished at reduced efficiency.
The following table presents the objectives and systems to be used in each of the six
program phases.
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PHASE
I. Lunar Probes
2. Lunar OrbiLs
3. Lunar Soft
Landing
4. Lunar Landing
and Return
PAYLOAD
OBJECTIVE BOOSTER (Pounds)
Obtain Lunar and ATLAS-ABLE 370
Cishmar Environmental Data
Map C,omplete Lunar ATLAS- 1,200
Snrtace (10-15' Re_)lution) CENTAUR
Soft Land on Moon and SATURN 2,000
obtain environmental data (4 stages)
SATURN
(5 stages)
NOVA-4
(5 stages)
Return First Payload
fl'om Moon (A core sample
of the lunar surface)
4,500
25,000
SATURN 1,4f_l
(5 stages)
NOVA-4 10,000
(5 stages)
NO. OF
SHOTS
6
6
9
METHOD
High Re_)lution Vide_
System and Sensors.
&flat energy and strip
mapping.
Deceleration stage, tel-
minal guidance alighting
gear, core sampling
devices.
(_)re drilling and analysis
package, hmar launching-
atmospheric drag and
retro-rocket re-e ntr y,
earth terminal guidance.
5. Manned Vehicle Develop a Three Man NOVA-4 30,000 13
Development Space Vehicle filr (5 stages) (Hi alt &
Aerodynamic Earth *ARAGO Lunar Pass)
Re-entry (5 stages) 30,00(I
(Lunar
I_nding &
Return
with Man)
6. Ltmar Base Construct an Operational *ARAGO 30,000 1/mo
Development Permanent Base on the (5 stages) Man Space
moon and sup[x)rt a Vehicle)
21 man crew. 57,000 I/ mr)
80,[gX)
(One Way
Cargo
Vehicle)
Extend Dyna S_ar Tech-
niques to Re-entry veloci-
ties of 37,000 ft/sec.
fldly automatic flight of
manned space vehicle to
moon and retllrn to earth.
(kmstruct temporary base,
build underground per-
manent base, install _)per-
ational surveillance
equipment. Support of
the completed base will
require a total of I flight/
month.
*ARAGO is the term used to describe the 6 millilm pound thrust, liquid hydrogen and oxygen, propulsion stage.
[4] Many items of equipment will be required for the lunar base program and wherever
existing or programmed equipments would meet the requirements of the lunar base pro-
gram they were scheduled for use. Where the item did not presently exist and none is pro-
grammed, a development schedule was provided. In addition, all necessary items are
scheduled for use in the program as early as possible. This will improve reliability by use
and growth, and allow the equipments to be "man-rated" by the desired time.
The major-pacing hardware items that require development to start immediately are
as follows:
1. A liquid hydrogen and oxygen rocket stage which develops six million pounds of
thrust.
2. A 30,000 pound, three man, earth return vehicle.
3. A 100 KW nuclear power unit capable of operating on the lunar surface for two
years.
4. A suit/capsule capable of protecting personnel in the hmar en_4ronment.
5. A closed ecological system for use in the permanent lunar base.
308 TIlE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY REI+AI'I()NS
6. A high definition video strip mapping system to map the hmar surface.
7. Suitable biopacks for use in the first three phases of the program.
8. A fully throttable, 6,000 pound thrust, liquid hydrogen and oxygen propulsion
system.
9. A hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell.
10. A horizon scanner and altitude control system for hmar terminal guidance.
11. A command link midcourse guidance system.
12. A communications and terminal guidance package to be dropped on the lunar
surface from orbiting vehicles.
The second major question concerning the establishment of a manned base on the
moon is, '"Co'hen can this he accomplished?" The Master Program Schedule for establish-
ing a manned lunar base was obtained by scheduling the development of every known
technical item and then integrating these individual sch¢+dules to determine when the
base could become a reality.. • .
Five major milestones worthy of special mention are:
1. First lunar sample return to earth November 1964
2. First manned lunar landing and return August 1967
3. Temporary hmar base initiated November 1967
(This temporary base will be on the lunar surface and it will provide facilities
while the permanent underground base is under construction.)
4. Permanent lunar base completed December 1968
(The permanent base will support a complement of 21 men.)
5. Operational Lunar Base June 1969
(Equipment will be installed to perform surveillance of earth-lunar space.)
The third major question is, "How much will it cost to establish a manned lunar base?"
• . . These cost figures were prepared by the Air Force. After the technical program plan
was completed, the Cost Analysis Panel "coated" the program using the best Air Force
information available from present ballistic missile and aircraft programs.
[5] The important cost figures are summarized below:
Total Cost-Perntanent Lunar Base $7,726 million
Total Cost-10 Year Program 8,146 million
(Includes installation of the permanent base and 6 monl hs of operations.)
Annual Operating Cost 631 million
These costs are based on the following assumptions:
1. The major development engineering cosLs on the Saturn B and the NOVA 4
boosters has [sic] been assumed to be provided under independently funded pro-
grams. However, the actual cost of the boosters has been included and it was
assumed that the first vehicle would be made available to _he lunar program. If
this is not the case, due to the "learning curve" it is expected that the vehicle costs
would be decreased.
2. The costs include all shots in the program except, the nuclear shots shown in the
last half of 1970. The development costs for the nuclear system were not includ-
ed because the hmar base program is not dependent upon the nuclear system.
However, if the nuclear system is available and more economical it would be used
to support the operational base•
3. Costs of all items normally considered as part of a weapon system (such as, launch
pads and ground facilities) have been included.
4. It was assumed that adequate earth based tracking facilities will be available as the
result of other programs. If they are not available the costs could increase by
300-600 ntillion dollars in the later phases of the program.
When the average annual cost ($814 million) of file proposed program is compared
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totheAirForcefforts,it becomesapparentthatthisprogramisapproximatelyqualto
theoutputofjustoneofthemajorairframecompaniesnormallysupportedbytheAir
Force. As a matter of information, the annual cost of the U.S. Farm Subsidy Program is
approximately the same as the 9 1/2 year program required to install the permanent
lunar base.
One point worthy of particular mention when considering costs, is the development
of lunar resources. Analysis has shown that the development of lunar resources could
decrease the cost of Strategic Lunar Operations by as much as 25 per cent [sic]. This is
based on the fact that the moon's surface probably consists of many types of silicates. Since
hydrogen and oxygen are used as propellants in the transport vehicles, as essential ele-
ments in the secondary power systems, as an element for personnel breathing, and when
combined as water for life support, the value of obtaining these two elements on the
moon is obvious. Should oxygen and hydrogen be obtained on the lunar surface they
would be literally worth more than their weight in gold. This study has shown that it may
be very possible to process lunar silicates to obtain water and then, by dissociation, the
elements oxygen and hydrogen. It seemed very worthwhile to pursue this objective so a
program schedule has been presented in the Environment section of Volume II. A glance
at the lunar resource program schedule shows that the sample "core" of the lunar surface
to be obtained in Phase IV, is critical to this effort. Mthough the process will require large
quantities of power, solar energy is available in unlimited supply and nuclear power has
been programmed for use on the lunar base.
The fourth major question, "Why should a manned base be established on the
moon?," was not answered as a part of this SR-183 study. SR-192, the Strategic Lunar
System Study was initiated on 29 August 1958 for the specific purpose of looking at this
question. However, to provide a complete picture on the lunar base it seems necessary to
consider the question in this report. Since the [6] final results of SR[-] 192 are not yet
available, the mid-term conclusions have been utilized. The Space Mission Analysis por-
tion of this final SR[-] 183 report briefly discusses these conclusions. The essential faclors
can be stated as follows:
1. The lunar base possesses strategic value for the U.S. by providing a site where
future military deterrent forces could be located.
2. The decision on the types of military forces to be installed at the lunar base can
be safely deferred for 3 to 4 years provided a military lunar base program is lnlU-
ated immediately.
3. A lunar based earth bombardment system could have a CEP of two to five nauti-
cal miles.
4. The development of lunar resources could enhance the potential for strategic
space operations in the cislunar volume.
[7] CONCLUSIONS
The most important conclusions of this study can be summarized by the following
statements:
1. It is technically feasible to establish a lunar base by logical extension of present
techniques.
2. Earliest lunar operations may be attained through the use of a direct shot chem-
ically powered booster.
3. A 6 million pound thrust LOX/LH propulsion capability must be developed for
the three-manned vehicle for lunar landing and return missions.
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4. Investigationindicatesthatthe payload penalty for using earth re-entry retro
rockets is so great that the only logical re-entry approach is by means of aerody-
namic braking. Therefore, the present Dyna Soar program is essential to provide
re-entry vehicle design data.
5. A multi-phased program is essential to establish an operational lunar base. The
Program Plan presented in this report included tile following six phases:
Phase I Lunar Probes
Phase II Lunar Orbits
Phase III Soft Lunar Landing
Phase IV Lunar Landing and Return
Phase V Manned Vehicle Development
Phase VI Lunar Base Development
6. Based on the above program the following milestones have been established as
reasonable objectives.
a. First Lunar Sample Returned to Earth November 1964
b. Manned Lunar Landing and Return August 1967
c. Temporary Lunar Base Initiated November 1967
d. Permanent Lunar Base Completed December 1968
e. Operational Lunar Base June 1969
7. The initial pleases of the program can be undertaken for an investment which
averages approximately 800 million dollars per year during the initial building
phase. After the establishment of the base the annual costs will decrease to about
600 million dollars per year. This may be still further reduced when nuclear
propulsion becomes available and as lunar resources are developed to provide
oxygen and hydrogen to support space operations.
8. A lunar base is the initial and essential step in the attainment of a military capa-
bility in the lunar volume.
9. A military lunar system has potential to increase our deterrent capability by insur-
ing positive retaliation.
10. The decisions regarding the type of military operations to be conducted in lunar
and cislunar space can be safely deferred for several years provided a military
lunar base is established which can be readily expanded to support lunar opera-
tions.
11. From a national viewpoint it is desirable that a lunar base be established as soon
as possible. This conclusion is based on the strategic potential as well as the psy-
chological, political and scientific implications.
[8] This page intentionally left blank.
[9] The following actions are recommended as a result of this study.
1. The program for establishing a military lunar base be recognized as an Air Force
requirement.
2. Immediate action be taken to implement the early phases of the program.
3. Immediate action be taken to start the development of the critical long lead items
listed below:
a. Six million pound thrust LOX/LH propulsion system.
b. Three-man space vehicle which can re-enter earth's atmosphere.
c. There are smaller items that should be started before the end of 1960. These
are listed in the separate technical areas.
4. A program office be established within ARDC to coordinate with NASA, all activ-
ities directed toward the establishment of the lunar base.
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5. The military requirements and NASA's requirements be integrated into one
national lunar program.
6. Responsibilities be assigned for the various phases of the integrated lunar pro-
gram.
7. The establishment of the base be considered a military expedition.
8. The Air Force develop space operational know-how by being intimately involved
in all phases of the lunar program. This is in keeping with the philosophy of con-
currency and is necessary to shorten the development cycle.
9. Further study be initiated as explained in each section of the technical report.
The follow-on SRo183 study will tie all of these together into a comprehensive sys-
tems study.
Document 11-16
Document rifle: General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, to
General Landon, Air Force Personnel Deputy Commander, and General Wilson, Air Force
Development Deputy Commander, April 14, 1960, reprinted in: Defense Space Interests,
Hearings Before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of
Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1961 ).
Document 11-17
Document rifle: Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the
Military Departments, et al., "Development of Space Systems," March 6, 1961, with
attached: Department of Defense Directive 5160.32, "Development of Space Systems,"
March 6, 1961, reprinted in: Defense Space Interests, Hearings Before the Committee on
Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st sess.
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961 ).
Document 11-18
Document title: Overton Brooks, Chairman, Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S.
House of Representatives, to the President, March 9, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Document 11-19
Document rifle: President John F. Kennedy, to Overton Brooks, Chairman, Committee on
Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, March 23, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
After the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) returned control of the military space program
to the individual services---primarily the Air Force--there was gradually increasing concern in
Congress and the press that the Air Force was interested in expanding its power over other aspects of
the civilian space program as well. In ap_l 1960, Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas White wrote a
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memorandum to his staff stating that he wanted them to cooperate more fuUy with NASA and that it
might be possible that NASA would eventually be combined urith the military. Almost a year lateg,
newly appointed Secreta_ of Defense Robert mcNamara gave the Air Force control of the development
of all military space systems. The other services would still conduct basic research, but after some pre-
determined point, the program would be turned over to the Air Forcer. White's memo "leaked" and,
combined with the McNamara policy statement, led to hearings before the House Committee on Science
and Astronautics, chaired _ Overton Brooks. Before the hearing_ started, Brooks sent a letter to
President Kennedy asking for clarification of the Air Force's role in conducting aspects of the nation-
al space program. By the last day of the hearings, Kennedy responded, declaring that manned and
unmanned exploration of space and the application of space technology to peaceful activities were
NASA missions, but that there also were exclusivelv military missions in space as well.
Document 11-16
[no pagination]
AFPDC (Gen Landon)
AFDDC (Gen Wilson)
14 April 1960
l. I am convinced that one of the major long range elements of the Air Force future
lies in space. It is also obvious that NASA will play a large part in the national effort in this
direction and, moreover, inevitably will be closely associated, if not eventually combined
with the military. It is perfectly clear to me that particularly in these formative years the
Air Force must, for its own good as well as for national interest, cooperate to the maxi-
mum extent with NASA, to include the furnishing of key personnel even at the expense
of some Air Force dilution of technical talent.
2. It has come to my attention that key personnel in NASA feel that there has been
a shift in Air Force policy in respect to the type of cooperation stated above. I want to
make it crystal clear that the policy has not changed and that to the very limit of our abil-
ity, and even beyond it to the extent of some risk to our own programs, the Air Force will
cooperate and will supply all reasonable key personnel requests made to it by NASA.
3. To meet the above requirements ] have no doubt that some shifting of Air Force
personnel within the Air Force will be necessary in order to feed new talent into [the Air
Research and Development Command]. This should be done. In addition, while late, we
must increase the number of slots in civil technical institutions for Air Force officers. I
want this type of technical education to be given the highest priority in our civil educa-
tional program and the percentage of slots in this respect to be radically increased, effec-
tive as early as possible.
THOMAS D. WHITE
Chief of Staff
cc: Under Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Perkins
General LeMay
General Schriever
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Documen111-17
[no pagination] THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C., March 6, 1961
Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Director of Defense Research and Engineering
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
The General Counsel
The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: Development of Space Systems
Having carefully reviewed the military portion of the national space program, the
Deputy Secretary and I have become convinced that it could be much improved by better
organization and clearer assignment of responsibility. To this end, I directed the General
Counsel of the Department of Defense to obtain your comments on a new draft DOD
Directive, "Development of Space Systems."
After careful consideration of the comments and alternate plans that were submitted,
the Deputy Secretary and I have decided to assign space development programs and pro-
jects to the Department of the Air Force, except under unusual circumstances.
This assignment of space development programs and projects does not predetermine
the assignment of operational responsibilities for space systems which will be made on a
project by project basis as a particular project approaches the operational stage, and
which will take into account the competence and experience of each of the Services and
the unified and specified commands.
We recognize that all the military departments, as well as other Defense agencies, may
have requirements for the use of space equipment. The directive expressly provides that
they will continue to conduct preliminary research to develop specific statements of these
requirements, and provides a mechanism through which these requirements may be ful-
filled.
Attached is a directive incorporating this decision. We expect all elements of the
Department of Defense to support it fully and to help develop the military portion of the
national space program in the most effective manner.
Robert S. McNamara
Encl. DOD Dir. 51GO.32
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[1] March 6, 1961
Number 5160.32
Department of Defense Directive
SUBJECT: Development of Space Systems
References:
(a) Memorandum (Conf) from Secretary of Defense to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, subject: Satellite and Space Vehicles Operations, September 18, 1959
(b) Memorandum from Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency to Secretary of
the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force, subject: Study Contracts
for Projects Assigned to the Advanced Research Projects Agency, September 14, 1959
(c) Memorandum from Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency to Secretary of
the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of [2] the Air Force, and Director,
Advanced Research Projects Agency, subject: ARPA Programs, June 11, 1959
L Purpose
This establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for research, development, test,
and engineering of satellites, anti-satellites, space probes and supporting systems therefor,
for all components of the Department of Defense.
II. Policy and assignment of responsibilities
A. Each military department and Department of Defense agency is authorized to
conduct preliminary research to develop new ways of nsing space technology to perform
its assigned function. The scope of such research shall be defined by the Director of
Defense Research and Engineering in terms of expenditure limitations and other appro-
priate conditions.
B. Proposals for research and development of space programs and projects beyond
the defined preliminary research stage shall be submitted to the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering for review and determination as to whether such proposals,
when transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, will be recommended for approval. Any
such proposal will become a Department of Defense space development program or pro-
ject only upon specific approval by the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of
Defense.
C. Research, development, test, and engineering of Department of Defense space
development programs or projects, which are approved hereafter, will be the responsibil-
it), of the Department of the Air Force.
D. Exceptions to paragraph C, will be made by the Secretary of Defense or the
Deputy Secretary of Defense only in unusual circumstances.
E. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering will maintain a current sum-
mary of approved Department of Defense space development programs and projects.
IlL Cancellation
Reference (a), except as to the assignments of specific projects made therein, and ref-
erences (b) and (c) are hereby cancelled.
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IV.. Effective date
This directive is effective upon publication. Instructions implementing this directive
will be issued within thirty (30) days.
ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, Secretary of Defense
Document11-18
[1] March 9, 1961
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
My dear Mr. President:
I am seriously disturbed by the persistency and strength of implications reaching me
to the effect that a radical change in our national space policy is contemplated with some
areas of the executive branch. In essence, it is implied that United States policy should be
revised to accentuate the military uses of space at the expense of civilian and peaceful
uses.
Of course, I am aware that no official statement to this effect has been forthcoming;
but the voluminous rash of such reports appearing in the press, and particularly in the
military and trade journals, is, it seems to me, indicative that more than mere rumor is
involved.
Moreover, I cannot fail to take cognizance of the fact that emphasis on the military
uses of space is being promoted in a quasi-public fashion within the defense establish-
ment. Nor can I ignore the suggestion, implicit in the unabridged version of the Wiesner
report, that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration role in the development
of space systems will be predominant. Such an assertion not only seems to disregard the
spirit of the law but minimizes the values of peaceful space exploration and exploitation.
I have hesitated to call this to your personal attention. However, since the National
Aeronautics and Space Council, whose duty it is to advise on the formulation of United
States space policy, remains unformed, I feel constrained to broach the matter directly.
May I point out that the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 passed the
Senate in which both you and the current Vice President so ably served without a record-
ed dissenting vote. It was unanimously approved by the House. In that Act Congress took
great pains to declare that space activities "shall be the responsibility of, and shall be
directed by, a civilian agency exercising control over aeronautics and [2] space activities
sponsored by the United States..." Space activities "peculiar to or primarily associated
with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the
United States" were quite properly made the responsibility of the Defense Department,
but this was a literal "exception" to the proclaimed procedure.
As you know, I served twenty-two years on the House Armed Services Committee. I
would be the last person to attempt to weaken our defense posture. But neither do I
intend to sit by and, contrary to the express intent of Congress, watch the military tail
undertake to wag the space dog.
The law makes it crystal clear that the prime American mission in space is tox_ard
peaceful purposes. It specifically enjoins NASA to promote space science and technology
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with a view to the "application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and out-
side the atmosphere." The law not only does not limit NASA's functions to scientific
research; it affirmatively directs NASA to make peaceful use of space and to develop oper-
ational space systems, manned and unmanned. This is a legislative requirement imposed.
To place the prime operational responsibility for space exploration and use with the mil-
itary, particularly when no military requirement for men ill space yet exists, wotdd be to
disorient completely the space program as contemplated by Congress and as set forth in
the law.
As Chief Executive of the United States charged with the conduct of foreign affairs
and as a former member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, you are, I know,
aware of the great importance of preserving the peaceful image of the United States with-
in the international community. At the same time, few areas of national endeavor today
serve better to reflect the American attitude in world politics than what we intend and
how we behave in this new dimension of human activity, l do not see how we can square
an exclusive, or even a predominant, military exploitation of space with our announced
aspirations for peace and disarmament. To sublimate military operations in space would
thus seem to be inconsistent with our foreign policy and, in myjndgment, would serve to
impede our fllttlre negotiations for world-wide disarmament.
There is another extremely important aspect of this picture, namely participation by
private enterprise in the space venture. If we are to reap genuine economic pay-off
through space exploration, we must find ways of eliciting and using the resources of pri-
vate capital. While I recognize that the armed services have a legitimate interest in such
space enterprises as communications, weather prediction, navigation and the like, I sub-
mit that these concepts have a predominant use for peaceful activities. In my judgment,
we will lag seriously in any efforts to bring private enterprise into space if we turn control
of research, development and operation of such endeavors over to the military whose [3]
needs are highly specialized and whose research methods tend to be restricted in scope
and concept.
To amplify: if we envision the military in control of world-wide space communications,
it is difficult to understand in advance what basis would be provided for world-wide media
of communications such as television, radio and telephone systems. If we concede military
control of weather satellites, how shall such control be reconciled to the needs of farmers,
merchants, and business generally? If we permit military domination of space navigation
devices, are we fldfilling our obligations to the merchant marine and the commercial air
fleets operating on and above the high seas? I think not. In fact, many of the benefits
which humanity could expect to reap from the exploration of space may easily be lost
unless they are made available on a non-military basis. If the fruits of our efforts to con-
quer space are to enrich people's lives and raise standards of living throughout the world,
they must be handled through a civilian peace-time agency, not by the military which nec-
essarily is governed by its particular objectives.
In conclusion, I feel obliged to point out that in view of the recent Defense
Department decision to concentrate all military space research in a single service, this
question of civilian preeminence in space exploration becomes paramount. Space explo-
ration involves much research, basic and applied, and it is axiomatic that the rate of
research pay-off is accelerated many times when a variety of approaches, ideas and con-
cepts are explored simultaneously. Testimony before our Comnfittee permits no doubt
whatever that the United States space effort, civilian and military, has achieved what it has
during the past three years only because of an imaginative and diversified approach.
If NASA's role is in any way diminished in favor of a space research program con-
ducted by a single military service, it seems unlikely to me that we shall ever overtake our
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Soviet competition--a competition which, by the way, has been peculiarly effective
because of its public emphasis on scientific and peaceful uses of space.
It is my hope that you will find it feasible to clear up this matter, and, coincidentally,
to reassure me in the very near future.
Very sincerely yours,
OVERTON BROOKS
Chairman
Document 11-19
[1] March 23,1961
Dear Overton:
Recently you wrote to me concerning my attitude toward the conduct of our nation-
al space effort. I appreciate your comments and have given considerable thought to the
problems of this program which you have raised. I hope that this letter will serve to reas-
sure you that there is no basic disagreement between us.
It is now, nor has it ever been, my intention to subordinate the activities in space of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to those of the Department of
Defense. I believe, as you do, that there are legitimate missions in space for which the mil-
itary services should assume responsibility, but that there are major missions, such as the
scientific unmanned and manned exploration of space and the application of space techo
nology to the conduct of peaceful activities, which should be carried forward by our civil-
ian space agency. Furthermore, I have been _tssured by Dr. Wiesner that it was not the
intention of his space task force to recommend the restriction of the NASA to the area of
scientific research in space. One of their strongest recommendations was," in fact, that vig-
orous leadership be provided by NASA in the area of non-military exploitation of space
technology.
As you have pointed out, there are programs which have strong implications in both
the military and civilian fields. In making policy decisions on such programs, I intend to
rely heavily on the advice of the Vice President, based on his invaluable experience with
the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. We are also moving ahead
with plans to reactivate the Space Council, and to make it an active and effective organi-
zation. As [2] you know, I have nominated Dr. Edward C. Welsh to be executive secretary
of the Space Council. I believe that he, working under the Vice President, can assemble a
top-flight staff that will make the Space Council more than just a box on an organization
chart as it has been heretofore.
I agree wholeheartedly with you that there are highly important benefits to be real-
ized from the civil applications of space technology and that private enterprise must play
an important role. I am confident that with the help of the Vice President, the Space
Council, the Senate Committee under Senator Kerr, and the House Committee under
your able leadership, we can assure that the proper policy decisions will be reached.
Again, may I thank you for your comments and also express my appreciation for the
outstanding .job you are performing as Chairman of the Committee on Science and
Astronautics.
Sincerely yours
,John F. Kennedy
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Document 11-20
Document tide: "Summary Report: NASA-DOD Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group,"
September 24, 1962, pp. ii-iv, l-l-III-13.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
After President Kennedy's May 25, 1961, speech to Congress, which committed the United States to a
lunar mission, there was an attempt to establish military and civilian requirements for large launch
vehicles, with the hope of establishing a single national launch vehicle fleet. On July 7, 1961, NASA
Associate Administrator Robert Seamans proposed a joint study to determine mission models and
requirements affecting the selection of large launch vehicles; the study was headed by NASA's Nicholas
Golovin. As the study progressed, the different requirements and institutional interests of NASA and
the Department of Defense (DOD) became clear and both agencies quickly distanced themselves from
the contents of the report. By the time this report was released on ,September 24, 1962, almost a year
after the group had completed its work, it had been obvious for some time that there would be very lit-
tle cooperation between NASA and the DOD on large launch vehicles.
[ii]
Foreword
Early in 1961 numerous studies relative to our space programs were undertaken
under a variety of auspices. In one of the initial efforts the Space Exploration Program
Council of NASA revived in detail the various aspects and approaches to manned lunar
landing including both rendezvous and direct ascent. This review culminated in the deci-
sion that NASA would proceed toward the manned lunar landing on a broad base.
Accordingly, studies were initiated to aid in formulating an approach to the task. At about
the same time, the Secretary of Defense requested a comprehensive study by his staff of
our total national space program and a comparison of these with what was known of Soviet
undertakings in this field.
Early in May 1961, NASA presented its plans for accomplishing a manned lunar
landing and estimates of the cost to the Department of Defense for the purpose of coor-
dinating the resources and efforts of these two agencies to accomplish this mission. These
discussions culminated in a NASA-DOD report submitted to the Vice President, in his
capacity as Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, entitled
"Recommendations for Our National Space Program: Changes, Policies, Goals." This
report, dated 8 May 1961, was submitted jointly by the Administrator of NASA and the
Secretary of Defense.
The most important of these recommendations was that the achievement of manned
lunar landing before the end of the decade be established as a national goal. In addition,
it was recommended that scientific exploration of space be intensified; that operational
communications and meteorological satellite systems be developed at the earliest reason-
able time; that large scale boosters be developed for potential military use as well as to
support the civilian space program; and that an increased effort be placed on advanced
technology, particularly with regard to the development of chemical and nuclear rocket
propulsion. It was recognized, of course, that further analysis would be required to devel-
op more detailed program plans in each of the recommended areas. It is important to
note, however, that the basis for such planning was clearly [iii] specified in the 8 May 1961
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report; it was recognized that long-range planning, especially for launch vehicles (which
account for more than half the cost of space programs), must first be successfully accom-
plished, and that such planning was essential to insure that national resources would be
properly harnessed to national tasks on a national scale.
The 8 May 1961 report gave renewed support to the "building block" concept. It was
stated in this connection: "It is absolutely vital that national planning be sufficiently
detailed to define the building blocks in an orderly and integrated way. It is absolutely vital
that national management be equal to the task of focusing resources, particularly scien-
tific and engineering resources, on the essential building blocks."
The budgetary and policy recommendations of the 8 May report were adopted by the
President and presented to the Congress in his message of 25 May. Subsequently, virtual-
ly all the recommended authorizations and appropriations were passed by the Congress.
Simultaneously with these acts, NASA and DOD continued an intensified effort to
define mere explicitly and explore more thoroughly the actions that would have to be
taken to implement these recommendations. New studies were begun in both agencies
and the talents of specialists were harnessed in organizations in many parts of the country.
Within NASA the first of a series of major study efforts was begun on 2 May 1961, ini-
tiated to define in greater detail the feasibility, schedule, and costs of accomplishing
manned lunar landing, giving attention to the various possible approaches for accom-
plishing the mission. An ad hoc task group was then established and assigned the respon-
sibility for defining in detail a feasible approach for accomplishment of an early manned
hmar landing. A second ad hoc group was assigned the task of conducting a broad survey
of the feasible ways for accomplishing manned lunar landing.
One of the results of these studies was establishment of the need for further infor-
mation on the rendezvous approach to manned lunar landing and the associated launch
site planning and resources required. Accordingly, two [iv] additional ad hoc task groups
were established. One group established on 20June 1961 was assigned responsibility for
studying in detail the plans and supporting resources needed to accomplish manned
lunar landing by the rendezvous technique. The other group established 23 June 1961
conducted a joint NASA-DOD study of national launch site planning and of the resources
required to accomplish the manned lunar landing mission--as it was defined by the ear-
lier studies.
Early in July it became apparent that a very major effort was necessary to aid in defin-
ing the large launch vehicles which would be needed for the Manned Lunar Landing
Program. Numerous mechanisms were considered for this purpose. The idea of estab-
lishing a committee of scientists and technologists somewhat analogous to the Von
Neuman Committee, which in 1954 recommended the initiation of our ICBM program,
was considered. The possibility of establishing a contractor or a group of contractors
charged with responsibility for this analytical and planning effort was also considered.
From such considerations emerged the concept of the Large Launch Vehicle Planning
Group (LLVPG). This group was to be comprised of representatives from both NASA and
DOD reflecting equally the experience, viewpoints and special knowledge of both agen-
cies. The group was to be responsible jointly to a senior official in each agency and
empowered to draw upon scientific and technological resources wherever they might be
found and needed ....
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[i-1]
Chapter I
Summary and Recommendations
I. Introduction
A. Formation of the Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group
The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA, in an exchange of corre-
spondence on 7 July 1961, established the DOD-NASA Large Launch Vehicle Planning
Group (LLVPG), to provide the necessary joint planning leading to future specification
and development of large launch vehicles required as a result of the expansion of the
national space effort outlined by the President on 25 May 1961.
The LLVPG was headed by Dr. Nicholas E. Golovin of NASA, and by Dr. Lawrence L.
Kavanau of OSD [the Office of the Secretary of Defense], who served as Deputy Director
of the group. They reported jointly to Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Associate Administrator
of NASA, and Mr. John H. Rubel, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Deputy Director,
Defense Research and Engineering) ofDOD. A total of nine DOD representatives and ten
NASA representatives made up the membership of the LLVPG. Their names appear in
Appendix A, which also describes the assistance the group secured from other agencies,
such as the Marshall Flight Test Center, Aerospace Corporation, Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, and industrial contractors. As noted in Appendix A, the LLVPG commenced
its operations in July and continued through the month of November 1961, and utilized
the equivalent full-time services of approximately 150 people during this period.
Representatives from many NASA and DOD components served as members of the
LLVPG. Although it was desired and necessary to insure that organizations charged with
on-going responsibilities for the execution of space programs would have the opportuni-
ty to participate in this planning effort, the principal criterion used in selecting members
of the LLVPG was their personal technical ability and experience. The objective was not
to attain a compromise between the preconceived notions of DOD representatives on the
one hand and NASA representatives on the other, but to harness, through cooperative
study, the best capabilities available for the task of laying out a long-range plan for a
National Launch Vehicle Program.
[1-2] The initial instructions to the LLVPG were comprised [sic] in a memorandum dated
7July 1961 to the Administrator of NASA from Dr. Seamans. This document was approved
by the Administrator of NASA and the Secretary of Defense. While these documents
served as the important starting point and the principal framework for LLVPG delibera-
tions, the LLVPG was responsive to considerable detailed guidance furnished by Dr.
Seamans and Mr. Rubel, immediately following its establishment, and from time to time
during the course of its deliberations. Since the objective of the LLVPG was to formulate
plans, it was natural to expect that ideas and concepts would be changed as their studies
and analyses evolved. This was indeed the case, and some of the notions with which this
undertaking began were significantly modified before the completion of the group's
effort.
Based on the direction received by the LLVPG, the following frame of reference for
the study was adopted:
a. The launch vehicle configurations and the operational procedures to be devel-
oped and recommended by the LLVPG were to take into account the current and
anticipated needs of DOD and of NASA and be guided by the following national
objectives for large launch vehicles:
(1) Early successfifl landing of manned spacecraft on the moon to return to
earth.
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(2)Mannedscientificmissionsinearthorbitandcircumlunarflightaswellason
thelunarsurface.(3)Launchvehicledevelopmentsforadvancedmilitarymissions.(4) Increasedreliabilityandeconomyofeffortachievedbymultipleuseofvehi-
clecomponents,vehiclestages,andcompletelaunchvehicles.
b. Theprincipalspecificallegationof theLLVPGwastheexplicitdevelopment,in
usefuldetail,ofatechnicallywell-establishedplanningbasisinwhichcoordinatedaction
couldbetakenleadingto thedevelopment[I-3]anduseoftherecommendedlaunch
vehiclesandthenecessaryfacilitiesfortheirtestandlaunching.Thegroupwascharged
withtheidentificationandpreparationofpreliminaryspecificationsforlongleadtime
itemsforwhichdevelopmentshouldbeinitiatedimmediately,andwasdirectedtoreview
andrecommendasuitablebalancebetweenearlyachievementof majorgoals,over-all
costs,andgrowthpotentialoflargelaunchvehicles.
c. GuidelinesprovidedtheLLVPGincludedthefollowing:(1)Bothdirectascentandrendezvousoperationswithrespecttothelunarland-
ingweretobeconsidered.(2)Plansweretobebasedoncomponentswithinthepresentstate-of-the-artbut
notrestrictedtoon-the-shelfitems.Whenthescheduleddevelopmentof a
newcomponentappearedquestionable,a duplicateapproachwasto be
included.
(3)Althoughonlyliquidandsolidmotorsweretoheemployed,proposaldesigns
shouldfacilitatexploitationofnuclearandelectricpropulsionforfollow-on
systemsif feasible.(4)Thegroupwastoconcernitselfonlywithlargelaunchvehiclesystems.The
word"large"wasto meanthosevehicleswhosecapabilitytoacceleratepay-
loadsonspacecrafttoescapevelocitywouldbegreaterthanthecapabilityof
theAtlas-AgenaBsystem.(Thisguidancewassubsequentlymodifiedasa
resultof theboosterrequirementsarisingin connectionwiththeNASA
Geminiprogram,andthegroupwasreconvenedbyamemorandumdated
18November1961,fromtheAssociateAdministratorf NASAandthe
AssistantSecretaryof Defense(DeputyDirectorof DefenseResearchand
Engineering)toextenditsstudyofvehiclesystemswiththerangeofpayloads
downto 5000 pounds.) The term "vehicle system" was to include not only
propulsion elements, but guidance, control and those instrumentation,
telemetry, and command/communication subsystems which are normally
physically part of the vehicle system and are employed for maneuvering the
payload or spacecraft into a desired sequence of position and velocity coor-
dinates.
[I-4] B. Approach
The general approach followed by the group was that of defining stage and vehicle
combinations which could reasonably be expected to become available within the next
5 to 8 years: executing a systematic quantitative analysis of their relative performance,
schedule, cost and reliability characteristics; and comparing resultant launch vehicle capa-
bilities, with the projected national missions requirements. In developing national launch
vehicle requirements for the period 1962 - 1970, the LLVPG utilized forecasts of launch
needs prepared by DOD and NASA reflecting programmed and anticipated mission
needs.
It was not considered an assignment of the LLVPG to establish preferred mission
modes where alternative operational concepts were involved as, for example, in the case
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ofvariousapproachestoaccomplishmentofmannedlunarlanding.However,it wasthe
aimofthegrouptodefinethelaunchvehicleconfigurations(andtheiravailability,cost,
reliabilityandperformancecharacteristics)a sociatedwithsuchalternativemission
modesandtherebyprovideinputswhichcouldbeusedfordecisionsbyDODandNASA.
Indefiningbuildingblockcombinationsofboostersandupperstages,consideration
wasextendedtomajorsubsystemsincludinguidancesystems,controlsystems,powersup-
plies,telemetryandthelike.Quantitativepreliminarydesignanalysesweremadeby
AerospaceCorporationand/ortheMarshallSpaceFlightCenter(MSFC),andwere
carriedthroughtoasufficientdepthof technicaldetailto substantiateth operational
feasibilityof eachprospectivelaunchvehicle.Thesestudiesincluded:propulsionsystem
performancecharacteristics;ontrollability;structuralbehaviorin typicaltrajectories;
detailedevelopmentschedulesfortheengines,tages,andvehicles,tructuredin the
formofPERTdiagramsincorporatingallsignificantmilestonesthroughoutthedevelop-
mentcycleuptofirstvehicleavailabilityforflightest,anddetailedcostestimatesforeach
phaseofthedevelopmentprocessforeachstageof everyvehicle,includingmanufactur-
ingfacilities,staticanddynamictestingfacilities,aswellasthenecessarylaunchcom-plexes.[I-5]In thiseffortoneoftheearlydecisionsoftheLLVPGwasthatnorecommendation,
consistentwiththeguidelinesgiventothegroupwaslikelytobeofpracticalutilityasa
basisformanagementdecisionsinNASAorDODunlesstheprospectiver liabilityofthe
vehiclesystemsinvolvedwasestimated.Accordingly,arrangementsweremadefordetailed
reliabilityanalysisofeachstage,eachmajorsubsystem,andeachover-allvehiclesystem.
Inviewofthefacthatdurationsoftestingprograms,bothstaticandflight,aredepen-
dentontheengineeringandtestingphilosophiesmployedin thedevelopmentprocess,
substantialttentionwasalsogivenbythegrouptothesematters.Theexperienceofqual-
ifiedstaffsatMSFCandAerospaceCorporation,aswellasofmembersoftheLLVPG,were
meldedin sharpeningtheconceptsinvolvedandinapplyingthem,toestablishvehicle
developmentandflightschedulesforvariousmission-vehiclecombinationslaterconsid-
eredbythegroup.
FurtherdetailsoftheparticipationoftheLLVPG,themannerinwhichthegrouppro-
ceededinitsactivities,andthecontentsofthefinalreportareincludedinAppendixA.
Asstatedpreviously,it wastheobjectiveof theLLVPGtodeveloprecommendations
foraNationalLaunchVehicleProgramthatwouldsatisfyNASAandDODflightmission
requirementsfortheremainderofthedecade.Therefore,oneof theinitialstepstaken
bythegroupwastoobtainthemissionrequirementsofthetwoagenciesandanalyzethem
withaviewtodevelopingasystematicmissionrequirementbasetoserveasafoundation
for thevehiclestudiestofollow.Spacecraftdevelopmentandmissionattemptschedules
wereassumedtobepacedbytheavailabilityofvehicles,thederivationofvehicletypesand
theirdevelopmentschedules.
Forconvenienceinanalyzingthecharacteristicsof thevariousvehiclesconsidered,
themissionrequirementsweredividedintofourclasses.Thesemissionclassesare:
ClassI -UnmannedNASAandDODmissionsplusearlymannedflight
ClassA-Lowearthorbitmissionsforlargemannedspacecraftsystems(Apollo,
Dyna-Soar,O bitingLaboratory)[I-6] ClassB - Mannedlunarmissionsinvolvinglunarcircumnavigation,lu arorbit
andlunarlandingbyearthorbitorlunarorbitrendezvous
ClassC-Mannedflighttothemoonbydirectascent
Thelaunchvehiclesstudiedwerecorrespondinglydividedintofourclasses.Theper-
formancecharacteristics,reliabilityanddevelopmentschedulesfor thesevehiclesare
summarizedinAppendixB.
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A total of over 800 missions was projected for NASA and DOD to the end of the
decade. These missions were distributed among the four mission classes as follows:
NASA DOD Total
Class I
Class A 277 523 800
Class B 69 Undefined 69
Class C 1__..00 10
Total 356 523 879
[II-1] II. Principal Recommendations
A. Recommendations
The following are the principal recommendations of the LLVPG with a brief discus-
sion of each.
1. Class A Launch Vehicle Development
Recommendation: Development of the Saturn C-1 should continue.
The Saturn C-1 is the only vehicle (A-l) available in time to meet the present devel-
opment schedule of the Apollo program. Therefore, the Saturn C-1 vehicle (A-I) should
be developed, flown, and man-rated as soon as possible as a matter of high priority. Such
development will not only allow initiation of Apollo spacecraft tests at the earliest possible
date, but will also generate experience in the operation of large hydrogen-oxygen stages
and will provide definition of the problems and the potential of multiple engine clusters
for such stages.
2. Titan Launch Vehicle System
At the conclusion of the LLVPG studies in October 1961, the following recommen-
dation was made by the group with regard to the Titan III:
Recommendation: The 120-inch diameter solid motor and the Titan III launch vehicle should
be developed by the Department of Defense to meet DOD and NASA needs, as appropriate in the pay-
load range of 5000 to 30,000 pounds, low earth orbit equivalent.
Of the various considerations taken into account in evaluating the advisability of pro-
ceeding with development of the Titan III system, the principal arguments leading to the
conclusion of the group were: (1) the anticipated large number of DOD missions during
this decade justify the development of the Titan III family because of its substantially lower
cost per launch than for Saturn based vehicles; (2) the importance to DOD of having a
launching system not dependent on the use of cryogenic propellants; (3) the Titan III, by
virtue of the way its building blocks can be combined, permits greater flexibility; [II-2] (4)
the Titan III uses DOD experience with Titan II, making logistics and training easy for
DOD; and (5) development of large solid motor technology would be part of the devel-
opment effort and cost of this vehicle system. Such development would be in accord with
prior governmental policy decisions that advancement of large solid rocket technology
would be vigorously pursued.
Following the adjournment of the LLVPG in October 1961, unresolved questions still
remained relative to the role of the Titan III. The LLVPG had given little or no attention
to the Titan II-1/2, the Department of Defense had initiated a Phase I development on
the Titan III, and NASA was soon to make a decision on Gemini and was considering the
Titan II-I/2. To assist the pending decision by DOD and NASA relative to these vehicles,
the LLVPG was reconvened for analysis of the National Launch Vehicle Program in the
5000 to 30,000 pound low earth equivalent range.
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At theterminationofthisreconvenedsessionofthegroup,therecommendationontheTitanIII wasasfollows:
Recommendation:The Titan Ill space launching system should be developed by the
Department of Defense providing that the Phase I study now under way confirms the technical feasi-
bility and desirabi'lity of the sy'stem.
The further review of the Titan III by the group did not result in the introduction of
any additional factual evidence either for or against the prior recommendation. Thus, the
arguments outlined above in favor of Titan III suggest again the recommendation to pro-
ceed with development of the vehicle should the Phase I study confirm the technical fea-
sibility.
3. Saturn Upper Stage
Recommendation: Develop the S-IVB stage as promptly as possible- using it as an alternate
stage for the 5-1V in the Saturn C-I. This stage is necessary for the Class B vehicle recommended and
its combination with the S-I stage (A-2 vehicle-) will constitute another potential Class A vehicle,.
[II-3] An examination of the various Class B vehicles considered shows that all of the inter-
esting versions have as their third stage the S-IVB which is powered by one J-2 engine. In
view of its almost certain use in Class B vehicles it is considered extremely desirable that
plans be made for early flight tests of the S-IVB on the S-I stage in order to build up its
reliability as rapidly as possible.
4. Class 13 Launch Vehicle
Recommendation: Develop as promptly as possible a Class B vehicle (B-8, B-IO, or B-15) con-
sisting of a four or five F-I engine first stage, afour or fiveJ-2 engine second stage and a one j-2 engine
third stage (S-IVB). This vehicle- should be designed for use as a two-stage vehicle for low earth orbit
missions and a three-stage vehicle for escape missions with a minimum performance capability of
180,O00 pounds in a low earth orbit and 70,O00 pounds to escape.
It is felt that a Class B vehicle can be developed with relatively little delay and that this
development should be pursued with the highest priority. This conclusion results from
recognition that both earth orbit rendezvous and lunar orbit rendezvous are attractive
mission concepts and that they can be achieved with Class B vehicles. Furthermore, lunar
orbit rendezvous offers the chance of the earliest accomplishment of manned lunar land-
ing. It is quite likely that the pacing item for any rendezvous approach is development of
the Class B vehicles, hence the high degree of urgency recommended.
5. Use of Solid Motors in Class B Launch Vehicles
Recommendation: The design of the second and third stages of the Class B vehicle recom-
mended (B-8, B-IO, or B-15) should, if practicable, provide potential for economical and early sub-
stitution of a solid motor first stage for the four or five F-1 engine first stage. Substitution of such a
solid motor stage may permit the construction of a vehicle (B-5 or B-14) Of comparable but somewhat
lower capability than the recommended alLliquid Class B vehicle,.
[II-4] The group examined the question as to whether a solid tirst stage should be devel-
oped for the Class B vehicle in parallel with the recommended liquid first stage. It was con-
sidered that while LOX/RP is a familiar propellant combination and the F-1 engine
appears to be progressing satisfactorily thus far, there is considerable merit in a backup
development that exploits large solid rocket motors. This is particularly the case if the
manned lunar landing program is to be considered a high priority program aimed at
accomplishing the mission at the earliest possible date. Therefore, it was recommended
that the upper stages of the all-liquid Class B vehicle should be designed for possible sub-
stitution of a solid first stage. Such a solid first stage vehicle appears to be attractive in
terms of a low cost, high reliability and operational simplicity if there are sufficient con-
tinuing needs for Class B vehicles in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
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6. Rendezvous Operations Techniques
Recommendation: A major engineering effort should be made to develop rendezvous operations
techniques in both earth and lunar orbits as possible al_Oroaches for accomplishing the manned lunar
landing mission at the earliest possible date.
The Class B vehicle required for manned lunar landing by rendezvous operations will
be available earlier than the Class C vehicle necessary to carry out the mission by direct
ascent. Thus, if the development of rendezvous operations are not the pacing item, use of
the Class B vehicle offers the earliest possibility of a manned lunar landing.
It is therefore important to determine the feasibility of rendezvous at the earliest
possible date. Accordingly, efforts should be initiated as soon as possible to develop tech-
niques for both earth and lunar orbital rendezvous. A detailed discussion of these
rendezvous techniques is included in Chapter VI, Volume III.
[II-5] 7. Class C Launch Vehicles
Recommendation: Since it is by no means certain that the development of rendezvous opera-
tions will advance rapidly enough to provide earliest accomplishment of manned lunar landing, it is
recommended that the direct ascent capability be developed on a concurrent basis.
For that purpose the following specific steps are recommended:
a. On a concurrent and urgent basis a thorough engineering analysis should be
made of attractive Class C vehicles (C11, C-16, C-20, C,-24, C-25), their con-
stituent building blocks and other related possible configurations to enable
selection of the most desirable NOVA vehicle for manned lunar landing.
b. The large solid rocket motor and the large hydrogen/oxygen engine devel-
opment also recommended should be pursued in a manner that will permit
their potential use in a NOVA configuration for planetary missions.
The group felt that a Class C vehicle program must be carried forward on an urgent
basis and concurrent with development of orbital rendezvous. Nevertheless, the group
also felt that initiation of Class C stage and vehicle development at this time was inappro-
priate because of the lack of sufficient information to select a specific Class C vehicle.
The initial step that the group felt should be taken is to analyze in detail the poten-
tial Class G vehicles. This analysis should take into consideration the large solid motors,
the M-I engine, and the stages of the recommended Class B vehicle (B-8, B-10, B-15) that
would potentially be available as building blocks. It was also considered important to study
in greater depth the technical problems and schedule implications involved in producing
very large solid motors.
8. Large Liquid Hydrogen Eng'ine for Class C Launch Vehicles
Recommendation: Initiate promptly the development of a hydrogen-oxygen engine having a
nominal thrust of 1.5 million pounds.
[II-6] Studies made by the group to date do not support a specific thrust level recom-
mendation at this time but do suggest that a level above 1.2 million pounds is necessary
to provide for follow-up programs after a manned lunar landing.
Although it had been concluded that insufficient information was available to initiate
development of a specific Class G vehicle it was recommended by the group that devel-
opment be initiated or continued on certain components of attractive Class G vehicles
that might prove useful in the development of a Class G vehicle. One such component on
which the group felt development should be initiated was a large hydrogen-oxygen
engine, the M-1.
9. Large Solid Motors for Class C Vehicles
Recommendation: Initiate promptly a program aimed at the development and production of
solid propellant motors up to 300 inches in diameter and 3,000,O00 pound_ in weight. The /rrogram
should be associated initially with a thorough stud), of the advantages and disadvantages of the
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segmented type assembly, with particular attention given to clustered motor configurations.
Emphasis in the initial phase of the program should be to produce an early test firing
of a unitized motor of at least 240-inch diameter and to utilize to a maximum the existing
solid motor facilities for the development of 156-inch diameter segmented motors for test
firing as promptly as possible. This solid motor program should be conducted concur-
rently with development of the Class C liquid propellant vehicle.
The effort should be incrementally funded so as to reduce the total funds that must
be committed before definitive engineering information is available on the suitability of
large solid motors of various dimensions and before the requirements are established for
the number of motors needed in each size class. These recommendations are made in full
awareness of the fact that a new facility on water for case fabrication, propellant mixing,
casting and curing and for static firing purposes must be committed at the beginning of
this development effort.
[II-7] 10. Launch Facilities
Recommendation: The following launch complex plans should be implemented:
a. The complex for the Saturn C-1 should be built so that it is compatible for use with the
S-1 and S-IVB stage versions of Saturn (A-2).
b. Develop an Integrate-Transfer-Launch (ITL) complex for solid-boosted Class A vehicles.
c. Construct an ITL complex to handle the all-liquid Class B vehicle (B-8, B-I O, or B-I 5)
and initiate the A and E work necessary to permit use of the complex for launch of a
solid-boosted Class B vehicle (B-5 or B-14).
d. Initiate A and E studies on a Class C vehicle launch complex designed to accommodate
either liquid or solid first stage boosters and using all or part of the ITL concept.
Consideration has been given to the launch facilities required for all three vehicle
classes. In general, where new facilities are to be constructed, the group favors an ITL type
complex. This type of complex provides for an integration building near, but not on, the
launch pad in which the launch vehicle and spacecraft integration and checkout are per-
formed. After completing the checkout, the vehicle is moved to the pad, where it is fueled
and launched. By utilizing this technique, the on-pad time can be cut drastically and over-
all cost reduced while high launch rates are simultaneously achieved.
For Class A vehicles it is clear that the Saturn configuration should be launched from
the existing pad and others of similar design. An ITL is not worthwhile for these vehicles
because of the urgent program schedule. On the other hand, for a workhorse Class A vehi-
cle, which would have a solid first stage, the ITL concept should be used.
[II-8] B. Discussion of Recommendations
The basis for the principal recommendation, briefly discussed above are [sic] ampli-
fied in the following paragraphs.
1. Class A Vehicles
Considerations of the group relating to the Class A vehicles led to a study in some
detail of the reasons for supporting development of a Titan III-C vehicle in addition to the
Saturn C-1. It was projected that during this decade there would be over 200 missions,
largely for DOD, in which 12,000 to 30,000-pound payloads will be required in low earth
orbit. In addition to the Titan III-C there are two versions of the Saturn that have this pay-
load capability. These vehicles are the Saturn C-1 and a possible variation of Saturn (A-2)
using the S-1 and the S-IVB stages. The Saturn C-1 is already in the National Launch
Vehicle Program and the A-2 version of Saturn was recommended to provide early flight
development of the S-IVB stage.
Although the two versions of Saturn have performance capabilities that are compara-
ble or superior to the Titan III-C, the Saturns are likely to have a somewhat higher cost;
they do not have the militarily desirable feature of employing solid and storable propel-
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lants,whichpermitfastreactiontimes,or,statedifferently,permitlongwaitingperiods
on-pad;andtheydonotcontributetothedevelopmentoflargesolidmotortechnology.Ontheotherhand,thetwoSaturnvehiclesappeartooffermoregrowthcapabilityhan
membersoftheTitanIII familyforageneralprogramofspaceexploration.Inthisregard
theSaturnpermitslargerdiameterpayloadsthantheTitanIII-C.TheSaturncanaccom-
modatepayloadsofupto20feetindiameter,whichalsomakesthemsuitableforlaunch-
inganuclearstage.Thiswillbeanimportantadvantageif it iseventuallydesirabletouse
themforthedevelopmentofsuchstagesortoprovideincreasedpayloadcapabilitiesfor
futuremissionsbytheuseofanuclearupperstage.Itwasafterweighingthesefactorsthat
theLLVPGrecommendedthattheSaturnC-I,whichisscheduledfor usein Apollo
mannedorbitalflightspriortocompletionofTitanIII development,shouldbeimproved(Recommendation1) forthepurposeofitscontinueduseinsupport[II-9]of Apollo.Furthermore,theTitanIII shouldhedevelopedprimarilyforsupportofotherscientific
andmilitarymissions(Recommendation2).
In consideringtheTitanIII vehiclefamilyit wasnotedthattheTitanIII-Aandthe
TitanIll-B,whicharecloselyassociatedwiththeTitanIII-Cdevelopment,havepayload
capabilitiesthatcanheprovidedbythesecondgenerationCentauronanAtlas.There
was,therefore,somequestionastowhethertheTitanIII-AandIII-Bshouldbedeveloped.
However,developmentof heTitanBIfamilywillenabletheeconomicalintroductionof
theTitanIII-AandIII-IS;alsothoseversionsofTitanIII willserveasbackuptocryogenic
basedboostersorasasubstitutionforthemincaseswherefastreactiontimeisneeded.
2. Class B Vehicles
In connection with the development of the Class B vehicle, it was recommended that
development of the upper stage, the S-IVB stage, be initiated immediately with a view
toward flight testing it on an S-1 stage (Recommendation 3). This procedure would insure
most rapid development of the Class B vehicle.
The Class B vehicle recommended (Recommendation 4) will provide a minimum pay-
load capability of 180,000 pounds in low earth orbit and 70,000 pounds to lunar escape
velocity. This capability is sufficient to enable manned circumlunar flight using the Apollo
spacecraft and with a single rendezvous operation in earth orbit, to perform the manned
lunar landing mission. It was strongly recommended that the rendezvous approach be
pursued vigorously.
An item that received particular attention with relation to the Class B vehicles was
whether a large solid rocket motor should be developed in parallel or as backup to the liq-
uid first stage booster. Two configurations were examined, both of which utilized 156-inch
diameter solids on the first stage and J-2 engines on the second and third stages.
[II-10] It was concluded that a vehicle such as these might be attractive in terms of low
cost high reliability and operational simplicity if there are sufficient continuing needs for
Class B vehicles in the late 1960's and early 1970's (Recommendation 5). By reducing the
size of the solid motor first stage and thus significantly reducing vehicle cost, a useful vehi-
cle can be provided that will cover the payload range between 30,000 and 180,000 pounds
in a low earth orbit. While the total cost of the solid motor rocket development program
cannot be justified on the basis of this application alone, there are other applications for
solid motors in the development of Class C vehicles.
3. Class C Vehicles
The principal reason for recommending development of direct ascent capability con-
currently with rendezvous, and thus the development of a Class C vehicle was so that suc-
cess of the manned lunar landing mission is not solely dependent on the timely success of
rendezvous techniques (Recommendation 7). It is also important to recognize that the
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national space program should be projected beyond the initial manned lunar explo-
rations to the problems of a more thorough exploration of the moon, possible establish-
ment of a moon base and the initiation of a manned planetary exploration program.
Aside from the obvious direct importance of early attainment of U.S. capability for plan-
etary exploration there is also the consideration that failure to develop a Class C vehicle
at an early date could, if our rendezvous capability is delayed, leave this country in a par-
ticularly difficult posture if the USSR should be first to achieve a successful manned lunar
landing.
After reviewing the various configurations for the Class C or NOVA vehicle it was con-
cluded that insufficient information exists to permit selection of a specific NOVA config-
uration to be developed or to support a recommendation that development of a specific
stage be initiated, h was felt that more must be known about the performance and design
feasibility of the various vehicles considered and about the development risk of such
important elements as the very large solid rocket motors. Another consideration was
recognition of the cost and management difficulties of undertaking development of a
Class IS and C vehicle simultaneously and with equal urgency.
[II-11] The best approach appeared to he initiation and continuation of component
development which may be applicable to the NOVA vehicle. It would also be desirable to
intensify detailed engineering studies of the most promising Class C configurations. One
component that should be developed is the large hydrogen/oxygen engine, the M-l,
which is visualized as having a thrust between 1 and 2 million pounds (Recommendation
8). Such an engine could replace the five J-2 engines of the S-II stage with a single engine.
It would also permit the design of two or four engine stages considerably larger than the
present S-II stage, thus providing greater payload capability.
The other major component possibly useful for NOVA class vehicles is a very large
solid motor, and thus the recommendation that development be initiated on solid motors
up to 300 inches in diameter and weighing up to 3,000,000 pounds (Recommendation 9).
From the study of the various vehicle configurations it appears possible to make a Class C
vehicle by clustering 4 to 10 solid motors in the first stage on top of which would be placed
a complete Class B all-liquid vehicle (B-8, B-10, or B-15). The Class B vehicle would
require suitable modifications to the first stage to provide for altitude starting of the FI
engine and increased strength to withstand the structural loads that it would experience
as a second stage. If such a vehicle is not feasible, two other approaches are offered. One
is to be a cluster of solids for the first stage and new upper stages based on the M-1 and
J-2 engines (C-16 and C-21). The other approach is to make an all-liquid vehicle with all
of the stages different from those of the Class B vehicle. The C-11 is an example of such a
vehicle.
The development of large solid rocket motors was examined quite thoroughly by the
group. Of course, the generally claimed advantages of solids are high reliability, low cost,
and short development time. The group, however, found it very difficult to establish any
clear superiority in reliability or development time for the solid over the liquid rocket
booster. From the standpoint of cost, the solid motors appear relatively most attractive in
the Class A vehicles, less attractive in the Class B, and least attractive in the Class C. Since
the Class A vehicles require smaller diameter solids [II-12] (100 to 120 inches), which pre-
sent the least development risk and earliest availability, the group favors the development
of a solid first stage Class A vehicle as a workhorse. A solid first stage Class B vehicle
appears attractive from the viewpoint of operating convenience, cost and perhaps relia-
bility (based on the use of 156-inch diameter clustered solids). However, this vehicle is not
sufficiently attractive in itself to justify development of solid motors larger than 120 inch-
es in diameter. For Class C vehicles, the 240 to 280-inch diameter solids are considered the
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most attractive size.
If solid motors are selected for use in large vehicles, it therefore appears that the two
most attractive sizes are 156 and 240-inch diameter. The 156-inch diameter motors are
favored because, if segmented, they can be fabricated, tested and shipped with presendy
existing facilities and transportation met_hods. The basic factor limiting the size of a seg-
mented motor is the limit for railroad transportation. Present manufacturing facilities
permit research and development motors to be made in the 156-inch diameter size but
they are inadequate to supply production quantities. Development of the capacity to sup-
ply production demands for this size motor would require a new propellant mixing, cast-
ing and curing plant. One unattractive feature of the 156-inch diameter motor is the fact
that as many as 7 to 10 motors must be clustered together to provide the first stage of a
Class C vehicle. This means that the reliability of each motor must be very high and of
each segment even higher if the over-all stage reliability is to be satisfactory.
The advantage of going to larger diameter solid motors, those in the range of 240 to
280-inch diameter, is that only a few motors need be clustered in the vehicle first stage.
For example, four motors of this size appear to be adequate for the first stage of a Class C
vehicle. Fewer motors favor higher stage reliability and also simplify the intrastage struc-
tural design and vehicle bending load analysis.
There are three principal disadvantages of the larger motors. The first is that a greater
chance exists for the occurrence of developmental problems, although at this time no
such problems can be identified by scaling [II-13] analysis. The second disadvantage is
that production of even the early test motors must await construction of new plant facili-
ties. In order to facilitate transportation to the launch site such facilities should be locat-
ed on navigable waterways. Thus, it would require from 6 to 18 months longer to develop
these motors than those of 156-inch diameter. Finally, such large motors, particularly if
unitized, are extremely heavy, weighing about 2,500,000 pounds. Thus, new problems in
handling, transportation and assembly must be faced.
Whether large solid motors will actually provide the advantages of early availability,
flexibility of configuration, simplicity of operation and high reliability in Class C vehicles
cannot yet be predicted with any assurance. However, the importance of developing a
Class C vehicle at the earliest possible date is so great that initiation of'a large solid motor
program, including development of integrated motors up to 300-inch diameter, is called
for. Furthermore, the design studies of various Class C vehicles with solid propellant first
stages should be intensified. It is felt that such an effort will insure availability of a Class C
vehicle at the earliest possible date with a relatively modest additional development effort.
In connection with the possibility of using large solid motors, a NOVA vehicle com-
prised of all solid stages was considered. The most carefully investigated vehicle in this
class was conceived by the Jet Propulsion laboratory and proposed for the manned lunar
landing program in JPL-TM33-52, "A Solid Propellant Nova Injection Vehicle System," 3
August 1061. The report proposed a four-stage vehicle consisting entirely of solid propel-
lant motors with a liftoff gross weight of 25,000,000 pounds, and an estimated capability
of placing 130,000 pounds in a lunar escape trajectory. This design was considered suffi-
ciendy interesting to warrant careful review by qualified and disinterested organizations.
Accordingly, it was requested that Space Technology Laboratories and the Boeing
Company review the JPL report. After completion of these studies, the group arrived at
the conclusion that the all-solid NOVA development constituted a very high risk program
and thus should not receive further consideration.
[II-14] 4. Future Decisions
There are three major future program decisions that are implied by the conclusions
and recommendations of the group. These are:
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a. Whether or not the S-I stage - S-IVB stage version of Saturn, which is recom-
mended to provide early flight testing of the S-IVB stage, should be fully
developed as another Class A vehicle.
b. Selection of the Class C or NOVA vehicle design.
c. Establishment of the diameter and other pertinent specifications of the large
solid rocket motors to be developed, and definition of the stages in which the
large solids are to be used.
Replacing the S-IV stage of the Saturn C-I with the S-D, rB stage will provide a substan-
tial increase in performance capability. In addition, the single engine of the S-IVB stage
offers the potential for greater ultimate reliability than does the six engine S-IV stage.
Even though the S-IVB stage is successfully flown on an S-I stage for test purposes, con-
siderable additional design and development effort would be required to fully develop
such a vehicle for operational use. Therefore, the decision as to whether the development
of such a vehicle should proceed must be based on the degree of success achieved in
developing the Saturn C-I and the Titan III and on their ability to fulfill the mission
requirements for Class A vehicles.
The decisions on the Class C vehicle design and the selection of the large solids to be
developed can interact strongly. The first opportunity for a decision on Class C vehicle
configurations will occur when the recommended design studies are completed in about
mid-1962. Probably a better decision can be made if it is postponed until late 1962, by
which time significantly more should be known about the performance of the F-l, the
J-2, the cluster of eight H-1 engines in the S-1 stage, and about 156-inch diameter solid
motors. More may also be known about the feasibility of orbital operations. If the solid
motor development program and stage engineering studies [II-14] proceed as recom-
mended, probably no appreciable time will be lost in the Class C vehicle operational date
by delaying the configuration decision for a year. This viewpoint is based on the premise
that the final configuration selected would use a large solid motor first stage and the mod-
ified upper stages of the Class B vehicle based on the M-1 engine. If the configuration cho-
sen is the all-liquid Class C vehicle (C-11), some time will probably have been lost.
If the solid motor diameter decision is not made as part of the vehicle configuration
choice, but is kept open among 156, 240 and 280-inch or greater, it will probably be an
additional six months to a year before enough is known from actual tests of the large solid
motors to enable selection of a diameter with confidence.
[III-1] III. Supplemental Recommendations
In addition to the primary recommendations there were several supplementary rec-
ommendations made by the group. One subject of particular importance, which NASA
requested the group to consider at the end of its study efforts, was a possible launch vehi-
cle for the Gemini spacecraft. Other supplementary considerations and recommenda-
tions concern largely technical problems which stand out as requiring further detailed
study to maximize vehicle system usefulness and to minimize time and costs. These sup-
plemental recommendations of the group are summarized in the following paragraphs.
A. Supplemental Launch Vehicle for NASA's Gemini Program
Recommendation: A minimum modification version of the Titan II ballistic missile should be
used for the Gemini program.
In the studies of launch vehicle requirements for Gemini it was found that there were
four alternative vehicles that might be used. These four vehicles are the Titan II, Titan
II-1/2, Titan IIIAJ, and the Saturn C-1. The development schedule indicates that the Titan
IIIAJ will not be available until a year later than the two versions of the Titan II. In addi-
tion the need for all of the Saturn C-1 vehicles scheduled for production to support the
Apollo program, as well as launch facility scheduling problems associated with an
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increasedSaturnC-1launchrate,indicatethatconsiderationfthisvehicleispurelyaca-
demic,sinceitwouldnotbeavailableforusein theGeminiprogram.Thustheonlyuse-
fulalternativesaretheTitanII andTitanII-1/2.Theprincipaldifferencebetweenthese
twovehiclesi thattheTitanII-1/2providessubsystemredundancyleadingultimatelyto
highereliabilitybutwithapenaltyinpayloadweight.
Sincetheperformancedifferencesbetweenthesetwovehicleconfigurationsarenot
striking,vehiclereliabilityanddevelopmentschedulesweretheareasofconsiderationin
makingachoicebetweenthem.Safetyof thecrewwillbeinsuredbymalfunctiondetec-
tionandabortsystemsineithervehicle.Thusthegreaterreliabilityofferedbyadditional
redundancyoftheTitanII-1/2isafactorthatcanbesupportedprincipallyasaneedon
thebasis[III-2]of launchvehicleconomy.However,theinitialplanningoftheGemini
programcallsforonlyabout18flightsandtheTitanIIwillhaveattainedareasonablereli-
abilitybythetimethisprogrambegins.Therefore,littleweightcanhegiventopossible
economicgainsthatmightberealizedwiththeTitanII-1/2.In addition,theinherent
uncertaintiesinreliabilityestimatesa wellasuncertaintiesinprojectedreliabilitygrowth
duringthebrieflifespanoftheGeminiprogramsuggestthateventheeconomicargu-
mentsbasedongreaterreliabilityofTitanII-1/2maynotbewellfounded.
Othermajorfactorsthatwereweighedindeterminingtherelativesuitabilityofthese
twovehiclesare:(1)availabilityn15to18monthsafterprogramgo-ahead;(2)thedegree
towhicheithermayinterferewithDODprograms;and(3)relativecost.
Consideringthemanyfactorspertinenttoachoicebetweenthesetwovehicles,itwas
thejudgmentofthegroupthatuseoftheTitanII ICBMwithminimummodificationsin
theGeminiprogramwouldprovidegreatestassuranceof timelyavailabilityof avehicle
thathasadequater liabilityandperformance,bestutilizationofDODengineeringand
managementresourcesa sociatedwiththeTitanIIweaponsystem,andminimumvehicle
costfortheprogram.
B. Reliability and Reliability Growth
Recommendation: A vigorous theoretical study and experimental program must be imple-
mented to determine the degree to which redundancy, engine-out and manned monitoring and con-
trol should be used in each vehicle and subsystem. The LLVPG believes that, in the size booster vehi-
cles considered for the Apollo missions, it is practical and desirable to use such techniques to a far
greater extent than was possible in previous booster systems.
The reliability to be expected in early flights of vehicles used for the manned lunar
landing program has an extremely important bearing on the time required to accomplish
the mission and on the cost of the over-all program. In addition, reliability will have an
effect on crew safety and on the [III-3] possibility of program stretch-out or cancellation.
Indeed, it might be said that the chances of being first to the moon are very small indeed,
unless a significant step forward can be made in obtaining high reliability earlier in the
life of the vehicles than has been experienced to date.
From an examination of the results of the calculation of mission success data analyzed
by the LLVPG, it was found that it would take two to three years of flight test and about
25 to 60 launchings to man-rate a Class B or C vehicle using the reliability growth estimates
of this study. As previously indicated, it is important to note that "man-rate," as used in this
entire study, refers to a vehicle having an absolute reliability of 50 percent or more. This
level of reliability should not be confused with "man-safety" which is sought to be main-
tained at a relatively much higher level by providing abort subsystems for crew escape in
case of catastrophic malfunction.
If a significant improvement in early reliability were achieved, the date for mission
accomplishment could be advanced about a year. In addition, 20 to 30 flight vehicles
could be eliminated from the program at a cost savings of the order of one billion dollars.
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Thereliabilitygrowthcurvesusedin theanalysiswerebasedonpastexperiencepri-
marilywithballisticmissilesandspaceadaptationsthereof.Thedatafrompreviousflight
testprogramsweresmoothedandinterpretedin termsofthenumberof suchsystems,
stages,restarts,etc.,involved,andin termsof thenumberof redundantandnon-
redundantelementssuchasengines,thrustvectorcontrolsystemsandthelike.Thefun-
damentalssumptionu derlyingtheargumentis:It willbepossibletoobtainabouthe
samearlyreliabilityonanabsolutebasiswiththenew,largelaunchvehiclesaswehave
donein thepaston smaller,primarilyballistic,missiles(Atlas,Titan,Thor,Jupiter,
Polaris).
It couldbea,guedthatthereliabilitygrowthshouldbemuchbetterbecauseomuch
hasbeenlearnedfrompastfailuresandmistakes,andbecauseweightandperformance
arenotquiteascriticalastheywereforsuchvehiclesastheAtlas.Conversely,it couldbe
arguedthatthereliabilitygrowthwillhe[III4]worsebecauseofthegreadyincreasedsize
of thesenewvehicles,theuseofanewpropellant(hydrogen),theclusteringof 4,5,and
even8 liquidenginesperstage,andthesimultaneousdevelopmentof somanylarge
stagesandmulti-stagev hiclesbythesameorganization.I thegroup'sdeliberationsit
wasagreedthatthesetwosidesoftheargumentjustaboutoffsetoneanotherandthatreli-
abilitygrowthaboutequaltothatofpastvehicledevelopmentprogramsmightreasonably
beexpected.Nevertheless,itwasrecognizedthatthereisaverywiderangeofuncertain-
tyin reliabilitygrowthprojections.
It isimportanttoexamineverycarefullythequestionastowhether,andhowit might
bepossible,toimprovesignificantlyhereliabilitygrowthrateofthenewvehiclestobe
developed.In ordertobesomewhatmorespecificabouthemajorproblems,theLLVPG
hadspecificstudiesmadein thetechnicalreasofredundancy,theroleof manincom-
plexsystems,andengine-outcapability.
C. Reliability Budgeting
Recommendation: The iterative use of the "reliability budget" during the design phase is prob-
ably the most practical means of achieving an optimum approach in reliability engineering of com-
plex systems.
Because of the large number of stages involved in the total lunar mission, the require-
ment for a much higher level of redundancy should be anticipated than has been normal
in the past. This redundancy will vary from conservative design margins and state-of-the-
art engineering to the use of completely redundant subsystems in some cases. The
iterative use of reliability budgeting provides a basis for establishing the amount of redun-
dancy to be employed in a given system or subsystem.
Reliability budgeting is a general approach toward reliability which has been used on
some programs and which can be extended and improved for application to the manned
lunar landing program. It is an iterative approach which must be run repeatedly until the
design converges or is fiozen for other reasons. Underlying the whole process is a recog-
nition and an acceptance of the fact that there are gains to be made by the judicious
employment of [111-5] redundancy but that such employment in no way diminishes the
need for a sound analytical approach to design.
The process of reliability budgeting begins with the system engineer. The first step is
for the system engineer to block out the total system design and translate it into a relia-
bility budget. Each subsystem is assigned a level of reliability which in combination with
those of the other subsystems will produce the desired system reliability. Where the
assumed reliability, is not feasible with the simplest system configuration, redundancy is
added judiciously until it is attained. Costs and schedules must be evaluated in parallel to
assist in weighing the merits of the particular design choice.
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The reliability budgeting task is then given to the subsystem designer who carries
through the same processes for his subsystem against the assigned reliability target given
to him by the system engineer. Should the subsystem designer find the reliability target
impossible to meet, even with optimum redundancy, he must obtain a new target from the
system engineer, thus requiring that the system engineer rebudget the reliability require-
ments among the various subsystems. Conversely, if the subsystem designer finds ways of
obtaining reliability higher than the target value, the system engineer can likewise take
this information into account together with the cost and schedule implications to rebud-
get his reliability among the various subsystems.
By carrying this process on through to the lowest level of component design and by
maintaining the ovex_all design relatively fluid in its early stages and freezing it as late as
possible, the maximum number of iterations can be made and thus the optimum use of
redundancy can best be approached.
D. The Role of Man in System Operation
Recommendation: It is recommended that prompt steps be taken to initiate further detailed
studies concerning the role of man in system operation employing well-definitized systems and subsys-
tems of the launch vehicles intended to be used for future manned missions. Furthermore, launch vehi-
cle s_stems designs compatible with crew participation in vehicle control, but not solely dependent on
it, s'hould be investigated in detail. It would be desirable [III-6] for these studies to be conducted by
organizations having experience and capability in the manned aircraft and missile design field.
The problem which is of concern here is the establishment of the role of the flight
crew during the launch phase of manned flight operations. That is, whether the crew
should be given an active role in the control and management of the launch vehicle sys-
tems or whether they should maintain a completely passive role with all functions being
programmed automatically. Because of man's inherent ability to perceive, reason, and
judge in even unrehearsed situations, it is believed that the idea of a completely passive
role for the crew is unreasonable.
There are several modes of manned participation which could be considered, namely:
a. Direct control
b. Monitor, switching, and override
c. Monitor, adjustment, and maintenance
The direct control mode would provide the crew with the primary path for control
inputs to the given system in much the same manner as our present day aircraft are
designed. In this mode, the automatic controls would be provided for crew convenience
for use during reasonably uneventful periods. The second mode--monitor, switching, and
override--would provide the crew with a generally subordinate control approach with the
option for primary control. In this mode, the crew would normally monitor a system and,
in the event of some malfunction, they could exercise direct control by manually switch-
ing to a redundant system or by manually overriding the automatic system. The third
mode provides for the lowest degree of crew participation. In this mode, the crew would
monitor certain function displays and would make only minor adjustments, such as gain
settings, gyro realignment, etc. In addition, the crew could perform certain maintenance
functions, such as changing fuses and small components.
[|II-7] Of the three modes of participation cited, it is believed that the direct control
mode is probably too drastic in view of our present, very limited experience in this area.
On the other hand, some real gains in the over-all reliability, or mission success achieve-
ment, are likely to be made by the judicious adoption of the second and third modes of
crew participation for certain launch vehicle systems.
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After reviewing this problem and the various possible approaches, the following gen-
eral conclusions were reached:
a. From an environmental standpoint, no evidence exists indicating that the
vehicle control task cannot be handled by man as an integral control ele-
ment.
b. Considerable evidence exists to show that man, having been given adequate
instrumentation and training, has the capability of successfully completing
booster trajectory control during launch.
c. It is believed that appreciable gains in mission success can be achieved
through crew participation, particularly during the early development stages,
where the demonstrated reliability of launch vehicles is generally quite low.
In the light of the foregoing, it is believed that the role of the spacecraft crew should he
one of active participation during the launch phase of flight. The exact degree of crew par-
ticipation cannot, of course, be definitely specified at this time. However, available evidence
suggests that the crew should be provided with more than merely monitor capability.
E. Engine-Out Capability
Conclusion: While engine-out capability appears attractive on the basis of the engine and con-
trol system redundancy considerations, a detailed engineering study of the implications on the remain-
ing portions of the vehicle system is required.
l. Performance Degradation Versus Reliability Increase
The LLVPG has made some estimates of the losses in payload that would result from
stage designs with engine-out capability. The major points revealed by this study are as follows:
a. For a given number of engines, the performance loss with one engine out is
about one half as great in a second stage as in a first stage.
b. Engine-out performance loss is serious in the first stage, particularly if the
number of engines is small (four or five compared to eight) and engine shut-
down occurs early in the stage burning time.
c. Engine-out penalties in first and second stages are a non-linear function of
time; one engine shutdown at the halfway point results in about one-fourth
to one-fifth as much performance loss as when the engine shutdown occurs
just after ignition.
d. Operation with an engine out does not result in a significant performance
loss in a third (escape) stage.
These performance degradation results are based upon reasonably well-designed
vehicles and therefore should not be assumed as applying to off-optimum or unique vehi-
cle designs.
Another approach to engine-out redundancy would be to add extra or spare engines.
The performance loss for the Saturn C-4 class vehicles using such an approach has been
examined and found to be acceptably low. It would be possible to design a stage carrying
a true spare engine which would not be started unless required; however, this "delay-until-
needed" design philosophy would appear undesirable in the lower stages.
Preliminary analyses of the over-all problem by the LLVPG has led to the
following stage-by-stage design philosophy:
a. First Stage--the design should probably be based upon hold-down and
engine-out. One engine out in this stage could extend to two if a large num-
ber of unreliable engines are used. Similarly, if a stage [III-9] contains a small
number of very reliable engines, the engine-out design approach should not
be used.
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All engineshouldbestartedbeforeliftoffandshouldbeableto operate
throughthethrust/weightinstabilityandhighqregions.Theuseof hold-
downaidsthereliabilitysinceoverone-half(68percent)of theenginefail-
uresoccurin thefirstfewsecondsofengineoperation.
b. SecondStage--allenginesin thisstageshouldbestarted.Theqproblemis
not importantin thisstagesincestagingoccursat averyhighaltitude.
Engine-outcapabilityshouldbeprovidedfor inallmultipleenginestages.
Theperformancer liability"map"isattractivein thisstagesincengine-out
performancelossesareaboutone-halfto one-thirdassevereasin thefirst
stageandtheimprovementi reliabilitywithoneengineoutcapabilityis
attractive.
c. ThirdStage--atwo-enginestageseemsattractiveherefromareliabilitypoint
of view.Thereliabilityofatwo-enginestageis typicallyraisedfrom0.90to
0.95bytheuseofoneengineredundancy.
Thethirdstageproblemissomewhatunique.Firstexaminationsseemtoindicatethat
atwo-enginesystemshouldbeusedbystartingjustoneengine,withthesecondengine
startedonlyif thefirstshouldfail.Theguidancecontrolproblemsin thethirdorhigher
stage,if bothenginesareinitiallystarted,seemtobequitesevere.Therefore,thedelay-
until-neededapproachissuggested.
2. Effect on Other Systems
The previous suggestions are based upon considerations of the reliability of engine
and control systems and their associated failures and performance. For a stage to have
engine-out capability a number of modifications of other subsystems may be required.
These modifications will affect system reliability and performance. The autopilot, for
instance, may be required to have provisions for automatic reprogramming when an
engine is shut down. Similarly, the control system may be required to have faster [III-10]
response and to operate with larger gimbal angles and increased actuation forces. Vehicle
structure will be subjected to new load distribution which may necessitate a different
design. The implications of engine-out operation will vary between stage designs. It is
anticipated that, in some cases, significant modification (by present sta.ndards) of autopi-
lot and/or structure and control systems will be required to accommodate the engine-out
feature. Other stages may conceivably require litde or no change in these systems.
E Automatic Vehicle Checkout and Countdown Considerations
Conclusion: The significance of the considerations concerning automatic checkout and count-
down of vehicles is twofold:
a. A most intimate relationship is needed among design criteria of the vehicle and its sub-
systems, of ground support equipment and the launch complex of the spacecraft, its
propulsion and other subsystems, and of the payload. The extent of this relationship,
and the amount of preplanning needed cannot be fuUy envisioned at this time.
b. The necessity to standardize specifications of interrelated components will require a level
of systems engineering, both in comprehensiveness and in detail, far surpassing in com-
plexity previous technological undertakings of any kind.
Among the factors strongly influencing the probability of mission success is the effi-
cacy of checkout procedures used just prior to launch. The checkout procedures may
require the testing of all essential components, subsystems and systems and thus involve
measurement of up to 1500 functions in research and development vehicles. The concept
of automatic checkout has been advanced primarily for two reasons: (1) to reduce the
amount of time required in using launch facilities; and (2) to enhance the reliability of
the entire checkout operation.
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No figures can be quoted on time savings or operational vehicle reliability improve-
ments achievable with automatic checkout procedures, since numbers and types of mea-
surements, amount of data processing, manner of [III-11] presentation and use of
processed data are not currently defined. It has been estimated, however, that manual
operations for a large vehicle might require two to three weeks as contrasted with three
days for an automatic system.
The employment of automatic checkout equipment will require a high level of
advance planning effectiveness and good over-all system engineering, in the following
areas:
a. Design criteria of the vehicle, the ground support equipment and the launch
complex must contain automatic checkout requirements so that the auto-
matic checkout concept is extended back to, and properly accounted for, at
the stage and subsystem manufacturing level.
b. Management arrangements between contractors involved in development of
the vehicle, the ground support equipment and the launch complex.
c. The planning and stocking of spares, up to and including individual stages.
d. Equipment modification and change control. The potential conflict between
research and development or operational changes and automatic checkout
compatibility requires that the changes be carefully scheduled.
Even with effective preplanning, 30 to 40 flights may be needed to perfect the launch
vehicle automatic checkout system. It is possible that the spacecraft checkout system can
be perfected in fewer flights, since it is in some ways less complex than the vehicle system,
but this implies extensive systems engineering coordination at the earliest stages between
spacecraft and vehicle contractors. In this view, conceptual separation between spacecraft
and launch vehicles is largely artificial and has significance or convenience principally for
administrative rather than substantive engineering purposes.
The difference between automatic checkout of solid and liquid motors is not entire-
ly clear due to unknowns affecting solid motor design and assembly. Checkout procedure
on solid motors may be shorter and less complex but the [III-12] loading process may be
longer, since by some estimates the motors must be perhaps assembled at the launch area
instead of the assembly area. The estimated installation and checkout time required for
solids may be as long as several weeks. There is little doubt, however, that the advantages
of automatic checkout will be required for solids as well as liquids.
The high level of design unification which will be required for the launch vehicle,
ground support equipment and launch complex must also be extended to include the
spacecraft and all of its essential subsystems. Since the demands on the crew in flight
should be minimized, the spacecraft system must incorporate design provisions permit-
ting not only automatic checkout on demand but also containing continuous reliability
and damage assessment checks. These checkout provisions must naturally be compatible
with the ground-based launching checkout system. In addition, limited but effective and
compatible provisions must be included for in-flight maintenance, based on modular
design, at least for those components with the lowest reliability and for those most subject
to in-flight damage.
G. Technical Manpower Requirements
Recommendation: Because the preliminary study oJ technical manpower requirements for
DOD and NASA programs during the remainder of the decade suggests that a potential shortage of
technical manpower may be in store, becoming critical in CY 64, it is recommended that a more thor-
ough and complete inquir_ in this area be initiated by DOD and NASA as expeditiously as possible.
It may also be desirable to begin developing plans promptly for appropriate action by DOD and NASA
in case the difficulties predicted by the LL VPG are confirmed.
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In view of the large scale and long duration of the research and development efforts
needed to accomplish the manned lunar landing mission, and the need to superimpose
them on the already large and growing requirements of the Department of Defense for
scientific and technical manpower, a study was undertaken by the group to provide infor-
mation on whether such [III-13] manpower resources might be a limiting factor to early
accomplishment of national apace exploration objectives.
This study compared an estimate of the supply of scientists and engineers for each
year through 1967 with three estimates of the need for such manpower. The supply for
any year was computed by beginning with an inventory for 1960 (as reported by the
National Science Foundation), increasing it by the number of college graduates and non-
degree personnel entering the field each year, and decreasing it by losses due to retire-
ment because of age or death and transfers to other fields.
Three estimates for manpower need were developed in an effort to insure realism in
the final comparisons of supply with demand. One estimate was based on the projections
by industry of the ratio of scientists and engineers to total employment, the latter itself
being estimated from gross national projections. The other two estimates were based on
building up the total national need for scientists and engineers from estimates of total
research and development and other dollar expenditures using "experience" ratios for
numbers of scientists and engineers per million dollars for various types of such expendi-
tures.
The conclusion of the study is quite clear. No matter what projection of the national
needs for scientists and engineers is chosen as the probably correct one, the supply does
not appear adequate; the lowest reasonable estimate of requirements approximates the
projected supply. This lowest reasonable estimate includes, however, a substantial number
(many tens of thousands) of scientists and engineers engaged in writing proposals and
brochures, and in advancing state-of-the-art through engineering overhead, and may,
therefore, be subject to adjustment if appropriate national policies and implementation
procedures are developed.
It is also of interest that the most stringent problem in adjusting demand and supply
for scientific and technical manpower will probably occur during 1964 if LLVPG estimates
for program growth turn out to be valid.
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Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, to The Honorable Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense, January 16, 1963.
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January 21, 1963.
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Source: All in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
As an Earth-orbiting program that would develop capabilities for in-orbit rendezvous and human
observation of the Earth from space, the Gemini program was of high interest to the Department of
Defense as well as the program's sponsor, NASA. In late 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, with the support of Presidential Science Advisor Jerome Wiesn_ attempted to seize con-
trol of the program from NASA, or at least share in its management. This initiative set off an intense
conflict between NaSa and Department of Defense (DOD) top management. Several documents give
a sense of the issues at stake. The January 16, 1963, letter from James Webb indicates the depth of
NASA concern, while the January 18 Webb memorandum to Associate Administrator Robert Seamans
suggests Webb's desire to find a way to settle the dispute. The January 21 NASA-DOD agreement
resolved the conflict. NASA would retain management control over the Gemini program, but a joint
NASA-DOD Program Planning Board would ensure that the program "s activities were responsive to
DOD 's interests and requirements. Mentioned are Deputy ,Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Cdlpatric,
Director of Defense Research and Engineering Harold Brown, Deputy Director of Defense Research
and Engineering John H. Rubel, and NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden.
Document 11-21
[1] January 16, 1963
The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D.C.
Dear Bob:
I cannot agree that your proposed version of an agreement would set up management
arrangements suitable to a national Gemini program. Nor do I consider its basic pattern
one which can be made acceptable through a series of negotiated changes.
In the recent discussion in which you, Mr. Gilpatric, Dr. Brown, and Mr. Rubel par-
ticipated, with Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans and me, I presented in detail the reasons why we
here in NASA consider it a serious mistake to proceed with any plan to transfer the
Gemini program to the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense as raised by Dr.
Wiesner. Following the subsequent receipt of your suggested agreement, Dryden,
Seamans, and I have consulted with our senior associates involved in the manned space
flight program. We are unanimous in the view that for us to proceed with the arrange-
ments you suggest would jeopardize our ability to meet our manned lunar landing target
dates, would disrupt or certainly impair the effectiveness of an organization that is func-
tioning in a magnificent way on a very tight schedule, and would raise a public and
Congressional storm of protest that the language and intent of the National Aeronautics
and Space Act of 1958 was being violated.
The scientific knowledge and technologies we, as a nation, need are being rapidly
accumulated. An effective capability to continue this activity has been created. It is oper-
ating in close co-operation with the military services, and we have recently, through the
establishment of a Deputy Associate Administrator for Defense Affairs, strengthened our
effort to make available all that is of use to them. We should not risk this hard-won
progress.
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The policies we have been following in this agency have been directed toward the
establishment of a broad national participation by and stimulation of the utilization of
increased resources in the universities to meet present and future national requirements.
Similarly, increasingly important programs of international cooperation involving both
governmental and scientific agencies have been successfully established and are a valuable
asset to the Nation's space program, both operationally and scientifically. To mix military
and civilian activities to the extent proposed would appear to us to have the most serious
implications for the future success of these important national and international activities.
Further, the clear and repeated pronouncements which have been made by the
President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and [2] other leaders concerned with
space, would be compared here and abroad with the action taken, with the inevitable con-
clusion drawn that there had been a major change in policy with regard to the objectives
and purposes of the United States in space activity. Such a conclusion could have a far-
reaching influence upon this country's relationships with both the neutral and hostile
blocs and upon their policies.
As an alternative to your suggestion, I enclose a brief agreement with an attached sug-
gested plan for increased Air Force participation in Project Gemini. It is about as far as we
in NASA feel we can go at this time.
Permit me to close with the suggestion that the agreement I enclose will retain for the
President a flexible military program including manned space flight, with the ultimate
growth of that program dependent on the knowledge both NASA and the Department of
Defense gain as we go along. It facilitates the closest co-operation in obtaining and utiliz-
ing this knowledge. The President can as a matter of policy increase this military program
or decide not to go forward with it. Likewise, the proposed agreement, taken with the pro-
gram which he is recommending to Congress in his 1964 budget for NASA, gives him a
civilian program to develop the scientific and technological base for pre-eminence in
space with a vigorous program to make the manned lunar landing and the incident gain-
ing of experiences in extended manned space flight on a fast schedule. Here again the
President retains the flexibility, dependent on the needs of the Nation, for speeding up or
slowing down the NASA program. To join the DOD and NASA programs in a monolithic
effort would inevitably cause the total program to be characterized as military with sub-
stantial loss of flexibility in our international posture.
Sincerely yours,
James E. Webb
Administrator
Document 11-22
[1] January 18, 1963
Memorandum for Dr. Seamans--AA
After thinking overnight about the suggestions made by Secretary McNamara, it
seems to me that in reality he is coming back with the same pattern of joint management.
I do not see how this is possible under the law. However, I think it is essential that we
explore every possibility of working with him and retaining his support. Further, we
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certainlymustgointothequestionverycarefullyofwhyhefeelsheneedsavoiceinour
managementtobesureweaccomplisht ethingsthatarerequiredin theinterestoftheDepartmentofDefense.
Further,it seemstomethatwhenhesayshedoesnolknowwhatisgoingonin these
programs,wecouldsuggestomewaythathecouldfindoutandkeepabreastwithouthav-
ingtoactuallyparticipatein thedecisions.Somehow,emustconvincehimthatwecan
operatethisprogrambetterasit isnowbeingoperated,producingmorevalueforthe
totalnationalinterest,includingthemilitary,thanunderanyothersystem,butareper-
fectlypreparedtohaveanysystemthathelpsidentifythethingsthatarein thenational
interestandfacilitatestheiraccomplishment.
I gottheimpressionlastnightthatsomehowtheclauseaboutextendingthearrange-
mentswenowhaveaboutlaunchvehicles---thatneitherofuswillstartanotheronewith-
outasign-offbytheother--tothemannedspaceflightfieldisofgreatimportance.Itmay
bethathefeelshissituationwouldbeseriouslyimpairedif weshouldstartamanned
orbitingstation,andthathewouldthenbeexpectedtosupporti ashavingvalueforthe
militaryservices.
Ontheotherhand,I donotseehowwecandischargeourresponsibilitiesandgivehimavet()overthis.Wecould oit withrespecttothelaunchvehiclesbecauseeachofus
was[2]developingsome,eachofushadauthoritytodevelopothers,andweneededsome
devicetoinsistonanationalprogram.Itmaybethattherearesomelementsofthissit-
uationin themannedorbitalproblem,andif soweshouldexplorethemwithgreatcare.
It maybethathewilltelltheBureauoftheBudgetwhathehasnotyettoldus--his
realreasonsforwantingajointly-managedeffort.
WhileI believetheinstructionstotheBureauoftheBudgetshouldbeasImentioned
themtoHaroldBrown--thatthelastpaperdrawnbyMcNamararepresentssomethingon
whichheandI wouldliketo try to findagreement,providethereisa basiswithout
destroyingfundamentalvaluesfor eitherof usor impairingthePresident'sposition,
requirementsandresponsibilities.I thinktherearemanyelementsinthedraftthatdonot
correspondwiththis.However,it seemstomethatsomeagencyexperiencedinhandling
PresidentialproblemsmustputtheseforwardperhapsmoreforcefullythanI havebeen
abletodoso.
It seemstomethatyou,Hugh,andI shouldbearinmindthatwehavesigned,asyou
saidlastnight,andsentoverapaperthattrulyrepresentsourviews.WhilewewantogojustasfaraswecantomeetMr.McNamara,wemustnotrecedefromthispositionexcept
aswereachasettlementthatallofuscanlivewith.
I wonderif HaroldBrownwouldbewillingtolistwhatit istheywantfromGemini?
I havenodoubtwhateverthatMcNamaraisunderratingtheproblemsthatwillbecre-
atedwithCongressif heinsistsontheparticipationi ourmanagementor thatwepar-
ticipatein themanagementof hedevelopmentofmilitaryequipmentsuchasweapons
systems.Wecancontributeagreatdeal,butwhenit come[sic]totheactualdevelopment,thisisnotourfunctionunderthelaw.
Thereisanotherelementwhichwemustconsider.Undertheproposedarrangement,
wewouldlosecontroloftheresearchwhichwewilldo.ThebasicpolicyfromNACAdays
isthatwewoulddeterminetheresearchwhichwasnecessary,wouldfundit, andwoulddo
it.Thismadeusindependentofthosewhowantedustoundertakecontractresearch,but
of course,wewerealways[3] sensitivetotheirneeds.I believethisprincipleisonethat
hasmadeforadvance,hasgiventhenationstrength,andthateventhoughMr.McNamara
doesnotseemtobeabletounderstandit today,wemustnotlightlyputit aside.Afterall,
wedonotknowhowlongheor I oranyoftheprincipalactorswillbeonthestage,and
wemustkeepasystemthatotherscanoperateunder.
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These are just early morning thoughts as I leave for the airport.
James E. Webb
Administrator
Document 11-23
[11
Agreement
Between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and the Department of Defense
Concerning the Gemini Program
This document defines the policy agreement for arrangements to insure the most
effective utilization of the GEMINI Program in the national interest.
1. Objectives of the GEMINI Program
The GEMINI Program constitutes a major portion of the current near-earth manned
space program in the United States. It is the intent of this agreement to assure that the sci-
entific and operational experiments undertaken as a part of the GEMINI Program are
directed at the objectives and requirements both of the DoD and the NASA manned space
flight program.
2. Establishment of the GEMINI Program Planning Board
A GEMINI Program Planning Board is hereby established reporting jointly to the
Administrator of the NASA and the Secretary of Defense. The Associate Administrator of
the NASA and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development will
serve as Co-Chairmen of the Planning Board. The Board will include two additional rep-
resentatives of each of the two agencies. Members will be named by the Co-Chairmen and
approved by the Administrator of the NASA and the Secretary of Defense,
3. Functions of the GEMINI Program Planning Board
The Board hereby created is intended to assure that the GEMINI Program is planned,
executed, and utilized in the over-all national [2] interest, in accordance with policy direc-
tion from the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the NASA, so as to avoid
duplication of effort in the field of manned space flight and to insure maximum attain-
ment of objectives of value to both the NASA and the DoD. The functions of the Board in
carrying out this responsibility shall include the delineation of NASA and DoD require-
ments and program monitoring to insure that they are met in:
1. The planning of experiments.
2. The actual conduct of flight and in-flight tests.
3. The analysis and dissemination of results.
Should actual project plans fail to meet the requirements specified by the Board, or
should competing requirements produce resource or schedule conflicts, the Co-
Chairmen shall so inform the Administrator of the NASA and the Secretary of Defense.
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4. GEMINI Project Management
NASA will continue to manage the GEMINI project. It is, however, agreed that the
DoD will participate in the development, pilot training, pre-flight check-out, launch oper-
ations and flight operations of the GEMINI Program to assist NASA and to meet the DoD
objectives.
5. FundinK
In recognition of its interest in the program, the DoD will contribute funds to assist
in the attainment of GEMINI Program [3] objectives. The amount of such support will be
determined on the basis of recommendations submitted by the Board.
6. Additional Programs
It is further agreed that the DoD and the NASA will initiate major new programs or
projects in the field of manned space flight aimed chiefly at tile attainment of experi-
mental or other capabilities in near-earth orbit only by mutual agreement.
James E. Webb
Administrator, NASA
Date: January 21, 1963
Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Date:January 21, 1963
Document 11-24
Document title: Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Vice
President, "National Space Program," May 3, 1963.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
In April 1963, President Kennedy asked Vice President Johnson to conduct, as chairman of the
National Aeronautics and Space Council, an overall review of the national space program, published
as Document IIL17 in Volume I of Exploring the Unknown. Secretary of Defense McNamara's
reply suggests the many ways in which the programs of NASA and Department of Defense had become
intertwined.
[1] 3 May 1963
Memorandum for the Vice President
SUBJECT: National Space Program
This memorandum will respond to Dr. [Edward C.] Welsh's memorandum to me of
April 10, requesting information on which to base replies to the questions in the
President's memorandum to you of April 9. I should point out first that most of the points
raised by the President deal with matters for which NASA has primary or exclusive respon-
sibility. My comments will, therefore, be confined to the military aspects to questions 2
and 3, and to question 5.
Question 2: What specifically are the principal benefits to the national economy we
can expect to accrue from the present, greatly augmented program in the following
areas.., military technology?
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I have attempted to measure these benefits by estimating the extent to which [the]
DoD budget would be increased, in each of the DoD budget categories corresponding to
the major NASA budget categories, if the present greatly augmented program had not
been undertaken by NASA. It should be borne in mind that a part of the augmented pro-
gram, including, for example, the TITAN III development, has been undertaken directly
by the Department of Defense. The military justification for this portion of the program
is such that it would have been undertaken without regard to the other objectives of the
National Space Program. The great bulk of the augmented program, $4,388 million out
of $4,696 million, is in the NASA budget; the Department of Defense space program for
FY 1964 is about 7% higher than the 1 January 1961 projection for FY 1964, after adjust-
ment for comparability. A comparative tabulation of DoD and NASA budgets for the
National Space Program appears at Table I.
Research. Although it is difficult to assess the direct military value of space research, it
appears likely about $20 million of NASA's $100 million research budget proposed for FY
1964 would be undertaken by DoD in the absence of a NASA program.
[2] Exploratory and Advanced Development (corresponds to NASA's Supporting Research
and Technology). While the military value of this category of expenditures is almost
equally difficult to determine in advance, I estimate that some $100 million of NASA's
augmented program might be supported by DoD if NASA were not supporting it. In addi-
tion, the Department of Defense would probably support the entire NASA "base" program
in this area under like circumstances.
Engineering Development
Launch Vehicles. The major NASA development activity in this field is focused on the
use of liquid hydrogen to lift the extremely large payloads required for the lunar mission.
This technology is probably not of much military value because of severe operational
restraints on its handling and storage. Some of this development work will undoubtedly
have incidental military benefits, but they cannot be estimated in advance, and would not
merit DoD expenditures in the absence of the NASA program. Primary DoD reliance is
on the TITAN III as the standardized workhorse building block for military applications
in space. It is important to point out, however, that the concept of a single National
Launch Vehicle Program dates back to the first agreement between NASA and the DoD
signed in the new Administration, by Mr. Webb and Mr. Gilpatric, in February 1961, and
that the Department of Defense includes in its consideration of launch vehicles for new
military missions any vehicles under development by NASA for non-military space mis-
sions.
Manned Space Craft. The APOLLO space craft, designed for the lunar mission, has no
predictable military applications. The GEMINI space craft, however, is in a different cate-
gory, and if it were not under development, the Department of Defense would probably
undertake a GEMINI-type program. The NASA GEMINI program has a critical early flight
date as a part of the over-all lunar project. This condensed scheduling cannot be
supported as a military requirement, and, therefore, an additional Defense program of
$150-$200 million in FY 1964 might be justified in lieu of the $300 million level of effort
proposed by NASA for FY 1964.
Unmanned Space Craft. In part because DoD was active in this area before the organi-
zation of NASA, there are no vehicles under development by NASA which would have
been undertaken or would be taken over by DoD in the absence of the program.
[3] Mission Applications. A number of the special mission applications of NASA space
vehicles, such as meteorological satellites and communication satellites are of military
interest. If they were not undertaken by NASA, the Defense budget might be increased by
$25-$50 million in these particular mission application areas. Most of these applications
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stem from the pre-1961 NASA program, and their present level of effort cannot easily be
apportioned between the "base" program and the augmented program. These essentially
experimental mission applications, however, do not include the necessity for extensive
military development activity, since the technology for military operations is increasingly
distinct from the technology for experimentation.
Other. Most of the increase in the augmented NASA effort classified in Table I as man-
agement and support reflects the lunar program directly and has no demonstrable mili-
tary value. We have found, for example, that military use of GEMINI could very likely be
fitted into our existing DoD tracking facilities for current classified programs, without
major increases in funds. Of course, if space becomes very much more important from a
military standpoint--if many more laboratories, tracking sites, launch facilities and the like
were needed over and above what we already have in the Defense Department[--] then
NASA's extensive facilities could be combined into indirect military assets. On the other
hand, based upon what we presently foresee, the Defense Department would not pay for
the large augmented management and support effort, or any appreciable fraction of it, if
NASA did not.
Summary
The NASA budget estimate for FY 1964 totals approximately $5.7 billion. It is about
$4.5 billion larger than the NASA budget for FY 1962 as of January 1961. The NASA bud-
get for FY 1964, as projected at that time was somewhat less than the present amount.
In the foregoing paragraphs, I have identified approximately $600-$675 million of
NASA effort which appears to have direct or indirect value for military technology. Of that
amount, about $275-$350 million stems from the augmentation of NASA programs since
January 1961.
Question 3: What are some of the major military problems likely to result from con-
tinuation of" the National Space Program as now projected in the fields of . . . gov-
ernment... ?
[4] While the detailed answer to this question will come more appropriately from NASA,
some comments from the special vantage point of the DoD may be appropriate.
The concerns suggested in this question were foremost in our minds two years ago
when Mr. Webb and I submitted our report to you of 6 May 1961. On page 10 of that doc-
ument, urging the importance of planning at the national level, we noted that the decade
of 1950-1960
"has witnessed a great expansion in U.S. government sponsored research and
development especially for large scale defense programs. Enormous strides have been
made, particularly in our space efforts and In the development of related ballistic mis-
sile technology on a 'crash' basis. We have, however, incurred certain liabilities in the
process. We have over-encouraged [sic] the development of entrepreneurs and the
proliferation o[" new enterprises. As a result, key personnel have been thinly spread.
The turnover rate in U.S. defense and space industry has had the effect of removing
many key scientific engineering personnel from their jobs before the completion of
the projects for which they were employed. Strong concentrations of technical talent
needed for the best work on difficult tasks have been seriously weakened. Engineering
costs have doubled in the past ten years.
"These and other trends have a strong adverse effect on our capacity to do a good
job in space. The inflation of costs has an obvious impact, and they are still rising at
the rate of about seven per cent [sic] per year. This fact alone affects forward plan-
ning. It has often led to project stretch-outs, and may again in future years. The
spreading out of technological personnel among a great many organizations has
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greatly slowed down the evolution of design and development skills at the working
level throughout the country."
Earlier in the same report we also stated again in connection with planning, that
"it is absolutely vital that national management be equal to the task of focusing
resources, particularly scientific and engineering resources, on the essential building
blocks. It is particularly vital that we do not continue to make the error of spreading
ourselves too thin and expect to solve our problems through the mere appropriation
and expenditure of additional funds."
[5] The concerns expressed in the report of 8 May 1961 were related to the impediments
to and opportunities for success in undertaking an expanded space program. The con-
cerns implicit in Question 3 of the President's memorandum relate to impact of this pro-
gram on the non-government sector. These two concerns are opposite sides of the same
coin. Moreover, the same trends that were of concern two years ago are, in many cases, of
equal or greater concern today.
For example, it turns out that federal expenditures for research and development,
although they exhibit fluctuations from year to year, seem to have been following a long-
range trend for the last fifteen years, at least. This trend rises much more steeply than the
total federal budget or total [gross national product]. In fact, if extrapolated, federal
expenditures for research and development can be predicted to equal the entire gross
national product by about the year 2000. It is obvious, therefore, that the slope of the
curve must flatten out over the next few years.
The Department of Defense, along with every other agency of government and the
private sector of the economy, is in increasingly sharp competition for the research and
development dollar. The elimination of waste and inefficiency in the National Space
Program, whether it occurs in NASA, in DoD, or in overlaps between the two agencies, is
essential to our national security.
Question 5: Are we taking sufficient measures to insure the maximum degree of coor-
dination and cooperation between NASA and DoD in the areas of space vehicles
development and facility utilization?
The adequacy of coordination and cooperation between NASA and DoD must be
measured by the extent to which such efforts support the policy of creating and main-
taining a single National Space Program. That policy has governed our actions since the
beginning of this Administration. In our report of 8 May 1961, Mr. Webb and I stated, in
summary:
"Clearly, then, the future of our efforts in space is going to depend on much more
than this year's appropriations or tomorrow's new idea. It is going to depend in large
measure upon the extent to which this country is able to establish and to direct 'an
Integrated National Space Program'."
[6] We pointed out then (page 12) that:
"It will be necessary, therefore, to find a way to formulate and apply plans and
policies aimed at insuring the success of an Integrated National Space Program. Top
level scientific and policy direction must be forthcoming from the top management
echelons. The mere statement of broad objectives will not be enough. Periodic bud-
get reviews and their intensification in the spring of each year will not suffice. It will
be necessary to impose policy and management actions which will alter many of the
trends of the past ten years, particularly in the management of research and engi-
neering resources on a national scale."
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In my view, it is essential that all major space programs be integrated with military
requirements in the early stages of their development. This integration has been fostered
through the organization and operation of the Aeronautics and Astronautics
Coordinating Board and its six panels. A series of written agreements between NASA and
DoD spells out this general policy in such fields as development of launch vehicles and
space craft, administration of range facilities, and planning for communications satellites.
I am not satisfied, and I am sure that Mr. Webb is not satisfied, that we have gone far
enough to eliminate all problems of duplication and waste in administration. We are
engaged in a continuing joint effort in this area. But I am more concerned with the poten-
tial dangers in the divergence of our efforts in the study and planning of potential new
large projects.
Take, for example, the proposed space station being considered by NASA and DoD,
and still in the planning phase. While it is not yet clear that the project is justified, either
on a military or nonmilitary basis, it is clear that it should be undertaken only as a nation-
al program, which meets the requirements of both NASA and DoD, and that it must be
jointly planned from its inception.
Coordination and joint planning of our efforts must extend to all so-called "advanced
studies." Experience has demonstrated that if many or sizeable [sic] studies are support-
ed throughout industry, the expectation of a new project grows rapidly until such expec-
tations are translated into public debate and controversy. Mr. Webb and I agreed on this
matter in recent discussions.
In the National Launch Vehicle Program, to take another example, we must be con-
stantly alert to consider new vehicles for inclusion as standard "building block" vehicles
meeting the requirements of both agencies. We must refrain from undertaking unneces-
sary new developments, and we must limit the scope of adaptations of standard devices to
unique projects. Both NASA and DoD continue to be exposed to proposals for addition-
al launch vehicles or modifications of those that are already a [7] part of the National
Launch Vehicle Program. It is even conceivable that within a year or two pressures will
arise to develop vehicles using new materials and techniques on the sole ground that "no
new launch vehicle projects have been undertaken" in a long time. This is not to say that
we should abandon the continuing examination of new technological achievements in
these areas. But development projects must be jointly planned and development decisions
jointly taken.
Coordination and joint planning of our efforts must extend to all so-called "advanced
studies." Experience has demonstrated that if many or sizeable [sic] studies are support-
ed throughout industry, the expectation of [a] new project grows rapidly until such expec-
tations are translated into public debate and controversy. Mr. Webb and I agreed on this
matter in recent discussions.
I am also concerned with the potential dangers in the divergence or unnecessary
duplication of our efforts in fields where technology and other factors are rapidly chang-
ing. Communications and meteorological satellites are two examples. I have already can-
celed some major programs in the communications area, and I do not propose to launch
any additional projects until the roles of NASA, DoD and the Communications Satellite
Corporation have been clearly defined.
The heads of the two agencies must constantly be sensitive to the dangers of duplica-
tion and waste. The problem is of sufficient importance to require continuous monitor-
ing at a level above that of the agencies themselves. I suggest that responsibility for this
monitoring be assigned to the Bureau of the Budget and to the Director of the Office of
Science and Technology. Only by assigning specific responsibility in this fashion can the
integrity of the National Space Program be protected.
Robert S. McNamara
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 347
[8]
TABLE I
SPACE AND SPACE RF_I ATED PROGRAMS
BREAKDOWN BY DOD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM CATEGORY OF
AMOUNTS APPEARING ON PAGE 404 OF BUREAU OF THE BUDGET SPECIAL
ANALYSIS G, "Research and Development and Selected Scientific and Technical Activities
of the Federal Government,"January 1963.'
NEW OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
DOD NASA
DOD
R&D Program
Category
Research
Exploratory Dev.
Advanced Dev.
Supporting R'sch.
& Technology
Engineering Dev.
Operational Sys. Dev.
Mgt. & Support
TOTAL
FY1962 (act.)1963(est.)1964(est.)1962 (act.)1963 (est.)1964 (est.)
4 4 6 23 65 99
140 159 166 - -
535 5O9 4O5
675 668 571 236 439 647
112 382 437 845 1,858 3,297
26 39 40
46'7 525 61..._4 692 1,261
1,285 1,618 1,668 1,796 3,623 5,664
' Special Analysis G states: '"l'he amounts show for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration cover all the activities of that agency except those specifically identified
with aircraft technology. The estimates for the Department of Defense include all the
principal amounts identifiable with the Department's space programs, but exclude certain
amounts which cannot be feasibly separated from other military expenses, such as the
development of missiles which are also used in the space programs, military personnel
costs, and various other operating costs."
Document 11-25
Document tide: W.F. Boone, to Mr. Webb, Dr. Seamans, Dr. Dryden, "DOD-NASA
Relations," July 12, 1963.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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NASA's Office of DOD Liaison, headed by retired Admiral W.. Fred Boone, performed the difficult task
of attempting to keep communications open between NASA and the military when Secretary of Defense
McNamara and NASA Administrator Webb were at odds. Boone's fuly 12, 1963, memorandum to
top NASA officiaL_ attempted to place in perspective NASA's views of the military intentions and the
military's view of Nasa intentions. It highlights the problem_ of developing collaborative programs
with such widely differing needs.
[no pagination]
A/Mr. Webb
AA/Dr. Seamans
AD/Dr. Dryden
AAD-3
July 12, 1963
DOD-NASA Relations
In response to your desire expressed at a recent staff meeting, the attached paper is
submitted.
The paper has been prepared with the thought that it would be used as a "talking
paper" rather than one to be given to Mr. McNamara.
The whole paper has been coordinated with [D. Brainerd] Holmes and has his con-
currence.
The section on GROUND SUPPORT OPERATIONS has been coordinated with
[Edmond C.] Bucldey [special assistant to the administrator] and has his concurrence.
If the DOD agrees that NASA and the DOD should work together primarily on the
basis of coordination rather than joint action, I suggest that we might want to ask the
AACB to agree on the meaning of "coordinate" in this context.
It is suggested that this be held on an "eyes only" basis among Dr. Dryden, Dr.
Seamans, and yourself, until all or part of the paper is released by you.
W.E Boone
2 Enclosures
DOD-NASA Relations
Definition
[1] PRIVATE--Eyes Only for Mr. Webb, D_. Dryden, and Dr _%amans.
DOD-NASA Relations
1. The purpose of this paper is to bring into focus the divergent philosophies, attitudes,
and interpretations of the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration with respect to the implementation of the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958. Delineation of certain differing points of view may suggest guidelines
for their resolution, and closer agreement as to principles involved will permit the two
agencies to work more harmoniously, economically, and effectively together in the nation-
al interest.
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2. This discussion will be presented under the headings of NATIONAL POLICY, PLAN-
NING, and GROUND SUPPORT OPERATIONS as these pertain to space activities, and
AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH. These are the areas in which the principal problems appear
to lie.
NATIONAL POLICY
3. A difference of opinion exists as to the proper function and status of the Space
Administration under the Space Act of 1958.
NASA Position
4. The National Aeronautics and Space Act was responsive to national requirements in
two categories: (1) general welfare, and (2) security. The objectives set forth in the Act
were formulated after thorough deliberation by the Executive and Legislative Branches,
and extensive correlation with the scientific community. The Act provided that the scien-
tific exploration and exploitation of space shall be the responsibility of and directed by an
independent civilian agency, while stating the major exception that "activities peculiar to
or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations or
the defense of the United States (including the research and development necessary to
make effective provision for the defense of the United States) shall be the responsibility
of, and shall be directed by, the Department of Defense... " Thus, the Congress clearly
recognized the need for two mutually supporting but separately directed space programs.
The Act established a liaison mechanism (the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, later
superseded by the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board) through which the
DOD and NASA were required to "advise and consult with each other on all matters with-
in [2] their respective jurisdictions relating to aeronautical and space activities" and to
"keep each other fully and currently informed with respect to such activities." The Act
provided that the President shall determine which agency shall have responsibility for the
direction of a space activity.
5. In drafting the Act, the Congress stressed the peaceful purposes of our space activi-
ties. It was apparently recognized that the exploration of space was more than an area of
future significance to the defense of the United States, and that the scientific, political,
and economic benefits to be derived from a space program might be subordinated if
space exploration were conducted solely under military auspices.
6. NASA sees the national space effort as a spectrum encompassing three areas: (1)
acquisition of basic scientific knowledge and the development of basic technologies and
operating techniques; (2) the application of space knowledge, technologies, and tech-
niques to the development of prototype space systems; (3) the production and operation
of commercial and military space systems to meet national requirements. A necessary
adjunct to this total effort is the establishment of a government in [-]house capability sup-
ported by a broad industrial base competent in the space field.
7. NASA's assigned functions lie primarily in category (1) above. The DOD has research
and development responsibilities in this category to the extent that such research and
development pertains to the defense of the United States. NASA's responsibilities do not
extend to the area of category (3). Category (2) is a gray area in which the responsibili-
ties of DOD and NASA overlap to a considerable extent. NASA of necessity becomes an
operating agency in those cases where basic subsystems and operating techniques can best
be developed by means of an experimental operational flight system, and where NASA is
called upon to furnish operational services to another agency. NASA recognizes that some
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programs to meet the requirements of DOD and NASA in category (2) are of such mag-
nitude as to require that a single program serve the needs of hoth agencies; i.e., a manned
orbiting laboratory. Where predominant interest is at issue in such cases, a Presidential
decision as to management responsibility would be needed. Presumably, the decision, in
addition to the matter of relative interest in terms of experiments to be accommodated,
would take into account additional factors such as management c¢_mpetence, operational
experience, and political impact.
8. Consideration of national policy and national interests dictates that the civilian space
program under NASA should be an "open" program with maximum dissemination of
derived information "tot the benefit of all mankind," whereas these same considerations
require that a military space program be conducted essentially under security restrictions.
[ 3] DOD Position--as it :ill, ears to NASA
9. The attitude of the DOD with respect to the roles of the two agencies in the national
space effort differs from that of NASA in that the DOD sees the civilian and military space
programs as one program which should be jointly conducled to attain both civilian and
military objectives. They believe that the military requirements in space were not as well
foreseen when the Space Act was passed in 1958 as they are now. In the intervening years,
it has become apparent that the Soviet space program is directed primarily toward the
gaining of a military advantage through space operations, forcing the United States to
build a military defense in space. Because of this increasing role, the military should have
a stronger voice in shaping and direction of the total national space program than was rec-
ognized and provided for in the Space Act.
10. This attitude has led to efforts on the part of the DOt) to have segments of the NASA
program transferred to the DOD (i.e., Gemini, bit-astronautics, training of astronauts,
MILA). The desire to control is especially strong within the Air Force, as the Service of pri-
mary interest in the field of space, is disproportionately small and has not received the
proper public recognition. The Air Force considers that space operations are simply an
extension of flight operations in the atmosphere, and therefi)re that they should be under
Air Force control. Lacking greater support for this position at the DOD level, the Air
Force has made an "end runs" [sic] to members of Congress and the White House staft,
and has launched an intensive and well organized public relations campaign to convert
the public to the Air Force point of view. The Air Force is inclined to look upon NASA as
a competitor rather than a parmer in the field of space.
Proposed Basis of Agreement
11. The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator should agree in principle along the
following lines, and should join in a vigorous effort to indoctrinate subordinate staffs and
agencies in acceptance of these principles:
(a) It was the intent of Congress, and remains in the national interest so t_aras possi-
ble without jeopardizing national security, that the United Sates maintain in the
eyes of the world the peaceful image of our space program.
(b) As a corollary to (a), NASA should remain a fully independent, civilian agency.
[4] (c) There are certain advantages to the national space effort, and in the long run
specifically to the Department of Defense, which accrue the virtue of civilian
agency management of a major portion of the total space effort; i.e., internation-
al cooperation; and relations with the research and development organizations of
industry, with the civilian scientific organizations, and with the university com-
munity.
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(d) At the same time, the unfolding military requirement in space demands an
expanding role for the Department of Defense in the total space effort.
(e) For the present, this increasing role will be accommodated by earlier and
stronger concerted DOD-NASA action on the basis of coordination rather than
joint control, and in a manner which will not compromise the civilian character of
NASA's activities.
(NOTE: "Coordination" as used in this paper, will have the following meaning: _M1
agency having responsibility to "coordinate" with another agency on a specitied
project (1) will recognize the interest of the other agency in the project, (2) will
initiate a fifll exchange of information and consultations early in the conceptual
phase, (3) will encourage the active participation of the other agency in the plan-
ning flom the very outset, and (4) will make an earnest effort to meet the require-
ments and objectives of the other agency. Concurrence of the other agency will
be sought in the planning and execution of the project. Concurrence is not
required as a pre-condition to fitrther action. However, matters on which agree-
ment is not reached may be referred for resolution to the next higher authority
in which both participants have a voice.)
(f) It is expected that the decision as to management responsibility for a m_ior new
program will be made by the President primarily on the basis of predominance of
interest, but also taking into account other factors such as capability to conduct
the program, relation to other major programs, international aspects, security
considerations, etc.
There will be maximum cross-servicing in the use of support resources and tech-
nical know-how.
Except in unusual cases, joint management responsibility is not favored on the
basis that the requirement for concurrence at every step [is] inefficient, uneco-
nomical, and tends to impede rapid progress.
PLANNING
12. A difference of opinion exists as to the desirabilitT of joint versus coordinated plan-
ning.
NASA Position
13. NASA's assigned mission is to maintain a national position in the vanguard of space
exploration. In its quest for scientific knowledge and its efforts to develop the basic tech-
niques necessary for space operations, NASA must constantly seek to advance man's space
fi-ontier further into the unknown. In pursuing this mission, NASA should not be restrict-
ed by a limitation that its advanced exploratory studies must be related to established
operational requirements of either a military or commercial nature. At the same time,
NASA should ever be alert to discern those areas of research which appear to offer the
most promising potential for the solution of military problems and for otherwise con-
tributing to the national welfare, and be prepared to orient its efforts responsively to these
objectives.
1 '4. There should be a thorough, inter-agency exchange of ideas and information as to
requirements and problems early in the process of formulating advance studies in an area
of mutual interest, but to impose the restriction that the formal concurrence of another
agency is required before NASA may proceed with such a study would seriously ohstrucl
NASA's ability to discharge its statutorily assigned functions.
[51 (g)
(h)
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15. Major filture progress in space are [sic] likely to be so costly that the nation will be
able to afford only one program in each category. Consequently, each such program
should be designed to meet, in so far as possible, the requirements of all government
agencies for space research and development.
16. Once the decision is made to embark upon a multi-interest project, the agency
responsible for its direction should be designated. Thereafter, the planning and execution
should be coordinated between interested agencies to assure that in so far as practicable
the requirements of all agencies are fulfilled in the national interest. The primary respon-
sibility for that coordination should reside with the agency directing the project.
[6] DOD Position---as it appears to NASA
17. The DOD view with respect to planning differs from that of NASA in that the DOD
feels all planning relating to NASA programs or projects which are of interest to DOD
should be jointly conducted from inception. This view has led DOD to seek inflexible
agreements concerning the manner in which NASA's advance exploratory studies may be
initiated, including sign-off authority for DOD.
PrOposed Basis of Agreement
18. (a) Requirements and objectives in any particular area of space research and devel-
opment will, as a general rule, be developed unilaterally by DOD and NASA.
Subject to security restrictions, general knowledge of each other's requirements
and objectives must be assumed.
(b) Prior to the approval by either agency of a study project in an area of mutual inter-
est, inter-agency coordination will be accomplished. This will take the form of a
free exchange of information concerning requirements, objectives and plans for
the study, and an earnest attempt to cast the study in such manner as to be respon-
sive to the requirements and objectives of both agencies in so far as practicable.
Provisions will be made so that in the event an agency feels that its needs are not
being adequately met in formulating the study, recourse may be had to higher
authority for resolution of differences, initially to the Co-chairmen of the
[Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board].
(c) Results of studies in an area of mutual interest will be made available to both
agencies.
(d) Upon approval of a new major project of mutual interest, the agency responsible
for its direction will also be charged with insuring that adequate arrangements for
coordinated planning and coordinated monitoring of execution are made.
Again, provision will be made for recourse to higher authority to resolve differ-
ences.
GROUND SUPPORT OPERATIONS
19. There are some conflicting views in the matter of control of ground support operations.
[7] NASA Position
20. NASA fully subscribes to the concept of national launch ranges operated by the DOD
for the benefit of all government user agencies. NASA has levied known requirements on
the ranges for over 140 future launches, over 40 of which involve tracking ships. However,
the requirements which NASA must place on the ranges have become so large, complex,
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and exacting that NASA feels it must actively participate in planning the manner in which
the ranges are to be equipped and operated to provide the project-peculiar services
required by NASA.
21. The magnitude and nature of the Manned Lunar Landing Program are such as to
require that the assembly, check-out, and launch area (Merritt Island) be under NASA
control.
22. The world network of land-based orbital tracking and data acquisition stations should,
to the maximum practical extent, be under NASA control for NASA missions. This applies
to planning of facilities, specification and installation of instrumentation, training and
maintenance of proficiency activities, communication links, and operational control dur-
ing a flight. As high a degree as possible of standardization among stations is necessary in
order to permit the most effective operational flexibility and casualty control during an
operation. Exceptions to this doctrine can be accepted in the case of a few DOD stations
that are already in existence, strategically located, and responsive to NASA requirements.
This doctrine is made necessary by the indivisible relationship between program man-
agement and the operations control organization.
23. If and when stations of the NASA world network are utilized to track DOD missions,
NASA would be willing to place these stations temporarily under DOD operational con-
trol ifDOD considers this necessary to the mission and to the extent permitted by interna-
tional agreements. (Nearly half of the spacecraft being tracked by the NASA satellite net-
work are DOD spacecraft.)
24. Arrangements for the procurement, preparation, and operation of the project pecu-
liar tracking ships required to occupy the critical stations for insertion into orbit and injec-
tion into the moon transfer in the Apollo operation must be such as to give NASA a high
degree of control through relatively direct administrative channels.
25. To this end, NASA's present intention is to employ MSTS [Military Sea Transportation
Service (NAVY),] a DOD agency experienced in the operation of special purpose ships, to
prepare the hulls and machinery and to operate the ships themselves as differentiated
from the instrumentation installed therein. In the interest of standardization, NASA plans
to use the same contractor for installation and operation of the instrumentation as is used
in the case of other NASA stations in the net. [8] While these ships will be required near-
ly full time for the Apollo mission, NASA has no objection to adding general purpose
instrumentation to the extent this will not compromise the project peculiar instrumenta-
tion, and to make the ships available for general purpose use when not required in con-
nection with Apollo. Generally speaking, these ships should basically be special purpose
ships, with a general purpose secondary mission, rather than vice versa.
26. The priority assigned to the Apollo program and considerations of safety are such that
where other agencies are depended upon to furnish facilities or perform essential services
in the loop, NASA must have the prerogative of monitoring the provisions for rendering
such services to the extent necessary to assure itself that all recognizable potential limita-
tions which might delay the schedule or increase the risk of the mission are eliminated.
DOD Position---as it appears to NASA
27. The DOD takes the position that the launch ranges are a national asset which would
be used to capacity by other agencies of the government, and on which requirements
should be levied without voice as to the manner in which these requirements are to be
met. The range facilities, including tracking ships, should be primarily "general purpose"
in nature, with "project peculiar" provisions added. The DOD fears that NASA, by estab-
lishing the Merritt Island Launch Area and seeking to acquire its own project-peculiar
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tracking ships, wishes to depend less anti less upon tile D()I) ranges fin- services, becom-
ing a range operator instead of a range user.
Proposed Basis o] AL,reement
28. The cli|'t_'ren_ es in dfis area stein more from a lack of mutual trust than flom differ-
ing concepts. Each agency sees the other as seeking control of segments of its operations.
This has at times inhibited a free exchange of intormation. In order to dispel any such
fears, it is proposed that D()D and NASA agree in principle to the following, and that all
subordinate organizations be informed accordingly:
(a) The concept of national launch ranges operated by the DOD is to be fully accept-
ed and implemented. NASA will depend upon the facilities and services of these
ranges to the extent that they can meet NASA requirements.
[9] (b) The principle of "primary assignment" will be applied in accordance with priori-
ties established by mutual agreement or by higher authority.
(c) Where NASA specialized requirements exceed the capacity of the national range,
the range will be given an opportunity to augment its capacity if desired, before
NASA proceeds to make its own provisions to meet the excess requirements.
(d) NASA will continue to be responsible for operating the world networks required
fox tracking NASA spacecraft in orbit and in hmar and planetary transfers. In the
interest of avoiding unwarranted duplication, ttw DOD will utilize these NASA
networks fin- DOD orbital missions where feasible.
(e) Generally speaking, the point of demarcation between the ranges and the world
tracking nets will be the point of insertion into orbit.
(f) Each agency will participate actively on a coordination basis in the other's plans
for equipment development and facilities with the objectives of achim4ng the
maximum practicable degree of standardization and permitting such facilities
and equipments to meet the needs of both agencies to the ,naximum practicable
extent.
(g) All tracking [of] the data acquisition ships, once ready fl)r ser_4ce, will be assigned
to the national ranges who will utilize MSTS to operate and maintain the ships
generally under the same arrangements that currently govern the MSTS to oper-
ation and nlaintenance of special purpose ships for various agencies of the
government. Under this arrangement, there will be a mutually agreed upon
scheduling authority who will assign the ships to the operational control of tile
user agency on a prime assignment basis as necessary to meet the requirements
of the user agency as to training, calibration check-out, minor modifications to
instrumentation, and tracking and data acquisition operations.
(h) Operation of instrumentation aboard each ship will be contracted for directly by
the user ha_fng primary interest.
[lO] AERONA LrflCAL RESI:.'ARCIt
29. There is a difference of opinion as to the relative importance time-wise of aeronauti-
cal research programs utilizing new prototypes and the flight test programs of these pro-
totypes.
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RS- 70 Program
30. In a letter dated May 3, 1962, the Administrator proposed to the Secretary of Defense
that one of the three XB-70 prototypes be made available to NASA for use in conducting
an advanced aeronautical research program in the area of supersonic cruise flight. NASA
considers that this program is essential to our country's progress in the field of aeronau-
tics, and that the information desired cannot be obtained by any other means. No official
response to this request has been received. Recently, after an elapse of over a year, the pro-
posal has been revived by NASA in the [Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating
Board].
31. NASA considers it to be of the utmost importance that the opportunity presented by
the XB-70 for flight research in the supersonic range be fully exploited as early as practi-
cable. The data to be gained thereby will have special application in tile develc)pment of
the supersonic transport now advocated by the Administration.
32. A proper flight research program cannot be conducted simultaneously with and as a
part of the flight tests of this aircraft. Since the instrumentation for the research program
should be installed during the fabrication of the designated aircraft, an early decision by
the Secretary of Defense to make one of the XB-70 prototypes available on loan to NASA
is required if the valuable data to be derived from such a research program is to be avail-
able in time to be used in designing the supersonic transport.
TFX Program
33. By letter dated .January 15, 1963, the Administrator requested that one of the early
TFX prototypes be made available on loan to NASA to be used in conducting a flight
research program to obtain basic data concerning the variable swept wing concept incor-
porated in the aircraft. This concept originated at the Langley Research Center, and much
of the supporting ground research data were gathered there. On 1 March 1963, the
Secretary of Defense responded by disapproving the request, making the alternate sug-
gestions that:
(a) NASA participate jointly with the Air Force by combining the research program
with the flight test program,
[ 11 ] (b) NASA acquire one of the prototypes upon completion of the flight test program,
or
(c) NASA purchase an additional prototype at a cost of about $10 million.
Alternative (c) appeared to involve unwarranted duplication, and neither alternative (a)
nor (b) would permit the accomplishment of an adequate flight research program in a
timely manner.
34. Following personal negotiations with the Secretary of the Air Force by the Deputy
Associate Administrator for Defense Affairs, discussions were commenced between NASA
and the TFX Project Office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base to find ways and means of
meshing an adequate flight research program under NASA control with the flight test pro-
gram on the TFX prototypes. It is too early to say whether satisfactory arrangemenLs for
meeting the requirements of both agencies will evolve from these negotiations. The
Secretary of Defense and the Administrator should agree to review this matter again about
six months hence.
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Proposed Basis of Agreement
35. In layout [of] a program for the acquisition of a new military aircraft type incorpo-
rating a new concept or a substantial projection of a current design concept, provision will
be made to make an early prototype available to NASA fi_r the purpose of accomplishing
an "in-flight" research program designed to obtain advanced technical data in the field of
aeronautics.
[no pagination]
Definition of
"Coordination With" and "In Coordination With"
This expression means that agencies coordinated with shall participate actively; and
concurrence shall be sought; and that if concurrence is not obtained the disputed matter
shall be referred to the next highest authority in which all participants have a voice.
(The above information from JCS Publication "Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint
Usage" and Arm_ I_gulation 320-5)
Document 11-26
Document tide: James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, and Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense, "Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Covering a Possible New Manned Earth Orbital
Research and Development Project," August 17, 1963, with attached: "Procedure for
Coordination of Advanced Exploratory Studies by the DOD and the NASA in the Area of
Manned Earth Orbital Flight Under the Aegis of the AeronautiCs and Astronautics
Coordinating Board."
Document 11-27
Document title: Robert S. McNamara, to Honorable James E. Webb, NASA Administrator,
September 16, 1963.
Source: Both in Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Among the more important areas on which NASA and the Department of DeJense (DOD) agreed to
cooperate was the development of future orbital space stations. This a_,weement, signed on August 17,
1963, was to cover the development of a joint national space station. Although Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara _igned the agreement, in a Septemb_ 16, 1963, letter to Administrator Webb, he
expressed his reservations, fiJcusing particularly on the need for both agencies to concur on, not just
coordinate, their future activities related to future station design and development.
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Document 11-26
[1]
Agreement Between the Department of Defense and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Covering a Possible New Manned Earth Orbital
Research and Development Project
Objective
It is the purpose of this agreement to ensure that in the national interest complete
coordination is achieved between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and
the Department of Defense in approaching a possible new project in the area of manned
earth orbital research and development vehicles.
Basic Considerations
The National Space Program has now advanced to the point that further significant
progress in the areas of scientific research, space exploration, basic space technology, and
defense applications may well require the operation of a manned orbital research and
development system involving spacecraft larger and more sophisticated than Gemini and
Apollo. Such a system would be a major technical and financial undertaking. For this rea-
son, and while recognizing that the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 assigns to
their respective Agencies separate and distinct responsibilities in the planning, directing,
and conduct of aeronautical and space activities, the Secretary of Defense and the
Administrator of the NASA agree that advanced exploratory studies and any follow-on
actions in this area should be most carefully coordinated through the Aeronautics and
Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), successor to the Civilian-Military Liaison
Committee established by the Space Act. They further agree that in so far as practicable
all foreseeable future requirements of both agencies in this area should be encompassed
in a single project.
A system involving a manned earth orbital research and development vehicle capable
of prolonged space flight would provide basic scientific and technological knowledge and
basic design and operational criteria which would have across-the-board application to
both military and civilian operational programs. Such a developmental system would be a
mandatory forerunner of any long duration manned space operational system. Based
upon present knowledge, it appears that the requirements of the DOD and the NASA, as
well as of all other interested governmental agencies, can be met in a single national pro-
gram. It is necessary that the NASA and the DOD take steps to ensure that their total
effort is directed to this end.
Agreement
Pursuant to the foregoing, the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA
agree to a common approach to this project through the steps set forth below. In the event
that agreement is not reached on [2] any issue considered by either party adversely to
involve the responsibilities of his Agency, the issue of disagreement will be jointly referred
to the President for resolution.
a. The DOD and the NASA will continue advanced and exploratory studies in this
area as considered necessary by the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, NASA,
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respectively, to develop data as to Agency requirements, possible design concepts, feasi-
bility, and costs; these studies will be coordinated under the AACB in accordance with the
procedures set forth in the attachment hereto.
b. The AACB will include the evaluation of various concepts from tile standpoint of
productiveness, feasibility, and estimated costs.
c. The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, NASA, will then attempt to
arrive at a joint recommendation as to whether to proceed with a new project in this area,
evaluating the national need by comparing potential returns to returns which could be
realized by an extension of current ongoing projects.
d. If the recommendation under c., above, is affirmative, the DOD and the NASA
will jointly formulate an agreed project description for submission to the President togeth-
er with
e. A recommendation as to responsibility for the direction of the project based on
predominant interest and consideration of other pertinent factors, such as management
competence, relation to other programs in progress, and international political implica-
tions.
f. If and when a decision is made by the Administration to proceed with such a pro-
ject, the appropriate timing determined, and responsibility fbr direction assigned, a joint
DOD/NASA board will be established to formulate the specific objectives to be obtained
by means of the project and to approve the experiments to be conducted.
g. Acting in accordance with the results of f., above, tile Agency assigned responsi-
bility for direction will prepare a definitive project plan tor approval by the Administration
and submission to Congress for funding.
h. On provision of the necessary funding, the project will be implemented under
single management but with joint DOD/NASA participation and monitorship.
James E. Webb Robert S, McNamara
Administrator, NASA Secretary of Defense
Aug. 17, 1963
Attachment
Procedure for Coordination of
Advanced Exploratory Studies
[1]
Procedure for Coordination of Advanced Exploratory
Studies by the DOD and the NASA in the Area of
Manned Earth Orbital Flight Under the Aegis of the
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board
(Attached to McNamara/Webb Agreement dated August 17, 1963)
1. As a general procedure, there will be the maximum practicable interchange of ideas
and information at all levels within the two Agencies beginning early in the conceptual or
planning stage of the advanced exploratory studies in this area.
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2. Within fifteen (15) days after the signing of the Basic Agreement, each Agency will
present to the Manned Space Flight Panel a list of studies which have been completed dur-
ing the past three (3) years. Detailed information relating to these studies will be fur-
nished to the non-sponsoring Agency on request.
3. Within fifteen (15) clays after the signing of the Basic Agreement, each Agency will
present to the Manned Space Flight Panel a status report concerning:
(a) All studies which are in progress under contract and in-house;
(b) All studies which already have been formalized in a Statement of Work but not yet
approved; and
(c) All additional new studies under active consideration or development.
4. Within thirty (30) days after the signing of the Basic Agreement, the Panel will:
(a) Institute a review of the studies under category (a) above, and will effect such
coordinating action as is deemed appropriate and practicable in the light of their on-
going status;
(b) Designate to the AACB those studies in categories (b) and (c) above which either
Agency considers should be formally coordinated to incorporate requirements of both
Agencies and to avoid unwarranted duplication.
5. Thereafter, the Panel will be kept informed of all new studies taken under active con-
sideration or development by either Agency, and will promptly designate to the AACB any
new study which either Agency considers should be formally coordinated as above.
[2] 6. In the case of each study designated to the AACB for coordination, the non-
sponsoring Agency will, within fifteen (15) days of such designation, indicate in writing its
concurrence in the study without change, its reasons for not concurring, or submit in writ-
ing a list of the requirements of the non-sponsoring Agency which are desired to be con-
sidered for incorporation in the study. If no comments are received within the fifteen (15)
day limit, satisfactory coordination may. be assumed.
7. Within thirty (30) days of the receipt of notification from the Panel of the designation
of a study for coordination, the Co-Chairmen of the AACB will either:
(a) Certify in writing that satisfactory coordination has been accomplished, or
(b) Jointly submit to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, NASA, an expla-
nation of any areas of disagreement arising out of the coordinating action. At that point,
the sponsoring Agency may, if desired, proceed with the study.
8. In all of the foregoing steps, the responsibility for taking the init!ative in the coordi-
nating process will rest with the Agency sponsoring the study in quesuon.
Document11-27
[11
Honorable James E. Webb
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington 25, D.C.
16 Sept. 1963
Dear Jim:
Thank you for your correspondence of August 17, 1963, and your proposed agree-
ment covering a possible new manned earth orbital research and development project. I
appreciate your constructive and earnest efforts to develop a method which will insure a
sound, coordinated approach to this potentially important national efforl. I am fully
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awarethat,sincewebeganourdiscussionsonthismatter,therehavebeenmanyactions
implementedwhichhavealreadygonealongwaytowardimprovingtheexchangeof
informationbetweenouragenciesandthecoordinationofourstudyefforts.I concurin)'ourproposedagreementi manyrespectsandI feelthatit isanexcellentcontribution
toimprovedunderstandingandmutuallyusefuleffortofouragencies.I do,however,havecertainreservations.
AsI haveexpressedseveraltimes,mygreatestcurrentconcernis to insurethat
advancedengineeringstudiesareproperlyintegratedandphasedsothattherequire-
mentsanddesignconstraintsofeachagencycanbereallyincorporatedfromthebegin-
ning.Forthisreason;andbecauseof thepotentialscopeandnationalimportanceofthis
program,I havecontinuedtoinsistontheprincipleofconcurrenceofoneagencyin the
proposedactionsoftheothervicesimplecoordinationa dpossiblesubsequentunilater-
alactionin thefaceofdisagreement.Asanexampleofthetypeofproblemwearecon-
fronting,I refertoyourproposed$3.5millionforcontractoreffortfor thedesignof a
MannedOrbitalResearchLaboratory (MORL). I believe that an effort of this magnitude
is premature by eight months to a year since it will not be possible prior to that time for
us to provide properly for the incorporation of Defense Department judgements [sic] and
thoughts on military requirements into the design. You must realize that if ongoing DOD
studies provide justifiable military objectives for a space station development, there may
be the necessity for a significantly different design approach which will be responsive to
both agency's needs.
[2] I further note that the proposed agreement does not define specifically the level of
study effort required to qualify for interagency coordination [in] an "advanced explorato-
ry study," although provision is made for the coordination of all such studies. I believe that
an annual level of effort of $100,000 defines a reasonable threshold for initiating such
action.
I concur in your view that the AACB is the proper medium for interagency coordina-
tion. I would observe, however, that while coordination has always been a prima facie
AACB function, this has been accomplished in the past largely by other means, through
other channels. I believe the AACB can serve as an effective coordinating body as long as
proper attention continues to be accorded to the membership of the Board and its pan-
els and the formulation and execution of meeting agendas, and as long as we both empha-
size the resolution of issues at the Board level.
There remains, of course, the subject of recourse in the event that you and I cannot
reach agreement on any issue referred to us. In the unlikely event that this should occur,
I feel that, as a matter of practice, we should inform the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget concerning the nature and extent of disagreement before initiating unilaterally
any program actions which might later be subject to criticism in Congress or elsewhere.
Finally, I believe that at the present time it is not essential that we define the proce-
dure for implementing the possible development program. It is inevitable that this
procedure will be influenced by the nature and extent of each agency interest in such a
program. Our final determinations of these procedures, therefore, may he somewhat
different from what we now envisage.
I believe we have discussed this matter as much as is usefid and that it is most impor-
tant to insure continued harmonious accord between our agencies. Therefore, hoping
you can accept my reservations as expressed in this letter, I have signed the agreement as
you have prepared it. I believe that we can proceed constructively on the basis of this
agreement and our mutual desire to formulate a recommended course of action in the
best national interest.
Sincerely
Robert S. McNamara
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Document 11-28
Document title: John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to Dr.
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., NASA Associate Administrator, March 19, 1966, with attached:
Robert Seamans, Jr., NASA Deputy Administrator, and John Foster, Jr., Director of
Defense Research and Engineering, DOD, Memorandum of Agreement, "Establishment
of a Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB)," no date.
Source: Deputy Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This agreement established the p_nciple of reciprocity and sharing of flight opportunities between
NASA and the Department of Defense, and it applied to the Apollo and the Manned Orbiting
Laboratory programs. When the Space Shuttle agreement was formulated, the agreement in this mem-
orandum was not renewed. When the subject of human spaceflight experiments arose again in the
mid-1980s, the approach taken in the earlier agreement was modified to fit with the shuttle manage-
ment process and was handled by the Air Force.
[no pagination]
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING
Washington 25, DC 20301
March 16, 1966
Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Associate Administrator
National Aeronautics & Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546
Dear Bob:
In response to your letter of 1 March 1966, I have concurred in the NASA-DoD
Memorandum of Agreement establishing the "Manned Space Flight Experiments Board
(MSFEB) ."
Based on discussions of our staff, and with the understanding that it would be accept-
able to you, I have added to paragraph 6 of the Memorandum the following sentence:
"Similar technical advice will be made available from appropriate DoD agencies."
A copy of the revised Memorandum is attached.
Sincerely,
'_[ohnny"
John S. Foster, Jr.
Enclosure
._2 Yt IE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MIIATARY RH_\I I()N_
[1]
Memorandum of Agreement
Subject: Establishment of Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB)
General Guidelines
This Memorandum of Agreement is implemented in order to provide a means of
coordination of the DoI) and NASA manned space flight experiments program. These
experiments, of a scientific, technological, or non-military operational nature, will be car-
ried as a secondary objective on a space-available basis on selecled DoD flight missions
and as primary or secondary objectives on NASA flight missions.
It is anticipated that experiments will be submitted from a variety of sources to both
DoD and NASA where they will be reviewed and, if approved, submitted to a joint exper-
iments review hoard whose functions are defined in this agreement. In general, those
experiments which are related primarily to basic space science, technology, and applica-
tions will be assigned to NASA programs. Similarly, those experiments which are peculiar
to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations,
or the defense of the United States would normally be assigned to DoD programs, when-
ever possible. This is not to preclude, however, the assignment of any experiment to a pro-
gram of either Agency when this appears desirable on the basis of economy, timeliness, or
other considerations of national interest.
[2] 1. PURPOSE
This agreement established a Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB) to
coordinate experiment programs which will be conducted on l)oD and NASA manned
space flights.
2. AUTHORITY
The MSFEB is advisory to the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight,
NASA, and the Deputy Director for Strategic & Space Systems, DoD.
3. FUNCTIONS
The MSFEB will have the following functions:
a. Recommend the approval or disapproval of experiments to be conducted under
DoD and NASA Manned Space Flight Programs.
b. Recommend assignment of experiments to specific flight programs.
c. Recommend relative priorities of experiments to be implemented, and periodi-
cally review the numbers of experiments scheduled for specific missions.
d. Review the status of approved experiments.
As used herein, "experiment" means an investigation which is not essential to the pri-
mary mission, launching, navigation, or recovery of the space vehicle or the spacecraft.
Experiments normally will be under three general classifications: scientific, applications,
and technological or non-nfilitary operational. MSFEB recommendations will be based on
analyses which show that it will be operationally and technically ff-asible to conduct the
experiment, and that the basic experimental objectives of the investigation can be satis-
fied within the framework of the primary mission objectives of the program to which the
experiment is assigned.
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[3] 4. MEMBERSHIP
The following personnel will serve as members and alternate members of the MSFEB:
Members Alternates
Dr. Homer E. Newell
Associate Administrator for Space Science
& Applications, NASA
Dr. Mac C. Adams
Associate Administrator for Advanced
Research & Technology, NASA
Dr. George E. Mueller
Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, NASA
Mr. DanielJ. Fink
Deputy Director for Strategic &
Space Systems, DOD
Gen. Bernard A. Schriever
Commander of the Air Force
Systems Command, USAF
Mr. Edgar M. Cortright
Deputy Associate Administrator for Space
Science & Applications, NASA
Dr. AlfredJ. Eggers, Jr.
Deputy Associate Administrator for
Advanced Research & Technology', NASA
Mr..lames C. Elms
Deputy Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight, NASA
Mr. John E. Kirk
Assistant Director for Space
Technology, DOD
Brig. Gen. Harry L. Evans
Vice Director, MOL Program
Office of the Secretary of the Mr Force
5. CHAIRMANSHIP AND VOTING PROCEDURES
The Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, NASA, will act as Chairman. In
his absence the DOD member will act as Chairman.
MSFEB recommendations will not be based on majority and minority voting. Where
recommendations are not unanimous, the views of all members will be recorded.
6. S7A/4F SUPPORT
A technical advisor to the Board will be appointed from the staff of the Associate
Administrator for Manned Space Flight to provide an independent source of advice to the
Board on the feasibility and technical merit of proposed experiments submitted for Board
approval, and on such other matters as the Board may deem desirable. Similar technical
advice will be made available from appropriate DoD agencies.
[4] A member of the staff of the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight will
serve as Executive Secretary to the Board and will be responsible for the management of
the Board operations and maintenance of records. Additional support will be provided to
the Board, as required, by the Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program.
7. SUBMISSION OF EXPERIMENTS
Experiments will be reviewed within the sponsoring NASA or DOD Program Offices
for scientific and technical merit prior to their submission to the MSFEB Secretariat for
consideration bv the Board. This rex4ew should include a recommendation of the priori-
ty of an experin_ent relative to others submitted by the sponsoring office.
8. COOPd)INATION
It is the responsibility of the sponsoring office to accomplish appropriate coordina-
tion of experiment proposals within its program. The Executive Secretary, MSFEB, in
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conjunction with his coordination duties for the NASA Advanced Manned Missions
Program, will effect overall coordination of experiments among the NASA Program
Offices and a designated point of contact in DOD prior to placing them on the agenda
for MSFEB consideration.
9. GENERAL
The Executive Secretary, MSFEB, will document the recommendations of the MSFEB
for presentation to the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, NASA, and to
the Deputy Director for Strategic & Space Systems, DOD.
Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Deputy Administrator, NASA
John Foster, Jr.
Director of Defense Research &
Engineering, DOD
Documen111-29
Document title: Thomas O. Paine, NASA Administrator, to Honorable Robert C.
Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force, April 4, 1969, with attached: "Terms of Reference
for Joint DOD/NASA Study of Space Transportation Systems."
Source: Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History
Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
/'resident-elect Richard Nixon appointed a Space Task Group, chaired by. Vice President-elect Spiro
Agnew, to oveT:see American space policy. At a March 22, 1969, Space Task Group meeting, the mem-
bership discussed joint development of a Space Transportation A_stevn (STS). Less than two weeks
lat_ on Ap6l 4, NASA Administrator Paine formaUy invited Secreta_;r of the Air Force Seamans to
study jointly the possibility of building a national STS.
[no pagination]
Honorable Robert C. Seamans
Secretary of the Air Force
Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301
April 4, 1969
Dear Dr. Seamans:
Enclosed is a draft of Terms of Reference for a joint DoD/NASA study of space trans-
portation systems. I understand this draft has been coordinated between our staffs, and I
have signed it. Upon notification of your approval and signature, we are prepared to pro-
ceed immediately to implement the terms of the study.
Sincerely yours,
T.O. Paine
Administrator
Enclosure
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[1]
Terms of Reference for Joint DoD/NASA Study
of Space Transportation Systems
OBJECTIVE:
The objective of the joint DoD/NASA study of Space Transportation Systems is to
assess the practicality of a common system to meet the needs of both the DoD and the
NASA. Emphasis will be placed on the economic sensibility and technical feasibility of
such a system.
BACKGROUND:
The need for a joint DoD/NASA group to study space transportation was discussed at
the Space Task Group meeting of March 22, 1969. The Space Task Group was established
by the President to recommend by September 1, 1969, a National Space Program for the
post-Apollo period. It is expected that submissions by each participating agency will occur
in June or July 1969. The joint DoD/NASA Study Group should provide timely results for
these submissions.
FUNCTIONS:
The study shall be accomplished in two parts, the first part to be done separately by
the two agencies, DoD and NASA, and the second part to be done jointly.
1. The first part of the study shall proceed as follows:
(a) Each agency, DoD and NASA, shall study its own [2] needs, present and
future, for a new space transportation system.
(b) On the basis of its own needs, each agency shall make a preliminary deter-
mination of the characteristics of the transportation system that would best
meet its needs.
2. The second part of the study shall be done jointly and shall proceed as follows:
(a) Tile Joint Study Group shall assemble and correlate the needs of both agen-
cies for a space transportation system.
(b) The Joint Study Group shall assess the technical feasibility of various systems
to meet the needs of both agencies.
(c) The Joint Study Group shall compare the relative costs and assess the eco-
nomic sensibility of systems meeting the needs of both agencies.
(d) The Joint Study Group shall recommend a preferred concept and, if appro-
priate, alternative concepts of a space transportation system and provide the
supporting rationale for each concept.
RESULTS:
A report shall be provided to the President's Space Task Group on June 15, 1969.
APPROACH."
The Staff Directors of DoD and NASA serving the Space Task [3] Group shall each
designate a co-chairman for the Joint Study Group. Theses [sic] co-chairmen shall
appoint members from each agency to form the group. The Staff Directors shall be
responsible for providing a report to the Space Task Group on June 15, 1969.
APPROVAL:
l)r. Robert C. Seamans
Secretary of the Mr Force
Dr. Thomas O. Paine
Administrator, NASA
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Document title: George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, Memorandum for the
Record, "Space Shuttle Discussions with Secretary Seamans," January 28, 1970.
Source: Deputy Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
By early 1970, NASA had recognized that Department of Defense (DOD) support would likely be
essential if147zite House appwval for the Space Shuttle program were ever to be obtained. In this mem-
orandum, NASA Deputy Administrator George Low records an ear& policy-level discussion with
,Secretary_ of the Air Force Robert ,%amans and Assistant Secretary for lCp.search and Development
(;rant Hansen on NASA-I)OD cooperation in shuttle planning.
[11
Jan. 28, 1970
Memorandum for the Record
SUBJECT: Space Shuttle Discussions with Secretary Seamans
On January 27, 1970, I met with Bob Seamans to discuss the Phase B shuttle effort,
shuttle classification, and the proposed DoD/NASA agreement on the Space Shuttle.
I informed Bob of our plans to move out with a Phase B effort in the near future and
told him of our general Phase B plans. I mentioned that, to my knowledge, the Air Force
was in basic agreement with these plans except possibly on the questions of gross weight
versus payload weight and cross-range requirements. I explained the reasons for going
with a 3 1/2 million-pound gross weight and pointed out that the studies could be
redirected at mid-point if this was the wrong weight. I also pointed out that the cross-range
question would be handled by having two point designs, one with low cross-range and the
second with high cross-range. Seamans agreed that the basic objective of the shuttle pro-
gram should be to develop a low-cost transportation system and that requirements, such
as cross-range, go-around capability, etc., must be tested in the light of this objective.
Although he made no specific commitment, I believe that he has no significant objections
to the points that I made. Grant Hansen was also present and raised a question concern-
ing the use of gross weight instead of payload weight. However, he voiced no strong objec-
tions to our approach. A letter from Paine to Seamans on this subject was given toSeamans.
On the subject of classification, there was agreement that the Space Shuttle program
should be conducted on a generally unclassified basis. The justification for specific DoD
performance requirements can, of course, be presented internal to the government on a
classified basis, but the resulting Space Shuttle system shouht be unclassified in the same
sense that the Apollo Program was unclassified. Seamans agreed to these points and full),
recognized the international flavor of the program.
[2] I left copies of the proposed NASA/DoD agreement on the Space Shuttle .... Bob
Seamans pointed out that the Air Force had no money to spend on shuttle development
this year, but nevertheless was very much interested in developing the shuttle as a nation-
al capability. He strongly urged the establishment of a co-chaired board for DoD require-
ments. Although he did not have time to read the agreement while I was there, I read
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pertinentexcerptsohimandreceivedafavorabler sponse.Iwouldexpectthat the Mr
Force will sign the agreement in short order.
In response to a direct question, Bob Seamans pointed out that the Air Force was
indeed an agent for the DoD on the Space Shuttle program and that he had discussed ihis
with both Secretary Laird and John Foster.
Following the discussions on the Space Shuttle, we talked about aeronautics, with
Seamans emphasizing the need to move forward on an aeronautics program. AI Eggers
[Dr. Alfred J. Eggers,Jr., special assistant to the Administrator] had, earlier in the day, dis-
cussed with him our dealings with [the Department of Transportation (DOT)] on the
VTOI,/STOL [vertical takeoff and landing/short takeoff and landing] aircraft program.
Seamans indicated that the Air Force would like to participate in this effort as a third
party, with the principal effort coming from NASA and DOT.
We also discussed the DoD/NASA funding picture, and Seamans pointed out that
Secretary Laird is most interested in getting NASA to "pay its own way." He felt that Tom
Paine should have lunch with Secretary Laird in the near future to discuss this in more
detail. We agreed that the immediate problem is that of ETR [Eastern Test Range] and
KSC and that some joint study in this area may be called for. At the present time the Air
Force is conducting its own study on whether or not it should maintain a capability at
ETR.
Bob Seamans' last point concerned the direction of NASA programs. He mentioned
that, in the 1960's, NASA was fully supported because of the competition with Soviet
Rnssia. This type of support should not be expected in the 1970's. NASA should therefore
help solve the problems of the natural emfronment and thereby help pay for itself.
George M. Low
Deputy Administrator
Document 11-31
Document tide: Thomas O. Paine, NASA Administrator, and Robert C. Seamans, Jr.,
Secretary of the Air Force, "Agreement Between the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the Department of the Air Force Concerning the Space
Transportation System," NMI 1052.130, Attachment A, February 17, 1970.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
During 1969, it became, clear that there was great interest within the Department of Defense (DOD)
as well as NASA with respect to a reusable space launch system. Reflecting this, a joint NASA-Air
Force (USAF) Space Transportation System Committee wasformally created on February 17, 1970,
and was given primacy among all joint activities pertaining to the Space Transportation System.
Important concepts established in the agreement included the unclassified nature of the program, the
possibility of international cooperation, and equal participation of NASA and DOD in shuttle devel-
opment, in terms of both investment and operations. This equality of investment was later used as the
basis .fi_r subsequent shuttle pricing agreements.
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[1]
Agreement Between
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and the Department of the Air Force
Concerning the Space Transportation System
This document establishes an agreement between NASA and the Department of the
Air Force, acting as the agent of DoD, to insure that the proposed National Space
Transportation System will be of maximum utility to both NASA and the DoD.
I. Objective of the Space Transportation System
The objective of the Space Transportation System (STS) is to provide the United
States with an economical capability for delivering payloads of men, equipment, supplies,
and other spacecraft to and from space by reducing operating costs an order of magni-
tude below those of present systems.
The program may involve international participation and use. The development of
the STS will be managed by NASA. The project will be generally unclassified. For purpos-
es of this agreement, the STS will consist of the earth-to-orbit Space Shuttle.
II. NASA/USAF STS Committee
A. Organization
In order that the STS be designed and developed to fulfill the objectives of both the
NASA and the DoD in a manner [2] that best serves the national interest, a NASA/USAF
STS Committee is hereby established that will report jointly to the Administrator of the
NASA and the Secretary of the Air Force. The Committee will consist of eight members,
four to be appointed by the Administrator of the NASA and four to be appointed by the
Secretary of the Air Force. The Co-Chairmen of the Committee will be the Associate
Administrator for Manned Space Flight (NASA) and the Assistant Secretary for Research
and Development (Air Force). Any proposal for changing the composition or tunctions
of the Committee will be referred to the NASA Administrator and the Air Force Secretary
for their joint consideration.
B. Function
The Committee will conduct a continuing review of the STS Program and will rec-
ommend steps to achieve the objectives of a system that meets DoD and NASA require-
ments. Specifically, the Committee will review and make recommendations to the
Administrator of NASA and to the Secretary of the Air Force on the establishment and
assessment of program objectives, operational applications, and development plans. This
will [3] include, but not be limited to: Development and operational aspects, technology
status and needs, resource considerations, and interagency relationships.
THOMAS O. PAINE ROBERT C. SILAMANS, JR.
Administrator, NASA Secretary of the Air Force
Date: Feb. 17, 1970 Date: Feb. 17, 1970
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Document 11-32
Document title: William F. Moore, NASA STS Secretary, and Lt. Col. Donald L. Steelman,
USAF STS Secretary, "Space Transportation System Committee: Summary of Activities
for 1970," June 1971.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The Space Transportation System (STS) Committee was established as the policy-level coordination
forum between NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD) for developing the Space Shuttle. It drtnv
its authority from the February 17, 1970, NASA-DOD agreement on the STS. It was through the
forum of the STS Committee that DOD's requirements for the Space Shuttle were first transmitted to
NASA; DOD indicated the conditions under which it would place exclusive reliance on the shuttle.
This report summarizing the committee's first year activities, endorsed by the NASA and Air Force sec-
retaries to the STS Committee, demonstrates the considerable groundwork that was laid during that
time for the joint program. The acronyms MSC, MSFC, and KSC are NASA centers and stand for the
Manned Space Cente,;, the Marshall Space Flight Center, and the Kennedy Space C,ent_ respectively.
The acronym OSSA refers to NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications, and AFSC stands for
the Air Force Space Center.
[1]
Introduction
The NASA/USAF Space Transportation System Committee was formed for the pur-
pose of providing a policy level interface between NASA and the USAF on the problems
of developing the Space Shuttle. An agreement was formally signed on February 17, 1970
by Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force, and Dr. Thomas O. Paine,
Administrator, NASA. The agreement specified the objective of the Space Transportation
System (STS), defined its limits, and established a committee to perform a continuing
review of the program and recommend steps to achieve the objectives of the system that
would meet the needs of both NASA and the DOD. The committee consists of eight
members, four from each agency, and is co-chaired by the Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight (NASA) and the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development
(USAF). A copy of the agreement is attached to this summary.
The original members were:
USAF
Mr. Grant L. Hansen
General Walter Hedrick
General Raymond Gilbert
General E M. Rodgers
Co-Chairman
Member (HQ USAF)
Member (AFSC)
Member (AFSC)
NASA
Mr. Dale D. Myers
Mr. Vincent Johnson
Mr. Lee .]ames
Dr. Chris Kraft, Jr.
Co-Chairman
Member (OSSA)
Member (MSFC)
Member (MSC)
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By separate correspondence the Secretary of the Air Force and the Acting
Administrator of NASA invited the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and
Space Council [NASC] to participate on the committee as an official observer. During the
year the membership has changed in the Air Force representation and provision was
made for specific alternates to attend when the principal was unable to make a called
meeting.
[2] The current membership and alternates are:
USAF
Mr. Grant IL. Hansen--Co-Chairman
Alternate--Mr. Frank Ross
MGen Paul Cooper--Member (AFSC)
Alternate--Col Paul Atkinson
BGen Kenneth Chapman--Member (AFSC)
Alternate----Col Ralph Ford
Col John Albert--Member (AF/RDS)
Alternate--Col Frank Knolle
Official Observer
Mr. William Anders--NASC
AlternateIM. Raymond Gilbert
NASA
Mr. Dale D. Myers--Co-Chairman
Alternate--Mr. Charles Mathews
Mr. VincentJohnson_Member (OSSA)
Alternate--Dr. Robert Wilson
Mr. Lee James--Member (MSFC)
Alternate--Dr. William Lucas
Dr. Chris Kraft, Jr.--Member (MSC)
Alternate--Lt Gen (Ret) Frank Bogart
The following summary of the Space Transportation System Committee's activities
covers the period from the initial meeting on May 28, 1970, througta the sixth meeting on
December 15, 1970.
[3]
USAF Personnel Participation
in the Space Shuttle Program
One of the first questions at the initial meeting of the STS Committee was the extent
to which the Air Force would participate in the Space Shuttle activities. The discussion
focused on USAF personnel participation in the NASA program offices particularly at
MSC and MSFC. SAMSO [Space and Missile Systems Organization] on an ad-hoc basis was
already covering early integration meetings by travel assignments (TDY). NASA stressed
that the activities were beginning to accelerate and that a more permanent arrangement
would be welcome if the Air Force wanted to participate actively. It was emphasized that
very close coordination between NASA and the Air Force at the center level was critical to
the Phase B definition eftort and that this was the most ettective way to facilitate the
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exchange of technical data and program activity status. NASA preferred direct involve-
ment (or detailing) of Air Force personnel in the program activity, but that as a minimum,
immediate liaison was recommended.
At the second meeting of the STS Committee in June 1970, NASA presented its plan
based on non-reimbursable assignment of USAF officers to NASA Centers and
Headquarters. The plan requested five officers each for Headquarters and MSFC, ten offi-
cers for MSC and two officers for KSC during the Phase B activity. When Phases C and D
were begun the Air Force could augment these assignments with additional officers as the
need arose. The USAF accepted the plan for further study and stated that ten qualified
officers would be assigned to SAMSO with five placed at MSFC and five on duty at MSC to
participate in the Phase D activity. They expected to have the officers on site by fall. In the
meantime SAMSO would continue covering the two centers by TDYuntil the assignments
were executed. No assignments were made to KSC but [the] Air Force agreed to reap-
praise its manpower situation and report to the Committee in 90 days. They would also
investigate the possibility of establishing a point of contact in the 6555th Aerospace Test
Wing at Patrick AFB to coordinate activities with KSC.
At the sixth meeting in December the Air Force reported that the two officers request-
ed for KSC would be assigned to SAMSO with duty at KSC and that they should be on
board by July 1971.
[4] As a result of these actions, the following officers are currently participating in the
Space Shuttle activities at the two Centers.
MSFC
LCol Thomas Moore
Maj James A. Feibleman
Capt Byron Thurer
MSC
Maj Patrick Crotty
Maj Gary H. Minar
Maj Charles T. Essmeier
Implementation of Phase B
Space Shuttle Management Plan
NASA reported to the STS Committee at the first meeting its management plan for
implementing the Phase a definition studies. The organization chart attached shows the
relationship of the three Manned Space Flight Centers (MSFC, MSC and KSC) to each
other and to the Headquarters Space Shuttle Office. Also shown were the Phase B con-
tractor management assignments to the centers and the Vehicle System Integration
Activity (VSIA) function between MSC and MSFC with Headquarters participation.
Main points relative to the management of Phase efforts were the assignment of the
North American Rockwell vehicle contract to MSC and the McDonnell Douglas vehicle
contract to MSFC. Houston would have the overall orbiter technical responsibility for
both contractors and Huntsville would have the overall booster technical responsibility for
both contractors. The three Phase B engine contracts with Pratt and Whitney, Aerojet and
Rocketdyne are being managed by MSFC. KSC has representatives in both center program
offices and participates in the integration activity. Program integration activity takes place
on a regular basis and includes representation from the Air Force (SAMSO).
Space Shuttle Facilities Planning
A briefing on the Master Facilities Planning Study was presented to the STS
C<_mtnittee at its first meeting. Basically the NASA Facilities Office is managing a $380K
study by the Ralph M. Parsons Co. The study is to survey the candidate facilities as to their
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adequacy to support the Space Shuttle [5] Program and the costs of modifications or new
construction required to meet criteria established as necessary for the launch, recovery
and refurbishment of tile Space Shuttle. The twelve month study is to culminate in a
report to NASA setting forth the plan having the most favorable overall features as mea-
sured against the "ideal facilities matrix."
The Committee was concerned as to how this study was tied into the facilities activity
of AACB [Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board], but was assured that close
personnel liaison and information exchange would prevent any duplication of effort, h
was stated that the AACB effort is an across-the-board national facility activity whereas the
Parsons study is specifically oriented toward Space Shuttle requirements. It was also point-
ed out that the Air Force had personnel participating in the Space Shuttle Facilities
Planning Group and therefore would be kept fully aware of the progress of the study.
As a part of the discussion the question of industrial funding was raised by NASA, in
particular, as it relates to the use of AEDC [Arnold Engineering Development Center] test
facilities at Tullahoma and the Rocket Propulsion Laboratory Test Stand 1-56 at Haystack
Butte. The present policy of DOD requires user funding for such facilities and the Air
Force did not have FY 71 funds available to support shuttle testing at AEDC. An alterna-
tive would be to reprogram funds within the DOD to support Space Shuttle testing.
However, military priorities for project funding precluded this. Therefore, any Phase B
Space Shuttle testing at AEDC facilities would have to be on a cost reimbursable basis in
accordance with the DOD policy.
Space Tug or Orbit-to-Orbit Shuttle
A discussion of the expected similarities and differences between the DOD and NASA
requirements for the space tug or orbit-to-orbit shuttle (OOS) was presented to the STS
Committee by NASA at the first meeting. The main point emphasized was that a single
design may be possible, but that further conceptual study and definition of mission
requirements were needed.
NASA informed the Committee that it was proceeding with a pre-Phase A study of the
space tug which it hoped would define its requirements. The Air Force reports that it also
was planning to conduct a concept and requirements analysis for the OOS. The
Committee felt that the two studies would be [6] complementary.
The Air Force Co-Chairman indicated that it might be appropriate for the develop-
ment of the OOS to be undertaken by the Air Force. The NASA Co-Chairman stated that
they would like the Air Force to consider that approach. Also the NASA Co-Chairman
reported that the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) had contract-
ed with two groups of foreign contractors for a pre-Phase A study to determine the feasi-
bility and derive a simple definition for a space tug design. The costs of the contracts are
approximately $500K. The STS Committee agreed that ELDO should be encouraged to
continue in their space efforts.
At the sixth meeting in December 1970, NASA briefed the Committee on the ELDO
tug studies and the NASA pre-Phase A Space Tug studies. The various configurations
being studied by ELDO were discussed and the observation was made that nothing dif-
ferent from U.S. findings on the space tug had emerged. NASA concluded their presen-
tation on the pre-Phase A studies briefing with the following list of findings:
a. Reusable tug synchronous mission performance is extremely sensitive to mass
fraction.
b. Ground based tugs will not be recovered for most synchronous missions.
c. Synchronous payload recovery will require tug staging or orbital propellant
loading.
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d. Moderate increase in shuttle payload capability (above the 25K reference pay-
load) will not affect general conclusions or tug utilization for synchronous missions.
e. Current upper stages may serve as effective interim expendable tugs for synchro-
nous missions.
f. Shuttle economic model should assume no synchronous tug or payload recov-
ery-at least for [the] early operational years.
The NASA Co-Chairman stressed that in the tug studies we want to make sure that the
payload and Space Shuttle interface is minimized in order to keep the system complexity
and cost down. NASA also covered the expendable stages for use with the Space Shuttle
in lieu of an OOS or space tug. This included the current state of "kick" stages such as
Agena, [7] Centaur, Burner II, and the Titan Transtage as well as the potential modified
Agena and modified Centaur stages all of which could serve as interim tugs.
The Air Force gave a status report on the DOD orbit-to-orbit shuttle and expendable
stage study efforts. In FY 71 the DOD effort has involved both contractor and in-house
activity to define an OOS that would meet unique DOD requirements. Contracts for con-
ceptual designs of a reusable OOS were let with two contractors in February 1971. This
effort is directed toward meeting DOD needs with an assessment being made to see if
[the] vehicle couldn't meet the needs of both agencies with a minimum of modification.
The Air Force also was specifying that deployment/retrieval considerations for the earth
orbital shuttle/orbit-to-orbit shuttle (EOS/OOS) and payload interfaces be examined.
Engine design studies to define a light weight, high performance propulsion system for
potential use in a high energy upper stage/OOS were being conducted at the same time.
General Security Guide
The development of a general security guide for the Space Shuttle program was
assigned to both NASA and the USAF at the first meeting in May 1970 of the Space
Transportation System Committee. A draft of the security guidelines was presented to the
Committee for review and comment at the second meeting. It was requested that the
guidelines for their comments and a report be made to the Committee at a later date. The
Committee also suggested that the draft be as short as possible. A condensed version was
submitted at the third meeting for consideration and coordination.
Comments were incorporated and the general security guidelines were accepted by
the Committee at the fourth meeting in October 1970. The Co-Chairmen instructed the
Secretariat to prepare the document for their signature. The guidelines were signed on
November 19, 1970 and distributed through channels to all elements participating in the
Space Shuttle Program.
[8]
Space Shuttle Payload Size
The Air Force briefed the STS Committee on DOD payload size and weight require-
ments at the second meeting in June 1970.
Payload physical size has a definite influence on development and operational costs;
however, in order to make the decision, mission utility to both NASA and the DOD must
be considered in the analysis as well. From the baseline the size and weight of future pay-
loads was projected for missions to be flown eight to ten years hence when the shuttle
would be operational. Also the growth history of launch vehicle payload capabilities and
the length of payload fairings were shown as indicators of the need to plan for the accom-
modation large payload mission requirements that would utilize [a] 60 foot by 15 foot
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cargo bay and carry an equivalent payload weight of 40,000 pounds to low earth polarorbit.
The diameters of current launch vehicles restrict their payload diameters which in
turn causes design complications and the attendant high costs for packaging and reliabil-
it),. Furthermore, analysis of available data shows that the pressing need for improved
capability and mission use demands larger diameters and greater payload weight capabil-
ities. Increased lifetime, power and minimnm design cost are additional parameters fiJr
consideration.
Based on required improvements to the present systems, mission needs and payload
growths predicted fi)r the 1980's an equivalent payload weight capability of 40,000 to
53,000 pounds is required to low earth polar orbit; 40,000 to 50,000 pounds is required to
low earth polar orbit. A 60 foot cargo bay length is necessary tot current and proiected
missions and a 15 foot diameter is needed for high energy missions if the 60 foot lengthis not to be exceeded.
It was pointed out that studies [have] shown a Space Shuttle with a 40,000 to 50,000
pound capability, coupled with sufficient payload volume (the baseline requirement) is
the most economical size for DOD and national mission pr¢_iections. NASA studies were
in agreement and also indicated that the larger vehicle was more economical from a total
dollar standpoint but there was the problem of securing the annual funding levels
required for this type [of] development.
[9] The Air Force emphasized that if a shuttle of reduced payload capability was devel-
oped then NASA could expect the Air Force to retain an inventor), of expendable launch
vehicles to satisfy their mission needs and this would cause the shuttle to lose some of its
economic attractiveness and probably degrade the utility of the shuttle. It was also noted
that DOD has not been considering any upgrading of its current stable of expendables
because it is intended that the shuttle, if properly sized and with the proper capability,
would replace them.
NASA suggested that cost tradeoff studies for retaining a limited expendable launch
vehicle capability and developing a smaller Space Shuttle versus the development of a
large Space Shuttle should be considered. This suggestion was accepted and a report was
requested for the next meeting.
At the fourth meeting the Committee was informed by NASA that the 60 foot by 15
foot cargo bay should be retained and that the 25,000 pound payload to reference orbit
(55 ° x 270 nm) with air-breathing engines in [it] could be increased to 40,000 pounds to
low earth polar orbit by removing the air-breathing engines. The USAF emphasized that
operational and safety considerations must be analyzed before such a proposal would be
accepted. NASA indicates that the airbreathers would be re_ained for all development/
test flights and also for the early operational flights.
International Participation
At the second meeting of the STS Committee, the Office of International Affairs dis-
cussed the possibility of foreign industry and governments participating in the Space
Shuttle Program. This would require a technology exchange between the parties involved.
The STS Committee received a request from the Chairman, lnteragency Ad Hoc Group
on NSDM 72 for assistance in establishing procedures for the exchange of technical data
with those nations desiring to participate in the development program. The Air Force
indicated they had been studying this and therefore was assigned the task of drafting a
technology sensitivity guidelines document for review by the Comnfittee.
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While the sensitivity guidelines document was being coordinated in both the DOD
and NASA, the Phase A and B contractors were advised by NASA to control foreign rep-
resentatives [ 10] within the contractor's system on the same basis as an.',, foreign visitor. At
the fifth meeting the STS Committee learned that the Grumman agleement with Dornier
of West Germany and the North American Rockwell (NAR) agreement with
Messerschmidt, Boelkow and Blohm (MBB) and British Aircraft Company (BAC) had
been approved in two phases. The first phase provides for transfer of general data and tim
second phase provides for the transfer of more specific data after tim U.S. contractors and
their foreign participants have defined the areas of interest and government-to-
government agreements have been approved.
The STS Committee requested copies of the coordinated sensitivity document be sup-
plied to each member at tim sixth meeting with comments to be forwarded to the
Secretariat by December 28, 1970. The STS Committee also decided that the sensitivity doc-
ument, when approved, would be subject to semi-annual reviews. (The document was sttl)-
sequently approved and forwarded to the NASA Office of International Affairs--Code I).
Other Government Agency/Other Military Service
Space Shuttle Mission Requirements
NASA was requested by the STS Committee to check with other civilian agencies and
the Air Force was requested to check with other military services for all possible mission
requirements that might he factored into the Space Shuttle mission model being formu-
lated for the Phase B study contractors. NASA reported at the third meeting that mission
requirements from other government agencies are coordinated by the Meteorological
Satellite Program Review Board and provided to NASA planners when these requirenlents
are firm. The Air Force reported that Arm],' and Navy mission requirements have been val-
idated and are reflected in the extended DOD mission and traffic models provided to
NASA on 4 June 1970. These models cover projected missions and traffic through 1990.
The Air Force will keep the model data current by updating or revising when necessary.
[11]
Early Flight Payload Identification
NASA informed the Air Force at the third STS Committee meeting that they were
attempting to identify meaningful specific payloads that could be candidates for the early
orbital shutde flights. Primary emphasis was being placed on identifying payloads for low
altitude missions, particularly those which would not require high energy stages. Payloads
for high energy missions [that] would require additional propulsive stages would also be
identified but in a separate category. It was suggested that the Air Force also identify a
number of specific payloads that could be candidates for early flights.
At the fourth meeting the STS Committee was briefed on the results of a ,joint
NASA/USAF-SAMSO study leading to the selection of specific payloads that could be car-
ried on early shuttle flights. The STS Committee requested that USAF and NASA field
installations be provided copies of the study for review and comment. Guidance for the
review was given by USAF (Hdqtrs) and [the NASA Office of Manned Space Flight].
A briefing on the in-depth review of the first ten Space Shuttle missions was present-
ed in December at the sixth meeting of the STS Committee. The NASA portion of the
briefing provided data on the constraints that must be placed upon the early payloads and
the capabilities that the crew and orbiter will have on the first few flights. With these lim-
itations in mind, several prospective payloads were discussed but no hard schedule was
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proposed nor desired. The USAF portion was classified and provided alternate payloads
to those first proposed in the original package. They suessed that the Air Force data was
for planning purposes and as such could change as mission requirements changed during
the next eight years of shuttle development.
The STS Committee decided that NASA and the USAF should continue the study
since it had proven a good mechanism for learning about some of the expected opera-
tional and interface problems.
[12]
Phase B Cost/Design Performance
Management Plan
NASA presented its Cost/Design Performance Management Plan which was imple-
mented during Phase B at the third meeting of the STS Committee in August 1970. The
plan resulted from the need to assure NASA that they could afford to build the Space
Shuttle and that the contractors were aware of the limitations of the NASA projected bud-
get. By establishing objectives early in the program, NASA hoped to give the contractors
"bogeys" which they could use in their definition studies and that the studies would pro-
duce a realistic program that NASA and the nation could aftord.
These cost objectives or "bogeys" are in fact specific cost estimates established as a tar-
get or baseline reference to accomplish the specific goal. The bogeys which the Phase C
vehicle contractors are using now related primarily to that portion of the Space Shuttle
program for which they are responsible. It is important to realize that other cost elements
such as main engines, facilities, special test handling equipment, etc., will have to be taken
into account in addition to the vehicle contractor cost in order to arrive at a total Space
Shuttle program cost. Cost objectives for these other elements of the program have been
set and will be used at the appropriate time in the phased program plan.
The fundamental principal of the cost objective plan is to provide working cost tar-
gets as a cost reference in the design selection process during the Phase B definite effort.
Cost thus becomes a major design criteria in the same sense as performance. The high
cost elements and influence will be identified and consideration can be given to alternate
design approaches or a modification of the requirements if necessary, e.g., the decision to
make GLOW [gross lifioff weight] a tradeoff variable and baseline the payload weight as
a means of lowering costs and simplifying design.
The necessity to stay within the cost objective can then be an incentive to find and
adopt new ways of doing business including subsystems tradeoff. This method thus
becomes the shared responsibility of both the government and the contracts to keep costs
as low as possible while at the same time maintaining the high quality and reliability that
have been a hallmark of the space program to date.
[13]
Crossrange Requirements
Operational requirements of the DOD and refinement of NASA studies have resulted
in the crossrange of the Space Shuttle being baselined at 1100 nm.
In a classified briefing at the fourth meeting of the STS Committee the Air Force
pointed out that the military need for a high crossrange is based on DOD dedicated mis-
sions requiring a fast response in the event of a national crisis, a quick return from orbit,
[or] abort to orbit[,] and return to a high crossrange, the order of 1100 nm, is necessary
to provide the operational flexibility required by these types of mission.
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One way of achieving this requirement is to trade payload weight for the added
Thermal Protection System (TPS) weight which will protect the vehicle in the hypersonic
maneuvers that produce the desired crossrange. A study to determine the merit of such a
trade was initiated by the Air Force. At the sixth STS meeting the Air Force gave a classi-
fied briefing covering the preliminary findings of the study.
Of the DOD applications, the near polar missions were shown as the ones requiring
the 1100 nm crossrange if the orbiter is to return to the launch site after once around.
This high crossrange requirement could be reduced if alternate landing sites were used.
However, the orbiter would have to be ferried from the alternate recovery site to the
launch site for refurbishment prior to its next launch. Use of alternate sites then would
require additional handling and servicing equipment. Since the orbiter ferry range is lim-
ited to about 700 nm, either in-flight refueling or several flight legs night be required
depending on the location of the alternate site.
About 30% of the DOD missions require the orbiter to carry an equivalent payload
weight of about 40,000 pounds to low entry orbit and still have a high crossrange capa-
bility. This equivalent payload weight does not include the propellant weight of 11,000
pounds required for abort to orbit using the then currently baselined engine size. (Engine
size has subsequently been increased to 550,000 pounds of thrust at sea level.)
The briefing concluded that, for some DOD missions, high crossrange requirements
are coincident with heavy payloads. Therefore, unless alternate recovery sites and ferry-
ing [14] capabilities are shown to be operationally attractive, the shuttle orbiter must have
both the 1100 nm crossrange capability and the ability to deliver 40,000 pounds to low
earth polar orbit. This capability will enable the Space Shuttle to capture the type of mis-
sion discussed above.
Air Force Phase B Study Tasks
The Air Force briefed the Committee on their FY71 STS study tasks at the third meet-
ing. Their primary emphasis was a study effort to identify the functions and operating
modes peculiar to the support of DOD missions. Contract tasks were proposed as add-on
effort to the two NASA Phase B vehicle contracts. This would provide an assessment of
NASA Phase B candidate Space Shuttle system capabilities to support missions unique to
DOD.
The contractors would perform tradeoff studies and cost analysis to determine the
impact of specific DOD needs on baseline system design and operations and to determine
the modifications necessary to the baseline configuration in order to capture the DOD
missions. The Air Force assured NASA that this study effort would identify those DOD mis-
sions that the current NASA baseline configuration would satisfy. It was emphasized that
contractor teams supporting the DOD study effort would be identifiable and separate
from the teams performing work under the NASA Phase B contract. The contracting
alternatives were discussed and the STS Committee recommended that the NASA Phase
B Space Shuttle contracts be amended to accomplish the specified Air Force tasks. Also
recommended was a management approach which assured the close integration of the
SAMSO and NASA study efforts. NASA agreed with this approach and felt that the addi-
tion of thc two $300K tasks would contribute significantly to the Phase B effort.
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Document 11-33
Document title: John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to Dr.
James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, April 13, 1972.
Source: Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History
Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Because a large number r¢ militarv and national security, payload._ are placed into polar orbit._ and
the launch sites at Cape Canaveral are unsuitable for th-is purpose, the military has launched satel-
lites into ht[4h-inclination orbits from Vandenberg Air Force Base in ('alifornia since Februar_, 1959.
The use of Dtndenberg a, a shuttle launch and hmding site was one of the primary drivers of shut-
tle design , determining o'o_s-range requirements and abort modes. In April 1972, the DejOartment of
Defense officiaUy concurred with the selection of both Kermedv Space Center and lhndenberg as
launch and landin_ site,s f_rr the Space Shuttle.
[no pagination]
Dr. James C. Fletcher
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, I).C. 20546
13 April 1972
Dear Dr. Fletcher:
This is to advise you that the Department of Defense concurs in the selection of tile
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, as
launch and landing sites for the Space Shuttle, as follows:
1. The initial launch and landing site will be at l_S(: and be used for research and
development launches and for all easterly operational launches feasible flom KSC.
General purpose shuttle facilities for all users will he provided by NASA at KSC on a time
schedule compatible with the shuttle development program.
2. A second operational site for missions requiring high inclination launches not
feasible from KSC is planned at Vandenberg Air Force Base toward the end of the 1970's.
General purpose shuttle facilities for all users will be provided by the Department of
Defense at Vandenberg AFB on a time schedule compatible with progress in the shuttle
development program and timely utilization of the shuttle for operational missions
requiring high inclination launches.
Sincerely,
John S. Foster, Jr.
Document 11-34
Document title: George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, to NASA Associate
Administrator for Manned Space Flight, "Space Tug Decision," October 3, 1973.
Source: Deputy Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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This memorandum from NASA Deputy Administrator George M. Low reflected NASA thinking
regarding management of the space tug. Low _ reasoning included Department of Defense (DOD)
funding of part of the development costs of the overall Space Transportation System, so NASA could
reduce its costs and peak funding requirements. Furthermore, Low considered it important that the
Air Force get more involved in the shuttle's development. DOD had committed to use the shuttle con-
ditionally, requesting further study of its performance and technology and demon._tration of both its
cost savings and operational status. Deeper involvement by the Air Force, it was assumed, would lead
to its stronger commitment to the shuttle. Don Fuqua, mentioned in the memorandum, was a Florida
congressman active on the House Committee on Science and Astronautics. Jim Wilson was a com-
mittee staff member.
[l]
Memorandum
October 3, 1973
TO: M/Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight
FR: AD/Deputy Administrator
SUBJECT: Space Tug Decision
Don Fuqua asked to see me privately after the ASTP [Apollo-Soyuz Test Project] brief-
ing. During the private meeting he asked, "Does NASA intend to develop the Tug or do
you intend to let the Air Force take it away from you?"
I told Don that this decision had not yet been made but that NASA management was
quite interested in having the Air Force develop the Tug for two reasons:
1. to minimize NASA's peak funding requirements, and
2. to get the Air Force (DOD) more deeply involved in the Space Shuttle develop-
ment.
Don voiced a number of concerns, most of which are expressed in the attached doc-
ument, which, I believe, was prepared by Jim Wilson. I promised two things:
1. Phil Culbertson would get together with Jim Wilson soon to discuss some of the
points raised in the document. Specifically, the question of the applicability of the Space
Act would be discussed.
2. [NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Dale] Myers and Low
would get together with Fuqua toward the end of October to discuss the entire issue.
[2] I am not sure whether the end of October date needs to be firm, but certainly we
ottght to talk to Fuqua about it before a final decision is made.
By copy of this memo, I am asking Gerry Griffin to keep track of setting up this
meeting.
George M. Low
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Document 11-35
Document title: James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, to Honorable James R.
Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, June 21, 1974.
Document 11-36
Document title: W.P. Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Honorable James C.
Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, August 7, 1974.
Source: Both in Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
NASA and the Office o[ Management and Budget had agreed on January 3, 1972, that the ,Space
Shuttle would have a large payload bay, capable of handling the largest U.S. military satellites being
planned. This did not mark a policy derision of exclusive use of the shuttle, howev_'as is evident in
this letter from NASA AdministratorJames Fletcher to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and the
reply from.Deputy Secretary of Defense W.P Clements. By 1994, the Department of Defense (DOD)
was examzmng the wisdom of a complete phaseout of expendable launch vehicles, which raised seri-
ous concern within NASA and Congress. Later budgetary decisions would make abandoning expend-
able launch vehicles a de facto policy because of the cost of maintaining both options. This de facto
policy, howev_ was never explicitly stated; DOD continued to favor a prudent expendable launch
vehicle backup policy. The handwritten note on the Clements letter is from NASA Deputy
Administrator George Low to Fletcher. In the Fletcher letteg, Mal Currie was the Director of Defense
Research and Eng6neering; his name was misspeUed by Clements.
[1]
Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC 20301
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Document 11-35
June 21, 1974
I had hoped to see you before having to leave town for two weeks, but since this has
not been possible I am taking this way to alert you to the matter 1 wanted to talk to you
about.
It concerns the Space Shuttle. Through our regular contacts with I)OD, we under-
stand that in the present review of the DOD five-year plan questions are being raised on
the DOD participation in the shuttle program which had been agreed to for planning pur-
poses at the time the program was approved by the President. Questions are being raised
on the DOD's provision of launch and landing facilities on the West Coast, on future DOD
procurement of orbiters for DOD use, and on the planned phase-out of DOD's use of
expendable launch vehicles.
We have discussed these problems with the Air Force and Mal Currie and they are
working on ways to reduce the cost of the facilities planned at Vandenberg Air Force Base
and to minimize the budgetary impact on DOD procurement of orbiters. Neither the
VAFB facilities nor the procurement of orbiters are matters requiring actual decisions now
or in the FY 1976 budget.
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My concern is that a decision in the DOD planning process to back away from previ-
ously planned DOD participation in the shuttle program, or a decision which implies that
the DOD will not rely on the shuttle for its space activities in the 1980's, could be used by
Congressional opponents of the program to attack and perhaps even cut back the shuttle
development program.
As you know, the Space Shuttle is an Administration program that is national in scope,
and decisions to proceed with the shuttle were based, in part, on previous DOD studies
which indicated [2] very substantial benefits to DOD through use of the shuttle. I'm sure
you would plan to consult with me in advance if you believed that any decisions making
significant changes in DOD's previously planned role and use of the Space Shuttle are
necessary at this time. However, [ was afraid that due to the press of other DOD business
such consultation might have been overlooked and therefore was most anxious to see you
before I left.
In my absence George Low will be available to meet with you whenever convenient.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
James C. Fletcher
Administrator
Document 11-36
Aug 7 1974
[no pagination]
Honorable James C. Fletcher
Administrator
National Aeronautics & Space Administration
Washington, D. C. 20546
Dear Dr. Fletcher:
The Secretary and I were pleased to have the opportunity to discuss with you and Dr.
Low the Space Shuttle program and the concerns which you raised earlier in your June
21, 1974, letter.
The Department of Defense is planning to use the Space Shuttle, which NASA is
developing, to achieve more effective and flexible military space operations in the filture.
Once the Shuttle's capabilities and low operating cost are demonstrated we expect to
launch essentially all of our military space payloads on this new vehicle and phase out of
inventory our current expendable launch vehicles.
Recent budget actions assure that adequate outyear funding will be available to devel-
op a low cost modified upper stage for use with the Shuttle. This stage will be ready for
operational use at Kennedy Space Center concurrently with the Shuttle in 1980. Funding
is also included now in out budget for establishing a minimum cost Shuttle launch capa-
bility at Vandenberg Air Force Base consistent with realistic DOD and NASA needs. This
addition should be available around December 1982; however, funding constraints could
cause some delays. As we made clear in our conversation, overall budget constrainLs force
us to defer any consideration of orbiter buys at this time.
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Dr.Curry[sic]hasbeenverymuchinvolvedinourbudgetarydeliberationson the
useoftheShuttleandwillbeavailabletodiscussthesepoimsfurfllerwithyouatanytime.
Sincerely
W.P.Clements
Document 11-37
Document tide: John F. Yardley, NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight; John J.
Martin, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and Development); James C.
Fletcher, NASA Administrator; William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense,
"NASA/DOD Memorandum of Understanding on Management and Operation of the
Space Transportation System," January 14, 1977.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
In the mid-1970s, NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD) began to discuss the management
and operations of the Space Shuttle system. These discussions resulted in a memorandum of under-
standing, which expanded earlier principles of cooperation between NASA and DOD. The document
avoided asserting that the Space Transportation System would be the exclusive launch vehicle for
DOD, referring to it instead as the primary launch vehic&.
Ill
NASA/DOD
Memorandum of Understanding on
Management and Operation of
the Space Transportation System
1.0 PURPOSE: This Memorandum of Understanding establishes the broad policies and
principles that will govern the relationships between the D()D and NASA relevant to the
development, acquisition and operation of the national Space Transportation System.
The Memorandum of Understanding shall be used as the basis for more detailed docu-
mentation between the NASA and the DOD further delineating Space Transportation
System management and operations concepts and the specific roles and responsibilities of
each agency.
For purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding, the national Space
Transportation System consists of an earth-to-orbit Space Shuttle, the upper stage(s)
required for orbital velocities exceeding the Shuttle capability, and the ground support
equipment and facilities necessary for operation of the system. A DOD-developed expend-
able Interim Upper Stage (IUS) will be available concurrently [2] with the operational
Space Shuttle for use by both agencies. There is planning for development of Spinning
Solid Upper Stage (SSUS) to supplement the IUS which would be available concurrently
with the operational Space Shuttle for use by both agencies.
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2.0 BACKGROUND: On February 13, 1969, the President appointed a multi-agency Space
Task Group to develop recommendations on the direction which the U.S. Space Program
should take in the Post Apollo period. The Space Task Group recommended that a
reusable Space Transportation System be developed to allow more economical and effec-
tive use of space.
On February 17, 1970, NASA and the Air Force, acting as the designated agent lot
DOD, established by joint agreement the NASA/USAF Space Transportation System
Committee to provide an instrumentality for joint review and recommendations con-
cerning development and evolution of a Space Transportation System which fulfill the
objectives of both NASA and DOD in a manner that best serves the national interest.
[3] On January 5, 1972, the President decided that the United States should proceed at
once with the development of a space transportation system capable of providing routine
access to space and taking the place of all present launch vehicles except the very small-
est and the very largest.
On April 13, 1972, the selection of J.F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida, and
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, as launch/landing sites for the Space Shuttle was
agreed upon.
3.0 GENERAL POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES: The Space Transportation System (STS) is a
national program designed to serve all users---both civil and defense. The evolution of a
viable, cost effective system requires the efficient use of extensive national resources, pri-
marily those of NASA, DOD and the aerospace industry. The overall planning and coor-
dination to insure the most effective utilization of these resources in the development,
acquisition and operation of the STS are the responsibility of NASA. The DOD will use the
STS and participate as a partner in development, acquisition, and operation activities as
specifically defined herein.
[4] Effective and efficient use of the national STS requires an environment of under-
standing and cooperation between the agencies. To this end, there shall be maintained a
free and effective interchange of essential technical, financial, and managerial informa-
tion between the two agencies. This interchange shall be accomplished primarily through-
out the NASA/USAF Space Transportation System Committee. Coordination will be
maintained with the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board and other joint
groups established by mutual agreement.
It is anticipated that interest in the National Space Transportation System will con-
tinue to grow as more and more agencies recognize the merits and benefits associated
with a non-expendable means for placing and retrieving payloads in space. The STS
should provide benefits for many varied space requirements. Fulfillment of requirements
from actual and potential users of this system must be given careful consideration. Insofar
as their fulfillment does not compromise other priority requirements to an unreasonable
degree, the}' will be accommodated.
[5] The cooperation and coordination required will be implemented so as to assure con-
sistency with applicable policy with respect to the relationship between civil and military
space activities.
4.0 MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS CONCEFTS: The overall objective is to ensure that
the national Space Transportation System will be of maximum utility to both agencies.
The accomplishment of this objective will be under the purview of the joint NASA/USAF
STS Committee.
The following concepts, policies and principles, and the associated roles and respon-
sibilities are agreed to:
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4. 1 NASA RESPONSIBILITIES: The NASA is responsible for developing the overall STS
operations concepts and plans for serving as overall financial manager for the STS. In
addition:
4.1.1 The NASA is responsible for the development of the Space Shuttle, to include
the orbiter and its propulsion systems, the solid rocket boosters, the external tank and
general purpose ground support equipment and facilities.
[6] 4.1.5 The NASA will make every effort to incorporate the DOD requirements into
the Space Shuttle, with due consideration for schedule and cost impacts, in order that
the STS be designed and developed to fulfill the objectives of future uses of the STS.
4.1.3 The NASA is responsible for providing the general purpose Shuttle equip-
ment and facilities to perform the ground, launch and landing activities for all Space
Shuttle operations at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). NASA will plan for an initial
operational capability at KSC in 1980.
4.1.4 The NASA will plan to use the Interim Upper Stage (IUS) for appropriate
missions and is responsible for providing to DOD those requirements affecting the
IUS design which are considered important to meet NASA objectives. NASA will pro-
vide the USAF with funds for their peculiar IUS requirements.
[7] 4.1.5 The NASA will plan to use the IUS for all of its planetary missions for those
earth orbital missions that are not more economically achieved by the SSUS. The
SSUS will be used primarily for get-synchronous missions of the type currently flown
by the expendable Delta and Atlas-Centaur vehicles.
4.1.6 The NASA is the responsible agency for Space Shuttle flight planning and
interacting all flights and users. NASA will provide fbr management, integration,
flight operations, and control for all Shuttle flights regardless of launch or landing
site used. For DOD dedicated missions DOD will provide the mission director. STS
users will provide to NASA their requirements in the fbrmat and to the detail required
by NASA to allow the hardware and software integration of the payload or combined
upper stage payload combination. Payload mission planning and operations are the
responsibility of the payload agency. Funding for these activities will be in accordance
with the reimbursement sub[-]agreement referred to in 4.1.8.
[8] 4.1.7 NASA with USAF assistance will develop integrated STS logistics and training
plans encompassing, JSC [Johnson Space Center], I_$C, and VAFB.
4.1.8 NASA, as financial manager of the STS, is responsible for establishing an STS
pricing and reimbursement policy for all non-DOD users for the STS operational era.
Because of DOD's heavy investment, large usage, and the operation of VAFB, the
DOD pricing and reimbursement arrangements will be jointly negotiated between
NASA and DOD and will be set forth in a more detailed NASA/DOD sub[-]agree-
ment.
4.2 DOD RESPONSIBILITIES: The DOD will plan to use the STS as the primary vehicle for
placing payloads in orbit. In addition:
4.5.1 The DOD is responsible for providing to NASA those requirements affecting
the Space Transportation System which are the responsibility of NASA and consid-
ered essential to meet the DOD objectives.
[9] 4.2.2 The DOD will develop the IUS including the general purpose ground sup-
port equipment. The DOD will insure that both DOD and NASA requirements are
considered in the current IUS validation phase.
4.5.3 The USAF is the responsible agency for planning the mission integration of
users involving DOD programs and international military activities covered by gov-
ernment-to--government agreements. The USAF is the focal point for providing the
necessary data to NASA for the STS integration of the integrated DOD payload upper
stage combination.
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4.2.4 The USAF is responsible for providing the general purpose Shuttle equip-
ment and facilities to perform the ground, launching and landing activities for all
Space Shuttle operations at VAFB. The USAF will operate VAFB and plan for an ini-
tial operational capability at VAFB of 1982.
[ 10] 4.3 OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES
4.3.1 The resources of both agencies which can contribute to the development,
testing, production, training and operations for the STS will be used to the maximum
extent possible. The plans and agreements on agency roles and responsibilities for use
of these resources will be developed as required.
4.3.2 To the maximum extent possible, ground support equipment and ground
operating procednres developed for use at KSC by NASA will be used by DO[) at
VAFB. NASA will consider the DOD operational needs at VAFB in the development of
KSC equipment and procedures.
4.3.3 Each agency is responsible for providing its own payload facilities external to
the launch pad area. Launch pad payload facilities will be provided by the developing
agency to satisfy the normal mode of payload operations at that launch site. Other
payload peculiar facilities and [ground support equipment] will be provided [ 11 ] by
the agency responsible for the peculiar payload. Mutual usage of facilities will be con-
sidered where feasible and appropriate.
4.3.4 Orbiter flight control for all missions will be the responsibility of the NASA
JSC Mission Control Center (MCC) unless mission traffic changes or security needs
require that a DOD MCC be developed. DOD and NASA will agree on DOD peculiar
security provisions required at NASA facilities. Such provisions will be subjected to
negotiated reimbursement.
4.3.5 STS flight elements procured will be interchangeable for use on either
agency's missions, and capable of being operated at all designated sites.
4.3.6 A procurement strategy for acquisition of STS production items will be joint-
ly developed by NASA and the USAF for both initial investment and continuing pro-
curement.
4.3.7 The STS will be compatible with the communications, command, and control
systems of both agencies.
[12] 4.3.8 An operating/using agency(ies) mission model, to include expendable boost-
er transition and phase-out plans, will be maintained to provide the basis for program
and operational analyses and planning.
4.3.9 This Memorandum of Understanding represents the current status of agree-
ments between NASA and the DOD on development, acquisition and operation of the
Space Transportation System. Revisions and/or amendments will be made as required
to maintain the currency of this document.
5.0 EFFECTIVE DATE: This Memorandum of Understanding is effective on the last day
of the signatures below:
John E Yardley
Associate Administrator
for Space Flight
.John J. Martin
Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force (Research and
Development)
Date: 13 October, 1976 Date: 13 October 1976
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APPROVED:
James c. Fletcher
National Aeronaulics and
Space Administration
William t', Clements, Jr.
1)eputy Secretary of Defense
Date: I)ecember 6, 1976 Date: 1-14-77
Document 11-38
Document title: John J. Martin, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and
Development), Department of Defense; John E Yardley, NASA Associate Administrator
for Space Flight; Robert N. Parker, Acting Director, Defense Research and Engineering,
Department of Defense; A.M. Lovelace, NASA Deputy Administrator, "Memorandum of
Agreement Between NASA and DOD: Basic Principles for NASA/DOD Space
Transportation System Launch Reimbursement," March 7, 1977.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
]ohn J. Martin, Assistant &cretary of the Air Force (Research and Developnw, nt), and John E Yardle_,,
NASA Associate Administrator for SpaceFlight, signed an agreement in March 1977 that determined
what the Department of Defense (DOD) would pay for shuttle lau n ch services. For the first six years
of operation, DOD would pay NASA what amounted to the intremental costs of materials and ser-
vices. This agreement later caused much public discussion about the favorable price allowed DOD pay-
loads, but it is important to note that this decision had been based on the recognition of equal involve-
ment established in the original Space Transportation System agreement of February 1970 (Document
11-21 in this volume). VAFB is the acronym for Vandenberg Air Force Base, and KSC stands for
Kennedy Space Cent_
[1]
Memorandum of Agreement Between NASA and DOD
SUBJECT: Basic Principles for NASA/DOD Space Transportation System Launch
Reimbursement
The intent of this reimbursement agreement is to encourage efficient operation, early
transition from expendable launch vehicles to the Space Shuttle, provide pricing sta-
bility and to establish a mutually acceptable price for STS launch and flight services.
This agreement applies to DOD sponsored US payloads and DOD cooperative agree-
ment payloads.
2. It is agreed that:
(a) The DOD should pay a fair share price to have payloads placed in orbit by the
Space Transportation System.
(b) The price to the DOD should recognize that both the DOD and NASA will incur
STS investment, operating and support costs.
(c) NASA, as financial manager of the STS, is responsible for establishing an STS
pricing and reimbursement policy for all non-DOD users which should recover
EXPLORING THE UNKNO'O,2q 387
[2] 3.
(a)
(b)
appropriate support and depreciation of investment costs. NASA will reimburse
the DOD for appropriate use charges paid to NASA under NASA's reimburse-
ment policy (reference Federal Register, dated January 21, 1977) in addition to
any other changes as may be specifically required by law at the time of contract.
(d) The DOD reimbursement to NASA will be based on the costs of materials and ser-
vices, to be mutually agreed upon. The DOD will provide the VAFB Space Shuttle
launch support for all non-DOD users in return for provision by NASA of all
Shuttle launch operations support from KSC and Shuttle flight operations sup-
port for all DOD flights. These services are projected to be of approximately
equal value to each agency.
In line with the above, we agree that:
The DOD should be charged a fixed price for the first six years of operations.
The initial six year price per launch should be a realistic projected materials and
services cost per launch averaged over the first six years. The materials and ser-
vices costs definitions are set forth in Appendix A.
(c) There should he no recoupment of prior years costs ever or under the mutually
agreed upon projected costs of part 3b.
(d) For launches after the first six years of STS operations, the price to DOD will be
adjusted annually based on actual costs projected each year for materials and ser-
vices. The adjustment is intended to insure meeting the goals established in parts
2a and 3c of this Agreement.
(e) The DOD and NASA agree to establish the price of STS launches for the DOD.
The specific price for materials and services will take into consideration the pro-
grammatic, operational and technical services uncertainties in providing STS
launch services during the six year fixed price period. The mutually agreed to
price is $12.2M in FY 1975 dollars escalated according to a mutually agreed to ecoo
nomic index.
This agreement is contingent on the DOD meeting the VAFB STS launch site activa-
tion schedule agreed to in the MOU dated January 14, 1977, that NASA meet the [ini-
tial operational capability] dates for the KSC launch site and the Shuttle, and that
NASA provide an adequate orbiter fleet.
DOD agrees to reimburse NASA for STS launches in the fiscal year prior to the fiscal
year of launch and at least twelve months prior to the planned launch date. The reim-
bursement will be made in dollars escalated to the fiscal year of payment (reference
paragraph 3e above). If after payment [3] for a DOD launch, the launch is slipped or
cancelled, the DOD will receive credit on a future launch. The DOD and NASA will
develop a launch schedule three years prior to launch based on the most probable
launch requirements. The schedule will be updated annually.
This agreement becomes an integral part of the NASA/DOD Memorandum of
Understanding on Management and Operations of the Space Transportation System
dated January 14, 1977.
John E Yardley
Associate Administrator
for Space Flight
National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
4.
5.
6.
John J. Martin
Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Research and Development)
Department of Defense
Date: 7 MAR 1977 MAR 7 1977
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Robert N. Parker
Acting Director, Defense Research
and Engineering
Department of Defense
Date: 7 MAR 1977
A.M. Lovelace
Deputy Administrator
National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
MAR7 1977
[no pagination]
Appendix A
The total of all costs incurred by the government for the procurement of all expend-
ed hardware; refurbishment hardware and all flight spares and provisions excluding exter-
nal tank propellants, the maintenance and support costs included in the $12.2M are:
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
Refnrbishment
Spares
Engine Overhaul and Test
Transportation
Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's)
Solid Propellants
Refurbishment of SRB's
Spares
Procurement of Replacement Units
Transportation
External Tank (ET)
Production
Spares
Transportation (excludes West Coast Port to Launch Site Transportation)
System Support
ET, SRB and SSME Sustaining Engineering Support Services
Orbiter Spares
Replenishment and Transportation of LRU's and Shop Replaceable Units to
Support Orbiter [Hardware] Maintenance and Replacement
Crew GPE
Replacement and Replenishment Hardware and Field and Maintenance Support
for all Crew Related GPE
Contract Administration
Costs Associated _dth Contract Administration of all Shuttle Direct Support
Con tractors
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Document 11-39
Document Title: George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, Co-Chairman, Aeronautics
and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), and Malcolm R. Currie, Director of
Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, Co-Chairman, AACB, "Joint
NASA/DOD Position Statement on Space Shuttle Orbiter Procurement," January 23,
1976.
Source: Documentary History Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington
University, Washington, D.C.
The initial launch rate for the shuttle was set at 60flights per year, with 40 fiom Kennedy Space
Center and 20from Vandenberg Air Force Base. NASA soon determined, howev_ that this flight rate
was unachievable without a five-orbiter fleet, and in 1976 the space agency began to ask for a fifth
orbite_. NASA expected the Air Force to pay for this vehicle. Department of Defense (DOD) leadership
refused to acknowledge that its mission dictated the need for the fifth orbiter and feared it would have
to procure the vehicle on its own. NASA and DOD agreed that a fifth orbiter was needed, but both
agencies deferred the decision to budget funds for the fourth and fiflh orbiters, as well as the decision
on who would pay for them. Ultimately, only four orbiters were built initially. A fifth orbiter was not
built until after the loss of the Challenger.
[no pagination]
Joint NASA/DOD Position Statement
on Space Shuttle Orbiter Procurement
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense
agree that five Space Shuttle Orbiters are needed to meet our national traffic model
requirements. Orbiters are funded by NASA within the [design, development, testing, and
evaluation] and [the] production programs. Neither agency has budgeted fimds for the
remaining two Orbiters. While this is a current interagency Space Shuttle issue, NASA has
evolved a production plan which does not require an FY 1977 funding increment.
Therefore, NASA and DOD agree to work together to resolve this issue as part of the FY
1978 budget cycle activities.
George M. Low
Deputy Administrator
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Co-Chairman, AACB
23Jan 1976
Date
Malcolm R. Currie
Director of Defense Research
and Engineering
Department of Defense
Co-Chairman, AACB
January 23, 1976
Date
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Plan for NASA-DOD Orbiter
Procurement Decision
1. Fletcher-Clements Exchange of Letters
2. Currie/Low sign position paper
3. Currie/I,ow prepare detailed request
for NASA/DOD issues paper to be
prepared by STS Committee
4. STS Committee address the following
issues:
a. Verify need for 5 orbiters
b. Develop detailed budget plans, using
various delivery assumptions, and assuming
either NASA or DOD funding
c. Prepare draft issues paper for
Fletcher-Rumsfeld meeting
5. STS Committee prepare monthly progress
reports addressed to Currie and Low.
Currie and Low meet as necessary
6. Fletcher-Rumsfeld meeting
7. IfFletcher-Rumsfeld cannot agree on
which agency funds orbiter, prepare
joint Presidential issues paper
8. Fletcher-Rumsfeld-Lynn discuss joint
issues paper
9. Fletcher-Rumsfeld-Lynn meet with
President
Dec 75/Jan 76
Jan 76
Jan 76
By Aug 76
Feb, Mar, Apr,
May, Jun, Jul
Aug 76
Aug 76
Aug 76
Sep 76
Document 11-40
Document title: General Robert T. Marsh, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, to
General Charles A. Gabriel, Chief of Staff, USAF, August 5, 1982, with attachment.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
By the time the Space Shuttle became operational, it had changed considerably from what the Air Force
had originally anticipated. The Air Force faced launch costs totaling nearly $300 million per flight.
Air Force Systems Command Commander General Robert T. Marsh, who was in charge of Air Force
participation in the ,Space Transportation System, felt it was necessar_ to inform Air Force Chief of
Staff General Charles A. Gabriel of rising shuttle costs. His information package provides a detailed
comparison of launch costs for a variety of Titan and ,Space ,Shuttle vehic& mixes.
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General Charles A. Gabriel
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
Washington, DC 20330
5 AUG 1982
Dear Chief
Although many of us are familiar with projected costs of conventional weapons sys-
tems, the understanding of space systems and support costs, as well as future predictions,
is not as clear. To enhance this understanding, I've provided a macro-perspective of where
launch costs in the Shuttle era are headed.
I am emphasizing launch costs in this package because I want to alert you to the sig-
nificant Air Force requirements we will see when the STS at Vandenberg AFB and [the
Consolidated Space Operations Center] become operational. The effective cost to ride
[the] Shuttle will be about $300M per launch in the late 1980s. These costs are based on
an optimistic launch plan, and due to the high fixed costs involved, reducing the number
of flights will increase the cost per flight.
The amounts in this package do not reflect our approved program. They are merely
intended to convey the message that costs for access to space are increasing. Although
most of our near-year requirements are founded, I think you'll agree that we face a sig-
nificant budgeting challenge in the out-years when these systems become operational.
I think the attachments help generate a clearer understanding of the space arena. We
will pro_fde additional information should you desire.
Sincerely
ROBERT T. MARSH, General USAF
Commander
2 Atch
1. Titan and Shuttle Costs Per Flight
2. Launch Costs w/Investments
Amortized
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Document 11-41
Document title: Lt. General Richard C. Henry, Commander, Air Force Space Division, to
General Robert T. Marsh, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, March 4, 1983.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
By the early 1980s, the Space Shuttle program was considerab& behind .schedule and was not meet-
ing its promised flight rates or cost targets. Various leader_ in the U.S. Air Force were increasingly
uneasy with relying on the shuttle. In March 1983, Lt. General Richard C. Henry, in this letter to
General Robert T. Marsh, expressed growing concern that carrying humans aboard a vehicle designed
to merely deliver payloads to orbit created an unnecessary expenw. This indicated the changed status
of human spaceflight initiatives in the military, which was later reflected in the Department of
Defense's (DOD) position on the proposed NASA space station. Henry _ letter also gave a broad
overview of a proposed military launch strategy, which eventuaUy evolved into what was called a
"mixed fleet" after the Challenger accident.
[1]
General Robert T. Marsh
AFSC/CC
Andrews AFB, DC 20334
4 March 1983
Dear General Marsh
Last year the AF committed to using [the] Space Transportation System exclusively
and according to current planning, we will close down the Titan production line this
spring and expand all Titans and Atlas' in the 1987, 1988 time frame. I believe this plan
is seriously deficient from the DOD standpoint both operationally and economically.
Current estimates of STS mission model requirements have been reduced to where
they can be satisfied with a launch capability of about 20 per year, 16 at KSC and 4 at VAFB.
Thus, there is a debate underway as to whether a fifth orbiter should be procured. This
situation coupled with a phase of Expandable Launch Vehicles, might lead to (an eco-
nomically irreversible) loss of all U.S. capabilities to produce space launch vehicles in the
1985 time period.
A four orbiter only fleet, experiencing problems similar to those of Challenger, would
develop a backlog of launches that would take months to years to work off. This presents
a considerable threat to the continued vitality of the national space program and in par-
ticular, could impact national security through inadequate launch support of priority
DOD spacecraft.
In the past, it has been argued that the shuttle would achieve economy by launch rate.
A high launch rate is not materializing, and is unlikely to come forth; therefore, we should
seek alternative ways to achieve best return on investment. An example is the acceptance
of orbiter refurbishment and checkout at KSC prior to Vandenberg launch as a perma-
nent procedure to restrict work force build up on the west coast. Another example is to
re-look at the economics of using the shuttle on missions where iLs unique capabilities are
not needed.
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The current cost estimate ($FY 83) for shuttle launch to place a payload in geosyn-
chronous equatorial orbit (GEt) is 165 million dollars. Similar estimates ($FY 83) for a
commercial version of the Titan/Centaur and a modified Atlas/Centaur are 125/115 mil-
lion dollars and 120/90 million dollars respectively, where the first number includes the
amortization of development costs over nine launches and the second is the cost per
launch thereafter. Launch of a stretch version of the Titan/Centaur is estimated at
145/120 million dollars. The major driver in the higher STS costs is the cost of carrying
man on a mission which does not need man. The costs shown here for expendable
vehicles, launched, [2] are slightly less conservative than we would have used in the past
(possibly by 10 or 15 million per launch). However, the important point is that the GEt
mission can be accomplished at less cost with an expandable booster. 1 have not included
the not insignificant costs to our spacecraft to enable their carriage on a manned vehicle
(the orbiter).
Assuming that commercialization of expandable launch vehicles does occur, I believe
their most important use by DOD would be the transport of spacecraft to GEt, namely
[the Defense Support Program], MILSTAR, [Defense Satellite Communication System]
III and other special missions.
From the DOD standpoint, either the Titan/Centaur or the modified Atlas/Centaur
launch vehicles would meet most of the performance requirements through the 1980's.
Thus, a DOD commitment to commercial launches of either vehicle could provide an
expendable launch vehicle capability for critical DOD programs through the late 1980's
(in the longer term, the growth Titan/Centaur presents the option for launching larger
payloads than does Atlas). DOD launch rate requirements for this time period, are expect-
ed to be about four or five per year.
Another opportunity for DOD participation in commercialization of expandable
launch vehicles exists for the Delta class launch vehicles. The GPS [Global Positioning
System] and the DMSP [Defense Meteorological Satellite Program] programs are cur-
rently being launched on Atlas. Both payloads are relatively small and lightweight and,
therefore, both require manifesting with other payloads for effective Shuttle launching.
To date, no other appropriate DOD payload has been found for manifesting with either
GPS or DMSP. Although manifesting with non-DOD payloads may prove feasible, single
payload launches, when needed, are necessary for effective systems operation. Thus, it
would be highly desirable to have a dual capability for launching these payloads; the
Satellite replacement rate for the GPS and DMSP programs is expected to be about three
or four per year.
We estimate that the 20 flight per year STS requirement would include 6 flights per
commercial GEt satellites and 7 for government. If commercial launch vehicles captured
these flights, the yearly STS flight rate would be reduced to about 7. Most, if not all, of
these would require the unique capabilities of the Shuttle.
100 flights have been postulated for the useful life of a Shuttle. Thus, a four orbiter
fleet flying 20 flights per year could be expected to wear out in about 2 decades. Reducing
Shuttle flights to those for which it has unique capabilities could significantly expand the
life of the fleet.
The orbiter is necessarily an essential element of a space station program which NASA
proposes to initiate. Therefore, if the nation embarks on a space station program in the
near future, it will be argued that more orbiters should be procured for the construction
and sustaining of the station. This would be an investment of about $2 billion per orbiter
above and beyond the non [-] recurring and recurring space station costs.
The question of requirements for a space station is now under debate. I suggest that
this debate is premature. The more ftmdamental question is the utility of [3] man in space
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and whether we first, need him in a hostile environment; then, if we do, how can we sus-
tain him in a more affordable way than we do today. I believe strongly that these questions
can be addressed and answered with the existing four orbiter fleet on spacelab type mis-
sions.
In summary, I believe that the orbiter is a marvelous machine, but it is better used for
those missions where the utility of man is clear or needs further exploration. It is clear that
man is not needed on the transport mission to GEt and is, in fact, the more expensive
alternative. I recommend an investment strategy in a mixed fleet, preferably with com-
mercialization. The primary DoD mission is on orbit, not in getting there. I recommend
the government endorse commercialization, and commit to commercial launches to
GEt. This will assure the success of commercialization.
I recognize that these are issues that transcend the Air Force and DoD, and need
NASA, OMB and National Security Council involvement, but I suggest that Air Force lead-
ership is not inappropriate.
I urge your serious consideration of my recommendations before we burn our bridges
behind us and stand ready' to give any additional support that you may need.
Warm regards
Richard C. Henry
Lt. General, USAF
Commander
Document 11-42
Document tide: Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries
of the Military Departments; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Under Secretaries of
Defense; Assistant Secretaries of Defense; General Counsel, "Defense Space Launch
Strategy," February 7, 1984, with attached: "Defense Space Launch Strategy," January 23,
1984.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The Department of Defense continued to support the Space Shuttle despite reservations about its per-
formance and reliability. The Air Force, howev_ wanted a back-up expendable launch vehicle until
the shuttle's problems had been solved. In early 1984, Secretary of Defense C_spar Weinberger issued
a directive that established a need for a "complementary expendable launch vehicle" to supplement the
Space Shuttle. The vehicle developed to meet this requirement became known as the Titan IE.
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Memorandum for Secretaries of the
Military Departments
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Under Secretaries of Defense
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
General Counsel
SUBJECT: Defense Space Launch Strategy
On 23 January 1984, I approved the attached Defense Space Launch Strategy. The
approach described in this document will be used to guide future defense space launch
planning. Please ensure, maximum distribution to all those affected within your depart-
ments and agencies.
Caspar Weinberger
Attachment
[1]
Defense Space Launch Strategy
POLICY
Defense space launch strategy has been developed in response to validated DoD
assured space launch requirements and implements the launch policies contained in the
National Space Policy and the Defense Space Policy. The National Space Policy identifies
the Space Transportation System (STS) as the primary U.S. government space launch
vehicle, but recognizes that unique national security requirements may dictate the devel-
opment of special purpose launch capabilities. The Defense Space Policy states that:
"While affirming its commitment to the STS, DoD will ensure the availability of
an adequate launch capability to provide flexible and operationally responsive
access to space, as needed for all levels of conflict, to meet the requirements of
national security missions."
REQUIREMENTS
The DoD has a validated requirement for an assured launch capability under peace,
crisis and conflict conditions. Assured launch capability is a function of satisfying two spe-
cific requirements: the need for complementary launch systems to hedge against unfore-
seen technical and operational problems, and the need for a launch system suited for
operations in crisis and conflict situations. While DoD policy requires assured access to
space across the spectrum of conflict, the ability to satisfy this requirement is currently
tmachievable if the U.S. mainland is subjected to direct attack. Therefore, this launch
strategy addresses an assured launch capability only through levels of conflict in which it
is postulated that the U.S. homeland is not under direct attack. Additional survivability
options beyond an assured launch capability are being pursued to ensure sustained oper-
ations of critical space assets after homeland attack.
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STRATEGY
Near Term: Existing Defense space launch planning specifies that DoD will rely on tour
unique, manned orbiters for sole access to space for all national security space systems.
DoD studies and other independent evaluations have concluded that this does not repre-
sent an assured, flexible and responsive access to space. While the DoD is fully committed
to the STS, total reliance upon the STS for sole access to space in view of the technical and
operational uncertainties, represents an unacceptable national security risk. A comple-
mentary system is necessary to provide high confidence of access to space particularly
since the Shuttle will be the only launch vehicle for all U.S. space users. In addition, the
limited number of unique, manned Shuttle vehicles renders them ill-suited and inappro-
priate for use in a high risk environment.
The solution to this problem must be affordable and effective and yet offer a high
degree of requirements satisfaction, low technical risk, and reasonable schedule availabil-
ity. Unmanned, expendable launch vehicles meet these criteria [2] and satisfy DoD oper-
ational needs for a launch system which complements the STS and extends our ability to
conduct launch operations further into the spectrum of conflict. These systems can pro-
vide unique and assured launch capabilities in peace, crisis and conflict levels short of gen-
eral nuclear war. These vehicles are designed to be expendable and the loss of a single
vehicle affects only that one mission and would not degrade filture common, national
launch capabilities by the loss of a reusable launch system.
The President's policy on the Commercialization of Expendable Launch Vehicles
[ELVs] states that the goals of the U.S. space launch policy are to ensure a flexible and
robust U.S. launch posture, to maintain space transportation leadership, and to encour-
age the U.S. private sector development of commercial launch operations. Consistent with
this policy, the DoD will pursue the use of commercially procured ELVs to meet its
requirements for improving its assured launch capabilities. For requirements that cannot
be satisfied by commercially available ELVs, unique DoD developments may be undertak-
en for special purpose launch capabilities.
The STS will remain the primary launch system for routine DoD launch services.
Unmanned, expendable launch vehicles represent a complementary capability to the STS
and will be maintained and routinely launched to ensure their operational viability. To
accomplish this, selected national security payloads will be identified for dedicated launch
on ELVs, but will remain compatible with the STS.
Long Term: While commercial expendable launch vehicles represent an available solu-
tion to the unique DoD space launch requirements into the early-1990s, the need for
other DoD launch capabilities to meet requirements beyond that must be evaluated and
validated. This effort must be initiated immediately in order to ensure that future nation-
al security space missions are not constrained by inadequate launch capability. The evalu-
ation should examine potential DoD launch requirements, such as the need for a heavy
lift vehicle, and should attempt to take maximum advantage of prior investments in the
U.S. launch vehicle technology base.
IMPLEMENTATION
As Executive Agent fi)r launch vehicles, the Air Force will take immediate action to
acquire a commercial, unmanned, expandable launch vehicle capability to complement
the STS with a first launch availability no later than FY 1990. These vehicles must provide
a launch capability essentially equal to the original STS weight and volume specifications.
In addition, the Air Force, in conjunction and coordination with other Services,
affected agencies and departments, will:
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a) identify specific national security systems that will be used on the commercially
procured expendable launch vehicles and the proposed peacetime launch rate
required to maintain an operationally responsive posture.
[3] b) develop a comprehensive space launch plan to meet projected national security
requirements through the year 2000. This strategy will be submitted to the Secretary
of Defense for approval and validation.
The Defense Space Launch Strategy will be reflected in the FY-86 Defense Guidance Plan.
Document 11-43
Document title: Charles W. Cook, Executive Secretary, Defense Space Operations
Committee, Memorandum for Defense Operations Committee (DSOC) Principals, "DoD
Position on Shuttle Issues," November 19, 1984.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The Defense Space Operations Committee was a Department of Defense (DOD)-wide internal policy-
making and coordination group composed of the leading space individuals in each military service,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff President
Reagan had directed NASA and DoD to determine what steps were necessar"_ to make the shuttle fully
operational. The Defense Space Operations Committee was the mechanism to coordinate the DOD
definition of the steps necessary to attain operational status. On October 19, 1984, the committee
principals were briefed on the issues identified by the Air Force. Their comments were included in the
operational plan. The committee met again on October 29, 1984, and the recommendations were
finalized on November 19, in a memorandum representing the first coherent statement by DOD of
what it meant by an "operational Space Transportation System. "DODfelt that a number of require-
ments for the Space Transportation System had not been adequately addressed by NASA, and the out-
standing issues were stated as changes needed in the Space Transportation Master Plan.
[no pagination] 19 November 1984
Memorandum for Defense Operations Committee
(DSOC) Principals
SUBJECT: DoD Position on Shuttle Issues
Attached is a revised copy of the DoD Position resulting from the DSOC meeting of
29 October 1984. Changes have been incorporated to reflect the comments received. I
would like to touch base with each of you personally early next week to go over the final
position.
CHARLES W. COOK
Executive Secretary
DSOC
2 Attachments
1. Revised DoD Position
2. Summary--Issues Not Discussed
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Memorandum for the Defense Space Operations
Committee (DSOC)
SUBJECT: DoD Position on Shuttle Issues
During the 19 October 1984 meeting of the DSOC, l)oD positions were established
on several key ShutOe issues.
Attachment 1 summarizes the DoD positions on issues discussed during the DSOC
meeting. Attachment 2 summarizes less controversial issues which were coordinated with
you.
I am requesting that the Executive Secretary coordinale with NASA in revising the
Space Transportation System Master Plan to retlect DoD positions prior to the Master
Plan being approved.
2 Attachments
1. Summary--lssues I)iscussed
2. Summary--Issues Not Discussed
[1]
Attachment 1
Defense Space Operations Committee,
29 October 1984
DoD Position on Key STS Master Plan Issues
Continued Ortn'ter Production
The Space Transportation System (STS) Master Plan must include a viable, long-term
plan for the Space Shuttle System. Since the STS is the primary means of transportation
to space for all U.S. programs, including national security programs, it is essential that the
STS Master Plan contain a NASA program for providing continued orbiter capability.
The current NASA budget and financial program does not include plans for a fifth
orbiter, follow-on orbiter, continuing spares production, requalif)ing and restarting pro-
duction lines, or qualifying the orbiter fleet beyond 100 flights. In view of the national pol-
icy for the use of the Shuttle system, the plan would not be complete without a specific
program for viability of the orbiter fleet through continued orbiter production.
Therefore, the DoD takes the position:
"In accordance with National Policy, the STS is the primary means of access to
space for all U.S. programs, including National Security programs. The STS
Master Plan should include provisions for continued orbiter fleet capability.
Specifically, NASA should develop definitive plans with adequate budgetary fund-
ing for continuing spares production and qualification of the orbiter fleet beyond
the current 100 flights. Since the loss of an orbiter would have a significant impact
on the STS overall mission capability, NASA should develop a plan to address that
contingency."
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Interoperability of Orbiters
Space launch operational flexibility is restricted by the fact that each of the orbiters
in the current fleet has different characteristics and capabilities.
[2] Therefore, the DoD takes the position:
"rhe STS Master Plan should include Provisions to increase interoperability of
the orbiter fleet. Specifically, additional orbiters should be fully capable of meet-
ing all existing and documented DOD mission requirements. NASA should mod-
ify existing orbiters as follows:
(1) Orbiter 103 modified to be Centaur-capable.
(2) Orbiter 099 upgraded to allow operating from Vandenberg.
All launch facilities should be interoperable with all orbiters. Therefore, the Air
Force and NASA should modify the shuttle launch facilities to accommodate the
configurations of all orbiters."
Payload Performance (Shuttle Lift Capability)
The STS Master Plan should include the Level I requirement of 32,000 pounds of pay-
load lift capability for a Vandenberg Reference Mission 4 or equivalent. Of concern to the
DoD is the fact that even with filament-wound-case solid rocket boosters and main engines
operating at 109% thrust, maximum performance is approximately 28,000 pounds of pay-
load to low earth orbit. Additionally, there is not a specific program (aside from hopeful
flight experience, demanifesting, etc.) to attain the 4,000 pounds needed to reach the
NASA "goal" of 32,000 pounds. Therefore, the DoD takes the position that:
"The STS Master Plan should include a definitive technical plan with appropriate
budgetary fimding which, with a high degree of confidence, will meet the com-
mitment of a lift capability of 32,000 pounds for Reference Mission 4 or equiva-
lent."
Orbiter Crossrange Capability
The Shuttle orbiter crossrange requirement of 1100 nautical miles cannot be met with
the current design. This shortfall will prevent a Vandenberg Shuttle launch from aborting
once-around back to Vandenberg. Current orbiter capability is approximately 800 nauti-
cal miles. This impacts DoD payloads by involving increased exposure to landing at abort
and contingency landing sites outside the Continental United States.
Complying with the 1100-mile crossrange requirement wottld appear to entail a cost-
ly orbiter redesign.
[3] Therefore, the DoD takes the position:
"The Level I crossrange requirement of 1100 miles remains unchanged. The STS
Master Plan should include extension of the current Shuttle crossrange beyond
800 miles. This extension should be accomplished through flight test and analy-
sis. Until the crossrange requirement of 1100 miles can be met, NASA should
develop definitive plans with adequate budgetary funding for a capability to pro-
vide air transportation of payload and orbiter from contingency landing sites to
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thelaunchsite.NASAshouldalsoassurethat the design of any future orbiters or
Thermal l'rotection System (TPS) meet the needed l l00 mile crossrange capa-
bility."
Ortn'ter/Cargo Transportation Capabilities
The STS Master Plan should include specific steps to be taken to provide payload and
orbiter transportation capabilities.
The DoD takes the position:
"NASA should provide a second Shuttle Carrier Aircraft (SCA) and should install
refueling capabilities on both SCA. The Air Force should plan to procure outside
airborne cargo transportation capability. Both NASA and the Air Force should
develop definitive plans with adequate budgetary funding to accomplish these
tasks."
It is noted that the Air Force is examining a way that they may provide a Civil Reserve
Air Fleet (CRAF) 147 that could be modified by NASA for use as a backup SCA.
Orbiter Bay Contamination
Since orbiter bay contamination could have a significant effect on the design of future
payloads, the orbiter bay contamination environment must be accurately characterized.
The DoD takes the position:
'q'he STS Master Plan should reflect the NASA and the Air Force Contamination
Working Group plan to provide pre-flight cleanliness specifications and proce-
dures, and inflight measurements to define the orbiter bay environment. NASA
should provide quantitative contamination data to the payload community for
design consideration."
[4] Future Shuttle Management
On the issue of filture management of the Space Transportation System (STS) the
DoD position is:
'q'he status quo with the current NASA-led, joint NASA/DoD management
arrangement is the preferred management option for the foreseeable future.
NASA should identit), and separately account for the Shuttle budget (e.g. bud-
getary fencing) to distinguish that funding from other NASA Programs. Transfer
of the STS to another government agency in the foreseeable filture is not recom-
mended."
Additional l}oD conunent[s]:
'q'he DoD should not be the sole operator of the STS."
"An STS operational organization within NASA might t}e acceptable to DoD if the
following conditions are met:
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ISSUE
DOD SECURITY COSTS
OIL I,F_kSE OFF VANDENBERG COAST
FUTURE FLIGI 1T CttANGES
DoD participation in organizational implementation
DoD participation in operational management
Specific NASA commitments are made to complete the necessary Shuttle
system enhancements as specified in the STS Master Plan's Baseline
Operation Plan."
Attachment 2
Issues
STS Baseline Operations Plan
INFORMATION ITEMS
COMMENT
- NON-SECURITY CH_MNGES TO
SECURITY SYSTEMS
- IN WORK BY NASA _MND SYSTEMS
COMMAND
- COULD LIMIT LAUNCtI AZIMUTH
- SENSITIVE "POLITICAI2' ISSUE
- IAW REIMBURSEMENT MOA
NEW PRICE DETAILED IN 1985
- EXPECT $63-100M PRICE (FY84 $)
RECOMMENDATION
CONTINUE WORKING THESE ITEMS SEPARATELY
NON-CONTROVERSIAL CAPABILITIES SHORTFALLS
ISSU E
MISSION DURATION
RESCUE CAPABILITY
DOCKING MODULE
SPECIFICATION
SHUTI'LE SYSTEM CAPABILITY
30 DAYS 10-12 DAYS
SUITS & PERSONAL NONE
RESCUE SYSTEM
INTERNATI ONAL NONE
REQUIREMENT FOR
RENDEZVOUS & DOCKING
(bkPABI LITY
COMMENT
DOD REQ'T IS 7 DAYS
+ 2 DAYS CONTINGENCY
NO DOD REQUIREMENT
NO DOD REQUIREMENT
408 'FILE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RFI_,VFIONS
OPERATIN(; IJFE
ADDITIONAI,
PROPELLANT
10 YEARS, CERTIFIED TO
500 USES 100 USES
ORBITAL NONE
_EUVERING
SYSTEM (OMS) KITS
RECOMMENDATION
SATISFIES PROJECTED
20-YEAR MISSION MODEL
NO DOI) REQUIREMENT
CONCUR _qTH NASA POSITION TO CHANGE REQIJlREMENTS SPECIFICATION
TO BE CONSISTENT WITH CAPABILITY
NATIONAL SECURITY/CRISIS CONSTRAINTS
SHU'ITI_
SYSTEM
ISSUE SPECIFICATION CAPABILITY COMMENT
LANDING WEATHER
CONSTRAINTS AND
AUTOLAND
NONE NO PRECIPITATION
15,000 FI" CEILING
7 MILE VISIBILITY
8 KNOT CROSSWIND
- RTLS & EOM* ALTERNATE
LANDING SITES PLANNED
- AUTOI_AND DEMO ON
SFS 51-E (FEB 85)
ORBITER AUTONOM3( NONE TACAN FOR NAV
AND DEORBIT
TARGETING UNq'I L
1992
- GPS PLANNED
- ORBITER COMPUTER
UPGRADE APPROVED
LAUNCH FROM WITHIN 2 HRS 6.5 HRS (KSC)
4.5 HRS (VAFB)
- ACCEPTABLE
CONSTRAINTS
ORBITER TURN-
AROUND TIME
14 DAYS
BETWEEN
FLIGHTS
28 DAYS IS GOAI_ - ACCEPTABLE
CONSTRAINT
(DOD HAS PRIORITY)
RECOMMENDATION
ACCEPT FACT THAT STS WILL NOT MEET TRADITIONAL MILITARY SYSTEMS
REQUIREMENTS (ALL WEATHER, RAPID DEPLOYMENT, SURVIVABIIJTY, ETC.)
* RETURN TO LAUNCH SITE AND END OF MISSION
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PAYLOAD MISSION FLEXIBILITY CAPABILITIES
ISSUE
NAVIGATION
ACCURACY
SHU'ITLE SYSTEM
CAPABILITY DOD REQUIREMENT COMMENT
1000'-ALL AXIS 45'-ALL AXIS WITH
GPS
GPS WILL MEET
REQUIREMENT
NASA/AF PLAN FORJOINrF
IMPLEMENTATION OF GPS
CAPABILITY (FY 87 BUDGET
$30-40M)
REDUNDANT NO REDUNDANCY
PAYLOAD SERVICES
- Ku BAND ANTENNA
CONTROL
- PAYLOAD DATA
SYSTEM (PDI)
- MANIPULATOR ARM
(RMS)
REDUNDANCY IN
MISSION CRITICAL
SYSTEMS
- AF PAYLOADS RELUCTANT
TO USE SERVICES
- REDUNDANT ANTENNA
CONTROLLER OR
MECHANICAL STOPS
NECESSARY
REDUNDANT PAYLOAD
DATA SYSTEM, MORE
RELIABILITY IN ARM
NEEDED
- COSTS HIGH: PDI (40
POUNDS, $2M); RMS (900
POUNDS, $20M)
EXTRA VEHICULAR
ACTIVITY (EVA) PROVISIONS
- IMMEDIATE EVA MINIMUM SEVERAL
HOURS
CARGO BAY 56 FT TO 60 FT
ENVELOPE
NO CURRENT
REQUIREMENT
6oFr
- ACCEPTABLE CONSTRAINT
- REQUIRES CONTINUED
MISSION-BY-MISSION
COORDINATION
RECOMMENDATION
- NASA/DOD AGREE ON EFFECTIVITY OF GPS
- NASA/DOD EVALUATE ON MISSION-BY-MISSION BASIS, COST AND
WEIGHT TRADES OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS
- ACCEPT EVA CONSTRAINT
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Documen111-44
Document title: National Security Decision Directive 164, "National Security Launch
Strategy," February 25, 1985.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Under Secretary, of the Air Force Edward C Alctn@ wanted to keep expendable launch vehicle pro
duction lines open, because he was concerned that valuable manufacturing expertise wouM be lost.
ttaving completed a commercial competition to select the complementm 7 expendable launch vehicle,
AIdridge needed NASA to concur with the Air Force _ selection of a 7)tan derivative. Negotiations at
the staff level had little success. Aldridge called NASA Administrator James Beggs to discuss the mat-
t_ Th_ reached an agreement, which was transcribed and taken to the National Securit_ Council to
be processed for the President's signature. The result was the National Security Lau_ich Strategy,
which, (tiler the Challenger disast_ resulted in the Dqmrtment t_ Defense transfernng most oj it_
payloads off the shuttle.
[1] February 25, 1985
National Security Launch Strategy
NSDD 144, National Space Strategy, states that the Space Transportation System
(STS) will continue as the primary space launch system for both national security and civil
government missions. It also directs DoD to pursue an improved assured launch capabil-
ity that will be complementary to the STS. This NSDD provides a launch strateg 3, to imple-
ment these two provisions, as well as initiate a study to look toward the future development
of a second-generation space transportation system.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of
Defense (DoD) will work together to insure that thee STS is fully operational and cost-
effective at a flight rate sufficient to meet justified needs. (The target rate is 24 flights per
year.)
The Air Force will buy ten expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) and will launch them
at a rate of approximately two per year during the period 1988-92. A competitive decision
will be made between the Titan derivative vehicle and the SBR-X before March 1, 1985.
DoD will rely on the STS as its primary launch vehicle and will commit to at least one-
third of the STS flights available during the next ten years. NASA and DoD will jointly
develop a pricing policy for DoD flights that provides a positive incentive for flying on the
Shuttle. The pricing policy will be based upon the principle that an agreed reimburse-
ment rate per flight will be comprised of a fixed and variable component. This will result
in an annual fixed fee and a charge per flight at marginal or incremental cost. NASA will
propose a pricing policy based upon this principle by April 15, 1985.
DoD and NASA will jointly study the development of a second-generation space
transportation system--making use of manned and unmanned systems to meet the
requirements of all users. A full range of operations will be studied, including Shuttle-
derived technologies and others. It would be anticipated that NASA would be responsible
for systems management of civil manned systems and DoD would be responsible for [2]
systems management of unmanned systems. DoD and NASA will jointly define the terms
of reference of this effort for issuance as a National Security Study Directive (NSSD).
Any disagreements regarding implementation of this Strategy should be referred first
to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and subsequently, if neces-
sary, to the President for resolution.
Chapter Three
The NASA-Industry-University
Nexus: A Critical Alliance in the
Development of Space Exploration
by W. Henry Lambright
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is and always has been
more than a simple, conventional government organization. When NASA Administrator
James E. Webb spoke in 1966 about the organization he headed, he referred proudly to
an enterprise involving some 420,000 men and women involved in the single-minded pur-
pose of leading the United States into space. At the time, however, less than 10 percent
(34,000) of those employees were civil servants. NASA extended its reach through con-
tracts and grants to numerous external organizations, chiefly industry and universities.
The government-industry-university team constituted a powerful institutional partnership
throughout NASA's history?
The 1960s--the Apollo years---were the time when this partnership reached its peak
in terms of scale. '_It was also the period during which NASA established or refined most
of its innovative management practices. Since then, NASA has consolidated and built fur-
ther on the foundation it created for itself; few fundamental changes were made in the
character of the relations between NASA and its nongovernment partners during the
1970s and 1980s, even as the partners attempted to adjust to diminished budgets and a
lower national priority for space. As an agency, NASA still represents one of the more
effective government-industry-university systems in existence. This essay focuses on how
this system came into being after Sputnik I, was expanded, was pushed to its limit during
the 1960s, and was altered in the post-Apollo era of spaceflight since the decade of the
1960s. Most of NASA's interactions with industry and academia since Apollo have been an
extension of the approaches put in place during that earlier time.
Origins: The Glennan Era, 1958-1961
Because NASA was formed from existing components based elsewhere within the U.S.
government, especially from among the various components of the defense organization,
it inherited a strong "in-house" tradition of technical expertise (referring to the idea that
1. For biographical information on.lames E. Webb, especially as it relates to his management philoso-
phy for large-scale technological systems, see W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA
(Baltimore, MD:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). For a condensed analysis of Webb's leadership in lhis
effort, see W. Henry Lambright, '[lames E. Webb: A Dominant Force in 20th Century Public Administration,"
Public Admini_strationReview 53 (March/April 1993): 95-99; W. Henry Lambright, "Past and Present in Powering
Big Technology," Space "llme.s:Magazine of theAmerican Astronautical Soc/ety34 (November-December 1995): 11-13.
2. For a critique of this administrative approach from one who sees in it too great an aggregation of
power, see the Pulitzer Prize-winning book by Walter A. McDougall .... The Heaven._and the Earth: A Political
Ht_tt,vy of the 5"paceALoe(New York: Basic Books, 1985).
'tl 1
412 THENASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITYEXUS
mostengineeringandevensomeproductionworkwouldbeperformedbyagovernment
entityratherthananindustryoruniversitycontractor).Anemphasison"in-house"tech-
nologicalskillhadbeenbequeathedfromvariousweaponslaboratories,becomingknown
collectivelyasthe"arsenalsystem."Clearly,WernhervonBraun'sArmyBallisticMissile
AgencyteamattheRedstoneArsenalinHuntsville,Alabama,wasanorganizationfirmly
rootedin thiscultureofin-housecapability.In addition,suchgovernmentorganizations
asthenonmilitaryNationalAdvisoryCommitteeforAeronautics(NACA),firstestab-
lishedin1915asameansofimprovingthequalityofairplanesintheUnitedStatestohelp
offsetforeigncompetitioni thecommercialmarket,developedstrong"in-house"tech-
nicalexpertiseinaeronauticalresearchanddevelopment.'
ThefirstNASA dministrator,T.KeithGlennan,onleavefromhispositionaspresi-
dentoftheCaseInstituteofTechnology,appreciatedthelegacyof "in-house"ngineer-
ingcapabilitythattheorganizationalcomponentsincorporatedintoNASAhaddevel-
oped,butit didnotmeshwellwiththemissionofthenewagencyasheunderstoodit.
Accordingly,hedeterminedthatmostofNASA'sworkwouldbeperformedexternallyby
industry.Thiswasrequiredinpartbytheneedto"scaleup"rapidlyforProjectMercury,
NASA'sfirsthumanspaceflightprogram,butitwasalsoamatterofideology.Ashewrote
inhisdiary:
. . . having the conviction that our government operations were growing too large, I determined
to avoid excessive additions to the federal payroll. Since our organizational structure was to be erect-
ed on the NACA staff and their operation had been conducted almost wholly "in-house," I knew I
would face demands on the part of our technical staff to add to in-house capacity .... But I was con-
vinced that the major portion of our funds must be spent with industry, education, and other insti-
tutions. +
Glennan, as an Eisenhower Republican, believed that government's role should be kept
small and that the federal government should rely on private enterprise for getting the
public's work done whenever possible?
To a very real extent, Glennan was both an Eisenhower Republican with a fiscally con-
servative inclination and an aggressive businessman with a keen sense of public duty. He
also possessed a strong opposition to government intrusion into the lives of Americans.
But he was also an administrator and an educator with a rich appreciation for the role of
science and technology in an international setting. '+As historian Roger D. I+aunius has
written of Glennan:
3. This legacy of "in-house" engineering capability has been explored in detail in Howard E. McCurdy,
l_nde NASA. High Technologzcal aTul Organizational Change in the U.S. Space lXro_,wam (Baltimore, MD:Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1993), pp. 34-50.
4. "12 Keith Glennan, The Birth o[NASA: The Diary oft Keith Glennan, J.D. Hunley, ed. (Washington, DC:
NASA SP-4105, 1993), p. 5.
5. Robert L. Roshoh, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4101,
1966), pp. iii-vii.
6. These themes are well developed in Glennan's diary, The Birth of NASA. See also "Glennan
Announces First Details of the New Space Agency Organization," October 5, 1958, NASA Historical Reference
Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC; James R. Killian, Jr., Slmtnik, Scienti._Ls,
and Ei+_enhower: A Mermnr +(the Fir._t Special As._i_tant to the President for S_n,:e and "l'e_hnologff (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1977), pp. 141-144;James R. Killian,Jr., Oral History, July 23, 1974, NASA 1listorical Reference Collection.
Eisenhower's concerns abonl this aspect of modern America are revealed in "Farewell Radio and Television
Address to the American People," January 17, 1961, t'aper_ o[ the IXee_Jdent, Dwight D Eiwnhower 1960-61
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 103540.
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While he was an ardent cold warrior and understood very well the importance of the space pro-
gram as an instrument of international prestige, Glennan emphasized long-range goals that would
yield genuine scientific and technological results. Second, he believed that the new space agency should
remain relatively small, and that much of its work would of necessity be done under contract to pri-
vate industry and educational institutions. This was in line with his concerns about the growing size
and power of the federal government. Third, when it grew, as he knew it would, Glennan tried to
direct it in an orderly manner. Along those lines, he tenaciously worked for the incorporation of the
non-military space efforts being carried out in several other federal agencies---especially in the
Department of Defense--into NASA so that the space program could be brought together into a mean-
ingful whole. 7
Glennan fostered the replication of his values and perspectives in NASA as he began to
direct its affairs in the fall of 1958, and by the time of his departure from Washington in
January 1961, they had been placed on the road to adoption.
Little attention was given to universities, per se, during the Glennan era. There was
interest in nurturing space science and research projects sponsored at universities, but
Glennan did not develop a master plan for the incorporation of a partnership with uni-
versities. What he did establish in 1958 was a University Research Program Office at NASA
Headquarters under the direction of the Office of Aeronautical and Space Research. This
organization, at the behest of the technical program offices, oversaw a small "research by
contract" program. [III-1]
In May 1960, Glennan reorganized this structure and created the Office of Research
Grants and Contracts as an administrative unit of NASA to coordinate research conduct-
ed by nonprofit institutions. This effectively made the new organization the liaison
between NASA and most universities, acting on behalf of program offices for work per-
formed outside the agency. All such research activities, therefore, were approved by NASA
Headquarters, even though the agency's field centers might still manage the actual work
once it was put into place by the Office of Research Grants and Colatracts."
The Department of Defense Framework
Also during the Glennan period, the basic structure of NASA-industry relations was
established. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, which laid out the legal
groundwork for NASA's creation, anticipated that the agency would contract with indus-
try for much of its activities. 9 In a significant policy action, it extended to NASA the pro-
curement authority contained in the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 (ASPA).
The importance of this legislation was that it recognized that NASA would be establishing
a parmership with many of the same companies with which the Department of Defense
(DOD) already had long-standing relations.
The ASPA provisions, which had been amended frequently over the preceding
decade, provided the government with the flexibility to address work based on research
and development (R&D). ASPA allowed the federal government to divert from the tradi-
tional practices of advertising for competitive bids and awarding contracts to the lowest
responsible bidder. Instead, the government could use negotiation, a technique developed
largely in World War II to meet the war crisis and institutionalized subsequently by DOD.
7. Roger D. Launius, "Introduction," in Glennan, The Birth of NASA, p. xxii.
8. Rosholt, Admini._trative Hist_rryof NASA, pp. 128-29.
9. This act is available as Document II-17 in John M. Logsdon, gen. ed., with LindaJ. Lear, Jannelle
Warren-Findley, Ray A. Williamson, and Dwayne A. Day, Explxrhngthe Unknown: ,%lectedDocuments in the Hi_t_rryOf
the U.S. Civil Spao" Prokwam,VolumeI: Organizingfro"Exploration (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407, 1995). 1: 334-45.
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OnOctober30,1958,{;lennanunderlinedNASA'sintentto extend ASPA and DOD
practices into its.jmisdiction, He announced that NASA's procurement and contracting
regulations '_'ould conl'ornl in every practicable way" to ASPA. Defense contractors would
not have to learn how to work under new rules.'" This was imp{}rtant for many reasons,
including the fact that much of what NASA was doing in its initial years was work DOD
had pioneered and then transferred to NASA. With tile work came the defense contrac-
tors. As a principle of his policy, Glennan maintained continuity between the defense
realm and NASA's {ivilian realm as much as possible, and this continuity increased NASA's
contracting options.
Glennan also helped smooth relations with DOD and industry by hMng many former
DOD officials to work specifically on NASA-industry relations. In January 1959, he
appointed Ernest Brackett, a DOD procurement specialist, to head NASA's Procurement
Division. John Johnson, Glennan's General Counsel appointee, also came from DOD.
These men brought others to NASA, many of whom had learned government-industry
relations in the DOD setting. '_
Once its staffing was well under way, NASA began holding conferences with industry
to discuss NASA hardware needs and the legal/administrative relations governing pro-
cnrement. [III-2] NASA stressed that (1) it expected most of its work to be performed by
industry and (2) it intended to make it easy for industry to work with the agency by main-
taining a principle of continuity between DOD and NASA contracting procedures.
The Patent Problem
One problem in NASA-industry relations in the Glennan era loomed very large: the
question of how to ascertain and assign the rights to patented inventions. In the Space
Act, there is a lengthy provision (section 305) requiring that inventions (and their
patents) made in pertormance of contracts for NASA become the property of the U.S.
government, unless waived (in which case the government retained a royalty-free license
for the use of the invention). The responsibility of waiving U.S. rights to an invention was
retained by the NASA Administrator, assisted by the Invention and Contributions Board
(a body established by the Administrator). Waivers were to be made only in the public
interest.
This statutory policy was similar to the statutory policy guiding the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), but it was very different from the policy that DOD had promulgated
administratively. DOD, the nation's largest buyer of R&D and the agency with an indus-
trial clientele similar to NASA's, followed a more liberal policy from the contractor's point
of view. The invention remained the property of the contractor, with the provision that the
government would have a royalty-free license for the invention's use. In other words,
NASA would have to invoke the waiver procedure to grant the same privileges to a con-
tractor that DOD could grant outright in the contract itself. '_
Glennan was stymied in regard to his "continuity" policy, at least in this area. The
patent issue mattered in two ways. First, there might well be tangzble stakes involved.
Significant inventions might derive from working for NASA, and industry could therefore
make additional money from marketing them in other contexts. For the federal govern-
ment, these financial stakes did not exist, because the government itself did not commer-
cialize inventions. However, at a second, symbolic level, dwre were two political issues:
I0. Roshoh, AdmZnBtram,e ttistory oJNASA, p. 62.
11. I&d., pp. 62_}3; Glcnnan, Birth of NASA, pp. 108,120.
12. Rosholl, Admini_tratwe Iti_tm7 o/NASA, p. 92.
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 415
whetherthefederalgovernmentmightendup"payingtwice"foritsworkandwhethertile
governmentwas"gi_4ngaway"thepublic'spropertyrightstoaninvention.
Thesesymbolicconcernswereintenselyexpressedbycertainlegislatorswithapop-
ulistbent.AsgovernmentexpandeditsR&DworkbeyondDOD,theymadeit apointto
pushtheir"titlepolicy"(theAECmodel)intootherfields.Inatomicenergy,whichbegan
asagovernment-createdmonopoly,industrydidnothavetheopportunityofightforthe
licensepolicy(theDODapproach).In thecaseofNASA,industrydidfight--butonly
aftertheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceActhadbeenpassed.
Whathepatentissuealsoilluminatedwasthedegreetowhichterms uchas"pro-
curement"andeventhebroaderconceptof"acquisitionspolicy"maskedadynamicinsti-
tutionalrelationshipbetween"buyers"and"sellers."Thefederalgovernmentisabuyer,
butthebuyerdoesnotalwaysholdallthebargainingadvantages.In thepre-Apolloclays,
NASAwasdistinctlyatadisadvantage--ors it perceiveditself--vis-a-visDODinacquisi-
tionof thebestcontractors.Manyfirmsquietlyspreadthewordthat"NASAwouldtake
vourpatents."Theyalsopointedout thatNASAwasanR&Dagencyandwouldnot
providethelucrativeproductionrunsindustrycouldgetthroughDOD.Moreover,the
leadersofNASA,suchasGlennanandtheDODtransplants,didnotwantanAECtypeof
policy.TheywantedcontimfiiywithDODandanequalchancetogetthebestandmost
enthusiasticcontractors--thecontractorcompaniesthatwouldallowtheirmostcreative
(andinventive)peopletoworkonNASAcontracts.
Althoughit isallbutforgottentoday,thismatterof patentpolicywasasignificant
politicalissuein theGlennanera.NASAwastryingtoinitiateacloserelationshipwith
industry;it wasarival of DOD for many space missions, and by no means an advantaged
rival. The patent issue grated on these relations. Glennan felt that the section 305 legisla-
tion tied his hands, and the result was his decision to get the legislation amended.
Legislators favoring the title policy took a stand, and a legislative struggle ensued. [III-3]
This created a controversial backdrop to the more staid NASA-industry relations in other
areas during 1959 and 1960. NASA fought for an amendment throughout the Glennan
period and was finally able to get legislation through the House of Representatives that
would shift the law from title-oriented policy to license-oriented policy. This legislation
failed in the Senate, however, where such powerful and populist Democratic senators as
Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, and Russell Long of
I.ouisiana favored the title approach.
Other Early NASA-Industry Developments
Having decided that most of its work would be done with industry, and using DOD
practices as much as possible, the next question for NASA was how to award major con-
tracts. Glennan concluded that he should be the decision maker for large contracts. In
October 1959, NASA promulgated a formal procedure for selecdng the recipients of very
large NASA contracts. The procedure provided that the NASA Administrator would select
all contractors when the intended contract exceeded $1 million. Glennan indicated that
the Administrator would be advised on these decisions by ad hoc source selection boards,
primarily composed of technical specialists. '"
For instance, Glennan's personal diary discussed the dilemmas involved in the bid-
cling and selection process. In one particularly poignant section, he described the process
leading to his selection of Rocketdyne to build the J-2 engine, which powered both the
Saturn 1B first stage and the Saturn V second stage:
13. l_d.
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At 9:00 o'clock the Source Evaluation Board on the 200 K engine reported. Thh is a stinkeg, in
the vernacular--five companies bid and three of them are very close together at the top. In fact, they
are so close in the technical evaluation that it is almost impossible, to choose between them. The same
is essentially true in the business evaluation except that one of them bid $138 million, a second bid
$69 million, the third bid $44 million. These bids are really estimates of the total cost of the project
since this research and development work is always handled on a cost plus a fixed fee basis. The costs
do give an indication of the extent of experience of a company in undertaking a difficult task of this
sort. For instance, one of the companies which was not in the running bid only $24 million dollars.
While the highest one is undoubtedly high, the lowest indicates a complete lack of understanding of
the difficulty of the job.
I took the reports and will now have to sit down with myself in an attempt to find a proper answer
to this question.
Later he met with his chief advisers, and they agreed that Rocketdyne would receive
the contract. This process was ticklish at best. As Glennan concluded: "It is a fact that if 10
people bid, 9 of them are going to be unhappy because only 1 can win. With the 9 having
representatives in Congress, it is almost inevitable that some charges of favoritism, lack of
objectivity, etc., will be tossed our way. ''_
Throughout 1959 and 1960, Glennan had various management consultants take a
look at the agency's administrative issues, including NASA-industry relations. The gener-
al thrust of these reports confirmed Glennan's view that as much of NASA's work as pos-
sible should be contracted out. [III-4, III-5] However, the reports also pointed out the
need for balancing the external work with internal competence. NASA's centers pressed
on Glennan their need to grow and build competence. By the end of the Glennan years,
85 percent of NASA's $1 billion budget was going to industry. But the agency was also
expanding its in-house work and capabilities.
Under Glennan in the 1958-1960 period, NASA established a strong relationship with
industry based on the principle of continuity with DOD contracting practices. As a
Republican, Glennan's conservative values helped create a sense of partnership critical to
jumpstarting NASA-industry relations. The "closeness" with industry bothered some crit-
ics, including NASA civil servants who wanted more work to be performed in-house. This
was particularly true of those who had come to NASA from NACA and the Army Ballistic
Missile Agency. The patent issue was also left unsettled. All in all, however, Glennan left a
solid foundation on which the next Administrator of NASA could build.
The Webb Era, 1961-1968
Under James E. Webb, NASA Administrator from 1961 to 1968, the NAsA-industry-
university relationship expanded tremendously. Webb continued the basic philosophy of
Glennanmto contract out most of the agency's work to industry--but he surpassed
Glennan by consciously seeking innovation in these relations. Both continuity and change
were objects of NASA policy. Whereas only modest efforts had been made on the acade-
mic front under Glennan, Webb established a "university program" that went beyond, in
its goals, anything seen in government before--or since. Glennan was rather cautious in
his approach to external institutions. Webb used government with an eye toward reform.
Glennan was a technical engineer. Webb---a lawyer-administrator with exceptional political
skills--had the instincts of a social engineer. When he took the oath of office, Webb stat-
ed that "my purpose would be to work toward creating an environment within which
14. Glennan, Birth of NASA, p. 137.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 417
NASA could be as innovative in the management of its programs as it was in aeronautics
and space science. '''_ [III-6]
When first asked by the White House whether he would accept a nomination as NASA
Administrator, Webb made it clear that he wanted to inherit the two principal NASA offi-
cials from the Eisenhower administration: Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden, who
was a physicist and former NACA chief, and Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans,
Jr., who was also known as the "General Manager." Webb wanted to make the major deci-
sions in conjunction with these two men, and together they would form a "triad" for the
administrative leadership of the agency.
The May 1961 decision to go to the Moon--just three months after Webb took
office--had tremendous impacts on NASA in many ways. The question facing Webb,
Dryden, and Seamans after the Apollo decision was how well Glennan's contracting
system would serve to organize the lunar landing program. In general, they accepted that
system, even strengthening the procedures instituted by Glennan. The principle of con-
tracting out for R&D was reaffirmed, and the role of in-house staff in technical direction
was stressed. Headquarters officials took it upon themselves to make procurement policy
more uniform, yet flexible enough for NASA to obtain space hardware whose main fea-
tures could not be specified in advance, t6
Given Webb's orientation, there would have been changes in the way NASA dealt with
universities and industry even without Kennedy's decision to go to the Moon. However,
what that decision did was enlarge the scope of NASA's effort and give it a new urgency
and many more resources) 7Also, problems that were important for Glennan were less sig-
nificant under the impetus of Apollo. For example, the patent issue was one problem
Glennan felt had to be resolved with new legislation. Webb decided that he could handle
the problem administratively, using the waiver clause. In effect, Webb used an adminis-
trative strategy to bring NASA patent policy in line with DOD policy. This infuriated tide
policy advocates, but Webb pushed ahead and absorbed intense (sometimes very person-
al) criticism thereafter from particular legislators. This made for easier NASA-industry
relations, though. It also made it possible for NASA to move on other issues in Webb's
agenda.
Among the issues Webb wanted to address was the role of universities and industry in
economic and social development.Just two days prior to the announcement of the Apollo
goal, on May 23, 1961, Webb sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson a memorandum in
which he revealed that NASA-industry-university relations would have a new flavor, ts
[III-7] For Webb, Apollo was both an end and a means. As an end, it served as an arena
for a technological race with the Soviet Union for pride and prestige. AS a means, it would
provide an impetus that would allow NASA to spend a large amount of R&D money in
15. James E. Webb, "Foreword" in Rosholt, Administrative History of NASA, p. iv.
16. Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4102, 1982), pp. 65-
105; Sylvia D. Fries, NASA Engineers and the Age of ApoUo (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4104, 1991), pp. 17483;
McCurdy, Inside NASA, pp. 134-41.
17. On the Kennedy lunar decision, as well as the ramifications of it, see John M. Logsdon, The Decision
to Go to the Moon: ProjectApollo and the National Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970); Charles Murray and
Catherine Bly Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); Roger D. Launius, Apollo:
A Retrospective Analysis, Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 3 (Washington, DC: NASA, 1994); Andrew
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ways that would help the country, including ha_4ng government work with universities and
industry in terms of regional economic development.'"
Webb also told Johnson in this wide-ranging memorandum how he thought about
Apollo. He mentioned tile prospect, for example, of a new NASA facility to manage the
Apollo program; this eventually was the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston (later
named Johnson Space Center). He suggested its possible linkage with Rice University.
Webb noted that I,loyd Berkner, Chair of the Space Science Board of the National
Academy of Sciences, was establishing a Graduate Research Center in Dallas, Texas, with
industrial backing and that this new organization might also be brought into the alliance.
Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma (Chair of the Senate Space Committee) also had inter-
ests in this area, and he and others saw a development potential for Arkansas and
Mississippi. Even without NASA's involvement, Webb anticipated a scientific-industrial
complex in California, rnnning from San Francisco south through the new University of
California at San Diego. Webb saw another center emerging around Chicago, as a piw)t,
and a strong northeastern arrangement with Harvard, MIT, and similar institutions. He
envisioned work in the Southeast, perhaps revolving aronnd the Research Triangle in
North Carolina, in which Charlie .Jonas as the ranking minority member on Albert
Thomas's House Appropriations Subcommittee (which controlled the NASA budget)
would have an interest. To fill out the picture, he thought NASA could help make the pos-
sibility of a southwestern complex into a reality.
It was clear that Webb thought about NASA-industry-university relations both as a pro-
cedure to secure the Apollo goal and also as a way toward advancing regional socioeco-
nomic development. The latter end would also be a means for Apollo in terms of winning
congressional support. For Webb, it was one mosaic, with each part contributing to the
whole design. Thus, on May 25, 1961, when Kennedy announced the Moon decision,
Webb had an institutional strategy in mind, and he was ready to go at fltll speed.
Early Decisions Involving Contractors
Like Glennan, Webb believed the big decisions on procurement should be made at
the top. However, with NASA's budget soaring, the $1 million level established by Glennan
as the threshold for the Administrator's personal involvement was raised to $5 million. As
Webb wrote:
Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans, and ! determined that we would personally examine, in detail, the
results of the work of all source evaluation boards on competitively negotia_d contracts that amount-
ed to 5 million dollars or more. We expected these boards to appear before us personally in a formal
setting and make a full and complete presentation of (1) the method cho._en to break down for evalu-
ation the contractor proposaLL (2) the results achieved in the applicatio_ ¢_ this method, and (3) the
judgment of the board on each of the categories of the breakdown.
The fact that the three senior officers of the agency would take the time to conduct what amount-
ed to a thorough hearing and question-and-answer period on each contractor selection action enabled
19. This approach toward handling Apollo has been explicitly laid out in Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., "The
Fertile Crescent: The South's Role in the National Space Program," .Y_mthwe.tternIti._t_m_ztlQuarterly 71 (January
t968): 377-92; Robert A. Divine. "Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Space," in Robert A. Divine, ed., The
.]ohrL_onYea_, vol. IL"Vietnam, the Environment, and Science(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987), pp. 217-
53; Robert Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning," unpublished paper
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all levels of management, in Headquarters and in our Centers, to get their questions out on the table
before all three of us for deba_ and clarification. Another important result was that when the presen-
tation to the three of us was ov_ everyone involved had a clear understanding of the elements basic
to a proper decision and everyone in NASA concerned with the matter was aware of this. The burden
then passed to Dryden, Seamans, and me to ma_ the final decision, and the personnd of the boards
were in position to form their own judgments as to whether the three of us did in fact arrive at the best
decision as indicated by the facts and analysis. Furth_ an important element of a NASA-wide and
pervasive self-policing system was thereby established. This has had an important effect on main-
taining high standards throughout the agency. '_'
In tile months following the Apollo announcement, NASA made one decision after
another involving contracts to companies for the Moon program. The most controversial
decision, made late in 1961, was the award to North American Aviation for the construc-
tion of the Apollo spacecraft. This was controversial because the Source Evaluation Board
recommended in favor of a company other than North American. A number of astronauts
and Manned Spacecraft Center Director Robert Gilruth believed that North American
Aviation, which the Source Evaluation Board also ranked highly, was more qualified and
said so to Webb, Dryden, and Seamans.
Webb had an informal policy to spread contracts around so NASA would not overly
depend on any one organization. North American had already been awarded the contract
for the second stage of the Saturn rocket (S-II). Hence, given the Source Evaluation Board
recommendation, there was a second reason not to give this critical contract to North
American. However, pressured by Gilruth and others, Webb and his senior colleagues
decided in favor of North American. It was the largest single contract of the entire Apollo
program._
In early 1962, with most of the big hardware contracts for Apollo signed, NASA made
two other industrial decisions of policy significance. These involved contracts for sup-
porting NASA in Apollo management. One was the Bellcomm contract with AT&T.
Bellcomm was a profit-making subsidiary established by AT&T in March 1962 at NASA's
request to conduct analytical studies in support of Apollo. The second, a General Electric
contract signed in February 1962, was to assist with the integration, reliability, and check-
out of hardware at the three large spaceflight centers (Houston, Marshall, and Cape
Canaveral). These two contracts, negotiated on a sole-source basis, helped NASA with the
total Apollo system, whereas other contractors worked only on Apollo componentsY
One other development involving industry during the start of the Webb era is worth
noting. In a November 1961 reorganization, a small Industrial Applications Office was
established as part of the Office of Space Applications. The larger office was concerned
with communications satellites, weather satellites, and large hardware programs, while the
Industrial Applications unit concentrated on NASA technology "spinoffs" to industries
outside the space arena. [III-8] This highlighted Webb's interest in the socioeconomic
mission for NASA, as mentioned in his memorandum to Vice President Johnson. In the
university field, Webb was similarly seeking to achieve multiple goals in parallel.
20. ,lames E. Webb, "Forewol d," in Roshoh, Admini_trntive Hi_t¢wy _!['NASA, p. v.
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Launching a New University Relationship
With the overall expansion of the space program, NASA's interactions with universi-
ties grew enormously. Most of these were in the field of space science. The November 1961
reorganization established an Office of Space Science to organize and sponsor most of
this work. '_
Academic participation in Project Apollo was relatively modest compared to that of
industry. However, one of the most critical contracts for Apollo did go to a university--the
Apollo guidance and navigation contract awarded to MIT's Instrumentation Laboratory
on August 9, 1961. This was a sole-source award, much to the annoyance of industry.
NASA justified the selection because the laboratory's director, C. Stark Draper, was viewed
as the country's leading expert on guidance systems.
However, the most striking aspect of NASA's university relationship came with the
advent of the Sustaining University ProgramY' In November 1961, the Office of Research
Grants and Contracts was moved under the Office of Space Science, and a new program
was launched under this organization's aegis. This program aimed to use universities for
socioeconomic goals.
Until 1961, NASA, like most other federal agencies supporting research in universi-
ties, concentrated on specific projects. The agency's interest in allocating resources for
the best research was paramount. The consequence was that a relative handful of univer-
sities in the nation received most federal research grants and contracts. Webb inherited
the "project system" and did not interfere with this basic pattern of NASA relations to aca-
demic science. Most of NASA's science money was spent on projects directed by leading
academic investigators.
But Webb did not believe this was enough. [III-9] In late 1961, following considerable
discussions within and outside NASA, the Administrator directed the agency to establish
the Sustaining University Program. z_This was intended to complement the project system
model with an approach that would relate NASA to universities as institutions, rather than
to specific individuals and projects. The program had three basic components: fellow-
ships, research grants, and facilities.
The program also embodied a number of policy thrusts. One thrust was human
resources, with the goal of enlarging the number of Ph.D.s in selected technical fields
through fellowships. A second thrust was geographical spread, to nurture new centers of
strength (as well as new talent) in university science throughout the country. NASA pro-
vided funds to universities, not to individual students. The fellowships were then awarded
by those universities; hence, students had incentives to enroll there, rather than going to
a few elite schools. The third thrust was the interdisciplinary principle. NASA provided
research funds to support broad areas of research and involve a cross section of disci-
plines, including social scientists, who would study the impacts of science and technology.
A fourth thrust focused on regional socioeconomic development. NASA would provide
laboratory facilities--buildings--if the presidents and faculty of a university receiving a
NASA facility pledged to work actively with private enterprise and community leaders in
their local area, using the scientific, technological, and managerial advances being gen-
erated by the space program to benefit their regions and communities. Finally, there was
23. John E. Naugle, Fir._tAmong Equal._:The Selection of NASA Space Saence Exl_riments (Washington, DC:
NASA SP-4215, 1991), pp. 107-11.
24. For more on this subject, see W. Henry Lambright, Launching NASA's Sustaining University Pn_gram
(Syracuse, NY: lnterUniversity Case Program, 1969).
25. W. Henry Lambrighl and Laurin L. Henry, "Using Universities: The NASA Experience," Public Polioj
20 (Winter 1972): 61-82.
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afifthprinciplethatwasimplicitinalltherest--the nhancementoftheuniversityasaninstitution.NASAwantedacoherentresponsefromtheuniversity;thismeantthattheuni-
versityadministration,especiallythepresident,hadtobeaproactiveforce--aleader--in
implementingtheobjectivesoftheSustainingUniversityProgram.
Thisprogramwentwellbeyondanythinganyotherdepartmentoragencywasdoing(orevenconsidering)atthetime.NASAhadnospecificlegislativeauthoritytodowhatit
did,but,in theenvironmentofApollo,itwaspossibleforanindividualwithWebb'sgoals
andskillsto innovateinwaysthatwouldbeimpossiblelater.[III-10]Thepresidentand
keylegislatorsgaveWebbenoughleewayto startheSustainingUniversityProgramin
1961.Onceunderway,theprogram'sgeographicalspreadattractedaconsiderablecon-
stituency.Thereisnodoubtthattheabilityof NASAto reachmoststatesthroughthe
SustainingUniversityProgramhelpedbuildsupportfortheagency.However,thebroad-
ernotionsofusinguniversitiesforaNASA-basedocio-industrialpolicymatteredtoWebb.
ThehistorianWalterMcDougallcontendsthatWebbaimedatbuildinga"SpaceAge
America.''a_If so,a majorpartof theleveragewasto besuppliedbytheSustaining
UniversityProgramandthe"spaceageuniversity."Thus,byearly1962,theNASA-
industry-universitypartnershiphadbeenforgedanew.Althoughanextensionof the
Glennanperiod,it borethedistinctstampofJamesWebb,especiallywithrespectto
NASA'suniversityrelations.[III-11]
"Incentivizing" Contracts
One of the problems of R&D contracting was that technical uncertainties made it dif-
ficult to judge how much it would cost to create a particular item of hardware. Hence,
most of the industrial contracts NASA awarded in the late 1950s and early 1960s were cost
plus fixed fee. In 1962, Administrator Webb participated in an interagency task force
headed by David Bell, Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The report of this group (the
"Bell Report") examined various aspects of the public-private relationship between gov-
ernment and industry. _7 Webb was a major participant on the task force, and the report
emphasized areas in which NASA was already moving.
One of these was the notion of "incentivizing contracts" so that industry would have
some motivation to perform well and save money. Following some internal studies and the
advice of Robert Charles, who served as Webb's special assistant for procurement in 1963,
NASA established more and more contracts with incentive provisions. The basic notion of
NASA contracting would claim that "significant improvement in product quality.., time-
liness and cost can be achieved if the procurement process is saturated with competition
before contract execution, and with performance and cost reduction incentives there-
after." In late November 1963, NASA directed that the number of cost-plus-fixed-fee con-
tracts be reduced substantially and that incentives be considered for all contracts. Many
existing contracts were subsequently converted to incentive arrangements, including the
North American contract for the Apollo spacecraft. Doing so was difficult. In some cases
(such as the North American contract), the process was achieved over a period of years. 2"
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Bringing Projects Under Greater Control:
Phased Project Planning
During 1964-1965, NASA leaders made an effort to bring industrially managed pro-
jects under greater control. Webb's view was that "when you let the contract, all you've
done is started a process that with the greatest of care, anc't ability, and drive will produce
a bird. All you've done is put in motion forces that have the capability but which could fail
at any point along the line. '':''
In the mid-1960s, NASA received increasing criticism ti'om members of Congress and
others who believed too much was being spent on space versus the Great Society or
Vietnam. Webb believed that NASA had to be especially careful to avoid even the appear-
ance of mismanagement of its industrial contracts (cost overruns, schedule slippages, and
so on), because this would give critics a wedge to attack the entire program:'
In 1964, the deputy of Robert Seamans, Earl Hilburn, studied NASA's methods of
scheduling and project cost estimation. In 1965, the results of Hilburn's analysis were
implemented in the form of a new agency policy, "phased prqlect planning," to define
programs more explicitly. This policy was aimed at conducting R&D contracts in a num-
ber of sequential phases with maximum competition characterizing the "phase-by-phase
increments of project execution," with each phase allowing fi)r "the flmdamen tal concept
of agency top management participation at all major decision points. ''_t Presumably, gov-
ernment could terminate the contract at each phase and go elsewhere if dissatisfied. It
also permitted better opportunities for an agency to kee t) track of costs and schedules.
Phased project planning was "predicated on the assumption that NASA employees
would be responsible primarily for defining programs and pro_,iding technical direction to
agency contractors. ''_ The concept that government would direct industry in large-scale
development programs was also a critical principle of the Bell Report. For the most part,
NASA felt exceedingly capable of exercising technical management. But there was one
area where the agency did not, and this caused NASA to create a new in-house center.
The Electronics Research Center
As the space program grew, it became evident that electronics was a crucial discipli-
nary area, cutting across virtually every NASA field. As one scholar, Thomas Murphy, con-
cluded:
NASA specialists estimated that forty percent of the cost qthe space boosters would be accounted
for by electronics components. The figure was even higher with respect to spacecraft, where it was esti-
mated that fifty percent of the cost involved electronics. In the tracking and data acquisition elements
of the program, as much as ninety percent of the resources were electronics-oriented?"
29. lind., p. 81).
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NASA leaders were increasingly feeling tile need to have more in-house competence
to direct the vast electronics work being performed by indusuy and universities. "NASA
management was very sensitive to avoiding some of the problems the Air Force had expe-
rienced," Murphy added, "in relying too heavily on contractors whose work it lacked the
ability to evaluate. TM
Webb, Dryden, and Seamans decided in 1962 that NASA needed an Electronics
Research Center and that the best place in the country to put it was the Boston area. They
wanted it located where frontier research was going on in universities and where there was
a concentration of the electronics industry. In their view, the Harvard-MIT-Route 128
complex made the Boston area a natural. There was also relatively less NASA work in this
region, compared to California, another possible site. Finally, Webb no doubt viewed the
Boston area as an ideal site to test his vision of government, industry, and university coop-
eration.
The problem was that the Boston area was Kennedy territory. Not only was the presi-
dent from Massachusetts, but his younger brother Edward (Ted) was running for senator
in the fall of 1962 with the slogan: "I can do more for Massachusetts." Webb kept quiet
about the Electronics Research Center decision, informing the president, but not making
it known even in preliminary discussions with the Bureau of the Budget. He feared a leak
that would mix NASA interests with the Massachusetts election. After Ted Kennedy's elec-
tion, the decision was made known to the Bureau of the Budget and became official when
NASA submitted its budget to Congress in early 19637'
The protests were large and immediate, with most of the criticism coming from
Midwest legislators. The "taint" of political favoritism was charged, and Webb denied it.
However, those against the siting choice prevailed in Congress to the extent thal the
Electronics Research Center's approval was made contingent on NASA conducting a
nationwide search for sites. NASA conducted the required search, and this did not change
the final outcome, but it did delay the start in building the center (in Cambridge,
Massachusetts) by a year. By that time, Lyndon Johnson had become the president. _
NASA's Controversy With the California Institute of
Technology's Jet Propulsion Laboratory
In January 1964, Ranger 6----one of the space vehicles designed to study landing sites
on the Moon prior to NASA's sending astronauts--failed. This was the sixth Ranger flight
in a row to fail, and so much effort had been invested in this particular flight to make it
succeed that its failure brought many festering issues to light. The Ranger failure raised
questions about the relationship between NASA and the California Institute of
Technology's (Caltech) Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)._7
The primary issues were the responsiveness to NASA of JPL, which was in charge of
Ranger, andJPL's capacity to manage large technology projects.JPL was different from all
other NASA centers in that it was not a civil service organization. The laboratory grounds,
buildings, and equipment belonged to the government, but the laboratory itself--as an
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organization--waspartof Caltech,anditsstaffwereCahechemployees.JPLidentified
withtheacademicvaluesofCaltech,andCaltechchargedNASAformanagingJPU
JPLhadbeenaccustomedto near-totalutonomyunderitspreviousponsor--the
Army--andhadexpectedthesameunderNASA.TherewerespecialprovisionsinJPL
contracts--amutualityclause--indicatingthatJPLcouldrefusetoperformcertainkinds
ofworkthatdidnotsuititsinterests.However,twofactorscreatedseedsforchange.The
firstwastheApollodecision,whichgaveaspecialurgencytoRangerandchangedit from
aresearch-orientedlunarscienceprojecttoanenablingmissionforApollo.Inresponse,
NASAwantedtoinstallageneralmanagerundertheJPLdirectorwhowouldinstillpro-jectmanagementvaluesandskills.JPLneededtogivemoreattentiontodeadlines,costs,
andtightengineeringprocedures.ThesecondfactorwasWebb'sdesirefor more
responsefromCaltechtoWashington'smanagementdirectives.
Aspartofitsmanagementresponsibility,accordingtoWebb,Caltechshouldbemore
involvedwithJPL,gettingthelaboratorytointeractwithothertmiversitiesandindustry
in California.JPLshouldsetanexamplefor theuniversitiesundertheSustaining
UniversityProgramtofollow.CaltechpresidentLeeDuBridge,however,wasnotinterest-
edindoingwhatWebbwanted,andhetoldWebbthat.'_
Thisinstitutionalstrugglecontinuedintotheearly1960s. JPL had on its side both
prestige and a history of independence. NASA, however, supplied the money, and the
Caltech-JPL contract was up for renewal. What tipped the scales in favor of NASA was
Ranger 6. The Ranger disaster first produced a NASA investigation and then a congres-
sional inquiry. Because of these inquiries, Caltech's Board of Trustees became involved.
Webb protected Caltech andJPL from congressional actions that might have gone too
far in punishing these institutions. At the same time, he bargained with Caltech's Board
of Trustees to get more control over JPL. The chairman of Caltech's Board of Trustees,
Arnold Beckman, became a Webb ally, and the pressure on Caltech and JPL to change
became too strong to resist. [111-12, 111-13] The mutuality clause was removed, there was
agreement by Caltech and JPL that a general manager would be appointed, and the
Caltech fee was made subject to performance evaluation. [III-14, II1-15] Webb was unable
to get DuBridge to go along with his vision of a "space age university," but Webb never
stopped trying. Most importantly, from the standpoint of buffering the NASA-Caltech-JPL
partnership from a congressionally mandated restructuring, Ranger 7 was launched on
July 28, 1964, and was successfulY
Problems With the Sustaining University Program
Starting in 1966, Webb initiated several studies on how the Sustaining University
Program was doing? ° What he found was that by most "standard" measures of a successful
government-university program, the Sustaining University Program was doing very well
indeed. The fellowship program was highly regarded in the academic community. The
facility grants provided badly needed buildings. The research money was put to work in
ways that could be described as interdisciplinary, in comparison to traditional research
groupings, although in most cases this involved relations among physical and life scientists
rather than between such "hard" scientists and social scientists.
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Webb was disappointed, however, with the university response to his desire for innov-
ative approaches to complex problems. He had signed a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) with each university president receiving a facility grant. These MOUs included
commitments by the presidents to work on the Sustaining University Program's broader
goals. For example, they were to seek new and more effective ways to make research
results available to external clientele. There were reports on some campuses of industrial
advisory committees, conferences on applications of new findings, outside consulting rela-
tionships of individual faculty members, and so on. But most of these initiatives seemed
trivial to Webb. He was seeking a more profound response, basic attitude changes, a major
restructuring of campuses, and new external relationships for academic professionals. 4'
Webb badgered his staff and eventually reorganized and changed the leadership of
his Office of Research Grants and Contracts. However, the more fundamental problems
were on the campuses of the United States. A task force that he appointed to study NASA-
university relationships told him in 1968: [III-16]
The failure of the universities to respond to the explicit agreements of the memorandums--tech-
nology transfer and multidisciplinary research--suggests that the [Sustaining University Program]
goals, which they contained implicitly, were not achieved. Thus, the [Sustaining University Program]
facilities program cannot claim to have developed concern for societal problems, capability for insti-
tutional response, awareness of a service role, or strengthened ties with industry and the local and
regional community.
The major criticism that must be made of the universities' response to the Memorandum of
Understanding is that they did not try. They clearly committed themselves to make an "energetic and
organized" effort to implement the memorandums, and then did not make it. 4_
The year 1967 was the turning point for the Sustaining University Program, as well as
a turning point for NASA in general. The reasons behind this shift reflected Webb's poli-
cy dissatisfaction, but they were more closely related to budget constraints. President
Lyndon Johnson, in putting together the federal budget that went to Congress that year,
looked everywhere for budget savings to finance the conflict in Southeast Asia, which was
now becoming his dominant preoccupation. The Sustaining University Program was nice
to have, but not really essential, in the president's view, and he ordered Webb to terminate
the program.
Given his own frustration with the program's results, Webb was not in a good position
to defend the universities. Indeed, as Vietnam protests on campuses heated up, Johnson
was not anxious to listen to any defense of academia. The best thing Webb could accom-
plish was to get permission to curtail, rather than terminate, the program and to do so
over time. Webb had just a few more initiatives he wished to try before closing the pro-
gram--initiatives that included research in administration and management, engineering
systems design, and aid to historically black colleges and universities.
The $31 million budget for the Sustaining University Program was slashed to $10.9 in
fiscal year 1968 (calendar year 1967). As Webb left NASA in November 1968, the program
was scaled down even further, and it was eventually terminated completely by President
Richard M. Nixon. The program's funding ended officially in 1970.
41. Laurin L. Henry, The NAX4-Univer_ity Menurmnda of Understanding (Syracuse, NY: InterUniversity
Case Program, 1969).
42. ! [truer Morgan, et al., A Study t?fNASA Univer_'ity l_kwam_ (Washington, DC: NASA SP-185, 1968), p. 58.
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Tile Sustaining University Program's lifetime ran from 1961 to 1970 (fiscal years 1962
to 1971). It obligated more than $200 million to research, training, and facilities that com-
plemented and facilitated NASA's larger research project eftort. Some of tim program's
accomplishments are as follows:
• More than 4,000 graduate students at more than 100 universities were financed in
space-related disciplines.
• About 1,400 faculty members participated in research and design projects at NASA
centers during the summers.
• Thirty-seven research laboratories were built on university campuses.
• More than 3,000 space-related endeavors were carried out under the research portion
of the program.
Snccessfial by almost every customary standard, the Sustaining University Program
enlarged the personnel base from which to draw aerospace scientists and engineers,
brought new universities into aeronautics and space research, facilitated regular partic-
ipation by scientists in NASA project research, consolidated disparate research endeavors
into space "centers" on campus, and served as a model for other agencies with regard to
institutional grants, geographical spread, and other features. It even stimulated many
social scientists to focus on science policy and technolog_ as a dominant concern. What
the program did not do was meet the broader criteria set by Webb:
He hoped to see more innovation and change in univer_itie.s--tzroader capabilities for multidis-
ciplinarv research, universi_ concern with the technology transfer process, increased involvement with
industry and community and regional problems, developing capability for institutional response to
societal need. These hopes were largely disappointed. By the late 1960s, there was evidence on some
campuses of movement in the directions Webb sought, but just as these were appearing [the Sustaining
University Program] ended. 4_
Problems With Industry: NASA's Relationship
With North American Aviation
Without question, the NASA-industry-university partnership had produced the suc-
cesses of the Mercury program. This partnership was so eftk'ctive in the Gemini program
that it won an award for achievement in 1966 as an example of excellence. In January
1967, however, the Apollo fire occurred, taking the lives of three astronauts while they
conducted tests in a space capsule on the launch pad." This served to focus attention on
problems in the relationship of NASA with North American Aviation, the builder of the
Apollo spacecraft. No doubt, some of the issues involw:d were present where other
government-industry interactions were concerned. However, the NASA-North American
problems were especially significant, given the central role North American played in
43. Lambright and Henry, "Using Universities," p. 73.
44. On the Apollo 204 capsule fire, see "The Ten Desperate Minutes," L!/e. April 21, 1967, pp. 113-14;
Erik Bmgausl, Murder on I'm134 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. 1968); Mike Gray, Angbe o/Attack: Harrison St_rrrna
and the Race to the M_,_m(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1992) ; Erlend A. Kennan, and Edmund H. Harvey,.Jr.,
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Apollo, and the resulting managerial solution was an example of what Wehb called "inno-
vating our way" out of a problem."
The North American controversy went back to the original award of the Apollo space-
craft contract. As noted, this was one of those rare occasions when Webb, Dryden, and
Seamans overruled the Source Evaluation Board. Charges of "politics" were hurled at the
time, and not forgotten in subsequent years by NASA critics. What made the North
American Aviation award stand out was its size and the fact that it made the corporation
the single most important contractor for NASA in terms of sheer work.
The nature of the Apollo program was such that it entailed a relatively small number
of huge awards. North American received two of these. The six largest NASA contract
awards made to industry all involved Project Apollo. The expenditures on these contracts
through fiscal year 1969 are shown in the following table.
Major NASA Contracts
(cumulative awards through 1969)
Cost
Contract Contractor (in billions)
Apollo Spacecraft
Lunar Excursion Module
_IC Stages of Saturn V Rocket
_II Stage of Saturn V
S-IVB Stage of Saturn V
Apollo Integration and Systems Support
North American Aviation 3.345
Grumman Aerospace 1.914
Boeing Company 1.377
North American Aviation 1.269
McDonnell Douglas 1.097
General Electric 0.754
Source: NASA, Annual Procurement Report, FY 1969, p. 30. Cited in "R&D--The Government-
Industry Relationship," Thomas E Murphy, Science, Geopolitics, and Federal ,Spending
(l,exington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1971), p. 173.
Hence, from 1961 on, NASA knew it had an unusually dependent relationship with
North American Aviation. Marshall Space Flight Center managed the _II contract on
behalf of NASA, and the Manned Spacecraft Center managed the Apollo spacecraft con-
tract. NASA worried that North American was not always giving the agency's work the
attention required.
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During the early years of the relationship, North American Aviation developed a neg-
ative reputation within NASA. The company, for its part, thought NASA's criticism unfair.
By 1965, the delays on both the S-II and the spacecraft were long enough for NASA
Headquarters to become truly concerned. Late in 1965, the director of the Apollo pro-
gram within the Office of Manned Space Flight, U.S. Air Force General Samuel C.
Phillips, organized a "tiger team" of NASA specialists who went to North American to
investigate what was going on. Phillips prepared a highly critical report that would later
become notorious as the "Phillips Report." In the report, a series of extreme criticisms
were pointed directly at North American. [III-17, III-18]
During 1966, North American worked to respond to the NASA criticisms; however,
problems continued. The most visible ones were recounted by Aviation Week and Space
Technology, a trade journal, on November 21, 1966. It reported on a "crisis" threatening the
U.S. Moon landing venture. "_ The specific problems reported in the article included the
structural failures of both a North American command module fuel tank and the S-II
stage. They were indeed serious problems, so much so that Webb felt obliged to alert
President Johnson to them.
NASA and North American did in fact quickly address these known issues. By the end
of 1966, the situation was looking so good that optimism prevailed among NASA's tech-
nical people. However, one technical issue that was not addressed was the possibility of a
fire in the pure oxygen atmosphere of the space capsule. The fire problem did not
become an issue until it actually occurred in January 1967. Indicative of the tangled state
of NASA-North American Aviation relations at the time was the circumstance that NASA
and its contractor were haggling over a renegotiation in their basic agreement at the turn
of the year. This most significant of all the NASA-industry partnerships was actually held
together only by a letter contract as 1967 began.
The fire took place January 27, 1967, and threw NASA-North American relations into
turmoil. NASA established an internal accident review board, which was followed by a
series of congressional investigations. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that the
first six months after the fire was a period of crisis management, with the succeeding
months a time of recovery. During the crisis management period, media attention was
searching and accusatory. The NASA-North American partnership was a target, as was the
performance of the NASA Administrator in particular.
There were charges that the original award to North American Aviation was a result
of political pressure led by North American lobbyist Fred Black and a former Lyndon
Johnson associate and Washington insider named Bobby Baker. Meanwhile, the NASA
investigation showed that NASA and North American were both at fault, with many errors
of both omission and commission. Webb concluded that tile basic relationship was sound;
however, "surgical" changes would have to be made. This meant key personnel changes;
the head of NASA's Apollo spacecraft project office in Houston was replaced. At Webb's
adamant insistence, his counterpart at North American was also replaced. The NASA-
North American contract was renegotiated so that the contractor was penalized financial-
ly for the accident. And most importantly, a new contract was negotiated with Boeing to
certify that "the whole unit, vehicle and payload, does function together, is compatible,
and is ready for flight." The Boeing contract was announced by Webb in congressional tes-
timony on May 9, 1967. `7 All these actions were taken rapidly, largely at the command of
Webb, and sometimes after bitter discussions between Webb and North American
46.
1966, p. 36
47.
"Problems Force Drastic Apollo Rescheduling," Aviation Week and Space 7bchnolog 3, November 21,
Levine, Managzng NASA in the Apollo Era, p. 90.
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President, J. Leland Atwood, with Webb threatening to take the Apollo contract away from
North American unless the company went along--which it ultimately did.
All this happened while Webb defended publicly and before Congress the basic
strength of the NASA-North American system. Congress and Webb engaged in a major
struggle over the right of Congress to see the aforementioned "Phillips Report" that had
been so critical of North American. Webb regarded NASA's ability to deal frankly and pri-
vately with contractors as critical to its ability to root out problems at an early stage and
then address them. In the end, Webb let Congress see the Phillips Report only in execu-
tive sessions of the Senate and House space committees.
After six months, the crisis decision making gave way to recovery. The wounds
between NASA and North American Aviation began to heal. For everyone, the Apollo
lunar landing in 1969 marked the final evidence of successful recovery. The Apollo fire,
while not forgotten, became much less significant in the wake of this triumph. The issues
in the NASA-North American relationship became matters for historians rather than pol-
icy makers. The successful lunar landing quite properly refocused attention on the posi-
tive aspects of NASA's industrial and university partnerships.
Other Organizational Innovations: Research Institutes
The basic relationship NASA had with industry and universities was a direct one.
NASA addressed a university or corporation one-on-one. However, the agency experi-
mented in its early years with other approaches to getting its work done. One approach
worth documenting was the creation of a research institute. Its earliest manifestation orig-
inated in the Glennan years and grew under Webb. A different version came into being at
the end of the 1960s, and a third variation was born in the 1970s.
One of these was the Institute for Space Studies. Robert Jastrow, a NASA physicist and
scientific administrator, was concerned that NASA needed to have a close relationship
with the best scientific minds in the country for its theoretical space science work. He pro-
posed to Glennan that a special institution be established. In December 1960, Glennan
approved setting up the Institute for Space Studies in New York City. It was established as
an arm of the Goddard Space Flight Center, but with considerable autonomy over the
choice of its research activities. The institute would have a small in-house staff and be a
place where notable scientists could come and work for relatively brief stays. It would also
work closely with Columbia University and other institutions in the New York City area.
The institute flourished in the 1960s and evolved various programs of interaction with uni-
versifies, succeeding in its prime objective of linking NASA more closely to the very best
space science theorists. Such individuals came to NASA via fellowship and other arrange°
merits with the institute? 8
Another organization NASA created was the Lunar Science Institute, which was
founded on a different kind of model--the university consortium. The origins of the
Lunar Science Institute lay in the realization in the late 1960s that as Apollo flights
brought lunar samples and other data back to the Manned Spacecraft Center, there was a
need to maximize the use of these samples and other data by non-NASA space scientists.
The Institute for Space Studies was obviously a model, but NASA's Manned Spacecraft
Center in Houston, in contrast to Goddard (which ran the Institute for Space Studies),
was not oriented toward science. Instead of an institute managed by a NASA center, Webb
turned to the possibility that an institute might be managed by a university or a group of
48. Van Nimmen and Bruno, with Rosholt, NASA Hi.,,toricalData Btmk, Vol. I, pp. 314-25.
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universities. With the help of the National Academy of Sciences, NASA established the
Lunar Science Institute, based near the Manned Spacecraft Center. [V-19] Then, on
March 12, 1969, NASA formed a university-based consortium, called the University Space
Research Association, to manage the institute, which remained in Houston.
However, the Lunar Science Institute was launched at a time of budget shrinkage,
whereas the Institute for Space Studies had been born during a time of growth. The new
entity was not greeted with enthusiasm by civil servant-led NASA entities that were hard-
pressed to defend existing resources. Personality issues exacerbated the situation. The
l+unar Science Institute survived, but it left a legacy, that was controversial.*'
A somewhat later and entirely different approach to these institutions was the Space
Telescope Science Institute. By 1970, NASA had a number of ambitious space science pro-
jects on its agenda, but because of budget cutbacks and government-academic rivalries,
relations between NASA and the scientific community had deteriorated. The agency con-
sciously searched for better ways to deal with the community. The space telescope, a high-
priority program tbr scientists as well as for NASA, became a vehicle for finding a solution
to what Homer Newell has described as a "love-hate relationship." Astronomers, those sci-
entists most concerned with the telescope, had Kitt Peak National Observatory and other
national facilities in mind. They called for an institute that would be managed by a uni-
versity consortium and located at a university to maximize their control over the tele-
scope's observation agenda. NASA, which had its own in-house scientists, did not wish to
relinquish such control. NASA insisted that it was a mission agency, not the National
Science Foundation."
University" astronomers and NASA scientists (chiefly at Goddard Space Flight Center)
fought for the next few years. By 1975, an important inside ally of academia emerged.
[III-20] This was Noel Hinners, Associate Administrator for Space Science. For Hinners,
"an institute could solve two problems: one, pacify, if you will, the ground based astrono-
my community, so that they'd be all the more supportive of the Space Telescope, and two,
really provide an external advocate for a good operations program." In short, Hinners
concluded that unless NASA had a united constituency outside NASA to help promote the
telescope, the agency" could not get the necessary resources to have a telescope at all. This
meant giving the astronomers what they wanted: the Space Telescope Science Institute? _
Hinners arranged for the National Academy of Sciences to study the plan and even-
lually added its blessing to the institute in 1976. [III-21] In 1978, NASA Administrator
Robert Frosch followed suit. NASA Headquarters backed the academic astronomers over
the NASA scientists, and Hinners announced the NASA decision to Congress, pointing
out that the agency would retain operational control of the telescope in orbit. [III-22] On
.January 16, 1981, following a vigorous competition, Frosch announced that a university'
consortium based at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, would receive the
contract to operate the Space Telescope Science Institute; it has been in operation since
that date?"
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Changing NASA-University Relations
During the latter 1970s, there were several efforts to improve the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of NASA's administration of research grants and contracts to colleges and uni-
versities. In 1977 and 1978, a review of the entire program led to several reforms to
improve accountability, ensure quality, and establish mission criticality for university
research supported by NASA/" [I11-23, III-24]
Even if these reforms were successful, other difficulties had emerged by the early
1980s as the launch rate of scientific satellites by NASA had dropped from its peak of four
to five missions a year to only one or two annual flights. Moreover, the Sustaining
University Program had disappeared a decade earlier, and NASA's graduate fellowship
program had been terminated. Indeed, the purchasing power of the space science bud-
get had been cut almost in half over a two-decade period. Contrary to expectations, fre-
quent opportunities to carry out scientific investigations on the Space Shuttle were not
emerging?"
In this context, NASA in 1983 undertook a comprehensive re-examination of its rela-
tionship with American universities. This review validated the perception that there were
serious problems in the relationship and proposed a series of steps that NASA might take
to address those problems. [1II-25] However, most of those steps fell victim to continuing
pressures on the Office of Space Science and Applications budget; only the recommen-
dation to reinstitute a Graduate Fellowship Program was fully implemented. By the mid-
1980s, the NASA space and Earth sciences program, including its university-based
component, perceived itself in a crisis situation; the intimate and mutually productive
relationship that had developed over the past quarter century required revitalization? _
A new wrinkle to NASA-university relations took place in 1988, when Congress passed
the National Space Grant Act, which established a national program of space grant
colleges and universities eligible for a major fellowship program. [III-26] With the first
competitive awards for fellowships in 1989, 21 independent space grant consortia began
operation. Three years later, the number of consortia stabilized at 52. The intent of this
program was to:
• Continue to strengthen the national network of colleges and universities with inter-
ests and capabilities in aeronautics, astronautics, Earth systems, space science and
technology, and related fields
• Encourage cooperative programs and collaborations among colleges, universities,
business and industry, and federal, state, and local governments
• Promote programs related to aeronautics, astronautics, Earth systems, and space sci-
ence and related technology in the areas of research, education, and public service
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• RecruitandtrainU.S.citizensforcareersinaeronautics,a tronautics,andspacesci-
enceandrelatedtechnology,placingspecialemphasisondiversitybyrecruiting
women,underrepresentedminorities,andpersonswithdisabilities
• Supportthenationalagendatodevelopastrongscience,mathematics,andtechnol-
ogyeducationbasefromelementarythroughuniversitylevels"_
This parmership infused various educational institutions in the United States with
funding from NASA to further aerospace science and technology in the same way that the
National Land Grant College Act of 1862 made federal resources available for higher edu-
cation in the nineteenth centur).
A New Role for NASA--Supporting U.S. Industry
One of the themes that President Ronald Reagan's administration brought to
Washington in 1981 was increased reliance on the U.S. private sector, rather than the gov-
ernment, to take the lead in developing new areas of economic and societal activity. With
respect to the space program, there was a flurry of interest in "privatizing" various ele-
ments of the government's activities, including the Landsat program, the operation of
expendable launch vehicles, and even the construction and operation of additional Space
Shuttle orbiters. Another area of emphasis was the potential for substantial economic
returns from space; one influential projection was that by the year 2000, the annual rev-
enue from commercial activities in space could reach $65 billion? 7 The White House
issued a National Commercial Space Policy in 1984; in response, NASA developed a
"NASA Commercial Use of Space Policy" during the same year. [III-27] This policy was
intended to implement a new goal for the space agency--parmerships with U.S. industry
to "expand opportunities for U.S. private sector investment and involvement in civil space
and space-related activities. "_"
In response to this emphasis on space industry, NASA established in September 1984
an Office of Commercial Programs, to be overseen by an associate administrator at the
NASA Headquarters level. This new entity was intended to provide "a focus for and facil-
itate efforts within NASA to expand U.S. private sector investment and involvement in civil
space related activities." Specifically, NASA Administrator James M. Beggs intended the
office to foster:
• New commercial high-technology ventures
• New commercial applications of existing space technology
• Unsubsidized initiatives aimed at transferring existing space programs to the private
sector _o
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Since it was first established in 1984, the Office of Commercial Programs has enjoyed
mixed success in meeting the objectives laid out in the original charter. "'
NASA, as an R&D organization created to carry out national science and exploration
objectives in space, found its new relationship with an emerging but uncertain commer-
cial space sector difficult to incorporate into its long-established patterns of institutional
behavior. While a number of the initiatives contained in the 1984 Commercial Use of
Space Policy were formally put into practice (perhaps most notably a network of universi-
ty-based Centers for the Commercial Development of Space that brought industry and
university researchers together with funding from both NASA and industry), a combina-
tion of mixed returns from early commercially oriented experiments, the Challenger
accident and the resultant dramatic decrease in Space Shuttle flight opportunities, and
institutional resistance at NASA meant that space commercialization never got very high
on the agency's list of priorities for its future.
The emphasis on government-industry cooperation in commercializing space had
another implication for NASA; other government agencies began to take a more active
role in space-related issues that NASA had previously thought were its exclusive purview.
During the 1980s, the Department of Commerce created an Office of Space Commerce,
while the Department of Transportation formed its own Office of Commercial Space
Transportation. Operating through the Executive Branch interagency process, these orga-
nizations were often critical of how NASA was carrying out its new partnership with indus-
try. At other times, they pushed for new roles for NASA in the commercialization process.
By the last year of the Reagan administration, commercialization advocates within the gov-
ernment were able to delay the release of a new statement of national space policy until it
was accompanied by a set of commercially oriented initiatives. [III-28] The proliferation
of space organizations within the government was not a comfortable development for
NASA.
The efforts toward greater commercialization of space activities did not abate with the
change of administrations in 1989. In January of that year, George Bush succeeded
Ronald Reagan as president, with whom he had served as vice president. Bush continued
to emphasize the development of space industry. During the Bush administration, the
shaping and articulation of space policy were the work of the National Space Council, a
descendant of the National Space Council first established in 1958 under the National
Aeronautics and Space Act (Public Law 85-568). Chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle,
the council consisted of the heads of all federal departments or other high-level offices
having either a programmatic role or legitimate concern in federal government space
activities, including NASA, the Department of Commerce (which contains the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), the office of the director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the office of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among
others.
Several of the National Space Council's policy declarations, designated "National
Space Policy Directives" (NSPD), related directly to commercial space policy. NSPD-2
("Commercial Space Launch Policy") [III-29] reflected the administration's commitment
in 1990 to developing a thriving commercial space sector by establishing "the long-term
goal of a free and fair [space launch] market in which the U.S. industry can compete"
internationally. NSPD-3 [III-30] elaborated the administration's commercial space policy
60. NASA Management Instruction 1103.38, "Role and Responsibilities--Assistant Administrator for
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with specific guidelines "aimed at expanding private se(u_r investment in space by tile
market-driven Commercial Space Sector." Each of these do_ mnents emphasized a strong
presidential commitment to commercial space activity. Each also hvlped redefine the rela-
tionship of NASA to the space industry."'
Privatizing the Space Shuttle
One of the most potentially significant developments in NASA's history of private sec-
tor relations has been the privatization effort for the Space Shuttle. The Space Shuttle has
been seen as a momentous technological innovation that has gone from R&D to opera-
tions. As it has made that transition, many observers have suggested that NASA, whose
mission is R&D, should "spin ofF' the shuttle to the private sector, in the early 1980s,
NASA administrators spoke of this eventuality taking place by 1990.
The transition did not take place in light of the 1986 Challenger accident, which
showed the shuttle to be far less routine than NASA officials believed. The Space Shuttle
is a piloted vehicle, and it is utterly indispensable for many of the most important NASA
activities, including the space station. The notion of "operational" has, therefore, had to
be redefined. In a real sense, the shuttle is not routine, and safety ntust be toremost in
everyone's mind. After 15 years of flights, learning has taken place, however, and a new
structural relationship has been proposed in the mid-1990s as desirable and possible. Also,
budget pressures have forced NASA to take a hard look at shuttle management. The key
document in privatization decision-making thus far is the Report of the ,Space Shuttle
Management Independent l_'view Team (February 1995). ('haired by Christopher Kraft, for-
mer director of the Johnson Space Center, the review team called for replacing much of
NASA's shuttle bureaucracy and many contractors with a single contractor possessing
broad decision-making authority.
The report led to a decision by NASA in 1996 to negotiate a (ontract with a new con>
pany called United Space Alliance (USA), formed by a parmership of Rockwell
International and I.ockheed-Martin. It is believed that such a move would save $1 billion
annually in present shuttle costs and require far fewer employees to service shuttle oper-
ations. The actual details of what would remain governmental and what would be private
are to be worked out over time. Scheduled to begin by September 1996, the transition of
the shuttle from public to private would take years. Privatization of the Space Shuttle
would break new ground in NASA-business relations--indeed governmental-private sec-
tor relations in general. There has been talk and some action at NASA in terms of priva-
tization in the past, but never has an activity so central to NASA been privatized, or one
so overladen with risk to human life.
Privatization of the shuttle makes NASA a showcase for the Clinton administration's
call for "Reinventing Government." However, the move is a controversial change in pub-
lie-private relations. It entails marrying private profit, cost reduction, and public purpose
in shuttle utilization. At the same time, privatization is expected to maintain a virtually
perfect record in preventing loss of human life. The combination of requiremenLs is
unprecedented.
Conclusion
This essay has discussed NASA-industry-university relationships--a research partner-
ship. The basic infiasuucture for this partnership was established in the period from 1958
to 1969. Changes subsequent to this era have been variations on the models of this time
61. This infoHnation was obtained from Sylvia K. gaaeme,. ()tlice of Policy and Plans (Code Z),
"Explanation of Exv(ulive Branch Policy Directives," Seplemt_*l 1995, _)py available in NASA ttislorical
Reference Collection.
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frame, modified by the need to address funding constraints. Attempts to expand NASA's
role to support private sector commercial space initiatives have had difficulties.
Nonetheless, NASA overall has been an important pioneering agency in terms of industry
and university relations. NASA's innovations in contracting and emphasis on spinoff tech-
nologies have been adopted by other government functionaries. NASA-university rela-
tions in the Sustaining University Program, while disappointing to Webb, were precursors
of the current emphasis on government-university-industry relations today. NASA's geo-
graphical spread and institutional development policies certainly have been emulated
elsewhere.
The problems in these relationships are more than balanced by their positive features.
NASA's basic problem in these relationships since 1969 has been how to maintain some
of their more successful features that were seen earlier in NASA's history--such as the bal-
ance between in-house capability and contractor expertise. It is easier to innovate when
funds are growing rather than declining. Also, as the space program matured, it has
become increasingly necessary to determine what activities must remain governmental
and what can be privatized. The division of labor based on concepts of what is R&D and
what is operational in space can be controversial, as the shuttle case indicates. Still, the
basic infrastructure has proved itself robust and resilient. During the 1960s, NASA built a
base that could last and a set of parmerships that could be renewed. The NASA-industry-
university relationship today remains one of the more adaptive and important policy con-
cepts when applied to national purposes.
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Document II1-1
Document rifle: T. Keith Glennan, Memorandum from the Administrator, "Functions and
Authority--Office of Research Grants and Contracts," April 6, 1959.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, DC.
When T. Keith Glennan became the NASA Administrator in the fall of 1958, just as the space agency
began operations, he had the opportunity to frame relations with other federal and phvate organiza-
tions as he wished. Recognizing that universities held much scientific and technical expertise, he nat-
urally sought a formal attiance that would allow a mutually beneficial relationship. Much of what
he put in place was carried out by the Office of Research Grants and Contracts, the formal entity at
NASA Headquarters charged with caring for this relationship. The following memorandum provides
a statement offunctions and authority for this office, as well as a rationale for action.
[11 April 6, 1959
Memorandum from the Administrator
Subject: Functions and Authority--Office of Research Grants and Contracts
1. Purpose of this Memorandum.
a. To redesignate the University Research Program Office as the Office of Research
Grants and Contracts.
2.
b. To provide a statement of functions and authority for the office.
Functions. The Office of Research Grants and Contracts is assigned the following func-
tions.
b.
c.
Developing the NASA basic research program to be conducted in educational,
scientific and industrial organizations, except for research directly related to or
accomplished under the Space Flight Development Program.
Assisting other offices and divisions in identifying basic research projects which
justify NASA support.
Serving as NASA contact point for research scientists and administrators of other
organizations concerning research grants and contracts.
d. Advising educational, scientific and industrial organizations of NASA basic
research needs.
e. Providing procedures for handling all unsolicited research proposals received by
NASA.
f. Obtaining and coordinating the review and evaluation of all research grant and
contract proposals, with other interested and responsible offices and divisions.
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[21 g. Providing the Procurement and Supply Division with recommendations and nec-
essary justifications for all research grant and contract actions.
h. Ensuring, or providing when necessary, proper technical monitoring of spon-
sored research.
i. Coordinating the sponsored basic research program with related programs of the
National Science Foundation and other Government agencies.
j. Ensuring, and assisting in, the publication of research information arising from
the sponsored research program.
k. Providing administrative services for all approved research grants and contracts,
including recommending type of contracts or grant instrument forms, mainte-
nance of official agency files and records, handling of all correspondence, receipt
and processing of vouchers for payment, etc., but not including such services for
industrial research sponsored with Space Flight Development funds.
3. Reporting Responsibility. The Chief, Office of Research Grants and Contracts reports
directly to the Director, Aeronautical and Space Research.
4. Scope of Authority. The Chief, Office of Research Grants and Contracts is authorized
and directed to take such action as is necessary to carry out the responsibilities
assigned to him within the limitations of this and other official NASA issuances and
communications.
5. Limitations on Authority. The authority of the Chief, Office of Research Grants and
Contracts, does not include technical cognizance of research activities funded in the
Space Flight Development Program or research conducted in NASA facilities, but
does include administration of university and non-profit institution grants and con-
tracts to ensure conformance to administrative policies and procedures.
6. Relationships With Other NASA Officials. In performing the functions assigned to him,
the Chief, Office of Research Grants and Contracts is responsible for recognizing the
delegations of authority and responsibility of other NASA officials and for seeing that
instructions he may issue are properly coordinated with the offices and divisions hav-
ing joint interests.
T. Keith Glennan
Administrator
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Document 111-2
Document title: Walter D. Sohier, NASA Assistant General Counsel, "Legal Framework of
NASA's Procurement Program," NASA-Industry Program Plans Conference, July 28, 1960
(Washington, DC: NASA, 1960), pp. 105-108.
At a first-of-its-kind NASA-industry conference in mid-1960, NASA presented its thinking regarding
future spaceflight plans to the industries that wouM play a key role in implementing those plans. In
anticipation of increased contracting with industry, NASA's Assistant (k'neral Counsel, Walter D.
Sohi_ provided an overview of the space agency's procurement polio. In it he emphasized the legal
aspects of the procurement poli O, being implemented tO, NASA. This poll O, .served the space agent), dur-
ing the earliest period of it.s contracting for spacen'aft, ancillary, _omponents, and .support inJm-
structure in the lunar landing program of the 1960s.
[105]
Legal Framework of NASA's Procurement Program
It is my purpose to discuss with you the legal framework of NASA's procurement pro-
gram. Since many of you are familiar with the basic statutory and regulatory authority
under which the procurement operations of the Military Departments function, particu-
lar emphasis will be given in this discussion to similarities and differences between the
rules which we in NASA must follow and those which govern the military. The subject of
NASA's statutory patent policy is presented in the paper by Mr. Gerald D. O'Brien, our
Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters, and therefore will be omitted entirely from
this discussion.
The question of what statutory procurement authority to give such a new agency in
order for it to be able to carry out its rather tmique program within the tight schedules
necessarily involved was given considerable thought during preparation and enactment of
what is now the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. The original bill which was
submitted to Congress by the Executive Branch contained a broad grant of substantive
authority for NASA to enter into such contracts or other transactions as might be neces-
sary in the conduct of its work and on such terms as the new agency might deem appro-
priate. This bill also proposed making applicable to the new agency the provisions of
chapter 137 of title 10 of the U.S. Code, formerly known as the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947.
There were both history and practical reasoning behind choosing this legislative
approach to NASA's procurement authority. Historically, NASA's predecessor organiza-
tion, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NA(LA), had been included along
with the military departments and the Coast Guard as an agency to which the provisions
of the Armed Services Procurement Act applied. Hence, this set of rules was already famil-
iar to NASA people. From a practical standpoint, it was t('lt that the research and devel-
opment procurement activities of the new agency were likely to involve the same general
industry as that which was engaged in military research and development programs. To
require this agency to follow about the same set of procurement rules as the military tol-
lowed might avoid needless confusion on the part of industry and might cut to a mini-
mum delays created by unfamiliarity with the practices of the new agency.
Essentially, this formulation of procurement authority was in the end enacted into law
[in] the Space Act I)y the Congress, requiring NASA to folh)w the same statutory rules gov-
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erningprocurementproceduresa timmilitary.In spiteof thisfact,thereareanumber
of ditterencesbetweenthestatutoryauthorityavailableto NASAandto the military
departments that have an impact on the procurement process and which will be apparent
to industry in its dealings with NASA.
Tile first, and most serious, difference relates to NASA's lack of attthority to indemni-
fy research and development contractors against unusually hazardons risks. The military
departments have had such indemnification authority since 1952, but tmformnately this
authorilv was not extended to NASA. We have been able largely to surmount this problem
where i(uclear material is involved, since lhe Atomic Energy Commission can extend
indemnitication coverage under the Atomic Energy Act to NASA contractors covered by
operating licenses of the AEC. There remain, however, instances of other nnusually haz-
ardous risks that are involved in the performance for work for NASA. These risks by very
definition are not normally insurable unless exorbitant premiums are paid. NASA has
sought to rectify this lack of authority by proposing in [106] our legislative program to
Congress that NASA be given the same attthority to indemnify research and development
contractors as is available to the military. We have hopes that when Congress comes back
next month this, along with other items of the legislative program, will get favorable
action.
A second difference between the legal authority available to the military departments
and Io NASA that has procurement implications relates to the authority of the military to
exempt foreign purchases fiom the payment of duty under 10 U.S.C. 2383. This statutory
provision provides that the Secretary of a military department may make "emergency pur-
chases of war material aboard." It is clearly inapplicable to NASA. The immediate practi-
cal effect of this difference in authority is obvious.
A less obvious effect arises in connection with the Buy American Act and the handling
of purchases in Canada. Defense currently provides that the purchases in Canada of sup-
plies appearing on certain departmental lists will, in effect, be exempt from the Buy
American Act. Supplies purchased in Canada that do not appear on such lists are likewise
exempt, except that duty will be added to the price offered by the Canadian supplier,
whether or not a duty free entry certificate is provided pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2383.
For NASA to treat certain listed supplies in the same way as the Department of
Defense would mean that, in spite of the actual payment of duty, the Canadian firm would
be treated as if no duty were to be paid. Thus, under such a procedure, a Canadian firm
would be awarded a contract even though the ultimate cost to NASA, when duty is con-
sidered, might be considerably more than the next lower bid or proposal. The taxpayer
would come out the same in the end, but NASA appropriations would suffer.
We have recently determined that because of this difference in the application of duty
to purchases in Canada by NASA we cannot adopt precisely the same policy and proce-
dures as the military in dealing with Canadian companies. Moreover, American industry
will be involved in this problem since the duty situation, so far as it affects subcontractors
in Canada as well as other countries, must be taken into consideration. As you can see, this
is a pretty complicated subject. Suffice it to say that NASA has tried to minimize the pro-
cedural differences in this area between dealing with the military and dealing with NASA.
But certain differences must remain, since our authority to exempt from duty purchases
fiom foreign sources is not the same as that of the military.
A third difference in legal authority available to DOD and NASA has been resolved by
Executive Order. At the outset, NASA was not an agency authorized by the President to
include the so-called "no set-off" provision in its contracts pursuant to the Assignment of
Claims Act. By Executive Order No. 10824, dated May 29, 1959, the President remedied
tim situation[thus placing NASA in tim same position in this respect as die Department
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of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the General Services Administration.
Prior to the issuance of the executive order, this lack of authority of NASA had posed dif-
ficulties for contractors that were in need of financing.
An effort to eliminate a fourth difference between DOD and NASA is being made in
the NASA legislative program for this year. This difference relates to the bonding require-
ments of the Miller Act. Under this act, the Secretaries of the military departments and of
the Treasury are authorized to waive the requirements of the Miller Act in the case of cost-
type contracts. NASA is not an agency to which this authority to waive has been extended.
When Title II of the First War Powers Act was in existence, this lack of authority posed
no difficulty for NACA, NASA's predecessor, because Title II afforded a similar authority
to waive this bonding requirement. However, with the repeal of Title II by Public Law
85-804, this failure to be specifically authorized by the Miller Act to waive bonds under
cost-type contracts became significant. This was so because Public Law 85-804 clearly states
that it is not to be construed as authorizing the waiver of "any bid, payment, performance,
or other bond required by law."
We have had a recent contract situation arise where this has posed an awkward and,
seemingly, unnecessary situation for us. It would [107] appear that the end result was
never intended by the Congress, and we hope the situation will be remedied by the
Congress in August by adding NASA to the agencies authorized by the Miller Act to waive
bonds in cost-type contracts.
A final difference in authority, a remedy for which is also in our legislative submittal
presently before the Congress, relates to our authority to outlease property. It has pro-
curement implications to the extent we lease out industrial facilities to companies in con-
nection with the performance of NASA contracts. The heart of this problem lies in the fact
that the military departments have express statutory authority in 10 U.S.C. 2667(b) (5) to
outlease property even though the consideration for such leasing is no more than main-
tenance of the property by the lessee. The absence of such express authority requires the
charging of additional consideration. NASA has, in the Space Act, the authority to lease
out property but does not have express authority to accept maintenance of the property as
sole consideration. We are seeking such authority in our legislative program. Without it,
NASA must treat industry differently in this respect than does the military.
I have discussed in some detail certain differences in authority which must be borne
in mind in doing business with NASA as distinguished from the military departments.
These are exceptions to the general rule that the rules involved in doing business with
NASA are not appreciably different from doing business with the military. But I do not
wish to overemphasize the differences in procurement authority between NASA and the
military. Essentially, the same set of rules applies. This may be illustrated by turning briefly
to a discussion of the regulations governing NASA procurement.
There are two main bodies of government Procurement Regulations at the present
time--the Armed Services Procurement Regulation [ASPR], and the Federal
Procurement Regulations. Generally speaking, the Federal Procurement Regulations are
followed by the civilian agencies of the government, the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation by the military agencies. This would seem to be a logical division, since most
of the civilian agencies are governed by Title III of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, under which the Federal Procurement Regulations
are issued, whereas the military is governed by a different statute establishing procure-
ment procedures. The difficulty arises with respect to NASA, however, since--civilian as it
is---it is governed by the same procurement law as the military departments and not the
civilian agencies of the government.
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Where does this lead to in terms of which procurement regulations to apply to NASA?
A compromise was worked out on this question which, we feel, achieves the laudable
objectives of the Federal Procurement Regulations System to eliminate the multiplicity of
government procurement regulations while also achieving the objective of not requiring
contractors of NASA to learn a different set of rules from those which they must follow in
contracting with the military departments.
In essence, this compromise permits NASA to adopt the policies and procedures set
forth in ASPR rather than in the Federal Procurement Regulations [FPR]. In practice, it
seems unlikely that there will be many differences of substance between the FPR and the
ASPR. Ifa policy or practice is not covered by the FPR, NASA will follow any existing ASPR
policy or practice unless the Administrator of NASA determines that the objective of uni-
formity between NASA and DOD is outweighed by other considerations. Of course, in the
area of patents, NASA must adopt special policies and procedures because of the unique
patent provisions contained in the Space Act. It is also contemplated that, in the area of
grants and contracts falling generally within the purview of Public Law 85-934, NASA will
not be required to conform to any future FPR coverage on these matters.
NASA has already published a considerable portion of its procurement regulations. In
the near future, the balance will be published. These will appear, as they are published, in
the Federal Register as part of the FPR System. However, they will read and look very
much like ASPR.
One practical effect of these arrangements concerning ASPR and the FPR and our
manner of proceeding in the adoption of procurement regulations is that, when a mili-
tary department is faced with administering a NASA [108] contract, it will not be unfa-
miliar to it. We can, in effect, tell the military: '_Just follow your normal procedures for
contract administration; our contracts are pretty much the same as yours." And, of course,
for industry--ordinarily the same industry with which the military departments deal--a
new set of rules need not be learned.
This simplifies the problems of negotiating contracts, too. If a company wants to
change a NASA clause or form, the first question asked is whether a similar deviation has
been granted by the military departments. If not, why is NASA any different? If so, NASA
will certainly give the request careful consideration and will ordinarily grant the request.
NASA cannot afford to hash over old arguments with respect to some of the policies
now set forth in ASPR and to open up these matters for extensive negotiation. If we have
ideas as to changes that should be made in standard clauses or in major policies, we would
prefer to work these changes out with the other government agencies as a normal course
of proceeding. Of course, our special mission may give rise to the adoption of some dif-
ferent procurement policies and procedures in fields other than patents. In addition, it
must be recognized that at the present time NASA's contracting is largely of a research
and development nature: hence, it must orient its procurement methods to this fact. We
do not wish to abandon flexibility where this is needed to get our special job done. But we
feel that the present arrangements under applicable statutes and regulations are, in gen-
eral, well suited to meet our needs. We are hopeful that the few deficiencies in authority
which were noted earlier will be remedied by the Congress when it returns to finish up its
work in August.
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Document 111-3
Document title: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific Inventions, "Property Rights in Inventions Made
Under Federal Space Research Contracts," Hearings on Public Law 85-568, August 19-20,
November 30, December 1-5, 1959, Report No. 47, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 1-36.
Responding to a drive q;earheaded by. NASA Administrator 71 Keith Glennan, the Houw o/
Representatives voted to am_,nd NASA's title-oriented patem poll 0, to reflect the l)epartment O/
Defense's license polio,. This legislation died, howev_ when the Se_mte ]ail_od to pass a similar vev--
sion. These hearing exeerpt_ capture the issues underpinning the patent poll 0, question.
[11
Property Rights in Inventions Made Under
Federal Space Research Contracts
Wednesday, August 19, 1959
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific Inventions,
Committee on Science and Astronautics,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m., in room 214-B, New House
()ffice Building, Hon. Erwin Mitchell (Chairman of the suhcommittee) presiding.
MR. MITCHELL. The subcommittee will be in order.
As the witnesses know, this is the first general session of 1he special Subcommittee on
Patents and Scientific Inventions. I feel--and I know that the members of the subcom-
mittee feel--that we are certainly considering a most important problem--not only one
that is important currently, but which will have a great significance in the future. I think
each of us feels that we can, by very slow and thorough study, possibly set a course of action
in the patent field insofar as the Government is concerned.
We are certainly most privileged to have two distinguished specialists in this field t_:,
testify, this morning--Mr. John A. Johnson, the General Counsel of NASA, and Mr. Gerald
D. O'Brien, the Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters, NASA.
Mr..Johnson, do you have a prepared statement?
Statement of John A. Johnson, General Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration; Accompanied by Gerald D. O'Brien, Assistant General Counsel for Patent
Matters, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairmen, I do not have a prepared statement.
MR. MITCHEI.L. We would like you to just give us a general outline of NASA's activ-
ities insofar as patents are concerned.
MR..JOHNSON. I will be glad to, Mr. Chairman.
I should at the outset say, despite the chairman's very generous introduction, that 1
am not a specialist in patent matters, but Mr. O'Brien, our Assistant General Counsel fm
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PatentMatters,isandIwouldhopeonmoretechnicalspectsofthepatentproblemsthat
hewillbeourwitnessthismorning.However,I amacquaintedwithandresponsibletothe
Administratorf NASAfor thepatentpoliciesof theNationalAeronauticsandSpace
Administration.[2]Astilecommitteeknows,theNationalAeronauticsandSpaceActof 1958containsa
section,section305,whichdealsinquiteelaboratedetailwiththesubjectof inventions
whicharemadein theperformanceofcontractsfortheNationalAeronauticsandSpace
Administration.
Theoveralleffectofsection305istorequirethatsuchinventionsbecometheprop-
ertyof theU.S.Governmentif heyaremadeundertheconditionsspecifiedinsection
305(a)unlesstheAdministratorfNASAdeterminesthatthepublicinterestishetter
servedbyawaiverof rightstothoseinventions.In thatcase,however,theGovernment
wouldstillremainaroyalty-freelicensetotheuseoftheinvention.
Thispolicywhichisexpressedinsection305,thestatutorypolicy,isatfundamental
variancewiththepolicyfollowedbytheDepartmentofDefense.It israthersimilartothat
followedbytheAtomicEnergyCommission--notidenticalwiththat,butit isquiteappar-
entthatthestatutedoes,initsoverallsubstance,followtheAtomicEnergyActratherthan
thepracticeoftheDepartmentofDefense.
Asyouknow,theDepartmentofDefensepolicyisoneofordinarilyacquiringonlya
royalty-freelicensetoinventionsthataremadein thecourseofresearchanddevelopment
worksponsoredbytheDepartmentofDefenseagencies.
ThispolicyoftheDepartmentofDefenseisnottheresultoflegislation.It istheresult
ofpolicydeterminationsmadein theexecutivebranchoftheGovernment,whichhave
beenwellknowntothelegislativebranchformanyearsandevidentlyacquiescedinby
theCongress.
MR.MITCHELL.Mr.Johnson,justtopinpointhat,whatistheunderlyingphiloso-
phyinsofarastheNASApointofviewisconcerned?
Whythedifference?
WhatisyourthinkinginNASA?
Whyshouldtherebethedifferencein thepatentpolicyinDODandNASA?
MR.JOHNSON.Mr.Chairman,thereasonthereis a differenceis becausethe
Congressodecidedayearago.
Thiswasnottheresultof anydeterminationwithintheagency.As a matter of Pact,
the agency didn't exist when Congress passed this law. Therefore, it has not been an open
question for NASA as it has been for the Department of Defense.
The Department of Defense, being unhampered by legislation on this subject, has
determined its policy on its own, hut with congressional knowledge and acquiescence.
MR. MITCHELI,. Is there any existing policy in NASA now insofar as this matter is
concerned?
MR. JOHNSON. The existing policy in NASA is to do our best to implement the pro-
visions of law passed by the Congress a year ago.
This has really been the only thing we could do, and it has been our task.
Now, if you are asking, Mr. Chairman, whether the agency has yet evolved a position
on whether this legislation should be continued, this hasn't been formally developed yet.
I am not really in a position to express either the agency's or the administration's point of
view yet on that. It will be devel%oed in time for the Congress to consider [3] at the next
session because we are now in the process of preparing our legislative program fox the
next session of Congress. As you know, this must he submitted to the Bureau of the
Budget. It may be transmitted to Congress only after we have the approval of the execu-
live branch on it. l can, howevel; express some personal points of view on the matter, if
you wish.
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MR.MITCHELL.I wouldlikeforyoutodoso.
MR.JOHNSON.It ismyownpersonalpointofview--andI havexpressedthispub-
liclyseveraltimesoverthepastfewmonths----thatit isundesirableforanagencysuchas
NASAtobecompelledbylegislationtofollowapatentpolicythatisfundamentallydiver-
gentfromthatoftheDepartmentofDefense.
Now,I saythiswithoutenteringuponthequestionofwhetherit isgoodGovernment
policytotaketitletoinventionsthatarisefromGovernment-sponsoredres archornot.
Thisisaquestionwhich,asyouknow,hasbeenmuchdiscussedin theCongressandthe
legislativebranchformany,manyears.TheCongresshasneverchosentoenactuniform
legislationonthissubjectfor theentireexecutivebranchof theGovernment.Wehave
somepiecemeallegislation;wehavelegislationfor theNationalScienceFoundation;we
havelegislationfor theTVA;wehavelegislationfor NASA;wehavelegislationfor the
AtomicEnergyCommissiona dprobablyotherstoo.Allofthesearedifferent.Wehave
nolegislationfortheDepartmentofDefense,whichisthebiggestagencyofallspending
moneyonresearchanddevelopmentcontracts.
WhatI wouldsayisthis:That,leavingasideforthemomenttheultimatequestionof
whatisgoodGovernmentpolicyasawhole,untilauniformlegislativeplanisdevisedby
Congressfor theentireexecutivebranchoftheGovernment--itisdesirablethatin the
fieldof patents,asinallotherlegalaspectsofourprocurementprogram,weshouldbe
freetofollowtheDepartmentofDefensepolicies.
I saythatforthisreason:Allofourprincipalcontractsarewiththeverysamecom-
paniesandwillbewiththeverysamecompaniesthatareprincipalcontractorsfor the
DepartmentofDefense.
WearenotreallyliketheAtomicEnergyCommission,whichhadtoembarkonan
entirelynewfield of technologyandwherethe majorworkwasdonewithinthe
Government--atleastatthebeginning.Herewearerightinmidstreamasfarasthewhole
aeronauticsandspaceindustryisconcerned.
Thespaceindustry,asyouknow,istheaeronauticsndustryin transition.
MR.FULTON.I can'tagreetothat.MR.MITCHELL.Mr.Fulton.
MR.FULTON.I can'thavethatgobyunchallenged.
MR.MITCHELL.Goahead
TherecordwillshowMr.Fulton'sobjection.
MR.FULTON.Yes.I justcan'thavethatasageneralcomment.I don'tthinkyou
meanit.
MR.JOHNSON.Well,mayIelaborateabitonit?MR.FULTON.Goahead,sir.
MR.JOHNSON.Atthepresenttimethecompaniesthathaveexpressedthegreatest
interest--thisappliestoallpartsofthecountry--inourleadingcontracts,ofcourse,that
areproducingtheboosters[4] forthespaceprogramarethesamecompaniesthathave
beenin theaeronauticsandmissilebusinessdownthroughtheyears.
Theyearsareofsortofrecentoriginbecausethisisafastmovingindustry.
Thereareprobablysomecompaniesthatmaybeconfinedsolelytospacebusiness,
butthisis,Iwouldsay,notverymuchinevidenceyet.
In anyevent,ourcontracting,byandlarge,iswiththesamecompaniesthathavesub-
stantialbusinesswiththeAir ForceandtheNavyin particular,andtheArmyto some
extent.
I mightjustcite.
Well,I won'tmentionames.Thatisbeyondyourinvestigation,I think,thismorning.
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In those cases where research and development work is involved we have had to
request that our patent clauses be inserted in the contracts placed by the military depart-
ments.
This might not technically be called for by the terms of the statute because the statute
speaks of contracts of the administration and I suppose it is an arguable question whether
a contract placed by the Air Force with X Company at the request of NASA is a contract
with the administration, but we felt, as a matter of policy, it would open the door wide to
a type of evasion which the Congress certainly could not have contemplated if it were pos-
sible for NASA to place contracts through the military departments and evade section 305.
So, we have required, as a matter of policy, that our patent clauses be inserted in all
of those contracts.
This means that a contract is placed by the Air Force at NASA's request for work that
is substantially similar to the very work they would be placing themselves with that same
company, the patent results of the first contract are essentially different from the patent
results of the second contract, and yet this is the U.S. Government dealing with this com-
pany with the right hand and with the left hand. It is our feeling that this is not a good
position for the Government to be in.
Now, I would like to say something more in that connection. Congress has been quite
careful in every other respect in recognizing that we must do business essentially as the
Department of Defense does it. NASA is the only nonmilitary agency that is under the
terms of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, now codified as chapter 137, title
10, of the United States Code.
NACA was under that act when it was first enacted 11 years ago. It was actually passed
in 1948, I believe. Last year when the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was
passed, Congress in section 301 (b), specifically amended chapter 137 of title 10, which
appears in that portion of the code that applies to the Defense Department, to make it
applicable to NASA. This doesn't apply to the Atomic Energy Commission; it doesn't
apply to the General Services Administration or any other Federal agencies of the
Government. Thus, unlike all the other civilian agencies, NASA alone is under the terms
of the Armed Services Procurement Act.
[5] One of the first official acts of the Administrator after NASA came into existence last
fall was to announce that NASA would, insofar as practicable, follow the policies and pro-
cedures of the Armed Service Procurement Regulations, which is an elaborately devel-
oped set of regulations implementing the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1917.
We thought it would be undesirable, since Congress has determined that we should
be under the same corpus of legislation, to be developing an essentially different group
of regulations.
As you know, the General Services Administration has a responsibility for achieving
maximum uniformity in procurement regulations in the executive branch of the
Government and they recently published the Federal Procurement Regulations, or the
first portions of it at least.
NASA has secured from the General Services Administration authority to deviate
from the Federal Procurement Regulations. Insofar as the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations are not consistent with them, we have the authority to follow the Armed
Services Procurement Regulations rather than the FPR's when the Administrator deter-
mines that to be in the public interest.
There have been a number of other instances during the past year in which we have
striven for legal uniformity with the Department of Defense to carry out what clearly
seemed to be _he intention of Congress in amending the Armed Services Procurement
Act to inch, de NASA.
446 TIlENASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITYExtrs
Weobtainedbyexecutiveordertheso-calledV-loanauthoritytoguaranteeloansto
contractorsundertheDefenseProductionAct.Weobtainedtheauthoritytousewhatis
calledthenoset-offclauseundertheAssignmentofClaimsAct. Both of these could be
accomplished by Executive order. They were available to the Department of Defense and
the President extended them to us.
We also joined with the Department of Defense in seeking identical pieces of legisla-
tion which would grant both NASA and the Department of Defense authority to indem-
nify contractors to a very large amount against certain exua hazardous risks involved in
the kind of business they are doing for us.
One of those bills came to this committee; the other one to the Armed Services
Committee. There has been no action on them at this session of Congress.
All of these actions, which we deemed to be in accordance with the intent of
Congress, expressed in the portion of the act I referred to, have been designed to put us
in a posture of legal equality or parity with the Department of Defense.
The one outstanding exception to that is in the field of patents and this, of course, is
a field of great importance to industry.
Now, we are sort of the tail on the dog in this. Our program is not as big as the
Department of Defense program; yet in the developmenl of much of this hardware, it is
quite indistinguishable so far as the technology is concerned ti-om the kinds of things that
the Department of Defense is doing.
MR. MITCHELL. If 1 may interrupt you at this point, I think I should state to the
members of the committee the gentlemen were not requesled to give any official position
as far as NASA is concerned, but [6] merely to brief us on the existing law. However, 1
think it is most important--and I appreciate deeply, Mr. Johnson, your willingness--to
give us your own personal views because that is exactly what the subcommittee wants. We
want to hear opinions concerning the existing law and the operation of the law that you
and Mr. O'Brien are so familiar with.
I can see, as a matter of convenience, why NASA would want to operate similarly to
DOD, but, in your personal opinion, if you care to give it, is ttlere any uniqueness about
the R. & D. field so far as NASA is concerned that would cause the Government to have
more interest in the result of these inventions?
Is there some difference between DOD and NASA in the R. & D. field?
MR.JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, there is a difference in the results so far as some
of the ultimate product is concerned.
I would think so far as the technology is concerned and so far as the public interest is
concerned that they are substantially identical. There is no significant difference.
As you know, the Department of Defense is way out in forward-looking research in
space technology. It has to be because, while NASA is given a very extensive statutory
responsibility by the first sections in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, sec-
tion 102(b) excerpts from that and gives to the Department of Defense those activities
peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military
operations or the defense of the United States, including the research and development
necessary to make effective provision for the defense of the United States.
So far as inventions are concerned, the same kind of inventions can very well be made
in the course of developing these advanced weapons systems that are utilized in space, as
might be the case on the civilian side.
Now there are some uniquely civilian applications this might not be true of.
MR. MITCHELL. Any questions by any members of the committee?
MR. KING. Yes.
MR. MITCHEI.I,. Mr. King.
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MR. KING. Mr.Johnson, you expressed your opinion, unofficially, and we understand
the spirit in which it was given, but I am interested in pursuing it just a bit.
Your reasoning has followed pretty much in the line that you think uniformity is a
good thing inasmuch as NASA's practice, as indicated by the Congress, is not uniform and
not consistent with the practice developed by the DOD: therefore, that creates an anom-
aly. You feel it might be well to bring the two together.
That, as I understand it, is the burden of your reasoning.
That, of course, avoids the question, the big question, which is: What is a desirable
policy here?
If the NASA policy, as expressed by Congress, is inherently correct and sound and if
the DOD policy, which has not received congressional approval, but has just grown up, is
inherently unsound, then it seems to me the movement should be in the other direction.
Even though NASA may be the tail and the DOD is the dog, if the tail happens to be right
and the dog happens to be wrong, then the movement would be in the other direction.
[7] So, I get to the more ultimate question as to what is a sound policy.
Now, that, I realize, is a tremendous question. You may not want to comment on it,
but if you would like to I would be interested in hearing your comments.
MR. JOHNSON. Mr. King, I agree with your analysis entirely. That is the ultimate
question.
I would rather not express an opinion on that because I am sure that we in NASA have
a lot more to learn about this.
We have been in the process during the past several months of administering this just
as objectively and fairly as we can, and I would like to assure the committee that I feel con-
fident that the views I have just expressed have not impaired our objectivity in the admin-
istration of this provision of the law.
This is the ultimate question that Congress has been discussing off and on, and so has
the executive branch for I don't know how many years. It would be, I think, a great pub-
lic serviCe if it could be decided wisely and finally.
I think I would rather at this stage of things simply say that until that question is set-
tled and the Congress itself is able, through the processes you have of bringing together
so many different points of view and the practices of the different agencies, to setde this
thing, it is undesirable for an agency like NASA, given the kind of business we have to do,
to be compelled to be essentially different from the Department of Defense.
MR. KING. Mr. Johnson, don't you feel, though, that this ultimate question is
inevitably before us?
We can't evade it, and I, personally, would be most reluctant to predicate any decision
of mine simply on the grounds of uniformity without coming to grips with this more ulti-
mate question, and I haven't made up my mind on it and I don't want anything that I am
saying to you to intimate that I have. I just recognize that as the ultimate problem, and I
would be loath to take an action simply for the sake of uniformity if that action actually
represented a step away from what I would otherwise consider to be the more desirable
objective.
So, my comment is this: Don't you feel that this subcommittee still must face this ulti-
mate question and predicate its action on the basis of the ultimate question rather than
on the basis of uniformity alone?
MR.JOHNSON. I'm sure that the committee can't avoid facing the ultimate question.
I do think, though--and I suppose maybe I must differ with you fundamentally on
this--that if a problem like this can't be settled with some reasonable degree of unifor-
mity, here is an area where equal treatment by Government agencies is a principal that is
perhaps even paramount to the question that you are concerned with. I don't mean by
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this you have to, say bring TVA into this picture, but you have here two agencies, NASA
and the Department of Defense, that are doing a very similar kind of business with a sim-
ilar segment of U.S. industry.
I don't think that you will find that this is a question that lends itself to a very clear
black and white solution.
The very fact that Congress, itself, has dealt with it in such a variety of ways before,
and the fact that it is argued by people who [8] have spent their lives in the patent field
without clear-cut answers, I think would indicate that there is probably a lot to be said on
both sides of the question, so that I don't think you would be committing a really gross
error by at least achieving uniformity before you have solved the ultimate problem.
I think there is something essentially wrong with the U.S. Government, which, after
all, is one legal person, dealing with a company through two different agencies on essen-
tially the same kind of contracts and taking an invention with one hand and leaving it
there with the other, or say, two different companies----one that happens to be only con-
tracting with NASA at that time and the other one with the Department of Defense, but
on essentially similar kinds of business and involving inventions that are in the same field
of technology.
I think equality is still the basic principle of equity; and it is more desirable here to
have equality of treatment than it is to perpetuate inequality for fear you might depart
temporarily from what would appear ultimately to be the best principle.
MR. DADDARIO. Will the gendeman yield?
MR. KING. Yes.
MR. DADDARIO. If that is so and you feel there should be this equality, why is it that
you put a limitation on some of these departments, which are not under this restriction,
when they make contracts in behalf of NASA, that [th]is patent infringement type of
restriction should apply?
MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Daddario, as I said before, we are administrating this law as
objectively as we can without regard to the personal opinions that I have been asked to
express here this morning. As we see the law, it could not be intended that NASA, simply
by placing an order with the Defense Department rather than entering into a contract
with X Company directly, would cause an arbitrary difference in patent results.
We know that when Congress writes a law, even as complicated as this, they can't say
everything, and we have to try to determine what the intent of Congress was.
We read in section 305(b):
"Each contract entered into by the Administrator with any party for the performance
of any work shall contain effective provision_ "
and so forth.
This is the basis for our patent clauses.
It was our conclusion that Congress must have intended that when any work is placed
as a result of a NASA requirement by the Government it is within the intention of
Congress that the patent provisions of section 305 apply.
You wouldn't get uniformity, anyway, because you would still have the NASA contracts
as distinguished from the DOD contracts. So, you are already faced with the lack of uni-
formity. You have the contracts placed direcdy by NASA. You have the contracts placed
directly by the Defense Department for its own business. Those are already nonuniform
by virtue of the legislation.
Now, you have this intermediate category of contracts placed by the Defense
Department at the request of NASA with our funds and for our proposes, and this is the
question: Should we throw these into the pot with the Defense Department contracts or
should [we] throw them into the pot with our contracts?
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[9] We felt that if we didn't throw them into the pot with our contracts this would be just
an open-sesame to an evasion of the patent requirements of section 305.
MR. DADDARIO. In some cases you have departments which enter into contracts for
the benefit of NASA without necessarily utilizing funds obligated to NASA. They are essen-
tially using their own funds.
Isn't that so?
Mr. JOHNSON. There is--yes--a small amount of that.
I don't know of any new contracts of that kind being placed.
MR. O'BRIEN. No.
MR. JOHNSON. I think all of our new business---you see, we have a certain number
of contracts that were commenced originally by the Defense Department. We had an exec-
utive order last October transferring a number of projects from the Air Force and from
ARPA, and also the Vanguard project from the Navy Department, as an example.
Now, in the case of those projects, contracts were already in existence and we have
taken them over. That is a case where we clearly didn't feel it would be legally proper for
us to amend the contract to change the patent situation, because if a contract means any-
thing at all it means what is says when the contractor signs it.
At the present time I don't know of any cases where other Government agencies are
continuing to place contracts with their own funds for our benefit.
MR. DADDARIO. That is all.
Thank you.
MR. KING. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to belabor this, but I would like to say for the
record I think we would be derelict in our duty as a subcommittee if we did not consider
the problem of uniformity in the context of the larger problem; that is, whether or not
the Government's retaining patents is inherently a good policy or a bad policy.
I feel that that problem is before us, and I just wanted to state that for the record.
MR. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. King.
I think you have stated the purpose of the creation of this subcommittee, and that is
the problem that we are going to look to.
Mr. Bass, I am going to recognize you, but I have just one question first.
What difficulty, if any, have you encountered as a result of the wording in the NASA
Act and the difference in the policy of DOD?
Has it concerned you or made it more difficult to obtain contracts?
MR. JOHNSON. This is a difficult question, Mr. Congressman, to answer categorically.
We have had a number of contractors express reluctance at first to enter into con-
tracts with us and have even requested additional compensation because of the loss of
what would otherwise be their patent rights.
I think that in every case, even though it has taken time, we have negotiated this prob-
lem successflflly and have not, I believe, to date been faced with a known situation of
unwillingness to do business with NASA.
We have also taken a firm stand against any additional compensation for the loss of
what they regard as their patent rights, but which we [10] regard under the terms of the
law as the patent rights of the United States.
On the other hand, we have had a number of reports--these, I should say, are unau-
thenticated and it is not the kind of thing we can trace down easily--of companies that
have put out the word to their own personnel that they will not accept any work for NASA;
they will not do any work either as a prime contractor or a subcontractor which involves
the loss of patent rights which they would otherwise retain if they were doing business for
the Department of Defense.
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Now,it isverydifficultoknowtheextentofthatbecausewhenweputoutrequests
for proposalswedon'tknowwhetheracompanythatdoesn'trespondisnotrespondingfor thatreasonorforsomeotherreason.
Also,whenyougetdowntothesubcontractorlevel,in thelowertiers,thisissome-
thingwhichsomeofourprimecontractorsmightknowmoreabouthanwedo;butwehavehadinformationtothateffect.
PerhapsMr.O'Briencouldbemorespecificonthis.
MR.O'BRIEN.No;I don'tthinkI couldaddverymuchtothat,Mr.Johnson.I think
thatistheextentofmyinformation.
MR.JOHNSON.Wehavetorecognize,too,thatwehavebeenonlyin thebeginning
phaseof thisthing.It takesquitea longwhilefortheimpactof thesethingsreallytobefelt.
Wehavebeenin thebeginningstageof ourcontractingprogram,andthewhole
NASAprogramisstillpretty oung.
SofarI don'tbelievewehavehadyetthefirstreport,havewe,ofaninventionmade
in theperformanceofoneofourcontracts?MR.O'BRIEN.No.
MR.JOHNSON.Theultimate--
MR.MITCHELL.In negotiatingthesecontractsif Imayinterrupt,haveyouhadindi-
cation,withoutgoingintospecifics,thatif thecontractorhadthepatentrightthiscon-
tractcouldbeletlesscheaplytotheGovernment?
Havetheyindicatedthat,knowingtheexistinglawandknowingit couldbedone?
Hastherebeensomesuchindicationwhenyounegotiateonthesecontracts?
MR.JOHNSON.Therehavebeensomeindicationsofcontractorsthatwantedextra
compensationf rthisthing,butit hasbeenrefusedandtheyhavetakenthecontract.
Theansweristhat,frommypersonalknowledge--and,ofcourse,therearemanyof
thesethatI havenothadpersonalknowledgeof---Idon'tknowof thatkindofcase.MR.MITCHELL.Mr.O'Brien.
MR.O'BRIEN.I knowofnonewheretheyhaveplacedapremiumorsaidtheywould
doit for a lesseramountif thepatentprovisionsof theircontractweresimilarto the
DepartmentofDefensepatentprovisions.
I onlyhavetheinstanceswheretheyhadtriedtomakeadditionalchargesfortaking
thepatentrightsprovisionsoftheNASApatentclauses,andthiswasnotpermittedand
theydidn'ttakethecontractwiththeoriginalpricing.MR.MITCHELL.Mr.Bass.
[11]MR.BASS.Then,Mr.Johnson,I assumeyoubaseyourfeelinginregardtothisques-
tionprimarilyon thegroundsofequityandwhatis fairratherthanonanymatterof
impedingorhinderingthedefenseeffortbecauseof thisunequaltreatment?
MR.JOHNSON.I dobaseit onthat,Mr.Bass,primarily.
I think,too,withreferencetoMr.King'scomments,I amlookingatthismainlyasa
lawyerratherthanasapersonconcerned,asthecommitteehastobe,withtheultimate
questionofGovernmentpolicy.I thinkthat,asalawyer,in thenegotiationofcontracts
withindustry,it isbasicallyunfairfortwoGovernmentagencies,bothrepresenting,after
all,thesameU.S.Government,tobedealinginessentiallydifferentwaysonamatterof
thisimportancewiththesamecontractorsorwithtwocontractorssimilarlysituated.
MR.KING.Wouldthegentlemanyieldatthatpointofonequestion?MR.BASS.Yes.
MR.KING.Rightin connectionwiththat,Mr.Johnson,doyounot feelthatthe
waiverprovisionsin thelawallowingtheAdministratortowaivethemundercertaincir-
cumstances-thatif heexercisedthatratherliberally,thatthatmightnotbringabouthe
uniformitythatyoudesire?
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MR.JOHNSON. From the strictly legal point, Mr. King, the waiver provisions could be
exercised to achieve absolute uniformity, but that would only be, I think, by disregarding
the main intent of Congress in enacting section 305.
I mean by that it would be necessary for the Administrator to adopt almost a policy of
automatic waiver in every case, because typically the Department of Defense does not
acquire title to inventions.
Of course, this is what industry would like to have us do. It has been proposed to us.
This is only natural. They would say, "Why don't you just utilize this very extensive author-
ity granted here and, if you think uniformity is desirable, announce a policy of automatic
waiver in almost every case?"
It certainly doesn't seem to us that Congress could have taken the trouble to enact a
provision as elaborate and detailed as this is and expect that to be the result.
We haven't gone into our waiver regulations at this hearing today. We do have inter-
im waiver regulations out and, while we think they are reasonably liberal, they don't begin
to go that far.
MR. BASS. Mr. Johnson, you pointed out a little earlier in your testimony that in the
Atomic Energy Commission they are governed by the same policy as NASA.
Is that not correct?
MR. JOHNSON. Not precisely, but more like ours than like the Department of
Defense.
MR. BASS. And you justified that on the ground that in the atomic energy field this
was a brand new field and, therefore, perhaps there was no inequity involved; is that right?
MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Bass, I was simply explaining the difference between AEC and
NASA. I don't want to be in the position of justifying that legislation either. I don't know
enough about the atomic energy business. I do know, I think, enough about it to know
that it is quite different from our business.
[12] MR. BASS. I always thought of your business as pretty much pioneering, too.
That is the point I am coming to.
MR.JOHNSON. Mr. Bass, here, I think, is the reason we have section 305 in the act if
I can speculate a little bit, because, as you know, this is a rather unique piece of legislation
and has no significant legislative history behind it that we can read in the reports and the
debates of Congress. In the establishment of a new civilian agency to carry on a very for-
ward-looking program of research and development and a new and expanding technolo-
gy, it must have seemed that the Atomic Energy Commission was the best precedent, the
most analogous field of Government activity. But I think when you look at the kind of
technology we are involved in, the kinds of contracts we are making, the very fact that
most of the business we initially have had was transferred to us from the Defense
Department, we must conclude that while we are out in a very forward field of technolo-
gy, it is a field that has been in process of development a long, long time. You can't.just
drive a sharp line between space technology and missile technology and between missile
technology and aeronautical technology.
It is a field in which the Department of Defense has already had a long and well-
understood patent practice, which the Congress has at least acquiesced in, because it has
been well known and is one of the big features of our economy.
I think the atomic energy field is quite different. It was developed originally as what
you might call a Government-housed effort through the Manhattan project. This was
clone in large Government laboratories and installations segregated from private industry.
We have a rule of Government monopoly in that field that pervades the whole thing which
we don't have in the space and aeronautical field. We must not forget either that this
agency is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the act is the National
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AeronauticsandSpaceAct.It isn'tjustspacetechnologywearetalkingabout.Thisisthe
NationalAeronauticsandSpaceActof 1958,andthissection305isn'tconfinedtospace
technologyeither.ItappliestothewholefieldofactivityofNASA.
MR.BASS.Now,forinstanceif I mayinterrupt,wearein theprocessofdevelopingthenuclear-poweredengine.IsthatdonebytheAtomicEnergyCommissionrus?
MR.JOHNSON.Weareparticipatinginthis.I don'tknowhowmuch--
MR.O'BRIEN.Yes.
MR.BASS.I waswondering--
MR.JOHNSON.I amnot technicallyequippedto describethedivisionof effort
betweenNASAandAFConthatsortofthing.
MR.FULTON.WehavetheRoverprogram.
MR.O'BRIEN.UndertheRoverprogramfundsaretransferredtoAEC.
MR.FULTON.If I maycommentonthat,underRickover,ofcourse,theAEChasthe
atomicnuclearengineandwehaveitunderNASAundertheRoverandotheralliedpro-jects.Thereisalapover.
MR.JOHNSON.In thatareaI knowthatMr.O'Brienhasworkedoutsomepatent
procedureswiththeAtomicEnergyCommission'spatentcounsel.Perhapsyouwouldlike
tohavehimexplainthose.
MR.BASS.Yes;Iwouldliketohavehimexplainthat.[13]MR.O'BRIEN.In connectionwithProjectRover,thefundsweretransferredfrom
NASAto the AtomicEnergyCommission,whichplacedthe contractwithNorth
American,andin thiscontractwehadboththeAtomicEnergyActof 1954andthe
NationalAeronauticsandSpaceActof 1958toconsider.Thecontracttermsprovidethat
theinventionswhichemanatefromtheresearchworkundertakenpursuanttothatcon-
tractwillbesubjecttobothactsand,withoutgoingintoanydetailsofthepatentarticle
whichwasincludedin dlatcontract,it doesattempt--andwehopeit achievesthatpur-
pose-tomaketheinventionswhichweremadeincarryingouttheresearchunderthat
contractsubjecttobothacts.
Thatisabouthegistofthesituation,I wouldthink.
MR.BASS.Onefinalquestion:If thiscommitteeandtheCongresshouldecideit
wouldbebettertochangethepatentpolicywithregardtoNASA,wouldwenotbeforced
into applyingthe sameruleswith respecto thepatentsof the AtomicEnergyCommission?
MR.JOHNSON.Mr.Bass,I don'tthinksoatallbecausetheydon'thavethesamesit-
uationofrelativeuniformityin alltheseotherrespectswiththeDepartmentofDefensethatwehave.
Congress,asI havementionedbefore,hasalreadydecidedthatin thefieldofgener-
alprocurementregulationsNASAistofollowtheDepartmentofDefense.
Thisdecisionwasmadelastyear.
NosimilardecisionhaseverbeenmadewiththeAtomicEnergyCommission.
It hasbeenauniqueoperationfromthebeginning.
So,whereasNASAisaseparateagency,it doesn'thavethesamekindof uniqueness
in itsmannerofdoingbusiness.Congresshasrecognizedthatin thelegalfieldit isdesir-
ableforustobeasuniformwiththeDepartmentofDefenseaspossible.
MR.BASS.Thankyou.
I havenofurtherquestions.
MR.MITCHELL.Mr.Fulton.
MR.FULTON.Wearegladtohaveyouhere,andI wouldliketogooverthisfield
ratherwidelysothatwecancheckintoandseewhatheproblemsare,andIwouldsayto
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you, rather than have some of the answers directly today, I would rather have you give it
some more thought, because I have been a member of the previous select committee and
was on the committee at the time of the conference report, and I was also one of the con-
ferees when the patent provision was put in
The question first comes up in this field, as it does in any field: What are the limits
that we are talking about?
For example, are we going to talk simply about patents in space?
Are we going to talk about them in the field of aeronautics?
Are we going to talk about them in both fields?
For my part, I could see there would be a distinction between the patents fields in
aeronautics and in space. One, the aeronautics field, has been developed under the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics over a period of time under established
principles. The other is an entirely new field.
Now, would you agree with that?
Would you agree that you could have a distinction between aeronautics' patents and
space patents?
[14] Then I have some other distinctions I would like to make.
The question is: In your mind, must the aeronautics field always apply to space in the
patent field?
I don't think they should.
MR.JOHNSON. I agree, Mr. Fulton, there can be a distinction between patents in the
field of aeronautics and space.
I would like to define "space" rather restrictively in that connection if I could, and
recite the fact that we have already made this distinction in our waiver regulations.
As you know, the law doesn't make any distinction between aeronautics and space.
MR. FULTON. I am going to point out the defects in the law, as I see it.
MR. JOHNSON. Yes.
MR. FULTON. Likewise, I am going to point out the defect, possibly, in not distin-
guishing between research and development contracts as regards patents and ordinary
supply contracts either in space or aeronautics.
MR. JOHNSON. We made the distinction also.
MR. FULTON. You see, our section we made in the previous select committee just
applies across the field in aeronautics and space as well as on every type of contract.
Isn't that right?
MR. JOHNSON. That is correct.
I feel I must say a few words in self defense at this point because--
MR. FULTON. No. I am just inquiring. I am not criticizing you.
MR. JOHNSON. May I say something in explanation?
We did make that distinction. We have made it administratively--and we were without
any published legislative history on this to help us---because we simply could not believe,
in the context of this section, that every time we entered into a contract for the supply of
some office supplies or something of that kind it was intended that this kind of patent
clause should go into it. We have confined the use of the patent clause to--we have a
rather elaborate formula in our regulations; but, to oversimplify it, it is basically a research
and development type contract. We felt, after all, that this is the only reasonable intention
we could read into this section of the law; but the language is so broad that some of the
initial commentators on this section made it appear more horrible than it actually is in
practice.
MR. FULTON. The point I am making is: The law is too broad, and in that connec-
tion I disagree with it and believe it should be more carefully written, so that, as a matter
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offact,I wouldcomplimenttheNASA,theAdministrator,andthe people who have been
advising him on making the distinction as to the type of contract that the patent provi-
sions apply to.
Of course, when you come to a situation where there is a Defense Department type of
contract, the Defense Department for years has had the provision that the particular per-
son, the inventor, or the company with the contract has the exclusive right to the patent,
subject to a free license or, rather, a free use by the Government, unless the inventor or
the particular person who made the discovery is an employee of the Government.
[15] Now, that brings me to the next question: Should we not have a distinction under the
patent provisions of the NASA law as between the contractors and the employees?
I would say to you I see no particular reason why there should be a difference as to
employees in this connection, Government employees in this connection, especially when
we have the Executive Order 10096 of 1950 covering all Government employees.
When there has been such an Executive order and we have the Government Patent
Board, why do we make a distinction in this particular act?
I think the act might be deficient in that regard.
What do you think?
MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Fulton, we have taken the position that section 305(a) does not
apply to our employees, but that they are still under Executive Order 10096---
MR. FULTON. I think that is fine.
MR. JOHNSON (continuing). Because it says:
"Whenever any invention is made in the performance of any work under any contract
of the administration..."
The term "contract" is a broad one, and I admit it would be arguable to construe it so
broadly as to include our employment contract with our own employees. But in view of
the fact the Congress has, for example, in its TVA legislation dealt specifically with employ-
ees, we couldn't believe it was intended to work a distinction between the NASA employ-
ees and, say, the employees of the Department of Defense in view of Executive Order
10096.
MR. FULTON. But you specifically limit yourself to the determination of what the
Chairman of the Government Patent Board has decided and the decisions of that Board,
and under no circumstances do you go outside that and try to apply direct court deci-
sions?
You are restrained administratively, are you not?
MR. JOHNSON. Right.
MR. FULTON. | will ask the other gentleman that question.
MR. O'Brien. Yes; this is true, Mr. Fulton. We are bound by the decisions of the
Government Patent Board.
MR. FULTON. So, the particular agency of the Government--and you are represent-
ing NASA here--makes its own determination and then forwards that determination to
the Chairman of the Government Patent Board for his decision to see if it is right, does-
n't it?
MR. O'BRIEN. This is correct, sir.
MR. FULTON. But even there the Chairman doesn't decide whether the inventor is
entitled to the invention unless the inventor, himself, appeals; isn't that correct?
MR. O'BRIEN. The Chairman of the Government--
MR. FULTON. The particular person aggrieved must appeal?
MR. O'BRIEN. The Chairman of the Government Patent Board has the inherent
right to either agree or disagree with the initial determination of the agency, but--
MR. FULTON. Yes; but he doesn't review the particular ownership of the patent
unless the inventor, himself, appeals; isn't that right?
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MR. O'BRIEN. He may review the initial determination; yes.
[16] I can't agree with you, Mr. Fulton.
I think he may review the initial determination.
MR. FULTON. That is the practice.
I am trying to get the practice.
MR. O'BRIEN. Oh, yes; I think this is generally true.
MR. FULTON. As a matter of fact, when it comes to the Chairman of the Government
Patent Board, he then is the one who construes this Executive Order 10096 of 1950 in accor-
dance with the court decisions and not particularly in reference to its strict legal language.
MR. O'BRIEN. That is correct.
MR. FULTON. Isn't that correct?
MR. O'BRIEN. That is correct.
MR. FULTON. So that you have to go through this system to get a determination?
Is that not the case?
MR. O'BRIEN. That is true.
MR. FULTON. Let's go a little bit further. Let's look particularly to section 203(b) (3),
where it says "to acquire (by purchase, lease, condemnation, or otherwise), construct,
improve," and so on, and then, in the same sentence, includes "such other real and per-
sonal property (including patents)," and then it gives the right "to sell and otherwise dis-
pose of real and personal property (including patents and rights thereunder) .... "
Actually, to me, that portion of the section referring to condemnation is completely
unnecessary in this provision because we have other provisions that will take care of it.
Is that not right?
MR. O'BRIEN. With respect to patents, I believe this is true.
MR. FULTON. With respect to patents.
MR. O'BRIEN. I don't know about other properties.
MR. JOHNSON. We wouldn't want to delete that wording because it applies to other
things.
MR. O'BRIEN. A lot of other property.
MR. FULTON. Yes; but I am referring only to patent.s---
MR. O'BRIEN. I agree.
MR. FULTON. And I think we should exclude the wording in that section applying to
patents because under title 48 of the United States Code there is also the provision that
takes care of that administrative authority for patents.
MR. JOHNSON. This will simply not be used.
MR. FULTON. My point is: it is overlapping and redundant in respect to patents. So,
the act is poorly written in that regard in that particular section.
Is that not right?
MR. O'BRIEN. I agree.
MR. FULTON. I would say when no condemnation is necessary, because the
Administrator can acquire the use of any patents there existing upon payment of reason-
able compensation to the patentee, it would then further cloud the title of anybody and
make it harder for the individual patentee.
Is that not right?
MR. O'BRIEN. It would be if the authority were so exercised.
[ 17] MR. JOHNSON. I think it would be just inconceivable this authority would be exer-
cised.
MR. FULTON. Why shouldn't we have a provision that gives to the inventor or the
company that hires him the exclusive right to the ownership of the patent in commercial
situations that have no direct relation either to military or security uses?
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MR. JOHNSON. I think several of your questions have come pretty close to the waiv-
er regulations we have developed under the present law.
MR. FULTON. Yes; that is correct, but I am trying to set what the law should be
changed to because actually your regulations are based upon what the legislative intent of
Congress must have been without any hearings on the patent provision and no legislative
history.
Is that not correct?
MR. JOHNSON. Well, of course, the law itself gives us considerable discretion. So we
haven't really had to justify everything in terms of what Congress might have foreseen.
We felt that congress certainly expected the Administrator to use his best judgment,
but at the same time you are quite right in saying that we have had to sort of look in the
dark here in trying to stay consistent with what Congress must have intended.
We have tried to do that.
MR. FULTON. Then where supply contracts are concerned and there is either back-
ground information, trade secrets, or previous patent rights--in that case, it would seem
to me this particular NASA Act of 1958 is burdensome and restrictive.
You see, it doesn't give credit to the company which has a patent and experience built
up in a particular field; does it?
MR. O'BRIEN. I don't know that I exactly follow you, Mr. Fulton.
MR. FULTON. Here is the point--
MR. O'BRIEN. I don't think we acquire rights under background patents.
MR. FULTON. Suppose some person, some inventor, or some company has the back-
ground information, the trade secrets and previous patent rights in a particular field; the
question is: Should these all be made available to the Government without reasonable
compensation?
MR. O'BRIEN. The), should not and they are not under the act.
MR. FULTON. Secondly, when there is a new patent or patent in that field or a sub-
stantial discovery that would require the company to disclose these or make them avail-
able to the Government, does the mere fact of an additional discovery in the field require
them to come up with all this other background, patent and trade information?
MR. O'BRIEN. Certainly not with respect to background patents. There is some ques-
tion about the acquisition of technical data in order to practice the invention which is
made under a contract with NASA.
MR. FULTON. That is the question I am raising, and I wish you would submit some
sort of statement on it to get the line of demarcation as to where that might be.
(The information requested is as follows:)
The first question concerns the issue of whether or not the operation of section 305 of the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 is burdensome or restrictive upon contractors with respect to the
Government's acquisition of background patents or trade secrets.
[18] With regard to background patents, the NASA Patent Regulations, sub'part A (24 EIL 3575),
specifically states that it is the policy of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to pay
reasonable compensation for the acquisition of %'ights in background patents" and that the same will
be acquired only by "specific negotiation, "not by the automatic operation of the contract clauses used
to implement section 305 of the act.
To the same effect, the special NASA "property rights in inventions" clause, which appears as
appendix IX-A in these regulations, also provides in paragraph (g)(i) that any license granted to the
Government does not imply the granting of any license under any dominating "background"patent.
Accordingly (excluding those inventions made by Government employees), NASA does not
acquire, except by direct purchase, any rights in an invention that has been reduced to practice prior
to and independently of a NASA contract.
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With regard to trade secrets as they may be involved in normal patent acquisition, the special
NASA "property fights in inventions" clause, referred to above, requires that the contractor shall fur-
nish to the contracting officer a written report containing fuU and complete technical information con-
cerning any invention made in the performance of any work under the contract. Compliance with this
clause may require the contractor to reveal background technical information of a proprietary nature.
Ordinarily, howeveg, the type of information required for the preparation of a patent application is not
that type of "background information" which would be susceptible to protection as a trade secret.
Moreoveg, the NASA Patent Regulations, subpart A, paragraph 1201, I01 3(b), states that the con-
tractor may initially furnish to the contracting officer only such technical information as may be
required for the purpose of identifying an invention made by the contractor and in determining its
utility in the conduct of aeronautical and space activities. When requested by the contracting office,,
the contractor shall, howev_ prepare and furnish such additional technical descriptions of the inven-
tion as will be adequate for ready transposition to patent specification form and for effective prosecu-
tion of the patent application.
With regard to the matter of acquiring trade secrets directly, NASA's practice is like that of the
Department of Defense concerning the acquisition of technical data and of rights in technical data.
In those NASA contracts which have as one of their purposes the performance of technical or scientif-
ic work directed toward the development of models of equipment or practical processes, NASA requires
that there be delivered such technical information as may be necessary for the manufacture of the
equipment or the performance of the process. To this end NASA has adopted the data clauses as set
forth in sections 9-203.1 and 9-203.4 of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation.
MR. FULTON. I think that is a defect of the act at present. With respect to research
and development, I think, we could make a distinction there on that type of contract
because generally industry is willing to give the background information, especially when
it is for a military or security purpose.
Is that not right?
MR. O'BRIEN. Generally, I think so.
MR. FULTON. All right. Then let me disagree with the former gentleman here a lit-
tle bit.
When you were speaking, I was making some notes.
You had spoken of this being the creation of a civilian agency and remarked that this
was a new field of patent law that is being developed for a civilian agency when, as a mat-
ter of fact, under the Department of Defense the provisions for patents were otherwise.
I would like to point out to you in the TVA Act of 1933, under 16 United States Code,
as well as in the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, there were two civilian agencies
created, each of which had patent provisions different from the Department of Defense.
At the time this act of 1958 that we are speaking of for NASA was passed, we were with-
in the emergency conditions, which may now be forgotten, of the first orbit of the sput-
nik. Secondly, no one then [19] knew as much about space as we do now and we thought
that it was a new field, that it was much over and beyond anything that was then covered
by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
I say in that connection, as a member of the former Space Committee, that is why the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics was not just continued and the space put as
a subdivision under that particular body, but the whole new concept was set up that it was
to be the NASA rather than the NACA.
One of the great differences between Dr. Dryden and myself--I will speak for myself,
although I know that Mr. McCormack felt a little bit along the same lines that I did--was
that, as it was discussed so many times in the bearing before the select committee, space
was just a buildup of aeronautics. Now, our feeling was that it was a new field and should
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be treated as such; secondly, that it had a good bit of the security requirements of the
Atomic Energy Act because at that time we thought that either the sputnik or a space plat-
form could cause us to lose everything we had. Under those circumstances, we wanted no
one company to find and get the key to space and then everybody else in the country or
the Government have to go through that one particular source in the approach to space.
So, I think you should take that philosophic background into account when we are
now, at a later time, looking at the past history. For example, I had written down here my
recollection that the inventions or discoveries of any employee of the U.S. Government or
by any employee of the TVA corporation, together with any patents on those discoveries,
are the sole and exclusive property of the corporation and the corporation is authorized
to give licenses to various people.
MR. JOHNSON. May I comment on that?
MR. FULTON. That is the provision of the TVA Act, as I recall it, in 1933, so that we
do have a precedent for NASA.
MR. JOHNSON. I would like to comment on that, Mr. Fulton.
That provision you refer to applies to TVA research by its own employees.
As I recall the report rendered by the Senate Judiciary Committee earlier this year on
the TVA patent practices, they had acquired no patents as a result of Government-spon-
sored research with private industry.
As we said before, section 305 does not apply to NASA employees. It applies solely, on
the other hand, to Government-sponsored research in private industries, and TVA is not
a precedent for this situation at all. The TVA situation is taken care of under Executive
Order 10096, which imposes a certain regime on it. TVA is different from other
Government departments, but it is not a precedent for this kind of treatment of contrac-
tors.
The National Science Foundation, on the other hand, is not a precedent either
because there the legislative provision merely is that the Foundation shall take such inter-
est in patents as the public interest requires and, as you know, the National Science
Foundation has followed the same practice as the Department of Defense in requiring
only a royalty-free license.
MR. FULTON. As I recall it, the National Science Foundation provision requires that
the contracts shall contain provisions regarding [20] the disposition of inventions pro-
duced under those contracts in a manner calculated to protect the public interest.
MR. JOHNSON. That is correct.
MR. FULTON. And the discoveries and patents must be directly related to the subject
matter of the contract, and in the case of either the contractor or the inventor being an
employee it must be directly in connection with the assigned duties or the purpose of the
contract.
Is that not right?
MR. O'BRIEN. Yes.
MR. JOHNSON. But the legislative provision does not say anything about the taking
of tide to those inventions being the rule in the case of the National Science Foundation.
In carrying out that particular provision of law the National Science Foundation ordinar-
ily does the same thing as the Department of Defense does and only acquires a royalty-free
license.
MR. FULTON. Yes, but don't you think when there is a specific legislative provision
under the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 that the contracts that are let shall
contain provisions governing the disposition of inventions produced under the contracts
in a manner calculated to protect the public interest that that certainly is a provision relat-
ing to the title and use and licensing of the patents?
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MR. JOHNSON. It relates to that subject matter, but it doesn't require the
Government to take title to the patents, by any means.
MR. FULTON. No, but it certainly governs--
MR. JOHNSON. If it does, the National Science Foundation has been in gross disre-
gard of the law for a number of years.
MR. FULTON. No, but it certainly limits the use of the patents, doesn't it?
Doesn't it limit the use, because every contract that is made with the National Science
Foundation has to have these provisions in it that they are to be handled in a manner cal-
culated to protect the public interest?
MR. O'BRIEN. It seems to me it would certainly lead to some interest of the
Government or some governmental interest being acquired, but--
MR. FULTON. So, it is an extension in the act of NASA, but it is not contrary to those
other two agencies and some of their actions.
I think it is certainly a like comparison to compare these two previous civilian agen-
cies--one, the TVA in 1933 and the other the National Science Foundation Act of 1950,
as well as the Atomic Energy Act.
Now, let us look at that for a minute. The Atomic Energy Act has been changed by the
act of 1954. Would you please comment on what you think of the present state of the art
in the Atomic Energy Act with the amendment of 1954 put in?
MR. JOHNSON. I am not competent to do that at all.
MR. FULTON. Would you please state that--
MR. JOHNSON. I know the Atomic Energy Commission has had testimony recently
before the Joint Committee, but I don't feel competent to talk on that.
MR. FULTON. I believe they appeared before subcommittee of the Judiciary
Committee as well.
If you will give us a short statement on that, I would like to have that.
[21] (The information requested is as follows:)
The question raised by Congressman Fulton concerns the statutory concept of aeronautical and
space activities as it is used in section 305(c) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act.
Section 305(c) imposes a responsibility upon the Commissioner of Patents to determine which
applications for patents disclose inventions having significant utility in the conduct of aeronautical
and space activities. It was suggested by Mr. Fulton that the concept is too broad and that it does not
permit a distinction between the field of governmental interests and the field of private interests regard-
ing the area in which patents may not be issued without first having the applicant submit urdtten
statements of the circumstances under which the invention was made. It was suggested that the respon-
sibility of the Commissioner should be delimited and proposals for doing so were requested.
It appears that the foregoing objective could be effected by statutory language basing the selection
criterion to be used by the Commissioner of Patents on the concept expressed in the NASA Patent
Waiver Regulations, subpart 1 (24 F.R. 8788), of inventions-
(I) primarily adapted for and especially useful in the development and operation of vehicles,
manned or unmanned, capable of sustained flight without support from or dependence upon the
atmosphere, or
(2) of basic importance in continued research toward the solution of problems of sustained flight
without support from or dependence upon the atmosphere.
MR. FULTON. Could we make a distinction, then, between patents that are not being
used for what we would call the welfare of the Government?
Suppose you had a patent discovery where its prime importance or effect was relating
to the welfare of our Government or some important governmental functions; would you
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makesomedistinctiontherein tryingtoeliminateandputinto the private field such
patents?
Would it not have that effect?
MR. JOHNSON. I didn't hear the last.
MR. FULTON. For example--I will simplify it--to protect private industry in the pri-
vate field, where there are nongovernment usages chiefly.
MR. O'BRIEN. Yes. I think that we have tried to make such distinctions in patentable
inventions in our waiver regulations.
We have tried to reserve an entire area of patentable inventions, with respect to which
no waiver would generally be granted, as those inventions which become perhaps associ-
ated with the public interest, so that it wouldn't be to the public benefit to grant rights in
these inventions, inventions used almost exclusively in outer space, solar sails, or some-
thing of that character, because to grant rights in these inventions or patents on these
inventions might carry the inference that private industry or private parties were autho-
rized to go into outer space under no governmental regulation.
We have also in our waiver regulations identified a class of inventions as those inven-
tions which have predominant commercial utility and only incidental utility in space and
aeronautics.
MR. FULTON. Yes. Now, there is a comment there--
MR. O'BRIEN. As to this type of invention, we are granting or proposing to the
Administrator to grant waiver of rights so that the contractor who made these inventions
can exploit the invention to the public benefit, to bring these inventions into the hands
of the public and to use the patent for that purpose.
MR. FULTON. So, my comment is: Section 103, when it makes the definitions that are
very broad covering both equipment that is usable [22] and possible exclusively in outer
space, as well as commercial-type equipment, is, therefore, too broad in its coverage and
should be changed.
So, I would make a change in the definitions in section 103 to make the field of pri-
vate enterprise larger and to protect what we in Government are deeply interested in, that
is, the things that are related to Government uses, exclusive outer space uses or weapon
purposes.
What do you think of that?
To summarize, that is to change the definitions and restrict them in section 103.
MR. O'BRIEN. Well, I think the definition of aeronautical and space activities, as set
forth in section 103, is broad and probably could be more carefully defined.
I haven't given much thought to that, Mr. Fulton.
MR. FULTON. Would you look into that and submit us some sort of recommendation
along the lines I have been trying to point up here?
I would rather not do it here because the time is running out.
MR.JOHNSON. That definition, Mr. Fulton, is only of significance in connection with
section 305(c) insofar as patent matters are concerned.
MR. FULTON. That is correct.
MR. JOHNSON. That is where the term appears.
MR. FULTON. It has to be taken in connection with section 305(c).
Just one more point and I am through.
I was just trying to think back.
The question comes up of the development of the space field in relation to time. I can
see that when we were passing and preparing for the passage of the act of 1958 we were
under emergency conditions. The question now occurs: Are we in the same emergency
conditions in space and are we in the same relative place where we have such a lack of
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knowledge that we have to keep the field open and, therefore, have a larger Government
interest in these patents or has the time come where we now see more about the field and
we should, therefore, say, as I would recommend, that the field of private enterprise and
individual initiative and private rights should be more stressed?
Would you comment on that?
Where are we in point of time in relation to a transition period that is different from
the Atomic Energy Commission in its development?
MR.JOHNSON. Well, I think we are in a substantially different position than we were
a year ago.
1 know our Administrator has made several statements to that effect--that we are able
to shake down, in a sense, into a more orderly program and know where we are going and
the worthwhileness of the things we are doing in a much better way than we were a year
ago when it was necessary to try to do everything at once.
I don't think that I can compare this very profitably, Mr. Fulton, with the Atomic
Energy Commission.
MR. FULTON. As you remember, the patent section of the American Bar Association
at its 1956 meeting had recommended the repeal of the provisions of the Atomic Energy
Commission patent sections.
They wanted them repealed.
They haven't taken any action since.
Then at their 1958 meeting they recommended the outright repeal of the patent sec-
tions of the NASA Act.
[23] To me, that probably goes too far and my disposition would be to try to go over it, as
we are today, and pick out the places where the language is too broad and the provisions
cover more than we intended because at the time we passed it, at that stage of the act, we
couldn't make definite provisions that would account for all these variations.
Now, which approach would you use?
Would you use the ABA approach or would you use the approach that some of us on
this committee recommend of revision, and move toward the private ownership and the
private field?
MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Fulton, this, of course, is a question that we are all sweating over
a good deal in NASA right now in preparing our legislative recommendations for the next
session of Congress.
I would not expect Congress to repeal outright section 305, and I wouldn't think,
speaking personally now, that NASA would make any such recommendation.
It seems to me that--
MR. FULTON. You, therefore, disagree with the patent section of the American Bar
Association at its 1958 meeting?
MR. JOHNSON. I read that. I don't recall the detail now, but if it is true that they rec-
ommended simply an outright repeal I would disagree with that.
On the other hand, there are two ways of approaching it, and I think--
MR. FULTON. Actually, while you are on that point, while we are commenting on
what they did do, they had a resolution opposing Government ownership of the patents
and inventions arising from Government-financed research and development as well as
repeal of the patent sections.
I must say that to you.
MR. JOHNSON. Yes.
MR. FULTON. 1958.
MR. JOHNSON. You have mentioned as a precedent the National Science
Foundation provision. I would think that would be probably the minimum that the
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Congress ought to do, if you were to undertake a radical treatment of section 305.
Substitute something of that kind, which would express the concern of Congress in the
protection of the public interest in patents in this field, hut would leave to the
Administrator great discretions as to how to do it, without imposing the kind of rules from
which we now have to depart by means of waiver.
This is quite a different thing from section 305.
MR. MITCHELl.. Would the gentleman yield?
MR. FULTON. I would like to have him continue. I am very interested in this point.
MR.JOHNSON. I say this without regard to whether the National Science Foundation
has or has not carried out its legal responsibilities.
I don't have any opinion on that either because I don't know enough about their busi-
ness.
In the alternative--and it is my guess, if I must do some forecasting now--this is prob-
ably the way we will present our legislative proposals.
MR. FULTON. I will be glad to hear it.
[24] MR. JOHNSON. In the alternative, we would propose a cleanup of this legislation
along the lines you have mentioned this morning.
There are some things that obviously were done in haste, it seems to us, in this secdon
and, on the basis of the past year's experience, even in line with what one might call the
overriding philosophy of this section, you can make a lot of changes in it and make it
more understandable and easier to administer.
Certainly I think the ultimate choice, as far as patent philosophy is concerned, is
going to be one that the Congress will have to make and ought to make, I think, with this
question of uniformity in mind, as well as Mr. King's ultimate question.
These two things have to be balanced, and whether you give one the greater consid-
eration or the other I think is a very serious legislative problem.
My own personal preference would be to substitute for section 305 something very
much like the general principles in the National Science Foundation Act and then hold
us responsible for the way we protect the public interest.
MR. FULTON. How would that then correlate with your previous statement on the
Department of Defense?
Why do you now say you would correlate this with the civilian agency, the National
Science Foundation Act of 1950, when previously I thought you were going to say corre-
late it with the military and Department of Defense practices?
MR. JOHNSON. I am not suggesting the National Science Foundation just for the
sake of making NASA uniform with a civilian agency. The National Science Foundation
practice is actually the same as the Department of Defense practice at the present time.
Now, that practice could be changed. If it seemed to be desirable in the public interest to
change the practice under the broad terms of the National Science Foundation Act, they
could do it. Under that kind of authority from Congress we could, as a matter of admin-
istrative policy, make our policies as uniform with those of the Department of Defense as
we felt the situation demanded, and we could examine the results of that on the case-by-
case basis to see whether the public interest was adequately protected.
In order to achieve uniform practice with the Department of Defense, you don't have
to have uniformity in statutory language. The Department of Defense has no statutory lan-
guage. The broad grant of authority to the Administrator to take such action as is in the
public interest, which is really what the National Science Foundation Act says, could result
in uniformity of practice, although not in uniformity of statute.
MR. FULTON. But you would sdll have that assertion of title under the section 305 (d)
and (e) remain subject to the Board of Review of the Patent Interferences, wouldn't you,
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and you would also have the final decision on the authority of the Administrator of NASA,
wouldn't you, that is, the final decision on waiver?
MR. JOHNSON. If we did the thing I was just suggesting, you would eliminate all of
this portion of section 305 that relates to tide.
The National Science Foundation Act has nothing about title in it, Mr. Fulton.
[25] MR. FULTON. I know, but I am still saying: Wouldn't you still retain a waiver provi-
sion of some type or a dtle provision and keep it under the Review Board of Patent
Interferences and leave some final authority on that particular type of thing in the
Administrator of NASA?
MR. JOHNSON. I don't see how they are compatible.
It seems to me what you are suggesting now is that you really retain a rule that says
tide will ordinarily vest in the Government with the power of waiver vested in the
Administrator.
This is radically different from what the National Science Foundation Act says. The
National Science Foundation Act doesn't impose a rule of title acquisition.
MR. FULTON. That is right.
MR. JOHNSON. It leaves all the discretion to the head of the agency.
MR. FULTON. So, you would then have the complete dtle provision cut out in the
NASA Act?
MR.JOHNSON. This is what I would say my personal preference would be at the pre-
sent time in view of the fact I feel very strongly about the inequity that now exists between
the DOD practice and ours.
MR. FULTON. That is all.
Thank you.
I appreciate very much both of your comments, which have been excellent and very
interesting.
MR. MITCHELL. What you are saying, Mr. Johnson, in substance, is that you are sug-
gesting legislation which would give to the Administrator the right to determine the spe-
cific phraseology that would go into the contract insofar as whether the Government
would retain title or not; is that it?
MR. JOHNSON. This is correct, which is the way I read the National Science
Foundation Act.
MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Daddario.
MR. DADDARIO. Mr. Johnson, taking the present posture of the space program into
consideration and also last year's experience, do you find any need that NASA have
greater protection in inventions than the Department of Defense?
MR. JOHNSON. I don't think so.
By this, I am not meaning to say I agree entirely with the Department of Defense pol-
icy as a matter of policy either; but on this question I would say--and I might hark back
to Mr. Fulton's remarks about the great interest in such things as space platforms and
security interests, and so forth; naturally, all of this applies to intercontinental ballistics
missiles, too--you have got the most urgently needed things with the greatest security
considerations right over in the Department of Defense.
Our work by and large, is unclassified. Not all of it, but the greater portion of it is in
the nonmilitary side of the program. I think I would have to say, honestly, that I cannot
see any reason why there is a need for acquisition of title to inventions under our contracts
if such a need does not exist under Department of Defense contracts.
MR. DADDARIO. Following that further, if such a need does not exist and, therefore,
we can assume from that there is an imposition of a greater need than is necessary on
these companies which might wish to enter into contracts with the Government, is this
added prohibition, if we can put it that way, affecting the space movement?
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[26]Arecompaniesnotcontractingwithyouasaresult?
MR.JOHNSON.I testifiedearlierthatit isverydifficultogetdefiniteinformation
onthat.
MR.DADDARIO.Whatisyourthought?
MR.JOHNSON.Wehavenotencounteredsofarinanyofournegotiationswithcon-tractorsaturndownbecauseofthis.
Wehavencounteredalotofresistance,buttheyhaveallbeennegotiatedsuccess-fully.
Wecannotbesure,ofcourse,thatsomeof thethingswehearabouthecomplete
unwillingnessofsomecompaniestodobusinesswithNASAmaynotbetrue.
Wehavehadrumorsandreportsparticularlyatthesubcontractorlevelthatsome
companieshaveputoutthewordtheydon'twanthebusiness;theywillnotdoanybusi-
nessthatinvolvesthevestingoftitletoanyof theirinventionsin theGovernmentand,
hence,theirpeoplearenottobidonNASAcontractproposals.
Thiskindofthingishardtogetdefiniteinformationonbecauseyoujustdon'tknow
abouthepeoplewhodon'trespondtoyourinvitationsorrequestsforbidsandproposals.
Somemaybedoingit becausetheydon'twantthebusiness;theyarecompletely
bookedupor theyaren'tinterested;or theymaybestayingawayforthisreason.Youcannotbesureofthis.
MR.DADDARIO.Mr.Johnson,if youhaveacompanywhichisin theaeronautical
fieldand,becauseofthegreatinterestthereisinspace,it hasastrongresearchanddevel-
opmentsection,couldn'tyouassumetheywouldlookverycarefullyintoputtingthe
endeavorsthattheyhavealreadyputintothisfieldtotheuseof theGovernment,when
thatwholeprogramcouldthenbetakenbytheC,overnmentandthenpassedoff into
commercialenterprisesor toothercountriesor toothercompanies,andthiscouldbe
researchanddevelopmentwhichtheyhavebuiltuptothispointwiththeirownmeans
andwithoutanyGovernmentassistancewhatsoever?
MR.JOHNSON.I couldspeculatealongthoselines.Thatsoundsquitereasonable
and,ofcourse,wearetoldbyindustrythisisexactlytheirreactiontoit.
MR.DADDARIO.Wouldn'tyousaythismustbethereactionbecausethisis tradi-
tionalwaywhichmanycompanies,thosewithgreatradition,haveoperated?MR.JOHNSON.Yes.
MR.DADDARIO.Theyhavelookedahead;theyhaveresearchanddevelopmentpro-gramstokeepthemselvesapacewithprogress?
MR.JOHNSON.Thatistrue.
MR.DADDARIO.Andit mustnecessarily,asaresult,besomethingthattheywould
lookintoverycarefully,andif theyaredoingso,thisneedthatyouhavetaggedonhere
andwhichyou,yourself,sayisnotnecessary,isprobablyslowingdownthewholespace
programbecausecompaniesarestayingawayfromit?
MR.JOHNSON.Mr.Daddario,I simplycannotsayI knowtheprogramisbeing
slowedownbythis.I couldn'thonestlysaythat.
Everythingyousaysoundsreasonable,andwearetoldthattherearecompaniesthat
arereluctant--infact,evenunwilling--todobusiness,particularlywithourprimecon-tractorsonthesublevel.
[27]I couldn'tdocumentit bysayingI knowXcompanyorYcompanyorZcompanyhas
refusedtodobusinesswithusorhasslowedowntheirparticipationbecauseofthis.
MR.DADDARIO.Letmeaskyouthis:Let'sassumethereisasituationwhereyouhave
acompanythatdoesenterintoacontractwithNASAand,in theperformanceofthiscon-
tract,it usesotherinventionswhichit hasproducedtoincreaseitstechnicalsuperiorityorpotential.Whatwouldbethesituationi volvingtheutilizationoftheseotherinventions?
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MR. JOHNSON. Do you want to comment on that?
MR. O'BRIEN. Yes.
I will comment on this, Mr. Daddario.
We do not, by acquiring a right to use or acquiring title to an invention made under
contract with NASA, acquire also fights under patents on inventions developed indepen-
dently of a Government contract. These are called background patent rights on inven-
tions. The owner or right to practice the invention under contract, where we acquired
rights, does not automatically give the Government rights under these background
patents.
MR. DADDARIO. Who is to decide whether it follows within one patent or the other?
You have no way of waiving, do you, under the present provisions, these rights to
inventions before a contract is signed?
So, if you sign the contract, then it is up to your Administrator to determine whether
or not they are background inventions or whether or not they fall within the area under
which they can then be separated from Government control?
MR. O'BRIEN. I think I misunderstood you perhaps as to what you regard as a back-
ground invention.
We regard as a background invention an invention which has been made by a con-
tractor prior to the entering into a contract with NASA, and by "made" we mean actually
reduced to practice.
As to those inventions, NASA would acquire no rights merely because an improve-
ment on that invention was made in the pursuance of research work under a NASA con-
tract.
MR. DADDARIO. Let me ask you this: Is there any provision at the present time under
which a waiver can be granted before a contract is entered into?
MR. O'BRIEN. The law so provides.
Our regulations do not provide for granting of any waivers prior to entering into a
contract.
MR. DADDARIO. Then, under the act, the situation is this: Under all circumstances,
even though the Administrator would have the authority, as the chairman has pointed out
previously, you would first have to give him the complete control and he would then have
to decide whether or not it fell within the categories set forth?
MR. O'BRIEN. That is right, sir.
MR.JOHNSON. I think we might mention the prima facie case for waiver, though, in
this connection.
MR. O'BRIEN. Yes.
Mr. JOHNSON. I think this is related to the questions you asked.
MR. O'BRIEN. Yes.
[28] In this regard, we have established certain categories of invention. If an invention
which is made by a contractor falls within these categories, and he can show to the
Administrator or to the Inventions and Contributions Board that this is so, then the con-
tractor has established a prima facie case for waiver of title or the waiver of the right of the
United States to acquire title.
Now, these classes of inventions are, one, those inventions which a contractor may
have conceived prior to entering into a contract with NASA and upon which he has filed
a patent application, but which was first actually reduced to practice in the performance
of the contract.
That is the first class.
MR. DADDARIO. Before you go further, because there isn't much time and there may
be others who have questions, there is one thing which bothers me here and I am sure you
can give me the answer.
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Whena waiverisgrantedunderanycircumstances,arethereminimumrequire-
merits?
MR.O'BRIEN.Thereare.
MR.DADDARIO.Therefore,thereisnosuchthingasacompletewaiver?
Nomatterwhathesituationmightbe,onceaninventioncomesunderthejurisdic-
tionofNASA,whateverwaiverisgranted,thereareminimumrequirementsand,there-
fore,asortofacloudonthetitleofwhatevertheinventionmighthe?
MR.O'BRIEN.Thefirstclassof inventionwhichI gaveyou--thereareveryminor
requirements.MR.DADDARIO.Butsome?
MR.O'BRIEN.Withrespecttothisfirstclassofinvention,therequirementswould
notplaceanycloudonfl0e.
Wehavecertainrequirementsinourwaiverinstrument,butastothoserequirements
theywouldnotplaceacloudonfl0e.
Astoothercategoriesofinvention,the requirements are provisional; that is, title is
provisional, the retention of title is provisional, upon the satisfying of certain require-
merits, those requirements being that the invention should be developed to the point of
practical application, which means that it must be developed so that it is put into the
hands of the public. We believe that the granting of rights to inventions to a contractor by
waiver must carry some assurance that the contractor will not shelve the patent on this
invention or not let the public have the benefit of it. If this were to be permitted the waiv-
er would not be in the public interest. For that reason, we have placed compulsory work-
ing provisions upon the grant of these waivers. So, if the invention has, in our view or in
the view of the contractor, to which we agree, predominant commercial interest and only
incidental interest and utility in space and aeronautics and we give him the right to
acquire title in the invention and the right to acquire a patent on it, then we say, "You shall
practice this invention; you shall put it into the hands of the public within a period of years
or you shall make it available for license to anyone who desires to do so."
MR. DADDARIO. Does that include foreign governments and foreign countries, any-
one who would do so?
MR. O'BRIEN. No; I think not.
[29] Mr. DADDARIO. You think that would be restricted to the continental limits of the
United States?
MR. O'BRIEN. Yes.
MR. DADDARIO. That is all.
MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Quigley.
MR. QUIGLEY. I have no questions.
I do regret my inability to be here on time. I occupied the witness stand in another
committee and on a matter which was controversial. I couldn't quit under fire. So I had
to stay, and I deeply regret it, because I wanted to get here and get the benefit of this back-
ground presentation. So I will have to study the record.
MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Yeager.
MR. YEAGER. Mr. Johnson, did I understand you to say in the recommendations for
legislation next year there will be some recommendations for a change in section 305?
MR. JOHNSON. No, Mr. Yeager. I didn't predict that positively--
MR. YEAGER. There might be?
MR.JOHNSON (continuing). As to what NASA's position would be, I said we are hard
at work in developing this as a part of our entire legislative program, and I said that, so far
as a personal prediction was concerned. I would predict that we might submit even alter-
native provisions as means of treating this problem.
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I suppose, if we did that, we would have a clear-cut recommendation as to which one
we preferred.
I certainly think it is fair to say we will have some legislative recommendation to
amend section 305.
I don't see how we could help but have that. This is one of our major legal problems.
MR. MITCHELL. You are going to have to live with this law, and certainly you should
give us the benefit of your experience and your recommendation.
MR. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
MR. YEAGER. Might that include section 306, too, on the----
MR.JOHNSON. That is an entirely separate question. At the present time, I don't per-
sonally have any--
MR. YEAGER. This doesn't give you concern at the moment, then?
MR. JOHNSON. No.
MR. YEAGER. As 305 does?
MR. JOHNSON. No, this is an entirely separate question.
MR. YEAGER. I would like to develop just one brief line here.
You have interpreted in section 305 (a) the phrase "any work" to exclude procurement
contracts; is that correct?
MR. O'BRIEN. Yes, sir.
MR. YEAGER. And according to the memorandum, I think, of May 6, which you sub-
mitted to this committee, you indicated that you are requiring your patent clause in con-
tracts where the work is of a technical or scientific or engineering type. Does this extend
to subcontracting?
MR. O'BRIEN. Yes
MR. YEAGER. It does?
MR. O'BRIEN. Yes.
MR. JOHNSON. The description is a little more elaborate than that.
MR. YEAGER. Yes.
[30] MR. JOHNSON. I think you are giving it sort of a shorthand characterization.
MR. YEAGER. Yes; but what I wanted to get at is not in direct reference to that provi-
sion. What I am getdng at is how you arrived really at the intent of Congress on this, and
again in section 305(c), where apparently you have interpreted this to mean that this sec-
tion applies only in the case of work, done under a contract with NASA. You say NASA has
concluded that this was not intended; this section was not intended to give the
Government rights under inventions outside the contractual situation with NASA.
MR. O'BRIEN. We regard this provision of the act as a policing provision.
MR. YEAGER. How did you reach that conclusion?
MR.JOHNSON. Mr. Yeager, you have asked several questions, I am not sure just which
one I am answering first.
MR. YEAGER. How did you reach the conclusion that Congress did not intend for sec-
tion 305(c) to apply to situations other than those where a work contract was under
NASA? That is what I was getting at.
MR. JOHNSON. Section 305(c).
MR. YEAGER. The record, as I recall the previous testimony, is pretty skimpy on this.
MR. JOHNSON. Yes.
MR. YEAGER (continuing). And I was just wondering whether you perhaps didn't
have to just play it by ear.
MR. O'BRIEN. I think a resolution reading of 305(c) and a reading of 305(d) answer
that the information on the material, which, under these provisions of the act, tile
Commissioner of Patents is required to secure from the applicant for a patent, is that
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informationandmaterialwhichbearsdirectlyuponthecircumstancessurroundingthe
makingoftheinventionandwhetherornotit wasmadeunderanycontractwithNASA.So,if alloftheinformationandmaterialwhichissubmittedinthesestatementswhich
theCommissionersecures,bearson thequestionof whetheror nottheinventionwas
madeunderanycontractof NASA,whatotherpurposecouldthisprovisionofthelaw
haveotherthantomakeinquiryastowhetherornotitwasmadeunderacontract?
Therefore,webelievedthisprovisiongenerallytohavetwopurposes,thefirstprovid-
ingapolicingprovisionfor ourcontractsandthesecondprovidinganopportunityto
havetheAdministrator'sdetermination,subjectto a reviewbyanotherindependent
agency;namely,theBoardofPatentInterferencesofthePatentOfficeor,ultimately,theCourtofCustomersandPatentAppeals.
WetriedtoderivefromthissubsectionftheactsomeincidentaldvantagetoNASA,
fromatechnologicalpointofview,thatinbringingthisinformationto theattentionof
theNASAtechnicalstaff,wheretheinventionsareofsignificantu ilitytospaceandaero-
nauticsNASAmightderivesometechnologybenefitfromitsdisclosure.
It hasn'tproventobeofmuchvaluein thisrespect,but--
MR.YEAGER.WhatI wastryingtogetatwas:Yousayyoubelievethistohavebeen
thecase,andthisseemedreasonabletoyou.[31]Butasfarastherecordshows,thereisn't
muchtogoon,sincetherewerenobearingsandverylittledebateonit inCongress,and
theconferencer portwasverymeager.
MR.O'BRIEN.Theconferencer porthas---
MR.YEAGER.Itsaysomethingaboutit, butmyquestionis:Wouldn'tyouagreethis
issusceptibleofadifferentinterpretation?
MR.JOHNSON.Mr.Yeager,Iwouldliketoanswerthat.
Youmentionedbefi)re,I think,threeorfourimportantinterpretationswehavegiven
tosection305.Intheabsenceofanylegislativehistory,allofthesehavebeenratherarbi-
trary.I havetoadmithat.
Thisistheproblemyouarefacedwithingivinganinitialinterpretationtoanyimpor-
tantpieceoflegislation.
I don'tthinkinanyof thesecasesthatwehavedone_iolencetothestatutorylan-guage,andwehavealwaystried,aswellaswecould,todiscoverfromreadingthesections
asawholewhatwefeltthelegislativeintentwas.
Mr.O'Brienhasjustexplainedhowwethinktheinterpretationwehavegiventosec-
tion305(c)doesderivefromastudyofthesectionasawhole.MR.YEAGER.Sure.
MR.JOHNSON.Thisistrueofalltherestofit, butwewouldadmithesearearguablepropositions.
Wehavetriedineachcasealso,whilenotdoingviolencetothelanguage,totryto
reachaninterpretationwhichwethoughtwasamostworkableoneandonethatwecould
administer.
MR.YEAGER.Yes.
I wasn'tsuggestingtherewasanyviolencedonetoit.TheonlypointIwasdrivingat
was:Unlessthesesectionsareclarified,perhapsatsomepointin thefuturea future
administrativebodymightverywellconstructthemdifferentlythanyouhave.
MR.JOHNSON.Thatisquitepossible.
I wouldliketosay,too,thatwehavetried,eachstepalongtheway,tokeepthecom-
mitteefullyinformedoftheadministrativenterpretationswehavegiventhisact.
I thinkyouhavebeenconstantlysuppliedwithourregulationsandcontractclauses
andhavebeeninformedofalloursignificants epsjustassoonaswehavetakenthem.
MR.YEAGER.Thankyou.
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That is very helpful.
MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Bass.
MR. BASS. Mr. Johnson, I just want to say I have been very much impressed with your
presentation, and particularly the grasp that you and Mr. O'Brien have shown of this very
complicated technical field.
Would you give us, very briefly, a biographical sketch of yourself?.
It might be interesting.
MR. JOHNSON. I am a graduate of DePauw University, and University of Chicago Law
School, and have a graduate degree from Harvard Law School, LL.M. I am a member of
the Illinois bar, practiced law in the general counsel's office of the Chicago, Burlington,
& Quincy Railroad and with the law firm of Wilson & Melivaine in Chicago before World
War II.
MR. BASS. I know the firm very well.
MR. JOHNSON. I have 3 years of active duty in the Navy.
[32] My Government service--I have been with the Department of State in the Office of
United Nations Affairs and with the Department of the Air Force where I was General
Counsel for the last 6 years before assuming the position of General Counsel of NASA last
October.
MR. BASS. How old are you?
MR. JOHNSON. Forty-three.
MR. MITCHELL. Any further questions?
MR. DADDARIO. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.
MR. MITCHELL. Let me express appreciation on behalf of the committee for the
appearance of both you, Mr. Johnson, and you, Mr. O'Brien. Certainly the information
you have given us will be of help. As I stated previously, we are in no hurry on this matter
and we will be looking forward to seeing you back with an official recommendation.
Thank you very much.
MR. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
MR. MITCHELL. The committee will be in recess until 10 in the morning.
(Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the meeting was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m.,
Thursday, August 20, 1959.)
[33]
Property Rights in Inventions Made Under
Federal Space Research Contracts
Thursday, August 20, 1959
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific Inventions,
Committee on Science and Astronautics,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:10 a.m., Hon. Erwin Mitchell
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
MR. MITCHELL. The subcommittee will be in order.
This morning we are privileged to have Mr. Ray M. Harris, Assistant Patent Counsel,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, who formerly was chairman of the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations Committee, and procurement and patent spe-
cialist, Department of Defense.
470 THENASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITYt:xus
Mr. Harris is presently with the Space Administration, as I pointed out. The purpose
of his appearance today is to brief the members of the committee on patent policies fol-
lowed by the Department of Defense and other Government agencies.
We are happy to have Mr. O'Brien back again this morning.
Do you have a prepared statement, Mr. Harris?
Statement of Ray M. Harris, Assistant Patent Counsel, NASA; Accompanied by Gerald D.
O'Brien, Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters, NASA
MR. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, as announced, my subject was supposed to be the patent
policy of the Department of Defense and other Government agencies, but I felt they were
discussed pretty extensively yesterday and probably if the members have any more inter-
est in those policies than was brought out yesterday, it could be handled by questions.
On the other hand, in view of some of the questions raised yesterday, I thought the
members might be interested in a discussion of some of the more fundamental aspects of
the patent problem and system as an aid to arriving at a determination of what the
Government's patent policy should be. Mr. King particularly raised that question.
I thought if the committee would care to, I would discuss that aspect.
MR. MITCHELL. I think it would be most benefiting.
MR. HARRIS. My prepared statement here is a couple of pages of introduction. The
first paragraph is what I have already said and then the second paragraph:
[34] I would like to say at the beginning that these are my personal views and have not
been coordinated with my superiors, Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Johnson. I agree with Mr.
Johnson, who spoke yesterday, that this problem is so complex that it is difficult to give a
categorical answer.
As Mr. Johnson said, this problem has been with us for many, many years. One might
be justified in arriving at different answers to the question with respect to Government
employees' inventions versus Government contractors' inventions, with respect to differ-
ent Government agencies, and with respect to different fields of technology.
The problem is currently being studied by the staff of the Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and by an interde-
partmental working group under the chairmanship of the Commissioner of Patents, Study
No. 14 of the Interagency Task Force for Review of Government Procurement Policies and
Procedures.
Mr. O'Brien is a member of this study group 14 and I was while I was with the
Department of Defense.
The problem has been the subject of numerous studies in the past, most notable
being the Attorney General's report of 1947 to which there was a sequel report of
November 9, 1956. In the sequel, the Attorney General pointed out that the Department
of Defense patent license policy was permitting the concentration of patents in the hands
of big business.
I would like also to mention, in the interests of what has been done on this subject,
that Dr. Howard L. Forman, who is a personal friend of mine, got his Ph.D. degree on the
subject as a result of his investigations into what should be the patent policy of the
Government with respect to its employees' inventions and has written a book on the sub-
ject: "Patent--Their Ownership and Administration by the United States Government"
published by Central Book Co., Inc.
I think the above introduction indicates the extent of the problem. Nevertheless, I
have a conviction that the people concerned with this problem have spent too much time
attacking it from the standpoint of who should have the rights to patents as a matter of
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law or equity, and not nearly enough time as to what is the purpose of ownership of a
patent, and from the Government's viewpoint, what should it do with the patents it owns.
If the Government doesn't have a good program of administration of its patent property,
why should it be so concerned with getting title to the patents, and getting more patent
property?
I might say also, Dr. Forman takes that position, that we have the cart before the
horse. We have been concerned with deciding who should get the rights to the patents
and we haven't decided first what we are going to do with the patents we've got.
MR. KING. As a matter of fact, what does happen to Government patents? Do they go
into the public domain or are they locked up for 17 years?
MR. HARRIS. The practice largely with Government-owned patents is, in effect that
they come under the public domain because the Government does not have a policy of
enforcing its patents. In order for a patent to be used as the patent law intends it to be, it
must be exercised--the exclusivity provided by the patent must be exercised which
[35] means that you must use it for yourself or your licensees and not permit others to use
it. The Government's policy is exactly the opposite. When it gets a patent, most of the
Government agencies will grant a revocable, not an irrevocable, royalty-free license to any-
one who asks for it. If you don't ask for it, it is all the same because they won't sue you for
infringement.
Mr. O'Brien, would you like to add to that?
MR. O'BRIEN. I would only mention that one of the reasons for the Government's
patent policy, as Mr. Harris has stated, is that the major executive branches of our
Government have no authority to grant rights in patents which that agency of the
Government may own. The Congress has never provided the executive branch of the
Government with that authority except in a few instances such as the Tennessee Valley
Authority and the AEC.
MR. HARRIS. And our own organization.
MR. O'BRIEN. And the NASA.
MR. MITCHELL. Mr. King, will you yield?
MR. KING. Yes, I am through, Mr. Chairman.
MR. MITCHELL. I understand you to say that in most agencies you do not have the
authority to grant licenses?
MR. O'BRIEN. The authority to grant any irrevocable or exclusive license.
MR. MITCHELL. The policy has been to grant these licenses but they are revocable?
MR. O'BRIEN. That is right.
MR. BASS. Does that also mean the Government cannot collect royalties and enter
into that kind of agreemenO
MR. HARRIS. I think it would mean that except in the case of these agencies which
have the authority such as NASA, TVA, and AEC, I believe.
MR. BASS. They have the authority?
MR. HARRIS. Yes.
MR. BASS. Do they exercise it?
MR. HARRIS. No, sir.
We haven't developed our policy on the subject. We are in the process of trying to for-
mulate a policy but one of the difficulties that one is going to have in trying to grant roy-
alty-bearing licenses is that it is obligatory on the licensor in such cases to defend that
patent against infringers because it is unfair to the person who takes a license and agrees
to pay royalties if somebody else would start to manufacture the thing and not pay royal-
ties and have it royalty-free.
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So,therefore, in private practice, it is incumbent upon the patent owner who grants
a license to undertake to sue infringers. In the Government's case, if it were to adopt a
policy of granting royalty-bearing licenses it would mean the Department of Justice would
have to sue infringers of patents.
MR. KING. May we pursue this, Mr. Chairman.
MR. MITCHELL. Yes.
MR. QUIGLEY. May I ask a question here just for clarification?
Do I gather, sir, that the Tennessee Valley Authority and the AEC, those two, have in
the past granted exclusive licenses, not with the royalties attached?
MR. HARRIS. The Tennessee Valley Authority has granted at least one royalty-bearing
license.
[36] MR. QUIGLEY At least one royalty-bearing?
MR. HARRIS. Yes. The AEC has never granted more than a revocable license, which
the Department of Defense also grants. They have never exercised the authority of their
act.
MR. QUIGLEY. In other words, while the AEC has the authority to grant exclusive
irrevocable licenses, the), have not in fact exercised it?
MR. HARRIS. That is right.
MR. QUIGLEY. What you are saying in effect, then, is that the only Government
agency that has done that would be the TVA?
MR. HARRIS. That is right, and also that license was to a British concern and it may
be that they didn't know the situation over here, as well as ourselves, because had I been
representing an American client or them, I would have advised then not the enter into a
royalty-bearing license.
MR. QUIGLEY. Even though this authority has existed on the books for a number of
years, in fact it has not been exercised?
MR. HARRIS. That is right.
MR. QUIGLEY. With this one exception?
MR. HARRIS. That is right, sir.
MR. O'BRIEN. I would like to add one comment.
The Tennessee Valley Authority does grant licenses which are irrevocable, but not roy-
alty-bearing. It has granted exclusive licenses.
MR. QUIGLEY. That would be the only agency of the Federal Government that has
done that. AEC has the authority to, but hasn't.
MR. O'BRIEN. Yes, sir, except for a few instances of vested property of the Alien
Property Custodian where licenses have been granted under those vested patents.
MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Harris, this example you gave of the British concern obtaining
a license was later canceled ....
Document 111-4
Document title: T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, Memorandum for Distribution,
"Appraisal of NASA's Contracting Policy and Industrial Relations," February 29, 1960,
with attached: "Preliminary Outline of Plan for Appraising NASA's Contracting Policies
and Industry Relationships," February 26, 1960.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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Document 111-5
Document fl0e: McKinsey and Company, Inc., "An Evaluation of NASA's Contracting
Policies, Organization, and Performance," October 1960 (a report prepared under con-
tract for NASA).
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan began 1960 with an eye to the future, concerned with estab-
lishing policies to guide NASA's external relationships with other government agencies and private
industry. Knowing NASA would be contracting out the majority of its work through various field cen-
ters with diffehng characteristics, and recognizing that his actions would set a precedent for the agency
in years to come, Glennan felt it important to acquire outside advice on these issues. Consequently, he
hired the management consulting firm of McKinsey and Company to undertake an extensive study of
how NASA might best establish these external relationships. Reporting back eight months lat_
McKinsey laid out a number of recommendations. The first chapter of the firm's report summarized
them.
Document 111-4
[1] February 29, 1960
Memorandum for Distribution
Subject: Appraisal of NASA's Contracting Policy and Industrial Relations
A contract has been entered into with McKinsey and Company, Management
Consultants, for a comprehensive study of (1) how NASA should utilize industry and pri-
vate institutions, (2) method of utilizing in-house research capabilities, and (3) the extent
and manner of sharing responsibility and authority between government and industry.
Now that our field organizations are shaping up, it seems particularly important to study
very carefully how NASA can best conduct its business with industry in carrying out the
program planned for the next 10 years and in a context decentralizing the major elements
of industry relationships to the development centers.
The study will follow three basic approaches: (1) an examination of our experience
to date in handling several major contracting actions; (2) an appraisal of experience of
other government agencies; and (3) an analysis of approaches and techniques used or
advocated by our own centers. I urge all elements of NASA to be fully and completely
cooperative in working with the McKinsey staff.
In the past NASA has found that it obtains the greatest results from such studies if the
outside consultant group has a close liaison with responsible program areas most involved.
In this instance, our plan is to assign one NASA staff member to work virtually full time
with the McKinsey staff. This person in turn will be assisted by and will head up a task
group of people from various parts of NASA Headquarters. The task group will be com-
posed of the following people:
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Leader--William P. Kelly, Jr.--Office of Business Administration
Member--Newell Sanders--Office of Space Flight Programs
Member--Col. D. H. Heaton--Office of Launch Vehicle Programs
Member--Emerson V. Conlon--Office of Advanced Research Programs
Member--Walter D. Sohier--Office of General Counsel
Member--John R. Scull--Office of Program Planning and Evaluation
In addition, it is requested that each NASA research and development center, includ-
ing the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, designate a top level technical person with manage-
ment responsibility as a point of contact for the study group with that center. The name
of the individual so designated should be supplied in writing to the leader of the NASA
task group, Mr. William P. Kelly, Jr., Chief, Procurement Assistance Branch, Procurement
and Supply Division, Office of Business Administration, NASA Headquarters, as soon as
possible.
[2] Attached for your information is a brief summary of the study purposes and objec-
tives. I believe this is a timely study of one of our major problem areas and can result in a
major contribution toward improved program management if it is properly and enthusi-
astically pursued.
T. Keith Glennan
Administrator
Attachment as stated
[Attachment p. 1]
February 29, 1960
Preliminary Outline of Plan for Appraising NASA's
Contracting Policies and Industry Relationships
NASA is now a principal source of government contracts and may be expected in the
future to contract for the requirements of an even larger space program. It is dependent
upon its ability to contract effectively for the industrial and scientific resources of the
nation to carry out the national space program. NASA has now (and probably only with-
in the next year) the opportunity to appraise objectively and to revise imaginatively its
contracting policies and relationships with private industry and institutions.
Scope and Objectives of the Study
This study is to be primarily concerned with an analysis of the basic concepts of (1)
how NASA should utilize industry and private institutions, (2) the method of utilizing in-
house research and development capabilities, and (3) the extent and manner of sharing
responsibility and authority between government and industry.
The answers that this study seeks must be reconcilable with (1) the ten-year planned
program, (2) the present order of magnitude of in-house development resources (at least
through Fiscal Year 1961), and (3) NASA's basic policy of decentralizing major elements
of the contracting job (and related industry relationships) to the development centers.
These factors establish a basic frame of reference against which the feasibility of recom-
mendations must be tested.
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A study of NASA contracting at this time should be designed to provide factual and
reasoned answers to the following (and related) questions:
1. What role should the space development centers---Goddard, Huntsville, and
JPL--play in contracting? How does this role relate to the need for in-house
development and engineering capabilities? Which of several approaches should
be followed by the development centers in contracting, e.g., contracting with a
single company for a major system as [2] contrasted with contracting sub-systems
and components with several companies? To what extent should the approach be
varied in terms of the type of project involved? What are the implications of vari-
ous approaches to contracting in terms of laboratory requirements for personnel
and facilities, and in government-industry relationships?
2. Under what circumstances, and for what reasons, should NASA employ each of
the following in systems management?
a. NASA space development center.
b. Industrial contractor as solely a systems manager.
c. Industrial contractor as systems manager and prime contractor.
d. University or other type of nonprofit contractors as systems manager with an
industrial prime contractor as in the Vega case.
3. What approaches and techniques should NASA use in supervising contractor
operations and in evaluating contractor performance--from both a technical and
administrative point of view? How should these techniques be varied in terms of
(a) contractor capabilities, (b) amount of advanced research and development
involved, (c) priorities, and (d) similar factors? What decisions should be made
by the development centers and various elements of the headquarters staffin con-
tractor supervision? What information is required to make these decisions effec-
tively and how should it be provided?
4. How and to what extent should NASA encourage elements of United States indus-
try not now interested in or involved in space technology to enter the field?
5. What new approaches can be developed to provide effective incentives to indus-
try to control costs and increase performance? On what types of contracts, and
under what circumstances, can these innovations to contracting be employed?*
[3] 6. What problems does NASA's present approach to contracting cause in terms of
the agency's internal processes, particularly program planning, integration, and
control? What changes are indicated in terms of either contracting policies or
internal processes to increase the agency's over-all effectiveness?
7. To what extent is NASA limited by the government frame-work in making desir-
able changes in its approaches to contracting and in its relationships with con-
tractors? What steps should be taken to modify or remove these limitations?
An Approach to the Study
To answer these questions a three-pronged approach to fact finding and analyses will
be undertaken:
1. Appraise NASA's contracting experience by examining a sample of representative
contracts NASA has executed.** The analysis of the actions taken on each con-
tract should provide effective insights as to actual experience. To this end the
Study Team will, with the aid of NASA's staff, select contracts that provide
* Recognition must be given to the difficuhies involved in providing effective incentives in rapidly
evolving areas of research and development.
** This technique has been tested in an extensive study of "Weapons Acquisition" now under way at the
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration in collaboration with the Rand Corporation.
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2.
3.
contrasting approaches to contracting, e.g., the McDonnell Corporation contract
for the Mercury Capsule and the role of the Langley Research Center; Vega and
the role of JPL; and the North American contracts for the "big engine" and the
role of headquarters. The Study Team would not expect to derive answers to the
questions listed above from the analysis of any sample of contracts alone.
Appraise the experience of other government departments and agencies in con-
tracting for research and development projects. Evidence would be sought as to
the advantages and disadvantages of the differing approaches employed, e.g.,
AEC in reactor development; the Army in a program such as Jupiter;, the Air Force
on Atlas;, and the Navy on Polaris. In addition, the contracting practices of one [4]
large laboratory outside the NASA and AEC orbit will be reviewed, e.g., Lincoln
Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Analyze the contracting approaches and techniques now being employed by the
Development Operations Division, the Space Project Group, and JPL. This
approach will include assembling specific illustrations of the advantages and dis-
advantages of the various approaches to contracting represented by these three
groups. In addition, review and appraise the procedures followed by one or more
of NASA's Research Centers to make certain that the contracting requirements
and procedures at these Centers will not be incompatible with the policies to be
recommended.
Specific Steps Involved in the Study
More specifically, the Study Team proposes to proceed as follows:
Approximate Timing Steps
Feb. 29-Mar. 18 1. Finalize Detailed Study Plan: To make more precise the types of
information and analyses required, the ideas of key personnel in
NASA headquarters, Langley, Goddard, and atJPL as to materi-
als and experience relevant to the questions listed above will be
assembled. This step will also involve establishing criteria for the
selection of contracts to be studied. At the completion of this
step, the Study Team will:
a. Formulate, in terms of outlines and questionnaires, the spe-
cific detailed inquires to be made at NASA headquarters,
NASA development and research centers, successful indus-
trial contractors, unsuccessful contractors, and other gov-
ernment departments and agencies (Army, Navy, Air Force,
and AEC).
[5] Approximate Timing
Feb. 29-Mar. 18
(continued)
S_
b. Make a detailed presentation to the top staff of NAsAIboth
headquarters and field--picturing the study objectives and
plans. This will be done to ensure understanding of the
kinds of issues and problems the study seeks to resolve, and
the kinds of evidence, experience, and opinion that will be
required to resolve these problems. It will be important that
this step result in a consensus among key personnel as to the
desirability of the study objectives and the feasibility of the
approach. The Study Team will evaluate with the
Administrator, at this point, the adequacy of the study plans,
and the reactions of NASA's staff to these plans.
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Approximate Timing
Mar. 21-May 13 2.
[6] Approximate Timing
Mar. 21-May 13
Steps
Assemble Contracting Experience: This step will involve three simul-
taneous efforts:
a. In assembling and analyzing NASA's contracting experience,
the Study Team will be seeking information on such ques-
tions as:
(1) Where did the idea for the project come from? What
program decisions gave rise to it? Was its feasibility ade-
quately considered?
(2) Were in-house capabilities available for all or part of the
project? What factors such as cost, were considered in
making the decision to place the contract with an
industrial firm or private institution?
(3) What criteria or guidelines were used to select organi-
zations to submit proposals?
(4) What factors were considered in evaluating proposals
and what was the relative significance of each factor in
negotiating and awarding the contract?
Steps
b.
c.
(5) What major technical, timing, and cost modifications
were required in the contract and for what reason?
Who made these decisions and on what basis? What has
been the impact of these changes in NASA (e.g., repro-
gramming of available funds) and on the contractor?
(6) How are the contractor's operations supervised and his
performance evaluated?
In assembling and analyzing the experience of other gov-
ernment departments and agencies, the Study Team will
want to determine why certain approaches have been select-
ed for the contracting of specific research and development
programs rather than others, e.g., the Special Projects Office
in the case of Polaris; the separation of technical and
management supervision in the case of certain Air Force
contracts; the management services contract for systems
management on the Atlas; and the Army approach of in-
house systems management.
In assembling and analyzing the contracting approaches
employed within the NASA centers at Huntsville, Langley,
and JPL, the Study Team will want to determine what
circumstances created or accounted for the different
approaches to contracting and the specific advantages and
disadvantages of the varying approaches, in terms of con-
crete illustrations.
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Approximate Timing
May 16-June 24 3.
June 27-June 29 4.
Step5
Develop Preliminary Findings, Contusions, and Recommendations:
This step will involve (a) preparing a series of discussion papers
on each of the study's major objectives, and (b) subjecting these
discussion papers to the review and criticism of key headquarters
and field personnel. [7] This step has a dual purpose--(a) to
refine the conclusions and recommendations, and (b) provide a
basis for achieving a consensus among key NASA personnel as to
the approaches NASA should take to contracting and govern-
ment-industry relationships in the future.
Prepare Final Report: The Study Team's objective will be to pre-
sent a final report that sets forth recommendations and imple-
menting action steps that have, for all practical purposes, been
agreed to by key headquarters and field personnel. The previous
study steps are designed with this objective in mind.
Document111-5
[1]
An Evaluation of NASA's Contracting Policies,
Organization, and Performance
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
1--How Better to Perform NASA's Contracting Job--
A Summary of Recommendations
Importance of Contracting to NASA's Total Job
No single element of NASA's management is as essential to the accomplishment of
NASA's job as the ability to contract effectively for the research, development, production,
and services required. The volume of work to be done and the fast range of scientific and
engineering skills involved require that NASA utilize effectively through contracts those
enterprises--universities or business firms---that possess the skills required.
Approximately 85 percent of NASA's annual appropriations, hence, are spent on con-
tracts. This fact is illustrated by the following table:
Contracts
Personnel
Total
Estimated Obligations FY 1960 Budget Estimate FY 1 961
(millions) (millions)
Dollars Percent Dollars Percent
468 85.2 770 84.2
81 14.8 145" 15.8
549 100.0 915 100.0
* Increase due largely to added personnel costs resulting from transfer of Development Operations Division
(Marshall Space Flight Center) from Army to NASA effective beginning with Fiscal Year 1961.
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[2] Factors That Condition NASA's Job
The manner in which the contracting job is carried out is conditioned by four fac-
tors-(1) the unique characteristics of NASA's job, (2) the legislative framework within
which NASA operates, (3) the political sensitivity of contracting, and (4) the manner in
which NASA came into being.
(a) Characteristics of NASA's job
NASA's ultimate objective is the acquisition, evaluation and dissemination of scientif-
ic information. Space vehicles and associated hardware provide the tools to achieve this
objective. This means that most of NASA's contract dollars go for never-before-produced
experimental equipment and systems, requiring diverse engineering and scientific skills.
The bulk of NASA's contracting, hence, is carried out on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis.
This method of contracting demands a closer day-to-day working relationship between
NASA's technical and procurement specialists than other methods of procurement in
such areas as the preparation of work statements, analyses of costs, in selecting suppliers,
and in progress reporting and evaluation.
Contracting for such efforts is complicated further by the fact that many projects uti-
lize industrial resources on what is essentially a "one time basis." The enterprise that con-
tracts to carry out a NASA project may have to assemble scientists, engineers, technicians,
and facilities especially adapted to an unprecedented undertaking. Upon completion of
the project the "team" and facilities may no longer be required. There is little need for
the repetitive production of a succession of items (e.g., as in aircraft or even military mis-
sile systems) but for the production of a Single or very limited number of launch vehicles
and space craft. Procurement of a small number of unique items places major stress on
the reliability of each item.
The high reliability requirements, plus the small number of similar units that are
used, are central characteristics that distinguish and complicate NASA's procurement job.
These characteristics mean that the normal cost and performance incentives are often not
available to NASA and contractors. Therefore, NASA must substitute for the self-discipline
of such incentives continual and effective technical supervision of contractor's efforts.
[3] Over and above its own immediate needs for the services of industrial enterprises,
NASA has a longer-run obligation in a free enterprise society to provide industry oppor-
tunities to take advantage of the commercial aspects of research and development.*
The goods and services that NASA contracts for and the distribution of contracts
among suppliers inevitably condition the capacity of American industry and of individual
enterprise to participate in those areas where (a) commercial applications are foresee-
able, e.g., communications, and (b) where space research and development has an indi-
rect impact on industrial technology and commercial products, e.g., electronics.
These factors also determine the extent of economic concentration or dispersion that
will characterize the supplying industry in the decades ahead. At present, relatively few
industrial concerns possess the engineering and scientific skills requisite to the successful
completion of a total space vehicle subsystem such as the launch or space vehicle.
However, unless industrial contractors are encouraged to round out their capabilities,
NASA will find it necessary to expand its in-house capabilities---facilities and personnel
wise.
.Some of the problems involved were set forth in an address by Ralph J. Cordiner, Chairman of the Board,
General Electric Company, entitled "Competitive Private Enterprise in Space" at the University of
California, Los Angeles, May 14, 1960.
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(b) The Legal Framework of Contracting
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 provided NASA broad authority "to
enter into.., and perform such contracts.., or other transactions as may be necessary
to the conduct of its work and on such terms as it may deem appropriate." The Act also
made applicable to NASA the provisions of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947.
These legislative gran ts of procurement authority were designed (1) to grant NASA
the same flexibility to procurement as is available to the military and (2) to avoid the
imposition of an additional set of procurement regulations with which industry would
have to cope. This latter point is of particular [4] significance since a substantial propor-
tion of NASA's requirements are similar to those of the military departments and are pro-
duced by the same companies.
The contracting authority granted by the Congress has made it possible for NASA to
depend on the military departments during its first two years of existence for substantial
assistance in contracting. Without this assistance it would have been impossible for NASA
to have achieved as much in the time that has elapsed. However, this dependence has
influenced the speed and effectiveness with which NASA has developed its own organiza-
tion and contracting processes. It has also limited the extent to which NASA has been
able to initiate new approaches and techniques for contracting for research and develop-
ment.
(c) Political Sensitivity of Contracting
No aspect of NASA's job is more politically sensitive than the contracting process. In
substantial part this political sensitivity arises out of the large value of the contracts being
let and their significance to individual contractors and to the communities in which their
plants are located. A second cause of this sensitivity is the fact that the contracting activi-
ties of large government agencies have become instruments for achieving indirect objec-
tives. These include (1) assisting small business, (2) channeling public funds into
depressed and labor surplus areas, (3) maintaining a broad national industrial based for
mobilization, and (4) supporting academic and institutional programs.
NASA's public and Congressional relations will depend, in considerable part, upon
the manner in which the contracting process is carried out.
(d) NASA's Organizational Inheritance
NASA's organization was built on the foundations of the NACA laboratories. The tra-
ditional job of these laboratories had been in-house supporting research for the military
departments and the aircraft industry. Their staffs had litde experience in contracting for
complex development projects.
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, prior to its transfer to NASA, had been primarily con-
cerned with the in-house development of Army missile systems. Although this laboratory
had spent approximately half of its annual budget via contractors and vendors, the items
contracted for consisted primarily of raw materials, parts, components, and similar items.
Laboratory [5] personnel possessed little or no experience in contracting with industry
for major subsystems of the nature involved in NASA's program.
The individuals making up these groups had been primarily concerned with in-house
development and had had little experience in utilizing nongovernmental contractors for
development of subsystems as distinguished from components. The staff of the
Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency had had a marked-
ly different experience but this staff was similarly oriented toward in-house development.
A further factor conditioning NASA's contracting processes was the inheritance by the
Agency of a number of projects that had already been initiated by other agencies. These
include the Vapor Magnetometer Project, initiated by the Naval Research Laboratory; the
Saturn Launch vehicle by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 481
Defense and the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency;
the Centaur launch vehicle initiated by the Air Force; Tiros I, a project conceived and ini-
tiated by the Army Signal Corps; and Echo, a project developed by the Langley Research
Center of NACA.
Each of these projects involved differing approaches to (a) the division of effort
between government and private resources, (b) project management, (c) technical super-
vision of contractor efforts, (d) contract administration, and (e) progress reporting,
including financial and procurement control processes.
Method of Analysis
In studying NASA's approach to its contracting job, we took the pragmatic approach
of analyzing step-by-step twelve significant space flight and launch vehicle projects. The
projects studied are identified in Table 1--"Framework for Analyzing NASA's Contracting
Policies."* For each project, we studied the
[6] 1. Division of effort between NASA and private contractors in terms of the major ele-
ments (e.g., detailed design) that comprise each project.
2. Varying approaches employed in contracting, i.e., relying for the project on a sin-
gle contractor, procuring subsystems from various contractors, and procuring compo-
nents to be assembled with NASA.
3. Varying approaches employed in project management.
4. Techniques employed in technical supervision and administration of contracts.
In addition to these analyses of NASA's experience, we:
1. Studied the working relationships between technical and Procurement staffs in the
headquarters and in the field centers.
2. Acquainted ourselves with the comparable contracting experience of our agencies,
i.e., the Departments of the Air Force, Navy, Army, and the Atomic Energy Commission.
Summary of Recommendations
The results of these analyses are set forth in the following chapters of this report. Here
we summarize those recommendations on which action has already been initiated or on
which we urge that action be taken.
1. NASA has made significant progress in reorienting staffs that had been oriented
toward in-house research and development and in increasing the utilization of industrial
enterprises and other nongovernmental contractors. To stimulate further contracting
out, we recommend that NASA approve and generally promulgate the following criteria
to govern what work shall be done in-house, and what shall be contracted out:
(a) NASA should retain in-house the conceptual and preliminary design ele-
ments of a major project, or its equivalent, in each major program.**
* In addition to the project listed, we examined various aspects of contracts of the 17-1 engine;
Minitrack; research Grants and Contracts at Johns Hopkins and Stanford Universities and at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; Atlas----Able Space Probe; Snap 8; GE Plug Nozzle engine; nuclear rocket plump; and
Deep Space Net.
** Major programs include--(l) Applications, (2) Manned Space Flight, (3) Lunar and Planetary, (4)
Scientific Satellite, (5) Sounding Rocket, and (6) Launch Vehicle ....
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[7] Table 1
Framework for Analyzing NASA's Contracting Poficies
Space
Flight
Pmjects
Estimated Obligations FYI960* Distribution of Res_msibilities
(Millions of Dollars) Program Project Contract
In-House Out-of-House Mgmt Mgmt Admin. Principal Contractors
Mercury 3.8 87.2 OSFP STG Navy/Air Force McDonnell, Convair,
Western Electric**
Ranger 5.5 10.9 OSFP JPL Air Force Convair, Lockheed
OAt 05 0.3 OSFP GSFC Air Force Convair, Lockheed
S-16 0.05 2.1 OSFP GSFC Air Force Douglas, Ball Brothers
P- 14 0.7 0.2 OSFP GSFC Air Force Douglas, MIT, Varlan
Echo 0.05 3.2 OSFP GSFC Air Force Douglas, Bell Telephone,
General Mills, MMM
Launch Vehicle Projects
Saturn 43.0 135.3 OLVP MSFC Air Force
Centaur 0.2 36.5 OLVP MSFC Air Force
Agena-B 0.1 7.3 OLVP JPL Air Force
Delta 0.7 11.8 OLVP OLVP Air Force
Scout 005 2.5 OLVP Langley RC Navy
Vega 0.1 3.5 OLVP OLVP/JPL Air Force
Total $ 56. I 300.8
Total % 18.8 81.2
Douglas, Convair,
Rocketdyne
Convair, Rocketdyne
Convair, Lockheed
Douglas
Chance Vought
Convair
* The in-house estimates include obligations from the Salaries and Expenses Appropriation; out-of-house obligations from the
Research and Development Appropriation. The estimates were obtained from the various project managers and reflect the
general magnitudes only.
** The Western Electric contract for the Mercury tracking system is supervised by the Langley Research Center.
[8] (b) NASA's in-house efforts in the conceptual and preliminary design elements
of space flight and launch vehicle projects should be supplemented exten-
sively through the use of study contracts.
(c) NASA should retain in-house the detailed design, fabrication, assembly, test
and check out elements of a single advanced launch vehicle* and spacecraft
unique to each major program.
(d) Each center should contract out the detailed design, fabrication, assembly,
test, and check out elements of all launch vehicles and spacecraft except the
relatively few required to meet the criteria set forth in item (c) above.
(e) NASA's centers should contract all production manufacturing efforts includ-
ing the standard or relatively standard parts and components used for in-
house launch vehicles and spacecraft of an advanced developmental nature.
(f) NASA should contract out total space vehicles including the physical integra-
tion of subsystems, i.e., the launch vehicle and spacecraft.
* Or stage in the case of a project such as the Saturn Launch Vehicle, i.e., the S-I Stage.
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(g) NASA should contract with the external scientific community for a prepon-
derant proportion (70 to 85 percent) of all space flight experiments.
Adoption of these criteria will ensure the retention in-house of the capability required
to enable NASA effectively to contract for the bulk of the research and development ser-
vices needed. Adoption of the criteria will curb the tendency to do all that can be done
in-house and contract out what remains.
2. To utilize its in-house facilities to the fullest, we recommend that NASA:
[9] (a) Place responsibility for a limited number of development projects in the
research centers where they have the capabilities required, and these capa-
bilities are needed by NASA for the particular project.
(b) Establish project management teams in the Research Centers where this
means a center's capabilities can best be utilized to provide needed develop-
ment assistance.
3. The complex character of space vehicle subsystems makes inevitable the distribu-
tion of responsibility among several NASA centers and among industrial contractors. To
resolve more effectively the technical (in matching up one space vehicle subsystem with
another) and jurisdictional problems (headquarters staffs vs. center staffs) that arise, we
recommend that NASA:
(a) Assign as full responsibility as practicable for the execution of each project to
a specific center.
(b) Clarify the relative responsibilities of the headquarters staff and the space
flight centers by concentrating the efforts of the headquarters staffs on
reviewing and approving:
(1) Development plans for each space flight project, including conceptual
and preliminary designs and allocation of responsibilities in- and out-of-
house.
(2) Schedules in terms of major procurement actions and technical mile-
stones.
(3) Budget justifications and financial operating plans.
In addition, the headquarters technical staffs would evaluate projects and approve
changes in the project plans which significantly alter objectives, schedules, and/or costs.
4. Strengthen the capabilities of the space flight centers to manage projects, partic-
ularly those in which major systems or total space flight vehicles are developed by con-
tractors. To this end, we recommend that NASA:
[10] (a) Improve the competence of its project managers. Steps must be taken to
ensure that project managers develop the full complement of technical and
managerial skills essential for this task. The "custom-tailored" training pro-
gram for project management personnel that has been initiated is a promis-
ing step toward this end.
(b) Improve the project organizational arrangements that now exist. Each pro-
ject management team responsible for a major space flight project should be
headed by a full-time project manager reporting directly to the director or
deputy director of the responsible center.* Each project management team
should include sufficient technical and administrative (e.g., financial pro-
curement) personnel to make the project manager effective in mobilizing the
resources of the whole center, of other centers, and of the contractors.
* Because of the inability to attract senior project managers at the salary level NASA is able to offer, achieve-
ment of this objective will require, in a number of cases, a considerable period of time.
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5. NASA is faced with a major and complex task of developing, under cost-plus-
fixed-fee contracts, working relationships with contractors which neither stifle the con-
tractor's capabilities, nor relieve them of their obligations to use public funds wisely and
economically. To this end, we recommend that NASA:
(a) Develop a guide for preparing and evaluating statements of work to be clone
and service to be rendered under research and development contracts.
(b) Institute a continuing program to assemble and study cost data as a basis for
improving funding estimates.
(c) Provide a single point of ultimate technical authority for each contractor on
a given project--the project manager.
(d) Establish guidelines as to the approaches and techniques to be used in tech-
nical supervision of contractors.
[11] (e) Establish guidelines as to staff action on the analysis and control of costs in
terms of pre-award analyses of price, costs, and profits, and post-award costs
control techniques.
(f) Continue to make its own source selections, handle its own contract negotia-
tions, and provide its own technical supervision.
(g) Supplement use of the military services for "field service functions" by peri-
odic evaluation of services rendered, direct handling when required in spe-
cial situations, and approval of subcontracts within clearly prescribed criteria.
6. To overcome apparent deficiencies in the functioning of the headquarters
Procurement and Supply Division, we recommend:
(a) Approval of the organizational plan prepared by the Director of the
Procurement and Supply Division with one major exception; that is, focus all
activities related to facilities planning and utilization in a separate division in
the Office of Business Administration rather than in a branch of
Procurement and Supply Division.
(b) Development of a system of field center procurement reviews with will involve
key personnel from each of the branches of the headquarters Procurement
and Supply Division. This step plus the one recommended in item (a) above
will make it possible to abolish what is presently termed the Field Installations
Branch in the Procurement and Supply Division.
(c) Establishment of a position of Assistant Director in the Procurement and
Supply Division.* The person appointed to fill this position should be given
primary responsibility for the day-to-day internal management of the
Division.
(d) Additional staff be made available, particularly in the Policies and Procedures
Branch, for the Procurement Committee, and in the Procurement Assistance
Branch.
[12] 7. NASA's technical staff have reflected lack of understanding of the processes that
must be carried out if their needs for research and development services are to be trans-
lated into contracts with qualified suppliers and NASA's resources are to be conserved. To
overcome this lack, we recommend that steps be taken to aid the technical staffs--in head-
quarters and in the centers--in expanding their understanding of the:
(a) Succession of actions that the procurement staff must take to negotiate and
administer a contract.
* Action has been taken to establish such a position.
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(b) Importance of keeping procurement staffs advised of needs that will affect
procurement actions.
(c) Importance of recognizing what constitutes contractual commitments and
refraining from making themwithout advice from NASA procurement staffs.
(d) Importance of cost analysis and negotiation and tolerance of the time that is
required.
There is no simple nor established method of creating understanding and acceptance
of these points by technical personnel. The primary obligation falls on NASA's manage-
ment. It is to establish in day-to-day practice--at headquarters and in the field centers--
the concept of team action on procurement matters.
To implement this concept requires the availability of procurement personnel who
are strongly program oriented, while at the same time possessing outstanding experience
in, and a clear understanding of, the contracting processes associated with complex
research and development projects---including their financial and program implications.
8. Most of the development contracts that are still being awarded and supervised by
NASA headquarters can be associated either with a specific project or with the technical
skills available in one of the field centers. Wherever this is the case these contracts should
be technically supervised and administrated from a given field center rather than from
headquarters. In a very limited number of cases it may be appropriate for NASA head-
quarters to award and supervise contracts related to the development and feasibility of
future programs. This should knowingly be the exception to the general rule.
[ 13] 9. All contracts now supervised from headquarters that can be associated either with
a specific project or with the specific skills of one of the field centers should be technically
supervised and administered from the field centers; for example, those advanced tech-
nology studies for the development of solid rocket motors which are technically super-
vised from headquarters and administrated by the Goddard procurement office.
Document 111-6
Document tide: James E. Webb, Address at Graduation Exercises, Advanced Management
Program, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, December 6,
1966.
Document source: Administrators' Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Experienced in public management, NASA Administrator James E. Webb considered the development
of new approaches to management an important goal of the Apollo project. His emphasis called for
the assimilation of concepts and processes from government, industry, and academia into a usable
form. In this 1966 graduation address at the Harvard Business School, Webb took the opportunity
to explain his view of the interaction of various communities on spaceflight management, as well of
NASA "s broader contribution to public administration.
[1] During the time spent here, you have been studying the present state of the manage-
ment art as it has developed in recent years. You have brought yourselves up to date, and
I am certain that you hope that what you have learned will last you for at least a few years
to come.
On the other hand, you came here because you are not complacent. You recognize
that the world is changing and the requirements you have to meet on the job and off the
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job are changing. I am sure you want to continue to keep abreast of the times.
[2] That being the case, let me take this opportunity to talk about some of the changes I
see going on that challenge any new complacency you might be tempted to develop.
Let us start with some new kinds of management problems that all of us are going to
be dealing with in the days and years immediately ahead, Secondly, let us move on to talk
about some new approaches, new techniques and new solutions that are being tested and
that have proved productive in dealing with these new kinds of problems. Some of these
are too new to be written into the literature or even into the case studies generally avail-
able.
As I see it, there are new ways of thinking about management problems, new ways of
doing things or getting them done in an organization, new styles of management.
I. The Changing Dimensions of the Challenge
During the years since World War II, we have all been mindful of the magnitude of
the changes going on around us. The numbers needed to describe the growth in our [3]
gross national product or our national income, or the magnitude of our private invest-
ment or public debt are all enormous numbers. We have heard a great deal, too, about
the pace of change and about its acceleration. Much of our attention, therefore, has been
given to size and speed, and to how these affect the requirements for good effective man-
agement.
I want to talk about some other dimensions of the challenge we face. As I see it, the
problems that we are going to be dealing with in the days ahead of us are not just bigger
than the problems our parents or grandparents were faced with. They are different in a
number of important ways.
First, they are going to be more complex, in many bewildering ways.
How complex our environment is was brought forcibly to my mind in a recent article
in Business Week on the wood product industry. Some years ago, companies in the indus-
try who owned timberland became aware of the fact that they really had to farm their land
if they wanted [4] to stay in business. They had to grow new crops of trees to replace those
they cut down. Then the timber companies began to diversify, as they realized that the
closer they got to the end product, the more control they had over their markets and their
customers. And so timber companies began to go into all kinds of businesses. Some went
one way and some another. Some went into building products and others into paper prod-
ucts and one into retail stationery stores. This article in Business Week talked about the fur-
niture business and it told how one furniture manufacturer was building diningroom
chairs of wood, except that the legs were made of plastic, because that had proved to be
much stronger than wood for that purpose. In some of these companies, production of
both wood and plastic parts is now controlled by punch tape and by optical scanners that
trace cutting patterns electronically. As good wood gets scarcer, some companies are using
thin veneers backed with aluminum foil coated with vinyl. This article then went on to
describe some of the production techniques the furniture industries have borrowed from
the aerospace companies, resulting in highly automated production lines [5] that pro-
duce new kinds of raw materials, and then shape them and mold them under electronic
control. One company has adapted the technology of textile and paper mills to bleach
natural wood to a neutral color and then stain it to produce a more uniform finish than
can be found in natural timber. One company is working with epoxy impregnation of
wood that has been treated with nuclear radiation to change its molecular structure. The
purpose of this is to make hard wood out of pine, according to this manufacturer.
I cite this example only to illustrate one aspect of the complexity of what might appear
to be a relatively simple business. It serves to illustrate kinds of decisions that the man-
agements of even relatively small companies are faced with today, and will be faced with
increasingly in the days ahead.
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An interesting reflection for me as I read this article was the viewpoint of the TVA I
had gained back in 1947 when, as Director of the Budget, I had made an inspection of
each major river system which was being developed with Federal funds. In addition to its
demonstration farms which were experimenting with various new [6] phosphates and
other fertilizers developed through TVA research, experiments were being carried out to
determine how the small farmer could "tree-farm" his wood lot with highest yield.
Another reflection is that recently I read a report on the research which led to the radia-
tion hardening of treated wood which had been partly financed by the Atomic Energy
Commission and sponsored by the Southern Interstate Nuclear and Space Board. A wise
utilization of an accumulation of technology based on research does pay off--in the
health of a regional economy or in the profitability of a business. It pays offin the field of
management too.
Certainly you are mindful of the fact that very few of the companies that make up
Fortune's list of our 500 largest industrial corporations can be said to be in any one indus-
try, or even in two or three industries. The logic of events and of circumstances have led
them to diversify all across the industrial spectrum. And most of them are just as far flung
geographically as they are industrially. The search for raw materials and markets and labor
supply have caused them to set up shop in one [7] country after another all around the
world. Each of them has at its command many different kinds of raw materials, natural
and synthetic, and many different production technologies. Products are proliferating
and markets are fragmented and all of this requires different entrepreneurial skills which
require new kinds of management approaches.
What is going on in the private industrial sector of our economy is also going on
throughout our society. Our universities are no longer the simple "halls of ivy" they used
to be. Every major university is a large complex of different and diverse highly specialized
schools, and centers, and institutes, and research laboratories.
Our cultural institutions have become similarly complex. Instead of a Metropolitan
Opera House or a Carnegie Hall, New York now has a Lincoln Center and a similar cul-
tural complex is emerging in each of our metropolitan areas, or will soon emerge there.
Or think of our approach to the problem of poverty. Not so many years ago, we thought
of poverty in terms of incompetence or charity, in terms of drives to support charitable
institutions. Now we recognize that poverty is a much [8] more complex fact, requiring a
much more fundamental approach involving many different disciplines. Management of
efforts to apply new approaches can only be elaborately intricate.
Not only are the challenges facing us much more complex than they used to be, but
they are also involved increasingly with new sciences and new technology. Whether you
think of the wood product business or the Lincoln Center complex, those who occupy the
positions where important decisions are made are more and more dealing with a rapid
pace of scientific and technological progress. The furniture executive has to make deci-
sions involving optical scanners and radiation. The management of Lincoln Center finds
itself dealing with scientists who are experts in acoustics one day and on the next day with
engineers who are masters of the technology involved in the giant rotating mechanism
that operates the center stage of the new Opera House, and with the problems posed
when that breaks down the night before the new Opera House was to be the scene of its
first public performance. We in NASA face the same problem when a diesel engine refits-
es to start and a gantry [9] cannot be lowered to accommodate a major rocket launching.
Similarly, those who work in the field of poverty are involved in the latest findings of
behavioral scientists and economists. The same is true of those who are dealing in the
problems of mass transportation or air pollution or management of vast heahh and wel-
fare programs to serve our major communities. We in NASA are similarly involved when
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we have to translate a supersonic transport design into pilot performance or into a pre-
dicted return on invested capital for an airline.
And our affluent society is becoming day by day a more impatient society. Those who
hold positions of responsibility are expected to be able to cope with the most complex of
new scientific findings and their potential at the very frontier of technology. It was only a
few years ago that Henry Ford made his contribution by putting to productive use the
proven engineering practices involved in assembly line mass production. Production of
things is no longer the major challenge of our society. We are dealing with problems and
with solutions that involve high [10] elements of creativity and, associated with them, high
degrees of uncertainty and risk. Management must be able to assess these in its decision-
making. And to solve these problems we find ourselves involved with creating and learn-
ing to use different kinds of skills and talents and training.
I am reminded of the fact that not so many years ago one of our major corporations
was faced with the challenge of shifting from the assembly of electrical components to the
manufacture of products involving the latest developments in solid-state physics. The
electrical assembly operation required long lines of women with nimble fingers. The new
production line was peopled entirely by physicists with advanced degrees. This involved a
different kind of recruiting, a different kind of motivation, and a much different kind of
supervision. And, of course, it meant a different kind of management at the higher levels
of the company. These are some of the new dimensions that we are facing in our private
sector and in the public sector of our society. They define a new challenge and they
require a new kind of management.
[11] H. New Perspectives on Available Resources
I believe we can accept the fact that today's furniture manufacture has to think of the
new world of plastics as well as new kinds of treated wood. We have at our command, in
other words, a much wider range of natural and synthetic materials to take into account
in our critical decisions as managers.
But more important, I suspect, are the human resources we have to work with.
Our generation of managers grew up in a world in which there were some rather nice
distinctions between the world of commerce, the world of the university, and the world of
government. We came to think of these as quite separate, peopled with quite different
kinds of human beings, with different value systems and different sets of capabilities. To
some extent, at least, we thought of these as worlds in conflict with each other. One was
the world of the practical man of action, the other the world of the intellectual. One was
a profit motivated world and the other a world motivated by a desire to teach and to learn.
But as we look at the kind of problems facing us and accept the challenge of dealing
forthrightly with these, [ 12] it becomes increasingly apparent that we need to learn how
to work with or draw on each of these resources and learn how to meld them together and
balance them in proper proportion.
Certainly we have seen this at NASA where our successes can be traced to our learn-
ing how to relate our needs and resources to the needs and resources of these great
segments of our society. We have labored hard to set up a partnership in which each con-
tributes its capabilities to and receives its rewards from the effort to master and use the air
and space environments.
The first industrial revolution put to practical use the principle of standard or inter-
changeable parts. I suspect that the world we are making will be characterized by mobili-
ty, but also by interchangeability of people, by people who can transfer their work and
talents from the university into industry or from industry into government, a mobility in
any direction. The first name that comes to my mind is Robert Seamans, who was an
associate professor in the Department of Aeronautical Engineering at MIT, and [13]
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moved from there into industry where he had a distinguished career from which he was
drafted into government and is now the Deputy Administrator of NASA. There are many
other examples, and the number of people who can move easily and comfortably from
one of these spheres to another is increasing day by day. In dealing with the problems that
you will be working on in the years ahead, you will be drawing more and more on people
with this kind of talent.
III. New Kinds of Organizations
One thing that is becoming increasingly clear to students and practitioners of man-
agement is that the classic approaches to organization are inappropriate for dealing with
the kind of problems we are talking about.
The earliest attempts to increase the effectiveness of organizations followed the pre-
vailing concepts of the division of labor. The work to be done was broken down into iden-
tifiable tasks or functions, and a specialist was put at the head of each major element. This
had some obvious advantages, but it also had the disadvantage of dividing responsibility
into pieces that really did not [14] correspond to the reality of everything required to get
the total job done. Everyone had only partial responsibility so no one had the total respon-
sibility.
This led to the idea of decentralization, which divided the organization into units,
each of which had an identifiable task, for which the head of the unit could be held
responsible. This proved to have some advantages, but it had the disadvantage of weak-
ening the leadership contribution of those responsible for giving the entire organization
its direction and its momentum.
I believe we have learned that neither of these broad-brush concepts, nor any other
rules of thumb, work for all organizations. They fail particularly to meet the needs and
challenges we face. What we see going on today is the tailoring of new types of organiza-
tional structures and new kinds of assignments of authority and responsibility. We are
hearing more and more about free-form management, which connotes the development
of specific organizational approaches designed to serve a particular unit of a large com-
plex organization. Return to earth is so important to each astronaut and to NASA that we
tailor [15] to each his re-entry support or couch to give him maximum support at the time
he needs it most.
In modern management, we are seeing increasing use of organizational concepts like
product management and project management in which the responsibility for the devel-
opment and marketing of a product, or the completion of an important project are [sic]
put in the hands of one individual who has all required elements of command over all of
the resources he needs to get the job done. What characterizes these new kinds of
organizational structures is that they cut across the traditional proverbs used to express
concepts of authority and responsibility. They utilize, rather than accept as limits, the dif-
ferences of function or discipline or the division of work into bits and pieces. At NASA,
the concept of project management has been applied successfully to large and complex
efforts in which one individual is responsible for integrating all of the capabilities and
resources necessary to get the job done. Whenever possible, even while exercising very
broad authority associated with his responsibility for performance, cost, and schedule, we
leave him attached to [16] the laboratory or technical group within which his technical
competence was demonstrated and where the forward thrust of current research keeps
him up-to-date. This also gives him easy access to colleagues who know how to wring out
the facts needed for the difficult trade-off decisions.
The kind of challenges that we in management are facing today do, therefore, call for
new and experimental approaches to organization. One that I think worth commenting
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onin detailis thequestionofthechiefexecutivefunction.In traditionalorganizational
thinking,thestructureof anorganizationpeakedin thechiefexecutive,whowasposi-
tionedatthetopof theorganizationalhierarchy.Thisconceptgoesbacktosomeofthe
originsofmodernorganizationaltheoryandpractices,totheCatholichurch,andtothe
Prussianmilitary,whicharetheprototypesofmuchofmodernorganizationalthinking.
However,asorganizationshavebecomemorecomplexandtheirchallengesmoreinter-
disciplinary,it isbecomingincreasinglyapparentthatthereisnothingsacredabouthe
notionofasinglechiefexecutive.Accordingly,therehasbeenanincreasingtendencyto
experimentwiththeideaofthemultiplexecutive,[ 17] usually in the form of the "office
of the president" concept. I understand that a number of important companies, includ-
ing Union Carbide, General Mills, Metropolitan Life Insurance, Boise Cascade, and oth-
ers, have experimented with this pragmatic approach to the requirements of managing
the kind of far-flung and diverse activities over which some form of executive authority is
necessary. We saw this kind of need at the very beginning of NASA's history. We evolved,
therefore, a partnership arrangement which included Dr. Hugh Dryden, Dr. Robert
Seamans, and myself. We all had many common ideas, and yet each brought to our work
on the critical decisions affecting the nation's space effort certain specialized experience.
To do it any other way would have deprived the organization of critical inputs needed for
important decisions. To do it any other way would have deprived us of the kind of mutu-
al support and broadly-based leadership that I think we achieved.
The point I want to make is that there is need for innovation and risk-taking as well
as seasoned judgment in the structuring of organizations to face the challenges [18] of
today. This is true in the business world. It is equally true in managing many of the other
undertakings in our increasingly complex society.
IV. New Approaches and New Techniques
There are, then, no pat or ready-made organizational devices for structuring these
efforts which will substitute for analysis and judgment. Neither are there approaches or
techniques that can be taken off the shelf. We are in the midst of a period of innovation
and experimentation in both, and there is the same need for creativity that there is in sci-
ence and technology.
I find this going on in many efforts at the kind of complex problem-solving and deci-
sion-making I am talking about. Some specific examples from NASA may be helpful.
To begin with, every aspect of the aeronautical and space effort draws on many dif-
ferent disciplines and many different contractors and suppliers of services. Some of our
sources are within NASA itself. Others are in other agencies, and still others in universi-
ties. Altogether we have over 20,000 prime, first, and second tier contractors [19] in indus-
try, each of whom is making its contribution to the total effort.
From the beginning of the Space Act, we realized that this effort could achieve its
objectives only if each of the contributions to it fit into a carefully designed, fully inte-
grated, totally engineered system. Each of the 200 or more major projects could achieve
its objectives only if its elements similarly fit together into a desired whole. In this sense,
the space effort represents what is probably the greatest experiment to date in the design,
development, test, and use of large complex systems and sub-systems. In this effort, we
were concerned, of course, with the performance and cost of each element. We were also
concerned that all could be delivered and used on a very short time-phased schedule.
Ranger had to precede Surveyor, and Orbiter had to follow. Apollo needed the knowledge
to be gained from each. We knew that the perfection of the parts would not guarantee the
success of the effort. The interfaces among the elements were at least as important as the
elements themselves, and to manage this kind of achievement we found little in the text-
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books or in the case [20] histories. We did find men in our military services and in indus-
try who had experience in the management of large projects such as Minuteman and
Polaris. From the beginning we worked at developing new approaches and new tech-
niques appropriate for the design and management of this kind of systems effort, in the
open, without the protection of military security classification. One of the techniques we
had to develop involved the gathering, processing, and dissemination of large amounts of
information. We had to collect information on the state of each scientific and technical
field in which we or our suppliers were working, and we had to make sure this informa-
tion was used where appropriate. We had to establish techniques for collecting and
distributing information on the state of each of our programs, so that everyone with
responsibility or need-to-know could be kept informed.
Sometimes the collection and processing of data had to meet some rather strenuous
deadlines. For example, a few seconds after the launch of a manned vehicle, a decision
had to be made to abort or to continue the flight. [21 ] Thus we became involved in devel-
oping techniques for real time information processing.
Similarly, some of our projects involved many thousands of discrete activities, all of
which had to be coordinated and controlled at a central point. We had to develop display
techniques so that the progress of each of these elements could be displayed to teams of
people working on different aspects of the same project, in a manner that made it possi-
ble for everyone to know where everyone stood at a particular moment in time. PERT in
its original form was only a starting point to the development of the control technique we
use at Houston and at Cape Kennedy. Again, we had to experiment and to innovate. It is
gratifying that the techniques we developed have already found application outside of the
space effort.
One of the principles underlying a number of our management techniques is the
principle of visibility. We decided it was important that as far as possible problems be iden-
tified in a manner visible to everyone involved and that the people responsible for solving
these problems be [22] visibly identified to their colleagues. A number of management
techniques we have developed serve the purpose of achieving this kind of visibility of
information and responsibility.
Similarly, we wanted to achieve an approach to management in which everyone with
responsibility was aware that on any decision he could consult both colleagues and supe-
riors without delay and without an involved system to assure a common basis for almost
instantaneous identification of the important elements requiring attention. We had to
build individual competence and confidence that work could go on with full knowledge
of the individual that his superiors were literally "looking over his shoulder" at all times.
We had to do this without discouraging initiative and innovation. In this kind of an effort,
there was no room for protectiveness or self-consciousness. Accordingly, we developed a
number of techniques to achieve this kind of real time "over the shoulder" supervision.
[23] These are only a few of the management techniques we have developed. As a
result of this period of experimentation and testing, there are now available a number of
techniques of proven usefulness that may well have applicability to problems in other
areas of our economy and our society, in our country and around the world.
V. New Breeds of People
What kind of people do we need to manage and to carry out this kind of effort? What
qualities identify the individual with this kind of temperament and capability, and how do
we go about developing such people to their full potential? Very little is known about this.
It is all too new. The only thing we can be sure of is that they are different kinds of peo-
ple than those that have succeeded in management in the past. One characteristic we have
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always depended on is that of a strong urge to compete and the urge to excel. In the kind
of complex challenges we are talking about, it is rarely possible to attribute a solution or
an achievement to one individual. In this kind of effort the boundaries between disci-
plines is all [24] but erased and the skills of individuals fuse with each other. It is all but
impossible to identify who has contributed some key element to the final outcome. I sus-
pect that it is in this area of identifying the new manager and developing him to his full
potential that we have the most to learn and in which the greatest progress is yet to be
made. This may well be the greatest challenge to those of you who are dedicated to the
art of management.
Document 111-7
Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, Memorandum for the Vice President, May
23, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
After delivering to President Kennedy a recommendation supporting an American-piloted lunar land-
ing program on May 8, 1961, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson departed on a tour to review the
military and political situation in Southeast Asia. Given Johnson's interest in the space program,
NASA Administrator Webb prepared this memorandum for him upon his return. This memorandum
is an excellent example of the broad context in which Webb was contemplating the mobilization that
would be required to accomplish the Apollo program. The memorandum refers to Edward Welsh, the
executive secretary of the National Air and Space Council, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpat_ic, and Glen Seaborg, the head of the Atomic Energy
Commission. Webb also mentions Albert Thomas, a Democratic congressman from the Houston area
and chair of NASA's Appropriations Subcommittee; George Brown, one of the principals in the
Houston construction firm of Brown and Root; Jon ETik Jonsson, chairman of the board of Texas
Instruments; Cecil Green, a Dallas business leader; Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, chair of the
Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences; and a CharlieJonas, Republican House mem-
ber from North Carolina.
[1] May 23, 1961
Memorandum for the Vice President
By way of a brief report, as you return to Washington, let me set down the following:
1. The President has approved the program you submitted, with very few changes,
and the message will go up on Wednesday.
2. In working out this program and all of the details involved, there has been an
absolutely splendid spirit of teamwork not only with Ed Welsh but with the Defense
Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Bureau of the Budget.
3. Considerable interest has been expressed in this program by members of the
Congress, following your consultations with them, and as I have followed up, I have
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impressedonthemtheneedyouhavefeltforactionandtheimportancewehaveplaced
on theoperatingresponsibilitiesto becarriedbyMcNamara,Seaborg,andmyself.
Withoutexception,allhaverespondedwelltothis,andmanyhavepledgedfullestcoop-
erationandassistance.
4. In preparingfor thehearingson theoriginalKennedysubmissionbeforethe
HouseAppropriationsCommittee,andinotherdiscussionswithCongressmanThomas,
Thomasmadeit veryclearthatheandGeorgeBrownwereextremelyinterestedin hav-
ingRiceUniversitymakearealcontributiontotheeffort,particularlyinviewofthefactthatsomeresearchfundswerenowbeingspentatRice,thattheresourcesof Ricehad
increasedsubstantially,andthatsome300[sic]acresoflandhadbeensetasideforRice
foranimportantresearchinstallation.Oninvestigation,I findthatwearegoingtohave
toestablishsomeplacewherewecandothetechnologyrelatedtotheApolloprogram,
andthisshouldbeonthewaterwherethevehiclecanultimatelybebargedtothelaunch-
ingsite.ThereforewehavelookedcarefullyatthesituationatRice,andatthepossible
locationsneartheHoustonShipCanalorotheraccessiblewaterwaysin thatgeneralrea.
GeorgeBrownhasbeenextremelyhelpfulindoingthis.Nocommitmentswhateverhavebeenmade,butI believeit isgoingtobe[of]greatimportancetodeveloptheintellectu-
alandotherresourcesoftheSouthwestinconnectionwiththenew programs which the
Government is undertaking. Texas offers an unusual opportunity at this time due to the
fact that Dr. Lloyd Berkner, Chairman of the Space Science Board of the National
Academy of Sciences, is establishing a Graduate Research Center in Dallas with the back-
ing of ErikJonsson, Cecil Green, and others in that area (estimated at about one hundred
million dollars), and in view of the fact that Senator Kerr and those interested with him
in the Arkansas, White, and Red River System have now pushed it to the point that it is
opening up the whole area related to Arkansas, Oklahoma, and in many ways helping to
provide a development potential for Mississippi. If it were possible to get a combination
where the out-in-front theoretical research were done by Berkner and his group around
Dallas in such [2] a way as to strengthen all the universities in the area, and if at the same
time a strong engineering and technological center could be established near the water
near Houston and perhaps in conjunction with Rice University, these two strong centers
would provide a great impetus to the intellectual and industrial base of this whole region
and would permit us to think of the country as having a complex in California running
from San Francisco down through the new University of California installation at San
Diego, another center around Chicago with the University of Chicago as a pivot, a strong
Northeastern arrangement with Harvard, M.I.T., and like institutions participating, some
work in the Southeast perhaps revolving around the research triangle in North Carolina
(in which Charlie Jonas and the ranking minority member on Thomas's Appropriations
Subcommittee would have an interest), and with the Southwestern complex rounding out
the situation. I am sure you know that the decisions relating to thismust await the com-
pletion of the work on our program by the Congress, but I am convinced, and believe you
should consider very carefully, that will attract the kind of strong support that will permit
the President and you to move the program on through the Congress with minimum
political in-fighting. I think this is important in the present situation and particularly to
avoid the kind of end-runs that some of our friends related to the Pentagon, direclly or
industrially, have pursued in the past.
5. To get clearly before the country the idea that this is a national effort, the appear-
ance which will introduce the new program to the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences will be made by Gilpatric, Seaborg, and myself, all three sitting together at
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the witness table, and each of us presenting a brief statement to start the discussion. I
believe this is the kind of image of unity and drive in the Executive Branch that you wouldlike to see.
6. In all of the work that has gone on while you have been doing such a great ser-
vice in Southeast Asia, we have emphasized the important place you and the Space
Council have occupied in pressing forward for the necessary decisions. In view of this you
may wish to consider some form of statement or public expression in connection with the
presentation of the program to the country and to the Congress.
7. In order to discharge our obligation to give both the general public and the sci-
entific community a report on the Shepard flight, we are having a session sponsored by
NASA, the National Institutes of Health, and the National Academy of Sciences, in the
State Department Auditorium on June 6th. All the people concerned with the program,
and particularly those in the scientific and technological side, will be present, as will
Commander Shepard. Secratary [sic] Connaly of the Navy is giving a lunch that day for
Commander Shepard and Robert Gilruth, Director of the Space Task Group. Would you
like to give a lunch or join with me in giving a lunch to the scientists and others on the
program? Generally we have tried to avoid getting up any large lunch but could have a
small one right in the [3] State Department for those actually on the program and per-
haps one or two of the other leaders here that day.
James E. Webb
Administrator
Documen! 111-8
Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, Memorandum to NASA Program
Offices, Headquarters; Directors, NASA Centers and Installations, July 5, 1961.
Source: Presidential Papers, Agency Records, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston,
Massachusetts.
One justification for spending money on space is the benefit denved from _spinoffs "---knowledge or
technology developed for a specific space purpose that yields benefits in different fields altogether In
this letter,, Webb made an early effort to encourage NASA personnel to facilitate this process, not only
to justify space spending but on the grounds that it would help the United States in its Cold War
endeavor to outstdp the Soviet economy.
[]]
July 5, 1961
Memorandum
To: Program Offices, Headquarters
Directors, NASA Centers and Installations
One of the most important aspects of the space program is the possibility of the feed-
back of valuable, new technological ideas and know-how for use in the American economy.
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Our economy is expected to grow to something over 700 billion dollars per year by
1970. In the next ten years Dodge Reports estimates that something over 700 billion dol-
lars will be spent for building all kinds of things--highways, bridges, houses, airplanes,
trains, and so forth. It also estimates that some 360 billion dollars will be spent for main-
tenanc.e and repairs in this period. This means that something over a trillion dollars will
be spent in America to build or repair or maintain capital items.
Under the above circumstances, any technological gains from our program, if rapid-
ly inserted into the stream of the above activity, can yield great benefits. We must obtain
this yield at the most rapid rate to stay ahead of the USSR economy, which is constantly
seeking to gain from the technological ideas and know-how which are emerging from its
military and space effort. Our problem is to get the feed-back into our normal stream of
activity in a better manner than they are able to do.
I will appreciate your sending me any ideas you or your staff have as to specific areas
connected with our program where the feed-back can be accelerated or the method of
obtaining the feed-back improved.
James E. Webb
Administrator
Document 111-9
Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, Memorandum for Dr. Dryden, Deputy
Administrator, "University Relationships," August 4, 1961.
Source: Presidential Papers, Agency Records, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston,
Massachusetts.
In assuming the leadership of NASA, a key goal for James E. Webb was to foster space-o-tiented acad-
emic institutions in each of the nation's major geographic areas, with the ultimate goal of stimulat-
ing the general academic environment of each region. This plan, which would eventually be encom-
passed within the Sustaining University Program, broke new ground for the relationship between the
federal government and universities. In this memorandum, Webb targets Rice University in Houston,
Texas, as such a facility in the Southwest. A little over a month lateg, he recommended to President
Kennedy that Houston be chosen as the site for the Manned Spacecraft C,enteg, which became the
Johnson Space Center in 1973, and thereby a focal point for the entire Apollo program. As identified
in Document 111-7 above, Lloyd Berkner was the chair of the National Academy of Sciences's Space
Science Board.
[1] August 4, 1961
Memorandum for Dr. Dryden AD
Subject: University Relationships
As I believe we agreed before you started on your vacation, the whole area of devel-
oping university relationships is of very vital importance to our future, particularly the
development of some centers capable of greater efforts in the space science field. Of
course we must supplement this with some work with universities who can generally raise
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the level of education in the basic sciences, and the great reservoir remaining in the coun-
try seems to be the Middle West and the Southwest.
There are signs of stirrings in the Upper Middle West, around Minnesota, and some
in the Central Middle West, around Kansas City and the general South Illinois-Missouri-
Kansas area, and then quite a bit of stirring in the Southwest.
Also, the Research Institute, based on the North Carolina University complex, is
making some presentations as to the things they can do in the space program. And Lloyd
Berkner has suggested some activities for the Graduate Research Center.
In line with the above, I got a call yesterday from Hugh Odishaw, who says that the
Provost of Rice University will be here on Tuesday of next week, and I am to meet the two
of them for lunch at the National Academy of Sciences to talk over what Rice can con-
tribute to the program. I believe we already have an active program there and have been
told that the new president, Dr. Pitzer, is quite an outstanding man around which a real
effort could be built.
By copy of this memorandum, in the absence of Dr. Dryden, I would like to have such
information about Rice as will be helpful in conducting the above conference and endeav-
oring to develop the most constructive lines of interest for the agency with Rice.
James E. Webb
Administrator
Document II1-10
Document tide: James E. Webb, Administrator, to Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, President,
California Institute of Technology, June 29, 1961.
Source: President's Science Advisory Committee Files, John E Kennedy Library, Boston,
Massachusetts.
As a master politician, NASA Administrator James E. Webb realized the need for a broad national
consensus in support of the Apollo program. Recognizing that the university science community was
likely to be critical, Webb reached out to explain the program as he envisioned it. This letter is one
example of his approach. William Pickenng, whom Webb mentions, was the director of the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology.
[1]
Dr. Lee A. DuBridge
President
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, California
June 29,1961
Dear Lee:
Last night the Senate passed the full requested authorization of $1,784,000,000 for
our 1962 budget, which is the first formal endorsement of the program suggested by
President Kennedy. I believe this means that we will get an approval of our program some-
what earlier than I had expected and with a broader base of acceptance throughout the
country than seemed indicated even two or three weeks ago.
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Even so, I know the ultimate commitment to the program will depend on the way we
go at the job and the results we achieve. Therefore I have been wondering if it might not
be helpful if some of the leaders of American science, such as yourself, might not like to
have a rather complete briefing on exactly where we stand with respect to our planning.
We did have a task force drawn from our ablest people all over the country who have put
together a program that appears to be capable of accomplishment, and we are now con-
sidering alternatives to see whether we can better this plan. There are several areas where
competition exists, such as between the liquid and solid approach.
Would you feel it helpful to take the time, when you are next in Washington, for a
quite complete briefing as to how we expect to carry out our entire ten-year program,
including the lunar landing? I am taking the position that this program must be so com-
plete and so useful that even if we never make the lunar landing, or do it after the Russians
have done so, we still will have obtained outstanding value for the time and money invest-
ed. Your own judgement [sic] as to whether the program we have fits this requirement
would be helpful.
[2] Another possibility, which I have discussed with several, including Bill Pickering,
is that of asking a group of outstanding scientists who have expressed concerns about the
program to come in for a group briefing. In this way no one would be singled out, and we
would not have present anyone except those who were explaining the program. We would
not have those who are in favor of the program and who might want to argue on its behalf.
The purpose of this would be to facilitate the understanding which we hope everyone con-
cerned with the program will endeavor to achieve before they take their firm and final
positions on it.
As I told you by telephone when we first discussed this program, I certainly have no
desire whatever to suggest that anyone who wishes to oppose the program soften his crit-
icism. However, I do feel it quite important, under the conditions that exist in the world
today, that the program be quite thoroughly understood before strong adverse positions
are taken by our national leaders in any field.
Sincerely yours,
James E. Webb
Administrator
Document II1-11
Document tide: Hugh L. Dryden, "The Role of the University in Meeting National Goals
in Space Exploration," NASA and the Universities: Principal Addresses at the General Sessions
of the NASA-University Conference on the Science and Technology of Space Exploration in Ozicago,
Illinois, November I, 1962 (Washington, DC: NASA, 1962), pp. 87-91.
NASA Deputy Administrator Dryden gave this presentation at a NASA-university conference in
1962. This meeting, which was patterned after the NASA-industry conference of 1960, was the first
meeting in which NASA attempted to convey to the academic world the role envisioned for universi-
ties in the Apollo program. This represented the principal address at the general sessions of the con-
ference and pronounced formal NASA policy on the issue. As such, it was especially important as a
statement of government position on the interactions of various scientific and technical organizations
in conducting space exploration.
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The Role of the University in Meeting
National Goals in Space Exploration
[87] The last half century has brought forth a succession of new technologies, sparked by
advances in scientific knowledge but brought to maturity by the interaction of scientists
and engineers in an environment of national needs for national defense or social and
economic development. I need only mention the technologies of aeronautics, communi-
cations, radar, nuclear energy, and, now, space. These scientific and technological devel-
opments have affected our individual lives as citizens and as professional men and women,
and our social institutions, including universities, industry, and other segments of the
Nation, as well as government itself. Our international relations, our social and econom-
ic development, our military strength--all have been profoundly modified by the power-
ful forces of science and technology.
It is my purpose to discuss the role of the university in our present-day environment,
specifically its responsibilities in space exploration, the responsibilities of NASA, and our
joint responsibility for promoting the national welfare.
What is the role of the university today?
There is, I think, general agreement that the university's primary objectives are the
education and guidance of students and the promotion of scholarly and scientific inquiry.
The ideal university is a community of scholars engaged in research and teaching. In par-
ticular, graduate education at its best rests on research, the students learning as appren-
tices to teachers engaged in advancing knowledge in their professional field.
Yet to state these principles is not to provide a sufficient basis for determining the role
of a university. Better than I, college officials and faculty members know that this state-
ment of principles merely indicates where the university's ultimate identity and integrity
lie; it does not indicate how this state of affairs is to be achieved in the modern world.
So many at least superficially contradictory demands must be met: the requirements
of teaching our swollen enrollments.as opposed to those of research; the desire of the
individual scholar to wend his solitary way as opposed to the rising tide of programmatic
and team work; the necessity, from an institutional point of view, for drawing a balance
between scholarly withdrawal--from which perspective may be gained--and an involve-
ment with ongoing life that provides both intellectual stimulation and humane feelings.
The truth is, of course, that in the modern world the university must--for its own sur-
vival, and I think for the survival of all that we hold dear--face both inward and outward;
it must somehow contain the contradictory forces that threaten to tear our world apart.
Because of this, university administration and faculty members bear one of the most dif-
ficult burdens of our time. We in NASA--sharing many of the same problems--are aware
of this fact; and our aim is to remain aware of it in all of our activities.
In a Commemoration Day Address at the Johns Hopkins University on February 22,
1936, Isaiah Bowman presents this picture of a university which is, I think, equally applic-
able today:
A university is like a state in the variety of the forces that determine its life: clash of divergent
opinion, power to inspire men with exalted purpose, association of distinctive personalities, ordered
procedure in a self-governing system, financial perils, and even treasury crises. A citizen in a uni-
versity-state is not a recluse [88] trending daily a well-worn path of routine. True, he may deal one
day with quite petty details of courses and classes; but the next day finds him standing, as it were, on
the rim of the universe, analyzing the spectrum of a beam of starlight that left its remote source two
hundred million years before the tree-dwelling precursors of man passed their first anxious nights on
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 499
the ground. The range of the university's interest extends from microscope to telescope, from a student's
minute personal problem to the nature and impact of social forces that are rocking the worM.
I suggest that the exploration of space is a social force which is rocking the world. I
feel no hesitation whatever in saying that the university cannot ignore this force, that it
has an inherent responsibility entirely apart from any thought of governmental support
to contribute to this major task. Like the small nations of the world which many never
launch a satellite, but which must find ways of participation in space exploration, the
smallest university must contribute some of its intellectual resources and active interest.
Again quoting from Bowman:
To keep research in pure science in the University actively related to social needs and national
strength is a duty which cannot be evaded. Pasteur's dream of a private research institute was inter-
rupted again and again by waking realities. There was a national need for knowledge about the silk-
worm disease and for an understanding of the fermentation problem. His flaming sense of social
responsibility was the source of energy and inspiration in his attack upon national problems. As men
of privileged education we are not being trained and equipped for isolated and protected living, play-
boys in the land of dreams.
Our educational institutions bear a major responsibility for the success of our nation-
al effort to explore space. Our universities and colleges are called upon to produce a body
of scientists and engineers of unexcelled competence. Some of these graduates will enter
governmental service with NASA and other agencies participating in the space program:
some will join private research organizations and industrial corporations; but some must
remain at the universities where they continue to advance knowledge and produce new
talent. This last function, as previously mentioned, should receive high priority. The gov-
ernment laboratory, industry, the research foundation, all are users of creative and tal-
ented men without reproducing this vital national resource. The university alone is the
producer of new engineers and scientists.
The university is not only a center for the development of men with eager, trained,
self-starting minds but also a center of creative activity in research. The Summer-Study
Committee on NASA/University Relationships of the Space Science Board of the National
Academy of Sciences points out that:
... the opportunities for developing new fundamental knowledge and. technical applications may
very well equal or exceed those which have existed in the atomic anal nuctear phys_cs ]zetas aunng the
past thirty years .... A vigorous academic program in all appropriate aspects of the space endeavor
must be developed. Such a program must enjoy a visible relationship to that of the federal establish-
ment itself." but it is of utmost importance that it preserve the essential virtues of universities--a devo-
tion to scholarly and sdentific inquiry, a primary concern for the guidance and eduction of students,
full freedom of discussion and publication, and essential autonomy in the formulation of research
objectives and of programs of work directed toward such objectives.
Other aspects of the independent role of the university in the environment of a
national program of space exploration will be discussed subsequently. Consider now
NASA's specific needs for assistance from the university community. The NASA program
comprises four main areas---space sciences, manned space flight, applications of earth
satellites to communications and meteorology, and advanced research and technology.
What help do we expect to get from the university in each of these areas?
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Theterm"spacesciences"i ashorthandexpressiontodescribeinvestigationsi any
fieldof sciencecarriedoutbyapparatuscarriedintospacebysoundingrockets,earth
satellites,andlunar,planetary,orinterplanetaryprobes.Sometimesthetermisextended
inmeaningtoincludelaboratoryorearth-basedobservationsrelatedtotheflightexper-
iments.Thefieldsof scienceincludedare,in themain,astronomyandsolarphysics;geophysics,includingaeronomy,ionospherephysicsandenergeticparticlesandfields;
interplanetaryinvestigations;lunarandplanetaryinvestigations;andbiosciences.
TheNASAprograminspacesciencesisbeingbuiltontheparticipationbythecom-
petentscientificommunity.It isfreelyrecognizedthattheU.S.wouldhavenospacesci-
enceprogramworthtalkingaboutif atleastsomeofthe[89]mostcompetentscientists
oftheNationwerenotdeeplyinvolvedin it.Theimportanceofthecreativeactivityofthe
individualworkingscientistin theprogramisparamount.I isnecessarytomakeuseof
scientificompetencewhereverthatcompetencemaybefound.Althoughthereissignif-
icantparticipationbyscientistswithinNASA,scientistsinothergovernmentagencies,in
theindustrialcommunity,andtheinternationalscientificcommunity,themajorelement
in theparticipatingscientificcommunityistheuniversitycommunityoftheU.S.
Theuniversityscientistwhoparticipatesin satelliteandspace-probeexperiments
findsan environmentdifferentfrom that to whichhe hasbecomeaccustomed.
Traditionally,ascientistconceivesanexperiment,buildstheapparatushimselforhasit
builtunderhissupervisionin theuniversityshoporbycontract,carriesouthisexperi-
ment,analyzesthedata,andpublisheshisresults.Thisrelativelysimpleprocedureisnot
possibleinsatelliteandspace-probeexperiments,althoughafairapproximationtoit is
feasibleforexperimentswithsmallsoundingrockets.Satellitelaunchingrequireslarge
rockets,speciallaunchsites,aworldwidetrackinganddata-acquisitionnetwork,sharing
bymanyexperimentersinasingleflight,andalargeteamofcooperatingspecialists.The
scientistbecomesinvolvedinschedulinghisworktomeetaflightdate,oncethatdateis
set.Hisapparatusmustbeengineeredto meetseverenvironmentalrequirementsof
vibration,temperature,xposuretoradiationandchargedparticles,andsoforth.Some
universitiesareabletoprovidethisservice;othersmustdependonindustrialhelp.Thus,
theroleoftheuniversityscientistoftenreducestoconceptof theexperiment,develop-
mentoflaboratoryprototypesoftheequipment,analysisofthedataandpublication,plus
participationi alargeteamtodesigntheactualsatellite,launchit,andreceivethedata.
NASApolicyistosupportthetraditionofresponsibilityandfreedomoftheexperimenter
tothemaximumextentconsistentwiththenatureof theoperation.Selectionofexperi-
mentstobeflownismadebyaSpaceSciencesSteeringCommitteecomposedofscientists
andengineersinNASAHeadquarterswhoarenotcontendersforpayloadspaceandwhohavetheadviceandguidanceofoutsideconsultants.
Inthespacesciencesarea,NASAsupportsbygrantsthedevelopmentofscientificand
technicalinformationi areasbroadlyrelatedtospacescienceaswellasspecificproject
tasks.Examplesof currentspecifictasksare:develop,construct,andtestfourmagne-
tometerinstrumentssuitableforuseonasatellitetodeterminethemagnitudeanddirec-
tionof theearth'smagneticfieldandanalyzet lemetereddatafromtheinstrument;
design,construct,andtestaCerenkovcounterandassociatedcircuitryto measurethe
energyspectrumof highenergygammarays;testandcalibratetheequipmentbysyn-
chrotronor balloontechniques;andassembleinstrumentpackagessuitablefor usein
satellites.Examplesofbroadertasksinareasrelatedtospacescienceare:researchinsolar
andcosmic-rayphysics;theoreticalresearchonlow-energyelectronic,ionic,andatomic
impactphenomena;andthemagnetohydrostaticsofthemagnetosphereoftheearthandproblemsin theoryoforbitsofspacevehicles.
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In the field of advanced research and technology not directly connected with the
flight program of sounding rockets, satellites, and space probes, NASA is interested in and
supports a wide range of research activities from basic research to technological applica-
tions, from theoretical investigations to laboratory experiments. Some are related to prob-
lems of immediate operational concern; others endeavor to extend the present limits of
knowledge and broaden the research capabilities available for such extension. Our quar-
terly program report for July 1, 1962, shows about 450 active grants and research con-
tracts. A few of these are related to the manned space flight and the applications program
of NASA but the majority are in the fields of advanced research and technology and space
sciences.
Although NASA does place demands for direct assistance on the universities, we con-
sider that we have an obligation to conduct the space program in such a way as to help
strengthen the university. We wish to work within the existing university structure rather
than to set [90] up independent contract-operated activities that tend to draw the uni-
versity research scientist or engineer away from the teaching of students in the course of
the research he performs and directs. We seek to share in a joint responsibility to add to
our national strength. It is clear that NASA cannot meet all the desires or even needs of
the universities or mount a program of general support to education. We have neither the
responsibility nor the resources to do this. But like the logger who has a responsibility of
replacing for the future the trees which he harvests, NASA, as a user of university trained
talent, has an obligation to carry a fair share of the load of replacing the resources con-
sumed. The universities must bear their share of responsibility for the success of the space
program, as previously discussed, and must allocate an appropriate fraction of their own
material and human resources to the effort. But NASA stands ready to invest substantial
resources in partnership with the university.
Thus, in addition to direct project support, NASA initiated in fiscal year 1962, a pro-
gram of enlarged scope for utilizing more fully the abilities of our universities. The pro-
gram is frankly NASA-oriented but planned in such a manner to recognize the acute
needs of the university as well. In brief, to meet the space program needs, we are pro-
ceeding to strengthen university participation in four ways: (1) to utilize university
resources for specific research projects under grant or contract as appropriate; (2) to
encourage the establishment of interdisciplinary groups for research in broad areas to be
supported by grants; (3) to support the training of people in the field of space science and
technology through grants; and (4) in certain cases to provide research facilities.
The first method is the traditional support of projects; the other three are new so far
as NASA is concerned. The broad grants are intended to encourage the establishment of
creative multidisciplinary investigations, the development of new capabilities, and the
consolidation of closely related activities. As will be discussed subsequently, multidiscipli-
nary is here intended to include not only cooperative effort among branches of the phys-
ical sciences but also between physical and biological sciences and with some participation
from the social sciences, all as appropriate to the selected broad areas in which a given
university possesses high competence.
The third method comprises research training grants to increase the supply of scien-
tists and engineers in space-related science and technology. It has been estimated that by
1970 as many as one-fourth of the Nation's trained scientific and engineering manpower
will be engaged in space activities, although I cannot confirm the accuracy of this esti-
mate. For planning purposes only, we have suggested as a goal the support of about 4,000
graduate students per year in 150 qualified universities, to yield an annual output of about
1,000 new Ph.D.'s in space-related fields. In selecting universities, we consider such factors
as accreditation ratings, resources, previous and current efforts in developing research
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activityin the space sciences, location and extent to which the region already is provided
with advanced training opportunities, and so forth.
The fourth method is the provision of grants for facilities in certain cases.
Consideration is given to the urgency of the need, the nature and extent of the universi-
ty's involvement in space-related research, the relative importance of the research to the
national space program, the demonstrated competence, past achievements, and potential
future accomplishments of the research groups, and similar factors. In general, we
attempt to consider a total university situation and use an appropriate mix of the several
methods for the specific circumstances, subject of course to the total resources available
for the program.
In FY 1962 the commitments for the support of project research at universities were
of the order of $28 million and the estimate for FY 1963 indicates an increase to about $55
million. A few interdisciplinary grants date back to FY 1961. In FY 1962 eleven such grants
were made, amounting to a total of about $3 1/2 million. Training grants were made to
ten institutions amounting to a total of about $2 million, and facilities grants to five insti-
tutions amounting to $6 1/2 million, all of which have existing interdisciplinary activities.
This total [91] of $12 million for the last three categories will be increased to about $30
million in FY 1963. The many proposals on hand are under evaluation at the present time.
We recognize that a larger effort needs to be made and hope to move toward the desir-
able goals in succeeding years.
In recognizing the separate responsibilities and specialized interests of the universi-
ties and NASA and their interrelationships, we cannot forget other parties at interest in
the space-exploration program. The major fraction of the effort, as measured by dollar
value or manpower, is conducted under contract by private industry. There are many
aspects of university-industry and NASA-industry relations which lie outside the province
of the present discussion. Here we note only that NASA, the universities, and the aero-
space industries have a collective responsibility for the conduct of the space program.
The collective responsibility goes far beyond that for the success of the technical
aspects of the program, if the greatest benefit to the nation is to be realized. We have pre-
viously discussed at some length the conduct of the program in such a manner as to
strengthen the universities as an element of national strength. Similar conditions apply to
the aerospace industry, but our obligations extended further to every aspect of our social,
economic, and political life.
Space research and development, like the predecessor fields of rapid scientific and
technical advance at the frontiers of knowledge--aeronautics, electronics, and nuclear
research and development--produce corollary benefits in the form of new knowledge,
new products, new methods, and new materials which can be employed in the develop-
ment and manufacture of countess articles for human use. In the past the transfer
process proceeded in a laissez-faire manner at a relatively slow pace. We believe that it is
incumbent on all of us to try to accelerate this process. We have suggested that universi-
ties participate in promoting wider use of the information obtained by associating mem-
bers of the faculties in economics, business administration, and political science in the
activities of the interdisciplinary groups.
It is our feeling that the universities should go still further to assert leadership in
attacking the totality of problems affecting the welfare of man within their sphere of influ-
ence, whether this be a community, a region, or the entire nation. Abraham Horwitz, in
discussing "The Changing Scene in Latin American Medical Education" in the Journal of
Medical Education for April 1962, made some observations which, in the following para-
phrased form, are applicable to the current situation in the United States: There is a new
spirit abroad in the U.S. today, a spirit imbued with the determination to create more
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wealth,todistributeit moreequitably,andtopromotethewell-beingof man.Thefocal
pointofthissignalendeavorshould,webelieve,betheuniversitiesfortheprimaryneed
is for expertsto put to workthecapitalthatwillbeinvestedin systematicprograms.
Equallypressingistheneedforadeepandsearchingexaminationftheproblemsthatbesetusandtheestablishmentoftheproceduresfortheirsolution.Adebateofthiskind
canbestbecarriedonin theuniversity,whichisweddedtothefreeexaminationof all
problemsaffectingthelifeofmaninsociety,andwhereculture,in thesenseofperfection
ofman,hasitswellspring....
In summary,allofuswhoparticipatein theconductof thespace-explorationprob-
lemshouldendeavortodischargeourtaskinthelightofthesebroaderconsiderationsof
humanwelfare.Theuniversityhasa uniqueopportunity,notonlyto performbasic
researchandtrainnewtalentinnewareasofscienceandtechnologyandtocarryalarge
sharein thescientificaspectsofthespaceflightprograms,butalsotoprovideleadership
in thewidediscussiona dpracticalsolutionofthebroaderaspectsofextractingfromour
spacefforthegreatestpossiblecontributionstohumanwelfarewithinitssphereofinflu-
ence.ForitspartNASAisattemptingto givedueconsiderationto itsresponsibilityn
thesemajorquestionsofthesocialimpactofthespaceprogram.
Document 111-12
Document fide: Edgar M. Cortright, Memorandum for Mr. Webb, "NASA-CIT/JPL
Relations as they pertain to the present contractual arrangements of operating conditions
and the future role of JPL in the NASA Program," June 1964.
Document 111-13
Document tide: Arnold O. Beckman, Chairman, Board of Trustees, California Institute of
Technology, to James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, June 26, 1964.
Source: Both in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
One of the persistent challenges faced by NASA managers in the agency's earliest years was the rela-
tionship with the California Institute of Technology's (Caltech, or C17_, as stated in Document 111-12)
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (]PL) in Pasadena, California. JPL had been established during World
War II as a contractor facility developing rockets and other technologies for the U.S. Army. Since the
war, it had expanded its capabilities, and by the time of NASA's establishment in 1958, JPL was a
major location not only for the development of rocket technology but also space science. Because of this,
NASA leaders secured the transfer of JPL from the Army and re-emphasized in the late 1950s a JPL
effort already under way--Project Rang_ an effort to send satellites to the Moon. Following the fail-
ure of the Ranger 6 spacecraft in January 1964, NASA Administrator James E. Webb pressed Arnold
O. Beckman, chair of the Caltech Board of Trustees, to alter the methodologies of management at JPL.
These two documents describe this situation and propose changes. They successfully set in motion a
number of activities that affected the relationship for more than a decade thereafl_ Edgar Cortright
was NASA's Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications.
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Document 111-12
[1] Memorandum for Mr. Webb
Subject: NASA-CIT/JPL Relations as they pertain to the present contractual arrange-
ments of operating conditions and the future role of JPL in the NASA Program.
Although this memorandum is designed as a position paper it is necessary to review
certain aspects of the history in working with Cal Tech andJPL.
I. History
A. Contract Provisions
The initial NASA contract placed in late 1959 with CIT for the operation and man-
agement of JPL was quite broad and free from constraint and provided for minimum
control over the activities of the Lab. The current contract, executed in December 1961,
reflects the experience gained in the two preceding years, of dealing withJPL, but still per-
mitsJPL considerable latitude for independent operation. This operating latitude results
primarily from the necessity of mutual agreement between NASA and CIT/JPL on sub-
stantive changes in program or administration. During negotiation of the current con-
tract, NASA officials suggested a change in the requirement for mutuality in certain
aspects of JPL operation. However, this change was not successfully negotiated.
[2] B. JPLAssignments
Since the beginning of our working relationship with JPL, the Laboratory has been
assigned functions in the areas of flight projects, deep space instrumentation, and sup-
porting research and technology. Among the flight projects, the assignments have includ-
ed Ranger (Blocks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5), Mariners (A, R, C and B), Surveyor, Surveyor Orbiter
(study phase), Voyager (study phase), and Prospector (study phase--cancelled). In addi-
tion, the launch vehicle, Vega, was assigned to JPL and subsequently cancelled. JPL has
carried out the buildup of the deep space instrumentation facility on a worldwide basis. It
has carried out research in fluid mechanics, structures, propulsion, electronics, telemetry
guidance and control, and other areas, many of which were not covered at other NASA
Centers. JPL has, through a master planning board initiated by NASA, undertaken to
expand and upgrade the existing laboratory facilities for the Government.
C. JPL Organization
TheJPL organization was originally structured as a research laboratory in propulsion
fuels, materials, etc., and subsequently assigned one large project, e.g., Corporal, then
Sergeant. This meant that research people were intermixed with project people; the lab-
oratory was strictly a matrix organization and a loose one at that. With the assignment of
multiple projects, JPL began a series of reorganizations. [3] Basically, they created a
Systems Division to do .systems engineering for all of the projects, and two program
offices_the Lunar Program Office, and the Planetary Program Office. These program
offices, the Systems Division, and all of the other laboratory divisions reported to the
Director's office. The Program Offices contained the project managers with small staffs.
To assist in the management of this matrix, Dr. Pickering [JPL Director] hired a Deputy
Director (Brian Sparks). This early configuration has recently been modified to combine
the two program offices into a single program office; to strengthen the coordination
among projects, deep space instrumentation facility, research and development, and busi-
ness administration; and to strengthen the reliability and quality assurance effort.
Although the laboratory was not projectized, all employees working for the projects have
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been identified and fixed to a project. In brief then, the laboratory has moved in the
direction of strengthening its project management and correcting its faults after they have
become apparent to the laboratory. They still retain a matrix organization with many
important individuals reporting to Pickering and Sparks directly and with project offices
which are marginal in strength and quite dependent on strong front office leadership to
insure a smoothly functioning total laboratory team.
[4] H. NASA Direction
Initially, NASA direction toJPL was almost exclusively from the Office of Space Flight
Programs. With the advent of the NASA matrix organization JPL receives direction from
many offices in Headquarters, e.g., OSS, tART, T&DA, Office of Programs, Procurement
and Contracting, and the Office of Administration. The quality and depth of direction
have varied from situation to situation and many have been inadequate to the situation
existing within JPL on several occasions. The rapid growth of the laboratory of 2400 to
4000 has certainly contributed to developing problem areas. The rescheduling of projects
necessitated by the Vega cancellation and the Centaur slippage have been serious pertur-
bations. The overloading of the laboratory by NASA Headquarters and its own manage-
ment had caused problems which might have been avoided if we bad used better
judgement [sic]. Lasdy, the changing interface between JPL and NASA has caused
communications problems and misunderstanding with regard to direction functions and
authority.
III. Strength of CIT/JPL Performance
From the positive point of view, JPL represents a collection of highly imaginative and
skilled engineers and technicians. This scientific and engineering team has been attract-
ed to JPL, at least partially, because of the outstanding technical reputation of CIT. [5]
They have shown considerable flexibility and have been able to roll with the number of
reprogramming punches which have been forced upon them by circumstances. They have
shown a keen interest in the space program and, despite frequent internal wranglings,
they have never carried their arguments with NASA to the public. The working relation-
ships have grown steadily better and excellent communications links exist among individ-
uals in certain areas. The Project performance has generally been spotty, having varied
from outstanding on Mariner to poor on Ranger. Similarly, the quality of business per-
formance has varied ranging from excellent on source evaluation procedures used on
Surveyor to inadequate administration of the resulting contract.
IV. Weaknesses of CIT/JPL Performance
In general, the performance of Cal Tech andJPL can be summarized as follows: Cal
Tech has provided almost no visible leadership to JPL and has generally proven to be a
poor communication link between NASA policy makers andJPL policy makers, e.g., at the
DuBridge-Pickering level. Also lacking is action by the CIT Board of Trustees to clearly
define the Institute's responsibility in the management of JPL, and to assign specific
responsibility to designated positions or individuals. The CIT/JPL top leadership has
been weak in terms of attention to substantive program issues in the [6] laboratory and
in terms of responsiveness to official NASA guidance and direction. At times, the leader-
ship has almost obstructionist. This has primarily been the case when NASA suggestions
have been made with a view to improving laboratory management. The top management
has consistently taken the attitude that the management of their laboratory is their busi-
ness, and that unless the the contract terms specifically cover items discussed they have no
interest in our compulsion to perform functions or take actions demanded by NASA man-
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agements[ ic].Themostseriousconcernon the part of those of us doing business with
the laboratory, however, has been the lack of involvement of the top management in direc-
tion of the day-to-day operations. The organization is structured so that it requires such
involvement yet little or no evidence of such management direction is apparent. The
members of the team operate much of the time with no apparent leadership. Many of the
problems which JPL is now struggling to solve might have been avoided or at least recog-
nized earlier hadJPL management been more involved in the day-to-day execution of the
major laboratory assignments or had they worked with NASA to correct those weaknesses
detected and pointed up. One might say that it took the Ranger situation to make ]PL face
up to its many problems. I might add that NASA is having to face up to a few ofi_ own bythe same token.
[7] V. Actions That Can Be Taken Prior to Contract Renewal
Some of the things that can be done under the present arrangement for operation of
JPL are:
1. The CIT Board of Trustees should, by formal action, define the responsibili-
ty of CIT for direction of JPL.
2. CIT should designate a top University official to whom NASA can direct its
requests for corrective actions. This official should have clearly assigned authority to effect
changes in all areas (management, technical, and business administration). In this regard,
it may be desirable for NASA to offer to present its views to the CIT Board of Trustees.
3. An understanding should be reached whereby CIT/JPL will be responsive to
NASA suggested changes in management and organization. For example, there is still a
need for a strong General Manager at the Laboratory.
4. The "Task Order" problem should be resolved. The contract provides for sep-
arate task orders covering major NASA projects and these have not yet been negotiated.
5. The business management practices atJPL should be made compatible with
NASA policies and practices. Examples of areas where business management practices can
be improved are:
a. Procurement policies and procedures
b. Budget programming, financial management, and reporting systems
[8] c. Management of facilities property and supply
d. Travel and other fringe benefit policies
VI. Alternatives for Consideration Before Present Contract Expires
Since the present contract expires December 31, 1964, it is not too early to think
about the relationship of NASA-CIT/JPL after that date.
Several alternative arrangements are possible.
A. The contract could be allowed to expire and the Government owned Laboratory
could be operated by civil servants.
Advantages
1. True center of NASA would operate under same NASA policies and regula-
tions as other NASA Centers.
2. Problem of salary differential for similar work would disappear.
3. One echelon of management would be eliminated, i.e., CIT.
Disadvantages
1. Loss of effort and drive for some period while change takes place (6-12
months) Projects disrupted.
2. Loss of hardcore of key personnel--would probably move to industry.
3. NASA recruitment problem to be faced.
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[9] 4. NASA public image problem.
a. Cal-Tech
b. Scientific community-industry
c. Congressional
5. Loss of flexibility laboratory enjoys as contractor operated, e.g., not bound by
all Government rules and regulations.
B. A non-profit corporation could be substituted for CIT/JPL management.
Advantages
1. Single purpose of Board of Directors. Minimizes possibilities of conflict of
interest situations. Only serve one customer, NASA.
2. Provide NASA ability to have direct influence on management selected or
replaced.
3. Provide flexibility of wage and fringe benefit allowances---not tied to campus
scale or limitations.
Disadvantages
1. Project disruption while changes take place.
2. NASA public image problem.
3. Higher cost operation.
4. Magnification of differences between the Lab and other NASA Centers.
C. An industrial contractor could be selected to operate the Laboratory for the
Government.
[ 10] Advantages
1. Initial selectivity from range of industrial capabilities.
2. Flexibility of industry management policies and practices.
3. Responsiveness to changes in direction or level of effort.
Disadvantages
1. Project disruption while changes take place.
2. NASA public image problem.
3. High cost operation.
4. Loss of relationship of Lab to other NASA Centers.
5. Possible conflict of interest situations.
6. Loss of active and direct control.
D. A form of the present contract with CIT/JPL could be continued if the following
improvements can be worked out.
1. Clearly defined management responsibilities and accountability for CIT and
JPL.
2. Clearly defined communication links between CIT-JPL-NASA Managements.
3. Acceptance of NASA contractor relationship by CIT/JPL.
4. JPL responsiveness to NASA direction and control.
Advantages
a. No major disruption to programs and projects.
b. No major loss of hardcore key personnel.
[11] c. No public image problem.
d. No loss of flexibility of operating outside Government rules and regulations.
Disadvantages
a. Continued status of "almost NASA Center" concept.
b. Continued problem of campus-off campus status.
c. Management layer between lab and NASA-CIT.
d. Conflight [sic] of interest situations.
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VII.Summary
These observations on JPL and Cal Tech do not begin to tell the whole story, either
good or bad. However, I think they can provide background for a position which is rather
firm toward CIT in terms of demanding stronger management of the laboratory. In being
fair, however, I think we can be responsible in terms of time required to implement some
of the more radical changes we have suggested, such as hiring a general manager to sup-
plement Pickering and Sparks or breaking up the Systems Division to strengthen the pro-
ject offices. In reviewing our own judgements [sic], it might help to point out that these
opinions of the laboratory are held rather widely throughout industry and among many
of the JPL staff. The staff itselL I believe, hopes for continued NASA pressure which will
result in stronger management by evolution rather then revolution. I consider it desirable
that JPL continue in its past role of performing much the same function as a NASA
center. The laboratory will be of most use to NASA if we can truly develop [12] the work-
ing relationships to make this possible.
Edgar M. Cortright
Document 111-13
[1]
Mr. James E. Webb
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Webb:
June 26,1964
About three months ago, at a meeting in your office, we discussed the NASA-JPL-
Caltech relations. This meeting was the first opportunity since I assumed the chairman-
ship of the Caltech Board of Trustees to hear directly from you and members of your staff
about a number of problems related toJPL. I promised then to do everything possible to
assist in eliminating the causes of past complaints, improve management operations atJPL
in the light of suggestions made by your staff and others and attempt to find new ways in
which NASA and Caltech could be mutually helpful in expanding fundamental research
in space. Substantial progress has been made, I believe, and I thought you would be inter-
ested in hearing about it. In the following pages and attached appendices I have outlined
briefly some of the highlights in the areas of management, technical coordination, and
Caltech-JPL research activities.
Management
Prior to January 1, 1964 Price-Waterhouse management advisory services department
had been retained to study the organizational structure of JPL. At my request, the
McMurry Company was called in to evaluate the top dozen or more administrators atJPL,
and to make an independent study of the organization. This work, performed personally
by Dr. McMurry, has been completed.
One of Dr. McMurry's principal recommendations was the procurement of a new
Deputy Director at JPL. A detailed job description was prepared and two leading execu-
tive recruiting firms were retained to find suitable candidates. Many candidates were
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screened, including persons recommended by Mr. Hilburn and others in NASA. We were
very fortunate, we believe, in being able to secure General A. R. Luedecke, currently
General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission. I believe that General Luedecke is
an extraordinarily fortunate choice. His experience in handling large operations in the
Air Force and the AEC has given him an excellent background in governmental proce-
dures and requirements. In addition to his demonstrated high level of competence, the
fact that the AEC carries much, if not all, of its research and development through uni-
versity-type contracts has given the General very valuable experience which especially
qualifies him for the NASA-JPL-Caltech operation.
[2] Dr. McMurry's report recommends that certain organizational changes be made
atJPL. He recommends, however, that these changes be made after a new Deputy Director
has assumed his duties. In the meantime, several changes have already been made which
should improve management.
In December of 1963, the Lunar and Planetary Projects at JPL were consolidated
under Mr. R.J. Parks, who [was] appointed Assistant Laboratory Director for Lunar and
Planetary Projects.
In February 1963 the Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory formed an Executive
Council consisting of the Deputy Director, Assistant Laboratory Directors, and the Special
Assistant for Advanced Technical Studies. This group will advise the Director on all major
policy matters, develop long-range plans, and to recommend preferable courses of action
relative to major Laboratory questions and problems.
JPL management has consolidated all quality assurance and reliability activities into
one office, reporting directly to the Director/Deputy Director of the Laboratory. The
chief of this office, Mr. Brooks Morris, has been delegated the responsibility for all quali-
ty assurance and reliability activities related to JPL projects and to evaluate the probable
reliability of the designs and plans for Laboratory missions.
A Management Information Office has [been] established in March 1963 to provide
accurate and timely information toJPL top management, and to the appropriate elements
within NASA Headquarters.
AS suggested by certain people in NASA Headquarters, the Laboratory had taken a
very close, hard look at the advisability of modifying the matrix organization in favor of a
strict project structure. The results of this review has been a high degree of projectizing
within the technical divisions. The majority of the professional staff, working on the flight
projects, have been assigned full time and their efforts restricted to specific projects. The
management of JPL is continuing to move in this direction in the establishment of new
projects, as well as in the strengthening of existing projects.
The Financial Management Division has been transferred. The manager of that
division now reports to the Deputy Director, giving that office increased stature and
authority in keeping with the Laboratory's growth, and the increased emphasis on fiscal
and contractual activities.
The Procurement Division has been transferred. It now reports directly to the Deputy
Director in order to provide more complete integration of the technical and managerial
problems associated with the increasingly large procurement actions entered into by the
Laboratory in carrying out NASA's projects.
The Technical Studies Office, headed by Dr. Homer J. Stewart, has been established
to direct, coordinate and to originate alIJPL advanced mission studies for the unmanned
lunar and planetary exploration.
[3] To accommodate the increasing number of outside projects utilizing the DSIF
and theJPL SFOF, an Assistant Laboratory Director has been appointed to head the Deep
Space Network activities atJPL. Dr. Rechtin, who is in charge of this office, is responsible
510 TIlENASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITYEXUS
forcoordinatingallLaboratoryactionsrelativetotheDSIESFOFandtheJPLtechnical
divisionsinordertoassurethatprojectrequirementsareunderstoodandmet.
InJanuaryof thisyear,theFacilitiesOfficewasreorganizedandgivenresponsibility
fordevelopingtheimplementing[of]a technicalndsupportingfacilitiesprogramthat
willprovidethosefacilitiesrequiredfortheaccomplishmentofi sassignedtasksandfor
coordinatingandintegratingtheinputsfromtheJPLtechnicaldivisionsandother
sourcesintoasingleapprovedlong-rangemasterfacilitiesplan.
TheLaboratoryhasengagedtheservicesof theHarbridgeHouseorganizationto
makeadditionaldetailedstudiesoftheprocurementprocess,andtorecommendproce-duresandpoliciestobeadoptedbyJPLin thisarea.
InternalauditgroupsreportingtoCITandtothetopmanagementoftheLaboratory
arebeingestablishedtoreviewandascertainthedegreetowhichLaboratorypoliciesand
proceduresarebeingcompliedwithinordertoadequatelyinformmanagementofneedforcorrectiveactions.
In additionto theorganizationalchangesdelineatedabove,whichareaimedat
strengtheningthedecision-makingprocessesbywhichJPLconductsitsaffairs,theman-
agementoftheLaboratoryhasrequestedareviewoftheProcurementDivisionoperations
byapanelofNASAprocurementspecialistsandhasrespondedtoallsuggestionsoffered
bythisgroup;themajorityofthesubstantiverecommendationshavebeencarriedout.
To insurethatJPLwill receivethatbestpossibleguidanceandassistancefrom
Cahech,twonewandinfluentialworkingcommittees,reportingtotheChairmanofthe
BoardofTrusteesoftheInstitute,havebeenformed.Thiswillbringtheknowledgeand
experienceof manybusinessexecutivesandscientistsobearontheproblemsconcern-
ingthetaskstobeperformedbytheJetPropulsionLaboratory.
ATrusteesCommitteecomposedoftheChairmanoftheBoard,thePresidentofthe
Instituteandfourothertrusteeshasbeenestablished.TheybringtotheCommitteeavast
backgroundof experiencein themanagementof industrialorganizationsoperatingintheaerospacefi ld.[4] ThemembersoftheTrusteesCommitteeare:
Dr.ArnoldO.Beckman(Chairman)
President--BeckmanInstruments,Inc.
Dr.LeeA.DuBridge
President--CaliforniaI stituteofTechnology
Mr.JohnG.Braun
President--C.EBraun&Co.
Mr.ThomasV.Jones
President--NorthropCorporation
Dr.AugustusB.Kinzel
VicePresident,Research--UnionCarbideCorp.Mr.HerbertL.Hahn
Partner--Hahn&Hahn
Mr.WilliamE.Zisch
President--AerojetGeneralCorporation
Mr.RobertB.GilmoreandDr.WilliamH. Pickeringareexofficioandnonvoting
members.Thisgrouphasalreadymetseveraltimes.Itsprincipleroleisthatofadvisorto
theLaboratorytopmanagementonmajorpolicymatters,andto keeptheExecutive
CommitteeandBoardofTrusteesoftheInstituteinformedonimportantmattersatthe
Laboratory.
A committeeofappropriatefacilitymembershasalsobeenformedtodealwiththe
veryimportantinterrelationshipsbetweentheacademicandscientificstaffoftheInstitute
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and the technical staff of the Laboratory. The membership of the Facility Committee is as
follows:
Dr. Clark B. Millikan (Chairman)
Director---Graduate Aeronautic Laboratories
Dr. Robert E Bacher
Provost
Dr. Norman Horowitz
Professor, Biology
Dr. Robert B. Leighton
Professor, Physics
Dr. Frederick C. Lindvall
Professor, Electrical & Mechanical Engineering
Dr. Robert P. Sharp
Professor, Geology
Chairman, Division Geological Sciences
Dr. William H. Pickering
Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory
This committee is principally concerned with the technical problems in which the
experience of the scientific and technical staff of the Institute can be of support to the
Laboratory. It will meet frequently to review [5] activities at the Laboratory and the
Campus, to provide the Director of JPL with advice and support on important technical
decisions, and to arrange for the exchange of technical information and to advise on the
selection of highly qualified scientific personnel at the Laboratory.
Mr. Robert B. Gilmore, Vice President for Business Affairs at Caitech, has submitted
several reports to Mr. Hilburn, stating in some detail the corrective measures that have
been taken upon the recommendations of the Army Audit Report number LA 64-581,
date of issue February 26, 1964 entitled "Report on Financial Management and Related
Operations for the Period Ended June 30, 1963." A brief summary of some of the princi-
pal items is attached as Appendix A to this letter.
Technical Problems
As you know, there has been some criticism of JPL concerning technical matters such
as design features, quality control, and testing. Some have stated their opinion that JPL
scientists have not been adequately responsive to suggestions made by others. Not all sug-
gestions are necessarily good, of course. To assist JPL in evaluating suggestions and to
make sure thatJPL's technical problems will receive the attention of the best research peo-
ple at Caltech, the Caltech-JPL Facility Committee referred to above meets from time to
time. This group has given Dr. Pickering and his associates probably the best advice avail-
able today, in the respective fields of the committee members, on the suggestions and the
recommendations in the Kelly and Hilburn reports. To the best of my knowledge, every
technical suggestion that has been received by JPL has either been adopted or, if not
adopted, sound reasons for the rejection have been given.
With respect to Ranger 7, I have been informed and believe there has been the
utmost cooperation between JPL and NASA officials. So far as I know, JPL has performed
every task and made every test that has been requested by Dr. Seamans, Dr. Newell and
Mr. Cortright. I have been unable to find any indication of unresponsiveness or lack of
cooperation on the part of JPL. If something less than complete agreement on technical
matters existed in the past, that situation does not exist today.
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Caltech-JPL Research Activities
I have been aware, and I heartily applaud, your great personal interest in expansion
of basic research. The Institute certainly shares your interest and desires to do all it can to
assist in the development of a vigorous research program, not only at Caltech but in other
universities capable of carrying on fundamental research. To give me an idea of what
Caltech is doing in research related to space, Dr. Bacher and the various [6] division chair-
men at Caltech have provided the information that is attached as Appendices B through
I. The following items are included:
A proposal dated April 18, 1962 for NASA support of research in certain fields of
physics and astronomy. This report gives a broad outline of important fields of research
in which Caltech and the Mount Wilson and Palomar Observatories are engaged, togeth-
er with a specific recommendation for a 3-year research program. This has been brought
up to date by the attached list of staff members, post-doctoral research fellows and grad-
uate students now working in the various fields of research.
A proposal dated July 20, 1962 for pre-doctoral training grants for Caltech. This pro-
posal covers work that would be carried on in the divisions of biology, chemistry and
chemical engineering, engineering and applied sciences, geology, physics, mathematics
and astronomy.
A proposal dated July 22, 1963 for pre-doctoral training grants for a 3-year period.
This proposal is essentially a duplicate of the previous one, with certain added programs.
Extracts of memoranda given by the various division chairmen at Caltech, which con-
rain information of direct interest. Your attention is called particularly to the special sum-
mer program which started June 22, 1964 with 36 students selected from institutions all
over the country for an intensified course in problems of space technology.
I hope I haven't burdened you unduly with this rather lengthy letter. I feel that
Caltech andJPL both have done excellent jobs in getting on top of their problems and in
taking steps to insure that NASA will receive the type of managerial and technical com-
petence and performance that it desires. I believe that most of the sources of annoyance
in the past have been eliminated and that developments of the past three of four months,
while not entirely to the liking of any of us, have actually resulted in a substantial improve-
ment in understanding and in over-all operations.
If you would care to make any comments or suggestions, I should be pleased to
receive them.
Cordially yours,
Arnold O. Beckman, Chairman
Board of Trustees
Document 111-14
Document title: Raymond Einhorn and Robert B. Lewis, Memorandum to Mr. Hilburn,
"Review of Purposes and Application of CIT Fee and Overhead for the JPL Contract,"
with summary of report, October 20, 1964.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
One of the issues of contention in the NASA-Caltech relationship during the early 1960s was the fee
Caltech (referred to below as "CIT") charged NASA for managing the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
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(]PL). When the failure of the Ranger 6 spacecraft in January 1964 brought the terms of contract
renewal into question, the management fee amount became a significant issue. Consequently, NASA
Assistant Deputy Administrator Earl D. Hilburn instructed Audit Division Director Raymond
Einhorn and Financial Management Division Director Robert B. Lewis to review the fee. The fol-
lowing memorandum discusses this investigation and transmits a lengthy, five-part report. Also
included here is the summary from the larg_ 41-page report that was used to provide information for
the space agency's effort to reorient relations between the NASA Headquarters and JPL.
[11 Memorandum
October 20, 1964
TO: Mr. Earl D. Hilburn
FROM: Raymond Einhorn [initialed]
Robert B. Lewis [initialed]
SUBJECT: Review of Purposes and Application of CIT Fee and Overhead for the JPL
Contract
In accordance with your request to us and your discussion with Mr. Robert Gilmore, we
visited the California Institute of Technology to review a current statement of CIT's reasons
for a management fee for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory contract, and how CIT applied the
fee and other income received by the Institute. We also were to determine the kinds of indi-
rect expense which CIT charged to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory contract, the amounts
charged, and how reimbursements for these charges were applied by CIT ....
[2] I. SUMMARY
1. CIT Refused to Discuss Fee
CIT was unwilling to discuss the reasons for requesting or paying a fee for the JPL
operation. It thought it was inappropriate for NASA to ask about the application of the
fee, inappropriate for CIT to give the information, and dangerous for NASA to have the
information even if it should get it. Despite the recent discussions that have been held
with NASA officials concerning the fee, we were informed that Dr. DuBridge could not
present a list of reasons immediately since the statement had to be carefully drawn up and
reviewed by CIT officials and the Board of Trustees. The statement probably will not be
submitted until after modification 10 is signed, and apparently will not contain dollar or
other measurement factors.
2. CIT Reasons for a Fee
We summarized in Section II of this report the reasons previously given by CIT for the
fee, and have made comments based on our analyses. Of the reasons given, we believe
only four are suitable for consideration: (1) the benefits which NASA derives from a com-
petent technical team at JPL, attracted and retained by CIT's reputation and academic
environment, and from the availability of eminent faculty scientists to advise and consult
with the JPL technical team; (2) to compensate CIT for the risk of possible injury to its
reputation and damage to the future of the Institute, due [3] to technical failures in JPL
projects, which are beyond the control of CIT; (3) to provide a "buffer" or a reserve of
funds to help absorb the economic shock of the loss of fee and campus overhead pay-
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mentsin theeventheJPLcontractexpires;and(4)toassistin thecurrentfinancing of
higher campus costs, such as higher salaries and operation of expanded facilities caused
by the operation of JPL.
These reasons should be re-evaluated by NASA and CIT. Presumably Dr. DuBridge's
additional statement of CIT's fee reasons will be of assistance in accomplishing this eval-
uation. The assignment of dollar or other measurements to fee factors is difficult, except
for the "buffer" and "higher campus cost" items. These two factors can be measured ifCIT
would cooperate in the effort.
Other factors given by CIT in support of a fee do not have merit, such as unallowable
costs and intangible and other costs no longer recoverable under current cost principles
prescribed by the Federal Government (see Section IV). In addition, it should be noted
that several factors given to justify a fee relate to operations for which NASA is already pay-
ing a very large proportion of the costs.
3. Source and Application of CIT Funds
We are fairly certain that the fee is used to finance current CIT expenditures and to
provide the "buffer" that CIT stated it would need in case of the expiration of theJPL con-
tract. We also believe [4] it may be used to supplement the plant fund and other special
purpose funds. We are also fairly certain that the "buffer" is included in CIT's income sta-
bilization reserve, a general reserve established for the purpose of smoothing out the
"peaks and valleys" in the Institute's income. Our analysis of CIT's financial statements
confirms the fact that the reserve is broader than just for the "buffer."
The only information CIT was willing to provide on the overall source and application
of its operating income is summarized in Section II. However, the statement gives little
guidance on the application of the fee.
4. CIT Indirect Expenses
NASA pays CIT for about one-half of its general and administrative expenses and
about 65% to 78% of all major categories of general and administrative expenses that are
applicable to on and off campus activities. These expenses are summarized in Exhibit A
and Paragraph 2 of Section III. Our analyses of these payments showed not only that the
allocation basis of salaries and wages is not suitable in all instances, but that the benefits
to theJPL contract do not in many instances flow in this direction. A review of data avail-
able in selected areas, such as the Office of the Comptroller, showed that the vast majori-
ty of the effort is for on campus activities rather than for theJPL contract. Studies by the
Army Audit [5] Agency indicate that there are many general and administrative areas that
will be questioned by the contracting officer and the auditors when the preliminary audit
report is discussed with CIT officials in late December.
NASA also pays around 78% of the operation and maintenance expenses of the CIT
administration buildings and a corresponding proportion of the use charge and depreci-
ation on these buildings. To the extent that the allocation of general and administrative
expenses toJPL is high, operation and maintenance expenses are correspondingly high.
For other categories of overhead, NASA pays small amounts related toJPL's usage of
students and other educational facilities.
5. Practices of Other Agencies
We made a limited examination of the practices followed in similar contracts with
respect to the payment of a fee, as described in Section V. The only university situations
which appear to us to be truly comparable were the AEC contracts with the Universities
of California and Chicago. In these cases, the AEC pays a management allowance which
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AEC policy states may exceed a conservative estimate of indirect cost, provided the
allowance is not greater than the lower of the university's overhead requests or the fee that
would be payable to a commercial contractor operating a government-owned plant.
[6] It should be noted that as adjustments are contemplated or made in the amount of
overhead paid to CIT there will be even greater pressure for a fee. CIT has stated that the
sum of the overhead and fee is the payment it requests for the operation of the JPL con-
tract, and that this payment can be measured only partially by assignments of cost
incurred. The balance, however determined, is the price tag CIT places on the contribu-
tions it makes, including the privilege given to the Government of using the University to
conduct research ....
Document 111-15
Document tide: Contract Briefing Memorandum: Contract NAS7-100 With California
Institute of Technology, January 12, 1965.
Source: Jet Propulsion Laboratory Archives, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena,
California.
In response to both NASA and congressional investigations following the failure of the first six Ranger
spacecraft, NASA's relations with the Jet Propu_ion Laboratory and Caltech underwent a difficult
period in 1964 and 1965. As demonstrated in earlier documents, NASA leaders demanded a num-
ber of changes in the nature of the agency's relationship with both Caltech andJPL. Because the 1962
NASA-Caltech contract was due to expire in December 1964, contract renewal was contingent upon
these changes. The result was a two_year extension to the 1962 contract (NAS7-100), but with a num-
ber of significant changes, which are documented in this briefing memorandum.
[1] January 12, 1965
CONTRACT BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
Contract NAS7-100 With
California Institute of Technology
A. General
1. Contract NAS7-100 was originally entered into effective January 1, 1962, between
NASA and the California Institute of Technology for the performance of Research &
Development activities at Jet Propulsion Laboratory. NAS7-100 continued the effort per-
formed under NASW-6 which expired on December 31, 1962 and which was originally
entered into on May 1, 1959 when NASA took over the facilities at JPL from the
Department of the Army (Los Angeles Procurement District, Pasadena). The facility was
then administered under Army Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-18.
Total costs under NASW-6 approximated $166,516,043.31
Total Obligations Under NAS7-100 to Date, Approximates $ 776,183,640.01
2. NAS7-100 was scheduled to expire on December 31, 1964 and negotiations com-
menced in late 1963 and concluded in early 1964 for both a contract extension as well as
desirable management changes to be effected both contractually and organizationally.
During the latter part of 1964, CIT instituted many organizational changes, principal ones
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included(1)thehiringofGeneralA.R.Luedecke,(Ret)formerlywiththeAtomicEnergy
CommissionandassignedhimasDeputyDirectorof theJetPropulsionLaboratory(actuallyasGeneralManager)and(2)projectizingitsmajorprogramsfromwhatwasorig-
inallyamatrixtypeorganization.Duringthissameperiod,NASAdevelopedTaskOrders,
settingoutforthefirsttimein thealmostfiveyearsinceNASAstartedworkatJPLthe
specificareastheprogramsto becoveredin separatelyidentifiableandfundedTaskOrders.
3. NASAHeadquarters,satisfiedthatCIThadinstitutedmutuallydesirablechanges,
approvedonDecember16,1964,atwo-yearextensiontoContractNAS7-100toexpireon
December31,1966.Theextendedcontract,issuedasmodificationNo.10toNAS7-100,
actuallyisacompletelyrevisedcontractsupersedingin itsentiretythetermsandcondi-
tionsoftheoriginalcontract,asamended.
4. Allcontractmanagementa dmonitoringactivitiesareadministeredbytheNASA
ResidentOfficeatJPLunderthedirectionof theNASAInstitutionalDirector,the
AssociateAdministratorforSpaceScienceandApplications.
[2] B. NAS7-100 (mod. 10) Principal Provisions
1. Scope of Work
a. Both NASA and the CIT have agreed that the Contractor shall perform only
those specific tasks as may be designated in unilaterally issued Task Orders which fall with-
in the following broad areas of activity:
(1) Exploring the moon and its environment and the planets and interplan-
etary space, including earth-based investigations and operations related thereto.
(2) Conducting (i) a program of supporting research and (ii) a program of
advanced technical development, designed to make contributions to space science, tech-
nology, and exploration.
(3) Developing and operating the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility and
Space Flight Operations Facility in support of NASA programs.
(4) Carrying out investigations and providing services in the field of aero-
nautics.
(5) Assisting NASA in the formulation and execution of its programs by pro-
viding NASA with technical advice, studies and reports of investigations.
(6) Providing technical direction or project management in connection with
contracts for work falling within the broad areas defined above which are awarded by
NASA to other contractors.
The principal change between the old contract and that part revised as indicated
above is that NASA now may issue unilateral direction for CIT to perform within the areas
noted whereas CIT had the right previously to reject NASA's directions or insist on
changes before it would accept any specific task. The old provisions (commonly referred
to as "mutuality") served to restrict the Government on the work or services it could
demand of CIT and was the cause of much friction bexween technical counterparts of
both NASA andJPL. It is believed that the present arrangement will prove more satisfac-
tory and follows more closely the normal task order type contract which allows for unilat-
eral issuance of task orders. The contract does include, however, a safeguard against the
Government issuing technically unfeasible or otherwise unworkable tasks. The contractor
has an obligation to advise the Contracting Officer, within 10 days, of any Task Order it
(the Contractor) does not consider feasible. Such an occurrence, will, of course, be inves-
tigated by NASA.
b. If NASA desires any work performed by JPL which is not included in the
broad areas agreed to, it will be issued in a Task Order which requires acceptance by CIT.
This type of work is expected to be insignificant.
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[3] C. PreliminarytotheawardofModificationNo.10(therevisedcontract)both
NASAandCIThaveagreeduponthespecifictaskorderstobeissuedtocoverthework
theninprogress.Otherthanforarelativelyfewandminortasks,alldefinitivetaskorders
requiredtocovertheworkinprogresspriortoeffectivedateofModification10,havenow
beenissuedandwillbemaintainedonacurrentbasis.
d. InadditiontospecificscopesofworkincludedinseparateTaskOrders,there
arealsoincludedprovisionsconcernedwithTechnicalDirectionand Guidance,
Operationof aTechnicalPlan,ReliabilityandQualityAssurance,SpecificReporting
Requirements,ManpowerUtilizationPlansandProjectManagementResponsibilities---all
ofwhicharespelledoutandincludedincontractualdirectionsforthefirsttime.
e. Concurrentlywiththeissuanceof DefinitiveTaskOrders,NASAhasnegoti-
atedwithCITandthecontracthasnowbeenamendedtoprovideforan"authorizedman-
power"clause.ThisclausepermitstheContractingOfficer,forthefirsttime,toestablish
amanpowerceilingonthetotalnumberofpersonswhichtheContractormayemployat
JPLandprovidesapenaltyintheformofdisallowingcostsofpersonsemployedinexcess
oftheceiling.Undertheoldcontract,althoughinformedceilingswereestablished,they
wereusuallyexceededwithoutanypenaltyplacedontheContractor.Theinitialceiling
undertherevisedcontractwasestablishedonOctober31,1964as4,275persons.JPL
reducedto4,245personsasofNovember30,1964andto4,225personsasofDecember
31,1964.Theceilinghasbeenreducedto 4,100byJune30,1965,andto 4,000by
December31,1965.JPLisexpectedtobesustainedatabout4,000persons.Adequatecon-
troishavebeenestablishedatourResidentOfficeatJPLtoprecludeJPLfromexceeding
itsestablishedceiling.NewworkisbeingmonitoredthroughtheResidentOfficerelative
toadequacyofJPLmanpowerresourceswithoutdisturbingthemanpowerceiling.
2. ContractResources
a. CITmustprovideallofthemanagement,personnel,laborandservicesnec-
essaryforperformanceofallworkunderthecontractexceptthatworkwhichit isautho-
rizedtosubcontractfor.NASAfurnishesorCITacquiresfortheGovernment'saccount,
allproperty,includingfacilities,necessaryforperformanceofworkunderthecontract.
ThisincludesallrealandleasedpropertyatJPLandbuildingsauthorizedforconstruc-
tionbyJPLand/orArmyCorpsofEngineers.Now,forthefirsttime,allpropertyofafacil-
itiesnature,includingrealestate,comesunderthecognizanceandcontrolofaseparate
FacilitiesContractandremovesit fromtheResearchandDevelopmentareaunderwhich
itwasformerlycontrolled.b. TheFacilitiescontract(No.NAS7-270(F))providesforperiodicreporting,
control,protectionandmaintenanceof theGovernmentpropertyaswellasavehiclefor
authorizednewconstruction.
[4] 3. Reporting
a. Undertherevisedcontract,CITisobligatedtofurnishmanagement,finan-
cial,technical,progressandotherreportsastheContractingOfficermaydirect.Under
theoldcontracteachreporthadtobemutuallyagreedtobefurnishedbeforeit couldbe
placedintoeffect.Hereagain,"mutuality"hasbeenremovedto providefor prompt
responsefromtheContractor.UndertherevisedContract,however,CITmayinitiate
additionalunclassifiedreportstodisseminatescientificandtechnicalknowledgetothe
scientificommunity.Distributionandcostsofpublicationofsuchadditionalreportsare
furnishedannuallytotheContractingOfficerforhisreview.
4. FiscalandOtherManagementRequirements
a. CITisrequiredtosegregateandseparatelymaintainthecostsofeachTask
Orderandeachprogramsothatcostsforeachprogramarereadilyidentifiable.
b. JPL'sfinancialmanagementsystemustbecompatiblewithNASA'ssystem
includingintegrationof theNASA gency-widecodingstructure.NASA-PERTandthe
NASAFinancialManagementReportingSystemforcostypecontractshavebeenimposed
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onJPLanditsmajorsubcontractorsin implementationfanintegratedtime-costman-
agementcontrolandreportingsystem.
c. TheContractorisrequiredtomakemaximumuseofDepartmentofDefense
AuditandAdministrativeServicestoprecludeduplicationof effort.Auditservicesare
beingutilizedtothefullestextent.PropertyandInspectionServicesperformedbyDOD
Agenciesareconstantlybeingexpandedtomeetrequirements.It isexpectedthatpro-
posedDefenseContractAdministrativeS rvicesDistrictwhenestablishedinLosAngeles
willbeusedtothemaximumextentpracticable.
d. TheContractorisrequiredtosubmitannualbudgetestimatesfortheworkit
anticipateswillbeperformedfor eachsucceedingfiscalyearof aparticularprogram.
Revisedestimateswillbealsobefurnishedasprogramrequirementschange,arereduced
orareincreased.PeriodicguidelinesarefurnishedtoCITforusein projectingitsesti-mates.
e. Theusual"Limitationsof theGovernment'sObligation"and"EstimatedCost"clauseslimitingtheContractor'sexpenditurestofundsallottedandestimatedcosts
setforthinTaskOrdersareincludedin thecontracttocontrolunauthorizedxpendi-turesbytheContractor.
5. AllowableCosts
a. Theallowabilityofallcostsforpurposesofdeterminingamountspayableto
theContractorisdeterminedbythecostprinciplesetforthin [5]Part3ofSectionXV
of theArmedServicesProcurementRegulation applicable to Educational Institutions
(negotiations with CIT will be accomplished to convert the ASPR reference to the appro-
priate part of NASA Procurement Regulation). The contract also lists specific items of
direct costs for purposes of agreement on an "advance understanding" as to the allowa-
bility of certain costs by the Government. The types of costs listed are compatible with the
ASPR Cost Principles.
b. The revised contract calls for negotiation of overhead rates to cover institu-
tional indirect cost. These provisions follow the standard procedure for agreement on
final overhead rates as contained in most Government cost-type contracts. The old con-
tract provided for a fixed allowance for "indirect costs" which generally could not be
changed. This was fixed after the beginning of the fiscal year regardless of the actual over-
head expenditures which might be incurred during the year. The present procedure fixes
rates only after the completion of the fiscal year and is based upon actual audited over-
head expenditures. The present arrangement is more equitable to both parties.
6. Fixed Fee
a. A fixed fee is negotiated for each full fiscal year (or part of year included in
term of contract) and the amount agreed upon is included in an amendment to the con-
tract. The old contract did not provide any contractual incentive for raising or lowering
the fee whereas the revised contract contains a schedule of fee ranges from a stated min-
imum to a maximum range according to the NASA approved Financial Operating Plan.
The fee ranges are listed below:
Schedule of Fee Ranges
NASA Approved
Financial Operating Plan
$ $
150,000,000 175,000,000
175,000,000 200,000,000
200,000,000 225,000,000
225,000,000 250,000,000
250,000,000 275,000,000
275,000,000 300,000,000
300,000,000 325,000,000
325,000,000 350,000,000
Fee Ranges
Minimum Fixed Fee Maximum Fixed Fee
$ $
948,700.00 1,423 050.00
1,045,000.00 1,567 500.00
1,127,500.00 1,691 250.00
1,210,000.00 1,815 000.00
1,288,250.00 1,931 875.00
1,361,250.00 2,041 875.00
1,430,000.00 2,145 000.00
1,498,750.00 2,248 125.00
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ThebasisfordeterminingfeeisthetotalJPLfinancialoperatingplanfirstapproved
byNASAfollowingpassageandapprovaloftheNASAppropriationActforaparticular
fiscalyear.AlthoughthePlanmaybe [6] subsequentlyamendedor revised,thefee
remainsunchangedandavoidsanyaspectof a cost-plus-percentage-of-costsituation.
WithintherangeofaparticularFinancialOperatingPlan,negotiationsmaythentake
placewithinthestatedminimumandmaximumranges.Considerationisgivenbythe
ContractingOfficer,amongotherfactors,innegotiations,to:(1)Extentofsubcontracting(2)Complexityofthework(3)Pastperformanceevaluationsconductedunderanewclauseof thecon-
tractentitled"EvaluationfContractor'sPerformance."
b.Usingthecurrentfiscalyear(1965)foranexample,thefirstapprovedPlan
issuedbytheContractingOfficer,NASAResidentOffice,totaled$216,195,000.Thisthen
fallswithinanoperatingplanrangeof$200,000,000to$225,000,000andafeerangeof$1,127,500to$1,691,250,whichissubjecttonegotiations.ThefixedfeenegotiatedforFY
1964undertheoldcontractamountedto$1,250,000.
7. Patent,NewTechnologyandRelatedClauses
ThecontractcontainstheappropriatePatents,NewTechnology,DataRightsand
LicensesclausesprescribedbyNASAProcurementRegulations.TheNASAResidentStaff
includesaqualifiedPatentsAttorneywhomonitorsallofthepatenttypeactivitiesofJPL.
8. Subcontracts
a.Thecontractcontainsprovisionsforreviewof selectedsubcontractsbythe
ContractingOfficer to ensurecompliancewith goodbusinesspractices,NASA
ProcurementRegulationsandspecialrequirementsplacedupontheContractor.b.All of theContractor'sprocurementpoliciesandproceduresaresubjectto
approvalbytheContractingOfficer.IncludedareSourceEvaluationBoardprocedures
whichtheContractorhasagreedtouseforprocurementsinexcessof$1,000,000.
c.TheContractor,bycontractterms,hasestablishedandmaintainsa "Small
BusinessSubcontractingProgram"inaccordancewithcurrentstatutesandregulations.It
isalsoobligatedto include"SmallBusinessProgram"requirementsin allofitssubcon-tractswhichoffersubstantialsmallbusinessubcontractingopportunities.
[7] 9. AdvancePaymentsCITispermittedtoreceive,onaninterest-freebasis,advancepaymentsu uallyper-
mittedinthecaseofEducationalInstitutions.Theadvancepaymentsaresufficienttopay
currentpayrollandoperatingcosts.Undernegotiation,however,isa letter-of-creditpro-
ceduredesignedto replacetheadvancepaymentsprovisions.Thisprocedurehasbeen
promulgatedbytheU.S.TreasuryDepartmentandsimplifiestheadvancepayment
process.Itsprimaryadvantageis to reducethetimethatcashis in thehandsof theContractorandsaveTreasurytheinterestcostofidlemoneyinthehandsofaContractor.
Thisnewprocedureshouldbeineffectshortly.
10.SafetyandPlantProtectionTheContractorisobligatedtomaintainmaximumsafetyconditionsatalltimesand
complywith applicableFederal,Stateandlocal lawsand ordinancesincluding
Governmentregulationsapplicabletohandlingandstorageofpotentiallydangerousfuels
andpropellants.CITmustalsomaintainplantprotectiondevices,asecurityforceand
enforceapplicablerulesandregulationsregardingSecurityandClassifiedmatters.Itmust
coordinateallSecuritymatterswiththecognizantDepartmentofDefenseAgency.
11.EqualOpportunitiesforEmploymentTheContractorhasagreedto complywithall nondiscriminationpoliciesof the
Governmentandadministrativelyenforcecompliancebyitssubcontractors.
520 THENASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITYEXUS
12.KeyPersonnel,WagesandSalaries
a. Keypersonnelassignedtoaparticularprogram aynotbereassignedwith-
outtheconsentoftheNASAHeadquartersProgramDirector.
b. CITisobligatedtokeeptheContractingOfficerfullyinformedastoJPL's
wageandsalarypoliciesincludingnoticeofanyactiontoanemployeeinvolvingarateof
compensationinexcessof$15,000perannum.
13.GeneralServicesAdministrationSupplyServices
UnderthetermsoftheContract,theContractingOfficerhasrequiredJPLtoutilize
GSAsourcesfor anypropertywhichcanbefurnishedfromeitherwarehousetockor
fromGSAcontractors.Theuseof thisauthorizationhasresultedin savingsinprocure-mentcosts.[8] 14.Non-RenewalofContract
Appropriateprovisionsaremadeforthesettlementofclosingcostswhichmightrea-
sonablybeexpectedtooccurin theeventNASAshouldecidenottofurtherextendthecontract.
15.EvaluationofContractor'sPerformance
The revised contract includes provisions, for the first time, for the Government to
evaluate the Contractor's (JPL's) performance both semi-annually and at the close of each
fiscal year. An Evaluation Board will be composed of representatives appointed by the
NASA Administrator. Conclusions will be reached "after consideration of all the facts and
after giving CIT the opportunity to submit such information and material as it desires.
The conclusions reached by the Board will influence, in part, subsequent fee negotiations.
16. Government Property
The Contractor receives, issues, maintains and protects all Government property
under its control, in accordance with NASA Procurement Regulations and the NASA
Industrial Property Control Manual. The Contractor's activities in this area are continu-
ously monitored by a NASA Property Administrator assigned to the NASA Resident Office
Staff. Property in the control of subcontractors is monitored by DOD Agencies assigned
secondary property administration.
17. Other Requirements
Other contract clauses required by statute or regulation are included in the contract.
Document 111-16
Document fide: Office of Technology Utilization, Task Force to Assess NASA University
Programs, A Study of NASA University Programs (Washington, DC: NASA Special
PubUcafion-185, 1968), pp. 1-8.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Between 1962 and 1968, the NASA-university relationship expanded considerably. This document is
the report of a task force assigned to review the totality of that relationship, which had resulted from
NASA's attempt to use Apollo funding to effect a change in academic America. This report lent sup-
port to the decision to curtail drastically and eventually even to cancel the Sustaining University
Program.
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[1] Precis
This study examines the results of the total NASA university program. It is an assess-
ment of the program based on goals publicly expressed by NASA managers as recorded in
the literature and correspondence with universities. Foremost among the goals has been
the intent of NASA to accomplish its aeronautics and space mission while at the same time
strengthening the universities involved; NASA-sponsored research was to be conducted in
the traditional atmosphere of instruction and learning in order to maximize the indirect
returns from the mission-oriented programs. The study was approached through selected
sampling of NASA-university interactions by interviews, university visits, and in-depth case
studies. The significant limitations of the study are those imposed by the lack of sufficient
time to collect and analyze data on such a huge and diverse program. However, the Task
Force believes this report to be indicative of the total NASA university program.
Impact on NASA, Universities, and the Nation
The returns from all NASA university programs fall into the categories of new knowl-
edge, trained people, or new capability for research, education, and service. The major
impact of these returns is upon the participants. However, since NASA and universities are
both parts of the Nation, anything that affects them also affects the Nation. The results of
programs that affect the Nation outside the immediate areas of the participants generally
are too obscure to be identifiable. Therefore, the emphasis of this study is on the new
knowledge, trained people, and new capability that have impacted NASA and universities
and, through them, the Nation.
General.--NASA's university programs have made major contributions to the aero-
nautics and space program. Research sponsored by university programs has generated
new concepts, has developed new technology, and has created unique facilities for further
education and research. Over 50 percent of all experiments flown on NASA satellites have
been generated by university programs. Universities have awarded at least 500 graduate
degrees and provided continuing educatitn opportunities to thousands through NASA
employee graduate training programs. Even management of the aerospace program has
been influenced, since university consultants have given policy, scientific, and engineer-
ing advice to NASA at all levels. These contributions demonstrate that NASA university
programs have been successful in their first and most important objective---obtaining the
expertise of the university community to help meet the aeronautics and space goals of
NASA and the Nation.
NASA university programs have had a significant impact on the university communi-
ty. About 250 universities have been responsive to opportunities to become involved in the
aeronautics and space program made available by NASA. [2] They have welcomed NASA
support and have used it to strengthen and build research and education capability.
Centers of excellence exist that were created with NASA support. Entire departments and
graduate degree programs have grown out of NASA involvement, many new courses have
been developed, and countless science and engineering courses have had their content
altered by NASA programs. The national capability for education and research has been
both broadened and strengthened.
In general, universities have not taken advantage of the opportunities offered by
NASA to innovate in research management, multi-disciplinary research, and government-
industry-university relations. There is little evidence that the long-range goals of NASA
university programs, such as the development of a university capability to respond as an
institution, capability for multi-disciplinary research, concern with societal problems, and
acceleration of technology transfer, are being achieved. The examples that were identi-
fied-an Urban Laboratory at UCLA, the Industrial Development Division at the
University of Michigan, Cornell's new Department of Environmental Systems
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Engineering,etc.--areonlylooselytied to NASA programs. Sometimes they were
unknown to, or unrecognized by, the scientists administering the NASA grants. It should
be pointed out, however, that the dollars NASA has used to encourage change have come
mostly from the Sustaining University research and facilities programs and have amount-
ed to less than 1 percent of the total Federal support to universities. From this perspec-
tive, the changes that NASA university programs have stimulated in universities appear
more significant.
NASA's university programs have built up a reservoir of good will within the universi-
ty community toward the agency. University administrators generally perceive that NASA
is sensitive to their needs and has undertaken a program to assist them with facilities, grad-
uate student support, and institutional support grants. Generally, faculty members appre-
ciate the opportunities for research and education that have been made available to them.
Industry has benefited from NASA university programs through the increased avail-
ability of trained people, new knowledge, and new capability. For the most part, however,
industry-university relations do not appear to have been altered by NASA programs. Little
evidence was found that universities were working harder at transferring technology to
industry or have been successful in increasing industry support for university research.
Although NASA's stated policy is to conduct its programs in such a manner as not to
draw faculty away from teaching, some of the research institutes, centers and laboratories
in universities have very few graduate students involved in the ongoing research. Some
have full-time staffs of research professionals who neither teach nor supervise graduate
students. Most universities that have such special research groups are aware of the prob-
lem and are attempting to find mechanisms to bring research closer to the educational
process. Some are successful; some are not. Significant numbers of groups with little edu-
cational involvement still exist. NASA violates its own policies when it supports groups that
continue to divorce themselves from the educational function of the university.
[3] Project researcl_---About 70 percent of NASA funds obligated to universities has been by
the project research method. This system of supporting the research of principal investi-
gators within universities is serving both NASA and the universities well. Abuse of the sys-
tem sometimes occurs (e.g., overcommitment by an aggressive university researcher,
demands for industrial-type response by a NASA contract monitor, or too little educa-
tional involvement). However, on balance, these are excellent programs that have con-
tributed directly to the aerospace objectives of NASA. Project research also involves large
numbers of faculty and graduate students and generates about three out of four of the
space-science publications from all NASA programs. A large amount of education at all
levels---undergraduate, graduate, and postdoctoral--is supported by these NASA pro-
grams. More than 10 percent of all funds supporting project research have been invested
in equipment, which is available in university laboratories for further education and
research.
Small project grants, which involve only one or two faculty members and their gradu-
ate students, have often led to productive interactions with NASA center personnel.
Research on optimal control of nuclear rockets at the University of Arizona and ablation-
material research at Louisiana State University are examples of projects through which
NASA has received new concepts and techniques, the university has improved curricula
and research and increased the number of publications, and technology is being trans-
ferred from universities to other segments of society. Larger project research grants, while
producing valuable research, do not seem to foster development of as close a tie to the
ongoing NASA program.
Space-science flight experimentation represents an area of significant accomplish-
ment in NASA university programs. University scientists have been eager to take advantage
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of the opportunities made available by NASA to conduct experiments in space. More than
98 percent of balloon-borne experiments, more than 40 percent of sounding rocket
experiments, and more than 50 percent of satellite experiments flown on NASA vehicles
had principal investigators or coinvestigators in universities. For the satellite experiments,
this is five times the level of participation of industry and about the same as the partic-
ipation of all government laboratories. For the Orbiting Geophysical Observatory
program alone, 50 percent of the flight experiments and almost two-thirds of the early
scientific publications came from universities. A large share of the significant discoveries
in space science were made in university-originated experiments.
Although the university community appears to have an effective voice in flight pro-
grams and selection of experiments through advisory committees, some university people
complain about favoritism in the selection of flight experiments. Another continuing
problem with university participation in flight experiments is involvement of graduate stu-
dents. Long lead times and project uncertainties limit the suitability of flight programs for
thesis projects. Universities have adopted various approaches to circumvent the difficul-
ties, but NASA must continue to be aware of them and continue to seek administrative
mechanisms that encourage participation of graduate students.
A university research program in R. & D. management and socioeconomics in aero-
space-related areas has been NASA's only significant support of the social [4] science
disciplines. This program has been quite productive as measured by publications and
involvement of faculty and students. Capability for research on management of large tech-
nological programs has been created in several universities and is now available to the
Nation. However, few if any management or policy decisions or processes within NASA
appear to have been influenced by the research. While some of the research may have had
potential usefulness, NASA has no mechanism for utilizing its results. The program has
had no centralized direction or policy and almost no involvement of the centers where
many management problems occur. It may be significant that NASA has sponsored a uni-
versity research program in these disciplines without a corresponding in-house research
capability--a position it has carefully avoided in engineering and physical-science
disciplines.
Sustaining University Prograra.--The Sustaining University Program, which provided
about 30 percent of NASA funds obligated to universities and provides support to institu-
tions rather than to principal investigators within universities, has generally been success-
ful. Its short-range objectives--increasing the supply of trained manpower, increasing uni-
versity involvement in aeronautics and space, broadening the base of competence, and
consolidating closely related activities---have been achieved. However, the long-range
goals that require innovation and change by universities--capability for multidisciplinary
research, university concern with the technology-transfer process, increased university
involvement with community and societal problems, developing capability for institution-
al responsemhave not been successfully attained. There are a few indications of change
in the direction of long-range goals that may lead to future developments.
The aims and operation of the Sustaining University Program are poorly understood
within NASA outside the Office of University Affairs. Only in the Office of Space Science
and Applications, which formerly directed the program, are they reasonably well under-
stood and felt to have value to NASA as a supplement to project research. In other
Headquarters offices and in the Centers, no benefit to NASA is seen in the program. The
Sustaining University Program grants are viewed as giveaways to help universities. The
quality of research sponsored by the program is regarded as not good enough to obtain
support in open competition. The impact on both NASA and universities would have
been greater if the in-house managers had been involved and committed to the programs.
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TheSustainingUniversityProgramhasmadegrantslotmultidisciplinaryspace-relat-
edresearchto50universities.Thesegrantswereabout10percentofthetotalresearch
fundsprovidedtouniversitiesbyNASA.Thegrantsachievedtheobjectiveofbroadeningthebaseofinvolvementandcapabilityinaerospaceresearch.Theyhavecontributedto
theestablishmentofnewdepartments(e.g.,aerospaceengineeringorspacesciences)and
strengthenedoldones(e.g.,astronomy).Capabilitieswerenourishedthatsincesuccess-
fullycompetedforresearchsupportfromNASAprojectresearchandotherGovernment
agencies.
Themultidisciplinaryaspectof SustainingUniversityProgramresearchgrantshas
generallynotbeentakenseriouslybyuniversities.Theuniversitiesperceivethegrantsas
institutionalsupportin a conventionalsensethatdoesnotrequireinnovationin the
administrationf research.A contributing[5] factorto thisattitudeisthelackof "sys-
tems"administratorsinuniversitieswithbroadviewsofreal-worldproblemsandthecapa-
bilityforbreakingproblemsintosmallsubsystemsforattackbyindividualresearchers.A
smallamountof multidisciplinaryresearcht atinvolvesphysicalndlifescientistsand
engineersissupported,butlittleofit wasinitiatedunderthegrants.Researchinvolving
individualsfrommultipledisciplines,includingsocialsciences,jointlyattackingamulti-disciplinaryproblemisnonexistent.
NASAhasencourageduniversitiestoinvolvesocialscientistsintheirresearchwithlit-
tleresponse.Thesmallamountofsocial-sciencei volvementthatdoesexistisusuallyon
asubprojectthatdoesnotinteractwithotheresearch.
Manyof the individualresearcherssupportedbySustainingUniversityProgram
researchgrantshavenodirectcontactwithNASA.If theyknowtheircounterpartsin
NASA,it isonlybychance.Whilesomeof thescientistsandengineerselishindepen-
dence,manywouldwelcomecloserelationswithNASApeers.Examplesofinteractions
inprojectresearchillustratethebenefitsthatcloserelationscouldhaveforbothuniver-
sitiesandNASA.
A Sustaining University Program research grant in a university gives a focus to its aero-
nautics and space program that is not present in universities without such a grant. The
steering committee which administers the grant seems to give identity and visibility to the
total NASA program. The existence of this committee appears to give credence to NASA's
concern for doing its business in a way that strengthens the university and is a step toward
interdepartmental cooperation for multidisciplinary research. Key members of these com-
mittees tend to dominate the direction of the program for the total university.
The Sustaining University Program predoctoral traineeship grants to 152 universities
accounted for about 15 percent of total NASA obligations to universities and have sup-
ported more than a thousand students who have earned Ph.D. degrees in space-related
areas. By 1970, over 4,000 doctorates will have been earned by trainees. More than half of
these highly trained scientists and engineers are remaining in universities and will con-
tribute to the Nation through education and research for years to come. About a third of
the former trainees are seeking industrial careers. Many of their skills are transferable to
areas other than aerospace and will continue to benefit society and science whether or not
they engage in aerospace research. Some evidence exists that traineeship grants have
accelerated (as well as increased) the production of doctorates, but it is not conclusive
except in the obvious cases of students who otherwise would have held part-time jobs.
The trainees tend to be isolated from NASA and have little opportunity to identify
with the Agency. Since the program is administered by the individual universities, not
even the stipend checks come from NASA. The Agency has overlooked an opportunity to
communicate with the students, which is reflected by the statistic that only 1 percent of
the Ph.D. recipients have been hired by NASA. This indicates very little direct impact on
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NASA by the traineeship program.
[6] The traineeship-grant program has had little impact on large established graduate
schools. Ten or 12 additional traineeships tend to get lost in universities such as Cornell
or Michigan. However, traineeships were awarded to 152 universities, most of whom [sic]
do not have the size or reputation of the two universities just mentioned. The grants have
enabled the smaller and less well established universities to recruit more and better grad-
uate students and to strengthen their graduate education programs.
The Sustaining University Program has made 35 facilities grants to 32 universities that
have already resulted in 27 completed laboratories. The grants account for over 6 percent
of NASA obligations to universities. The facilities are enabling universities to participate
in aerospace programs more effectively by providing working space and by consolidating
aerospace-related activities. They are being used to house interdisciplinary activities, usu-
ally in the form of an aerospace-related institute, center, or laboratory. Little evidence was
found that technology-transfer processes or university interaction with the local or region-
al community had been stimulated by the facilities visited.
Little evidence was found that the Memorandums of Understanding associated with
Sustaining University Program facilities grants have led to anything but talk. Usually only
a few administrators with a university even knew about the Memorandum. They had not
attempted to use it as a tool to induce changes in procedures or attitudes; they did not
regard it as requiring them to do anything new or different. The major criticism which
must be made is that universities have not made "energetic and organized" efforts to
implement the Memorandums, which they clearly agreed to do.
Personnel development programs.--The temporary in-residence faculty programs (NASA-
ASEE [American Society of Electrical Engineers] summer faculty fellowships, NASA-NRC
[National Research Council] resident research associates) are among the most rewarding
of NASA university programs. NASA managers feel that the participants bring new talent
and ideas into NASA projects and develop continuing relationships with NASA after they
return to their schools. The participants like the programs for the exposure to real prob-
lems, for new ideas for research, and because they often provide a sponsor for their own
research. Almost a thousand NASA-ASEE summer faculty fellows have spent 10 weeks dur-
ing the summer working on real-world problems at a NASA center. More than 300 NASA-
NRC postdoctoral research associates have had the opportunity to conduct research in a
NASA center for at least 1 year. These programs have led to new research projects,
curriculum modifications, and the creation of new centers of excellence. The acoustics
program at North Carolina State University is just one outstanding example of impact on
NASA, the university, and the Nation resulting from participation in these programs.
The employee training program has contributed in a major way to upgrading the
capabilities of NASA personnel. Employees have earned about 400 master's degrees and
100 Ph.D. degrees by this method in recent years. Simultaneously, in meeting training
needs, NASA centers have strengthened old departments and accelerated the creation of
new departments in nearby universities. The graduate program in physics at the College
of William and Mary is one example of stimulation of regional graduate-education capa-
bility to meet Langley Research Center's graduate training needs.
[7] Alternatives for Future Consideration
The results of the study suggested many changes in procedures, policies, or approach-
es that would lead to more effective university programs. Many of these involve opera-
tional details and have been called to the attention of appropriate NASA managers. Only
those of broad scope and general interest will be discussed here.
A substantial portion of Government-supported R. & D. management research with-
in the country has been sponsored by NASA. However, NASA is not reaping full benefit
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fromit becausethereisnomechanismfortranslatingresearchintoapplications.Inphys-
ical-scienceandengineeringdisciplines,universityresearchersinterfacewithresearch-
orientedNASApersonnelwhoknowhowtodisseminatendusetheirresults.IntheR.&
D.managementarea,universityresearchersinterfacewithNASAmanagementpracti-
tionerswithwhomtheresearchershavedifficultycommunicating.Research-oriented
management-sciencegroupswithinNASAwouldbeoneapproachto improvingutiliza-tionofthesponsoredresearch.
TheMemorandumsofUnderstandingassociatedwithfacilitiesgrantshavebeeninef-
fectiveinaccomplishingchange.Thefacilitiesmaybeapermanentsymbolandreminder
ofNASAsupport,butNASAlosesallleverageoncethegrantisawarded.Memorandums
ofUnderstandingmightbemoreeffectiveininducingchangeif usedinconjunctionwith
institutionalormultidisciplinarygrantsthathavearenewalfeature.Universityadminis-
tratorscouldthenusethethreatof failureof renewalto influencefaculty.NASAhas
recentlybeguntoexperimentwithMemorandumsassociatedwithresearchandtraininggrantsandtheireffectivenessshouldbecarefullyevaluated.
ManyNASA-universityin eractionshavedemonstratedthatsynergismoccurswhen
personnelareinclosecommunication.Theelementofcloseworkingrelationshasbeen
missingfromresearchsponsoredbytheSustainingUniversityProgram.Therefore,the
benefitsto bothNASAanduniversitiesfromthisresearchwouldbeincreasedbyclosertieswithongoingNASAprograms.Individualresearchersinuniversitiesneedtocommu-
nicatewiththeirNASApeersanduniversityadministratorsneedmoredataonrealNASA
problemsfordecision-makingi allocatingrantresources.Therefore,centersandpro-
gramofficeshouldbeparticipants--notadvisors--andshareresponsibilityin adminis-
trationofSustainingUniversityProgramresearchgrants.
ThemechanismsthathavebeenestablishedforbringinguniversityfacultyintoNASA
onatemporarybasisarevaluedhighlybyNASAmanagersandbytheparticipatinguni-
versitypeople.It isnoteworthythatequivalentmechanismspermitNASAemployeesto
entertheuniversitycommunityonashort-termbasisbutarenotwidelyknownorused.
ManyhighlyqualifiedNASAscientists,engineers,andmanagerscouldmakesignificant
contributionstouniversitiesinresearch,education,andadministration,aswellasincrease
theirownunderstandingof universityproblems,if mechanismscouldbedevelopedfor
themtospend6monthsorayearasactiveparticipants---notstudents---inu iversitypro-
grams.ExchangeprogramsbetweenuniversitiesandNASAshouldbeencouraged.[8] Employeegraduate-trainingprogramsshouldbeconsideredasanothermethodfor
meetingtheNation'sneedfor highlyeducatedscientists,engineers,andmanagers.
Innovationsin theseprogramscouldhelpoffsethereductioninPh.D.productionthat
willcomeafter1970asaresultofdecreasesinSustainingUniversityProgramtraineeships.
If theemployeegraduate-trainingprogramscouldbeexpanded,NASAwouldbenefit
fromtheservicesofhighlymotivatedandcapablemployeeswhileatthesametimegiv-
ingthemeducationalopportunities.In addition,if NASA'srequirementsforemployeegraduatetrainingatnearbyuniversitiesarelarge,financialsupporttotheuniversitiesfor
facilitiesandfacultyaugmentationshouldbeconsidered.
Arequirementthatannualreportsonallgrantsandcontractssummarizenumbersof
graduatestudentsgivenfull or partialsupport,thesesupported,technicalreports
published,curriculumchanges,facilitiesacquired,anddegreesearnedbystudentsbeing
supportedwouldemphasizeto universitiesNASA'sdesiretosupportesearchinanedu-
cationalenvironmentandwouldprovidedatatoassesstheprogram.
Continuousfeedbackontheeffectivenessofuniversityprogramsi neededbyNASA
managementatalllevels.Abettermanagementinformationsystemandreportingofedu-
cationalimpactof NASAprogramswouldsatisfymanyrequirements.However,periodic
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use of ad hoc groups, university consultants, and regularly scheduled conferences of the
Office of University Affairs, Centers, and Program Offices will probably all be required.
Document 111-17
Document rifle: Major General Samuel C. Phillips, USAF, Apollo Program Director, to J.
Leland Atwood, President, North American Aviation, Inc., December 19, 1965, with
attached: "NASA Review Team Report."
Document 111-18
Docmnent rifle: George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, to
J. Leland Atwood, President, North American Aviation, Inc., December 19, 1965.
Source: Both in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
In late 1965, at the request of NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E.
Muelle_, Major General Samuel C. Phillips, Apollo Program Director at NASA Headquarters, initi-
ated a review of NASA's contract with North American Aviation, Inc. (referred to as "NAA " below),
to determine why work on both the Apollo spacecraft and Saturn V second stage was behind schedule
and over budget. This highly critical study, known as the Phillips Report, took on added significance
when in the aftermath of the Apollo 204 capsule fire (just over one year later), it was discovered that
NASA Administrator James E. Webb was apparently unaware of the existence of the report. General
Phillips provided a set of the notes which comprised the study to North American PresidentJ. Leland
Atwood, and George Mueller added his views in a separate lette,:
Document 111-17
[1] IN REPLYREFER TO: MA December 19, 1965
Mr. J. L. Atwood
President
North American Aviation, Inc.
1700 E. Imperial Highway
El Segundo, California
Dear Lee:
I believe that I and the team that worked with me were able to examine the Apollo
Spacecraft and S-II stage programs at your Space and Information Systems Division in suf-
ficient detail during our recent visits to formulate a reasonably accurate assessment of the
current situation concerning these two programs.
I am definitely not satisfied with the progress and outlook of either program and am
convinced that the right actions now can result in substantial improvement of position in
both programs in the relatively near future.
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Enclosedaretencopiesof thenoteswhichwascompiledonthebasisof ourvisits.
Theyincludedetailsnotdiscussedinourbriefingandareprovidedforyourconsideration
anduse.
Theconclusionexpressedinourbriefingandnotesarecritical.Even with due con-
sideration of hopeful signs, I could not find a substantive basis for confidence in future
performance. I believe that a task group drawn from NAA at large could rather quickly
verify the substance of our conclusions, and might be useful to you in setting the course
for improvements.
[2] The gravity of the situation compels me to ask that you let me know, by the end of
January if possible, the actions you propose to take. If I can assist in any way, please let me
know.
Sincerely,
SAMUEL C. PHILLIPS
Major General, USAF
Apollo Program Director
[Attachment p.1 ]
NASA Review Team Report
I° Introduction
This is the report of the NASA's Management Review of North American Aviation
Corporation management of Saturn II Stage (S-II) and Command and Service
Module (CSM) programs. The Review was conducted as a result of the continual fail-
ure of NAA to achieve the progress required to support the objective of the Apollo
Program.
The scope of the review included an examination of the Corporate organization and
its relationship to and influence on the activities of S&ID [Space and Information
Systems Division of North American], the operating Division charged with the execu-
tion of the S-II and CSM programs. The review also included examination of NAA off-
site program activities at KSC and MTF [Mississippi Test Facility].
The members of the review team were specifically chosen for their experience with
S&ID and their intimate knowledge of the S-II and CSM programs. The Review find-
ings, therefore, are a culmination of the judgements [sic] of responsible government
personnel directly involved with these programs. The team report represents an
assessment of the contractor's performance and existing conditions affecting current
and future progress, and recommends actions believed necessary to achieve an early
return to the position supporting Apollo program objectives.
The Review was conducted from November 22 through December 6 and was orga-
nized into a Basic Team, responsible for over-all [2] assessment of the contractor's
activities and the relationships among his organizational elements and functions; and
sub-teams who [sic] assessed the contractor's activities in the following areas:
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II.
[4] B.
Program Planning and Control (including Logistics)
Contracting, Pricing, Subcontracting, Purchasing
Engineering
Manufacturing
Reliability and Quality Assurance.
Review Team membership is shown in Appendix 7.
Team findings and recommendations were presented to NAA Corporate and S&ID
management on December 19.
NAA's Performance to Date--Ability to Meet Commitments
At the start of the CSM and S-II Programs, key milestones were agreed upon, perfor-
mance requirements established and cost plans developed. These were essentially
commitments made by NAA to NASA. As the program progressed NASA has been
forced to accept slippages in key milestone accomplishments, degradation in hard-
ware performance, and increasing costs.
Schedules
As reflected in Appendix VI key performance milestones in testing, as well as
end item hardware deliveries, have slipped continuously in spite of deletions
of both hardware and test content. The fact that the delivery [3] of the com-
mon bulkhead test article was rescheduled 5 times, for a total slippage of
more than a year, the All System firing rescheduled 5 times for a total slippage
of more than a year, and S-II-1 and S-II-2 flight stage deliveries rescheduled
several times for a total slippage of more than a year, are indicative of NAA's
inability to stay within planned schedules. Although the total Apollo program
was reoriented during this time, the S-II flight stages have remained behind
schedules even after this reorientation.
2. Costs
The S-II cost picture, as indicated in Appendix VI has been essentially a series
of costs escalations with a bow wave of peak costs advancing steadily through-
out the program life. Each annual projection has shown either the current or
succeeding year to be the peak. NAA's estimate of the total 10 stage program
has more than tripled. These increases have occurred despite the fact that
there have been reductions in hardware.
3. Technical Performance
The S-II stage is still plagued with technical difficulties as illustrated in
Appendix VI. Welding difficulties, insulation bonding, continued redesign as
a result of component failures during qualification are indicative of insuffi-
ciently aggressive pursuit of technical resolutions during the earlier phases of
the program.
CSM
1. Schedules
A history of slippages in meeting key CSM milestones is contained in
Appendix VI. The propulsion spacecraft, the systems integration spacecraft,
and the spacecraft for the first development flight have each slipped more
than six months. In addition, the first manned and the key environmental
ground spacecraft have each slipped more than a year. These slippages have
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2.
[5] 3.
occurred in spite of the fact that schedule requirements have been revised a
number of times, and seven articles, originally required for delivery by the
end of 1965, have been eliminated. Activation of two major checkout stations
was completed more than a year late in one case and more than six months
late in the other. The start of major testing in the ground test program has
slipped froin three to nine months in less than two years.
Costs
Analysis of spacecraft forecasted costs as reflected in Appendix VI reveals
NAA has not been able to forecast costs with any reasonable degree of accu-
racy. The peak of the program cost has slipped 18 months in two years. In
addition, NAA is forecasting that the total cost of the reduced spacecraft pro-
gram will be greater than the cost of the previous planned program.
Technical Performance
Inadequate procedures and controls in bonding and welding, as well as inad-
equate master tooling, have delayed fabrication of airframes. In addition,
there are still major development problems to be resolved. SPS engine life,
RCS performance, stress corrosion, and failure of oxidizer tanlcs has resulted
in degradation of the Block I spacecraft as well as forced postponement of the
resolution of the Block II spacecraft configuration.
m. NASA Assessment--Probability of NAA Meeting Future Commitments
A. S-II
Today, after 4 [/2 years and a little more than a year before first flight, there are
still significant technical problems and unknowns affecting the stage.
Manufacture is at least 5 months behind schedule. NAA's continued inability to
meet internal objectives, as evidenced by 5 changes in the manufacturing plan in
the last 3 months, clearly indicates that extraordinary effort will be required if the
contractor is to hold the current position, let alone better it. The MTF activation
program is being seriously affected by the insulation repairs and other work
required on All Systems stage. The contractor's most recent schedule reveals fur-
ther slippage in completion of insulation repair. Further, integration of manual
GSE has recently slipped 3 weeks as a result of configuration discrepancies dis-
covered during engineering checkout of the system. Failures in timely [6] and
complete engineering support, poor workmanship, and other conditions have
also contributed to the current S-II situation. Factors which have caused these
problems still exist. The two recent funding requirements exercises, with their
widely different results, coupled with NAA's demonstrated history of unreliable
forecasting, as shown in Appendix VI, leave little basis for confidence in the con-
tractor's ability to accomplish the required work within the funds estimated. The
team did not find significant indications of actions underway to build confidence
that future progress will be better than past performance.
B. CSM
With the first unmanned flight spacecraft finally delivered to KSC, there are still
significant problems remaining for Block I and Block II CSM's. Technical prob-
lems with electrical power capacity, service propulsion, structural integrity, weight
growth, etc. have yet to be resolved. Test stand activation and undersupport of
GSE still retard schedule progress. Delayed and compromised ground and quali-
fication test programs give us serious concern that fully qualified flight vehicles
will not be available to support the lunar landing program. NAA's inability to
meet spacecraft contract use deliveries has caused rescheduling of the total
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Apollo program. Appendix VI indicates the contractor's schedule trends which
cause NASA to have little confidence that the S&ID will meet its future spacecraft
commitments. While our management review indicated that some progress is [7]
being made to improve the CSM outlook, there is little confidence that NAA will
meet its schedule and performance commitments within the funds available for
this portion of the Apollo program.
[8] IV. Summary Findings
Presented below is a summary of the team's views on those program conditions and
fundamental management deficiencies that are impeding program progress and that
require resolution by NAA to ensure that the CSM and S-II Programs regain the required
program position. The detail findings and recommendations of the individual sub-team
reviews are Appendix to this report.
A. NAA performance on both programs is characterized by continued failure to
meet committed schedule dates with required technical performance and within
costs. There is no evidence of current improvement in NAA's management of
these programs of the magnitude required to give confidence that NAA perfor-
mance will improve at the rate required to meet established Apollo program
objectives.
B. Corporate interest in, and attention to, S&ID performance against the customer's
stated requirements on these programs is consider[ed] passive. With the excep-
tion of the recent General Office survey of selected functional areas of S&ID, the
main area of Corporate level interest appears to be in S&ID's financial outlook
and in their cost estimating and proposal efforts. While we consider it appropri-
ate that the responsibility and authority for execution of NASA programs be
vested in the operating Division, this does not relieve the Corporation of its
responsibility, and accountability to NASA for results. [9] We do not suggest that
another level of program management be established in the Corporate staff, but
we do recommend that the Corporate Office sincerely concern itself with how
well S&ID is performing to customer requirements and ensure that responsible
and effective actions are taken to meet commitments.
C. Organization and Manning
We consider the program organization structure and assignment of competent
people within the organization a prerogative of the manager and his team that
have been given the program job to do. However, in view of what we consider to
be an extremely critical situation at S&ID, one expected result of the NASA review
might be the direction of certain reorganizations and reassignments considered
appropriate, by NASA, to improve the situation. While we do have some sugges-
tions for NAA consideration on this subject, they are to be accepted as such and
not considered directive in nature. We emphasize that we clearly expect
NAA/S&ID to take responsible and thoroughly considered actions on the orga-
nization and assignment of people required to accomplish the S-II and CSM
Programs. We expect full consideration, in this judgement [sic] by NAA, of both
near and long term benefits of changes that are made.
Frankly stated--we firmly believe that S&ID is overmaned and that the S-II and
CSM Programs can be done, and done better, with fewer people. This is not to
suggest that an arbitrary [10] percentage reduction should be applied to each ele-
ment of S&ID, but we do suggest the need for adjustments, based on a reassess-
ment and clear definition of organizational responsibilities and task assignments.
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O.
[12]
It is our view that the total Engineering, Manufacturing, Quality, and Program
Control functions are too diversely spread and in too many layers throughout the
S&ID organization to contribute, in an integrated and effective manner, to the
hard core requirements of the programs. The present proliferation of the func-
tions invites non-contributing, "make-work" use of manpower and dollars as well
as impediments to program progress.
We question the true strength and authority of each Program Manager and his
real ability, to be fully accountable for results when he directly controls less that
50% of the manpower effort that goes into his program. This suggests the need
for an objective reappraisal of the people and functions assigned to Central ver-
sus Program organizations. This should be done with full recognition that the
Central organization's primary reason for existence is to support the require-
ments of the Program Managers. Concurrently, the Program Manager should
undertake a thorough and objective "audit" of all current and planned tasks, as
well as evaluate the people assigned to these tasks, in order to bring the total
effort down to that which truly contributes to the program.
It is our opinion that the assignment of the Florida Facility to the Test and Quality
Assurance organization creates an anomaly since the Florida activities clearly
relate to direct program responsibilities. We recognize that the existence of both
CSM and S-II activities at KSC may require the establishment of a single unit for
administrative purposes. However, it is our view that the management of this unit
is an executive function, rather than one connected with a functional responsi-
bility. We suggest NAA consider a "mirror image" organizational relationship
between S&ID and the Florida operation, with the top man at Florida reporting
to the S&ID President and the two program organizations reporting to the S&ID
Program Managers.
Program Planning and Control
Effective planning and control from a program standpoint does not exist. Each
organization defines its own job, its own schedules, and its own budget, all of
which may not be compatible or developed in a manner required to achieve pro-
gram objectives. The Program Managers do not define, monitor, or control the
interfaces between the various organizations supporting their program.
Organization--S&ID's planning and control functions are fragmented; responsi-
bility and authority are not clearly defined.
Work Task Management--General Orders, task authorizations, product plans,
etc., are broad and almost meaningless from a standpoint of defining end prod-
ucts. Detailed definitions of work tasks are available at the "doing level"; however,
these "work plans" are not reviewed, approved, or controlled by the Program
Managers.
Schedules--Each organization supporting the programs develops its own
detailed schedules; they are not effectively integrated within an organization, nor
are they necessarily compatible with program master schedule requirements.
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 533
[13]
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BudgetingSystem--Withoutcontroloverworkscopeandschedules,thebudget
controlsystemcannotbeeffective.Ingeneral,it isanallocationsystemassigning
programresourcesbyorganizations.
ManagementReports--Thereisnoeffectivereportingsystemto management
thatevaluatesperformanceagainstplans.Plansarechangedto reflectperfor-
mance.Trendsandperformanceindicesreportingisalmostnonexistent.
E. LogisticsTheCSMandS-IISiteActivationsandLogisticorganizationsareadequately
staffedtocarryouttheLogisticssupport.Theproblemsin theLogisticsareaare
inarrivingatamutualagreement,betweenNAAandNASA,clearlydefiningthe
tasksrequiredtosupporttheprograms.Theareasrequiringactionsareasfollows:
1. LogisticsPlan
2. MaintenanceManuals
3. MaintenanceAnalysis
4. NAA/KSCRelationship
5. CommonandBulkItemRequisitioningatKSC
6. ReviewofSpareParts,Tooling,andTestEquipmentS atus
E Engineering
ThemostpronounceddeficienciesobservedinS&IDEngineeringare:
1. FragmentationftheEngineeringfunctionthroughouttheS&IDorganiza-
tion,withtheresulthatit isdifficultoidentifyandplaceaccountabilityfor
program-requiredEngineeringoutputs.
2. Inadequatesystemsengineeringjob is beingdonefrominterpretationof
NASAstatedtechnicalrequirementsthroughdesignrelease.
3. Adequatevisibilityon intermediateprogresson plannedengineering
releasesislacking.Late,incomplete,andincorrectengineeringreleaseshave
causedsignificanthardwaredeliveryscheduleslippagesa wellasunneces-
saryprogramcosts.
4. Theprinciplesandproceduresforconfigurationmanagement,asagreedtobetweenNAAandNASA,arenotbeingadheredtobytheengineeringorga-
nizations.
G. CostEstimating
The"grassroots"estimatingtechniqueusedatS&IDis a logicalstepin the
processofarrivingatprogramcostestimatesanddevelopingoperatingbudgets.However,thereareseveralspectsof thetotalprocessthatareof concernto
NASA:
1. Thefirstrelatestotheinadequatedirecting,planning,scheduling,andcon-
trollingofprogramworktasksthroughoutS&ID.Whilethegrassrootsesti-
matesmay,in fact,representvalidestimates( ubjecttoscrubbingof "cush-
ion")ofindividualtasksbyworkinglevelpeople,webelievethatthepresent
deficienciesinPlanningandControlpermit,andmayencourage,theinclu-
sionin theseestimatesofworktasksandlevelofeffortsthataretrulynot
requiredfortheprogram.2. Thesecondconcernisthatthefinalconsolidationfgrassrootsestimates,
developedup throughtheS&IDorganizationi parallelthroughbothCentralfunctionalndProgramorganizations,doesnotreceivetherequired[15]managementjudgements[ ic],atsuccessivelevelsfor(a)therealpro-
gramneedforthetasksincludedin theestimate,or (b)adequatescrubbing
andvalidationoftheman-hoursanddollarsestimates.
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3. The third concern, which restllts from 1 and 2 above, is that the final estimate
does not represent, either in tasks to be done or in resources required, the
legitimate program requirements as judged by the Program Manager, but
represents total work and dollars required to support a level of effort within
S&ID.
Several recommendations are made in the appended reports for correcting defi-
ciencies in the estimating process. The basic issue, however, is that an S&ID
Management position must be clearly stated and disciplines established to ensure
that the end product of the estimating process be only those resources required to
do necessary program tasks. In addition, the Program Management must be in an
authoritative position that allows him to accept, reject, and negotiate these resource
requirements.
H. Manufacturing Work Force Efficiency
There are several indications of less than effective utilization of the manufactur-
ing labor force. Poor workmanship is evidenced by the continual high rates of
rejection and MRB actions which result in rework that would not be necessary if
the workmanship [16] had been good. This raises a question as to the effective-
ness of the PRIDE program which was designed to motivate personnel toward
excellence of performance as a result of personal responsibility for the end prod-
uct. As brought out elsewhere in this report, the ability of Manufacturing to plan
and execute its tasks has been severely limited due to continual changing engi-
neering information and lack of visibility as to the expected availability of the
engineering information. Recognizing that overtime shifts are necessary at this
time, it is our view that strong and knowledgeable supervision of these overtime
shifts is necessary, and that a practical system of measuring work accomplished
versus work planned must be implemented and used to gauge and to improve the
effectiveness of the labor force. The condition of hardware shipped from the fac-
tory, with thousands of hours of work to complete, is unsatisfactory to NASA.
S&ID must complete all hardware at the factory and further implement, without
delay, an accurate system to certify configuration of delivered hardware, properly
related to the DD 250.
I. Quality
NAA quality is not up to NASA required standards. This is evidence[d] by the
large number of "correction" E.O.'s and manufacturing discrepancies. This deft-
ciency is further compounded [17] by the large number of discrepancies that
escape NAA inspectors but are detected by NASA inspectors. NAA must take
immediate and effective action to improve the quality of workmanship and to
tighten their own inspection. Performance goals for demonstrating high quality
must be established, and trend data must be maintained and given serious atten-
tion by Management to correct this unsatisfactory condition.
J. Following are additional observations and findings that have resulted from dis-
cussions during the Review. Most of them are covered in most detail in the
appended sub-team reports. They are considered significant to the objective of
improving NAA management of our programs and are therefore highlighted in
this section of the report:
1. S&ID must assume more responsibility and initiative for carrying out these
programs, and not expect step-by-step direction from NASA.
2. S&ID must establish work package management techniques that effectively
define, integrate, and control program tasks, schedules, and resource
requirements.
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3. S&ID must give concurrent attention to both present and downstream tasks
to halt the alarming trend of crisis operation and neglect of future tasks
because of concentration on today's problems.
4. A quick response capability must be developed to work critical "program pac-
ing" problems by a short-cut route, with follow-up to ensure meeting normal
system requirements.
5. S&ID must maintain a current list of open issues and unresolved problems,
with clear responsibility assigned for resolving these and insuring proper
attention by Program and Division Management.
6. Effort needs to be applied to simplify management systems and end products.
There must be greater emphasis on making today's procedures work to solve
today's problems, and less on future, more sophisticated systems. The imple-
mentation and adherence to prescribed systems should be audited.
7. NAA must define standards of performance for maintaining contracts
current then establish internal disciplines to meet these standards. Present
undefinitized subcontracts and outstanding change orders on the S-II prime
contract must be definitized without delay.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The NASA Team views on existing deficiencies in the contractor's management of the
S-II and CSM Programs are highlighted in this section of the report and are treated in
more detail in the appended sub-team reports. The findings are expressed frankly and
result from the team's work in attempting to relate the end results we see in program con-
ditions to fundamental causes for these conditions.
[19] In most instances, recommendations for improvement accompany the findings. In
some cases, problems are expressed for which the team has no specific recommendations,
other than the need for attention and resolution by NAA.
It is not NASA's intent to dictate solutions to the deficiencies noted in this report. The
solution to NAA's internal problems is both a prerogative and a responsibility of NAA
Management, within the parameters of NASA's requirements as stated in the contracts.
NASA does, however, fully expect objective, responsible, and timely action by NAA to cor-
rect the conditions described in this report.
It is recommended that the CSM incentive contract conversion proceed as now
planned.
Incentivization of the S-II Program should be delayed until NASA is assured that the
S-II Program is under control and a responsible proposal is received from the contractor.
Decision on a follow-on incentive contract for the CSM, beyond the present contract
period, will be based on contractor performance.
It is recommended that NAA respond to NASA, by the end of January 1966, on the
actions taken and planned to be taken to correct the conditions described in this report.
At that time, NAA is also to certify the tasks, schedules, and resource requirements for the
S-II and CSM Programs.
[20] It is further recommended that the same NASA Review Team re-visit NAA during
March 1966 to review NAA performance in the critical areas described in this report.
536 THENASA-INDUSTR¥-UNIVEI,tsIIy EXUS
Document 111-18
[1]
Mr. J. L. Atwood, President
North American Aviation, Inc.
1700 E. Imperial Highway
El Segundo, California
Dear Lee:
December 19, 1965
In my letter of October 27, 1965, I conveyed to you the seriousness with which I
viewed the state of affairs in both the Apollo and S-II Programs at your Space and
Information Systems Division. Phillips' report has not only corroborated my concern, but
has convinced me beyond doubt that the situation at S&ID requires positive and substan-
tive actions immediately in order to meet the national objectives of the Apollo Program.
Since I am not sure that you see the performance of S&ID in the same light that I do,
let me give you a perspective from my point of view.
When I joined NASA in the Fall of 1963, I restructured the Apollo Program to bring
its several elements into balance and to establish a schedule that could be achieved based
on the state of development at that time. Since that time, in the spacecraft project, we
have found it necessary to:
a. Omit several sub-systems from 009.
b. Delay flight of 201 from November 65 until probably February or March 66 due
to late delivery of 009 and its GSE together with the many difficulties of getting things
[2] to work together at the Cape.
c. Reschedule the first manned flight from 203 to 204 to relieve the spacecraft
schedule. NAA ability to support the 204 flight scheduled in October 66 now looks doubt-
ful.
d. Reschedule 202 from April to June 1966 because 011 is several months behind
schedule. NAA ability to support the June schedule now looks doubtful.
e. Reschedule the first Block II spacecraft flight from 206 in April 67 to 207 in July
67. Late last year, when the Block II Program was defined, your people agreed that they
could and would do a better job on Block II engineering and that they would meet their
design review and drawing release schedules. I'm very disturbed to learn now that Block
lI engineering has been neglected and that it is some months behind schedule. To me,
considering performance to date, it looks like the danger flags portend delay of the criti-
cal 207 flight.
f. Delay the delivery of 008 by several months. This is a critical vehicle to perform
thermal vacuum tests in the Houston Chamber as a prerequisite to manned flight. People
will argue that the Chamber isn't ready, but we urgently need that spacecraft to get it work-
ing as a system vehicle and with its ground equipment and crews.
g. Delete seven boilerplate and flight spacecraft from the Block I Program to reduce
cost growth and relieve the schedule to minimize slippage.
I could go on; there are other things that we've had to accommodate such as cost
growth, but I believe this list gives you some insight into my evaluation of performance in
the spacecraft project. Now, regarding the S-II Project:
a. I am facing the probability that the flight of 501 will be delayed between three and
nine months. I [3] assure you that this is due entirely to the sirens of the S-II stage. It is
clear to me that it didn't have to come out this way, and I regret now that I wasn't more
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insistentayearandaquarteragowhenyouandI discussedthedangerflagsthenflying,
andthepossibilityofsuchfarreachingactionsastransferringtheprojecto yourLos
AngelesDivision.
b. ThecostproposalwhichS&IDpresentedto MSFCin Octoberof thisyearwas
shockingin lightofcostprojectionsreportedonlyonemonthearlier.PerhapsI should
evengosofarasto suggestthatit wasirresponsible;inanycase,it surelywasagross
demonstrationfmanagementshortcomings.
c. TheBattleshipProgramisanothersignificantcase.Yougotbehindit personally
andanignitiontestinNovember64resulted;butthatachievementwasoneyearbehind
theoriginalscheduleandthetestfixturewasodevoidofsystemsa tobelittlemorethan
afacade.Further,thefiringrecordindicatesthatonlyaboutone-thirdofthefiringsreal-
lyachievedtheirobjectives.ThefiringprogramwasstoppedlastApril to incorporate
flightsystems;it hasnotyetresumedfiring.
d. S-II-Tisarealproblem.It wasdeliveredlatewithwhatwastatedtobeapproxi-
mately21,000manhoursofworkto incorporateEO'sandperformworkthatwasnot
completedin thefactoryduetopartsshortages.Today,theworkstandsatover50,000
manhoursandthefiringscheduledforJanuary66willmostlikelyoccurinMarchorApril.
BasedonwhatI haveseensofar,I amveryconcernedthattheengineeringonwhich
S-II-IisbasedwillrequiremanychangeswhenS-II-Tisfired,andfurtherdelaysof501will
result.
It ishardformeto understandhowacompanywiththebackgroundanddemon-
stratedcompetenceofNAAcouldhavespent41/2yearsandmorethanhalfabilliondol-
larsontheS-IIProjectandnotyethavefiredastagewithflightsystemsinoperation.[4] Again,I couldgoonandenumerateadditionalproblems,butthepointsI havedis-
cussedshouldshowyouhowI seetheperformanceofNAAonthesetwoprograms.
I havebeenin thisbusinesslongenoughtounderstandquitewellthedifficultiesand
setbacksthatoccurandmanifestthemselvesinmanyformsingovernment-industrypro-gramswhichhaveastheirobjectivethedevelopment,building,andoperationof sophis-
ticatedsystemsinvolvingadvancedtechnologyandrealforwardprojectionofthought.My
experienceindicatesthatresultsarea functionof managementandtechnicalcompe-
tence.I submithattherecordofthesetwoprogramsmakesit clearthatagoodjob has
notbeendone.BasedonwhatI seegoingoncurrently,I haveabsolutelynoconfidencethatfuturecommitmentswillbemet.
I canseenowayofimprovingfutureperformance,andmeetingcommitmentswhich
NAAmustmeetif wearetoachievethenationalobjectivesofApollo,excepttoimprove
themanagementandtechnicalcompetenceof yourSpaceandInformationSystems
Division.
SamPhillipsisconvincedthatS&IDcandoabetterjobwithlesspeople.Heandhis
teamdiscussedthereasonswhytheybelievethisin theirbriefing.
I suggestthatyoucangoevenfurthertoconcentratemanagementa dtechnicaltal-
entonthetwoprogramsthatconstitute98percentofthebusinessofS&ID.Forexample:
a. Eliminateor transfertoanotherDivisionthoseactivitiesatS&IDthatarenotcon-
tributingdirectlyto theprogressof theSpacecraftndS-IIprojects.Examplesarethe
FederalProgramsGroup,partsof theInformationSystemsDivision,andpartsof the
AdvancedSystemsDivision.Thisshouldmakepossibleasubstantialconsolidationfcen-
tralengineeringandinsurethat[5]availabletalent concentrates on the two important
programs.
b. Take a hard look at the competence and effectiveness of individuals, especially in
the upper echelons of the organization; and move out those who are not really con-
tributing, due either to the organization or to their own competence.
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I urgeyouto considerthepotentialpayoffof extendingtheprojectmanagement
principlebeyondthe"designatedsubsystemsprojectmanager"asnowpracticedinDale
Meyers'organization.I amconvincedthatthereisnosubstituteforclearassignmentof
responsibilityandaccountabilitytoindividualsfordeliveringresults.Workpackagescan
bedefinedquiteclearlyinbothprojectsandI amsureit ispossibletoassignresponsibil-
ity to individualswhoaregivencontrolof theapplicablebudgetandwhoareheld
accountablefordeliveringonscheduleandwithinbudget.
I hadhopedthatalettersuchasthiswouldnotbenecessary.However,I considerthe
presentsituationtobeintolerableandcanonlyconcludethatdrasticactionisin thebest
nationalinterest.I assureyouthatI haveonlyonepurpose,andthatistocarryoutthe
ApolloProgramonscheduleandwithinplannedcosts.
I haveinstructedSamPhillipstokeephisteamtogethersothattheycanvisitS&ID
againinMarchtoseeifprogressisconsistentwiththatrequiredtoachieveprogramobjec-tives.
Sincerel5
GeorgeE.MuellerAssociateAdministrator
ForMannedSpaceFlight
Document 111-19
Document tide: James E. Webb, Administrator, to Dr. Frederick Seitz, President, National
Academy of Sciences, December 20, 1967.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
In this lette_, NASA Administrator James Webb thanks the National Academy of Sciences for its advice
regarding the establishment of a Lunar Science Institute to be a central location for the analysis of
samples returned from the Moon. He also attempts to claTify NASA's reasoning behind its decision to
establish such an institute. Essentially, Webb sought the creation of this institute under NASA fund-
ing but with academic management. This arrangement, he believed, was critical if the institute were
to achieve the stature Webb wanted for it.
[1] December 20, 1967
D_ Frederick Seitz
President
National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D. C.
Dear Fred:
We have your letter of November 1, 1967 and the report of the Academy of
NAsA/University Relations Committee. Will you please give them my thanks for the work
they have done so far to help resolve the problems of the "Lunar Science Institute" we are
thinking of establishing near the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) in Houston. We also
deeply appreciate the help you and the National Academy are giving us in this matter.
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We asked the Lunar and Planetary Missions Board (LPMB) to review the needs and
plans for this "Institute," which they did at their last meeting. The Board did not take any
formal action pending further clarification and discussion of the nature of the Institute at
their next meeting in January. Several of the members still have grave reservations about
the usefulness of the proposed Institute; its method of operation; and its effect on acade-
mic scientists interested in lunar exploration. Specifically, they are concerned that the
establishment of the Institute might weaken the position of the university scientist either
by encouraging him to participate only if he is a member of the Institute or by forcing him
to come to the Institute to do his research. They were also concerned about the name,
"Lunar Science Institute," which they felt implied a more substantial institution with a
larger staff than [2] that described to them. In the discussion at the Board and in later
consultations with the concerned members of the Board, it seems that we can alleviate
much of this concern if it is made clear that:
1. NASA plans to continue the policy of encouraging all competent scientists to
compete for participation in the lunar exploration program and that member-
ship or non-membership of his parent institution in the Institute will not be per-
mitted to affect the standing of his proposal in NASA's evaluation of it and others
in that competition.
2. The selection of the principal investigators in the Lunar Exploration Program or
for lunar sample analysis will continue to be made as they have in the past by the
highest level and most competent personnel in NASA.
3. The "Lunar Science Institute" is being established to help those scientists who
consider it desirable to come to MSC from time to time either to plan or conduct
their research and to provide an easy access to scientists who have an interest in
considering participation or in the pattern of relationships which will grow from
this pilot model experiment in the continuing NASA effort to find the most sat-
isfactory basis for scientists to participate in its programs.
4. Selection as a principal investigator automatically makes the facilities of the
Institute available to him when he needs to come to Houston.
5. NASA will continue to follow the policy of encouraging an academic scientist to
conduct his research at his home institution to the fullest extent possible and with
as little interference with his academic responsibilities as possible.
[3] It is also apparent that what we are thinking of is not so much an "Institute" as it is a
"Facility for Continuation Study" in a location that provides some benefits over and
beyond those heretofore available. Therefore, we should seek a name which more accu-
rately describes such a facility and its functions.
An interim arrangement whereby the National Academy of Sciences has a prime
contract from NASA for the operation of the facility, and where it, in turn, negotiates a
sub-contract with Rice University to operate the facility seems a reasonable arrangement
provided the following matters, in addition to those above, are worked out to our mutual
satisfaction and to the satisfaction of the LPMB and specified in the appropriate contracts
or memoranda of understanding:
1. The administrative arrangements and agreements necessary to bring the facility
into being and operate it. Careful attention must be given to the role of the
LPMB, which is the principal group we look to for advice on the content of the
lunar program and to represent the interests of the scientists involved in that pro-
gram. Careful attention must also be given to the role of the Science and
Applications Directorate at the Manned Spacecraft Center.
2. The size and type of staff required (should be small).
3. The location, size, and nature of the buildings and equipment to be utilized.
Presumably, this would be the West Mansion located on the Rice property adja-
cent to MSC.
540 THENASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITYNEXUS
4. If it is the West Mansion, the nature and cost of the modifications which will be required.
5. If the arrangement _¢ith the Academy and Rice is to be regarded as temporary,
then plans [4] leading to a permanent arrangement should be outlined.
Even though the arrangement for Rice to operate the facility may be temporary, these
arrangements should specify the role that Rice will play in the administration, the fee con-
sidered proper, and any plans or actions which Rice expects to take to help evolve new and
better relationships between graduate education in the disciplines involved and the space
program.
Dr. John E. Naugle, Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, will
be my representative in working out these arrangements with you as President of the
Academy and Dr. Kenneth S. Pitzer in his dual role of Chairman of the Academy
Committee on NASA/University Relations, and as President of Rice. Dr. Newell and I will
be following these matters very closely.
Sincerely yours,
James E. Webb
Administrator
Document 111-20
Document fl0e: John E. Naugle, Associate Administrator, NASA, Memorandum to
Administrator, "Space Astronomy Institute," February 4, 1976.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
This memorandum to Administrator James C. Fletcher from NASA Associate Administrator John E.
Naugle reflects the lengthy debate over form and control of the proposed Space Astronomy Institute,
soon to be renamed the Space Telescope Science Institute. The astronomy community was concerned
about playing a role in the telescope project, and envisioned an institute separate from NASA and
managed by a university or a university consortium. Dr. Hinners is Noel W. Hinners, NASA's
Associate Administrator for Space Science and the key individual in deciding the institute's finalform.
[1]
Memorandum
February 4, 1975
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
A/Administrator
AA/Associate Administrator
Space Astronomy Institute
On February 2, Dr. Richard Goody called on behalf of the International Astronomy
Group with which we met on January 29 in Williamsburg, Virginia. Goody said a matter
had come up after we left which he had been asked to discuss with NASA on behalf of the
group.
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The group discussed the so-called "Space Astronomy Institute" (SAI) and concluded
that SAI would very likely become the key or certainly one of tile two or three key astron-
omy institutions of the western world in the 1980's. The astronomers assembled in
Williamsburg wanted NASA to know of their interest in the SAI and also they were con-
cerned that there would be the necessary interaction of astronomers with NASA in devel-
oping the plan so this would indeed become such an institution. Goody said he had been
empowered by that group to approach NASA to offer to help in this matter and he felt a
group could be organized to represent the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the
American Astronomical Society [AAS] and the European Science Foundation (ESF).
I told Goody that: we certainly felt that the SAI was exceedingly important; we hoped
it became precisely the kind of institution he envisioned; and Dr. Hinners had laid out a
very careful approach in planning for the SAI which allowed for considerable interaction
and review of our plans with and by astronomers. I told him that Dr. Hinners and I would
need to discuss this matter with you before any commitment could be made, but that it
would be helpful to have a small group [2] of senior astronomers designated as the
spokesman for NAS, AAS and ESF. I told him there were precedents for NAS helping to
organize such a facility--noting that Mr. Webb had worked closely with the then President
of NAS, Dr. Seitz, in establishing University Space Research Association (USRA) and the
Lunar Science Institute, and that AEC had also worked closely with Dr. Seitz in creating
the Universities Research Association, Inc. (URA) in getting the big accelerator under
way.
At our meeting with you on February 9, Dr. Hinners will outline the present strategy
and plan of action for bringing the ASI [sic] into being. I told Dr. Hinners of Dr. Goody's
call and asked that he consider how a group such as the one proposed by Goody could be
brought into that plan of action.
John E. Naugle
Document 111-21
Document title: Memphis Norman, Budget Examiner, SET, to Mr. Loweth, "National
Academy of Sciences Report Regarding Institutional Arrangements for the Space
Telescope," April 6, 1977.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
In attempting to determine the best form of management organization for the Space Telescope Science
Institute, NASA requested that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study the issue and provide
a recommendation. The resulting report would play an important role in the decision to have a uni-
versity-led consortium manage the institute. This document, an internal Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) memorandum, contains a summary of the report, as well as additional comments that
reflect OMB's favorable disposition toward a non-NASA arrangement. Hugh Loweth was the head of
that portion of OMB that oversaw the NASA budget, and Memphis Norman was one of his staff mem-
bets. The name of the OMB division was Science, Engineering, and Technology (SET). PSA C stands
for the President's Science Advisory Committee.
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[1]
National Academy of Sciences Report
Regarding Institutional Arrangements
for the Space Telescope
The National Academy of Sciences conducted a Woods Hole Conference between July
19-30, 1976 to examine the institutional arrangements for the operational phase of the
Space Telescope--the report was released in January 1977. The report was prepared in
response to a request by NASA's Office of Space Science for the Space Science Board of
NAS to examine organizational and management features of a possible Institute and to
make recommendations for NASA's consideration. This memo summarizes the report,
and provides NASAl's] and our comments on the subject matter. There is no action for
use to take at this time, although we should keep it on our 'Watch list."
Background
• The Space Telescope will have the most complex organizational arrangement ever
experienced on a NASA mission. The project will involve over a ten-to-twenty year
period, two NASA centers, three headquarters program offices, NSF [National
Science Foundation], the European Space Agency, other national and international
organizations, and the complex of ground based observatories outside of NASA (the
Space Telescope and ground telescopes will complement each other).
• NASA talked to us last fall about an Institute for the Space Telescope, but the details
were sketchy. To assess the need for an Institute and plan it, NASA conducted an inter-
nal study last year, and asked the National Academy to conduct an additional
study involving spaced-based and ground-based astronomers. NASA is establishing a
working group (chaired by a NASA individual) to examine inputs from various groups
regarding the Institute, and to make recommendations to NASA management.
Report Summary
• The fundamental point addressed by the report is how to maximize scientific return
from a large investment for R&D and operations. The report proposes a strong role
for the Institute and concludes that ST operations should move from engineers to the
scientists and that central responsibility (a focal point) should be placed in a highly
visible independent institute (free from organizational restrictions) and staffed by
full-time astronomers.
[2] s Key recommendations include:
- The institute should organize and manage itself, and pick its own location---offa
NASA installation.
- The new organization should include space-based and ground based astronomers
(including foreigners) and provide for extensive coordination.
- The Institute should have direct involvement in the development and operation
of the Telescope. The Institute should have its own laboratories, facilities, and
computers, and plan and manage the science program (observations and instru-
ments); participate in technical development by developing hardware and soft-
ware systems for data handling and control capability on-board the ST, and being
involved in contract negotiations, trade-off decisions and design modifications;
perform data analysis at its own laboratories; and checkout the ST before and
after launch.
- Operational decision-making should be the responsibility of the Institute since
the participation of all astronomers should make possible decisions in the context
of a comprehensive astronomy program (overall strategy).
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- The Institute should be similar to a university consortium with a Director, Board
of Trustees, scientific staff, and advisory committees. Staffing would build-up to 90
positions by 1983 (ST launch year), and to 150-200 positions during operations.
- The Institute should be established as soon as possible and a Director appointed.
- Funding should be provided under contract with NASA with contributions from
NSF, other public agencies, foreign governments, and private organizations. Costs
were not provided.
- The Institute should maintain close liaison with NASA headquarters, NASA cen-
ters, engineering groups, contractors, and scientists.
NASA's Position
• NASA has not made a decision about the Institute---even whether to have one. A
working group will be set up (chaired by Warren Keller--NASA Headquarters) short-
ly to review the NAS report as well as other inputs.
[3] • The study group will include NASA engineers, scientists, and operations special-
ism, and advisers from NSF and NAS.
• The review will probably start with the NAS concept, since scientists should be in a
nucleus position and many aspects of the concept are good. However, NASA views the
concept as too large and expensive--particularly if NASA should fund. NASA will cost
out the NAS proposal and alternatives.
• NASA views the NAS report as an expression (particularly by ground-based
astronomers such as Kitt Peak) to curtail NASA's influence because of fear of NASA.
Astronomers want an NSF-type operation (independence).
• NASA plans to complete the study by July/August and recommend to NASA man-
agement whether to have an Institute and its size, structure, management, operations,
budget, and timing. A budget request for the Institute would likely be in the 1980 bud-
get--not 1979.
Staff Comments
• It appears that NASA is correct in sensing that astronomers (particularly ground-
based) are afraid of NASA. We have heard numerous accounts before from PSAC
members and NSF--perhaps there are good reasons for fear, particularly about the
Marshall Center which will manage ST development.
• However, we do believe that an Institute is a good idea, particularly the involvement
of ground-based astronomers. We have often talked about the need for coordination
and a comprehensive strategy for astronomy. The Institute may be the beginning.
• We also believe that once the Shuttle becomes operational its new capabilities should
allow for greater participation by scientists. Institutional arrangements to bring in
more people is a consideration for NASA in the future--these new programs will not
be "normal" NASA programs.
• We will need, obviously, to watch the funding arrangements and level of costs.
• Leo Goldberg feels very strongly that the science community should have a strong
hand in the organization and management of the Space Telescope--you may want to
formally ask NASA by letter to report to us on the NAS report and the Institute when
the_ are ready. We can prepare a letter for the Director or Mr. Cutter, if you wish.
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Document 111-22
Document title: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Technology,
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, "Space Telescope Program Review,"
95th Cong., 2d sess., Report No. 85 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1978), pp. 3-7, 11-14.
Dr. Noel W. Hinners, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Science, was the key player in resolv-
ing the dispute over whether a Space Telescope Science Institute should be operated by NASA or by a
university consortium. Opting for the latt_ Hinners presented to Congress NASA's reasoning behind
its plans for the institute. This explanation was delivered in a filled hearing room before the
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology in the
House of Representatives. Called by Hinners the "Space Telescope Program Review, "his report on July
13, 1978, presented well the planning for the NASA-universit_ partnership that governed the Hubble
Space Telescope.
[3]
Statement
of
Dr. Noel W. Hinners
Associate Administrator for Space Science
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
before the
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications
Committee on Science and Technology
House of Representatives
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I welcome the opportunity to review with you the status of the Space Telescope
Program. Following my brief overview including some discussion of our planned
approach to science operations, Mr. William C. Keathley, the NASA Space Telescope
Project Manager at Marshall Space Flight Center, will give a more detailed description of
the development program and its cost performance, and schedule status.
The Space Telescope is being designed as a general-purpose, astronomical observato-
ry in space with an anticipated lifetime of more than a decade. To be launched in late
1983 by the Space Shuttle, it will be the first long term national astronomical observatory
in space .... The availability of the Space Shuttle will allow in-orbit repair of the observa-
tory, exchange of experiments by Shuttle crew members, and, if necessary, return of the
entire system to Earth for refurbishment and subsequent relaunch.
The Space Telescope, by being outside the Earth's atmosphere, will enable us to
image objects that are ten times smaller than possible with ground-based optical tele-
scopes. This will permit us to study nearby objects in much greater detail or to detect
stellar counterparts at about ten times greater distance than is now possible from Earth.
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If theuniversehasabeginning,weshouldbeabletoseesomeobjectsastheywerenear
thebeginningoftime.TheSpaceTelescopewillallowustoobservelightovertheentire
rangefromthefarultraviolettothefarinfrared(fromwavelengthsofapproximately1100
angstromstoabout1millimeter=10,000,000angstroms).Mostofthisrangeisinaccessi-
blefromgroundobservatories.[4] Thespacecraftfacilityisacylinderof about14meters(46feet)in lengthand4.3
meters(14feet)indiameter,weighingabout9,000kilograms(10tons).Themirrorsize
willbe2.4meters(94inches),comparabletothelargerEarth-basedt lescopes.Themir-
rorissufficientlylargethatexperimentsrequiringlarge,light-gatheringpowercanbecar-
riedoutwiththisTelescopethathavebeenimpossiblewithsmallerpredecessors.The
highresolutionof theSpaceTelescopewillpermithedetectionandmeasurementof
starsasfaintasthe27thor28thmagnitude,somefiftytimesfainterthanthosewhichcan
nowbedetectedfromEarth.Spectrawillbeobtainablefromobjectsasfaintas25thmag-
nitude,whichis91/2magnitudes(factorofapproximately7,000)fainterthanispossible
withtheInternationalUltravioletExplorerand13magnitudes(factorofapproximately
100,000)fainterthanwiththeOrbitingAstronomicalObservatory.
Fiveversatilescientificinstruments(fourAmericanandoneEuropean)havebeen
selectedforflightatthefocalplaneoftheTelescopetocarryoutawiderangeofobser-
vations.TheSpaceShuttlein-orbitmaintenancecapability,mentionedearlier,willpermit
thereplacementoffailedOroutdatedequipmenta asmallfractionofthecostofanew
scientificmission.Thus,theSpaceTelescopecanbeoperatedwiththebestscientific
instrumentsa theybecomeavailable.
Preliminarydesigneffortsof thescientificfocalplaneinstrumentsfor theSpace
TelescopearebeingcarriedoutbyInvestigationDefinitionTeams,composedof partic-
ipatingscientistswhoweretentativelyselectedbyNASAonNovember8,1977.Finaleval-
uationandconfirmationofthepayloadselectionwilloccurinearlyFY1979,basedonthe
resultsofthepreliminarydesignreviews.Weareconfidentofourabilityto developthe
instrumentsonatimescaleconsistentwiththeSpaceTelescopeProjectschedule,which
assumesalate1983launch.
Ashasbeenindicatedin previoustestimony,negotiationswiththeEuropeanSpace
Agency(ESA)coveringtheirparticipationi theSpaceTelescopeProgramhaveresulted
in a Memorandumof Understanding,signedon October7, 1977,by the NASA
AdministratorandtheESADirectorGeneral.ESAwillsupply,withoutcostoNASA,one
ofthescientificinstruments,heFaintObjectCamera;thesolararray,whichwillprovide
powerfor thespacecraftfacility;and,anumberofpersonnelforscienceoperationssup-
port.Inreturn,observingtimeontheTelescopewillbeprovidedforEuropeanScientists.
NASA'sMarshallSpaceFlightCenterisresponsibleforoverallmanagementof the
SpaceTelescopeProject....[5]Asyouareaware,theSpaceTelescopeProgramwasapprovedasanewstartinNASA's
FY1987budget.TheProgram,becauseofitsverycomplexandinteractivenature,has
beencarefullyplannedandwelldefined.Currently,themajorhardwarecontractshave
beenawarded,andallelementsofthedevelopmentworkareonscheduleandwithinthe
costestimate.
Asindicatedin thepastestimony,thedevelopmentprogramfortheSpaceTelescope
doesnotincludefundingfortheoperationandmaintenanceof theTelescopeb yond
thirtydaysafterlaunchnorfortheestablishmentof hehardwareandsoftwarecapabili-
tiesrequiredforscienceoperations.AsI indicatedinFebruary,duringtheHearingson
theFY1979Budget,wemustbegintobudgetforscienceoperationsinFY1980,ifweare
tohavetherequiredoperationalcapabilityatthetimeoflaunch.Intheremainderofmy
time,I wouldliketodiscussthisareaofscienceoperationswhichhasbeenleftopenin
previoustestimony.I promisedthatwewouldgetbackanddiscussourplanswithyou.
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Asindicatedearlier,theSpaceTelescopeisplannedforoperationformorethana
decadewithattendantin-orbitmaintenance;r covery,refurbishment,andrelaunch;and
updateof thefocalplanescientificinstruments.... Duringtheoperationalperiod,theSpaceTelescopewillbeusedthemajorityofthetimeby"generalobservers"whowillbe
selectedonthebasisofproposalssubmittedinresponsetoperiodicsolicitations.Indevel-
opingobservingschedulesfortheTelescope,therequirementsoftheseobserverswillbe
integratedwiththoseofinx;estigatorswhoareinvolvedwithdevelopmentofspecificfocal
planeinstruments.TheSpaceTelescopeoperations,includingtheinvestigationselection,
scheduling,maintenance,r furbishment,e c.,canbeviewedasquiteanalogousto the
operationofalarge,ground-basedt lescope.
AnimportantconsiderationwithrespecttothescienceoperationsfortheTelescopehasbeenthequestionofwhetherornotaSpaceTelescopeScienceInstitutewillbeestab-
lished,renderingtheoperationsimilartothatforanumberoflarge,ground-basedfacil-
ities.Overtheyears,agrowingnumberofastronomicalgroupshavestudiedthequestion
ofSpaceTelescopescienceoperations.Whiletheseconsiderationshavebeencarriedout
towidelyvaryingdepths,allsuchgroupshavemaderecommendationsin favorof the
ScienceInstituteapproach.... The1976NationalAcademyof Sciencesstudygroup,
chairedbyProfessorDonald.F.Hornig,studiedtheproblematourrequest.Thisgroup,
whichconsistedofanadhocgroupofindependentscientists,stronglyrecommendedthe
establishmentofaSpaceTelescopeScience[6]Instituteandoutlined,insomedetail,the
functions,structure,andimplementationmodefor therecommendedInstitute.This
studyservedasthepointof departureforourin-housestudygroupinconsideringthepossibleestablishmentofaScienceInstitute.
Afterstudyingthisquestionatconsiderablelength,usinginputsfromboththein-
houseandexternalstudygroups,wehavecometoaconclusionthatthemostefficient
andscientificallysatisfactoryapproachtoscienceoperationswouldinvolvetheestablish-
mentof [a] SpaceTelescopeScienceInstitutewhichwouldbeoperatedundera long-
termcontractwithNASA.Ourapproach,owever,wouldnotbeidenticaltotheNational
ScienceFoundation'sapproachtooperationoflarge,ground-basedfacilities,inceNASA
mustretainoperationalresponsibilityforthespacecraft/observatory....
WefeelthatthescienceoperationsconceptfortheTelescopemustreflectalong-term
commitmentaswouldbeaccomplishedbyadedicated"independent"institute,giving
astronomersandscienceoperationspersonnelaccesstocomputerandotherfacilities,
basedonSpaceTelescoperiorities.Thereisnodoubtthatthescienceimpactof the
SpaceTelescopewillbecomparabletothatofmajorlaboratories,whicharebeingoper-
atedefficientlyasnationalfacilitiesinthe"institute"mode.Suchlaboratorieshaveproventoberesponsivetotheusercommunityand,atthesametime,abletoworkwellwiththe
fundingAgency.TheSpaceTelescopeisthefirstplanned,long-life,NASAscienceflight
project,andwefeelthatoperationalproceduresusedonpastflightprojectsdonot
necessarilyconstitutethemostefficientwayto handlethisprogram.Weare,inasense,
takingourcuefromthepeoplewhohavebeensuccessfullyoperatingtheanalogous,
ground-basedobservatoriesovera largenumberofyears.Anotherobviousadvantageofthe"institute"modeis thatit is an operational mode with which the world-wide astro-
nomical community is familiar and confident ....
The Space Telescope Science Institute would have independent management and
staff and its own computer hardware, which, in order to minimize cost, would begin oper-
ation using software developed by NASA.
[7] The Science Institute would conduct science operations activities in three major
areas: planning and management, Space Telescope scheduling, and data activities. Within
the planning and management function, the Institute would implement those policies
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established by NASA which pertain to Space Telescope use. In this endeavor, the Institute
would solicit, evaluate, and select observational proposals received from the scientific
community and would formulate, for NASA review and approval, yearly activity goals
which are in consonance with the overall policy established by NASA.
The Science Institute, in addition to a long-term planning function, would generate
the generalized observing schedules. To accomplish this function, computers would be
located at the Institute to develop the target selection sequence while, at the same time,
observing such factors as target availability, sky constraints, and spacecraft design con-
straints. The Institute would generate observing instructions as required. In turn, the
Space Telescope Operations and Control Center (STOCC) at Goddard Space Flight
Center would convert the observing instructions into space commands that would prop-
erly point and control the Space Telescope.
In the data activities areas, the Institute would provide equipment enabling visiting
scientists and staff to perform analyses of Space Telescope data, as well as to conduct basic
research in the field of astronomy. Further, it would evaluate science productivity of the
Space Telescope research program. It would help coordinate both correlative research
with ground observing facilities and international participation in the overall activity.
Finally, it would be responsible for informing the public of research results, as well as for
archiving all Space Telescope data for dissemination as requested.
In view of the use, initially, of NASA-generated software, the computer complex would
be designed to be compatible with the computers in the STOCC at Goddard Space Flight
Center. Consequently, the complex at the Institute would be designed by NASA prior to
the establishment of the Institute.
No compelling reasons have been identified for locating the Science Institute close to
any existing NASA facility, so long as appropriate Institute personnel are collocated at
Goddard Space Flight Center to interface with the STOCC. It is anticipated that the oper-
ational site of the Institute would be included as part of the proposals for its operation.
Only general site criteria would be specified by NASA. These criteria might include such
factors as proximity to an active astronomical center of excellence, a major airport, etc.
We currently would anticipate release of a Request for Proposals early in FY 1980 for
the operation of the Institute. The Institute would be built up slowly to full strength prior
to launch of the Telescope in the first quarter of FY 1984 ....
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[11] [BriefingCharts]
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE METHOD OF
SPACE TELESCOPE SCIENCE OPERATIONS
(AI.l, IN FAVOR OF THE SCIENCE INSTITUTE APPROACH)
Date
1966
APRIL 1975
Organization
REPORT OF STUDY HEADED BY NORMAN RAMSEY
ST SCIENCE WORKING GROUP--BODY OF SENIOR SCIENTISTS
SELECTED BY ANNOUNCEMENT OF OPPORTUNITY TO PAR-
TICIPATE IN THE PRELIMINARY DESIGN PHASE OF ST
AUGUST 1975 COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY--
ELECTED COUNCIL OF THE ONLY PROFESSIONAL ASTRO-
NOMICAL SOCIETY IN THE UNITED STATES
NOVEMBER 1975 LST STUDY GROUP--AD HOC BODY OF SCIENTISTS CON-
VENED BYTHE ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR TO PROVIDE AN
OVERVIEW OF THE ST PROGRAM
FEBRUARY 1976 SHUTTLE ASTRONOMY MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS
WORKING GROUP--SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP CHAIRED
BY THE CHIEF OF THE ASTRONOMY AND RELATIVITY OFFICE
OF THE OFFICE OF SPACE SCIENCE
DECEMBER 1976 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES---REPORT OF THE SPE-
CIAL STUDY HEADED BY PROFESSOR HORNIG
[12]
SPACE TELESCOPE SCIENCE INSTITUTE
CHARACTERISTICS
• LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO SCIENCE OPERATION
• COMPUTERS AND OTHER FACILITIES ACCESSIBI.E TO ASTRONOMERS AND
SCIENCE OPERATIONS PERSONNEL
• EFFICIENT MODE OF OPERATION WHICH HAS PROVEN TO BE RESPONSIVE
TO THE USER COMMUNITY AND AT THE SAME TIME TO WORK WELL WITH
FUNDING AGENCY
• ANALOGOUS TO THE OPERATING MODE EMPI,OYED AT LARGE GROUND-
BASED OBSERVATORIES OVER A LARGE NUMBER OF YEARS
• OPERATIONAL MODE WITH WHICH THE W()RI.I)WIDE ASTRONOMICAL
COMMUNITY IS FAMILIAR AND CONFIDENT
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[13]
SPACE TELESCOPE SCIENCE INSTITUTE
SOME KEY OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS
SCIENCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
- IMPLEMENT NASA ST SCIENCE POLICY
- SOLICIT, EVALUATE, AND SELECT OBSERVATIONAL PROPOSALS
- COORDINATE CORRELATIVE RESEARCH
- COORDINATE INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION
SCHEDULING
- GENERALIZED OBSERVING SCHEDULES
• TARGET SEQUENCE
• TARGET AVAILABILITY
• SKY CONSTRAINTS
• SPACECRAFT CONSTRAINTS
- GENERATE OBSERVING INSTRUCTIONS
DATA ACTMTIES
- REDUCE AND ANALYZE DATA
- CONDUCT BASIC RESEARCH
- EVALUATE SCIENCE
- INFORM THE PUBLIC
- ARCHIVE AND DISSEMINATE ST DATA
[14]
SPACE TELESCOPE SCIENCE INSTITUTE
SUMMARY
CHARACTERISTICS---
• INDEPENDENT MANAGEMENT AND STAFF
• DEDICATED FACILITIES (INCLUDING COMPUTERS)
• INITIAL SOFTWARE DEVELOPED BY NASA
• LONG-TERM CONTRACT WITH NASA
LOCATION-
. NO COMPELLING DATA-HANDLING, MANAGERIAL, OR COST REASONS FOR
LOCATION AT ANY EXISTING FACILITY
• SITE TO BE INCLUDED AS PART OF PROPOSALS FOR INSTITUTE OPERA-
TION/GENERAL SITE CRITERIA
IMPLEMENTATION--
• FIRST BUDGET YEAR--FY 1980
• RFP RELEASED--EARLY FY 1980
• FULLY OPERATIONAL--AT LAUNCH--FIRST QUARTER OF FY 1984
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Document 111-23
Document title: R. W. Gutman, Director, General Accounting Office, to Robert A. Frosch,
NASA Administrator, November 11, 1977.
Document 111-24
Document title: Robert A. Frosch, NASA Administrator, to Associate Administrator for
Space and Terrestrial Applications, eta/., "NASA/University Relations," May 18, 1978,
with attached: "Policy for Academic Involvement in the NASA R&D Program."
Source: Both in University Affairs Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
These two memoranda discuss the review and reform of NASA's university relations efforts during the
latter 1970s. In these documents, NASA Administrator Robert Frosch, in concert with others, sought
to delineate the relationship between NASA and academia, as well as the activities that were appro-
p_'ate for each to undertake. Essentially, Frosch directed that NASA rely on university expertise to pro-
vide basic research relative to the mission of the agency, and he interpreted NASA's role in this arena
as being one of facilitator He was also responding to concerns expressed by the General Accounting
Office ( GA O) that NASA was conducting its university affairs program as basically open-ended sup-
port for scientists and engineers without clear program definition. By tying the research sponsored by
NASA much more closely to aerospace research and development activities under way at the agency,
Frosch helped resolve many of these concerns.
Document 111-23
[1] The Honorable Robert A. Frosch
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Dear Dr. Frosch:
November 11, 1977
The General Accounting Office just completed a survey under assignment code
952174 of NASA's administration of research grants and contracts to colleges and univer-
sities. During this survey, several aspects of NASA's university research program were iden-
tified which we believe could be improved. Before planning additional work in this area
we believe it would be mutually beneficial to both NASA and GAO to meet with you and
your representatives. The purpose of the meeting would be to present to you our survey
results and observations and to obtain your views thereon.
The specific areas we would like to discuss are:
-- increasing university competition for research projects;
-- improving the negotiation process and detailed support for the number of hours
included in a proposal;
-- the possibility of requiring NASA technical monitors to visit research sites to see
what progress is being made;
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corrective action that NASA could take when the cognizant Federal audit agency
reports accounting system deficiencies at universities having NASA research
grants and contracts; and
acquiring and disseminating technical information.
Another area to be discussed relates to administrative differences between grants and
contracts. It is not always clear as to whether a grant or a contract is the proper instrument
to fund a project. In the case of grants, grantees are not required to report how funds were
spent, grants are not audited prior to closing, and grantee-acquired equipment is not
entered in NASA's Equipment Visibility System although NASA has the option to obtain
title to this equipment upon completion of a grant.
In summary, NASA's grant and contract administration practices give the appearance
that a university assistance program is being conducted rather than a mission-oriented
research program to further the agency's [2] mission. Several NASA officials told us that
a grant is a gift and that if a university fails to comply with grant provisions, action taken
by NASA is limited to "friendly persuasion." It may be a valid position that universities
should be treated differendy than commercial entities dealing with the Government; how-
ever, this should be balanced against the responsibility Federal agencies have for steward-
ship of public funds entrusted to them.
We would like to schedule a meeting at your convenience soon after the first of
December. Arrangements for the meeting can be made with Mr. Chester S. Daniels,
Assistant Director of this Division. He can be reached by telephone on 275-3191.
Sincerely yours,
R. W. Gutman
Director
[1]
Document111-24
Memorandum
May 18, 1978
TO: E-1/Associate Administrator for Space and Terrestrial Applications
R-1/Associate Administrator for Aeronautics and Space Technology
S-I/Associate Administrator for Space Science
L-1/Associate Administrator for External Relations
FROM: A-1/Administrator
SUBJECT: NASA/University Relations
We have completed our review of the role of academic institutions in the NASA R&D
Program, and it is our intention to continue to have strong academic involvement in the
NASA R&D Program.
NASA intends to enhance and strengthen the academic participation in its research
program, particularly in those disciplines supporting our aeronautical and applications
programs.
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It isNASApolicyto involveacademicscientistsprimarilyin basicresearch.NASA
encouragesagrowingindependentacademicresearchprogram;inparticular,academic
scientistswillbegiventheopportunityohelpadvancethefrontiersofscienceandtech-
nologyinalldisciplinesof interesttotheNationinaeronauticsandspace.Cooperative
programsbetweenacademiaandin-houseNASAresearchgroupsarebeneficialndwill
continue.NASAwillencouragetheuseoffacilitiesatNASAcentersbyuniversityscientists.
NASA'spolicyshallbetoencouragec ntersofexcellenceinuniversitiesandtocoop-
eratewithacademicgroupstostrengthenthemasrequiredinresearchandeducationi
aerospacescience,ngineering,andmanagement.[2] NASA'srelationswiththeuniversitycommunitywillbeconductedinamannerthat
reflectsconcernandunderstandingfortheroleofuniversitiesineducationandresearch;
avoidsundueimpositionofburdensomer quirements;anddoesnottaxaninstitution'sfinancialresources.
Enclosedisadraftofpolicyguidelinesforuniversityrelationshipswhichwillbecon-
vertedintoanappropriatepolicystatementbytheOfficeofExternalRelations.
EachAssociateAdministrator,workingwiththeappropriateCenterDirectors,hall
prepareandsubmitbyJuly1,1978,anactionplanformyapprovalforaccomplishingthegoalsof thispolicy.Theactionplanshoulddefinethecurrentprogramwithacademic
institutions,theplanstoincreaseemphasisonindependentresearch,andthemanage-
mentapproachdesignedtoplacethesepoliciesintoaction.Afteracceptanceof these
actionplans,theAssociateAdministratorsandtheCenterDirectorswillbeheldaccount-
ablefortheconductofallacademicactivitiesundertheircontroland,inparticular,for
strengtheningacademicprogramsinbasicreative,andindependentresearchin thearea
ofapplications,aerospacescienceandengineering.
TheAssociateAdministratorforExternalRelationswillberesponsiblefornecessary
coordinationactivitiesamongprogramofficesand shouldbe keptappropriatelyinformed.
It ismyfirmbeliefthatjudiciousapplicationofthesepolicieswillresultinacombined
strongerin-houseandacademicresearchestablishment,a dastrongerandmorecreativeNASAresearchprogramin thedecadesahead.
RobertA. Frosch
[Attachment 1]
POLICY FOR ACADEMIC INVOLVEMENT
IN THE NASA R&D PROGRAM
• Academic scientists will conduct a substantial portion of the basic research in all dis-
ciplines in the NASA program.
• Academic scientists will participate directly, or through advisory groups, in all phases
of the basic research activity: conception, planning, programming, execution, analy-
sis and interpretation of the data, and publication of the results.
• Academic basic research groups will be encouraged to show independence and cre-
ativity in their work which will be subject to periodic peer evaluation.
• Basic research opportunities using specified NASA spacecraft and/or specified instru-
ments aboard a NASA spacecraft will be available to academic scientists on the basis
of open competition, evaluation of their proposal by their peers and selection by the
appropriate Associate Administrator.
• NASA's research facilities will be available for basic research by academic scientists. The
appropriate Associate Administrator and Center Director will assure access of suitable
facilities, broad notification, and proper selection of academic research projects.
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• Cooperation in basic research between academic research groups and NASA in-house
groups will be encouraged.
• Continuing research programs will be subject to peer evaluation at least once every
three years involving reviews by a group of academic and in-house scientists with rec-
ognized research competence in the discipline.
• NASA's relations with the university community will be conducted in a manner that
reflects concern and understanding for the role of universities in education and
research; avoids undue imposition of burdensome requirements; and does not tax a
university's financial resources.
Document 111-25
Document fide: NASA/University Relations Study Group, "The Universities and NASA
Space Sciences," Initial Report of the NASA/University Relations Study Group, July 1983.
Source: University Affairs Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History
Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
By the early 1980s, the entire NASA-university space science relationship was still experiencing diffi-
culties. In March and April of 1983, a special group of NASA and university representatives met to
discuss the problems in the relationship and to discuss possible short- and long-term policy solutions.
The study group was co-chaired by Thomas Donahue of the University of Michigan and Frank
McDonald of NASA Headquarters. Their initial report, reprinted here, contained a series of recom-
mendations on ways to put the relationship back on a productive footing.
The Universities and NASA Space Sciences
[ 1 ] I. Introduction
From the beginning of the space program, university scientists have played a vital role
in all phases of NASA's basic space research activity. It continues to be NASA's policy that
a substantial portion of the basic research in space science should be conducted by uni-
versity groups. The contributions from these groups have been an essential factor in the
vitality of our nation's space program. Universities not only help generate new missions,
design and build experiments, and interpret data, but most importantly, they are the
essential conduit in transferring new knowledge and technology to other elements of soci-
ety through the education and training of students.
A. NASA/University Relations: The NASA space science program has evolved over
25 years from one with a high frequency of exploratory missions, to one based primarily
on long-lived observatories and planetary orbiters. During the 60's, NASA's space science
program involved an average of 4 or 5 flight missions per year. The scientific investigations
for most of these missions were selected by a competitive process with the university
groups historically supplying some 60% of the experiments. NASA further encouraged
university participation through continuing multi-disciplinary research grants to more
than 40 universities and through the construction of 37 space science buildings or addi-
tions. To increase the number of research workers, there was a nationwide program of
NASA fellowships for graduate students. By the late 60's, more than 5,300 students had
received 3 year graduate fellowship awards. The establishment of the Space Science
Board, under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences/National Research
Council, provided university research scientists with a major role in advising NASA on sci-
ence goals and policy for the U.S. space program.
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By the early 80's the NASA launch rate of scientific satellites had declined to 1 or 2
per year. The graduate fellowship program had been dropped and the sustaining univer-
sity grants were terminated. The Office of Space Science and Applications' [OSSA]
budget, when measured in 1982 dollars, has decreased from a peak of 1.63 billion dollars
in 1964 to .95 billion in 1984. Despite this decrease, the NASA science and applications
budget remains one of the major funding sources for basic research in the United States.
There have also been programmatic changes with a natural evolution toward larger and
more complex missions as the exploratory phase of space studies has been completed.
These new missions are taking the form of long-lived observatories such as Space
Telescope and the Gamma Ray Observatory and planetary orbiters such as Galileo and
the Venus Radar Mapper. A similar evolution has taken place with Explorers and the very
exciting but technologically challenging missions such as IRAS [Infrared Astronomical
Satellite] and COBE [Cosmic Background Explorer]. This sharp decrease in flight oppor-
tunities, accompanied by significant decreases in supporting research and data analysis
funding have had the most deleterious effect, forcing drastic reductions in many univer-
sity space research groups. Furthermore, contrary to original expectations, frequent
opportunities to carry out scientific investigations on the Space Shuttle have not yet devel-
oped.
[2] B. The Role of the University:. The elements of space sciences are a part of broader
scientific disciplines, such as astronomy and astrophysics, earth and planetary sciences,
and solar and space plasma physics. In their complete form, these provide both the ratio-
nale for the NASA programs and a framework for interpreting, incorporating, and com-
municating the results of those programs. It is through the continuing development and
evolution of this disciplinary framework and the education of new scientists and engi-
neers, that the universities play their unique and essential role in NASA's space program.
There are many facets to the universities' role in the space sciences which result nat-
urally from its place in this broader spectrum of science and engineering research. In the
universities, the space sciences maintain contact with related disciplines, benefiting from
and contributing to the cross-fertilization of creative activity that stimulates innovation.
Contact between disciplines in the universities also leads to the development of new areas
of research. For example, high energy astrophysics emerged from such contact between
physics and astronomy. Similarly, space plasma physics grew out of physics, geophysics,
and solar physics. Within the universities there is the flexibility to respond to the oppor-
tunities offered by new developments in related fields of study, and there are young, inno-
vative students anxious to develop and exploit new approaches to scientific endeavors.
Perhaps the most obvious role of the universities is in the education and training of
graduate students. Students are an integral part of university research programs which are
directed toward the increase of fundamental knowledge in the various scientific and engi-
neering disciplines. The infusion of new talent, ideas, and innovation through the educa-
tion of young people in the relevant disciplines is essential in maintaining the long-term
vitality of space sciences. Equally important is the transfer of knowledge and technology
that occurs when students trained in these disciplines move to industry and the nadonal
laboratories, taking with them research skills and familiarity with advanced technology
characteristic of the space sciences.
The universities educate more than just space scientists. As the results from the space
sciences are distilled and incorporated into coherent bodies of knowledge, they become
part of the general education of all students and are eventually woven into the fabric of
society.
C. The Requirements of University Space Science: The ways in which universities
participate in space science can be broadly characterized as the formulation of new con-
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cepts and ideas, the development of new observational and experimental techniques, data
analysis and interpretation, laboratory studies and theory. The relative importance of
these various modes tends to differ among disciplines and to change with time.
Organizationally, university participation has taken many different forms, from the cre-
ation of large research centers on some campuses to the involvement of small investigator
groups at other institutions. The vitality of NASA's space science program is dependent on
establishing an adequate research base at universities as well as at the NASA centers. It
requires adequate research and analysis funding, a proper level of support for mission
operation, data analysis and theoretical research, and continuing opportunity for partic-
ipation in flight experiments.
[3] Continuity of support is a very key factor in sustaining the vitality of university research groups.
To be effective, a typical university research activity must include professional faculty, key
senior research faculty, postdoctoral fellows, and graduate students. Many activities also
require a small core staff of engineers, programmers, and technicians in order to carry
out the technical and managerial tasks characteristic of space science programs.
Continuity is also important in the many cases where the innovations of subsequent pro-
grams often arise from the experience gained in previous programs.
Continuity of support for graduate students and postdoctoral fellows is also essential.
The key element of graduate education is learning to be a researcher, a process that takes
on average 6 years in space sciences, culminating in a doctoral dissertation. Undertaking
such a lengthy educational process is feasible only if there is dependable continuity of sup-
port not only for the student, but for the university group's research program.
As a postdoctoral fellow, for a period of 2 to 3 years, the scientist continues to devel-
op as a researcher, seeking to establish a solid research program and gaining recognition
as an effective and independent scientist through the publication of research results.
Since these objectives can be accomplished only with a sustained effort over several years,
continuity of support is required during this important phase of an emerging scientist's
research career.
Effective university programs also depend on the availability of modern instrumenta-
tion and computing facilities. Modern laboratory test equipment is critical not only in the
development of new observational techniques, but also in training graduate students in
the technology which is current in industrial and federal laboratories. Effective progress
in space research depends on the existence of appropriately staffed and maintained major
laboratory facilities, which must be periodically upgraded in order to address the scien-
tific questions of greatest interest with the most modern techniques.
All of these attributes, including the provision of adequate flight opportunities, con-
tinuity of support, and the need for modern instrumentation and computing facilities, are
necessary if the space sciences are to be sufficiently challenging to retain the interest of
senior researchers, to offer realistic career opportunities to the most innovative younger
researchers, and to attract capable, motivated graduate students.
D. NASA/University Study: Both NASA and the university scientific community have
recognized for some time that a significant and undesirable erosion has occurred in the
funding level of many university space research groups. (See Appendix 2 for a brief dis-
cussion of long-term funding trends in both NASA and in NASA funding to educational
institutions.) After consultation with the Space Science Board, NASA felt that the best
approach to defning the problem was to conduct a study with broad representation from
NASA and the university community. The terms of reference and list of participants are
included as Appendix 1. This group had meetings in March and April 1983. The strategy
developed was to first explore short-term problems and issues and then spend the next
year examining longer-term policy considerations and changes that might be made to
reaffirm and/or redefine the NASA-university space science program.
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[4]A letterdescribingthestudyandrequestingcommentsfromthecommunitywasent
tosome120scientists.Thirtypercentsentwrittenresponses.Arepresentativesampleof
theselettersisincludedinAppendix 3. Members of the group also had lengthy discussions
with many university and NASA scientists. The Headquarters science discipline chiefs were
also consulted in a series of meetings on the principal needs of their research areas.
In summary, the most important areas identified by the community and the discipline
chiefs were:
1. Increase the availability of low to moderate cost flight opportunities on the Space
Shuttle, Explorers and the sub-orbital programs.
2. Improve and modernize the university space science laboratories.
3. Provide additional data analysis funding.
4. Examine the adequacy of the research and technology base fox the space science
and applications program.
Three of these areas were identified where immediate steps could be taken which
would have a positive impact on the health of university research groups. These were:
1. University Equipment Grants to provide standard laboratory equipment, as well
as larger facility instruments, to university groups actively engaged in NASA research.
2. Graduate Student Fellowships to provide financial support to graduate students
working on NASA related programs.
3. Increased Funding for Data Analysis which many programs including Voyager,
IUE [International Ultraviolet Explorer], Landsat and others, could greatly benefit from.
The specific recommendations and their rationale are given in the next three sec-
tions. Looking beyond these immediate steps the following longer range studies are
planned for the coming year:
- The Space Shuttle offers great promise for creating new experiment opportunities on
a timely basis which can be exploited at a reasonable cost. A group will be established
under the auspices of the NAsA-university relations study group to examine how
these objectives can be met.
- It is recommended that the NASA Space and Earth Science Advisory Committee
examine the research and analysis program to ensure that the various discipline areas
are being properly supported both in the development of new detectors, advanced
analysis systems, and theoretical research.
- The NASA-Center-university relations should be examined to consider means by
which this partnership could be made more effective.
[5] H. Laboratory Tools for the Space Sciences
University scientists, with their students and staff, have made major contributions
during the past quarter century in establishing the position of leadership in the space sci-
ences and exploration that the United States enjoys. This achievement was made possible
by the unique collaboration, or partnership, between the university community and
NASA, that provided the resources, planning, and long-range objectives for our national
space program. Central to this success was the recognition by NASA at the beginning of
the Space Age (e.g., 1958-64) that university scientists needed the "tools" and equipment
to design and develop innovative instrumentation for space flight, and to process and ana-
lyze the data returned from space missions. Thus, through the purchase of equipment
and facilities with funds provided by NASA, and pooling of laboratory equipment existing
in the university laboratories at that time, there came into existence well equipped facili-
ties that generated a program of imaginative scientific research in space and permitted
the training of a new generation ot investigators, engineers and managers. However, dur-
ing the past decade the equipment and special facilities acquired in the early 1960's and
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70's became obsolete and increasingly difficult to maintain. Dramatic technological
advances in space flight instrumentation made it very difficult, or impossible, to develop
"state of the art" space flight instruments with the laboratory equipment of the 1960's and
early 70's. As aging instruments have fallen into disrepair, it has become all but impossi-
ble to obtain replacement parts from industry. Consequently, technicians in the laborato-
ries are preoccupied increasingly with repair of instruments, side-tracking them from
more important tasks.
The development of experiments for future space missions requires full access to
modern technology. All too often we are now training our next generation of scientists
and engineers and designing new experiments with equipment from a past generation--
instead of equipment that will keep them and our technology on the forefront of the engi-
neering and experimental sciences. Indeed, many European and Japanese laboratories,
with which we compete, are equipped with much more modern tools than those possessed
by our own laboratories.
How did NASA and the universities fall so far behind in equipping university labora-
tories for space research and teaching of the next generation--after such an auspicious
beginning? Two factors, both based on financial support, appear to be at the root of the
problem:
1. NASA support for space experiments by university investigators is in the form of
a contract which provides for the design, fabrication and testing of the instru-
ment, followed by funds for data analysis. However, the contracts exclude funding
for the acquisition of new capital equipment or facilities to carry out the com-
mitment;
[6] 2. Since the principal support is through mission contracts, university scientists look
to supporting Research and Technology (now Research and Analysis) grants for
research and equipment funds. However, over the past decade the real level of
support in these areas has steadily, declined. Consequently, as the support
declines, an ever-increasing fraction of the funds must be used to keep students
and staff--with the result that funds for equipment become non-existent, espe-
cially for state-of-the-art equipment.
The time has come to take extraordinary steps to rectify this situation and again bring
university laboratories into the same competitive position as laboratories in other coun-
tries, or even laboratories in our own NASA centers. Clearly, this will require an infusion
of funds over a period of a few years devoted to this objective, but an early beginning is
urgently needed.
In working out a program, we may define three general classes of equipment and
facilities needed as follows:
1. Commercial laboratory equipment (e.g., oscilloscopes, test equipment, spectral
analyzers, micro-processor development systems, etc.);
2. Small and medium sized computational equipment of the micro and minicom-
puter class (e.g., computers and peripheral hardware, tape and disc drives, ter-
minals, couplers to national networks, commercial software, etc.), and interactive
hardware which becomes especially important with the evolution of "observer
class" space missions (e.g., Space Telescope, IUE, etc.);
3. Major facilities for use by several investigators collaborating at an institution (e.g.,
vibration and shock testing equipment), or for establishing interdisciplinary
research (e.g., micro-ion probes, gas analyzers, etc.) which would be used by dif-
ferent groups of investigators within an institution. Another example would be
large, fast computer facilities of the Cray class, which would be used by several
investigators and jointly by investigators at several institutions. Major facilities of
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thistyperequireperiodictechnicalsupport;andit isrecognizedthattheneces-
saryfundingsupportforthesefacilitieshouldbeprovidedbyNASAaspartofthisprogram.
Clearly,theNASADisciplineChiefswithinOSSAareclosesttotheneedsoftheinves-
tigatorsandtheirinstitutions,andarein theoptimumpositiontomakejudgmentson
whichinstitutions,investigators,andresearcherswouldbenefitthemostfromequipment
funds.Therefore,werecommendthatalineitembeidentifiedineachDisciplineChief's
budgetwhichwouldbeavailableonlyforthispurposeandwouldbefundedthroughaug-
mentationofcurrentbudgetsbytheappropriateamount.[7]A preliminarysurveybyNASAstaffindicatesthatthe following annual budget levels
for this purpose would be:
Astrophysics
Planetary Sciences
Environmental Observations
including Space Plasma Physics
and Solar Terrestrial Theory
Life Sciences
Communications, etc.
TOTAL Annual Commitment:
$3.000M
2.000M
4.000M
1.000M
1.000M
$11.000M
In view of the urgency, it is recommended that this program be instituted in the FY
1985 budget and continued at this, or higher level, for at least five years---with a somewhat
lower level in future fiscal years.
How should the NASA Discipline Chiefs decide on which institutions to focus their
attention? Suitable criteria might include:
a. The proven record of the investigators at institutions with regard to innovative
instrumentation, discovery, and exploration in their disciplines;
b. The proven record of their training graduate students;
c. Evidence that the institution has demonstrated a commitment to the space sci-
ences as an integral part of teaching, research, etc., in the departments of the
institution;
d. New institutional support where a novel and important direction of research of
interest to NASA has been identified.
A program of this type is essential for revitalizing--indeed retaining--those institu-
tions and individuals and groups within institutions concerned with the space sciences, if
they are to continue their vital role in space research and training for the 1980's and
1990's.
[9] IlL Graduate Research Fellowships
The education and training of graduate students is one of the vital roles of the
University. Training these students in space science is important to NASA and to the tech-
nology base of the country. They bring dedication and new insight to the ongoing
research program and will design and build tomorrow's new generations of spacecraft,
instrumentation, telescopes and rockets.
To attract the best students into the challenging areas of NASA activities and to reaf-
firm its commitment to graduate education, it is proposed that NASA re-establish a
program of graduate research fellowships on a smaller and more focussed [sic] scale.
Such a program would initially have 50 fellowships and would build to an annual steady
state program level of 200 students.
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The existence of such a fellowship program would constitute an announcement by
NASA that the Agency is interested once again in seeing students of the highest quality
involved in its programs and, we believe, would be a mechanism for attracting the best
students. The competitive nature of the program we propose (as well as an attractive
stipend) would help ensure that these fellowships would be regarded as prestigious
awards. Such a fellowship program would permit awardees the freedom and stability to
concentrate on their studies and research and allow them to progress through their grad-
uate studies without being dependent on a particular NASA grant or flight program.
The fellowship program would be designed to attract students at two stages in their
careers. The first of these is at the transition from undergraduate to graduate school when
the student is selecting a field of study and a university department in which he wishes to
pursue those studies. The objective of the fellowship program is to influence the best grad-
uating seniors to select some field of space science. The second group of students is that
which is at the stage of selecting and being accepted by a faculty research advisor with a
view to choosing a thesis research topic. The purpose of the fellowship award, is to induce
the best students already in a department or a university that has a space science program
to do his thesis research in that program.
The preliminary prospectus for such a program is outlined in the following para-
graphs:
Graduate Research Fellowships
Eligibility--The first class of students eligible consists of those entering graduate
school who are accepted for study in a university department with a recognized program
in some phase of space science. A list of such departments will be prepared by NASA.
Students with outstanding undergraduate records and a[n] aptitude for success in some
field of space science will be sought. Their continuing eligibility would be dependent on
their selecting a space related thesis topic. The second class are students with proven abil-
ity in graduate study.
[10] Duration--In no case will a student be eligible to maintain a NASA graduate fellow-
ship beyond the sixth year of graduate study. For students in category (a), the initial award
shall be for three years. Renewal for a second three year period will be contingent on the
student's admission to candidacy for the PhD degree and acceptance by a faculty research
advisor for a thesis research project in space science. For students in category (b), the
award should be for three years, subject to annual certification that the student is making
normal progress toward a degree and is continuing to work in space science.
Stipend--The stipend should cover the full calendar year (not only the 9-month aca-
demic year) and be comparable to the best graduate research assistantships. The stipend
should provide full tuition at whatever university the student attends (so as not to prevent
students from attending private universities having higher tuition) and a living allowance
of $13,000 per year that would be increased by $1,000 per year after each additional year
after the first, up to a maximum of $16,000.
Application--Selection of candidates entering graduate school should be based on a
one-page statement by the student describing their career goals, a transcript, G.R.E.
results, and three letters of recommendation. For advanced students, the statement
should describe the proposed research topic and one of the letters of recommendation
must be from the proposed research advisor.
Selection--Applications should be submitted to NASA Headquarters and fellows
should be selected by a board consisting of 3 members of the academic community and 3
NASA scientists, all appointed by the NASA Administrator. NASA discipline chiefs will be
asked to review and grade the proposals in the appropriate disciplines.
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Number--Approximately 50 new awards per year, of which at least 25 should be to
entering graduate students, leading to a steady state number of about 250.
Publicity--We would urge wide publicity for the selected students including, if possi-
ble, articles in Science News, Science, etc.
[ 11 ] IV. Data Analysis and Mission Operations
It is the interpretation and analysis of the data from space missions that frequently
offers the greatest intellectual challenge to researchers, post-does and graduate students.
The scientist takes the information from these remote laboratories, analyzes the data, and
uses the results to extend our knowledge of the universe. This seeking of "new knowledge"
is the primary reason for undertaking these new missions. However, as the experiments
and spacecraft have become more complex and the costs of mission operations and data
analysis have increased, the available funding has not always reflected this change.
There has also been a very positive development over the past ten years as the aver-
age lifetime of the NASA science missions has significantly increased. This enhanced
longevity is due in large measure to the increase in space engineering experience and the
development of a sophisticated technology base. Despite the decrease in launch rate,
there are now some 14 active satellites returning valuable new data to a large number of
space experimenters and guest investigators.
This increase in spacecraft lifetime frequently offers a very cost effective means of
achieving new, high priority scientific objectives---objectives which were not part of the
spacecraft's original intended mission. For example, ISEE-3 has been moved from the
Lagrangian point 8,000,000 km in front of the Earth to a close lunar fly-by with repeated
passes through the distant geomagnetic tail region. It will be the first detailed survey of
this very dynamic portion of our magnetosphere. Later this year, ISEE-3 will be redirect-
ed toward the first encounter with a comet--Giacobini-Zinner in 1985. After completing
its fly-by of Jupiter and Saturn, Voyager 2 has now been targeted for a Uranus encounter
in 1986 and Neptune in 1989--thus making it possible to accomplish most of the objec-
tives of the original "Grand Tour." Pioneer 10, now in its 12th year, is exploring the dis-
tant heliosphere beyond 30 AU and discovering a number of unexpected phenomena.
ISEE I and II, Pioneer-Venus and IMP-8 [Interplanetary Monitoring Platform] are study-
ing the changes that occur in the Earth's magnetosphere, the atmosphere of Venus and
the interplanetary medium as the level of solar activity begins to significantly decrease.
IUE has an ahnost unlimited number of classes of astronomical objects that are being
observed for the first time in the ultra-violet portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Nimbus-7 is in its fifth year of operation and its data set of earth observations is now long
enough to permit study of long-term trends, interannual variations, and questions of cli-
mate. This fleet of active satellites is currently one of space science's greatest assets.
The Landsat programs produced vast quantities of high resolution imagery of the
[E]arth's surface. As with the operational meteorological satellites, there is a significant
need to analyze this data as part of scientific research into the fimctioning of the Earth.
Extended analysis of this type of data must be established in the university community as
an integral part of space science research or else this available wealth of information will
not be adequately used for furthering the understanding of our own planet.
[ 12] The costs associated with the extended phases of these missions are generally mod-
est, since most production and analysis programs have already been developed and only
require updating. However, the funding levels for data analysis and mission operations
have not been adequate to realize the full scientific return from this sustained and avail-
able flow of scientific data.
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In fiscal year 1983, the data analysis and mission operation budget is about $155M or
approximately 15% of the OSSA total budget. $14M of this was added by Congressional
appropriations committees to ensure the continuation of such key programs as Pioneer-
Venus and Pioneer 10. It is proposed that this be increased by $20M per year with most of
this increased allocation going to University groups. This increase in data analysis funding
will have an enormous impact on the vitality of the space science program.
A survey of the data analysis requirements was made by the NASA headquarter's [sic]
discipline chiefs and the following augmentations were proposed:
Data Analysis Requirements
Solar System Exploration
Inner Planets Data Analysis
(Mariner 10, Lunar Orbiter, PVO)
Outer Planets Data Analysis
(Viking, Voyager, Pioneer 10/11 )
$4M/_
$6M/_
Astrophysics
Solar & Heliospheric Physics
(SMM Guest Investigators, 0S0-7, 0S0-8)
Astronomy & Relativity
(OAt 2 & 3, Increase IUE)
High Energy Astrophysics
(HEAt-I, 2, 3, SAS-3)
$1M/_
$1M/_
$2M/_
Environmental Observations
Space Plasma Physics
(IMP-8, AE, ISEE-I, 2, 3)
Climate Research
(Nimbus 6 & 7, Sage l)
Upper Atmosphere Research
(Nimbus 4, 6 & 7, Sage, SME)
Global Weather, Tropical Air Quality
(GOES, GMS, TIROS-N, NOAA-D, E, F)
$1M/_
$1M/_
$1M/_
$3M/_
[ 13] V. Future Studies
The most important area identified by the community was increasing the availability
of low-cost flight opportunities via the Space Shuttle, Explorers, and the sub-orbital pro-
grams. This is a challenging task that requires more detailed study. The implementation
of a more effective Explorer program should be pursued by the Space Science Board,
NASA Headquarters and the NASA field centers. The current sub-orbital program is a
good way for graduate students to conduct small but scientifically significant experiments
which complement larger missions. The Space Shuttle offers great promise for creating
new experimental opportunities. With the current flight plans, there should be frequent
flight opportunities which can be exploited at a reasonable cost. The time scale from pro-
ject approval to launch should be on the order of 18 months. It is not surprising that the
great promise of the Shuttle for science has not been fully realized. The Shuttle itself has
just reached operational status. Scientists and the manned program both need to learn
how to use this new transportation system to greater advantage for science. The Study
Group strongly urges that NASA establish a panel to study the Spacelab experience and
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makerecommendationsnewapproaches.Itwouldbehighlydesirabletohavethistask
completedoverthenext8-10months.
TheresearchandanalysisfundingprovidestheresearchbasefortheNASAscience
programbothattheuniversitiesandattheNASAcenters.Overtheyearstherehavebeen
substantialchangesin theNASAprogram.TheStudyGrouprecommendsthata re-
examinationoftheR&A[ResearchandApplications]programbemadeto ensurethat
thevariousdisciplineareasarebeingproperlysupportedbothin thedevelopmentofnew
detectors,advancedanalysissystemsandtheoreticalresearch.It isrecommendedthatthis
studybeundertakenbytheSpaceandEarthScienceAdvisoryCommittee.
TheNASAcentersinmanagingthespacemissionsandsub-orbitalprogramsplaya
crucialrolein thespacescienceprogram.Thecentersalsomaintainstrongin-house
researchprograms.It isimportanttore-evaluateth University-NASACenterrelationship,
bothin themanagementofspacemissionsandexperimentsa wellastheirrelativeroles
in theconductofspacesciences.In thelongertermactivityoftheStudyGroup,acom-
mitteewill beformedincludingrepresentationfromall theNASAcenterstrongly
involvedin spacescienceanduniversityrepresentativestoconsiderwaysin whichthe
NASA-Universitypartnershipmaybemademoreeffective.Specificquestionsto be
consideredincludetheinterchangeof NASAanduniversitypersonnelatseverallevels,
methodsofmakingcenterfacilities,includinglargecomputersystems,moreaccessibleto
universityusers,andmethodsofprovidingcentermanagementa dtechnicalexpertiseto
universityprincipalinvestigators.
[1]
Appendix I
Study of NASA-University Relations in Space Sciences
Terms of Reference
I. Motivation for Study
The agency recognizes that the benefits to the nation from a vital university space sci-
ence program are large and diverse, and extend beyond the areas of scientific inquiry;
that university-based space science research is a national resource which cannot be dupli-
cated or obtained elsewhere; and that a healthy space science program at U.S. universities
is essential to the agency space science program.
The nation's space science program has evolved so there is now greater emphasis on
long-lived space observatories. These programmatic changes combined with a decline in
the funding of the space science program has led to a marked decrease in new opportu-
nities for flight experiments and to a decline in the viability of many long established
research groups.
While there may have been early expectations that the university-based program
could adjust itself at an appropriate level to support the agency space science program,
there is now a growing body of evidence which strongly indicates that university relations
and the resource represented in university space science will soon be insufficient to sup-
port current levels of the space science program in the agency.
II. General Approach to the Study
The agency, after consultation with the Space Science Board and other outside
groups, feels that the best approach to the problem is a study with broad representation
from NASA and the university community. The information resources (statistics, manage-
ment personnel, and contract network to the universities) are on hand within the agency.
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However, the programmatic changes related to both the evolution of the flight program
and the decrease in the number of flight activities depends on a combined
NASA/University discussion. Of greater importance is the understanding of conditions in
the university laboratories that can only be supplied by representatives from all levels of
university-based space science (researchers, program managers, university administra-
tors), and they should possess knowledge of the problems adequate at their respective
levels to serve as representatives of their communities. The agency will assume responsi-
bility for the management of the study and the study report.
[2] IlL Tasks for Study Group
A study group consisting of approximately 12 people drawn from NASA and the uni-
versity community will:
• Assess the health of university space science research groups and identify the problems.
• Examine, and redefine if necessary, the role of university groups in NASA future space
science program.
• Identify the essential steps which must be taken in the agency and universities to
restore university space science to a viable level.
• Present conclusions and recommendations to appropriate outside groups for com-
ment and assessment and to the Space Science Board and to NASA management for
review and action.
IV. Methodology
• Organizational meeting to pose the problem and scope of the study (2 1/2 days--
early March 1983).
• Period of information gathering (statistics, funding trends, student trends, program
trends) (April-June 1983).
- Individual visits
- Regional meetings/workshops
- Study groups, representatives meeting with appropriate groups (NASA centers,
university research groups, research administrators)
- Collection of statistics
• Synthesis of data and information (mid-July 1983, one week).
• Determine follow-on as necessary.
[1]
Appendix 2
Funding Trends in NASA's Space
Science and Applications Program
In this appendix, the long term funding trends in both the total NASA appropriation
and the Office of Space Science and Application's [sic] (OSSA) portion of that budget are
briefly examined. All of these budget numbers have been converted to 1982 dollars in
order to compare the variation of equivalent real purchasing power. In Figure 1, the total
NASA funding is shown for the 1960-1984 period. The corresponding OSSA numbers are
also shown, but have been multiplied by a factor of 10 to emphasize the relative variation
of the OSSA budget to the total NASA appropriation. The OSSA data has been compiled
by the Administration and Resources Management Division of NASA's Office of Space
Science and Applications. They have taken into account the reorganization and changing
program office responsibilities that have occurred during this time.
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Over a period of 3-5 years, there can be large variations in the annual OSSA funding
level .... The most disturbing trend is the decrease fiom 1.55 billion dollars in 1973 to 0.9
billion in 1982. Most of this decrease occurred in the planetary program .... These
changes reflect the launch of the Viking and Voyager spacecraft and the stretch-out of the
Galileo program. However, there are reductions in other areas that also have a large
impact on the science program. There has been a steady decrease in the annual appro-
priations for research and analysis in the space science area .... while the level in space
applications has remained relatively constant. As emphasized in the main body of the text,
this support is of great importance in maintaining the _Jtality of research groups ....
[2]... [3] NASA total tianding to universities has been almost exactly 3% of the total
appropriations liom 1973 to 1984 (Table 1). However, in 1982 dollars, there is a decrease
from 261.3M in 1973 to 177.6 in 1983. It is this very large decrease in the real funding level
that is the key problem in maintaining NASA research programs at the universities.
The marked decrease in the number of flight opportunities, (see Table 2), has been
an additional factor that has greatly affected space science research groups. This change
is more complex, since it represents both a decrease in the available funding, as well as a
move to larger, more expensive missions.
Table 1
Total NASA Funding to Educational Institutions
Total NASA % of Univ.
R&D Obligations Real Year in Constant Funding to Total
Year 1982 $(millions) $(millions) FY 1982 Dollars NASA Funding
1973 7,710 114.9 261.3 3.0%
1974 6,42t) 100.9 214.0 3.0 %
1975 6,160 112.4 215.1 3.0%
1976 6,210 122.5 215.1 3.0%
1977 6,030 124.9 198.0 3.0%
1978 5,950 135.3 199.0 3.0%
1979 6,100 147.8 198.5 2.8%
1980 6,330 177.3 215.1 3.0%
1981 6,010 191.1 209.1 3.0%
1982 6,020 185.6 185.6 3.0%
1983 6,210 197.2 177.6 2.8%
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[4] Table 2
NASA Space Science and Applications Launches
Year # of I_unches 5 Year Average/Year
1958 1
1959 4 --
1960 2
1961 3
1962 4 3.8
1963 3
1964 7 --
1965 7
1966 5
1967 8 6.2
1968 5
1969 6 --
1970 2
1971 4
1972 4 4.2
1973 6
1974 5 --
1975 7
1976 1
1977 5 4.O
1978 6
1979 1 --
1980 1
1981 2
1982 0 1.0
1983 1
1984 1 --
Document 111-26
Document tide: Section 201 of Title II of Public Law 100-147, "National Space Grant
College and Fellowship Program," October 30, 1987.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
During the administration of Ronald Reagan, 1981 to 1989, Congress passed the "National Space
Grant and Fellowship Act" as a means of making funding available to institutions of higher learn-
ing for the revitalization of the scientific and engineering disciplines. The act was deliberately mod-
eled on the Morrill Land Grant College Act of the 1860s, which provided land for public sale with
the proceeds going to public universities. The 1987 act created "space grant" universities and con-
sortia eligible for public funds to foster aerospace research and development and education.
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[no pagination]
Title IImNational Space Grant College and
Fellowship Program
Sec. 201. This title may be cited at the "National Space Grant College and Fellowship
Ac t."
Sec. 202. The Congress finds that-
(l) the vitality of the Nation and the quality of life of the citizens of the Nation
depend increasingly on the understanding, assessment, development, and utilization
of space resources;
(2) research and development of space science, space technology, and space
commercialization will contribute to the quality of life, national security, and the
enhancement of commerce;
(3) the understanding and development of the space frontiers require a broad
commitment and an intense involvement on the part of the Federal Government in
partnership with State and local governments, private industry, universities, organiza-
tions, and individuals concerned with the exploration and utilization of space;
(4) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, through the national
space grant college and fellowship program, offers the most suitable means for such
commitment and involvement through the promotion of activities that will result in
greater understanding, assessment, development, and utilization; and
(5) Federal support of the establishment, development, and operation of pro-
grams and projects by space grant colleges, space grant regional consortia, institutions
of higher education, institutes, laboratories, and other appropriate public and private
entities is the most cost-effective way to promote such activities.
Sec. 203. The purposes of this title are to-
(l) increase the understanding, assessment, development, and utilization of
space resources by promoting a strong educational base, responsive research and
training activities, and broad and prompt dissemination of knowledge and tech-
niques;
(2) utilize the abilities and talents of the universities of the Nation to support and
contribute to the exploration and development of tile resources and opportunities
afforded by the space environment;
(3) encourage and support the existence of interdisciplinary and multidiscipli-
nary programs of space research within the university community of the Nation, to
engage in integrated activities of training, research and public service, to have coop-
erative programs with industry, and to be coordinated with the overall program of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
(4) encourage and support the existence of consortia, made up of university and
industry members, to advance the exploration and development of space resources in
cases in which national objectives can be better fulfilled than through the programs
of single universities;
(5) encourage and support Federal funding for graduate fellowships in fields
related to space; and
(6) support activities in colleges and universities generally for the purpose of
creating and operating a network of institutional programs that will enhance achieve-
ments resulting from efforts under this title.
Sec. 204. As used in this chapter, the term--
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(1) "Administration" means the National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
(2) "Administrator" means the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration;
(3) "aeronautical and space activities" has the meaning given to such term in sec-
tion 2452(1) of this title;
(4) "field related to space" means any academic discipline or field of study
(including the physical, natural, and biological sciences, and engineering, space tech-
nology, education, economics, sociology, communications, planning, law, interna-
tional affairs, and public administration) which is concerned with or likely to improve
the understanding, assessment, development, and utilization of space;
(5) "panel" means the space grant review panel established pursuant to section
2486h of this title;
(6) "person" means any individual, any public or private corporation, partner-
ship, or other association or entity (including any space grant college, space grant
regional consortium, institution of higher education, institute, or laboratory), or any
State, political subdivision of a State, or agency or officer of a State or political subdi-
vision of a State;
(7) "space environment" means the environment beyond the sensible atmos-
phere of the Earth;
(8) "space grant college" means any public or private institution of higher
education which is designated as such by the Administrator pursuant to section 2486f
of this title;
(9) "space grant program" means any program which m
(A) is administered by any space grant college, space grant regional consor-
tium, institution of higher education, institute, laboratory, or State or local
agency; and
(B) includes two or more projects involving education and one or more of
the following activities in the fields related to space--
(i) research,
(ii) training, or
(iii) advisory services;
(10) "space grant regional consortium" means any association or other alliance
which is designated as such by the Administrator pursuant to section 2486f of this tide;
(11 ) "space resource" means any tangible or intangible benefit which can only be
realized from-
(A) aeronautical and space activities; or
(B) advancements in any field related to space; and
(12) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or any other territory or possession
of the United States.
Sec. 205. (a) The Administrator shall establish and maintain, within the
Administration, a program to be known as the national space grant college and fellowship
program. The national space grant college and fellowship program shall consist of the
financial assistance and other activities provided for in this chapter. The Administrator
shall establish long-range planning guidelines and priorities, and adequately evaluate the
program.
(b) Within the Administration, the program shall-
(l) apply the long-range planning guidelines and the priorities established by the
Administrator under subsection (a) of this section;
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(2)advisetheAdministratorwithrespecttotheexpertiseandcapabilitieswhich
areavailablethroughthenationalspacegrantcollegeandfellowshiprogram,and
makesuchexpertiseavailabletotheAdministrationasdirectedbytheAdministrator;(3)evaluateactivitiesconductedundergrantsandcontractsawardedpursuantto
sections2486dand2486eofthistidetoassurethatthepurposessetforthinsection
2486aofthistitleareimplemented;(4)encourageotherFederaldepartments,agencies,andinstrumentalities to use
and take advantage of the expertise and capabilities which are available through the
national space grant college and fellowship program, on a cooperative or other basis;
(5) encourage cooperation and coordination with other Federal programs con-
cerned with the development of space resources and fields related to space;
(6) advise tile Administrator on the designation of recipients supported by the
national space grant college and fellowship program and, in appropriate cases, on the
termination or suspension of any such designation; and
(7) encourage tile formation and growth of space grant and fellowship programs.
(c) To carry out the provisions of this chapter, the Administrator may-
(l) accept conditional or unconditional gifts or donations of services, money, or
property, real, personal or mixed, tangible or intangible;
(2) accept and use funds from other Federal departments, agencies, and instru-
mentalities to pay for fellowships, grants, contracts, and other transactions; and
(3) issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary and appropriate.
Sec. 206. (a) The Administrator may make grants and enter into contracts or other
transactions under this subsection to assist any space grant and fellowship program or pro-
ject if the Administrator finds that such program or project will carry out the purposes set
forth in secdon 2486a of this title. The total amount paid pursuant to any such grant or
contract may equal 66 percent, or any lesser percent, of the total cost of the space grant
and fellowship program or project involved, except that this limitation shall not apply in
the case of grants or contracts paid for with funds accepted by the Administrator pursuant
to section 2486c(c) (2) of this title.
(b) The Administrator may make special grants under this subsection to carry out the
purposes set forth in section 2486a of this tide. The amount of any such grant may equal
100 percent, or any lesser percent, of the total cost of the project involved. No grant may
be made under this subsection, unless the Administrator finds that-
(l) no reasonable means is available through which the applicant can meet the
matching requirement for a grant under subsection (a) of this section;
(2) the probable benefit of such project outweighs the public interest in such
matching requirement; and
(3) the same or equivalent benefit cannot be obtained through the award of a
contract or grant under subsection (a) of this section or section 2486e of this title.
(c) Any person may apply to the Administrator for a grant or contract under this sec-
tion. Application shall be made in such form and manner, and with such content and
other submissions, as the Administrator shall by regulation prescribe.
(d) (1) Any grant made, or contract entered into, under this section shall be subject
to the limitations and provisions set forth in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection
and to such other terms, conditions and requirements as the Administrator considers
necessary or appropriate.
(2) No payment under any grant or contract under this section may be applied
to-
(A) the purchase of any land;
(B) the purchase, construction, preservation, or repair of any building; or
(C) the purchase or construction of any launch facility, or launch vehicle.
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(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, the items in subparagraphs
(A), (B), and (C) of such paragraph may be leased upon written approval of the
Administrator.
(4) Any person who receives or utilizes any proceeds of any grant or contract
under this section shall keep such records as the Administrator shall by regulation
prescribe as being necessary and appropriate to facilitate effective audit and evalua-
tion, including records which fully disclose the amount and disposition by such recip-
ient of such proceeds, the total cost of the program or project in connection with
which such proceeds were used, and the amount, if any, of such cost which was pro-
vided through other sources. Such records shall be maintained for three years after
the completion of such a program or project. The Administrator and the Comptroller
General of the United States, or any of their duly authorized representatives, shall
have access, for the purpose of audit and evaluation, to any books, documents, papers
and records of receipts which, in the opinion of the Administrator or the Comptroller
General, may be related or pertinent to such grants and contracts.
Sec. 207. (a) The Administrator shall identify specific national needs and problems
relating to space. The Administrator may make grants or enter into contracts under this
section with respect to such .needs or problems. The amount of any such grant or contract
may equal 100 percent, or any lesser percent, of the total cost of the project involved.
(b) Any person may apply to the Administrator for a grant or contract under this sec-
tion. In addition, the Administrator may invite applications with respect to specific
national needs or problems identified under subsection (a) of this section. Application
shall be made in such form and manner, and with such content and other submissions, as
the Administrator shall by regulation prescribe. Any grant made, or contract entered into,
under this section shall be subject to the limitations and provisions set forth in section
2486d(d) (2) and (4) of this tide and to such other terms, conditions, and requirements
as the Administrator considers necessary or .appropriate.
Sec. 208. (a) (1) The Administrator may designate--
(A) any institution of higher education as a space grant college; and
(B) any association or other alliance of two or more persoris, other than indi-
viduals, as a space grant regional consortium.
(2) No institution of higher education may be designated as a space grant col-
lege, unless the Administrator finds that such institution-
(A) is maintaining a balanced program of research, education, training, and
advisory services in fields related to space;
(B) will act in accordance with such guidelines as are prescribed under sub-
section (b) (2) of this section; and
(C) meets such other qualifications as the Administrator considers necessary
or appropriate.
(3) No association or other alliance of two or more persons may be designated as
a space grant regional consortium, unless the Administrator finds that such associa-
tion or alliance-
(A) is established for the purpose of sharing expertise, research, educational
facilities or training facilities, and other capabilities in order to facilitate research,
education, training, and advisory services, in any field related to space;
(B) will encourage and follow a regional approach to solving problems or
meeting needs relating to space, in cooperation with appropriate space grant col-
leges, space grant programs, and other persons in the region;
(C) will act in accordance with such guidelines as are prescribed under sub-
section (b) (2) of this section; and
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(D)meetsuchotherqualificationsa theAdministratorconsidersnecessary
orappropriate.(b)TheAdministratorshallbyregulationprescribe-(I) thequalificationsrequiredtobemetundersubsection(a)(2)(C)and(3)(D)
ofthissection;and
(2)guidelinesrelatingtotheactivitiesandresponsibilitiesof pacegrantcolleges
andspacegrantregionalconsortia.
(c) TheAdministratormay,forcauseandafteranopportunityforhearing,suspend
or terminateanydesignationu dersubsection(a)ofthissection.
Sec.209.(a)TheAdministratorshallsupportaspacegrantfellowshiprogramto
provideducationalndtrainingassistancetoqualifiedindividualsatthegraduatel vel
of educationin fieldsrelatedto space.SuchfellowshipsshallbeawardedpursuanttoguidelinesestablishedbytheAdministrator.Spacegrantfellowshipsshallbeawardedto
individualsatspacegrantcolleges,pacegrantregionalconsortia,othercollegesandinsti-
tutionsofhighereducation,professionalassociations,andinstitutesinsuchamanneras
toassurewidegeographicandinstitutionaldiversityin thepursuitofresearchunderthe
fellowshiprogram.
(b)Thetotalamountwhichmaybeprovidedforgrantsunderthespacegrantfel-
lowshiprogramduringanyfiscalyearshallnotexceedanamountequalto50percentof
thetotalfundsappropriatedforsuchyearpursuanttothischapter.(c) Nothingin thissectionshallbeconstruedtoprohibitheAdministratorfrom
sponsoringanyresearchfellowshiprogram,includinganyspecialemphasisprogram,
whichisestablishedunderanauthorityotherthanthischapter.
Sec.210.(a)TheAdministratorshallestablishanindependentcommitteeknownas
thespacegrantreviewpanel,whichshallnotbesubjecttotheprovis[i]onsoftheFederal
AdvisoryCommitteeAct(5U.S.C.App.;PublicLaw92-463).(b)Thepanelshalltakesuchstepsasmaybenecessarytoreview,andshalladvisethe
Administratorwithrespectto--(l) applicationsorproposalsfor,andperformanceunder,grantsandcontracts
awardedpursuanttosections2486dand2486eofthistitle;(2) thespacegrantfellowshipprogram;(3) thedesignationa doperationofspacegrantcollegesandspacegrantregion-
alconsortia,ndtheoperationofspacegrantandfellowshipprograms;(4) theformulationandapplicationof theplanninguidelinesandpriorities
pursuanttosection2486c(a)and(b)(1)ofthistitle;and(5)suchothermattersastheAdministratorrefersto thepanelforreviewand
advice.
(c) TheAdministratorshallmakeavailabletothepanelanyinformation,personnel
andadministratives rvicesandassistancewhichisreasonabletocarryouttheduties of
the panel.
(d) (1) The Administrator shall appoint the voting members of the panel. A majori-
ty of the voting members shall be individuals who, by reason of knowledge, experi-
ence, or training, are especially qualified in one or more of the disciplines and fields
related to space. The other voting members shall be individuals who, by reason of
knowledge, experience or training, are especially qualified in, or representative of,
education, extension services, State government, industry, economics, planning, or
any other activity related to efforts to enhance the understanding, assessment, devel-
opment, or utilization of space resources. The Administrator shall consider the poten-
tial conflict of interest of any individual in making appointments to the panel.
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(2) The Administrator shall select one voting member to serve as the Chairman
and another voting member to serve as the Vice Chairman. The Vice Chairman shall
act as Chairman in the absence or incapacity of the Chairman.
(3) Voting members of the panel who are not Federal employees shall be reim-
bursed for actual and reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of such
duties.
(4) The panel shall meet on a biannual basis and, at any other time, at the call of
the Chairman or upon the request of a majority of the voting members or of the
Administrator.
(5) The panel may exercise such powers as are reasonably necessary in order to
carry out the duties enumerated in subsection (b) of this section.
Sec. 211. Each department, agency or other instrumentality of the Federal
Government which is engaged in or concerned with, or which has authority over, matters
relating to space-
(l) may, upon a written request from the Administrator, make available, on a
reimbursable basis or otherwise, any personnel (with their consent and without prej-
udice to their position and rating), service, or facility which the Administrator con-
siders necessary to carry out any provision of this chapter;
(2) may, upon a written request from the Administrator, furnish any available
data or other information which the Administrator considers necessary to carry out
any provision of this chapter; and
(3) may cooperate with the Administration.
Sec. 212. (a) The Administrator shall submit to the Congress and the President, not
later than January 1, 1989, and not later than February 15 of every odd-numbered year
thereafter, a report on the activities of the national space grant and fellowship program.
(b) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President shall
have the opportunity to review each report prepared pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section. Such Directors may submit, for inclusion in such report, comments and recom-
mendations and an independent evaluation of the national space grant college and fel-
lowship program. Such comments and recommendations shall be submitted to the
Administrator not later than 90 days before such a report is submitted pursuant to sub-
section (a) of this section and the Administrator shall include such comments and rec-
ommendations as a separate section in such report.
Sec. 213. The Administrator shall not under this chapter designate any space grant
college or space grant regional consortium or award any fellowship, grant, or contract
unless such designation or award is made in accordance with the competitive, merit-based
review process employed by the Administration on the date of enactment of this Act.
Sec. 214. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated for the purposes of carrying
out the provisions of this chapter sums not to exceed-
(l) $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 1988 and 1989; and
(2) $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 1990 and 1991.
(b) Such sums as may be appropriated under this section shall remain available until
expended.
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Document 111-27
Document title: NASA Commercial Space Policy, October 1984.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The Reagan administration placed a high value on privatizing many government services and activ-
ities. This perspective extended to space and was coupled with the optimistic viewpoint that space
commerce held the potential of growing into a multibillion dollar annual enterprise. In 1984, the
administration released a National Commercial Space Policy, which outlined its views in this area.
NASA responded soon after with its own commercial space policy, which attempted to redefine the
agency _ role, including being a partner with U.S. industry in exploring various areas of space
commercialization.
[ii]
[iii]
[iv]
NASA Commercial Space Policy
Encouraging Private Enterprise in Space
The purpose of this Policy is to prepare NASA for expanding its mission in
a new direction--the fostering of commercial enterprises in space.
This Policy, and accompanying Implementation Plan were drawn up by
representatives from NASA headquarters and field centers. These reJrresen-
tatives looked at the commercial possibilities in space and how NASA can
encourage more private industrial ventures in orbit.
To supplement their perspective, the NASA representatives sought and
received advice from experts in industry and universities as well as other
outside specialists.
The United States Government will provide a climate conducive to expand-
ed private sector investment and involvement in civil space activities ....
President Ronald Reagan
in his National Space Policy, July 4, 1982
We should establish a policy which would encourage commercialization of
space technolo_; to the maximum extent feasible.
Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Report, April 15, 1983
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The Committee is fully supportive of efforts by the private sector to invest
and seek commercial opportunities in space.
Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, U.S. Senate,
Report, May 15, 1983
The extent to which past investment in space technology contributes to our
future economic well-being and national growth will depend in large mea-
sure on policies and actions taken in a spirit of collaboration by the Federal
Government and industry.
Unless the public and private sector join to develop the opportunities pre-
sented by new space technologies and unless entrepreneurial forces are
engaged more fully, the United States wiU fall behind in the contest for lead-
ership in space and the economic rewards associated with that position.
[vl
May 1983 Report,
National Academy of Public Administration
Preamble
The new chapter in the U. S. space program that opened early in this decade with the
first flights of the Shuttle is now reaching a new phase: space technology is ripe for its tran-
sition from exploration to major exploitation, from experimentation to expanded prof-
itable commercial uses.
To examine the opportunities for and impediments to expanded commercial activi-
ties in space, NASA formed a Task Force in mid-1983.
The Task Force's conclusions are straightforward:
• Commercial activities in space by private enterprise should be expanded now if our
nation is to retain and improve its leadership in science and technology, its high liv-
ing standards, and its advantage in international trade.
• Natural and bureaucratic barriers inhibiting the commercialization of space need to
be and can be lessened or removed through joint actions by the Government and pri-
vate enterprises.
• With firm resolve and the commitment of reasonable resources over a number of
years, Government and private enterprise working together can turn space into a
realm of immense benefit for our nation.
• A positive NASA Commercial Space Policy should be implemented to expedite the
expansion of self-sustaining, profit-earning, tax-paying, jobs-providing commercial
space activities.
[vi] The NASA Commercial Space Policy supports commercial space activities through:
• Reducing the risks of doing business in space to levels competitive with conventional
investments.
- To reduce technical risks, NASA will conduct and stimulate additional research
relevant to commercial developments in space.
- To reduce financial risks, NASA will provide easy and inexpensive access to orbit
as well as to experimental ground facilities.
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- Toreduceinstitutionalrisks,NASAwillhelpremoveproceduralimpediments,
offerorganizationalsupport,andmaintainconsistentpoliciesregardingitsrela-
tionshipwithcommercialspaceventures.
Reachingoutandestablishingewlinkswiththeprivatesectortostimulatehedevel-
opmentofprivatebusinessesin pace.
- NASAwillexpanditstraditionallinkswiththeaerospaceindustryandacademiato
alsoembraceotherindustriessuchasnewhigh-technologyentrepreneurialven-
turesandthefinancialandnon-aerospaceindustrialndacademiccommunities.
- NASAwillexpandandtargetdisseminationfscientificnformationtostimulate
domesticspacecommerceprojects.
- NASAwillusepublicannouncements,interviews,peeches,pressreleases,and
articlesin technicalndbusinessjournalsto provideinformationaboutcom-
mercializationpportunitiesanditscommercializationactivitiestoindustry,acad-
emia,andtheAmericanpublic....
[1]
NASA Commercial Space Policy
Introduction
NASA's thrust into the future is taking a new turn: NASA is encouraging free enter-
prise to participate in space by inviting industries and other private entities to finance and
conduct business in space.
Private investment in space is called "space commercialization." Commercial projects
would aim at developing profitable products and services in space for sale to consumers
on Earth and for other space activities.
The NASA Policy to stimulate the commercialization of space will give new impetus
and importance to traditional space efforts. At the same time, the Policy will give private
enterprises the extra push they need to get started with permanent self-sustaining, tax rev-
enue-producing establishments that will generate unique goods, well-paying jobs, and new
outlets for innovation and ingenuity in space and on the Earth. The rewards can be
immense for our nation.
The Policy calls for new ways of thinking about space. It requires revision and inno-
vation in the traditional approaches and outlook. It calls for new roles by and alterations
in relationships between NASA and private enterprises.
NASA has accumulated a long and proud history of working closely and productively
with private enterprises. NASA-space programs have been based on participation and con-
tributions by a trio of segments in our society--Government, industry, and academic insti-
tutions.
Since its earliest days, NASA has employed industries and universities as contractors.
Since 1962, NASA has provided launch services for privately-owned commercial commu-
nications satellites. Beginning in 1972, NASA has entered into "partnership" arrange-
ments with private firms for the commercial use of space. Now, the nature and character
of NASA's relationship with private enterprise is changing still more. To persuade private
investors to become involved in new space endeavors, NASA must be responsive to the
needs and wants of these investors.
NASA must assure these investors of reliable and dependable roundtrip transporta-
tion for their projects between Earth and orbit. NASA must also help assure the availabil-
ity of suitable work places for industries in orbit.
NASA will need to expand its basic research--with the advice of these customers and
partners---to make sure it is relevant and helpful to private space ventures.
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NASAmustshareitsexperienceandknow-how,includingresearchinformationand
NASApatents.NASAwillneedtoestablishpacecommercializationoffices [2] at its head-
quarters and field centers to coordinate the new relationships with private investors.
There may be opportunity for specialized companies to serve as, intermediaries---
bridges--between NASA and private investors in space endeavors.
These and other approaches are outlined in the new NASA Commercial Space Policy
on the following pages.
Space commercialization can have profound impact on the future of our Nation. We
already know from our experiences with highly profitable, privately-owned communica-
tions satellites that free enterprise in space can work well. New leaps in technology which
are likely to emerge from private initiatives in space could have major implications for the
national economy, individual living standards and life styles, industrial activities and jobs
and international trade.
The NASA Commercial Space Policy is designed to provide a foundation and frame-
work for facilitating the realization of these opportunities.
[3]
NASA Commercial Space Policy
Executive Summary
Introduction
President Reagan, in his National Space Policy of July 4, 1982, made the expansion of
private investment and involvement in space, a major objective of the United States
Government. Committee reports from both Houses of Congress strongly endorsed this
thrust in 1983. Supporting statements also have come from studies by non-government
groups.
Opportunities for benefiting the nation are significant. Commercial space endeavors
offer the potential for new industries, new jobs, lower product costs and'an improved bal-
ance of trade. Technological advances from commercial use of space could help conquer
diseases, produce computers faster and smarter than presently exist, develop metals
lighter and stronger than any presently known, increase communications and informa-
tion availability around the world and enhance our understanding of our environment
and its resources.
NASA's Commercial Space Policy is designed to encourage private involvement in
commercial endeavors in space to help take advantage of these opportunities. The Policy
introduces approaches and incentives to reduce the risks inherent in commercial space
ventures to levels competitive with conventional investments.
This "Executive Summary" presents an overview of the goals and principles of the
NASA Commercial Space Policy, as well as a summary of major new initiatives NASA will
implement to stimulate private investment in commercial space ventures.
Goals and Principles
The primary goal of NASA's Commercial Space Policy is to encourage and stimulate
free enterprise in space.
Private investments in space, in turn, are expected to (a) yield important economic
advantages; (b) advance science and technology; (c) help maintain in U.S. space leader-
ship; and (d) enhance the nation's competitive position in international trade, thereby
improving the in [-]U.S. balance of payments.
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Implementation of the NASA Commercial Space Policy is to be guided by these five
principles:
1. The Government should reach out to and establish new links with the p_vate sector.
NASA will broaden its traditional links with the aerospace industry and the science
community to include relationships with major non-aerospace [4] firms, new entre-
preneurial ventures, aswell as the financial and academic communities.
2. Regardless of the Government's view of a project's feasitn'lity, it should not impede private
efforts to undertake commercial space ventures.
If the private sector is willing to make the necessary investment, the project's feasibil-
ity should allowed to be determined by the marketplace and the creativity of the
entrepreneur rather than the Government's opinion of its viability.
3. If the private sector can operate a space venture more efficiently than the Government, then
such commercialization should be encouraged.
When developing new public space programs, the Government should actively con-
sider the view of, and the potential effect on, private ventures.
4. The Government should invest in high-leverage research, and space facilities which encour-
age private investment. Howeveg, the Government should not expend tax dollars for endeavors
the private sector is willing to underwrite.
This will provide at least two benefits. First it will enable NASA to concentrate a
greater percentage of its resources on advancing the technological state-of-the-art in
areas where the investment is too great for the private sector. Second, it will engage
the private sector's applications and marketing skills for getting space benefits to the
people.
5. When a significant Government contribution to a commercial endeavor is requested, two
requirements must be met. First, the private sector must have significant capital at risk, and sec-
ond, there must be significant potential benefits for the nation.
In appraising the potential benefits from and determining appropriate Government
contributions to commercial space proposals, NASA will use an equitable, consistent
review process.
A possible exception to these principles would be a commercial venture intended to
replace a service or displace a NASA R&D program and/or technology development pro-
gram of paramount public importance now provided by the Government. In that case, the
Government might require additional prerequisites before commercialization.
Implementation
In implementing this Policy, NASA will take an active role in supporting commercial
space ventures in the following categories, listed in order of importance:
• New commercial high-technology ventures.
• New commercial applications of existing space technology.
[5] • Commercial ventures resulting from the transfer of existing space programs to
the private sector.
NASA will implement initiatives to reduce the technical, financial and institutional
risks associated with doing business in space.
To reduce technical risks, NASA will:
Support research aimed at commercial applications; ease access to NASA experimen-
tal facilities; establish scheduled flight opportunities for commercial payloads; expand
the availability of space technology information of commercial interest; and support
the development of facilities necessary for commercial uses of space.
To reduce financial risks, NASA will:
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Continue to offer reduced-rate space transportation for high-technology space
endeavors; assist in integrating commercial equipment with the Shuttle; provide seed-
funding to stimulate commercial space ventures; and, under certain circumstances,
purchase commercial space products and services and offer some exclusivity.
To reduce institutional risks, NASA will:
Speed integration of commercial payloads into the Orbiter; shorten proposal evalua-
tion time for NASA/private sector Joint Endeavor proposals; establish procedures to
encourage development of space hardware and services with private capital instead of
Government funds; and introduce new institutional approaches for strengthening
NASA's support of private investment in space.
A high-level Commercial Space Office will be formed within NASA as a focal point for
commercial space matters. This Office will be responsible for implementing the NASA
Policy to stimulate space commerce. It will have sufficient authority and resources to fully
carry out this assignment.
Document 111-28
Document rifle: Office of the Press Secretary, "The President's Space Policy and
Commercial Space Initiative to Begin the Next Century," February 11, 1988.
Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential F'des, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
During the second Reagan administration, an alternative space policy making body concentrating on
commercial spaceflight emerged to complement the National Security Council's Senior Interagency
Group (Space), known as SIG (Space). Chaired by the Commerce Department, the Space Working
Group of the White House Economic Policy Council worked on a new set of commercial space initia-
tives during 1987, at the same time that SIG (Space) was examining overall national space policy.
SIG (Space) finished its review first, and its directive on national space policy was approved by
President Reagan on January 5, 1988 (published in 1995 as Document III-42 in Volume I of
Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space
Program). Howev_ its release was delayed until the space commerce review was completed. Both
reviews were made public on February 11, 1988.
[1]
The President's Space Policy and Commercial
Space Initiative to Begin the Next Century
Fact Sheet
The President today announced a comprehensive "Space Policy and Commercial
Space Initiative to Begin the Next Century" intended to ensure United States space lead-
ership.
The President's program has three major components:
* Establishing a long-range goal to expand human presence and activity beyond Earth
orbit into the Solar System;
* Creating opportunities for U.S. commerce in space; and
• Continuing our national commitment to a permanently manned Space Station.
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ThenewpolicyandprogramsarecontainedinaNationalSecurityDecisionDirective(NSDD)signedbythePresidentJanuary5,1988,theFY1989BudgetthePresidentwill
submitshortlytoCongress,andafifteenpointCommercialSpaceInitiative.
I. Expanding Human Presence Beyond Earth Orbit
In the recent NSDD, the President committed to a goal of expanding human pres-
ence and activity in the Solar System. To lay the foundation for this goal, the President will
be requesting $100 million in his FY 1989 Budget for a major new technology develop-
ment program "Project Pathfinder" that will enable a broad range of manned or
unmanned missions beyond the Earth's orbit.
Project Pathfinder will be organized around four major tocuses:
- Exploration technology;
- Operations technology;
- Humans-in-space technology; and
- Transfer vehicle technology.
This research effort will give the United States know-how in critical areas, such as
human in space environment, closed loop life support, aero braking, orbital transfer and
maneuvering, cryogenic storage and handling, and large scale space operations, and pro-
vide a base for wise decisions on long term goals and missions.
Additional highlight[s] of the NSDD are outlined in Section IV of this fact sheet.
[2] II. Creating Opportunities for U.S. Commerce in Space
The President is announcing a fifteen point commercial space initiative to seize the
opportunities for a vigorous U.S. commercial presence in Earth orbit and beyond--in
research and manufacturing. This initiative has three goals:
• Promoting a strong U.S. commercial presence in space;
• Assuring a highway to space; and
• Building a solid technology and talent base.
Promoting a Strong U.S. Commercial Presence in Space
1. Private Sector Space Facility: The President is announcing an intent for the Federal
Government to lease space as an "anchor Tenant" in an orbiting space facility satiable
for research and commercial manufacturing that is financed, constructed, and oper-
ated by the private sector. The Administration will solicit proposals from the U.S. pri-
vate sector for such a facility. Space in this facility will be used and/or subleased by
various Federal agencies with interest in microgravity research.
The Administration's intent is to award a contract during mid-summer of this year for
such space and related services to be available to the Government no later than the
end of FY 1993.
2. Spacehab: The Administration is committing to make best efforts to launch within the
Shuttle payload bay, in the early 1990s, the commercially developed, owned and man-
aged Shuttle middeck module: Spacehab. Manifesting requirements will depend on
customer demand.
Spacehab is a pressurized metal cylinder that fits in the Shuttle payload by and con-
nect to the crew compartment through the orbiter airlock. Spacehab takes up approx-
imately one-quarter of the payload bay and increases the pressurized living and work-
ing space of the orbiter by approximately 1,000 cubic feet or 400 percent in usable
research volume. The facility is intended to be ready for commercial use in mid-1991.
3. Microgravity Research Board: The President will establish, through Executive Order, a
National Microgravity Research Board to assure and coordinate a broader range of
opportunities for research in microgravity conditions.
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NASA will chair this board, which will include senior-level representatives from
Departments of Commerce, Transportation, Energy, and Defense, NIH [National
Institutes of Health], and NSF [National Science Foundation]; and will consult with
the university and commercial sectors. The board will have the following responsi-
bilities:
• To stimulate research in microgravity environments and its applications to commercial
uses by advising Federal agencies, including NASA, on microgravity priorities, and con-
sulting with private industry and academia on microgravity research opportunities;
• To develop policy recommendations to the Federal Government on matters relating to
microgravity research, including tapes of research, government/industry/and acade-
mic cooperation, and access to space, including a potential launch voucher program;
[3] • To coordinate the microgravity programs of Federal agencies by:
- reviewing agency plans for microgravity research and recommending priori-
ties for the use of Federally-owned or leased space on microgravity facilities;
and
- ensuring that agencies established merit review processes for evaluating
microgravity research proposals; and
• To promote transfer of Federally funded microgravity research to the commercial
sector in furtherance of Executive Order 12591.
NASA will continue to be responsible for making adjustments on the safety of exper-
iments and for making manifesting decisions for manned space flight systems.
4. External Tanks: The Administration is making available for five years the expended
external tanks of the Shuttle fleet at no cost to all feasible U.S. commercial nonprof-
it endeavors, for use such as research, storage, or manufacturing in space.
NASA will provide any necessary technical other assistance to these endeavors on a
direct cost basis. If private sector demand exceeds supply, NASA may auction the
external tanks.
5. Privatizing Space Station: NASA, in coordination with the Office of Management and
Budget, will revise its guide lines [sic] on commercialization of the U.S. Space Station
to clarify and strengthen the Federal commitment to private sector investment in this
program.
6. Future Phvatization: NASA will seek to rely to the greatest extent feasible on private sec-
tor design, financing, construction, and operation of future Space Station require-
merits, including those currently under study.
7. Remote Sensing: The Administration is encouraging the development of commercial
remote sensing systems. As part of this effort, the Department of Commerce, in con-
sultation with other agencies, is examining potential opportunities for future Federal
procurement of remote sensing data from the U.S. commercial sector.
Assuring a Highway to Space
8. Reliance on Private Launch Services: Federal agencies will be required to purchase expend-
able launch services directly from the private sector to the fullest extent feasible.
9. Insurance Relief for Launch Providers: The Administration will take administrative steps
to address the insurance concerns of the U.S. commercial launch industry, which cur-
rently uses Federal launch ranges. These steps include:
• Limits on Third Party Liability: Consistent with the Administration's tort policy, the
Administration will propose to Congress a $200,000 cap on noneconomic damage
awards to individual third parties resulting from commercial launch accidents;
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[4] * Limits on Property Damage Liability: The liability of commercial launch operators for
damage to Government property resulting from a commercial launch accident
will be administratively limited to the level of insurance required by the
Department of Transportation.
If losses to the Government exceed this level, the Government will waive its right to
recover for damages. If losses are less than this level, the Government will waive its
right to recover for those damages caused by Government willful misconduct or reck-
less disregard.
10. Private Launch Ranges: The Administration will consult with the private sector on the
potential construction of commercial launch range facilities separate from Federal
facilities and the use of such facilities by the Federal Government.
11. Vouchers for Research Payloads: NASA and the Department of Transportation will
explore providing to research payload owners manifested on the Shuttle a one time
launch voucher that can be used to purchase an alternative U.S. commercial launch
service.
Building a Solid Technology and Talent Base
12. Space Technology Spin-Offs: The President is directing that the new Pathfinder program,
the Civil Space Technology Initiative [CSTI], and other technology programs be con-
ducted in accordance with the following policies:
• Federally funded contractors, universities, and Federal laboratories will retain the
rights to any patents and technical data, including copyright, th[at] result from
these programs. The Federal Government will have the authority to use this intel-
lectual property royalty free;
• Proposed technologies and patents available for licensing will be housed in a
Pathfinder/CSTI library within NASA; and
• When contracting for commercial development of Pathfinder, CSTI and other
technology work products, NASA will specify its requirements in a manner that
provides contractors with maximum flexibility to pursue innovative and creative
approaches.
13. Federal Expertise on Loan to American Schools: The President is encouraging Federal
Scientists, engineers, and technicians in aerospace and space related careers to take a
sabbatical year to teach in any level of education in the United States.
14. Education Opportunities: The President is requesting in his FY 1989 Budget expanding
five-fold opportunities for U.S. Teachers to visit NASA field centers and related aero-
space and university facilities.
In addition, NASA, NSF, and DoD [Department of Defense] will contribute materials
and classroom experiments through the Department of Education to U.S. schools
developing "tech shop" programs. NASA will encourage corporate participation in
this program.
15. Protecting U.S. Critical Technologies: The Administration is requesting that Congress
extend to NASA the authority it has given the Department of Defense to protect the
whole-sale release under the Freedom of Information Act those critical national tech-
nologies and systems that are prohibited from export.
[5] IlL Continuing the National Commitment to the Space Station
In 1984, the President directed NASA to develop a permanently manned Space
Station. The President remains committed to achieving this end and this requesting $1 bil-
lion in his FY 1989 Budget for continued development and a three year appropriation
commitment from Congress for $6.1 billion. The Space Station, planned for development
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incooperationwithU.S.friendsandallies,isintendedtobeamulti-purposefacilityfor
thenation'scienceandapplicationsprograms.It willpermitsuchthingsin spaceas:
research,observationf thesolarsystem,assemblyofvehiclesforfacilities,torage,ser-
vicingof satellites,andbasingforfutureSpacemissionsandcommercialndentrepre-
neurialendeavorsinspace.
ThehelpensureaSpaceStationthatiscosteffective,thePresidentisproposingas
partofthisCommercialSpaceInitiativeactionstoencourageprivatesectorinvestmenti
theSpaceStation,includingdirectingNASAtorelytothegreatestextentfeasibleonpri-
vatesectordesign,financing,construction,andoperationoffutureSpaceStationrequire-
ments.
IV.AdditionalHighlightsoftheJanuary5, 1988 NSDD
• U.S. Space Leadership: Leadership is reiterated as a fundamental national objective in
areas of space activity critical to achieving U.S. national security, scientific, economic
and foreign policy goals.
• Defining Federal Roles and Responsibilities: Government activities are specified in three
separate and distinct sectors: civil, national security, and nongovernmental. Agency
roles and responsibilities are codified and specific goals are established for the civil
space sector; those for other sectors are updated.
• Encouraging a Commercial Sector: A separate, nongovernmental or commercial space
sector is recognized and encouraged by the policy that Federal Government actions
shall not preclude or deter the continuing development of this sector. New Guidelines
are established to limit unnecessary Government competition with the private sector
and ensure that Federal agencies are reliable customers for commercial space goods
and services.
• The President's launch policy prohibiting NASA from maintaining an expendable
launch vehicle adjunct to the Shuttle, as well as limiting commercial and foreign pay-
loads on the Shuttle to those that are Shuttle-unique or serve national security for for-
eign policy purpose, is reaffirmed. In addition, policies endorsing the purchase of
commercial launch services by Federal agencies are further strengthened.
• National Security Space Sector: An assured compatibility for national security missions is
clearly enunciated, and the survivability and endurance of critical national security
space functions is [sic] stressed.
• Assuring Access to Space: Assured access to space is recognized as a key element of
national space policy. U.S. space transportation systems that provide sufficient
resiliency to allow continued operation, despite failures in any single system, are
emphasized. The mix of space transportation vehicles will be defined to support mis-
sion needs in the most cost effective manner.
• Remote Sensing: Policies for Federal "remote sensing" or observation of the Earth are
established to encourage the development of U.S. commercial systems competitive
with or superior to foreign-operated civil or commercial systems.
Document 111-29
Document title: Office of the Press Secretary, "Commercial Space Launch Policy,"
NSPD-2, September 5, 1990.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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During the administration of George Bush, 1989 to 1993, several commercial space policy documents
emerged that affected the manner in which NASA conducted its relations. National Space Policy
Directive-2 established a "Commercial Space Launch Policy" that reflected the administration's com-
mitment to develop a thriving commercial space sector by establishing "the long-term goat of a free and
fair [space launch] market in which the U.S. industry can compete" internationally.
[no pagination]
Statement by the Press Secretary
The President has approved a new National Space Policy Directive providing impor-
tant guidance which will further encourage the growth of U.S. private sector space activi-
ties. This policy, developed by the Vice President and the National Space Council, is
completely consistent with, and provided the policy framework for, the President's August
22, 1990, decision regarding participation by a U.S. firm in Australia's Cape York space
launch project. The policy supplements the National Space Policy which the President
approved on November 2, 1989.
The commercial space launch policy recognizes the many benefits which a commer-
cial space launch industry provides to the United States. It balances launch industry needs
with those of other industries and with important national security interests, and estab-
lishes the long-term goal of a free and fair market in which U.S. industry can compete.
The policy specifies a coordinated set of actions for the next ten years aimed at achieving
this goal.
Fact Sheet on Commercial Space Launch Policy
Policy Findings
A commercial space launch industry can provide many benefits to the U.S. including
indirect benefits to U.S. national security. The long-term goal of the United States is a free
and fair market in which U.S. industry can compete. To achieve this, a set of coordinated
actions is needed for dealing with international competition in launch goods and services
in a manner that is consistent with our nonproliferation and technology transfer objec-
tives. These actions must address both the short-term (actions which will affect competi-
tiveness over approximately the next ten years) and those which will have their principal
effect in the longer term (i.e. after approximately the year 2000).
In the near term, this includes trade agreements and enforcement of those agree-
ments to limit unfair competition. It also includes the continued use of U.S.-manufac-
tured launch vehicles for launching U.S. Government satellites.
For the longer term, the United States should take actions to encourage technical
improvements to reduce the cost and increase the reliability of U.S. space launch vehicles.
Implementing Actions
U.S. government satellites will be launched on U.S.-manufactured launch vehicles
unless specifically exempted by the President.
Consistent with guidelines to be developed by the National Space Council, U.S.
Government Agencies will actively consider commercial space launch needs and factor
them into their decisions on improvements in launch infrastructure and launch vehicles
aimed at reducing cost, and increasing responsiveness and reliability of space launch vehi-
cles.
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TheU.S.Governmentwillenterinto negotiations to achieve agreement with the
European Space Agency (ESA), ESA member states, and others as appropriate, which
defines principles of free and fair trade.
Nonmarket launch providers of space launch goods and services create a special case
because of the absence of market[-]oriented pricing and cost structures. To deal with
their entry into the market there needs to be a transition period during which special con-
ditions may be required.
There also must be an effective means of enforcing international agreements related
to space launch goods and services.
Statement by the Press Secretary
The United States seeks a free and fair international commercial space launch market
to further the use of outer space for the betterment of mankind. At the same time, because
space launch technologies have significant military applications, important U.S. national
security considerations must be addressed by our commercial space launch policy.
Over the past several weeks, the President has had detailed discussions with the Vice
President and other senior advisors on U.S. commercial space launch policy developed by
the National Space Council. The President has authorized the Secretary of State to
approve a license application for participation by a U.S. firm in Australia's Cape York
space launch project, provided certain agreements necessary to ensure U.S. national secu-
rity interests are reached.
Specifically, the U.S. will seek agreements to ensure that:
(1) The USSR will provide launch services (boosters, equipment, technology, or
training) only from Cape York or any other single location;
(2) The USSR and Australia will observe the Missile Technology Control Regime; and
(3) U.S. regulations on technology transfer to the Soviet Union will be observed.
The United States hopes and expects that these agreements can be concluded quick-
ly so that the license can be granted.
To permit continued U.S. participation, the United States in the coming months will
also be seeking agreements to ensure free and fair trade in the international commercial
space launch market.
Details of the U.S. commercial space launch policy will be announced in the near
future.
Document 111-30
Document tide: Executive Office of the President, "U.S. Commercial Space Policy
Guidelines," NSPD-3, February 11, 1991.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
In 1991, the Bush administration refined its commercial space policy by issuing
NSPD-3, which articulated in specific terms a commercial space policy Uaimed at expanding private
sector investment in space by the market-driven Commercial Space Sect_" The intent was to move
more of the onus for investment in space technology to the private sect_ where it was assumed that
market forces would d_ive down costs.
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[1]
U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines
A fundamental objective guiding United States space activities has been space leader-
ship, which requires preeminence in key areas of space activity. In an increasingly com-
petitive international environment, the U.S. Government encourages the commercial use
and exploitation of space technologies and systems for national economic benefit. These
efforts to encourage commercial activities must be consistent with national security and
foreign policy interests, international and domestic legal obligations, including U.S. com-
mitments to stem missile proliferation, and agency mission requirements.
United States space activities are conducted by three separate and distinct sectors: cwo
U.S. Government sectors[--] the civil and national security[--]and a non-governmental
commercial space sector. The commercial space sector includes a broad cross section of
potential providers and users, including both established and .new market participants.
There also has been a recent emergence of State government lmuauves related to encour-
aging commercial space activities. The commercial space sector is comprised of at least
five market areas, each encompassing both earth and spacebased activities, with varying
degrees of market maturity or potential:
[2] Satellite Communications: the private development, manufacture, and operation of
communications satellites and marketing of satellite telecommunications services, includ-
ing position location and navigation;
Launch and Vehicle Services: the private development, manufacture, and operation of
launch and reentry vehicles, and the marketing of space transportation services;
Remote Sensing. the private development, manufacture, and operation of remote sens-
ing satellites and the processing and marketing of remote sensing data;
Materials Processing: the experimentation with, and production of, organic and inor-
ganic materials and prodt, cts utilizing the space environment; and
Commercial Infrastructure: the private development and provision of space [-]related
support facilities, capabilities and services.
In addition, other market-driven commercial space sector opportunities are emerg-
ing.
The U.S. Government encourages private investment in, and broader responsibility
for, space-related activities that can result in products and services that meet the needs of
government and other customers in a competitive market. As a matter of policy, the U.S.
Government pursues its commercial space objectives without the use of direct federal sub-
sidies. A robust commercial space sector has the potential to generate new technologies,
products, markets, jobs, and other economic benefits for the nation, as well as indirect
benefits for national security.
Commercial space sector activities are characterized by the provision of products and
services such that:
- private capital is at risk;
- there are existing, or potential, nongovernmental customers for the activity;
- the commercial market ultimately determines the viability of the activity; and
- primary responsibility and management initiative for the activity resides with the
private sector.
[3]
Implementing Guidelines
The following implementing guidelines shall serve to provide the U.S. private sector
with a level of stability and predictability in its dealings with agencies of the U.S.
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Government. The agencies will work separately but cooperatively, as appropriate, to devel-
op specific measures to implement this strategy. U.S. Government agencies shall, consis-
tent with national security and foreign policy interests, international and domestic legal
obligation and agency mission requirements, encourage the growth of the U.S. commer-
cial space sector in accordance with the following guidelines:
• U.S. Government agencies shall utilize commercially available space products and
services to the fullest extent feasible. This policy of encouraging U.S. Government
agencies to purchase, and the private sector to sell, commercial space products and
services has potentially large economic benefits.
- A space product or service is "commercially available" if it is currently offered
commercially, or if it could be supplied commercially in response to a govern-
ment procurement request.
- "Feasible" means that products and services meet mission requirements in a cost-
effective manner.
- "Cost-effective" generally means that the commercial product or service costs no
more than governmental development or directed procurement where such gov-
ernment costs include applicable government labor and overhead costs, as well as
contractor charges and operations costs.
- However, the acquisition of commercial space products and services shall
generally be considered cost-effective if they are procured competitively using
performance-based contracting techniques. Such contracting techniques give
contractors the freedom and financial incentive to achieve economies of scale by
combining their government and commercial work as well as increased produc-
tivity through innovation.
- U.S. Government agencies shall actively consider, at the earliest appropriate time,
the feasibility of their using commercially available products and services in
agency programs and activities.
[4] - U.S. Government agencies shall continue to take appropriate measures to protect
from disclosure any proprietary data which is shared with the U.S. Government
in the acquisition of commercial space products and services.
• U.S. Government agencies shall promote the transfer of U.S. Government-developed
technology to the private sector.
- U.S. Government-developed unclassified space technology will be transferred to
the U.S. commercial space sector in as timely a manner as possible and in ways
that protect its commercial value.
- U.S. Government agencies may undertake cooperative research and development
activities with the private sector, as well as State and local governments, consistent
with policies and funding, in order to fulfill mission requirements in a manner
which encourages the creation of commercial opportunities.
- With respect to technologies generated in the performance of government con-
tracts, U.S. Government agencies shall obtain only those rights necessary to meet
government needs and mission requirements, as directed by Executive Order
12591.
• U.S. Government agencies may make unused capacity of space assets, services and
infrastructure available for commercial space sector use.
- Private sector use of U.S. Government agency space assets, services, and infra-
structure shall be made available on a reimbursable basis consistent with OMB
[Office of Management and Budget] circular A25 or appropriate legislation.
• U.S. Government agencies may make available to the private sector those assets which
have been determined to be excess to the requirements of the U.S. Government in
accordance with U.S. law and applicable international treaty obligations. Due regard
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shallbegivento theeconomicmpactsuchtransfermayhaveonthecommercial
spacesector,promotingcompetition,andthelong-termpublicinterest.[5] • TheU.S.Governmentshallavoidregulatingdomesticspaceactivitiesinamanner
thatprecludesordeterscommercialspacesectoractivities,excepttotheextentnec-
essarytomeetinternationalnddomesticlegalobligations,includingthoseof the
MissileTechnologyControlRegime.Accordingly,agenciesshallidentify,andpropose
for revisionor elimination,applicableportionsof U.S.lawsandregulationsthat
unnecessarilyimpedecommercialspacesectoractivities.
• U.S.Governmentagenciesshallworkwiththecommercialspacesectortopromote
theestablishmentoftechnicalstandardsforcommercialspaceproductsandservices.
• U.S.Governmentagenciesshallenterintoappropriatecooperativeagreementsto
encourageandadvanceprivatesectorbasicresearch,development,andoperations.
Agenciesmayreduceinitialprivatesectorriskbyagreeingtofutureuseof privately
suppliedspaceproductsandserviceswhereappropriate.
- "Anchortenancy"is an exampleof suchan arrangementwherebyU.S.
Governmentagenciescanprovideinitialsupporttoaventurebycontractingfor
enoughofthefutureproductorservicetomaketheventureviablein theshort
term.Long[-]termviabilityandgrowthmustcomeprimarilyfromthesaleofthe
productorservicetocustomersoutsidetheU.S.Government.
- TheremustbedemonstrableU.S.Governmentmissionorprogramrequirements
for the proposedcommercialspacegoodor service.In assessingtheU.S.
Government'smissionorprogramrequirementsforthesepurposes,theprocur-
ingagencymayconsiderconsolidatingallanticipatedU.S.Governmentneedsfor
theparticularproductorservice,tothemaximumextentfeasible.
- U.S.Governmentagenciesenteringintosucharrangementsmaytakeaction,
consistentwithcurrentpoliciesandfundingavailability,oprovidecompensation
tocommercialspaceprovidersforfutureterminationof missionsforwhichthe
productsorserviceswererequired.[6] • TheUnitedStateswillworktowardestablishmentof aninternationaltrading
environmentthatencouragesmarket[-]orientedcompetitionbyworkingwithitstrad-
ingpartnersto:
- Establishclearprinciplesforinternationalspacemarketshatprovideanatmos-
pherefavorabletostimulatinggreaterprivateinvestmentandmarketdevelop-
ment;
- Eliminatedirectgovernmentsubsidiesandotherunfairpracticesthatundermine
normalmarketcompetitionamongcommercialfirms;
- Eliminateunfaircompetitionbygovernmentsforbusinessinspacemarketscon-
sistentwithdomesticpoliciesthatprecludeordeterU.S.Governmentcompeti-
tionwithcommercialspacesectoractivities.
TheU.S.CommercialSpacePolicyGuidelinesareconsistentwiththeNationalSpace
PolicyandtheU.S.CommercialSpaceLaunchPolicywhichremainfullyapplicableto
activitiesofthegovernmentalspacesectorsandthecommercialspacesector.
Reporting Requirements
U.S. Government agencies affected by these guidelines are directed to report by
October 1, 1991, to the National Space Council on their activities related to the imple-
mentation of these policy guidelines.
George Bush
Biographical Appendix
Spiro T. Agnew (1918-1996) was elected vice president of the United States in November 1968, serving under
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Between 1962 and 1966, he served as head of the U.S. Agency for International Development and thereafter as
vice president of the Ford Foundation. While budget director, Bell was responsible for working with NASA in
establishing a realistic financial outlook for Project Apollo. See "Bell, David," biographical file, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
Lloyd V. Berkner (1905-1967) was involved in most of the early spaceflight activities of the United States in some
capacity. Trained as an electrical engineer, he was at first interested in atmospheric propagation of radio waves,
but after World War II he became a scientific entrepreneur of the first magnitude. He was heavily involved in the
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Nancy W. Boggess was a scientist at the Goddard Space Flight Center working on the Cosmic Background
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NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Herman Bondi was director general of the European Space Research Organization from 1967 through the early
1970s and the organization's transformation into the European Space Agency. A British citizen, Bondi later
served as science advisor to the minister for energy. See "Biography, Foreign Miscellaneous, A-D," file, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
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member of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. He also was president of Johns Hopkins University,
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Eugene A. Cernan (1934-), a career naval aviator, was chosen by NASA to enter the astronaut corps in the third
group, in 1963. He served as the pilot of Gemini IX upon the death of a prime crew member. He was also back-
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curement package contract of the mid-1960s. He left that position in 1968 to return to industry. See "Biography,
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nor and attorney general of Arkansas.
Charles W. Cook served during the 1970s and 1980s as deputy under secretary and deputy assistant secretary of
the U.S. Air Force in the Office of Plans, Policy and Operations of Space Systems. He also worked in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense as director for defensive systems and served in positions in the Advanced Research
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Projects Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and various aerospace companies. Since retiring from formal
government service in 1988, Cook has worked as a consultant to the Institute for Defense Analyses, ANSER, the
Defense Science Board, and .several other aerospace organizations in areas related to U.S. and foreign space
activities.
John J. Corson (1905-1990) had been a management consultant with McKinsey and Company, Inc. since 1951,
remaining there until 1966. T. Keith Glennan contracted with McKinsey for a series of studies, including:
"Organizing Headquarters Functions," two volumes, December 1958; "Financial Management--NASA-JPL
Relationships," February 1959; "Security and Safety--NASA-JPL Relationships," February 1959; "Facilities
Construction---NASA-JPL Relationships," February 1959; "Procurement and Subcontracting---NASA-JPL
Relationships," February 1959; "NASA-JPL Relationships and the Role of the Western Coordination Office,"
March 1959; "Providing Supporting Services for the Development Operations Division,"January 1960, on the
transfer of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency to NASA; "Report of the Advisory Committee on Organization,"
October 1960; and "An Evaluation of NASA's Contracting Politics, Organization, and Performance," October
1960. All are in T. Keith Glennan, Correspondence Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Edgar M, Cortright (1923-) earned an M.S. in aeronautical engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
in 1949, the year after he joined the staff of Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory. He conducted research at Lewis
on the aerodynamics of high-speed air induction systems and jet exit nozzles. In 1958 he joined a small task
group to lay the foundation for a national space agency. As soon as NASA was created, he became chief of
advanced technology at NASA Headquarters, directing the initial formulation of the agency's meteorological
satellite program, including the TIROS and Nimbus projects. After becoming assistant director for lunar and
planetary programs in 1960, Cortright directed the planning and implementation of such projects as Mariner,
Ranger, and Surveyor. He became deputy director and then deputy associate administrator for space science and
applications in the next few years. In 1967 he was deputy associate administrator for manned space flight. In
1968 he became director of the Langley Research Center, a position he held until 1975, when he went to work
for private industry, becoming president of the Lockheed_alifornia Company in 1979. See "Cortright, Edgar
M.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Laurence C. Ca'mgie (1902-1994) was a career Air Force officer and the first U.S. military jet pilot in 1942 when
he flew the Bell XP-59. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, in 1923 he went into the Army
Air Corps and became a pilot. In World War II, he served in a variety of weapons development programs, as well
as in a combat role in North Africa and Corsica. After the war, he directed the Air Force's research and devel-
opment programs, serving as deputy chief of staff for development, 1951-1954, and commander of Allied Air
Force in southern Europe before his retirement following a heart attack in 1955. See "Lieut. Gen. Laurence
Craigie, 92; First Military Jet Pilot for the U.S.," New York Times, March 1. 1994.
Malcolm R. Currie (192%) was trained in physics and electrical engineering at the University of California at
Berkeley and served in the U.S. Navy from 1944 to 1947. After military service, he returned to school to com-
plete his Ph.D. In 1954 he joined Hughes Research Laboratories, eventually serving as director, before becom-
ing vice president of Hughes Aircraft from 1964 to 1969. He then worked for Beckman Instruments, Inc., but in
1973 President Nixon appointed him director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Department of
Defense, where he served until returning to Hughes in 1977. See "Currie, Dr. Malcolm R.," biographical file,
NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Edward E. David, Jr. (1925-), served as science advisor to President Richard Nixon in 1970 and then as direc-
tor of the Office of Science and Technology. Previously, he had served between 1950 and 1970 as executive direc-
tor of research at Bell Telephone Laboratories. For a discussion of the President's Science Advisory Committee,
see Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Stienve Advice to the President from ttiroshima to Sd)l (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992).
James H. Douglas, Jr. (1899-1988), was secretary of the Air Force, 1957-1959, and deputy secretary of defense,
1959-1961. Trained as an attorney, Douglas practiced most of his career in Chicago but served as fiscal assistant
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secretaryof the treasury, 1932-1933, and under secretary of the Air Force, 1953-1957, before serving as Air Force
secretary. At the conclusion of the Eisenhower administration, Douglas rejoined his old law firm, Gardner,
Carton, Douglas, Chilgren & Waud. See *Miscellaneous Department of Defense (DOD)," biographical file,
NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Charles Stark (Doe) Draper (1901-1987) earned his Ph.D. in physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) in 1938 and became a full professor there the following year, when he founded the Instrumentation
Laboratory. Its first major achievement was the Mark 14 gyroscopic gunsight for Navy antiaircraft guns. Draper
and the laboratory applied gyroscopic principles to the development of inertial guidance systems for airplanes,
missiles, submarines, ships, satellites, and space vehicles--notably those used in the Apollo Moon landings. See
John Noble Wilford, "Charles S. Draper, Engineer, Guided Astronauts to the Moon," New York Times, July 27,
1987, p. 2; Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Mi._i_ Guidance (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1996), especially pp. 64-94; C. Stark Draper, "rhe Evolution of Aerospace Guidance Technology
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1935-1951: A Memoir," in R. Cargill Hall, ed., E.uays on the Hist, rO, o]
Rocketry and Astronautics, Vol. II (Washington, DC: NASA Conf. Pub. 2014, 1977), pp. 219-252.
Hugh L. Dryden (1898-1965) was a career civil servant and an aerodynamicist by discipline who had also begun
life as a child prodigy. He graduated at age 14 from high school and went on to earn an A.B. in three years from
Johns Hopkins University (1916). Three years later, he earned his Ph.D. in physics and mathematics from the
same institution, even though he ]lad been employed full time by the National Bureau of Standards since June
1918. His career at the Bureau of Standards, which lasted until 1947, was devoted to studying airflow, turbulence,
and particularly the problems of the boundary layer--the thin layer of air next to an airfoil that causes drag. In
1920 he became chief of the bureau's aerodynami_:s section. His work in the 1920s on measuring turbulence in
wind tunnels facilitated research in the NACA that produced the laminar flow wings used in the P-51 Mustang
and other World War II aircraft. From the mid-1920s to 1947, his publications became essential reading for aero-
dynamicists around the world. During World War II, his work on a glide bomb named the Bat won him a
Presidential Certificate of Merit. He capped his career at the Bureau of Standards by becoming its assistant direc-
tor and then associate director during his final two years there. He then served as director of the NACA from
1947 to 1958, after which he became deputy administrator of NASA under T. Keith Glennan and James E. Webb.
See Richard K. Smith, The Hugh L. Dryden Papers, 1898-.1965 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkin s University Library,
1974); Michael H. Gorn, Hugh L. Dryden's Career in Aviation and Space, Monographs in Aerospace History #5
(Washington, DC: NASA, 1996).
Lee A. DuBrldge (1901-1994), a physicist with a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin (1926), became direc-
tor of the radiation laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology after an academic career capped by
a deanship at the University of Rochester, 1938-1941. He was president of the California Institute of Technology
between 1946 and 1969, when he resigned to serve as presidential science advisor to Richard Nixon. He had
been involved in several governmental science advisory organizations before taking up his formal White House
duties in 1969 and serving in that capacity until 1970. See "Lee A. DuBridge," biographical file, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
Alien W. Dulles (1893-1969), brother of President Eisenhower's more famous secretary of state, served as direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1953 to 1961. See "Miscellaneous Other Agencies," bio-
graphical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
John Foster Dunes (1888-1959) served as secretary of state under President Eisenhower, 1953-1959. See
"Miscellaneous Other Agencies," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Frederick C. Durant IIl( 1916- ) was heavily involved in rocketry in the United States during the period between
the end of World War II and the mid-1960s. He worked for several different aerospace organizations, including
Bell Aircraft Corporation, Everett Research Laboratory, the Naval Air Rocket Test Station, and the Maynard
Ordnance Test Station. He later became the director of astronautics for the National Air and Space Museum,
Smithsonian Institution. In addition, he was an officer in several spaceflight organizations, including the
American Rocket Society (president in 1953), the International Astronautical Federation (president from 1953
to 1956), and the National Space Club (governor in 1961).
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Burton I. Edelson ( 1926- ) was NASA's associate administrator for space science and applications between 1982
and 1988. He earned his B.S. from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1947 anti served for 20 years in the service. He
then returned to school and received a Ph.D. from the University of California at San Diego in 1969. Thereafter,
he worked with the Communications Satellite Corporation for 14 years before arriving at NASA. See "Edelson,
Burt I.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Raymond Einhorn was a former General Accounting Office auditor who joined NASA in 1960 as its director of
audits. He served in this position throughout the 1960s. See _Assorted NASA Officials," biographical file, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
Dwight D. Eiserthower (1890-1969) was president of the United States between 1953 and 1961. Previously, he had
been a career U.S. Army officer and was supreme allied commander in Europe during World War II. As presi-
dent he was deeply interested in the use of space technology for national security purposes and directed that bal-
listic missiles and reconnaissance satellites be developed on a crash basis. On Eisenhower's space efforts, see
Rip Bulkeley, The S/mtnik._ C_sis and Early United State._ Spacz Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991);
R. Cargill Hall, "The Eisenhower Administration and the Cold War: Framing American Astronautics to Serve
National Security," Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives 27 (Spring 1995): 59-72; Robert A. Divine, The
,Sputnik Challenge: E_senhower _sRe.qxmse to the Soviet Satellite. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
John D. Erlichman was a senior assistant to the president during the Nixon administration. See John Erlichman,
Witness to Power: The Nixon Yea_ (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).
Konstantin Petrovich Feoktistov (1926-) worked as a spacecraft engineer and cosmonaut. As a cosmonaut, he
flew on the Voskhod 1 mission in 1964 and was also flight director on the Soyuz 18/Salyut mission in 1975. See
Who _ Who in Russia and the New States (London:J.B. Tauris and Co., 1993).
Peter M. Flanigan ( 1923- ) was an assistant to President Nixon on the White House staff, 1969-1974. Previously,
he had been involved in investment banking with Dillon, Read, and Company. He returned to business when he
left government service. His position in the White House involved him in efforts to gain approval to build the
Space Shuttle during the 196%1972 period. See "Miscellaneous Other Agencies," biographical file, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
James c. Fletcher (191%1991) was born on June 5, 1919, in Millburn, New Jersey. He received an undergradu-
ate degree in physics from Columbia University and a doctorate in physics from the California Institute of
Technology. After holding research and teaching positions at Harvard and Princeton Universities, he joined
Hughes Aircraft in 1948 and later worked for the Guided Missile Division of the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation.
in 1958 Fletcher co-founded the Space Electronics Corporation in Glendale, California, which after a merger
became the Space General Corporation. He was later named systems vice president of the Aerojet General
Corporation in Sacramento, California. In 1964 he became president of the University of Utah, a position he
held until he was named NASA administrator in 1971, serving until 1977. He also served as NASA administrator
a second time, for nearly three years following the loss of the Space Shutde Cha//engtrin 1986 until 1989. During
his first administration at NASA, Dr. Fletcher was responsible for beginning the shuttle effort. During his second
tenure, he presided over the effort to recover from the Challenger accident. See Roger D. Launius, "A Western
Mormon in Washington, DC: James C. Fletcher, NASA, and the Final Frontier," Pacific Historical Review 64 (May
1995): 217-41.
Gerald R. Ford (1913-) (R-MI) was elected to the House of Representatives in 1948 and served there until he
became vice president in 1973 following the resignation of Spiro T. Agnew. He then became president,
1974-1977, following Richard M. Nixon's resignation in the wake of the Watergate scandal.
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John S. Foster, Jr. ( 1922- ), is a physicist who served as director of Defense Research and Engineering from 1965
to 1973, when he moved to the private sector. He has served on a number of scientific and technical government
advisory boards. In 1995, he was the chair of a NASA federal laboratory review team. In 1992, he served on the
Vice President's Space Policy Advisory Board that reviewed U.S. space policy after the cold war. See "Foster, John
S.,Jr.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Robert A. Frosch (1928-) was NASA administrator throughout the administration of President Jimmy Carter,
1977-1981. He earned undergraduate and graduate degrees in theoretical physics at Columbia University, and
between September 1951 and August 1963, he worked as a research scientist and director of research programs
for Hudson Laboratories of Columbia University. Until 1953 he worked on problems in underwater sound,
sonar, oceanography, marine geology, and marine geophysics. Thereafter, Frosch was first associate and then
director of the laboratories. In September 1963, he came to Washington to work with the Advanced Research
Projects Agency, serving as director for nuclear test detection (Project VELA), and then as deputy director of the
agency. In .July 1966 he became assistant secretary of the Navy for research and development, responsible for all
Navy programs of research, development, engineering, test, and evaluation. From January 1973 to July 1975, he
served as assistant executive director of the United Nations Environmental Program. While at NASA, Frosch was
responsible for overseeing the continuation of the development effort on the Space Shuttle. During his tenure,
the project underwent testing of the first orbiter, Enterprise, at NASA's Dryden Flight Research Facility in south-
ern California. The orbiter made its first free flight in the atmosphere on August 12, 1977. He left NASA with
the change of administrations in January 1981 to become vice president for research at the General Motors
Research Laboratories. See "Frosch, Robert A., Administrators Files," NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Arnold W. Frutkin (1918- ) was deputy director of the U.S. National Committee for the International
Geophysical Year in the National Academy of Sciences when NASA hired him in 1959 as director of international
programs, a title that changed in 1963 to assistant administrator for international affairs. In 1978 he became
associate administrator for external relations, a post he relinquished in 1979 when he retired from federal ser-
vice. During his career, he had been NASA's senior negotiator for almost all of the important international space
agreements. See "Arnold W. Frutkin," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
G
Charles A. Gabriel served as U.S. Air Force chief of staff between 1983 and 1986 and was the highest ranking
uniformed official in the service. See "Miscellaneous DOD," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
Yuri Gagarin (1934-1968) was the Soviet cosmonaut who became the first human in space with a one-orbit mis-
sion aboard the spacecraft Vostok 1 on April 12, 1961. The great success of that feat made the gregarious Gagarin
a global hero, and he was an effective spokesman for the Soviet Union until his death in an unfortunate aircraft
accident. See _Gagarin, Yuri," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Thomas S. Gates (1906-1983) was a businessman who served as secretary of the Navy and then, from 1959 to
1960, as secretary of defense. See Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Branch, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC; Who's Who in Anumca, 1972-1973 (Chicago: Marquis Who's Who, 1972).
Roswell L. Gilpatric ( 1906- ) is a retired attorney who served as deputy secretary of defense from 1961 to 1964.
See Who_ Who in America, 1996 (New Providence, NJ: Marquis Who's Who, 1995).
Robert R. Gilruth (1913-) was a Iongtime NACA engineer working at the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory,
1937-1946, then chief of the Pilotless Aircraft Research Division at Wallops Island, 1946.1952, who had been
exploring the possibility of human spaceflight before the creation of NASA. He served as assistant director at
Langley, 1952-1959, and as assistant director (crewed satellites) and head of Project Mercury, 1959-1961--tech-
nically assigned to the Goddard Space Flight Center but physically located at Langley. In early 1961, T. Keith
Glennan established an independent Space Task Group (already the group's name as an independent subdivi-
sion of Goddard) under Gilruth at Langley to supervise the Mercury program. This group moved to the Manned
Spacecraft Center in Houston in 1969. Gilruth was then director of the Houston operation from 1962 to 1972.
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See Henry C. Dethloff, "Su_ktenly 7bnun'row Came... ": A Hist_rry ,![ the ]ohn_on Spa,e Center (Washington, DC: NASA
SP-4307, 1993); James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A Hi_ttrry o[ the l.angley Aer, mautical Latnrratmy, 1917-1958
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4305, 1987), pp. 386-88.
John H. Glenn, Jr. (1921-), was chosen with the first group of astronauts in 1959. lie was the pilot for the
February 20, 1962, Mercury-Atlas 6 (Frierul._hip 7) mission, the filst American orbital flight, making three orbits.
He left the NASA astronaut corps in 1964 and later entered politics as a senator from Ohio. See Lloyd S.
Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, "l'hi* New (bean: A lti._t_rry _[ Pr_qect Mercury
(Washington, DC: NASA SP_I201, 1966).
T. Keith Glennan (1905-1995) was the first administrator of the NASA. Born in Enderlin, North Dakota, in 1905,
Glennan was educated at Yale University and worked in the sound motion picture industry with the Electrical
Research Products Company. He was also studio manager of Paramount Pictures, Inc., and Samuel Goldwyn
Studios in the 1930s. Glennanjoined the Columbia University Division of War Research in 1942, serving through
the war, first as administrator and then as director of the U.S. Navy's UndeK vcater Sound Laboratories at New
London, Connecticut. In 1947 he became president of the Case Institute of Technology. During his administra-
tion, Case rose from a primarily local institution to rank with the top engineering schools in the nation. From
October 1950 to November 1952, Glennan served as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission. He then
served as administlator of NASA while on leave from Case, between August 7, 1958, and January 20, 1961. Upon
leaving NASA, Glennan returned to the Case, where he was continued Io serve as president until 1966. SeeJ.D.
Hunley, ed., The Birth t?f NASA: The Diary of Z Keith Glennan (Wasifington, DC: NASA SP-4105, 1993).
Daniel S. Goldin (1940-) became the ninth NASA administrator in April 1992 and immediately began to earn
a reputation as an "agent of change" by bringing reform to America's space agency. In addition to implement-
ing many management changes, Goldin negotiated with his Russian counteqJart, Yuri Koptev, the head of the
Russian Space Agency, to construct an international space station with a partnership involving fourteen nations.
Before coming to NASA, Goldin was vice president and general manager of the TRW Space & Technology Group
in Redondo Beach, California. During a twenty-five-year career at TRW, he managed the development and pro-
duction of advanced spacecraft, technologies, and space science instruments. Goldin began his career as a
research scientist at NASA's l.ewis Research Center in Cleveland in 1962, where he worked on electric propul-
sion systems for human interplanetary travel. See "Daniel S. Goldin," hiographical file, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
Nicholas E. Golovin (1912-1969), born in Odessa, Russia, but educated in this country (Ph.D. in physics at
George Washington University in 1955), worked in various capacities for the government during and after World
War II, including the Naval Research Laboratory, 1946-1948. He held several administrative positions with the
National Bureau of Standards from 1949 to 1958. In 1958 he was chief scientist for the White Sands Missile
Range and then worked for the Advanced Research Projects Agency in 1959 as director of technical operations.
He became deputy associate administrator at NASA in 1960. He joined private industry before becoming, in
1961, the director of the NASA-DOD Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group. He joined the Office of Science
and Technology at the White House in 1962 as a technical advisor for aviation and space and remained there
until 1968, when he took a leave of absence as a research associate at Harvard and as a fellow at the Brookings
Institution. See his obituaries, Washingttm Star, April 30, 1969, p. B-6, and Wa._hington Po._t, April 30, 1969, p. B14.
Mikhail S. Gorbachev (1931-) became leader of the Soviet Union in 1985 and restructured the nation, presid-
ing over the demise of the communist state and the end of the cold war in 1989. In the process, he opened nego-
tiations with the United States for significant international cooperation in space exploration. See Thomas G.
Butson, Gorbachev: A Biography (New York: Stein and Day, 1985); "Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich," biographical
file, NASA Historical Reference Collection,
Aristid V. Grosse ( 1905- ) was born in Riga, Russia, and trained in engineering at the Technische Hochschule
in Berlin. He came to the United States in 1930 and was on the chemistry faculty at the University of Chicago,
1931-1940. He then went to Columbia University briefly before working on the Manhattan Project during the
war years. In 1948 he became a faculty member at Temple University, presiding over the Research Institute (now
Franklin Institute) through 1969. See "Grosse, Aristid," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
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RichardW. Gutman (1921-) is a retired auditor and accountant who worked at the General Accounting Office
(GAO) on defense and international programs. From 1968 to 1972, he was deputy director of the Defense
Division, and when he retired front GAO in 1981, he was the director for the Defense Programs Planning and
Analysis Staff. See The GAO Review (Fall 1968, Summer 1978, and Spring 1982) GAO's Office _!] l'er_onnel
Management: l'rofes.gional Staff Reg_st_ entry for Gutman dated September 30, 1970. This information was
obtained from the GAO Law Library, Washington, DC.
George H. Hage ( 1925- ) was associated with Project Apollo in the 1960s. After completing his B.S. in elecu i_tl
engineering from the University of Washington, he went to work for the Boeing Company in 1947. He was
involved in the development of the Bomarc and Minuteman missile systems, and in 1962 he went to the
Minuteman assembly and test complex in Florida in 1962. From there he took charge of Boeing's reconnais-
sance efforts, and in 1968 he came to NASA Headquarters as deputy director of the Apollo program. Soon after-
ward Hage returned to Boeing, and in 1973 he was appointed president of the Aerojet Solid Propulsion
Company. See "Hage, George H.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
James C. Hagerty (190%1981) had been on the staff of the New Y_wk Tzme._ from 1934 to 1942, the last four years
as legislative correspondent in the newspaper's Albany bureau. He served as executive assistant to New York
Governor Thomas Dewey from 1943 to 1950 and then as Dewey's secretary for the next two },ears before becom-
ing press secretary for President Eisenhower from 1953 to 1961. See "Miscellaneous Other Agencies," bio-
graphical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Grant L. Hansen (1921-) was an engineer in the aerospace industry before serving as assistant secretary of the
Air Force for research and development from 1969 Io 1973. See Who_ Who in America, 1996 (New Providence,
NJ: Marquis Who's _Who, 1995).
George Haskell (1940-) is a British physicist who has worked for the European Space Agency (ESA) since 1972.
From 1972 to 1987, he worked in ESA's space science planning office, and from 1987 to 1992, he served as the
liaison officer for scientific use of the space station. He has also served as associate dean and vice president tor
academic affairs of the International Space University. See "Miscellaneous Foreign," biographical file, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
Walter Hedrick (192l-) was an Air Force brigadier general who was involved in space systems throughout the
1960s. In 1967, he became the Air Force's director of space, deputy chief of staff, research and development. See
U.S. Air Force biography, June 15, 1969, for Brigadier General Walter R. Hedrick,Jr., History Office, Air Force
Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH.
Richard C. Henry was a career U.S. Air Force officer involved in the development of space systems during the
last part of his service. He was commander of Air Force Space Division in Los Angeles between 1978 and 1982
and vice commander of Air Force Space Command for almost a year, 1982-1983, retiring as a lieutenant gener-
al. See Aero.spa_e Daily, February 9, 1983, p. 232.
Earl D. Hilburn (1920-) was trained in physics and mathematics at the University of Wisconsin and worked for
more than twenty years in the electronics and aerospace industry before accepting a position at NASA in 1963
as deputy associate administrator. In that post, he was responsible for industry affairs, helping maintain liaison
with the far-flung corporations involved in the production of NASA space hardware. In 1966 he left NASA and
became president of Western Union. See "Hilburn, Earl D.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
Noel W. Hirmers ( 1935- ) was trained in geochemistry and geology at Rutgers University, the California Institute
of Technology, and Princeton University. He began his career in 1963 with Bellcomm, Inc., working on the
Apollo program, and he arrived at NASA Headquarters in 1972 as the deputy director of lunar programs in the
Office of Space Science. From 1974 to 1979, he was NASA's associate administrator for space science. He also
served as director of the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum, 197%1982, and as director
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of the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, 1982-1987. He then became associate deputy
administrator of NASA before leaving the agency in 1989 to join the Martin Marietta Corporation as vice presi-
dent of strategic planning. See "Hinners, Noel W.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
John Hodge (1929-) began a distinguished career at NASA in 1959. 1 le worked in the area of flight control at
the Langley Research Center and the Johnson Space Center until 1970. In 1982 he became director of the Space
Station Task Force at NASA Headquarters. He then took on a series of increasingly responsible positions deal-
ing with the Space Station, culminating with him being named associate administrator for operations, space sta-
tion, in 1986. See "Hodge, John," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Valerie Hood ( 1945- ) is a lawyer specializing in space law who has worked for the International Affairs Branch
of the European Space Agency since 1976. See "Miscellaneous Foreign," biographical file, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
Donald E Hornig (1920-), a chemist, was a research associate at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Laboratory,
1943-1944, and a scientist and group leader at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 1944-1946. He taught chem-
istry at Brown University starting in 1946, rising to the directorship of the Metcalf Research Laboratory,
1949-1957, and also ser_4ng as associate dean and acting dean of the graduate school from 1952 to 1954. He was
Donner professor of science at Princeton from 1957 to 1964 as well as chairman of the chemistry department
from 1958 to 1964. He was President Lyndon Johnson's special assistant on science and technology from 1964
to 1969 and president of Brown University from 1970 to 1976. See Gregg Herken, (_rdinal Choice._: Science Advice
to the President from Hiroshinm to _l)l (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
H.C. van de Hul_t of the Netherlands served as president of the Commitlee on Space Research (COSPAR).
Lee B. James (1920-) was a career Army officer, trained at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and the
California Institute of Technology, who was assigned to the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Huntsville, Alabama,
in 1956. In 1960 he became deputy director of the Army's newly formed Research and Development Division.
In 1962 he was assigned to the Marshall Space Flight Center and the next year became deputy director of the
Apollo program at NASA Headquarters. In 1968 he returned to Marshall to head the Saturn Program Office and
retired from the Army as a colonel. Only a year later, he was elevated as the director of the overall program office
at Marshall. James retired from NASA in 1971 and accepted a faculty position at the University of Tennessee
Space Institute in Tullahoma. See "James, Lee. B., _ biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Robert Jastrow (1925-) earned a Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Columbia in 1948 and pursued postdoctor-
al studies at Leiden, Princeton (Institute for Advanced Studies), and the University of California at Berkeley
before becoming an assistant professor at Yale, 1953-1954. He then served on the staff at the Naval Research
Laboratory from 1954 to 1958. In 1958, he was appointed chief of the theoretical division at the Goddard Space
Flight Center. He became director of the Goddard Institute of Space Studies in 1961 and stayed at its helm for
twenty years before becoming professor of earth sciences at Dartmouth. He specialized in nuclear physics, plas-
ma physics, geophysics, and the physics of the Moon and terrestrial planets. ,See "Jastrow, Robert," biographical
file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Caldwell C. Johnson was a Iongtime NASA official who held a number of positions in the Apollo program at the
Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston in the 1960s. He started work at the Langley Memorial Aeronautical
Laboratory in Hampton, Virginia, in 1938 and worked in a variety of aeronautical engineering activities. He
moved to Houston with the Space Task Group in 1962. He retired fi-om NASA and became chief of design for
Space Industries, Inc., in Texas. See "Johnson, Caldwen C.," biogqaphical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
John A. Johnson ( 1915- ), after completing law school at the University of Chicago in 1940, practiced in Chicago
until 1943, when he entered military service with the Navy. From 1946 to 1948, he was an assistant for interna-
tional security affairs in the Department of State. He joined the office of the general counsel of the Department
of the Air Force in 19-t9 and served until October 7, 1958 (for the last six years as the general counsel), when
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he accepted the general counsel position at NASA. In 1963 he left NASA to become director of international
arrangements at the Communications Satellite Corporation. The next year, he became a vice president of
COMSAT, and, in 1973, senior vice president and then chief executive officer, retiring in 1980. See "Johnson,
John A.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Lyndon B. Johnson (1908-1973) (D-TX) was elected to the House of Representatives in 1937 and served until
1949. He was a senator from 1949 to 1961, vice president under John E Kennedy from 1960 to 1963, and presi-
dent from the time of Kennedy's assassination in November 1963 until 1969. Best known for the social legisla-
tion he passed during his presidency and for his escalation of the war in Vietnam, he was also highly instrumental
in revising and passing the legislation that created NASA and in supporting the U.S. space program as chair of
the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and of the preparedness subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee. While he was vice president, he chaired the National Aeronautics and Space Council. On
his role in support of the space program, see Robert A. Divine, "Lyndon B.Johnson and the Politics of Space,"
in Robert A. Divine, ed., TheJohnscrn Years: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science (Lawrence: University of Kansas
Press, 1987), pp. 217-53; Robert Dallek, '_ohnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning,"
unpublished paper delivered at a symposium on "Presidential Leadership, Congress, and the U.S. Space
Program," sponsored by NASA and American University, March 25, 1993.
Roy W. Johnson (1906-1965) was named director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency for the Department
of Defense in 1958, serving until 1961. Previously, he had been with the General Electric Company. He was a
strong proponent of exploiting space for national security objectives. See "Roy W.Johnson Dead; First U.S. Space
Chief," _¢_*shington Post, July 23, 1965.
U. Alexis Johnson (1908-) was a Iongtime member of the U.S. Foreign Service and served in a number of
embassies around the world. A specialist in Asian affairs, he was attached to the embassy in Tokyo, 1935-1938,
served as consul general to Japan, 1947-1949, and served as ambassador to Japan, 1966-1969. He also served on
several international commissions and in numerous senior positions with the Department of State in
Washington, D.C., most significantly as under secretary of state for political affairs, beginning in 1969 until his
retirement. See "Miscellaneous Other Agencies," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Vincent L. Johnson (1918- ) was a Iongtime NASA 'official, joining the agency in 1960 after working as an
aerospace engineer with the Navy since 1947. He managed the Launch Vehicle and Propulsion Programs
Division at NASA tteadquarters and had primary responsibility for the program management of Scout, Delta,
and Centaur launch vehicle development. He retired from NASA in 1974, after having served as deputy associ-
ate administrator for space science. See "Johnson, V.L.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Charlie Jonas (1904-) (R-NC) served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1953 to 1973. See Biographical
Direct*rry r![the United States C_mgre_s, 1774-1989 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989).
John Erik Jonsson (1901-1995) was an engineer and businessman who chaired the board of Texas Instruments,
Inc., from 1958 to 1966. He later became the mayor of Dallas. Biographical information from the Corporate
Archives Office of Texas Instruments, Inc., Dallas, TX.
William C. Keathley arrived at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in 1966. He served as the project manager
for the Apollo Telescope Mount experiments that were flown on Skylab and as chief of the Skylab Optical
Telescope Assembly project. In 1977 he was named manager of the Space Telescope Project (later named the
Hubble Space Telescope). See MarshaUStar, March 16, 1977, p.4, from the Marshall Space Flight Center History
Office, Huntsvine, AL.
Fates Kefauver (1903-1963) (D-TN) served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1939 to 1949 and in the
U.S. Senate fiom 1949 to 1963. He ran unsuccessfully as Adlai Stevenson's vice presidential choice in 1956. See
Biogwq, hi,al l)irect_rey r?[ the United States Congrex_, 1774-1989 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1989).
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M.V. Keldysh (1911-1978) was trained in physics and mathematics at Moscow University (where he received a
Ph.D. in 1938) and became the chief theoretician of Soviet cosmonautics in the 1960s. He had previously served
many years in a variety of positions at the Central Institute of Aerohydrodynamics, Moscow University, and the
Steklov Mathematical Institute. He was vice president (1960-1961) and then president (until 1975) of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences. See "M.V. Keldysh, Soviet Scientist, Dies," Washington Po_t, June 27, 1978.
Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy (1932_ ) (D-MA) has been a Iongtime Democratic member of the Senate from
Massachusetts who was first elected in 1962.
John E Kennedy (1916-1963) was president of the United States from 1961 to 1963. In 1960, as a senator from
Massachusetts between 1953 and 1960, he ran for president as the Democratic candidate, with party wheelhorse
Lyndon B. Johnson as his running mate. Using the slogan, "Let's gel this country moving again," Kennedy
charged the Republican Eisenhower administration with doing nothing about the myriad social, economic, and
international problems that festered in the 1950s. He was especially hard on Eisenhower's record in interna-
tional relations, taking a cold warrior position on a supposed "missile gap" (which turned out not to be the case)
wherein the United States lagged far behind the Soviet Union in intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tech-
nology. On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy announced to the nation the goat of sending an American to the
Moon before the end of the decade. The human spaceflight imperative was a direct outgrowth of it; Projects
Mercury (at least in its latter stages), Gemini, and Apollo were each designed to execute it. On this subject, see
Walter A. McDougall .... The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History r?f the Space Age (New York: Basic Books,
1985); John M. Logsdon, The Derision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1970).
Robert E Kennedy (1925-1968) was attorney general during the administration of his brother, John E Kennedy,
and a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1968 at the time of his assassination. He
was involved in the 1961 decision to go to the Moon as a senior advisor in the Kennedy administration. On his
career, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and Hit Tirne_s (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978).
Robert S. Kerr (1896-1963) (D-OK) had been governor of Oklahoma from 1943 to 1947 and was elected to the
Senate the following year. From 1961 until 1963, he chaired the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.
See Anne Hodges Morgan, Robert S. Kerr: The Xenate Years (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977).
Nikita S. Khrushchev (1894-1971) was premier of the Soviet Union from 1958 to 1964 and first secretary of the
Communist Party from 1953 to 1964. He was noted for an astonishing speech in 1956 denouncing the crimes
and blunders of Joseph Stalin and for gestures of reconciliation with the West in 1959-1960, ending with the
breakdown of a Paris summit with President Eisenhower and the leaders of France and Great Britain in the wake
of Khrushchev's announcement that the Soviets had shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over
the Ural Mountains on May 1, 1960. Then in 1962, Khrushchev attempted to place Soviet medium-range mis-
siles in Cuba. This led to an intense crisis in October, following which Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles
if the United States promised to make no more attempts to overthrow Cuba's Communist government. Although
he could be charming at times, Khrushchev was known for boisterous threats (extending even to shoe-
pounding at the United Nations) and was a tough negotiator, although he believed, unlike his predecessors, in
the possibility of Communist victory over the West without war. For further information about him, see his
Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974); Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev: A (_reer
(New York: Viking, 1966); Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhoweg, Khrushchev aml the U-2 Affair (New York:
Harper and Row, 1986); Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981 ).
Jmmes R. Killian, Jr. (1904-1988), was president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) between
1949 and 1959, but he was on leave between November 1957 and July 1959 to serve as the first presidential sci-
ence advisor. President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC),
which Killian chaired, following the Sputnik crisis. After leaving the White House staff in 1959, Killian contin-
ued his work at MIT. In 1965 he began working with the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to develop public
television. Killian described his experiences as a presidential advisor in ,Sputnik, Scientists, and Etsenhower: A
Memoir of th_ First Special Assistant to the. President fi_r Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977). For
a discussion of PSAC, see Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choir_s: ScienceAdvice to the Pre_ulentfrom Hiroshima to SDI (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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V.A.Kirillin(1913-)waseducatedasaphysicistandworkedinthermodynamics.HewasdeputychairoftheCouncilofMinisters(intheearly1960s)andchairofthe State Committee for Science and Technology
(1965-1980) for the Soviet Union. He was stripped of his position in 1980 after the ascension of Leonid Brezhnev
as head of the Soviet Union. See "Biography, Soviet, Miscellaneous (K-O)," NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
Henry A. Kisslnger (1923-) was presidential advisor for national security affairs from 1969 to 1973 and secre-
tary of state (under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) thereafter until 1977. In these positions, he was
especially involved in international aspects of spaceflight, particularly the joint Soviet-American flight, the
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, in 1975. See "Kissinger, Henry," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
George B. Kistiakowsky (1900-1982) was a pioneering chemist at Harvard University, associated with the devel-
opment of the atomic bomb. He later became an advocate of banning nuclear weapons. He served as science
advisor to President Eisenhower from July 1959 to the end of the administration. He later served on the adviso-
ry board to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1962 to 1969. See New York Time.L December
9, 1982, p. B21; "George B. Kistiakowsky," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Yuri N. Koptev (1940-) became general director of the Russian Space Agency. Trained as an engineer, he began
work in 1965 at NPO S.A. Lavochkina, as head of the organization for spacecraft design. Beginning in 1969, he
served in administration and eventually was appointed as senior engineer to the deputy minister at the design
bureau. See "Koptev, Yuri N.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Christopher C. Kraft, Jr. (1924-), was a long-standing official with NASA throughout the Apollo program. He
received a B.S. in aeronautical engineering from Virginia Polytechnic University in 1944 and joined the Langley
Aeronautical Laboratory of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) the next year. In 1958,
still at Langley, he became a member of the Space Task Group developing Project Mercury and moved with the
group to Houston in 1962. He was flight director for all of the Mercury and many of the Gemini missions and
directed the design of Mission Control at the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), redesignated the Johnson
Space Center in 1973. He was named the MSC deputy director in 1970 and its director two years later, a position
he held until his retirement in 1982. Since then, he has remained active as an aerospace consultant. See "I_aft,
Christopher C.,Jr.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Edwin (Din) Land was president of the Polaroid Corporation and a member of the Purcell Panel that assessed
spaceflight capabilities for the U.S. government in 1957-1958.
Harold R. Lawrence was assistant director of NASA's Office of International Programs. He resigned in 1960 to
take a job at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. See T. Keith Glennan, Correspondence Files, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
Theo Lefewe was the Belgian minister who served as chair of the European Spade Conference, which was a pol-
icy-level organization created to coordinate European responses to U.S. positions on space issues. Lefevre led
the European delegation in negotiations with the United States concerning launch assurance and post-Apollo
cooperation during the early 1970s.
Curtis E. LeMay (1906-1990) was a career Air Force officer who entered the Army Air Corps in the 1920s and
rose through a series of increasingly responsible Army Air Forces commands during World War I1. After the war,
LeMay built the Strategic Air Command into the premier nuclear deterrent force in the early 1950s. lle also
served as deputy chief of staff, 1957-1961, and chief of staff, 1961-1965, of the U.S. Air Force. He retired as a four-
star general in 1965 and ran for vice president with independent candidate George C. Wallace in 1968. See
Thomas M. Coffey,/ron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of C,eneral Curti.g l_May (New York: Crown Pub., 1986).
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Reimar Leust (1923-) is a German theoretical physicist who held a variety of prestigious academic and adviso-
ry council posts before serving as director general of European Space Agency li'om 1984 to 1990. See
"Miscellaneous Foreign," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Robert B. Lewis was a Iongtime government official who joined NA.%_ in 1961 as director of financial manage-
ment. He served until 1965, when he left the agency to return to the Office of the .Secretary of Defense. See
"Miscellaneous NASA," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Russell Long ( 1918- ) served as a U.S. senator from Louisiana from 1948 to 1987. See Biographical I)ire_.t_rry _]the
United States Congrreu, 1774-1989 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office).
Alan M. Lovelace (1929-) ss_as born in St. Petersburg, Florida, and was educated at the University of Florida,
receiving a B.S. in chemistry in 1951, an M.S. in organic chemistry in 1952, and a Ph.D. in organic chemistry in
1954. Shortly after the end of the Korean conflict, he served in the U,S. Air Force from 1954 to 1956. Thereafter,
Dr. Lovelace began work as a government scientist at the Air Force Materials Lalx)ratory, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. In January 1964, he was named as chief scientist of the Air Force Materials Laboratory,
and in 1967 he was named director of the laboratory. In October 1972, he was named director of science and
technology for the Air Force Systems Command at Headquarters, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. In
September 1973, he became the principal deputy to the assistant secretary of the Air Force for research and
development. One year late, Dr. Lovelace left the Department of Defense to become the associate administrator
of the NASA Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology. With the departure of George Low as NASA deputy
administrator in June 1976, Dr. Lovelace became deputy administrator, set ring untilJuly 1981. lie retired from
NASA to accept a position as corporate vice president of science and engineering at the General Dynamics
Corporation in St. Ixmis. See "Lovelace, Alan M.," Deputy Administrator files, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
George M. Low (1926-1984), a native of Vienna, Austria, moved to the United States in 1940 and received an
aeronautical engineering degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) in 1948 and an M.S. in the same
field from that school in 1950. He joined the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) in 1949; at
the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory he specialized in experimental and theoretical research in several lields.
He became chief of manned spaceflight at NASA Headquarters in 1958. In 1960. he chaired a special commit-
tee that formulated the original plans for the Apollo lunar landings. In 1964 he became deputy director of the
Manned Spacecraft Center in tlouston, the forerunner of the Johnson Space Center. He became deputy admin-
istrator of NASA in 1969 and served as acting administrator in 1970-1971. lie _etired from NASA in 1976 to
become president of RPI, a position he still held until his death. In 1990 NASA renamed its quality and excel-
lence award after him. See "Low, George M.," Deputy Administrator files, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Glynn S. Lunney (1936-) was a longtime NASA official. Trained as an aeronautical engineer, he came to the
Lewis Research Center near the time of the creation of NASA in 1958 and became a member of the Space Task
Group developing Project Mercury the next year. He worked on the Apollo program in a series of positions,
including manager of the Apollo Spacecraft Program in 1973 and manager of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project at
the Johnson Space Center in 1touston. Thereafter, he managed the development of the Space Shuttle and
served in several other NASA positions. Lunney retired from NASA in 1985 and became vice president and gen-
eral manager, Houston Operations, for Rockwell International's Space Systems Division. See "Lunney, Glenn S.,"
biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
M
Harold Macmillan (1894-1986) became a British member of Parliament in 1924, foreign secretary in 1955, and then
prime minister from 1957 to 1963. See "Macmillan, (Maurice) Harold," Current Biography YearlxxJk 1987, p. 637.
FrankJ. Malina (1912-1981) was a young California Institute of Technology Ph.D. student in the mid-1930s when
he began an aggressive rocket research program to design a high-altitude sounding rocket. Beginning in late
1936, Malina and his colleagues started the static testing of rocket engines in the canyons above the Rose Bowl,
with mixed results, but a series of tests eventually led to the development of the WAC-Corporal rocket during
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World War I1. After the war, Malina worked with the United Nations and eventually retired to Paris to pursue a
career as an artist. See "Malina, Frank J," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Vittorio Manno (1938-) is an Italian physicist who was a senior scientist at European Space Agency's Science
Directorate from 1972 to 1989. From 1989 to 1995, Manno served as the scientific attach6 at the Italian Embassy'
in Vienna. See "Miscellaneous Foreign," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Hans Mark (1929-) became NASA's deputy administrator in July 1981. He had previously served as secretary of
the Air Force from July 1979 until February 1981 and as under secretary of the Air Force since 1977. In February
1969, Mark became director of NASA's Ames Research Center in Mountain View, California, where he managed
the center's research and applications efforts in aeronautics, space science, life science, and space technology.
Born in Mannheim, Germany, he came to the United States in 1940 and became a citizen in 1945. He received
a Ph.D. in physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1954. Upon leaving NASA, he became chan-
cellor of the University of Texas at Austin. See "Mark, Hans," Deputy Administrator files, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
Robert T, Marsh, a general in the Air Force, was commander of the Air Force Systems Command from 1982 to
1984. See "Miscellaneous DOD," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
John J. Martin was educated as a mechanical engineer, receiving a Ph.D. from Purdue University in 1951. He
joined North American Aviation in 1951 and moved to the Bendix Corporation in 1953. In 1960 he joined the
Institute for Defense Analyses and in 1969 moved to the staff of the President's science advisor at the White
House. During 1973-1974, he served as the associate deputy to the director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
He then was deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force for research and development, 1974-1976, before return-
ing to Bendix. He became a NASA official in 1984, as associate administrator for aeronautics and space tech-
nology at NASA Headquarters, before returning to industry in 1985. See "Martin, Dr.John J.," biographical file,
NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Sir Harrie S.W. Massey ( 1908- ) was Quain professor of physics at University College in London and chaired the
British National Space Research Committee in the early 1960s. He was the leader of a team of British scientists
responsible for the selection of the experiments and instruments for the S.51 satellite project, a British-American
cooperative effort begun in 1959 to launch individual instruments into space for scientific purposes. See
"Biography, Foreign Miscellaneous, I-M," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
James A. McDivitt (192%) was a career Air Force officer, retiring as a brigadier general, who was chosen as a
NASA astronaut in the second group selected, in 1962. He served as command pilot of the Gemini IV and com-
mander of the Apollo 9 missions. He also managed the Apollo Spacecraft Program at Johnson Space Center
from September 1969 to August 1972; he then resigned from NASA and the Air Force. Starting in 1975, he
joined Pullman, Inc., in Chicago and then served as vice president, president of Pullman Standard, and execu-
tive vice president, in that order. He resigned from Pullman on January 31, 1981, to become vice president of
strategic management for Rockwell International in Pittsburgh. He then became senior vice president of gov-
ernment and international operations for Rockwell International in Washington, D.C. See "McDivitt,James A.,"
biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Frank B. McDonald ( 1925- ) began a career with NASA in 1959 as head of the Energetic Particles Branch in the
Space Science Division at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. Thereafter, he served as pro-
ject scientist on nine NASA satellite programs. In 1982 he became NASA's chief scientist, serving until 1987 when
he returned to Goddard as associate director/chief scientist. See "McDonald, Dr. Frank B. (Chief Scientist)," bio-
graphical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Neff H. McElroy (1904-1972) became secretary of defense in 1957 and served through 1959. He had previously
been president of Procter & Gamble and returned there in December 1959 to become chair of the board. He
served in that position until October 1972, a month before his death. See "McEIroy, Neil," biographical file,
NASA Historical Reference Collection.
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RobertS.McNamara(1916-)wasecretaryof defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,
1961-1968. Thereafter, he served as president of the World Bank, where he remained until retirement in 1981.
As secretary of defense in 1961, McNamara was intimately involved in the process of approving Project Apollo
by the Kennedy administration. See "McNamara, Robert S(trange)," Current BioKraphy Yeartmok 1987, pp. 408-18;
John M. Logsdon, The Decision t*_ (_J to the Moon: Project ApolbJ and the National Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1970).
John B. Medaris (1902-1990) was a major general commanding the Army Ballistic Missile Agency when "12 Keith
Glennan tried to incorporate it into NASA in the late 1950s. He attempted to retain the organization as part of
the Army, but with a series of Department of Defense agreements, the Air Force obtained primacy, in space activ-
ities. Therefore, Medaris could not succeed in his effort. Medaris also worked with Wernher yon Braun to launch
Explorer I in early 1958. He retired from the Army in 1969 and became an Episcopal priest, later joining an even
more conservative Anglican-Catholic church. See "John Brute Medaris," biographical file, NASA Historital
Reference Collection;John B. Medaris, with Arthur Gordon, (;_runldown firr Det_._ion (New York: Pumam, 1960)).
W.J. Mellors headed the Washington, D.C., office of the European Space Agency.
Clark B. Millikan (1903-1966) was a pioneer researcher in aerodynamics and guided missiles. With a Ph.D. in
physics from the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), he was the son of Nobel Prize-winning Robert A.
Millikan. He was appointed to the faculty of Caltech in 1928 and later became director of the Guggenheim
Aeronautical Laboratory at the institute. He was enormously important in fostering rocket technology, both at
Caltech and elsewhere, and he served as chair of the Guided Missile Committee for the Department of Defense
during the late 1940s and early 1950s. See "Clark B. Millikan ofCal Tech Dead," New Y_rrk Time.L January 3, 1966.
Erwin Mitchell (1924- ) (D-GA) served as a congressman from 1958 to 1961. He chaired the House
Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific Inventions, which was under the Committee on Science and
Astronautics. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congre.ss, 1774-1989 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1989).
Brooks Morris (1913- ) was an aerospace engineer who worked as a manager of quality assurance and reliabili-
ty at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory from 1961 to 1981. See Who_ _$7u_ in Aviation and Aerospace, U.S. edition
(Boston and New York: National Aeronautical Institute and Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd., 1983).
Donald Morris was a fornter Foreign Service official who joined NASA in 1967. Morris served as deputy assistant
administrator for international affairs and then became deputy associate administrator for applications-
management in 1976. In 1977 he was detailed to the President's Committee on Science and Technology. See
"Assorted NASA Officials," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
George E. Mueller (1918- ) was associate administrator for the Office of Manned Space Flight at NASA
Headquarters, 1963-1969, where he responsible for overseeing the completion of Project Apollo and for begin-
ning the development of the Space Shuttle. He moved to the General Dynamics Corporation, as senior sace pres-
ident in 1969, and remained there until 1971. He then became president of the Systems Development
Corporation, 1971-1980, eventually becoming its chairman and corporate executive officer, 1981-1983. See
"Mueller, George E.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Robert Murphy (1894-1978) was a career Foreign Service and State Department official. He served as deputy
under secretary of state for political affairs and then as under secretary in the 1950s. Biographical information
from the Biographic ICzg'L_ter of the Departratnt of State, 1959, Department of State History Office, Washington, DC.
Dale D. Myers ( 1922- ) served as NASA's deputy administrator from October 1986 until 1989. He had previously
been under secretary of the Department of Energy from 1977 to 1979. From 1974 to 1977, he was vice president
at Rockwell International and president at North American Aircraft Group in El Segundo, California. He also
was the associate administrator for manned spaceflight at NASA from 1970 to 1974. From 1969 to 1970, Myers
served as vice president/program manager of the Space Shuttle Program at Rockwell International. He was vice
president and program manager of the Apollo Command/Service Module Program at North American-
Rockwell from 196,t to 1969. ,M'ter lea_4ng NASA in 1989, Myers returned to private industry. See "Myers, Dale
D.," Deputy Administrators files, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
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John E. Naugle ( 1923- ) was trained as a physicist at the University of Minnesota and began his career studying
cosmic rays by launching balloons to high altitudes, in 1959 he joined NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in
Greenbelt, Maryland, where he developed projects to study the magnetosphere. In 1960 he took charge of
NASA's fields and particles research program. He also served as NASA's associate administrator for the Office of
Space Science and as the agency's chief scientist before his retirement in 1981. See.John E. Naugle, First Among
Equals: 7"he Sel_cti_m of NASA Spar_ Science Ex/mrimenLs (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4215, 1991).
Homer E. Newell (1915-1983) earned his Ph.D. in mathematics at the University of Wisconsin in 1940 and
served as a theoretical physicist and mathematician at the Naval Research Laboratory fiom 1944 to 1958. During
part of that period, he was science program coordinator for Project Vanguard and was acting superintendent of
the Atmosphere and Astrophysics Division. In 1958 he transferred to NAS;A to assume responsibility for planning
and developing the new agency's space .science program. He soon became deputy director of spaceflight pro-
grams. In 1961 he assumed directorship of the Office of Space Sciences, and in 1963, he became associate
administrator for space science and applications. Over the course of his career, he became an internationally
known authority in the field of atmospheric and space sciences, as well as the author of numerous scientific arti-
cles and seven books, including Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Year_ _?[,_mce Scienct (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4211,
1980). He retired from NASA at the end of 1973. See _Newell, Homer," biographical file, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
Richard M. Nixon (1913-1994) was president of the United States between January 1969 and August 1974. Early
in his presidency, Nixon appointed a Space Task Group under the direction of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew to
assess the future of spaceflight for the nation. Its report recommended a vigorous post-Apollo exploration pro-
gram, culminating in a human expedition to Mars. Nixon did not approve this plan, but he did decide in favor
of building one element of it, the Space Shuttle, which was approved on January 5, 1972. See Roger D. Launius,
"NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-72," 7"he Hi._tohan 57 (Autumn 1994): 17-34.
0
Gerald D. O'Brien was assistant general counsel for patent matters at NASA between 1958 and 1965, when he
was appointed an assistant commissioner of patents by President Lyndon B..Johnson. Previously, he had received
a B.S. in electrical engineering at the U.S. Naval Academy and a law degree in 1940 frorri American University's
Washington College of Law. He then served in the Navy as patent advisor to the National Defense Research
Council during World War Il. After the war, he became patent counsel of the Bureau of Ordnance, Department
of the Navy, fiom 1946 to 1958. See "O'Brien, Gerald D.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
Henk Olthof ( 1944- ) is a Dutch physicist who h_.s worked at the European Space Agency since 1977. From 1977
to 1986, he was responsible for the secretariat of the Astronomy Working Group. Since 1986, Olthof has served
as the head of space station and platforms for scientific users at the European Space Research and Technology
Centre in the Netherlands. See "Miscellaneous Foreign," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
Edgar Page (1935-) is an Irish physicist who specialized in cosmic ray research while at the European Space
Research Organization from 1965 to 1975. He then became head of the European Space Agency's Space Science
Department. Beginning in 1986, he has served as the science coordinator for the Ulysses spacecraft mission. See
"Miscellaneous Foreign," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Thomas O. Paine (1921-1992) was appointed deputy administrator of NASA on January 31, 1968. Upon the
retirement of James E. Webb on October 8, 1968, he was named acting administrator. I'[e was nominated as
NASA's third administrator on March 5, 1969, and confirmed by the Senate on March 20, 1969. During his lead-
ership, the first seven Apollo crewed missions were flown, in which twenty astronauts orbited the Earth, fourteen
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traveled to the Moon, and fimr walked on its surface. Paine resigned from NASA on September 15, 1970, to
return to the General Electric Company in New York City as vice president and group executive, Power
Generation Group, where he remained until 1976. In 1985 the White House chose Paine as chair of the National
Commission on Space to prepare a report on the future of space exploration. Since leaving NASA fifteen years
earlier, Paine had been a tireless spokesperson for an expansive view of what should be done in space. The Paine
Commission took most of a year to prepare its report, largely because it solicited public input in hearings
throughout the United States. The report, Pioneering the ,Space Fronti_ was published in a lavishly illustrated,
glossy format in May 1986. h espoused a "pioneering mission for 21st-century America"--"to lead the explo-
ration and development of the space frontier, advancing science, technology, and enterprise, and building insti-
tutions and systems that make accessible vast new resources and support human settlements beyond Earth orbit,
from the highlands of the Moon to the plains of Mars." The report also contained a "Declaration for Space,"
which included a rationale for exploring and settling the solar system and outlined a long-range space program
for the United States. See Roger D. Launius, "NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-72," The
Historian 57 (Autumn 1994): 17-34.
Frank Parker (1916-) was assistant director of Defense Research and Engineering at the Department of Defense
from 1959 to 1961. This information is from the Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Branch,
Department of Defense, Washington, DC.
RobertJ. Parks (1922-) was a Iongtime employee at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), arriving there in 1947
after completing his education at the nearby California Institute of Technology. Closely associated with robotic
planetary exploration, he worked on the Mariner, Ranger, and Surveyor programs. He served asJPL's planetary
program director in the 1960s and then becameJPL's associate and finally deputy director. See "Parks, Robert
J.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Kenneth S. Pedersen ( 1939- ) served in numerous government agencies--the Office of Equal Opportunity, the
Department of Commerce, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission--prior to
coming to NASA in 1982 as director of international affairs. In 1988 Pedersen was appointed as NASA's associ-
ate administrator for external relations, serving until 1990, when he left NASA to accept an academic appoint-
ment at Georgetown University. See "Pedersen, Kenneth S.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
Charles J. Pellefin, Jr., was a Iongtime NASA official who began his career at the Goddard Space Flight Center
as he was completing his Ph.D. in physics from the Catholic University of America in 1974. The next year he
moved to NASA Headquarters, where he managed the development and integration of scientific instrumenta-
tion for flight on the Space Shuttle. In 1983 he was named director of astrophysics in NASA's Office of Space
Science and Applications, and in 1992, he was appointed as deputy' associate administrator for safety and mis-
sion quality, serving until 1994. See "Pellerin, Charles J., Jr.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
Boris N. Petrov (1913-1980) was a leading Soviet scientist whose later years were devoted to space exploration.
As a senior academician for the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Petrov chaired the Inter_7,osmos Council, which
promoted cooperation in space among eastern European nations during the height of the cold war, 1966-1980.
See "Boris Petrov, 67, Soviet Expert on Automation, Space Research," Wo._hington Post, August 27. 1980; Kenneth
W. Garland, "Boris Petrov," Spactflight 23 (January 1981): 29.
Franklyn W. Phillips (1917-) graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1941 with a degree
in mechanical engineering. He then worked at the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, later moving to Lewis
Flight Propulsion Laboratory, where he conducted research on aircraft engine materials and stresses. In 1945 he
became a member of the NACA director's staff and served as administrator for a variety of NACA research pro-
grams in aircraft engines and aircraft and missile structures and loads. In October 1958, he became special assis-
tant to T. Keith Glennan, NASA's first administrator. He relinquished that position in January 1959 to become
acting secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, but in February 1960, he returned to his posi-
tion as Glennan's assistant. He continued in that job under James E. Webb until 1962, when he became director
of NASA's new northeastern office. In 1964 he became assistant director for administrative operations at the new
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NASA Electronics Research Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts. This information is from background sum-
maries of top NASA staff, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Samuel C. Phillips (1921-1990) was trained as an electrical engineer at the University of Wyoming, but he also
participated in the Civilian Pilot Training Program during World War It. Upon his graduation in 1942, Phillips
entered the Army infantry but soon transferred to the air component. As a young pilot, he served with distinc-
tion in the Eighth Air Force in England----earning two distinguished flying crosses, eight air medals, and the
French croix de guerre--but he quickly became interested in aeronautical research and development. He was
involved in the development of the successful B-52 bomber in the early 1950s and headed the Minuteman inter-
continental ballistic missile program in the latter part of the decade. In 1964 Phillips, by this time an Air Force
general, was lent to NASA to head the Apollo lunar landing program, which, of course, was unique in its tech-
nological accomplishment. He returned to the Air Force in the 1970s and commanded the Air Force Systems
Command prior to his retirement in 1975. See "Gen. Samuel C. Phillips of Wyoming," Congressional Rec_rrd,
August 3, 1973, S-15689; Rep. John Wold, "Sam Phillips: One Who Led Us to the Moon," NASA Activitie.*,
May/June 1990, pp. 18-19; obituary in New Yrrrk Times, February 1, 1990, p. D1.
William H. Picketing (1910-) obtained his bachelor's and master's degrees in electrical engineering and then
a Ph.D. in physics from the California Institute of Technology before becoming a professor of electrical engi-
neering there in 1946. In 1944 he organized the electronics efforts at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (TPL) to
support guided missile research and development, becoming project manager for Corporal, the first operational
missile JPL developed. From 1954 to 1976, he was director of JPL, which developed the first U.S. satellite
(Explorer I), the first successful U.S. circumlunar space probe (Pioneer IV), the Mariner flights to Venus and
Mars in the early to mid-1960s, the Ranger photographic missions to the Moon in 1964 and 1965, and the
Surveyor lunar landings of 1966 and 1967. See "Pickering, William H.," biographical file, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
Kenneth S. Pit.zer (1914-) was a chemist who served as director of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1949 to
1951. From 1961 to 1968, he served as president of Rice University. From 1964 to 1965, Dr. Pitzer also served on
NASA's Science and Technology Advisory Committee, and in 1965, President LyndonJohnson appointed him a
member of the President's Science Advisory Committee. Biographical information from University Relations
Office of Rice University, Houston, TX.
Herman pollack (1920-1993) was a State Department official for 28 years before retiring in 1974. He served as
the department's director of international scientific and technological affairs for ten years before retiring. See
obituary, Washington Post, April 14, 1993, p. C6, in "Biography, Other Agency Miscellaneous, N-Z," file, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
Richard W. Porter was an electrical engineer who worked on missile programs with the General Electric
Company before working on Earth sciences programs at the National Academy of Sciences. In 1964 he was the
academy's delegate to the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR). See "Assorted Government Officials," bio-
graphical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Thomas Power (1905-1970) was an accomplished pilot who served as a general during World War II. As chief of
staff to General Curtis LeMay, he was one of several top planners of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. After World War It, Power served as the commander of the Air Research and Development Command,
which developed early missiles. He served as commander of the Strategic Air Command from 1957 to 1964,
when he retired. See "Power, Thomas," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Donald L. Putt (1905-1988) was a career U.S. Air Force officer who specialized in the management of aerospace
research and development activities. Trained as an engineer, he entered the Army Air Corps in 1928 and served
in a series of increasingly responsible posts at the Air Materiel Command and Air Force headquarters. From 1948
to 1952, he was director of research and development for the Air Force, and between 1952 and 1954, he was first
vice commander and then commander of the Air Research and Development Command. Thereafter, until his
retirement in 1958, he served as deputy chief of the development staff at Air Force headquarters. See "Putt,
Donald," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
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Donald A. Quarles (1894-1959) was deputy secretary of defense between 1957 and 1959.Just after World War I!,
he had been a vice president first at the Western Electric Company and later at Sandia National Laboratories,
but in 1953, he accepted the position of assistant secretary of defense fo_ research and development. He also was
secretary of the Air Force between 1955 and 1957. See "Quarles, Donald," biographical file, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
j. Danforth (Dan) Quayle (R-IN) served as a senator before becoming George Bush's vice president from 1989
to 1993. As vice president, he chaired the National Space Council and had significant involvement with the devel-
opment of the space station, Space Shuttle replacement options, the Space Exploration Initiative, and NASA
management.
Erik Quistgaard was the director general of the European Space Agency frmn 1980 to 1984, overseeing the
Ariane rocket's development and Spacelab's many contributions to space science. See "Quistgaard, Erik," bio-
graphical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
R
Ronald Reagan ( 1911- ) served as president of the United States from January 1981 until 1989. During his pres-
idency, the maiden flight of the Space Shuttle took place. In 1984 he mandated the construction of an orbital
space station. Reagan declared: "America has always been greatest when we dared to be great. We can reach for
greatness again. We can follow our dreams to distant stars, living and working in space for peaceful, economic,
and scientific gain. Tonight I am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned space station and to do it
within a decade." See Sylvia D. Fries, "2001 to 1994: Political Environment and the Design of NASA's Space
Station System," Technology arul Culture 29 (July 1988): 568-93.
Felix Michael Rogers (1921-) was an ace fighter pilot who became an Air Force general. He was deputy chief
of staff for development plans at the Air Force Systems Command and also served with the United Nations
Military Armistice Commission in Korea. After working as the commander of Air University at Maxwell Air Force
Base, he became commander of the Air Force Logistics Command. See U.S. Air Force biography, November
1977, for General Felix Michael Rogers, History Office, Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Dayton, OH.
William P, Rogers (1913-) was chair of the presidentially mandated blue ribbon commission investigating the
Challenger accident of January 1986. It found that the failure had resulted from a poor engineering decision--
an O-ring used to seal joints in the solid rocket booster that was sosceptible to failure at low temperatures,
introduced innocently enough years earlier. Rogers kept the commission's analysis on that technical level and
documented the problems in exceptional detail. The commission, after some prodding by Nobel Prize-winning
scientist Richard P. Feynman, did a credible job of grappling with the technologically difficult issues associated
with the accident. See Report o] the Presidential C_nnmi._sion on the ,_pac* Shuttle ChaUtnger Accident, VoL I (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,June 6, 1986).
Dean Rusk (1909-1994) was a Rhodes scholar who studied philosophy, politics, economics, and law. After teach-
ing government and international relations and serving in the military in World War II, Rusk joined the State
Department in 1946. He held increasingly responsible positions, culminating in his appointment as secretary of
state in 1961. He served as secretary for eight years, through the entire Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
He was a strong supporter of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and also presided over U.S. foreign policy during the
Bay of Pigs incident and the Cuban missile crisis. See "Rusk, Dean," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
Roald Z. Sagdeyev (1932-) was one of the leaders of Soviet space science flora the 1960s through the 1980s. He
was involved in virtually every lunar and planetary probe of the Soviet Union during this era, including the high-
ly successful Venera and Vega missions. He also advised Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on space and arms con-
trol at the 1986 Geneva, 1987 Washington, and 1988 Moscow summits. In he [ate 1980s, he left the Soviet Union
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and settled in the United States, where he headed the East-West Science and Technology Center at the University
of Maryland at College Park. See Roald Z. Sagdeyev, The Makingofa Soviet S_entist: My Adventures in NuclearFu.*ion
and Space From ,Stalin to Star Wars (New York: John Wiley, 1995).
James R. Schlesinger (1929-) served in numerous governmental positions during the 1960s and 1970s. After a
career at the University of Virginia, 1955-1963, and the RAND Corporation, 1963-1969, he worked for the
Bureau of the Budget/Office of Management and Budget, 1969-1971. He also served as chair of the Atomic
Energy Commission, 1971-1973, and secretary of defense, 1973-1975. In 1977 he was appointed head of the
newly created Department of Energy. See "Schlesinger, James," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
Bernard A. Schrlever (1910-) earned a B.S. in architectural engineering from Texas A&M University in 1931
and was commissioned in the Army Air Corps Reserve in 1933 after completing pilot training. Following broken
service, he received a regular commission in 1938. He earned an M.A. in aeronautical engineering from
Stanford in 1942 and then flew 63 combat missions on B-17s with the 19th Bombardment Group in the Pacific
Theater during World War II. In 1954, he became commander of the Western Development Division (soon
renamed the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division), and from 1959 to 1966, he was commander of its parent orga-
nization, the Air Research and Development Command, renamed Air Force Systems Command in 1961. As such,
he presided over the development of the Atlas, Thor, and Titan missiles, which served not only as military
weapon systems but also as boosters for NASA's space missions. In developing these missiles, Schriever institut-
ed a systems approach, whereby the various components of the Atlas and succeeding missiles underwent
simultaneous design and test as part of an overall "weapons system." Schriever also introduced the notion of con-
currency, which has been given various interpretations but essentially allowed the components of the missiles to
enter production while still in the test phase, thereby speeding up development. He retired as a general in 1966.
See Jacob Neufeld, "Bernard A. Schriever: Challenging the Unknown," Makers of the United States Air Forc*
(Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986), pp. 281-306; Robert L. Perry, "Atlas, Thor .... " in
Eugene M. Emme, ed., A Hist_n'y o]Rocket Technolog_ (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), pp. 144-160;
Robert A. Divine, The Stmtnik Challenge: Ei.wnhower's Respome to the Soviet ._lli_ (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993), p. 25.
Glenn T. Seaborg (1912-) earned a Ph.D. in physics from the University of California at Berkeley in 1937 and
worked on the Manhattan Project in Chicago during World War 11. Afterward, he became associate director of
Berkeley's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, where he and associates isolated several transuranic elements. For
this work, Seaborg received the Nobel Prize in 1951. He also served as chair of the Atomic Energy Commission
between 1961 and 1971; thereafter, he returned to the University of California at Berkeley as a member of the
faculty. See David Petechuk, "Glenn T. Seaborg," in EmilyJ. McMurray, ed., Notable Twentieth-Century Scientists
(New York: Gale Research Inc., 1995), pp. 1803-1806.
Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (1918-), had been involved in aerospace issues since he completed his Sc.D. degree at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M1T) in 1951. He was on the faculty at MIT's Department of
Aeronautical Engineering between 1949 and 1955, when he joined the Radio Corporation of America as man-
ager of the Airborne Systems Laboratory. In 1958 he became the chief engineer of the Missile Electronics and
Control Division. He then joined NASA in 1960 as associate administrator. In December 1965, he became
NASA's deputy administrator, tie left NASA in 1968, and in 1969, he became secretary of the Air Force, serving
until 1973. Scamans was president of the National Academy of Engineering from May 1973 to December 1974,
when he became the first administrator of the new Energy Research and Development Administration. He
returned to MIT in 1977, becoming dean of its School of Engineering in 1978. In 1981 he was elected chair of
the board of trustees of the Aerospace Corporation. See "Seamans, Robert C., Jr.," biographical file, NASA
Historical Reference Collection; Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Aiming at Targets (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4106,
1996).
Frederick Seitz (1911-) was trained in mathematics and physics at Stanford and Princeton Universities and
worked at a variety of corporations, laboratories, and government organizations throughout his career. He
served on the National Defense Research Committee from 1941 to1945, was a consultant to the secretary of war
in 1945, served as director of the atomic energy training program at Oak Ridge from 1946 to 1947, was a science
609
advisort theNorthAmericanTreatyOrganization(NATO)from1959to1960,and was a faculty member of
several universities during his career. In 1962 he was elected president of the National Academy of Sciences, and
he was reelected to a six-year term in 1965. In 1968 he left the academv to become president of Rockefeller
University in New York City and served until his retirement. See "Seitz'. Frederick," biographical file, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
Eduard A. Shevardnadze ( 1927- ) was a reform leader of the Soviet Union along with Mikhail Gorbachev in the
late 1980s. He was heavily involved in the transformation of the nation from a Communist state to one built on
capitalism. Serving in a variety of sen or positions, he negotiated with the United States for international coop-
eration in space, including the building of a space station in tile 1990s. See Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future
ltehmg_ _ to Freedom ( New York: Free Press, 1991 ).
George E Shultz (1920-) served as director of the Office of Management and Budget after 1970, during the
Nixon administration. Before that time, he had been Nixon's secretary of labor. During the Reagan administra-
tion, 1981-1989, Shultz served as secretary of state. See "Shultz, George P.," Current Biography Yearbook 1988,
pp. 525-30.
S. Fred Singer (1924-), a physicist at the University of Maryland, proposed a Minimum Orbital Unmanned
Satellite of the Earth (MOUSE) at the fourth Congress of the International Astronautics Federation in Zurich,
Switzerland, in the summer of 1953. It had been based on two years of previous study conducted under the aus-
pices of the British Interplanetary Society, which had built on the post-war research of the V-2 rocket. The Upper
Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel at White Sands discussed Singer's plan in April 1954, and a month later,
Singer presented his MOUSE proposal at the Hayden Planetarium's fourth Space Travel Symposium. MOUSE
was the first satellite proposal widely discussed in nongovernmental engineering and scientific circles, although
it never was adopted. See "Singer, S. Fred," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Walter D. Sol'tier (1924-), a graduate of Columbia Law School, had worked for the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and the Air Force before joining NASA in 1958 as assistant general counsel. He became deputy general
counsel in 1961 and general counsel in 1963. He left NASA in 1966 to become a partner in a New York law firm.
See "Sohier, Walter," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Thomas E Stafford (1930-), a career military officer who retired as a lieutenant general in the U.S. Air Force,
was chosen by NASA in the second group of astronauts, in 1962. He served as the backup pilot for Gemini I11
and the pilot for Gemini _q. He became command pilot for Gemini IX upon the death of a prime crew mem-
ber and was the backup commander for Apollo 7, the commander of Apollo 10, and the commander of the
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. He resigned from NASA on November 1, 1975, to become commander of the Air
Force Flight Test Center, at Edwards Air Force Base in California. He was promoted to Air Force deputy chief of
staff for research and development in March 1978. He then retired from the Air Force in November 1979 and
became executive vice president of commercial sales and finance for American Farm Line in Oklahoma City. He
also worked as a consultant with Defense Technology in Oklahoma City and thereafter as vice chairman of
Stafford, Burke and Hecker, Inc., in Alexandria, Virginia. He joined the Spectrum Information Technologies
Technical Advisory Board in 1993. See "Stafford, Thomas P.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection,
Homer J. Stewart (1915-) earned his doctorate in aeronautics from the California Institute of Technology
(Caltech) in 1940,joining the faculty there two years before that. In 1939 he participated in pioneering rocket
research with other Caltech engineers and scientists, including Frank Malina, in the foothills of Pasadena. Out
of their efforts, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) arose, and Stewart maintained his interest in rocketry at that
institution. He was involved in developing the first American satellite, Explorer I, in 1958. in that year, on leave
from Caltech, he became director of NASA's Office of Program Planning and Evaluation, returning to Caltech
in 1960 in a variety of positions, including chief of the Advanced Studies Office atjPL from 1963 to 1967 and
professor of aeronautics at Cahech itself. See "Stewart, Homer," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection; Clayton R. Koppes, ]PL and the Amtrrcan Space Program: A Histtrry of ttv ]et Propulsion laboratory (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 23, 32, 44, 47, 7%80, 82.
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VladimirS.Syromiamikov(1934-)waseducatedatBauman Technical University in Moscow and went to work
for RKK Energia of Kalingrad after graduating in 1956. He was the designer of one of the most successful pieces
of space hardware used by the Soviet Union, the docking collar used to link two spacecraft together. It was adapt-
ed for use in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975 and has been successful in more than 200 dockings of
Soviet/Russian missions. It will be used aboard the International Space Station being constructed at the end of
the twentieth century. See "Vladimir S. Syromiatnikov, Russian Docking System Engineer," Space News, February
12-18, 1996, p. 22.
Brian Taylor ( 1940- ) joined the European Space Agency (then the European Space Research Organization) in
1967 as a staffscientist. In 1971, he became the head of the High Energy Astrophysics Division and then, in 1984,
the head of the Astrophysics Division. See "Miscellaneous Foreign," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
Albert Thomas (1898-1966) (D-TX), a lawyer and World War I veteran, had first been elected to the House of
Representatives in 1936 and served successively until 1962. In 1960 he was chair of the independent offices sub-
committee of the House Appropriations Committee and thus exercised considerable congressional power over
NASA's funding. See "Thomas, Albert," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Shelby G. Tilford was a NASA scientist in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the Office of Space Science, for which
he was director of Earth sciences. In 1992 he was appointed acting associate administrator for Mission to Planet
Earth and served until 1994. See _Fifford, Shelby," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Holger N. Toftoy (190%1967) was a career U.S. Army officer and an expert in ordnance who was responsible for
bringing the German "rocket team" under the leadership of Wernher yon Braun to the United States in 1945.
He became commander of the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, in 1954 and worked closely with yon
Braun's team in the development of the Redstone and Jupiter missiles. In the aftermath of the first successful
Sputnik launch in 1957, he persuaded the Department of Defense to allow the launch of the first U.S. Earth-
orbiting satellite aboard the Jupiter missile; the result.was the orbiting of Explorer I on January 31, 1958. He also
held a number of other positions in the Army; he was the head of the Rocket Research Branch of the Chief of
Ordnance in Washington, D.C., and the commander of the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. He retired
from the Army in 1960 with the rank of major general. See "Maj. Gen. Holger Tofloy Dies; Leader in U.S. Rocket
Program," New York T/mrs, April 20, 1967, p. 41.
H.S. Tsien (1909-) was a Chinese national who received a Ph.D. in aeronautics in 1939 from the California
Institute of Technology (Caltech) and worked on the development of rocket technology at his alma mater
through World War Ii. He was on the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1946 to 1949,
when he returned to Caltech. In the 1950s, his loyalty to democratic institutions was questioned, and he was
deported from the United States to the People's Republic of China. There, he was largely responsible for the
development of intercontinental ballistic missile rocket technology, especially the "Long March" launch vehicle.
See Iris Chang, Thre_ul oft_ Silkwm'm (New York: Free Press, 1996).
Nathan E Twining (1897-1982) was a career pilot in the Army and the Air Force, commanding the 13th Air Force
in the Pacific, the 15th Air Force in Europe, and then the 20th Air Force in the Pacific during World War I1. He
became chief of staff of the Air Force in 1953 and chaired the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1957 to 1960. See Donald
.1. Mrozek, "Nathan E Twining: New Dimensions, a New Look," in John L. Frisbee, ed., Makers of the Uni_d Sta_*
Air Fmre (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987), pp. 257-80.
James A. Van Allen (1914- ) was a pathbreaking astrophysicist best known for his work in magnetospheric
physics. Van Allen's January 1958 Explorer ! experiment established the existence of radiation belts--later
named for the scientist--that encircled the Earth, representing the opening of a broad research field. Extending
outward in the direction of the Sun approximately 40,000 miles, as well as stretching out with a trail away from
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the Sun to approximately 370,000 miles, the magnetosphere is the area dominated by Earth's strong magnetic
field. See James A, Van Allen, (h'igins of Magnetosphenc Physic.* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press,
1983); David E. Newton, "James A. Van Allen," in EmilyJ. McMurray, ed. Notable Twentieth-(_entury St_entist_ (New
York: Gale Research Inc., 1995), pp. 2070-72.
Hoyt S. Vandenberg (1899-1954) was a career military aviator who served as chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force
between 1948 and 1953. He was educated the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and entered the Army Air
Corps after graduation, becoming a pilot and air commander. 2M'tet numerous command positions during World
War lI, most significantly as commander of Ninth Air Force, which provided fighter support it! Europe during
the invasion and march to Berlin, he returned to Washington and helped with the formation of the Department
of Defense (DOD) in 1947. As Air Force chief of staff, he was a senior official at DOD during the formative peri-
od of rocketry development and the work on intercontinental ballistic missiles. See Phillip S. Meilinger, H¢_t S.
Vandenberg: The Li[e _[ a General (Bloomington: Indiana Universi_ Press, 1989).
W
Alan T. Waterman (1892-1967) was the first director of the National Science Fotmdation (NSF), from its found-
ing in 1951 until 1963. He received his Ph.D. in physics from Princeton U'niversity in 1916. lie then served with
the Army's Science and Research Division during World War l, on the faculty of Yale University in the interwar
years, with the War Department's Office of Scientific Research and Development during World War II, and then
with the Office of Naval Research between 1946 and 1951. He and NASA leaders contended over control of the
scientific projects to be undertaken by the space agency, with Waterman's NSF being used as an advisory body
in the selection of space experiments. See "Waterman, First NSF Head, Dies at 75," Sc/ence 158 (December 8,
1967): 1293; Norriss S. tletherington, "Winning the Initiative: NASA and the U.S. Space Science Program,"
Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives 7 (Summer 1975): 99-108; John E. Naugle, First Among Fqual,: The
Selectitm t_f NASA Space Science t';x[x,rim_zt_ (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4215, 1991).
James E, Webb (1906-1992) was NASA administrator between 1961 and 1968. Previously, he had been an aide to
a congressman during the New Deal era in Washington, an aide to Washington lawyer Max O. Gardner, and a
business executive with the Sperry Corporation and the Kerr-McGee Oil Company. He also had been director
of the Bureau of'the Budget between 1946 and 1950 and under secretary of state from 1950 to 1952. See W.
Henry Lambright, Powenng Apolh_:Jame.t E. Webb o[NASA (Baltimore:.johns Hopkins University. Press, 1995).
Caspar W. Weinberger ( 1917- ), a longtime Republican government official, was a senior member of the Nixon,
Ford, and Reagan administrations. For Nixon, he was deputy director (1970-1972) and director (1972-1976) of
the Office of Management and Budget. In this capacity, he had a leading role in shaping the direction of NASA's
major effort of the 1970s, the development of the reusable Space Shuttle. For Reagan, he served as secretary of
defense, where he also oversaw the use of the Space Shuttle in the early 1980s for the launching of classified
Department of'Defense payloads into orbit. See "Weinberger, Caspar W(illard)," Current Biography Yeartxmh 1973,
pp. 428-30.
Edward C. Welsh (1909-1990) had a long career in various private and public enterprises. He had served as leg-
islative assistant to Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO), 1953-1961, and was the executive secretary of the National
Aeronautics and Space Council through the 1960s. See "Welsh, Edward," biographical file, NASA Historical
Reference ColJection.
Fred L. Whipple (1906-) received a Ph.D. in astronomy from the University of California at Berkeley. He then
served on the faculty of Harvard University. He was involved in efforts during the early 1950s to expand public
interest in the possibility of spaceflight through a series of symposia at the Hayden Planetarium in New York City
and articles in Co//ier i_magazine, lie was also heavily involved in planning for the International Geophysical Year,
1957-1958. As a pathbreaking astronomer, he pioneered research on comets. See Raymond E. Bullock, "Fred
Lawrence Whipple," in EmilyJ. McMurray, ed., Notable Twentieth-Centurv Sczent_ts (New 'York: Gale Research Inc,
1995), pp. 2167-70.
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JamesEWhisenand(1911-)wastrainedasanaeronauticalengineerattheUniversityofIllinoisandenteredtheArmyAirCorpsin1934.Servingi avarietyofcommandstaffpositions,i cludingi combatinWorld
WarIIandKorea,heservedasspecialassistanttothechairoflheJointChiefs,(;eneralNathanETwining,
beginningi 1957asamajorgeneral.See"Biography,DODMiscellaneous,N-Z,"biographicalf le,NASAHistoricalReferenceCollection.
Gordon P. Whitcomb ( 1940- ) is a British engineer who began his career working on automatic landing systems
for civilian aircraft. In 1974 he joined the European Space Research Organization to work on spacecraft system
design. Currently, he is the head of the European Space Agency's Future Science Projects Office. See
"Miscellaneous Foreign," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Thomas D. White (1901-1965) was a career Air Force officer who served in a succession of increasingly respon-
sible positions until his retirement in 1961. lie was director of legislation for the secretary of the Air Force
between 1948 and 1951, deputy chief of staff for operations from 1951 to 1953; vice chief of staff from 1953 to
1957, and chief of staff from 1957 to 196l. See "White, T.D.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
Clay T. Whitehead was a White House staff assistant during the Nixon administration between 1969 and 1972.
t le was heavily involved in space policy associated with the decision to build the Space Shuttle and post-Apollo
planning for NASA. See Roger D. Launius, "NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-72," 7"he
Hi_t+rrian 57 (Autumn 1994): 17-34; Roger D. Launius, "A Western Mormon in Washington, D.C.: James C.
Fletcher, NASA, and the Final Frontier," Pacific Historical Review 64 (May 1995): 217_11.
Jerome B. Wiesner (1915-1994) was science advisor to President John E Kennedy. He had been a faculty mem-
ber of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and had served on President Eisenhower's Science Advisory
Committee. During the presidential campaign of 1960, Wiesner had advised Kennedy on science and technolo-
gy issues and prepared a transition team report on the subject that questioned the value of human spaceflight.
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